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OBSERVATIONS  
AND  
PROPOSALS  
Concerning the  
NAVY:

WITH

An Enquiry into its ~~present~~ CON-  
DITION; shewing its Ineffi-  
ciency to defend us from a sud-  
den Attack of the *French.*

A View of the Methods taken to man our  
Fleet; the Expences, Difficulties, and De-  
lays attending it; the Causes of our ill Suc-  
cess in doing it; occasioned chiefly by the  
Hardships put on the Sailors:

And a REMEDY proposed, Advantageous to  
the Nation, the Merchants, and the Seamen.

A Comparison between the Situation of the Of-  
ficers of the NAVY, and those of the ARMY;  
and a Method offer'd for redressing the Com-  
plaints of the Sea-Officers, fitting the Justice,  
Honour, and Welfare of the Nation.

ALSO

REGULATIONS proposed for the NAVY, submitted  
to the Consideration of every impartial Man.

L O N D O N :

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TO HIS GRACE the  
DUKE of *B E D F O R D*.

*My LORD,*

**T**HE Subject of the following Sheets will, I flatter myself, be thought by your Grace a sufficient Reason and Excuse for my addressing them to you; for to whom can whatever concerns the Navy, or those who are engaged in it, be so properly applied, as to him whom his Majesty has been pleased to honour with the Direction of them?

**Y**<sup>e</sup>t, my Lord, give me leave to say, however applicable such an Address might be to you on that account, that nevertheless I should not have chose to have presented to you a Work replete with Grievances, had I not the highest reason to believe you disposed and inclined to remove, as far as is in your power, all such as appeared to you under that Character.

FROM this Persuasion it is, that I am encouraged to throw the Cause of the Officers and Seamen under your Grace's Protection: and tho' their Distresses are of long-standing, and have run in a constant Channel for many

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Years; yet the same Zeal and Abilities with which you have always served your Country, will, I doubt not, be able, together with a thorough Knowledge in the Publick, of the Justness of their Complaints, to stop their Stream at the very Source.

BUT because your Grace's Time is too closely engaged in Affairs of the highest Concern to the Nation, to allow a Part sufficient to discover a Method productive of that End; I have therefore, my Lord, tho' very unequal to the Undertaking, attempted it: And tho' I would not offer to your Consideration any thing which I did not think right and proper to be done, yet I fear it would be flattering my Judgment too much, to believe your Grace will view every thing in the light it has appeared to me; nevertheless I am willing to hope, that some Proposals I have made will not be found altogether unworthy your Approbation, especially those which are intended solely for the Service and Advantage of the Nation; as are indeed principally those others, which are promotive of the Interests of the Officers and Seamen; and therefore on a double account, they will recommend themselves to your Grace's Protection.

AND, I doubt not, my Lord, you will have the indulgence to believe, that the ingenuous Declaration I have made of the Officers and Seamen's Sufferings, are designed as proper Motives, to induce those who  
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are yet unacquainted with them, to a ready Concurrence with you, in removing of them. Such a Declaration would have indeed been unnecessary to have been made to the Publick, had your Grace a power of yourself, to redress the Officers and Seamen's Grievances; but I much fear, if any I have mentioned, come within the reach of your Authority to prevent; if they do, I am confident they will not remain long unprevented.

I NOW beg leave to make you my Apology for the Style I have assumed, in delivering my Plan for the Navy; and I hope you will receive this Confession as my Excuse, that I knew not any other manner of expressing myself on a Proposal, of which I make myself the Author. It would, I judged, have been much more presuming to have recommended my Scheme to the Practice of that Board, of which your Grace is President, than to deliver my Opinion freely in what appeared to me right and proper to be done.

IF it should have merit enough to be found worthy the Attention of the Admiralty-Board, it will give me that pleasure, which every Man who loves his Country, and who feels for his Countrymen, receives, on his having discover'd a Means of Advantage to them, and who sees it supported by Men of great Abilities, Honour and Distinction. But in how much higher a degree is this communicative Happiness possessed by your Grace, who enjoys that valuable  
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Prerogative of the Worthy Great Man, as to be both able as well as inclined to do good Offices to those who are deserving of them? A Happiness, as it is most of all others to be desired; therefore, that it may be always continued to your Grace, may the Power ever remain as strong with you, as the Inclination to employ it to worthy Ends: in this Wish every true *Englishman* will join with me, who am with a Warmth ever unaccompanied with Adulation,


*Most respectfully,*

*Your GRACE's Devoted*

*and Obedient Humble Servant.*



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Proposals and Observations in  
*respect to our NAVY, &c.*

**I**T is a general received Opinion by the People of *England*, that the Navy, when in Commission, is the Security and Protection of *Great-Britain*; and so obvious are the Arguments in support of this Opinion, that no one, who has thought, or conversed upon the Subject, can be a Stranger, either to them, or the Proofs they carry: neither can they be ignorant that the Security of our Foreign as well as Home Dominions, together with that of our Trade, depends also on our Naval Strength. In short, every valuable thing we possess, whether it be our Religion, our Liberties, our Lives, or our Fortunes, and lastly, our Honour, the Preservation of each, and all of them, are greatly dependant on the Fleet, so far as they may be endangered by Foreign Force. If then the Care of our Navy be of this extent, it is incumbent upon us to provide for it at all times, if we are able, in such manner as will effectually secure to us the possession of those Blessings against any open, concealed, or sudden Attack of an Enemy. To examine then, if such a Provision be always made, and first, such a one as will at all times protect our Country; let us take a View of our Navy in a profound

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Peace: in doing which, we shall find it neither in an offensive or defensive Condition, there being oftentimes only five Ships of the Line in Commission, two of them at *Chatham*, two at *Portsmouth*, and one at *Plymouth*, each having no higher a Complement than one hundred Men, Officers and Servants included. This being our Naval Strength, it must appear to every one (both from the small number of Ships which compose it, and their Incapacity of putting to Sea with so few Seamen) the Insufficiency of it; in respect of securing us from an Invasion of our Country, should it ever be made at such a time. The only Reasons then that remain for any one's believing it will not be attempted, are grounded either on an Opinion of the Honour and Friendship of our Neighbours, or their Inability to undertake it in time, and before we are in a good condition to receive them. Few there are, I dare venture to say, that flatter themselves into the first Opinion, nor are there many that fasten their Security on the second; and those who do, do it on a Supposition of our receiving timely notice, to prepare and get ready a sufficient number of Ships to defeat any Scheme designed against us. The Question then turns upon this Point, Whether the *French* can be ready to proceed to the Execution of a Design formed against our Country, before we can put ourselves in a Posture to disappoint their Measures? I will not say they certainly can, nor do I believe any one will affirm, that they certainly cannot, as the contrary appears to me most probable, and will I doubt not to others, when they consider, that no Country has the means so much in their power as *France*, of forming or conducting an Expedition with Secrecy, Vi-

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gour, and Dispatch: The Authority of their King being absolute, makes it not necessary to have others concur with him before he takes his Resolution, and when taken, there need not many be made acquainted with it; his Power immediately seconds his Designs, and his Troops march at an Hour's Warning; the many Garrison Towns he has near to us, furnish him with Pretences for sending them thither, and the numbers of large Boats belonging to those Towns are sufficient to embark them: All these things may possibly, may probably be effected, before we have any certain Notice of a Preparation's being making against us. In this Situation our Ships are unrigg'd, without either Stores, or Ammunition on board, and our Seamen so disposed and dispersed, as for us not to be able to depend with any Certainty upon a third Part of the Number that may be immediately necessary on such an Occasion, especially if the Embarkation is followed suddenly by a Squadron from *Brest*; which that it may be, and perhaps too sudden for us to provide against, may be gather'd from the Experience we have oftentimes had of our and their Equipments, of which I shall presently have Occasion to speak more. At present I have said enough to shew, that from the keeping our Navy (on which we ground our chief Hope of Protection) in so weak a state in time of Peace, we thereby stand exposed to great Danger, the Danger of lying open, and almost defenceless against a powerful Nation prepared to attack us. And if our Country, which demands our first Care, is so insecurely guarded, we may readily infer, that our Honour, our Trade and Dominions abroad are no less so. And that we may remain in no doubt of their

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being so, I shall observe, that in the *Mediterranean*, where we have Possessions and a great Trade, there are seldom more than four or five Frigates employed, in the Limits of whose Stations is the most considerable Part of the Naval Force of *France* and *Spain*; the former in the Port of *Toulon*, a Place not above twenty four Hours sail from the Island of *Minorca*, and the latter in *Cadiz*, which is very little distant from *Gibraltar*. Hence it is evident, that the Protection we look for from our Navy in Defence of these Places, must depend upon a timely and sufficient Strength from *England*; a certain Reliance upon which, from the usual manner of conducting the Navy, Experience may inform us is not to be had; since to have it, we must have the Security of such a Number of Seamen as will equip and man out a Fleet superiour to the *French* and *Spaniards*, to act upon them before they shall have possess'd themselves of those Places, or have made such a Progress as shall render any future Efforts of our Fleet ineffectual. I say, Experience has shewn us, how unable we are to promise ourselves such a Dependance; for it has taught us, that the Manning of the Fleets of *France* and *Spain* is as easy and expeditious as ours is slow and difficult; it has taught us, that if instead of a Design of those two Powers upon *Italy*, they had first intended one upon *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*, that both those Places must have fell to them, together with our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*; and I know nothing that has surprized me more than the *French* letting slip so great an Advantage, as they are a Nation that is not withheld from pursuing it, by any Tyes of Faith or Honour: And sure I am, that this one, though slovenly Observance

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servance of their Treaty, has concerned them more than all their Breaches before or since; for what have they not lost by it? Who now could have contended with them in *Italy*, or without their leave have come into the Bay of *Gibraltar*, or Harbour of *Mabon*? How long after the Destruction of Admiral *Haddock's* Fleet would one sufficient to oblige the *French* and *Spaniards* to retire to their Ports, have been in getting together in the *Mediterranean*? and when it was there, where would have been its Use or its Security? Those Places would have been taken, which we now either possess for ourselves, or protect for our Friends, and beyond a possibility of our recovering them; and in those Places are our Magazines of Provisions and Stores, by which we are enabled to support and keep up our Fleet at present. If then we might have been brought into these Circumstances two or three Years after a declared War, when it might be expected we had provided in the best manner for our Security against a known Danger, how much more reasonable is it to suppose, upon the sudden breaking out of one, that we may be so, as well from the Situation of the Enemy, as the quick Progress of their manning their Fleets, in respect to that of our manning ours? which I have already said, is too evidently proved by Experience to be much slower, and our Distress for Seamen is too livelily painted by those very Methods we make use of to supply us with them; Methods, such as are both arbitrary and expensive, difficult and ineffectual, as will, I doubt not, appear by the following Description of them.

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The Methods practis'd for Manning our Fleet are these two, either entring all such, whether Seamen, or able-bodied Landmen, as willingly offer themselves; or, pressing all such of the former as are found either on shore or upon the water. In order to which, when a Man of War is first put in Commission, a Lieutenant belonging to her is appointed, with the additional Pay of half a Crown a Day, to take a Rendezvous in such place as the Captain shall judge most likely for him to succeed in raising Men for the Ship. As the Service he is employed in, is as well to press as to enter Seamen, he has therefore commonly with him ten or twelve, or sometimes twenty Men, to form a Body sufficient to execute that Duty; the daily Allowance of each Man is a Shilling, in addition to his proper Pay, all other Expences, as that of Boat-hire, Intelligence-Money, &c. are also defrayed by the Government. Add to it, that the Voluntiers raised by this Officer are generally rewarded with a Gratuity; and so necessary did the Parliament think it some time ago to give encouragement to the Seamen to enter into his Majesty's Service, that five pounds were ordered to each one that did so enter in a limited time; but so little did this Liberality weigh with them, that I may venture to affirm, not a Hundred were raised by it. The Inefficacy of this expedient made it more than ever necessary to pursue oppressive Methods of forcing Men into the Service; to effect which, every Man of War almost from the Time of her being first put into Commission, 'till that of her being ready for the Sea, had a Lieutenant employed in a Tender, to cruize in the Channel upon our home-ward bound Trade, and very commonly the large Ships had two. The Number of Tenders thus employ'd I am not able

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to determine; but certain I am, that the Sum expended for the Hire of those Vessels must be a very considerable Article in the National Expence; as can't but be evident to every one that considers the Nature of the Expence: Ships that are almost in constant want of Supplies or Repairs, cannot be let out for a small matter; especially when we add to that, the hazard of the Vessel which the Merchant runs, and the Cost he is at in maintaining a Master, Mate, and Crew, consisting perhaps of ten or twelve Men.

It follows then, that the raising Seamen for the Navy is a weighty Expence, as also that it is accompany'd with Difficulties which are the Children of Misconduct, and opposed by Delays the Parents of Disappointments; and of such Disappointments as may be, and perhaps have been of much greater Importance to the Nation, than the before mention'd Grievance of Expence. Which Grievance also has been in a late Instance greatly increased by delays, in their making a stronger Force, and consequently a greater Expence, necessary to the Expedition of *Carthagena*, than it would have been if sooner made. Thus an Undertaking in time may be carried not only with half the Strength, but likewise half the Expence that it may afterwards miscarry with; and as by the former, it may put an advantageous end to a War, so by the latter, it may be prolonged to our Ruin and a dishonourable Peace. Many then are the bad Effects of our being unable to raise Seamen timely for the Fleet, before our Enemies have made a Provision for their Security, and rendered themselves in so good a Condition, as not to fear the utmost Efforts of our Strength afterwards. From this Incapacity of ours it is, that they are encouraged to insult and affront

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us; which they would be terrified from, were our Navy in a more active State. And as its not being so, is chiefly caused by our Inability to raise Seamen timely for the Fleet, it will therefore be necessary to inquire whether this Incapacity arises from a want of Seamen in the Nation, our ill Success in raising them, or from both these Causes. To judge when, how far, and if the want of Seamen in the Nation has occasioned our not having been able to man our Fleets, we shou'd endeavour to fix these three things, the Number of Seamen sufficient for our Fleet, the Number in the Nation to supply those Wants, and the Times of both. We will therefore, in considering this matter, more particularly have a view to our Equipments since, and a little while before the Declaration of the *Spanish* War.

In regard to the first thing wanting to be known, I suppose the same Number of Seamen to have been necessary at, and from the beginning of our fitting out our Fleets, as at this time, or, at least 'till we had a *French* War; the Subject having been 'till then, as well before as since the Declaration of the *Spanish* War, at all times the same: for when we began to equip our Fleets, it must have either been with a View to, and in the Defence and Protection of our Kingdoms and Trade, to have brought the *Spaniards* to our Terms, or to have been able upon their refusal to act vigorously upon them. If these were not the Views, we begun to fit out a Fleet before there was any occasion; and if they were, we could not too soon have had a great Fleet in readiness to serve those Purposes best: For in proportion as we were superiour in Strength, Humility and Submission might be expected; or not producing them, the Capacity of securing ourselves, and ta-  
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king Advantage of the Enemy would have been greater. Thus then, supposing us to have had forty or fifty thousand Seamen in pay, at the Declaration of the *French* War, and then wanting more, it follows from what has been said, that forty or fifty thousand were necessary at the beginning.

We are now to endeavour to find out the Number of Seamen, that were in the Nation, at the different Times of our fitting out our Fleet, (out of which must be taken, all such as were protected for the Support of a necessary Trade;) but precisely to do it is impossible, as it depends upon the fluctuating Situation of our Trade: for as that is at home or abroad, so in proportion the Number of Seamen is less or greater; nevertheless it may easily be discover'd, at what part of the Time of our fitting out, the fewest Seamen were in the Nation. Now the Time when we were least able to supply them of any other, at the fitting out our Fleet, must have been at the first, as the Trade must then have been less at home than afterwards, since the Methods taken were stopping any Part we pleased from going out; consequently the Part coming in must have increased daily the Number of Seamen in the Nation. Now what that Number was, upon the first fitting out our Fleet, is, I say, difficult to determine, as well also the proportionable Increase of it afterwards to the Time; but that, as well for some Time afterwards as at first, the Number was too inconsiderable to answer in any degree the Demands of the Fleet, will appear if we consider first, that it is the Interest of the Merchants to keep their Ships constantly employed; therefore we cannot with Reason ever suppose any great Part of our Trade to be at  
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home at one time. Secondly, that as a great Number of Ships in Peaceable Times trade many Years from one Foreign Port to another, without coming home; therefore it cannot be expected they should return, 'till some Time after the Declaration of War. And Thirdly, that if after a five or six Years War, when all our Trade has been called home, we are yet unable to mann our Fleet, notwithstanding we have constantly employed all forcible Means, to take all Seamen coming home, and at home; and notwithstanding also, that the Merchants to furnish again their Ships, which have been stript, have taken Boys and Landmen into their Service; who have on their return from the Voyage been also pressed, and this again and again repeated; and notwithstanding, besides that to mann our Men of War, we have receiv'd into them great Numbers of Landmen, with the Addition also of Marines: I say, if we consider after so long a time, our Trade all in, and every Method tried, our Fleet is yet in want of Seamen; we may conclude, that at the Time of our first fitting out our Fleet, and for some Time afterwards, when our Trade must have been much more out, that the Number of Seamen in the Nation must have been very few, in respect to the Number wanted to furnish the Fleet; consequently our not being able to mann it at the Beginning, or for some time after, might be owing to the Want of Seamen in the Nation. But tho' that Want would of itself, so long as it existed, have prevented the manning our Fleet; yet it does not follow, that to the Want of Seamen in the Nation was wholly owing to our not being able to mann from the beginning, more Ships than we did; unless we suppose all of the Seamen (except such as were necessary

necessary to be protected) to have been secured in the Service of the Fleet. But with how little Reason we can suppose so, the Industry of the Seamen to escape our Search may make appear, or at least convince us, that where almost all endeavour to avoid being taken, that some if not many must succeed in it; and that Seamen are industrious to avoid being taken, is implied by the Methods of Force used to take them. Upon the whole, it may be concluded, that at the first fitting out of our Fleet, and for some time after, there was a Want of Seamen in the Nation to furnish it; and that for Want of an Inclination in them to enter into his Majesty's Service, the Want of the Fleet was made greater; which by the same Rule may have made us unable to mann it, at such a Distance of Time, as might have brought more Seamen into the Nation, than were sufficient for that Purpose.

Hence then, two things appear necessary to remedy these Evils; the First, to keep a greater Number of Seamen in constant Pay; and the Second, to give Encouragement to Seamen in general.

By the First, we shall secure as many more Seamen, as we exceed the Number usually kept up. And by giving Encouragement, we may secure a much greater Number of Seamen out of those in the Nation, than we are now able to do by Pressing; as by it we shall take off that Disinclination in Seamen, which is at present our great Bane in raising them. That we may know then, the Nature of the Encouragements wanting to be given, I shall point out those Discouragements Seamen have at present, from entering into his Majesty's Service.

The First of which, is the uncertain Time  
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of continuing in it; as it often happens, that Ships are commission'd and paid off in three or four Months; by which, the Seamen lose the Place they had before in a Merchant-Man, the Ship to which they belonged being gone abroad, or if at home, their Places supplied by others; so that by this Means they are left without any Provision for their Subsistence; and this Risque they run is the greater, if the Ship continues much longer in Commission before she is paid off.

And here then, I say, do we not discourage Men from the Service, instead of engaging them to it by their Interest? Do we not shew them, that we consider them as our Properties, to use them when we please and as we please, since when the Purposes for which we wanted them are served, we turn them away with Shame to ourselves, and Famine to them. Think you then, that Seamen can chearfully or voluntarily serve, or that after having receiv'd this Treatment they will again solicit for it? No; Wonder not then that Seamen are scarce in being found for the Navy, when the Merchants are provided in plenty: Their Dependance is like that of other Men, who live by their Trade, with this difference, that the latter sort indeed will always find Employment somewhere. Whereas, the Seaman, when out of his Calling, has not the Means of subsisting: from a Child or Boy he has gone to Sea; if therefore it happens, that there is no room for him in the Business he was brought up in, what must become of him? Shall we without Compassion see him like a common Beggar asking Alms, or shall we without Horror see him destined to the Fate of a Felon, for having perhaps supplied those Wants, which strong Necessity drove him to, and which his Country ought to have prevented? And lastly,  
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shall we see him flying his native Coutry, in search of a Support and Protection in another, without fearing the Loss our Ingratitude has brought upon us? Yet one of these Circumstances may, must be the Case, whenever the Fleet is paid off; for it is impossible to suppose, that our Trade, which tho' at present very much depress'd, can, however it may recover itself, be sufficient to admit the Addition of more than two Thirds of the Number of Seamen that at present compose our Navy. What then, once more I say, is to become of the remaining part of them? Here lies the Dispute, Whether or no a Body of People returning from doing their Country the most material Services, shall be left without the Means of Subsistence? The Reply of every honest, humane Man would surely be, No. Tho' I am afraid, from the great Corruption of the World, and the few Friends the Seamen have in it, that the Generality would answer in the Affirmative, and think themselves no longer obliged to support them, than while it appeared they continued to be serviceable. To these Men therefore I am glad to be able to address myself in another manner; and to shew them that the Care of our Seamen falls in with the Care of ourselves; and that to provide for them best, is to provide most for our own Advantage and Security.

The Discouragement which Seamen coming in homeward bound Ships have, from entering into his Majesty's Service, is first, that the Wages they have due for the Merchant-Ship they belong to, is generally paid them by a Note; which is commonly so drawn, that they are seldom the better for it, unless they can have leave to go and demand the Payment of it themselves,

elves, but that is not often allowed them; and perhaps the Man of War they are taken on board of, may be bound immediately out of *England*; in which case the Notes are all they have in exchange, both for the Wages they would have had, had they arrived in the Ship at her Port of Livery, and the Happiness and Comfort of seeing their Families. These Reasons then, and what I mentioned on the first Head, are what in part weigh with Seamen, and induce them to hide in a Hole, instead of offering themselves as Voluntiers.

The next Discouragement Seamen have from entering into his Majesty's Pay, is the great Hazard they run of the Loss of their Health and Lives, arising from a want of a proper Regulation of our Hospitals, and of a better Provision made for them on board a Ship.

Under these Articles, but particularly the first, I must say, they have had loud Reasons to complain; and so far am I persuaded into this Opinion, that instead of expecting those unhappy Men, who have experienced the Miseries of our Sea-Hospitals, to engage as Voluntiers in the King's Service, I should rather expect they would suffer all sort of Hardships to avoid it. And who is there, that has seen their calamitous Situation, that will not join with me in this Opinion? Who could, without being seized with Horror and the strongest Compassion, view several Hundred, the most useful Subjects of his Majesty, lying upon a sick Bed, or perhaps, upon Boards without one, in a Place exposed to Winds and Rain, without a sufficient Attendance, or hardly any, of Physician, Surgeon, or Nurse, without Clothes or Linnen to shift themselves,

themselves, and without proper Diet to recover them? As this is true, wonder not at what I am about to tell you; that Seamen in Fluxes, in Scurveys, and Fevers, instead of desiring to be sent to the Hospitals for their Recovery, have made it their earnest Sollicitation to their Captain to remain on board; and so much were they in the right, that many more that staid, got well, than what went ashore. Judge then, if Seamen prefer a Ship, in which there is a constant Noise and Disturbance, sometimes almost stifled with Heat, and at other times exposed to Cold, as the Ports are open or shut, without any thing but Rice and Salt Provision for their Nourishment; if, I say they prefer this Situation to an Hospital, what must be the Condition of that Hospital, and what the Causes occasioning such Hardships as I have mention'd? (I speak not now of their Lodgement.) They must either then proceed, for want of a sufficient Provision made by the Government with the Contractor and Surgeon, for want of their being able to furnish in the Place they are in, what their Contract obliges them to; or being able, for want of a just discharge and execution of their Duty. I would not be the Man, if there is such a one, under the last Circumstance, for ten times the Gain arising to him from such Means; for I think there is not in the World so villainous a Fraud, as that which heightens the Miseries and produces the Wants of sick Men; and he who makes it, acts the Part of a Destroyer instead of a Preserver.

I cannot conclude this Article, without doing Justice to a certain Gentleman, lately in Command, who directed, as far as was in his power to do, that

that the Sick in the Hospitals should have a proper and good Care taken of them, giving them Food fitting for them at all Times; and without confining every Man in an Hospital to the same Diet; which Rule may be very well for Men in Health, but not for others labouring under different Indispositions. At the same time that I take notice of the Caution he took in regard to Hospitals, I must observe, that the Ships of the Fleet had so good a Provision made for the Sick, that I believe there never was a Squadron preserved its Numbers for so long a time in any Part of the World, as that he had the Command of. This Gentleman, though he did all he could, and I am confident his Successor will also; yet I am satisfied, both one and the other find, that there is a great deal more to be done, which is out of their power; as there certainly is, and which ought to be directed, and under such a Regulation as may thoroughly remedy the Evils so much complained of.

The Discouragement I shall now speak of, is the turning Men from one Ship to another, separating them from their Comrades and Acquaintance, and from the Captain and Officers they might have chose to sail with; and this not once, but perhaps three or four times in a Year: By which means, Men having Pay for a number of Ships, find extreme great Difficulty to come at it. And this Hardship is the greater, when it is done to those belonging to a Ship a considerable time, and bound home, for they not only lose the pleasing Prospect of seeing their Families, but also with it the Payment of their Wages, in lieu of which they have a Ticket given them, which, if they sell, they are Losers  
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eight or ten Shillings in the Pound, and seldom less. And here, I am sorry to be able to give a late Instance of the melancholly Effect this Practice produced upon a poor Wretch, that was turn'd over from one of the Ships just come from the *Mediterranean*, on board another now abroad, who a few Hours after he underwent this Remove, placed himself in the Ship's Chains, a part which he judged fittest for his Purpose; and after having been there for some time, saying his Prayers, he jumped over-board with such determined Resolution on his Fate, that though there was a Boat along-side, he nevertheless was drowned.

The last Discouragement remaining to be mentioned (which partakes of part of the foregoing) is the keeping Ships so long abroad, by which the Seamen are deprived of the Happiness of seeing their Families sometimes for five or six Years, all which time they have been unable to give them any Support, not having received any part of their Pay from the Government; and thus distress'd, they have not had the means of providing themselves with either Clothes for their Health and Comfort, or proper Refreshments to correct those Humours and ill Habits of Body, which a long Custom of eating salt Diet must have contracted. Nor does the going home after so long an Absence much mend the Matter as to this last Grievance, or the one I mentioned, that of being so long from their Families; since they are not allowed a time ashore that is either sufficient to renew their Strength, restore their wonted Health and Spirits, or to enjoy much Pleasure in the Company of their Friends. These then are the most material Hardships to which Seamen stand exposed

in his Majesty's Service, and Hardships so material, as fully justify them from entering into it; and which will, so long as any of them subsist, make the manning of our Fleet, a Work of the greatest Difficulty.

But if we are disposed to remove them, we may also remove with them that Difficulty; and then instead of its being any longer necessary to practise those Cruelties which are now done upon Men, whose Value and Esteem to their Country, make them obnoxious to the worst of Treatment, Treatment suitable to none but Malefactors, and hardly justifiable under any Circumstance but immediate Danger; instead of this Necessity, we should find Seamen soliciting a Place in the Navy, with as much Industry as they now avoid it.

Here then I will enter upon pointing out a Method, which will at the same time it brings Advantage to the Seamen, produce the greatest Conveniences to the Nation; and Conveniences so great, that, abstracted from the first Consideration, are of themselves worth the purchasing at a much greater Expence, than it will be necessary to do it at; they being no less than the securing our Country from the Danger to which, it has been shewn, it oftentimes stands exposed, providing us with the Means of such a Strength at our Command, as will not fail, either to awe any Power from attempting any thing upon our Trade or Dominions abroad, or daring to do it, to enable us to resent immediately the Injuries or Indignities done us.

In order then to put us in this good Condition, we must, as I have before said, keep a Number of Seamen in constant Pay, and give such Encouragement to them, and others, as will

will engage and secure them to our Service. In regard to the Number to be in constant Pay, I would fix the following Proportion, *viz.*

A hundred on board a First Rate, ninety on board a Second, and down to a Sixth Rate inclusive, there should be an equal Number of Men as Guns; Fireships and Sloops having fifteen each. As the whole Amount would be near eleven Thousand, and as the Ships necessary to be employed abroad, would increase it to about four or five more, therefore a constant Provision would be made for a third Part of the Number of Seamen that would ever be wanting to man our Fleet; and a constant Security would be had of a sufficient Number to man and fit out in the space of a Week, a Fleet consisting of twenty-five Sail of the Line; which Force timely employed, and properly disposed of, may effect of itself a great deal. But because a larger may soon be wanted, I shall therefore propose a Method to secure it, which in like manner, as the foregoing one, will at the same time it makes a Provision for our Wants, provide for the Seamen too; this is to be done by registering, under the following Regulations, such a Number of Seamen, as will, together with those employed in the Navy (who should be included in the Register) compleatly man all the Ships we can ever at any time fit out. I have said, that one Third of this Number is supposed to be constantly provided for in the Service of the Navy; in order then, that the two remaining Thirds may also be provided for, when their Services are not wanted for the Navy; I propose, that after they are inrolled at the Navy-Office, that each Seaman should have a printed Ticket sealed and numbered, with the

Place of his Abode, his Name, Age and Description wrote upon it. This, upon his producing at an Office which should be establish'd in every Sea-Port Town, where a Copy of the Naval Register should be kept, should entitle him to be received on board any Merchant-Ship entering Men, provided the Ship had not already half her Complement made up of Naval Seamen; that being the Part every Merchant-Ship should be obliged to take, when the Navy was not in want of those Seamen. To this Office therefore, all Merchants, or Masters of Ships should give immediate Notice on the fitting out their Ships, that they might be furnished from thence with their proper Number of Naval Seamen; nor should any Merchant have a Power himself to enter any one, till the said Naval Seaman had made his Appearance at the aforesaid Office, and there have had taken down upon a List, the Ship's, Master's, Owner's Name and Voyage, and the same given him upon a Ticket, which should be understood as a Licence for him to go in the Merchant's Service; but to extend to no longer a time, than till the Ship returned from her Voyage; at which time he should make his Appearance at the aforesaid Office, where his Return should be taken notice of, and his former Licence delivered. And if the Government was in no want of his Service, he might as before take a new one up. And that no Seaman might omit paying this necessary Attendance, which would chiefly lead to the Discovery of the Number of Naval Seamen always in the Nation; the half of his Wages due to him for his Voyage, should be paid him at this Office, according to the Agreement enter'd into, between him and the Party concern'd; a Copy of  
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of which he should leave in that Office, signed by both Parties before he left *England*. And the Owner should deposit in this Office, upon the Arrival of the Ship, a Sum sufficient to answer the Demand; or failing to do it, the chief Person employed in this Office, should be empower'd to authorize the Seaman to an immediate Claim of double the Money, upon the said Merchant or Owner of the Ship. Farther, in order to prevent Merchants, or Masters of Ships, either thro' Ignorance or Design, from entertaining Naval Seamen at a Time, when no Licences were given, as well also to take care at other times, that they not fail with less than half their Complement, when they can be got consisting of them; the Officer who clears the Ship, should examine the Tickets of all the Men on board: from which it follows, that not only Naval Seamen should have Tickets, but likewise all other Seamen who are not register'd. The first Sort, I have already describ'd; those of the latter, should be given by the Officers of the Parish in which the Seamen live, express'd upon them in the same manner as the former; their Places of Abode, Names, Ages, and Descriptions of their Persons, and likewise number'd, and sealed, with the Seals of two Parish Officers, who should also sign their Names to the Tickets. And to guard against Forgeries, as well as for other Reasons, these Tickets should be stamp'd at the Navy-Office, and the Number each Ticket stands upon the Parish Register taken down on a List. To prevent likewise Seamen from having Tickets out of two Parishes at one time, great care should be taken by the Parish Officers, not to give any Strangers newly come to reside, any Ticket 'till they were well inform'd about them; and if they  
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they had not already receiv'd a Ticket from any other Parish. But if the Seaman should produce a Ticket, in that Case, the Parish Officers should receive that, and give him another; noting in it the Reason, that when it appeared at the Navy-Office, his former Parish and Number might be alter'd on their Lists. For the same Reason, that care should be taken to prevent Seamen having Tickets from two Parishes at one time, it is also necessary to caution the Parish Officers in giving the same Seamen Tickets at two several times, on pretence of their having lost the former one; that whenever it is done, the same Number, Date, &c. be put on the latter one as the former. These Precautions are necessary on the following account; as Seamen when they enter themselves upon the Naval Register, are to deliver in at the Navy Office their Parish Ticket, and in exchange receive a Naval one; if therefore they were afterwards, to get a Ticket from another Parish, or from their own with a different Number and Date than their former, they might in this Case deceive those at the Navy-Office who are employed in stamping the Tickets. And afterwards, when they found it convenient, impose also on the Officer appointed to examine them upon clearing the Ship; by passing for a Merchantman's Man, at the time when no Naval Seamen were permitted to leave the Kingdom.

But if the Cautions I have mention'd above were rightly attended to, that no Seaman coming a Stranger to a Place, had a Ticket given him before he had given a good Account of himself, as likewise that no one had a second Ticket with a different Number than the first; Impositions could seldom, if ever, take place, especially in the latter way. For as no Ticket would be esteem'd

steem'd valid till it had received the Naval Stamp, therefore any one bringing a Ticket in order to it, the Parish, Number, Date, &c. would immediately discover if the Person described by it was in the Service of the Navy, by turning to the Lists, in which it would be express'd against his Name and Number. But effectually to prevent any Attempts of this latter kind, it would be proper when a Seaman enter'd himself in the Naval Register, that the Parish to which he belong'd was made acquainted with it, that it might be inserted also in the Parish Register. Many good Purposes would be served by this; as when a Naval Seaman died, the Parish might oftentimes be able to send Information of it, when it otherwise would not be known at the Navy-Office; as also the Parish Officer might at a time when the Naval Seamen were wanted for the Government, very much facilitate the getting them in a proper Time. And a third Use such a Correspondence might be of; as when a Naval Seaman lost his Ticket, the Testimony of the Parish Register would be sufficient to recover him a new one. There remains now but one Guard more in order to prevent Masters of Ships, from carrying Naval Seamen out of the Kingdom, at times when they are wanted for the Service of the Government; as well also to oblige them, as others to carry their full Proportion. This must be done, first by regulating the Complement of Men, by the Tonnage of the Vessel and the Voyage; and secondly, by inflicting a severe Penalty upon the Masters of Vessels, sufficient to intimidate them from secreting any Men, and of such a Sort, as should at the same time be given as a Reward for the Encouragement, either of those who were hid, or any others on board to give Information.

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I am now to observe, that the Method I have propos'd of keeping a certain Number of Seamen in Pay, and registering a Number of others, must be as advantageous to the Merchant, as the Government; as by the first Proposal a less Demand would be made upon the Trade in general, than has been usual heretofore; and by the second, Merchants Ships would never be left without half their Complement of Seamen, which with the Addition of Landmen, would always be sufficient to sail them: Whereas now all the Seamen belonging to their Ships are, if they are met with, taken away; or, if any escape, they hide themselves out of fear of being press'd, by which means they are neither of use for a considerable time, either to the Government or the Merchant.

By the above Methods then, not only a greater Number of Seamen will be in the Nation, but we may likewise reasonably expect the Use of them in a greater proportion than we now have. I might add still another Consideration or two of advantage to the Merchants; the first would be, that they would sail their Ships much cheaper than now; and the second, their Trade might not only be continued by means of having such a Part of their Complement of Seamen, but it might also be preserv'd by our Fleet's being so easily and speedily put in a Condition to protect them; which it might be, if all the above Regulations were made with Care and Exactness, by only issuing out a Proclamation requiring all Naval Seamen to repair forthwith to the Ports express'd. This Method would, I doubt not, be sufficient, without any forcible Means us'd to bring them in; but that it might be effectual, a severe Punishment should be inflict'd on all such

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such who absented themselves a longer Time than was allow'd them to appear in; nor should these Men enter into Pay, till the Time of their Appearance, whilst those who either paid their immediate Attendance, or set out directly in order to make their earliest Appearance, should from the Time of the issuing out the Proclamation, be consider'd as in the Government's Pay; and an Encouragement likewise given to those who shew'd the greatest Alertness in coming, besides Conduct-Money, which should be general and proportioned to the Distance in the manner it now is, but at a higher rate; the present Allowance being much too small. Having, in the Provision I have made for Naval Seamen in the Merchants Service, made no mention of such as may have been Petty Officers in his Majesty's Ships, I now give it as my opinion, that they should be entitl'd to the Station of Mate; and every other one below that Character in any Merchant Ship, excepting *South-Sea-Men*, *India-Men*, and the *Turkey Company's* Ships; in which Ships also Mates of Men of War should not be refus'd as Third Mates, and downwards. And that Merchants might be inclin'd to entertain in their Ships such Petty Officers of the Navy as appear'd by their Certificates to be capable of their Duty; these Petty Officers should find it their Interest to recommend themselves to them, as a Recommendation from them should contribute to their Advancement in the Navy; and on the contrary, a well-grounded Complaint from the Merchant should deprive them for the future of having again the Post they had before in the Navy.

As I have endeavour'd to secure to us the Services of the Naval Seamen at home by all means possible,

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possible, let us now endeavour to secure the Return of those who go out in Merchant-Ships. To do this, we must prevent, as much as we are able, the Masters from ill treating their Men under the Articles of Provisions, Discharges, Wages and Supplies. In regard to the first, I would have a certain Allowance of Provision and Water made them, regulated in the manner as is now done in the Navy. And, that they might not be turn'd out of the Ship they belong to, when abroad, without justifiable Reasons, no Master of a Merchant-Ship should have it in his power to discharge any Naval Seaman, without the consent of the Consul of the Place where the Ship was, or a Captain of a Man of War's receiving him into his Ship. At his Return home therefore he should be obliged, under a Penalty to the contrary, to produce a Certificate from one or the other, shewing that it was done by their Approbation, and for good Reasons: and that no Seaman might leave his Master without the Consent of the Consul, unless when he goes into the King's Service; he should, in case of doing so, forfeit all his Wages due to him from the Ship, unless this should happen in a Place where no Consul was; and then a proper Evidence proving the Master's Usage of him to be barbarous and cruel, should give him not only a Title to his Wages, but also to Damages upon the Master. In relation to the settling of Wages, it should always be done, as I have before said, by a written Agreement signed by both Parties, and witnessed; and never at a lower Rate, than other Seamen in the said Ship. All Supplies made by the Master to his Seamen should be signed by the latter, or otherwise the Account should not be allowed; nor should those Supplies ever exceed more than half

half his Wages. Thus the Seaman returning home, or dying in the Voyage, would always have remaining something for his Family; and that his Family might come to the knowledge of his Death, the Master on his Return should be obliged to appear with the Men he brought home with him, at the Office where the Names of his People were lodged, there to give in his Certificate from the Consul, and Evidence of the Man's Death, together with the State of his Account, that Notice might be sent to the Parish, in order for the Heirs or Relations of the Deceased to appear for his Wages, which should be deposited in the Office by the Person who made the Contract. But, in case no demand was made for the Deceased's Wages by his Relations, or Executors in such a limited Time, it should be given to the Poor of the Parish to which the Seaman belonged.

Seamen entering on board any of his Majesty's Ships, either at home or abroad, from Merchants Ships, should be paid their Wages immediately on their doing so, that they might not be defrauded, as they now very frequently are, by their Masters, who oftentimes refuse giving a Note for it; or if they give one, 'tis of such a sort as is little better than no one at all; and at best, the Seaman, or his Family, have these Chances against them, either the Ships not arriving in *England*, the Master's dying before the Seaman can recover his Note, or the Seaman dying, by which his Family is deprived of that Support they otherwise might, and in justice should have had. And this is not the case only at present, of Seamen that enter, but those also that are pressed against their Will on board Men of War. Seamen likewise that leave their Ships abroad by the

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Consent of the Consul, should for the same Reason have their Wages paid them, and this always done at the Exchange of the Place: which Wages should be deposited in the hands of the Consul, till he had got the said Seaman into another *English* Ship; and this he should always send an account of to the proper Officer. In short, to oblige the Masters of Merchant Ships to do justice to their Men, a Power should be put into the hands of the Consuls, extensive enough to remedy any Complaints made to them by the Seamen; and sufficient on the other hand to keep the Seamen to their Duty Captains of Men of War also, as far as they have concern with Masters of Ships, either respecting the Wages of Seamen discharged into their Ships from Merchant-Men, or the Discipline which is necessary to be observed in Convoys, ought to have a power over them, for want of which at present many Masters are very ungovernable, not to say worse of them: And whatever Complaints they may have made to their Merchants, on account of their Ship being lost by the Neglect of the Captains of Men of War, I will venture to affirm, that where one has been lost or taken by means of this Neglect, an hundred has miscarried by their own Mismanagement or Design, and for want of paying a proper Regard to the Orders of the Captain of a Man of War; the Contempt they shew to which, looks as if they were oftentimes more industrious to lose Company than to keep it with the Ship, under whose Protection they have put themselves. I have great honour and regard for the Merchants; and therefore, should be sorry to see them make Captains of Men of War their Enemies, with whom it is much their Interest to be Friends; and to make them

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them so on no other Foundation, than the scandalous Reports of Men, whom their Interest prompts to tell Falshoods, that they may avoid the Punishment and Reproach which Truth would bring upon them. If a Captain of a Man of War has neglected his Duty, let him be complained of, and on proof of that Complaint be punished; but do not let him be reviled at, and the whole Corps be scandalized upon the single Authority of a Man in a low Character. But, on this Subject, I shall have more to say in another Place.

Having thus settled the Footing of Naval Seamen in Merchant Ships, I shall now fix it in Men of War, in such a manner as will obviate the remaining Objections already spoken of, as made by Seamen, to enter into his Majesty's Service.

It has been observed, that the first Objection Seamen have to engage in his Majesty's Service, is their uncertain Continuance in it. To remove which, I have proposed, that a Number shall always be retained in Pay, and that the Trade shall make a Provision for the rest; that is, that no Merchant Ship shall sail with less than half her Complement of Naval Seamen, which Regulation will, I doubt not, be quite sufficient to provide for all those who are not employed in the Government's Service; or if any Part should remain, their giving them a Freedom to work in Rivers, would answer the same End.

The next Objection made by Seamen, for coming from the Merchant Service into his Majesty's, is because their Wages are paid them by a Note, which they seldom get any thing for; not having the Liberty of going to solicit the Payment of it, and at the same time of their seeing their Families:

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milies: which forms another Objection. I have provided against the first, and in regard to the second, there should not be a single Man in the Service of his Majesty under the above Restraint; nor any one ever refused leave to go ashore, when Duty did not require his attendance on board. Nor need there any thing to be apprehended from so proper an Indulgence; on the contrary, I would put every thing to the hazard, upon their being fewer Deserters than at present. And this I am sure of, that many Seamen would be saved to the Government in another way; why then there would be fewer Deserters, is I think easy to account for; since the Motives Seamen have at present for deserting, are to avoid the Discouragements I have mention'd, and which I would have removed: Add to which, that by the Regulation I have propos'd, they could not be entertained in the Merchant's Service, as when they desert they now are. Why the Government would save many Seamen in another way, by this Practice of permitting them to go ashore, is, that now many are lost by Death, for want of Exercise, and the Smell and Refreshments of the Earth: And not only of this Number, are those who are prest on board Men of War, and there confined with Scurvys, which afterwards throw them into Fevers and Fluxes, and carry them off; but many others of the same Ship's Company are brought by them to the same Fate; and very frequently it happens, that a healthy Ship's Company is turned into a very sickly one by this means, more particularly in Ships employed in the Service of pressing. The third Objection made by Seamen is the melancholy Condition of our Hospitals, and the bad Provision made on board for the Sick. To remedy which, in the first place, all Hospitals

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pitals should be put upon a Royal Foundation; and next, on board every Ship should be a Providore for the Sick, who should be furnish'd with a proper Number of Beds, Shirts and Sheets for the Sick; and who should go on shore, with any Number of them sent there, to provide them with such Necessaries and Refreshments, as the Surgeon of the Hospital, together with the Surgeon's Mate of the Ship, (who should attend them) should direct. And in a Place where no Hospital was, the Providore should procure proper Refreshments for the Sick on board; and carry to Sea for their Use, such Provisions as could be conveniently taken on board.

This Method, as I believe it will be allowed more salutary than the one now practis'd, so I am sure it would be of less expence to the Government. For as now the Contractors are Gainers at least the Half of what is paid them to furnish the Contract; so it is not to be supposed, but that that Gain would more than supply any extraordinary Charge, arising from the propos'd Method.

The Monies laid out on these Services, should be drawn for upon the Government; the Captain, Surgeon, and Consul attesting to the Bills. The Grievance next to be spoke of, is the turning Seamen from one Ship to another; which, if my Scheme was put in practice, would be little necessary; and when redress'd, would make Men chearfully serve the Time allotted for their Ships staying abroad; provided that their continuance was settled, which I am of opinion should never exceed two Years; and provided also, that in the mean time a Subsistence was paid them, to support themselves and Families. I have many Reasons of Advantage to the Government, to give for the  
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confining the Continuance of Ships abroad to the Time mention'd; and I am sure no honest Objection can be made, to the more frequent payment of Seamens Wages; since the Parliament have thought fit to give it them in the same manner as the Army. And besides, have directed that two Months Wages in six, shall be paid to all Seamens Families, impower'd by them to receive it; which Grant upon the first Establishment of it was observ'd, but has been discontinued now for some Years.

The Reasons of Advantage to the Government, that may be given for the limiting the Time of Ships staying abroad for two Years, are, first, that few Ships after remaining that Time are without want of Repairs, which abroad they are oftentimes unable to make good; or being able, the Expence of doing it must be considerably greater than if done in *England*, from whence all the Materials must have been brought. But how much does the Government suffer, when Ships are kept, as they now often are, four, five, or six Years out; in the course of which time, sometimes from a want of Opportunity, at other times from the want of Materials and Conveniencies, Ships have been suffered to go on, growing and increasing in their Defects, that the utmost that could be done for them abroad, was to put them in some condition for their Passage home, which has been oftentimes so bad a one, that their Arrival has been thought next to a Miracle; and the Expences following from these Decays have been either the entire new building of the Ship, or the giving her such a thorough Repair, as is little inferiour to it; and the Inconveniency besides, which the Nation has suffer'd, has been the Loss of the Use of that Ship for a considerable time:

whereas

Whereas had she been sent home at a proper time, her Defects might have been remedied at a small Expence, and with little Trouble; and she employed either abroad or at home at the time, when in the other case she is re-building. These then, are the Reasons for Ships returning every two Years to *England*; to which may be added, others of great weight; as, for example, by a total Relief being made of our Fleets abroad in the course of two Years, the Trade would never be in want of Convoys, as Ships would be almost then constantly going and coming; and Ships of such Strength, as would leave the Merchant little to fear from the Enemy. Our Ships then would also be by this means more frequently cleaned than at present, and might be said by this Method to serve in great measure the End of Cruizers, as on their Passages they would run thro' the Tract of the Enemy's Trade. Add to these Considerations, the Expence which would be saved to the Government of Victuallers and Storeships, which would not then need to be sent so frequent as now, as every Ship coming out of *England* would come well furnished with Provisions and Stores. I will not either pass over observing another Gain that might arise to the Government by this Method of frequent Reliefs, which would be, if the Men of War of the Line coming out of *England* to the *Mediterranean*, brought on board them a Company of Soldiers for the Relief of the Garisons of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, from whence also the same Number might be returned by the Ships going home. This Method would save the great Expence of Transports, would make the Relief always easy from the Smallness of the Number, and would add Strength to our Ships, especially

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those going home, which are oftentimes in want of it, tho' would not then probably be so much as now, the time of their Continuance abroad making the Difference. However, this additional Force might serve to enable the Ships going home, to leave behind them in the Fleet some Part of their Complement that perhaps might chuse to stay; for tho' I would not have Men turn'd over, or kept abroad against their Will, yet do I see no reason why they should not have the Liberty of staying when the Service may receive Advantage by it. There are still Reasons remaining for Ships going more frequently home, than at present: First, that by it many Seamen which would and do now desert abroad, to go to their Families, would then be kept from doing it. And secondly, by Seamen being oftner with their Families, a greater Increase of Subjects would arise to the Kingdom; a Consideration always held of great importance by the wisest Nations: Besides, I might add, that Seamen by being more frequently with their Families, would make their Attachments to them the greater, and consequently they would be thence less tempted to engage in foreign Services.

Having thus pointed out the Hardships of the Seamen, and shewn the Methods by which they may be relieved in a manner consistent with, and promotive of the Honour, the Advantage and Interest of the Nation; I shall now proceed to shew those of the Officers, more especially such as concern their Pay; and I doubt not, in doing it, to engage you also in making a suitable Provision for them.

A Maintenance, I conceive to be such a Provision as will enable a Person to live decently, and properly in the Rank or Character of Life he

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is placed in; every one who has not those Means, must either degrade himself, or to keep up his Character in one way, lose it in another much more material. How severe then is such a Situation? Yet such is that of most Sea-Officers, and of every one that has not the good-fortune to have something independent of the Service. Who will not be of my opinion, when I tell him that the Half-pay of Captains of Men of War, one with another, is but an hundred Pounds a Year, and that of Lieutenants forty? Hence we may see Men coming from being respected, distinguished with Honours, charged with the Execution of Services of the greatest importance; I say, we may see them return to their Country and Families, not with chearful happy Countenances, but such as speak Care and Concern, arising from the melancholy Prospect before them. Who is there, that is at all acquainted with the Sea-service, but must have great compassion for that Man whose Circumstances make it more eligible for him to be constantly employed in it, than to live sometimes ashore, and share with his Countrymen part of the Blessings of his Country? Fatigue and Danger are largely his Portion when at Sea, let him then have some Repose, some comfortable Subsistence; and if we will allow, as sure we must, that the Officers of the Navy have as great a Title to our Care, as those of the Army, let us then shew them that we think so. I am far from saying those Gentlemen have too much; but if they have not, sure those of the Navy have too little. But as this may be made more fully to appear, in entering upon a Comparison between the two Services, I shall therefore beg leave to enlarge upon it, and observe how much the Officers of the Army

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have advantage over those of the Sea, as well from the Nature of the Service, as in Pay, Perquisite, &c. That I may be just in making this comparison, it will be proper to shew the Degree of Rank the Officers in one Service stand to the other; this Point I am the more inclined to discuss, as it will be necessary to my future Scheme.

The Rank then of the first Admiral of our Fleet, is equal with that of the first General of our Army: Admirals, whose Flags are at the Main Top-Mast Head, are equal to Generals; those whose are at the Fore-Top-Mast Head, to Lieutenant-Generals; and those whose are at the Mizzen Top-Mast Head, to Major-Generals: A Captain of a Man of War distinguished by a broad Pennant, thereby signifying him as a Commadore, has the Degree of Brigadier-General. Thus far his Majesty has been pleased to settle the Rank of Officers in the Navy and Army; but farther, not. We must then have recourse to Custom and Reasoning, in determining and fixing the Footing of all others. If we will admit of the Practice of Foreign Nations, I shall not fail to prove, that a Captain of a Man of War of the Line, is equal in Rank to a Colonel, it being allowed so in *France, Spain and Portugal*; Countries where the Navy is not entitled to that Regard and Esteem as with us, and where the Army is much more. But it is not from the Custom of Foreigners only, that we need look to for Examples; it has always been our own, whenever the Service has made it necessary for the two Corps to act together: and not only Captains of Ships of the Line, but such likewise of all others to a Twenty-Gun Ship included, have rank'd with Colonels.

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But as I have drawn an Example in my favour from the Practice of other Nations, I will very fairly admit of another, which makes against many of our Sea-Captains; and that is, that no Captains of Men of War (at least in the *French* Service) that command a less than a Line of Battle-Ship rank with Colonels. And I must own, I cannot help being of the same opinion, and have often thought that there should be some greater Distinction between Captains of Men of War, than that merely of Seniority; but this Distinction can never properly be made, whilst young Captains have large Ships, and old ones small. As I shall have occasion to say more upon this Subject in another Place, I shall therefore drop it for the present; and proceed to shew the Reasonableness of a Captain of a Line of Battle Ship's ranking with a Colonel, as well from the Importance of his Command, as from the Rank his Majesty has assigned to a Commadore.

The Importance of a Publick Trust is to be judged of, as it has concern to the Nation, which must be either from its Value in respect of Charge or Service. And the Person thus intrusted, ought to be deemed of more or less Consequence in proportion as his Charge and Abilities of Service arising from his Trust, are more or less considerable to the Nation.

The Question then follows, whether the Care of a Regiment be considered from these two, or either of the above-mentioned Scores; as a Command of greater Importance than that of a Man of War of the Line; I will very willingly leave the Decision of this Point to any Colonel whatever, and doubt not but he will allow that a Man of War, worth to the Government sixty thousand Pounds, supported when in Commission at the annual Expence of between twenty and thirty thousand

thirty thousand Pounds, employ'd in protecting our Country and Trade, is a Command to be consider'd in all respects as material as that of a Regiment. And farther, the Charge of a Man of War of the Line is not only greater than a Regiment, but the Power in a Captain of employing that Charge, is much more extensive than that of a Colonel over his Regiment; consequently, a greater Degree of Confidence is necessary to be had in one than the other. In whatever light therefore, the Comparison is made, the Colonel receives not any Advantage. The Honour of the *British* Flag abroad, which the Captain has under his Care, and the Respect and Distinction he meets with from bearing it; add still more weight to my Argument: a Distinction so great, as is little inferiour to that shewn a publick Minister, in which Character too a Captain of a Man of War, in virtue of his Station, sometimes acts.

Thus I have in a short, and I hope conclusive manner, shewn the Reasonableness of a Captain of a Man of War of the Line's ranking with a Colonel, both from Custom and the Importance of his Command: And I hope farther to shew it, in considering the Rank which his Majesty has been pleas'd to give to a Commadore. In the Army no one is made a Brigadier-General, that has not first receiv'd a Commission as Colonel, or what is the same thing, a Brevet for one; which gives him a Title to an equal Rank. It follows then, from a Parity of Reasoning, that as the Brigadier before he became one, must have been a Colonel; that also a Captain of a Man of War, before he was a Commadore, which Commission ranks him with a Brigadier, must be equal to a Colonel; otherwise his Preferment is disproportion'd

disproportion'd. And how much more so is his, who from a Captain of a Man of War, receives a Commission as Rear-Admiral, which gives him the Rank of a Major-General. From what Step then does one or the other take this rise? Say you, not from so high a one, as that of a Colonel? What then, from a Lieutenant-Colonel; an Officer who from the Nature of his Commission has no separate independant Command, and acting only in Obedience to, and Assistance of his Colonel? Sure then it will be granted, that a Person at the left Hand of a Major-General, has at least a Title to the Rank of a Colonel. And what Rank then shall we place him in to-day, who to-morrow may be a Brigadier? Shall we not call him also a Colonel? If so, my point is clear, that all Captains of Line of Battle Ships are intitled to the Degree of Colonels. And this Conclusion I draw from the late Appointment of Captain *Knowles* to the Degree of Commadore or Brigadier, an Officer who at that time was not half way up the List of Captains. But to strengthen this Reasoning the more, I would ask a Question or two, *viz.* Whether Commadore *Knowles*, after having been in the Character of a Brigadier, can fall inferiour to a Colonel when divested of his Command? If not, it follows that he must be either superiour in Rank to other Captains that command him, or those Captains must be Colonels too; which latter is so reasonable, that to suppose the contrary is the highest Absurdity. Again, I would ask, in what Rank shall we esteem that Officer, who has a Power of giving Orders to a Brigadier? If it be answer'd, that he is to be regarded as either a Senior Brigadier or a Superiour General; I reply then, that all Captains of Men of War senior to Commadore *Knowles*, had a Power of giving Orders

Orders to him; and consequently by this Rule of judging, they must be entitled to the Rank of a Brigadier.

But this Argument I don't insist upon farther (as I know Commadore Knowles's was an occasional Command, which ceased when the Service was over) than to expose still more the Absurdity of refusing the Rank of Colonel to a Captain of a Line of Battle Ship, whose Authority may be sufficient to direct a Brigadier. Having thus in every view that I have consider'd, or am able to consider, a Colonel and a Captain of a Man of War of the Line together, shewn to a Demonstration that the latter is not on any account to be esteemed inferiour to the former; he being a Principal in the Fleet as much as, or more so, than the other is in the Army; for the latter Corps having a greater Number of General Officers than the former, consequently the Colonel is by this made still less considerable, as it leaves him hardly the Chance of commanding more than his own Regiment; whereas a Captain of a Line of Battle Ship has frequently four or five Ships of the Line, and sometimes double the Number under his direction, to employ on Services of great importance: I say, having shewn that a Captain of a Man of War of the Line is entitled to the Degree of a Colonel, I shall now proceed to take notice of the great Advantage the Colonels have over Captains of Men of War, from the Nature of the two Services. And first, I shall observe, that a Colonel may have, and I believe it is not difficult to find out many that have had a Regiment twenty Years, without the Fatigue of twenty Days Duty; and nothing is more common, as well out of *England* as in it, than to see Regiments without their Colonels. But how different is the Situation

Situation of a Captain of a Man of War, who when he is in Pay, is constantly engaged in Duty, in which he stands exposed to the Inclemency of every Climate, and the Violence of every Wind; not a Rock or a Shoal but threatens him, and fills his Mind with Care and Anxiety; Fatigue and Watchings employ his Hours, whilst Ease and Quiet are the Colonel's Portion. I do not say indeed, but in time of War, Colonels as well as Captains of Men of War are exposed to Danger and Fatigue; but even then, the first have a Remission from it a considerable part of the Year, whilst the latter remain constantly engaged in it: nor can the worst Condition, that Colonels can be reduc'd to, be more terrible than that which has lately been the Fate of Admiral *Anson* and the Captains of his Squadron; the Sufferings of a Siege were never greater, nor I believe of a longer Continuance. Famine, Sickness, and Distresses in every shape, have been their constant Companions; one left to perish on an uninhabited Island, and another taken from his Ship that was just a sinking. Even the Enemy, however dreadful he may appear in the Land-Service, carries not with him a greater Face of Horror than in the Sea. The springing of a Mine is not more to be feared than is a Fire-Ship. In short, Danger in time of War, if it is not greater at Sea in some views than in the Army, it is more frequent in its Visits; and one Combat as well in Peace as War the Captain is sure to meet with, that of the Weather, which is oftentimes too powerful for him to contend against.

If then the Advantages of the Colonels are so manifest, it may be hoped that the Captains of Men of War have others to ballance in their favour, and that there is some other difference between



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tween them. Indeed there is; and such a one as the Misfortunes of the latter oblige them to own; Affluence and Want make just the distinction in the Provision made for one and the other. In the Comparison I now make, I confine my self to Colonels of Foot, and not of Horse, whose Appointments are more considerable than any of our Admirals, except the First. When I say this, I mean only the Pay, including in it the Allowances for Recruiting and for Deserters Cloathing. If I am to speak of other Advantages equally certain with their Pay, I can prove that Sir *John Norris*, with the whole Navy of *Great Britain* under his Command riding at *Spithead*, has not a Post of so great profit as a Colonel of Horse; and what gives me Concern to say it, not even at present of a Colonel of Marines. And the Vice-Admirals employ'd under him, receive not from their Commissions more than half as much as that Colonel receives from his Pay, and the certain Advantages of his Regiment added to it. How great then must be the Disproportion between this and the Income of a Captain of a Man of War of the Line? so great, that one with another, the Amount will make little more than a sixth Part. Nay, I will undertake to prove, that a Command of a Company at *Gibraltar* or *Portmahon*, falls not short in its Advantages, of a Captain of a Man of War of the Line. And yet these Captains are sent on board his Ship to command a Party of sixty Men under his direction, and rank with a Lieutenant in the said Ship. Where then is any proportion in the Encouragement for the Sea-Officers, as for those in the Army? Perhaps it may be answer'd, that the Chance of Prizes ballances the Difference of Pay; this indeed is opposing Chance to Certainty: however it is true, that

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that some fortunate Men have much more than exceeded by it any Advantage, that could arise from Pay. Yet how few are they in proportion to the Number of Captains on the List, and how often is it, that Chances of this kind offer? Never but in times of War, and then confined chiefly to Captains of small Ships; or even admitting that a Third of the Number of Captains make their Fortune by Prizes, (which is a much greater Number than it can hardly possibly happen to,) yet how does their good Fortune affect the two remaining Thirds, otherwise than by lowering them still the more by that Comparison? And if this Advantage we have been speaking of, is so great, Captains of Privateers have it too.

Hitherto then I have consider'd Captains of Men of War in full Pay and Commission, harassed and fatigu'd for a bare Subsistence, whilst Ease, Pleasure, and Profit have attended the Colonel; or obnoxious, till lately, either to Danger or Fatigue; happy in being able not only to live equal to his Character, but from the Circumstances of his Commission, affording him at the same time the Means of collecting a Fortune, without the Addition of a Place at Court, or a Government. Come then, whilst we are about it, let us throw all into the Scale; let us not pass by observing that the chief General of our Army had for a considerable Number of Years twelve thousand Pounds annually; whilst the chief Admiral of our Fleet had not one. Let us take notice, that inferior Generals to many of our Admirals, had not only Regiments of Horse or Foot, but Governments, and Places of great Profit; when our Admirals had little more than six hundred Pounds a Year, Vice-Admirals between four and five, and Rear-Admirals little more than three.

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And let us farther proceed to observe, that Colonels of Regiments of Foot had an annual Income never less than twelve hundred Pounds ; besides some having the Pay of vacant Commissions, the accidental Sales of Ensignships, Adjutancies, Quarter-Master-ships, &c. which I have been told some Years have more than doubled that Income. Add to this, that many have either had Governments or Lieutenant-Governorships, some of which, *viz.* *Gibraltar* or *Port-Mahon*, are made more advantageous than the most profitable Command an Admiral can have abroad. At the time, I say, they had these Appointments, a Captain of a Man of War of the Line had little more than an hundred Pounds a Year, and a Captain of a Company had three Perquisites included, without taking into the Account, any other Posts, as *Aid-de-Camp*, *Engineer*, *Adjutant*, *Pay-Master*, *Surgeon*, or *Quarter-Master* ; two or three of which Places are by many held at the same time, together with their Captain's Commission : whilst Captains of Men of War are so far from having their Lowness of Pay made up to them by Places, that those in which one would think they have a peculiar Right, they are seldom admitted into. And even Clerks, nay and such as have been their own Clerks, have been preferred to them ; and certain it is, that in order to be most considerable in the Direction of the Navy, the military Character must be avoided, as it is a Bar instead of a Means to Preferment ; and therefore we have oftentimes seen Men of little consequence placed in Posts of Distinction, which are deny'd to those of figure in the Navy, and such whose Abilities would render them useful in them. Indeed it cannot but be allowed, that there is one *Post* which no-body disputed with

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with Captains of Men of War ; this is the Government of *Newfoundland* : But whether they are without Competitors, from there being *no Salary* annexed to it, I know not ; and why there is no Salary allowed to the *Governor* of this *Place*, and why there is to all *Governors* of other *Places*, as well *little* as *great*, I also know not ; unless it is, that from the Nature of the Government, it is necessary to make a *Captain of a Man of War* *Governor* ; and therefore it would be breaking thro' a *standing Rule*, to admit them into *Places of Profit*. Captains of *French* Men of War are more than nominal *Governors*, nor have they a small share with the *Army* in Governments, all those abroad being filled up by them.

We need not from what has been said then any longer wonder, that Colonels dispute the Right of Captains of Men of War ranking with them ; nor indeed have the Captains of the Men of War much reason to desire they may be esteemed in the Rank of Colonels, as it is a Character their Circumstances cannot possibly support : happier therefore would it be for them, if they were not expected to appear, when abroad, in a Station that demands Respect and Honour, since Poverty and Contempt must be their Portion at home. It will be easily perceived, that in one Part of the Comparison I have made of the Officers of the Army and of the Sea, that the former are considered as remaining in whole Pay, whilst those of the Navy are only in Half-Pay, (I mean to be understood in a general Sense :) would one not rather have concluded from the Advantages which the Officers of the Army have over those of the Sea, when both are in whole Pay, that if either of the two Corps were to be reduced, it should be the former ; yet the Case is otherwise : People who

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who have been inured to Hardships in the Service of their Country, may perhaps be thought from it better able to bear still greater than those who are seldom exposed to them; is this the reason? Or is it, that because we think the supporting an Army in peaceable Times more necessary than a Fleet? I have shewn the Advantages which would arise from one, let those who are best acquainted with them that proceed from the other, explain them; whilst I once more beg leave to intercede, from the Reasonableness of it, that we pay, if not an equal Regard to the Sea-Officers, as to those of the Land, at least some Regard; and if we will not, or cannot, from our Inabilities, be generous enough to them to bring them equal to all the present Appointments of the Land, let us at least give them a constant Pay proportioned in some degree to their Rank and Character. Nay, I might say, that it is an Act both of the highest Justice and the greatest Prudence, where our Concerns are equal, to give equal Encouragements to those whom we charge with them, as by it we may expect to be served by Men of equal Character and Figure; whereas by throwing the Balance much on one side, it cannot fail of carrying with it in general Men of greater Distinction, than where the Support does in no degree rise up to the Character. And I believe, it is not to be disputed, that we should chuse to prefer those for Candidates, whose Birth and Education would reflect Honour on their Commissions, to others whom their Commissions would reflect it upon them. Merit and Desert are, no doubt, to be found in Men of all Degrees; and supposing it equal, yet Education and Family furnish out many Qualifications and Advantages for publick Life, which cannot be had by those of inferiour Degree.

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Degree. Let us then, on all accounts, support the Character of a Captain of a Man of War, as well for the Honour and Service of his Majesty, as for the Sake of the Captains; and not because we may always find People who upon any Terms will accept of that Commission, therefore give that as a reason for our not doing it.

As I have, in speaking of Sea-Officers, confined myself chiefly to the mentioning of Captains; I think it necessary to observe, that all other Commission Officers, as far as respects a better Support, are understood to be included in the Arguments; and Lieutenants, who from the Importance of their Charge, and from Custom and his Majesty's Order in regard to Prizes, are ranked with Captains of Foot, cannot therefore be thought to have a sufficient Allowance made them, their whole Pay being less than Lieutenants of Foot; which Officers many of them have at the same time two or three other Commissions, as Adjutant, Quarter-Master, Pay-Master, or Surgeon. It is not then only Captains of Men of War, but Lieutenants also that suffer a Disadvantage by a Comparison with the Army, as well in their whole as in their half Pay; and therefore they, as well as Captains of Men of War, have a Claim upon us for a farther Support; particularly the first Lieutenant, who besides having an equal Share of Duty in common with the others, is charged by the Captain with the Execution of all Orders, concerning either the fitting out of the Ship, the keeping her in a constant Condition for the Sea, or in whatever else relates to the Service: and so useful an Officer is he in the Ship, that on the well or ill performing of his Duty, depends in great measure the Dispatch of the Service, and the Order and Discipline in the Ship. For however good

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an Officer the Captain may be, yet is he not sufficient to attain the Ends of a right Government, unless he is seconded by his first Lieutenant, especially as that Officer in the Absence of the Captain commands the Ship. And here I cannot help observing, under that Circumstance, a Difficulty he is sure to engage with, and which never fails to obstruct the Service; it is, that he either must submit his Command to the Conveniency and Humours of his Brother Officers, however unreasonable they may be, or be sure in maintaining his Weight and Consequence, by exerting a proper Authority over them, to meet with Opposition and Ill-will in return. And as these Inconveniences arise from an Equality in Commissions, which differ only in point of Time, and as the Necessity of the Service requires an Authority in the executive Officer, not liable to be disputed with; therefore I cannot but think it would be of great use on board every Line of Battle Ship, to have the Officer next to the Captain placed in a superiour Character to the other Lieutenants. And tho' I have said, that the Rank of a Captain of Foot does of right belong to all Lieutenants of Men War, yet as a higher one than that cannot be given to the Officer I am now speaking of, and as in the Army there are Captain-Lieutenants whose Commissions are superiour to all other Lieutenants and inferiour to Captains, tho' they are allowed to rank with them, but have only the Pay of Lieutenants, and the Perquisites of the Colonel's Company; on this footing then I would have all Lieutenants of Men of War put, with such a sufficient Addition made to their present Pay, as might answer to Captain-Lieutenants in the Army, and which would place them inferiour to the Character of the Person I have been mentioning;

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tioning; whose Pay and Commission should be equal to that of the Captain of a Company. I know not what Reception these Proposals of mine for an Augmentation of the Sea-Officers Pay, may meet with; but that we may at least be disposed to do something for them, I shall go on to enumerate the farther Hardships they suffer, as well in as out of Commission. The first I shall mention is, that as from the Smallness of their Appointments ashore, they are under a necessity to bury themselves in Places where they can propose to live cheapest, which are commonly at a great distance from *London*; that they should thence be obliged to appear upon a Summons from the Admiralty without any Allowance made to them for their travelling Charges, or any for the Time of their Attendance, which very often into the bargain proves unnecessary, and they return again to their Families distressed and disappointed; or if they are commission'd for a Ship, tho' at *Plymouth*, they must go to her as well as they can, and after having fitted themselves out (on a Supposition of their going abroad) with Money taken up at an exorbitant Premium and Interest, in six Months, or a less time perhaps, they are paid off; and if their Creditors have no objection, they may go home again. Another thing very extraordinary is, Captains of Men of War are oftentimes ordered from their Ships in the River, to attend Court-Martials at the *Nore*, without any Allowance being made them either for their going or coming, or the time of their Stay upon that Service. What shall we then say to these Things? Can we think the Government is informed of them? Or, can we imagine, that they know that every Pay-Clerk in an Office has Ten Shillings a Day allowed him for travelling Charges,

ges, and that an Officer has not one? No, not our Admirals; tho' Commissioners have large Allowances on that head, notwithstanding their constant Salaries and Advantages are very considerable; nor does the Government leave those of the Navy any thing to wish for. Hard Distinction, that Men as they become more and more considerable to their Country, and as their Station exposes them to greater Inconveniences and Wants, that the Care of them should be in proportion neglected. But thus it is throughout the Navy, not a Person in any Branch of it ashore but is provided for superiour to his Character, nor any one afloat excepting Purfers, whose Support is not much beneath their Rank. That Officer indeed is well taken care of, perhaps for this Reason, that his Character partakes more of Civil than Military, and because it has been thought a proper Preferment for Noblemen's Footmen, who from having at his Lordship's Table served his Captain, shall enjoy under his Command a Place of much greater Profit than him; and this he does, not, as it is necessary to support his Figure, or because he is of more consequence than the rest of the Warrant-Officers; on the contrary, he is of less consequence, and so little is he of at all, that it has been customary to dispense with his Absence from the Ship, which could not be done (nor ever is) of any other Officer. I now come to an Article, which not only Captains and Lieutenants, but every other Officer, is concern'd in; and that is, the great Sufferings arising to them for want of their Pay: Sufferings, which not only themselves, but their Families are Sharers in. For how is it to be imagined, that their Wives and Children are to be supported at home, and themselves abroad, when the Ship to which they belong,

belong, has not been paid for five, six, or seven Years. Officers, that have a little Money beforehand, at least lose the Interest it would bring, were they not in need of using it; but others, under the Circumstance of having no Fortune, must either be distressed by a total Want, or to supply it, take up Money at a rate almost incredible. And here then I turn once more to the Army, in which we shall find all Officers and Soldiers have a regular Subsistence paid them equal to three Fourths of their full Pay. As the Pay then of the Sea-Officers is so low, and the Pay of all Persons in an inferiour Character, together with them, so long a Time after it is due before they have it; there need not, one would think, be any other discouraging Circumstances regarding their Support. Yet so it is, that if a Man of War by distress of Weather, or after having made a gallant Defence, is lost or taken, not an Officer or Seaman belonging to her (tho' the Place be at ever so great a distance from their Country, and the Time they are detained from it be ever so long) remains a Day longer in the Government's Pay. How melancholy then is the Situation of these unfortunate People, after having lost perhaps every thing they had belonging to them in the World, or at least every thing they were possessed of in the Ship; to be dragged to a Prison naked and wounded, without any other Reflection in their Confinement than the distressed Prospect of their Families, to add to the Weight of their own Misfortunes? Yet this Condition many a gallant Officer was placed in, in the late War; of which Number one, who, after losing almost every thing he had in the world, was kept two Years confined, without a Six-pence being allow'd him from

from the Government. Hard Situation! that thus as Fortune distress'd him, his Country distress'd him too. But Sufferings of hard Treatment, and ill Fortune, this worthy good Man had to struggle with all his Life long; and just as the former seem'd to abate, and the latter appear'd to have changed her Frowns into Smiles, then himself and Family felt the severest Stroke of her Power, which at once deprived them of him, and their Hopes, and his Country of an able, gallant Officer, who always serv'd it with an honest disinterested Zeal.

Does it not then seem once more, I say, as if Sea-Officers were thought fit Objects to exercise our Cruelties upon, that thus on their becoming Prisoners they are deprived of any Support from their Country, at the same time that Land-Officers have under that Circumstance been continued in full Pay, and large Allowances made to them for their Losses.

But as I do not hope, by the Arguments of Justice and Pity, to gain every body to my Party; therefore I am not often, I flatter myself, without Reasons of Advantage to the Government in Reformation I would have made; at least here I think I do not want them, as must be granted by every one who allows of the Necessity of Order and Subordination being preserv'd, at a Time when a Man of War is upon a Rock or Sand; and at the same time is inform'd, that from the want of a Continuance in Pay, Confusion and Disorder is produced on those Occasions; the Seamen holding themselves on that account no longer oblig'd to regard the Orders of their Superiours; but every Man thinking himself independent, insults at his will his Officer, and despises his Commands. And tho' I have said this Liberty

ty is taken, only on a Supposition that the Ship they are in is lost, and the Seamen from thence knowing themselves to be no longer in Pay; yet it may happen, and I have been told, has happen'd to one of our Sloops within these three Years, that a too early Belief, and Persuasion of the People of her being lost, followed by a disregard of their Captain's Orders, and a plundering for Liquors, with which, they soon made themselves incapable of Duty: I say, I have been inform'd by those who were on board the Vessel in that distress, that to those Causes was entirely owing the Loss of her, as she might otherwise have been got off. If this be true, how much would it be for the Advantage of the Government, to continue the Officers and Seamen's Pay, in order to prevent these Mischiefs. As I have been very particular in pointing out many Hardships concerning Pay, I therefore cannot omit mentioning the following one, which I call a Hardship; because, what was at first a voluntary Subscription, is establish'd now into an obligatory one, and put under such Limitations, and as it is said perverted to such Uses, as those for whose Benefit it was intended, are many of them quite excluded any Advantage; and others, deprived of a great Part of what by the Establishment they ought to have.

To explain this matter, every Officer has a Deduction made from his Pay, for the Support of Officers Widows; this Contribution was at first, as I have before said, given by the Consent of the Officers; at which time I believe it was understood by them to extend to the maintaining Officers Widows in general. But this has been far from being put in practice, all those being excluded any Support from thence, who are left in Circumstances, which bring in an Annual In-

come,

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 come, equal to that allowed to Widows in lower Circumstances. Thus a Captain's Widow, left with fifteen Hundred Pounds, and perhaps six or seven Children, comes not into the Number of Pensioners. But any Sum less than that, the Person possess'd of it, is entitled to a Pension of fifty Pounds a Year, tho' it should happen, that those Widows are without Children. How cruel and unreasonable then is this Distinction, and how severe is it upon Captains, who have large Families and small Fortunes, to take from them a Part of their Pay, for the Support of Officers Widows; and afterwards to exclude theirs from the Benefit of it? Yet how much more cruel is it, if what be said is true, that a considerable Part of the Sums arising from his Majesty's Bounty, and the Officers Contributions, is applied to the furnishing out Salaries to Places; which, 'till a few Years ago, were never thought necessary; and which even to this Time, I believe are not found so? At least, they are foreign, and have no relation to the giving any Assistance to the Widows: consequently can have no pretence for raising their Support from them, and lessening by it their Pensions; which, if they were paid to the utmost, would but enable them to struggle with Families, therefore unfit Objects to prey upon.

The next Article I shall speak of, particularly concerns Captains, and relates to the Detention of their Pay, till they have passed their Accounts, and answered every frivolous Objection. As this is an Obligation which gives great trouble to them, and besides puts them to an expence for Fees to the Clerks of the Navy-Offices, whose great Perquisites arise from a long-suffer'd Abuse upon the Officers and Seamen; and is at the same

same time, as I conceive, of little or no advantage to the Service: I think, it therefore is but reasonable to abolish it for the Captains sakes. Another thing I shall just mention, as particularly concerning Captains, is the Necessity they are oftentimes under of carrying Passengers by Order, which puts them to great Expences and Trouble, without any certain Allowance being made them for it; tho' some have with great difficulty, and after long sollicitation, got their Expences paid them from the Treasury. Does it then appear, from what has been hitherto said, that the Appointments of a Captain of a Man of War are sufficient to do every thing, that thus every thing is expected from him? Surely, no. And methinks, the utmost that can be asked of him is, his Trouble and Conveniency, without loading him with the additional Article of Expence.

I shall now finish the Subject of Grievances concerning Pay, with an Article of great and peculiar Distress to old Officers; I may easily be understood to mean, that one of being superseded. And here I may say, that I know not any Set or Corps of Men so likely to die of broken Hearts, as these Officers; for instead of giving them an easy Couch in their old Age, as a Reward for their Toil and Labour, and having spent their Lives in the Service of their King and Country with Honour and Credit, we treat them as Offenders and Criminals, by shewing them that we do not think them fit to be trusted; and farther, that they deserve to be punished: for not only is an Officer, who is superseded, deprived of his Right of Seniority, but he has also in effect taken from him the common Chance of all younger Captains, that I mean of commanding a Ship; therefore

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therefore obliged to sit down with his Half-Pay. I am far from thinking, that every old Officer should be made an Admiral, when it comes to his turn, there may be many Reasons to the contrary; but sure there can be no one, why any Man who has served his King and Country with Zeal and Fidelity, should be left to starve, because his Abilities may be unequal to a higher Station. But Captains are not the only Officers in this case, that have reason to complain of hard Treatment when their Country has done with their Services, Admirals share a Fate little better; for after having served in Characters of great Distinction, they are rewarded generally with a Pension, at most equal with what they had as Half-pay. And now then, agreeable to my Promise, I will have done with Grievances concerning Pay, and I wish I could have also done with all others; but I cannot pass over taking notice of the cruel unjust Attacks that have been frequently made upon the Corps of Captains of Men of War. I call them cruel and unjust, as I cannot think otherwise of any Attempts that are formed to punish Men, not for their own, but the Crimes of others; and that Attempts like these have been made three several times within these few Years, nothing is more certain, as also that one of them succeeded. Can any Circumstance be more discouraging to an honest Man, than to have his Character and Fortune depending not on his own, but on the Behaviour and Conduct of others? Sure it should be sufficient to exempt him at least from Punishment or Calumny, who deserves Reward and Applause for his Actions. Yet so it is, that on some Captains having been found culpable, the whole Corps have been stigmatized with the  
Odium;

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Odium; and not only underwent the same Scandal as the Offenders, but the Punishment of their Crime was made to fall heavier upon them than on the Persons offending. This was the case in the Appointment of Purfers to Twenty-Gun Ships; for sure those Men, who unprevented for ten Years together, were collecting great Fortunes by the Practice of every Fraud and Neglect of the Service; tho' notwithstanding afterwards for the Notoriousness of those Crimes, they were render'd incapable from ever holding any future Command in the Navy; yet having enriched themselves with their ill-gotten Gains, I say therefore, sure they were not so hardly dealt by, nor so great Sufferers as those, who never allowing themselves in any Gain to the prejudice of his Majesty's Service, to the injuring any Man under their Command, or the dishonouring their Commission by any base mean Practice, had on the account of the Men I have before mentioned taken from them a Perquisite, the only one then left in the Service, and which when taken away left them with an Appointment ill suited to their Rank and Character. And here I am sorry to say, that this Punishment so injurious to them was directed by those, who instead of oppressing them themselves, ought to have prevented others from doing it.

But so unfortunate has been the Situation of Sea-Officers, that they were persecuted not only on that occasion, but afterwards when the Merchants, their declared Enemies, had form'd a Scheme to deprive them of a Liberty enjoy'd by the meanest Subject; they were so far from being able to engage any one in their Cause, that those whom they might have had reason to expect it from, discouraged them all in their power  
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from opposing the pernicious Measures entered into against them.

If I was to speak more particularly of what passed in this Affair, the hard Treatment the Sea-Officers met with would more fully be shewn; let it suffice to say, that unassisted by any thing but the Justice of their Cause, their malicious Prosecutors were defeated. But as Men, whose Hearts are disposed to do Injuries, become more so from Disappointments; so they, undaunted by their former Miscarriage, renewed their Attack upon the Sea-Officers; and tho' the Points they were to carry, were of still a more extraordinary nature than those they aimed at before, yet as the Subject was difficult to be understood by any but sea-faring Men, or such as had been well informed by them, they therefore had a great latitude to work up their Purpose, and to gain the Votes of the House of Commons in their favour, which they did; and so satisfactorily to themselves, and so disadvantageous to the Sea-Officers, that the Terms by which they were to have held their Commissions, were such as I believe not many would have subscribed to. Necessitous Men must indeed always serve, mean-spirited will; but how we can engage that for those, who are neither compelled by the first Circumstance, nor under the Influence of the second, I know not. But happy it was both for them and the Nation, that the Trial was never made; and much therefore did both stand indebted to that Noble Peer, who with a Zeal worthy of the Station he filled, placed himself as a Barrier to oppose the Torrent, that was upon the point of overwhelming the Sea-Officers. On this occasion therefore it cannot be said, that those Gentlemen were without a Patron and Protector, one both able and at that time inclined

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inclined to serve them. The first he manifested by exposing so effectually the Unreasonableness and Absurdity of the Merchants Propositions, that he convinced the House of Lords of them, to the great Confusion of those Gentlemen; and the second he shewed by a Spirit truly great and noble, in making the Cause of the Sea-Officers so much his own, that on the Miscarriage or Success of that Day, he was resolved to have his Post depend: a Resolution, as it could not but raise in the Sea-Officers the highest Opinion and Reverence of him who made it, so it could not but flatter them with the Hopes that the indulgent Protection he then granted them, would shew itself in kind Offices on every occasion. How far those Expectations have since been answered, I leave them to determine. For my own part, I should be glad to be able to give farther Instances of his manifesting his Regard to the Sea-Officers; and wish also that I could accompany them, with others, from those Gentlemen who shared with him the Power and Abilities of serving them; for certain it is, that they stand in need of all the Support that can be given them by those, under whose Direction they are, and even then I fear they are the most unfriended Body in the Nation; a single Complaint against a single Person, and even that not founded on Truth, has threaten'd the whole Corps, whilst Governors stand unshaken amidst the Clamours and Complaints of an oppressed Multitude.

I am not so partial to Sea-Officers, as to imagine every one of them to be always in the right; nor am I contending for those, whose Conduct may be deserving of Censure; neither do I wish, after the Example I have just mention'd, that they should be screen'd from Punishment; God forbid.

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No; all that I hope for, for the future will be done for them in general, as to the matter I am speaking of; and what they in general would, I am confident, only desire, is that those, and those Men only be punished, who may be deserving of Punishment; and not all suffer for the Faults of one or a few; or any one upon a bare Accusation unsupported by Truth. Therefore, whenever any Complaint is made, let it remain as doubtful, till Proof be made of it; and the Person, or Persons to whom it may be applicable, have made their Reply to it: and not, as has heretofore been done, taking Assertions for Truths; thereby, sometimes dispossessing an Officer of his Ship; and at others, fixing a Scandal upon him, for what he never deserved. It is easy for ill designing Men, to propagate Falshoods touching the Conduct and Character of a Sea-Officer; for the same Reason that it is difficult for him to stop their Progress; the Distance he may be from his Country, making it impossible for him to remove the Impressions, the Publick have, for some time before, taken up against him. But tho' this Treatment he is liable to from every malignant Tongue, without being able to remedy it, or restore his Credit; yet when Complaints are levell'd against him upon no better a Foundation, it is easy for him to acquit himself to those, who have a Right to examine into his Conduct: and therefore not only that Liberty should be given him, but as the Person, or Persons preferring this Complaint, had a Right, if it had been true, to have demanded Justice to be done them on the Officer; therefore on its proving false, the Officer has a Right to expect Justice done him on the Person, or Persons, who have attack'd him thus maliciously. This would be shutting the Door upon those, whose  
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Complaints have no foundation in Truth; and leave them only the Means of spreading Scandal and Defamation, under the Cover of the Multitude, in the manner that was lately done, upon an Officer whose Behaviour and Conduct met with, as it deserved, the highest Approbation of a Court Martial; which as it has purged away the Venom, this conceal'd Adder so industriously had poison'd the Publick with, so it will, I hope, for the future, prevent any Credit to be given to such groundless Reports, as blacken the Reputation of Men, in the most delicate Part; and which are propagated by those, who would tremble to be expos'd to the Danger, which he on whom he casts Reflections, has oftentimes seen without fear. These Men, when no Enemy opposes, hold it practicable to take with one Ship of ours, even of inferiour Force, two of the Enemy's. But were they brought to a Sight of the Enemy, would be the first to propose running away from one. These Wretches, who thus peaceably would establish themselves into a Reputation of being brave, at the Ruin of an Officer's Credit, are not worth the Notice of any Man. But I am sorry to find in general, that there should be so unreasonable an Expectation from Officers as there is; and that we so over-rate ourselves and under-rate the Enemy, whose Ships of about the same Number of Guns, are far from being an indifferent Match for two of ours; their Superiority over us lying in the great Difference of the Weight of Metal, their much greater Number of Officers and Men, and the Goodness and Strength of their Men of War: add to which, that they are in all respects better appointed and disciplin'd for Action. Yet an Officer engaged singly, would stand but in  
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bad credit if he made a drawn Battle; as he would, if he fled from two Ships of the Enemy, of a proportionable Force I have been mentioning, without first engaging them. What Consequences such Expectations may produce, I am concern'd to think of; since they must either be the obliging Officers to throw off all Concern for their Conduct, to gain a Credit of Bravery, at the Expence of the King's Ship; or by being prudently and discreetly brave, make them meet with Ignominy and Reproach, instead of Applause. Yet I hope, tho' this shou'd be the Return, that the Officers of the Navy will choose to deserve well, whether they meet their Reward or not; rather than to court Fame, at the Loss of real Glory. For my own part, I know but this Way to it, to take every Advantage of the Enemy; and to suffer the Enemy to take no one, that can be avoided.

And now let me call upon every Man, who is a Friend to Justice and his Country, and ask him, if the Grievances I have mentioned as belonging to Sea-Officers, are not such as ought in Reason and Justice to be redressed? If they are, then let us set about it. And whilst we look up to our Admirals, as those whom we more particularly entrust with the Care of our Liberties, our Lives and our Fortunes; let us resolve not any longer to suffer them to fall from the Dignity so great a Charge honours them with, but support their Characters at least by a constant Continuance of their present Pay, if not by a farther Addition.

And now I think it time to say, that tho' I have chose to make use of the Arguments of Justice to dispose us to keep our Officers in constant Pay, that nevertheless the Necessity of

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of the Service in doing it would be a sufficient Reason of itself; and which we could not dispense with, admitting my Scheme to be pursued, in regard to the keeping up a Number of Seamen in peaceable Times; the Advantage of which, I flatter myself to have been able to convince every one of. It cannot, I say then, but follow, that where we employ Seamen, we must likewise employ Officers. Here then I will content myself with the Reasons I have made use of, in support of the many Proposals I have made, without entering into any farther Debate or Argument in justification of the Plan I have already delineated; and of which I shall now give a more clear and general Description, as far as regards the Navy in peaceable Times. However, as some things will occur, of which I have not yet spoke, I shall therefore in as short a manner as possible, point out their Advantages.

In the Plan of the Navy, I would have it settled, that all Admirals, Captains, Lieutenants, and Warrant-Officers, should be employed constantly in it in their respective Stations, together with such petty Officers as might be thought necessary, to answer to the Number of Seamen on board each Ship; which Number I have before regulated by the Number of Guns.

In settling the Disposition to be made of the Officers, every Captain should have a Ship which from his Seniority he was entitled to command: Thus the seven first Rates should be commanded by the seven oldest Captains; and proceeding on in the same course, every other Captain should be placed in his proper Order, with the Rank as follows. Those commanding first, second, third, and fourth Rates, should have the establish'd Rank of Colonels; Commanders of fifth and sixth

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sixth Rates, should have Rank as Lieutenant-Colonels; and those commanding Fire-ships, Sloops and Bombs, that of Majors: Also on board each Line of Battle Ship should be an Officer, with the Rank and Pay of a Captain of Foot. And the Lieutenants I would, as I have before said, have a better Appointment of Pay, and to rank with Captain-Lieutenants in the Army. The establishing a Rank in this manner, would not only be of service, in respect of placing the oldest Officers always in the largest Ships; but it would have this good effect, that Officers in general would more cheerfully and better serve, as the near Prospect of Preferment from one Step to another would always keep their Hopes alive; and give them new Spirits on their succeeding to it. Whereas, when they are now made Captains, they continue in that Station without any Distinction for perhaps thirty Years together, till Ambition, for want of being fed, is languished into an Indifferency and Dis-relish for Preferments.

The Officers, when regulated in this manner, should reside at the Port where their respective Ships were, there to be under the Direction of an Admiral or Admirals. And the Fleet thus manned with their Complement of Officers, and such a Number of Men as answer'd to the Number of Guns each Ship carried, should be disposed of at the three principal Ports, *viz. Portsmouth, Chatham and Plymouth*, in a proportion that best might answer the speediest Equipments; and that they might always be in a certain Forwardness, every Ship should have her standing Masts constantly in and rigg'd, with her Booms and Stores aboard, sufficient to compleat her other Rigging; as also her Ballast and Ground-Tier of Water.

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However, if the Expence of Stores should be thought too great, my Proposal need not be executed in so general a manner.

Next, that we might provide an active Strength, I would have out of the Number of Seamen kept in constant Pay, ten Ships of the Line mann'd to their middle Complement, five of which should be at *Spithead*, three at the *Nore*, and two at *Plymouth*, and all of them kept in a constant Readiness for Sailing; and besides manning these Ships out of those in the Harbour, I would also mann all our Cruizers (that is, Twenty-Gun Ships and Sloops) that were either necessary to be station'd in the Channel, or on the *Irish Coast*: But all others that were to be station'd abroad, should have their Complements made up out of the Naval Seamen, who were not kept constantly in his Majesty's Pay; no more being to be spared them from the Ships, than their established Number when in Harbour. Our Channel-Cruizers, at the same time they guarded our Coast against Smugglers, might also, by running now and then into the *French Ports*, give us timely intelligence of any Preparation they were making to fit out their Ships; in such case, our Cruizers may be called in, to assist with their Men in getting the Fleet in a Readiness for the Sea; which, from its being in so constant a Forwardness, would soon and easily be effected, and a great Number of Ships soon mann'd by means of our constant Strength, together with the Demand we should have on our Trade. The Use that I would propose to have made of the above-mention'd ten Ships of the Line, should be when there was no immediate want of them; the relieving every Year in the Summer Season our Garisons of *Gibraltar* and

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*Port-Mabon*, and visiting such Places in the *Mediterranean*, where it might be necessary to renew and confirm our Treaties, or to demand Justice for any Breach of them. Upon the Return of these Ships from this Service, they should go into Harbour, and the same Number mann'd with other Men should be sent out, and disposed of in the manner they before were. The Men on board the Home-Cruizers should be changed every six Months, that all might take their Tour of Duty with most Ease to themselves and Advantage to the Publick. And that every Officer and Seaman, in his Majesty's Service, might know what Duty was to be expected from him, and what Indulgencies they were to be entitled to, and not to have those Things absolutely depend, as they now do, upon the Will and Humour of every Commander; by which means, every Officer and Seaman changing his Ship, experiences also a Change of Government, which cannot fail of producing Confusion and Discontent: for whilst one Captain unreasonably exerts his Power to the utmost Stretch of it, and lays down a Plan regulated by his Temper, so another of a contrary Turn shall suffer a total Neglect of Duty, and a Non-observance of every thing that is proper. For these Reasons therefore, an uniform Discipline should be establish'd by Admirals and Commanders, in which it should be settled among other things, that an entire Subordination be paid not only from Seamen to Officers, and from Officers to superiour ones in the same Ship, but also from all Seamen in general to all Officers, and all Officers in general to their Superiours. In order to which, an uniform Cloathing should be wore by the Officers, distinguishing their Character and Rank.

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Rank. I would also propose to have Ship Courts-Martial established, to take cognizance of and punish Crimes of an inferiour Sort, committed by Petty Officers and Seamen belonging to any particular Ship. This Court should be composed of the Commander, and all Commission and Warrant-Officers, and their Votes given by Ballot, as indeed should the Votes in all general Courts-Martial be. This Proposal I have made, could not fail if put in execution, to strengthen and add weight to the Authority of the Officers, as the Seamen in this case would look upon them as their Judges; and as a Punishment directed by a Number carries a greater face of Justice with it, than when directed by one, therefore the Seamen incurring it would be left without any ground for Murmurings or Complaints; nor would they, in all probability, so often offend as now, as the Limitation of the Punishment now given, need not then be so confined, and which from its being so at present becomes rather a Matter of Jest, than a Thing to fear. It is true indeed, that in a Fleet, upon the Commander's Application to the Admiral, any Offender would be tried at a General Court-Martial; but if every one that deserves a greater Punishment than can be inflicted on him by the Captain was to be tried, the Time of the Admiral and the Commanders in the Fleet would be wholly taken up in doing it; from all which, the Necessity of Ship Courts-Martial more evidently appears.

Neglects or Misdemeanours committed by Officers, the Commander of the Ship should have a power to punish, by Confinement for a limited Time: others, of a nature requiring a Court-Martial,

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Martial, the Confinement might be as now extended till the Ship joined an Admiral, or Commander in Chief, with this Difference from the present Practice, that it should always be at large in the Ship, unless in the Case of Capital Crimes or Lunacy, and then the Person should be kept a Prisoner in his Cabin. To discountenance, as much as possible, any mean, low or base Behaviour amongst Officers, and to settle Disputes and Differences arising between them, a Court of Honour should be establish'd both in the Corps of Commanders and Lieutenants, to which every one who had Complaint to make should apply; and whatever Decision was given by the Court, either in regard to Disputes, or the Behaviour of any Person, it should be esteemed both final, and as the Act of the whole Corps: therefore on the fixing an Odium upon any Person, he should stand in that degree of Disgrace with every body, which the Censure of the Court should have pronounced. And tho' no Power of Punishment could be invested in that Court, farther than marking the Characters of People, and bringing them into Shame and Contempt; yet it is not to be doubted, but this Power would have so good an effect, that Men would be very cautious of falling under its Censure, and the more so, as by publishing their Disgrace their Preferments might and ought to be kept back, if not wholly stopped.

These then are the Regulations I would have the Navy of *Great Britain* put under; to which I could add others, which tho' not so material, yet nevertheless would be of great use: but as they would be altogether Innovations, and attended with

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with a fresh Expence, I shall therefore make no mention of them, nor am I sanguine enough to expect that the whole of what I have already proposed will be receiv'd into practice; tho' from my Heart, I can declare that I know not any one Proposition I have made, whereby either the Honour, the Advantage, or Interest of the Nation is not promoted. Nevertheless, there are Men who are willing and inclined to point out Inconveniencies of one side, and not to attend to the Conveniencies arising on the other. These will insist on the great and constant Expence the Nation must be put to, in keeping the Navy in Commission in the manner I have laid down, without looking back for these twenty Years past upon the infinite Sums it has paid for the frequent Equipments of our Fleets; which would have much more than answered to the maintaining my Scheme, and which if it had been then on foot, instead of being engaged in a War so long as we have been, we might either have wholly avoided one, or by this time have reaped such Advantages from it, as would have obliged the Enemy to sue for Peace on our own Terms.

To these Men therefore, who answer this Description, I do not apply myself; but to those of my Countrymen, whose Judgment is unbiass'd by every thing but Justice, who weigh and consider impartially every Proposal, and receive or reject it, as its Advantages or Disadvantages to the Nation are found to be greatest. To these Men I submit my Scheme to an Enquiry, and if it shall be found by them more productive of the latter Sort than of the former, I will not only excuse them from giving me their Vote, but will join with

with them in condemning what I am inclined to flatter myself at present they will not disapprove.

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