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THOUGHTS
ON THE
OBJECT
OF A
FOREIGN SUBSIDY.

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vernment of France towards this country, the real aim and character of the war is, the general deliverance of Europe; and, unless the subsidiary treaty be accompanied by a distinct exposition of the system by which its deliverance is to be effected and maintained, no satisfactory result can be expected. Though, in the ordinary form of an offensive and defensive alliance, no outline be given of the ultimate basis upon which a peace with the common enemy is to be constructed; yet, in the present unprecedented state of the Continent, it is materially essential, that a public acknowledgment should be made of the exclusive conditions.

The total subversion of the balance of power, by the subjugation of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and the principalities of Germany, under the dominion of France, sufficiently proclaims the necessity

of a new fundamental compact, by which the independence of the various States, composing the great republic of Europe, should be permanently established.

But, in order that a clearer judgment may be formed of the basis upon which the balance should be founded, it is necessary that the relative power of the dependent and independent proportion of Europe, as far as the statistical accounts of different authors will allow, should be distinctly stated.*

Dependent Proportion.

	<i>Population.</i>	<i>Revenue.</i>	<i>Army.</i>
France - - - - -	28,000,000	30,000,000	600,000
States of Germany - -	15,000,000	7,000,000	
Spain - - - - -	11,000,000	8,000,000	
States of Italy - - -	11,000,000	7,000,000	
Holland - - - - -	3,000,000	3,000,000	
Belgium - - - - -	2,000,000	2,000,000	
Portugal - - - - -	2,000,000	2,000,000	
Swisserland - - - - -	2,000,000	1,000,000	
	<u>74,000,000</u>	<u>60,000,000</u>	<u>600,000</u>

* See Pinkerton, Boetticher, Hoeck, Tinseau, and Playfair.

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Independent Proportion.

	<i>Population.</i>	<i>Revenue.</i>	<i>Army.</i>
Russia - - - - -	36,000,000	11,000,000	600,000
Austria - - - - -	23,000,000	12,000,000	365,000
England* - - - - -	15,000,000	32,000,000	135,000
Prussia - - - - -	9,000,000	5,500,000	248,000
Turkey in Europe - -	8,000,000	7,000,000	150,000
Sweden - - - - -	3,000,000	1,500,000	48,000
Denmark - - - - -	2,500,000	1,500,000	70,000
	<u>96,500,000</u>	<u>70,500,000</u>	<u>1,616,000</u>

By this statement it is manifest, that France possesses a control over nearly one half of the population and revenue of Europe; and, if she be allowed a sufficient time to form an enlarged and comprehensive system, calculated to conciliate or suppress the spirit of opposition which now exists, and to give to the different countries the consistency of one consolidated power, she will be enabled to maintain a military force of 1,200,000 men; and render ineffectual whatever resistance the other powers may then

* This statement refers only to the permanent revenue and regular army of each state.

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be disposed to offer to her universal dominion. What remains is much less difficult than what she has already accomplished. Had any statesman, twelve years ago, predicted that she would have overrun the proportion of Europe which her armies now occupy, his prediction would have been derided as the rhapsody of a Quixotte. Great as were the powers of Mr. Burke's mind, and prophetic as were his words, even he was incapable of divining the triumphs which she has achieved. But the means that can now be combined to resist her aggrandisement are diminished, and the means which she can adduce to assert it are increased. No doubt can, therefore, be entertained of the necessity of an immediate and universal confederacy to defeat, while defeat is practicable, the half-completed project of her ambition.*

* For the complete control of the government of France over those states whom she characterises by the title of her allies, see the able and masterly Treatise of Mr. Gentz, p. 266

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The object of the war is, therefore, clear and distinct; it is to restore the vital principle of the constitution of Europe—the balance of power; to rescue from the dominion of France the proportion of Europe, which the revolution has subjected to her arms; and to give to its governments a firm and efficient character, that will enable them not only to secure their own independence from future innovation, but to support the general balance of the other states.

But, from the little disposition which the continental powers have hitherto shewn to form a co-operation, no one has ventured to extend its demands further than to require the evacuation of lower Italy and Holland, leaving upper Italy, Swisserland, the states of Germany on the left of the Rhine, and the Austrian Netherlands, to be incorporated for ever with the integrity of France; though such an accession would give her an indis-

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putable ascendancy over every other power, and endanger the ultimate liberties of Europe.

But if a confederacy be now formed, and it be assumed, that the French can be dispossessed of all the territory which they acquired in the revolutionary war, it is perfectly reasonable that the public should be informed of the distribution which is to be subsequently made of it, before they become a party to the coalition by the grant of a subsidy.

It has certainly been surmised, that the pre-existing relations were to be reestablished; but however much the restoration of the previous system is to be preferred to any division of the ceded territories among the coalesced parties; yet, unless its imperfections be corrected by a broader participation of interest among the weaker states,

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no hope of permanent security can be formed. I am willing to admit, that antecedently to the French revolution, the balance was maintained with as much efficacy as the disconnected state of Europe, from its impolitic subdivision into so many different governments would allow. But the little resistance which the minor powers, in consequence of their separate and disunited authority, were capable of opposing to the arms of France, notwithstanding the protection which they received from the joint exertions of Russia, Austria, and England, indisputably attests the insufficiency of the former relations.— Unless, therefore, some resource be devised, of establishing among them a more effective confederation, and giving them the means of a competent defence, by concentration of force, and amity of operation, it will be impracticable to uphold their future independence, and maintain a durable balance of power.

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The only basis upon which an efficient system, conformably with this fundamental principle, can be grounded, is, by dividing that proportion of Europe, now occupied by the arms of France, into three independent kingdoms, by consolidating Belgium and Holland into one independent sovereignty; the inferior states of Germany into another; and the whole country of Italy into a third; as each kingdom would then possess a sufficient degree of internal strength to repel the aggression of any other power.

But in order to explain the practicability of this system, it is necessary to examine the interior and exterior obstacles that would oppose themselves to its completion.

The union of Belgium and Holland was projected in the enlightened reigns of Elizabeth and Henry the fourth; but no favorable opportunity then occurred for the exe-

ention of the measure ; though, had such a juncture arisen, the difference that then subsisted in the religious opinions of the two countries might, probably, have caused a serious obstacle to its success. But the spirit of toleration which their governments have since manifested, is sufficient evidence that no variation in the tenets of their faith would now originate the slightest difficulty ; and so far from any probability of the smallest internal opposition, there is not the least doubt but that, if the expulsion of the French forces were effected, the different States would eagerly embrace the junction, and exult in their deliverance from the abject condition to which they are now reduced.

The constitution which every Englishman would suggest for their federal establishment, would naturally bear a near resemblance to that of his own country ; but whatever were the form of government,

the archduke Charles, by the natural right of his family, his personal qualifications, and martial character, unquestionably prefers the fairest claim to the supreme magistracy, though provision should at the same time be made, that the sovereignty should never merge in the imperial dignity. Upon failure of issue the crown should devolve on the house of Orange, who should be publicly acknowledged the next in succession, and be reinstated in all the emoluments attached to its former inheritance. The seat of government should be fixed at Antwerp, and every exertion should be made by this country, consistently with its own security, to revive the opulence and power for which these countries were once so eminent.*

* In the wars of William, Holland alone, with no greater population than it now possesses, maintained a regular army of 150,000 men, and 80 ships of the line.

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During a period of profound tranquillity it would certainly have been wholly impracticable to have engaged the independent princes of Germany in the formation of a federal government; but now, that in consequence of this very independence their territories have been overrun by a foreign enemy, that many of their states have been incorporated with France, that their constitution has been changed, their sovereignty disregarded, and every insult which their weakness could provoke, and an imperious soldiery devise, submissively endured, there may, perhaps, be greater facility in procuring their concurrence. The reluctance which they would, in ordinary times have shewn to the consolidation of their authority, would have arisen from the apprehension of suffering a personal degradation in descending from the station of a sovereign to the station of a subject.—But no loss of consequence or power could now be sustained; and so far from considering that

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they would suffer humiliation by being placed on a level with the houses of Northumberland, Bedford, and Marlborough, in this country, or of Condé and Orleans, in France, it is impossible not to conclude, that they would be raised to a higher state of exaltation, by being thus made the first subjects of a great kingdom, possessing that weight and influence which should ever accompany illustrious descent and opulence, than by being retained in the uncontrolled sovereignty of a petty state, without the power of executing a single act to make that sovereignty respected.—In the original formation of the Germanic constitution, the elected monarch possessed a real authority, and commanded the real service of his constituent chieftains, who acted in one body under one head. But, since the elective princes, by gradual encroachments, have at length reduced the imperial title to an empty name, and dispossessed it of all its privileges,

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except the claim of a military contingent, which the independent states are compelled, by their constitution, to contribute upon their concurrence to associate in the same war, they have become the distinct and unconnected rulers of separate provinces, without estimation or authority, instead of being the proud supporters of a powerful throne, receiving and imparting the splendour which it reflects. In the high political importance from which they have thus fallen, it is earnestly to be hoped, that they will be once more reinstated by a federal union, and that each will be willing to surrender his exclusive authority over a particular territory, for a general participation in the government of the whole. The same power, which each possessed in his individual, should be possessed by all in their collective capacity; and though for the purpose of forming an efficient government, the constitution should consist of another

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deliberative assembly, together with a sovereign power, yet the lower house * should be exclusively appointed by the upper, and be composed of the existing ministers of the different States, and the inferior nobility of the realm, each prince having the nomination of a given number, in proportion to the magnitude of his dominions; and the king should possess no prerogative beyond his veto.

The Duke of York, from the claims of his family, from his high alliances, and particularly his affinity to the house of Bran-

* It is necessary to remark, that the great body of the nobility of the continent hold, for the most part, the same position in society with the country gentlemen of England, and that but very few approach the situation of a British peer. The old nobility of France amounted to about 70,000 families. The inferior deliberative assembly would therefore, in some degree, resemble the House of Commons. A free representative system has not been found to be consistent with the social relations of the continent.

denburgh, from his practical knowledge of the principles of a free government, and his intimate acquaintance with the customs of the country, should unquestionably be preferred to the sovereign station. It is well known, that his Britannic Majesty bears a peculiar attachment to his German dominions; but as it is improbable, from a variation in the law of succession, that the electorate of Hanover will long continue in the same line with the throne of this country; and as its connection with England, from whom it can receive no adequate protection, has in the space of fifty years twice subjected it to the incursion of a French army, it is reasonable to presume, that this august personage, who has ever manifested the most benevolent sentiments for the happiness of his people, will shew no reluctance to the transference of his authority to the duke of York, when the resignation would confer so signal a benefit on this de-

voted part of his hereditary possessions. The crown should be declared for ever separate from the crown of Great Britain, and the electors of Saxony and Bavaria should be acknowledged the next in succession.

The imperial dignity, a distinction valueless from its authority, but honorable from its antiquity, should be declared hereditary in the house of Austria, and the republic of Swisserland should be annexed to its dominions as an indemnification for the loss of the military quota. The king of Prussia should receive compensation for the cession of his external dominions out of the adjoining territories. Belgium and Holland should likewise receive a certain proportion on the left of the Rhine. The ecclesiastical States should be secularised, and the seat of government be fixed at Frankfort on the Meyne.

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By this consolidation of power, the princes of Germany would be enabled to interfere with vigour and effect, in the general councils of Europe, and possess that influence to which, from their aggregate resources and strength, they would be so justly entitled. They would compose, from their illustrious descent, their extensive possessions, and great alliances, the most august assembly in Europe; and so far from being subjected to the indignities which they now receive, they would be capable of maintaining inviolate the universal balance of power against every aggressor.

The same obstacles which, prior to the French Revolution, would have obstructed the federal union of the German States, would have equally obstructed the federal union of the Italian. The courts of Turin, Parma, Modena, Florence, and Rome, and the various inferior principalities and repub-

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lics, however incompetent to maintain the dignified relations of sovereign States, would have been brought with great difficulty to have resigned their respective authorities to the crown of Naples, for any participation that might have been proposed to them in the collective government of the whole kingdom. But the experience which they have now attained of the inconsistent association of weakness and independence, might, perhaps, incline them, if they possessed the power of expressing their will, to a general concurrence in the consolidation of their power. The articles which the natural claims of the different States appear to suggest for the basis of their union, are, that the king of Naples should possess the sovereign authority over all Italy, exclusive of the Venetian and Milanese territory, which should be annexed for ever to the hereditary dominions of the house of Austria. The king of Sardinia should be declared the next

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in succession, and retain his sovereignty of Sardinia, but hold his seat in the council of Italy, as duke of Savoy. The constitution should be similar to the constitution proposed for the German States; each prince having a seat in the upper council, and the nomination of a given number of the nobility for the lower, according to the extent of his dominions. The different republics should be converted into principalities, the temporal authority of the Pope annulled, and the seat of government transferred to Rome.

It is not easy to conceive, after the total ruin of their country, in consequence of their disunion, that the present representative of the house of Savoy, or the illustrious princes of the inferior States, would make any attempt to impede the success of these arrangements, as they would be fully reinstated in all those emoluments that were

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appropriated to the support of their court and household; and contribute only that proportion to the public revenue, which was applied to the maintenance of their civil and military departments. The distinguished service which they would render to their country, the share which they would still continue to possess in its councils, and the near proximity which they would bear to the throne, would strongly operate to reconcile them to the union.

By this confederation of her various governments into one, this celebrated but fallen country, would once more assume a commanding attitude among the nations of Europe; and again attain to that influence which the exalted sentiments that still animate her leading characters, and the magnitude of her combined resources, are so well calculated to impart.

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Whatever internal obstacles might therefore have subsisted, antecedently to the French Revolution, to the establishment of these kingdoms, that event has wholly removed; and so far from presuming that any serious opposition would now be manifested, it is competent to conclude, that the utmost zeal would be shewn to promote their foundation.

If then the disposition here recommended were realised, if the territories now occupied by the arms of France were divided into three independent kingdoms, the republic of Europe would consist of States that bore a nearer proximity to each other, in relative force, than had ever before been effected; and little practicability would subsist of any future violation of the balance. For, as the ultimate freedom of each would depend upon the equality of its strength to the others, immediately that, by the combi-

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nation of any two, the safety of a third was endangered, a general confederacy of the remainder would be established, to prevent its submission. So far, therefore, as human foresight could provide, this distribution would constitute an effectual pledge of the security of all, as it would be an insuperable bar to the subsequent aggrandisement of any. But, in order to form an opinion of the exterior obstacles that might oppose the success of this disposition, it is necessary to examine how far the present views of the principal powers of Europe are consistent with such an obstruction to the future enlargement of their dominions.

Of the views of this country there can be no doubt, as the balance of power has long formed the great principle by which its political relations have been exclusively regulated. At an early period of the last century, on account of the ambition of

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Lewis XIV. to add to his dominions the inferior States that bordered on his territory, and to attain to a dangerous ascendancy above the other powers, by the accession of his family to the throne of Spain, this principle was regarded as the fundamental canon of the public law of Europe; and scarcely a treaty was made, without a full and explicit declaration of its* acknowledgment, and the general enactment of such stipulations, as were held to be in due conformity to the provisions which it suggested. But, though we have been more frequently led to enter into alliances for the purpose of defending the liberties of Europe against the encroachments of France, yet, in every other instance, where an attempt has been made to violate this principle, the same promptitude of intervention has been shewn. In 1756, a treaty was concluded with the

* See Chalmers's Collection of Treaties. Peace of Utrecht, vol. I. 348; and Quadruple Alliance, vol. I, p. 259.

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king of Prussia, to guarantee the integrity of his dominions against the united arms of Austria, Russia, and France; nor in 1773 should we, according to Mr. Burke, have rejected the alliance which France herself magnanimously proposed to us, to counteract the first dismemberment of Poland, had not the state of our American colonies rendered the diversion of our resources at that juncture a dangerous policy. In 1791 we armed against Russia, to prevent the further reduction of the power of Turkey; and in 1794, it was repeatedly avowed by Mr. Pitt, that the final partition of Poland should have been strenuously opposed, could our utmost efforts have afforded her a competent protection. The fullest reliance may therefore be placed on the exertions of this country, to promote that system, which promised, by the equality of its relations, the most effective and durable balance.

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Of the liberal and exalted views of the emperor of Russia his majesty's speech contains the most satisfactory assurance, and fully warrants the conclusion, that this distinguished sovereign will support, with equal zeal, the same enlightened policy. But of the precise sentiments which the court of Russia may entertain on the relative state of the powers of Europe, no systematic opinion can be formed, as she has been too recently advanced to the rank which she now holds in the scale of nations, to supply the necessary evidence for an authentic conclusion. But it may be justly contended, if her conduct be measured by her interest, that she will at all times endeavour to prevent the decisive superiority of any one particular country. But it may perhaps be conceived, that if the preceding distribution were effected, the liberties of Europe would be as much endangered by the preponderance of Russia, as they

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now are by the preponderance of France. But there would, in my opinion, be no foundation for such a conclusion, as there is an essential difference between the central and external position of a superior power. If the ascendant state be situated, like France, in the centre of inferior kingdoms, the difficulty of connected, and the inefficacy of separate operations, render resistance less practicable, and make their conquest, one by one, an easier achievement. But if her position be external, the means of combination are more simple, and the bonds of the confederacy more firm, as the united States form in their coalition one compacted empire. On Europe so combined, it may be safely affirmed that Russia, though in conjunction with Asia, would be wholly incapable of making a serious impression.

It is by no means evident, even prior to the French revolution, that the house of

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Austria would have shewn any decided opposition to this policy, as the acquisition of Venice and Swisserland, on account of their immediate contiguity to its territories, would have afforded complete indemnification for the loss of Belgium, and the surrender of the military contingent. But now that the Netherlands are annexed to France, and that the future nomination to the imperial dignity is in the uncontrolled power of the French government, and illusively proffered to the monarch,* who will the most submissively bend to its purposes, there is no reason whatever to conclude, that the present Emperor will be hostile to the system. His late communication to the courts of Europe of the hereditary title which it was his intention to bear, is an honourable

* Though the protestant faith be no longer an impediment, it is impossible that the king of Prussia can seriously entertain the conception, that this honor is ultimately destined for his house.

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pledge that he will make no humiliating compromise of his independence for the preservation of the imperial crown of Germany in his house; when, instead of being the free gift of independent princes, who justly appreciate his high claims, it must be borne as the disgraceful badge of servitude to a foreign power. With these sentiments respecting the probable continuance of the title, it is impossible not to conceive, that he would willingly make a surrender of his claim of the military contingent, and support the united sovereignty of the German States for the perpetual inheritance of this prescriptive distinction in his family, and the more substantial and valuable accession of Swisserland;* as, by this important mili-

* The independence of Swisserland, according to the modern policy of the court of Europe, could never be maintained, as the instant that a war was declared between Austria and France, it would necessarily form, from its advantageous situation, the point of attack, and be occupied by the successful party.

tary station, he would the more effectually be enabled to control the ambition of France, and maintain the general balance. The elevation of the arch-duke Charles to the throne of Holland and Flanders would secure an important alliance, should the house of Brandenburgh, at any future period, endanger his dominion by an hostile confederacy with the united States of Germany. In addition also to the advantages which Austria would obtain by this arrangement, from the unbroken integrity of her empire, every effort should be made by England to draw forth her inmost commercial resources, and to assist her in the establishment of a colonial system, and the formation of a naval power.

But Prussia would, perhaps, of all countries be the most essentially benefited by the foundation of these kingdoms, as it would be totally impossible, subsequent to their forma-

tion, that such a state of relations could subsist by any the most anomalous coalition, as could tend to the subversion of her independence; and it would be as much the permanent policy of the United States of Germany and the Low Countries to prevent her dismemberment by Austria and Russia, as it would be the permanent policy of Austria and Russia to prevent her dismemberment by them; and, as by the elevation of the duke of York to the throne of the United Principalities of Germany, a satisfactory counterbalance would be formed to the augmentation of power which the house of Austria would acquire by the accession of the archduke Charles to the throne of the Low Countries, she would be wholly secure from the effects of any present disposition to hostility in the imperial family. She would effectually, therefore, be relieved from the necessity, to which she now holds herself impelled from her relative inferiority,

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of purchasing, by a reluctant neutrality, the protection of France. The additional stability which she would receive by the exchange of her various scattered and detached dominions for an adjoining and integral territory, would operate as a further inducement to a full conformity in the new distribution.

If then the disposition of the courts of London, Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin, may be inferred from their general views or particular interests, it is reasonable to conclude, that they will earnestly endeavour to promote the success of this distribution; but other views and passions, unconnected with general policy, may doubtless intervene to obstruct its realization.

Should, however, the system be established, the power of Europe would be distributed in the following proportions:

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	<i>Population.</i>	<i>Revenue.</i>	<i>Army.</i>
Russia - - - -	36,000,000	11,000,000	600,000
France - - - -	28,000,000	30,000,000	500,000
Austria - - - -	26,000,000	14,000,000	400,000
England - - - -	15,000,000	32,000,000	250,000
Prussia - - - -	11,000,000	6,500,000	240,000
States of Germany	11,000,000	5,000,000	200,000
Spain - - - -	11,000,000	8,000,000	200,000
Italian States - -	10,000,000	6,000,000	200,000
Turkey in Europe	8,000,000	7,000,000	150,000
Belgium and Holland	7,000,000	6,000,000	150,000
Sweden - - - -	3,000,000	1,500,000	48,000
Denmark - - - -	2,500,000	1,500,000	70,000
Portugal - - - -	2,000,000	2,000,000	24,000
	<hr/> 170,50000	<hr/> 130,500,000	<hr/> 303,2000

By this distribution all the powers of which Europe is composed would be competent to maintain the relations of sovereign states, as each would possess not only the resources of defence, but the means of vindication. I do not, however, mean to contend, that this arrangement would correct

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all imperfections. If it were possible that a general council could be appointed, with full authority to form the proportions that were best calculated to support an universal balance, a more equable disposition would doubtless be made. But, though the more nearly that the different states approximated each other in relative force, the more nearly the distribution would attain to perfection, yet it is not indispensably necessary to the maintenance of a practical balance, that all the powers should severally possess the same exact proportion of force, as the inferior States would be, in a great degree, upheld by the jealousies of the superior, and guaranteed by the general courtesy of the system.* The independence, therefore,

* It may perhaps be conceived, that the relative power of the different states should not be wholly measured by their population and revenue, as Denmark and Sweden, notwithstanding their comparative inferiority, have more than once shaken the thrones of Austria and Russia, and as, in later times,

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of the three kingdoms of Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden, whose natural position secured them from the desolation of the French revolution, should on no account be violated. But since the Dutch, Belgic, German, and Italian states have been already subdued, and only subdued in consequence of their disunited governments, there can be no doubt but that it would be more consistent with the general interests of Europe to confederate them by a firm and connect-

the great Frederic, with no less disproportion of resources maintained his independence against the united arms of Austria, Russia, and France. But, in the present state of European tactics and government, it would be impracticable for the inferior states to form any rational prospect of success in similar circumstances from such instances. From the general proportion of the military force of all nations to the extent of their population, and from the general attainment of the same degree of science and discipline by the aggregate body of European soldiers, those states must necessarily possess the greatest power, who have the means of supporting the greatest population.

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ed system, that would oppose an irresistible barrier to the encroachments of any other power, than to reestablish the prior relations which rather invited than prevented attack, and which were wholly incapable of transferring on the sovereign the respect and dignity which such a station should always command, or giving to the subject that protection which is the essential end and requisite of all constituted authority. Had they been formed into three independent kingdoms antecedently to the revolution, and possessed of the military force which their resources would have justified, there is not the smallest reason to conclude, that they would not have been as successful in resisting its impression as Austria, Prussia, and England. But it is not the least evil of such governments, that by preventing the birth of those proud and patriotic sentiments, which the exploits of a great nation are calculated to impart to the meanest individual who belongs to

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it, they reduce the people to a state of spiritless humiliation, without the sense of glory or shame, and render them callous to the best feelings of our nature.

It is highly important, therefore, both for the general interests of Europe, and the particular interests of the devoted proportion which was previously occupied by the inferior states that this disposition should be accomplished; and, though it may not be conceived to form the most perfect arrangement that theory could devise, it would indisputably establish a more equable participation of power, and afford the means of maintaining a more efficient balance, than any system by which Europe has been hitherto governed.

Nor can it be urged against this system, that it is less feasible than the restoration of the pre-existing relations. The very

same force which would reestablish them would establish this. If it were necessary that one doit more should be expended, that one man more should be raised, and that one drop of blood more should be shed, for the success of the one policy than the success of the other, it would be incumbent to admit, that there would be some reason for the renewal of the former disposition. But, since the application of the same means would be requisite for both, it is the duty of those who regulate the destinies of the world, to endeavour to extract good out of evil, by raising from the ruins, which the French revolution has spread, a great and enlightened system, that would exalt the state of Europe to a higher degree of prosperity than it had ever before attained.

But how far the continental powers may be disposed to co-operate against the present aggrandizement of France, there are no

documents by which the public can at present determine, though by what dim and purblind policy the coalition be prevented or procrastinated it is not easy to conceive. If the principle of the balance of power partook of the specious but flimsy philosophy of the Eutopian school, some justification of their forbearance might be urged; but since it is a sound and practical doctrine connatural with the political system of Europe, and forming the moral tenure by which each state holds its exclusive sovereignty, since it has been uniformly acknowledged by all statesmen, acted upon by all governments, and recognised in the most solemn national engagements, it is difficult to reconcile their present conduct with any of the views by which the councils of Europe have been hitherto guided.

At the commencement of the preceding

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century, when Lewis XIV. by the splendid enterprises of his early reign, and the conclusion of the Spanish match, manifested a disposition to subvert the ultimate balance, the powers of Europe, directed by the genius of William, Marlborough, and Eugene, compelled him to the renunciation of his conquests, and a formal admission of the perpetual separation of the two crowns; and if the exertions of these characters have received the unanimous approbation of posterity, for their defeat of his comparatively unambitious projects, it is somewhat singular that there should now be a pause, when one half of Europe is subdued, and all the means which its conquest supplies are studiously collecting to subdue the other; when not only Spain, but Belgium, Holland, the principalities of Germany, Italy, and Portugal, are virtually united with France into one Empire, and when the advanced posts of

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its armies are at the very gates of Berlin and Vienna.* It is true, that France has not yet been capable of deriving from these countries the whole of those resources which one connected supremacy would give; and it is for this reason, that the sword must be now drawn, or sheathed for ever. It is conceived by some, well qualified to judge, that all resistance is even now ineffectual; but whatever difference of opinion there may be, respecting the efficacy of an universal combination of the independent powers at the present moment, there can be but one sentiment of its utter inefficacy, at the period when her immense power will be fully consolidated, and she will possess a population of 70,000,000, a permanent revenue of 60,000,000*l.* and a regular army

* It may be said, that the French army is not in the actual possession of the Electorate of Bavaria; but it is well known that no resistance could be made.

of 1,200,000 men.* Were they now to form a coalition, there would be a co-operation of 1,600,000 men against 600,000; and notwithstanding the disadvantages which the allies would suffer, from the impracticability of bringing into the field more than a given proportion of their force, against the concentrated strength of France, from the uncertainty of effective concert in the military operations of different countries, and from the difficulty of repairing the waste of their armies, no apprehension need be entertained of the eventual result.

But if the confederacy be formed, the very same principle which caused it to reduce the ascendant greatness of France, should cause it to establish a just system of

* For the inconsistency of the conduct and language of the French government, its constant professions of moderation, and its constant acts of aggrandisement, see sir Francis D'Ivernois, page 65.

equable power upon its subversion. Many plans might, doubtless, be devised, by which the evacuated territory should be distributed; but unless the distribution were made in conformity to the principle of the balance of power, with a full reservation of the rights of the fallen princes, who should be admitted to a due participation in the federal governments, according to the extent of their former dominions, no just, pacific, and durable system could be matured. That the disposition which I have recommended would more effectually provide for the future maintenance of the balance, and make a more equitable retribution to the expelled princes, than any other arrangement that could be formed, I by no means contend.— I have merely traced the outline which the subsisting relations of the different states seemed to me to dictate, for the purpose of shewing the general practicability of complying with the provisions which the balance

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prescribes. But, whatever be the ultimate terms of peace, it is by this great constitutional principle of Europe that they should be exclusively tried; and in proportion as they approximated or receded from the conditions which it suggested, they would be favorable or detrimental to the interests of the world.

Previous, therefore, to the grant of a Foreign Subsidy, it is highly necessary that the views of the confederated parties should be distinctly avowed, in order that the public may be enabled to rely with implicit confidence on their firm determination, without any clandestine or sinister object to establish the balance of power, on the basis best calculated to secure from future violation the general Constitution of Europe.

THE END.

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