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AN HUMBLE
ADDRESS
TO THE
People of *ENGLAND*.

Being, A
DEMONSTRATION

That a **LAND-TAX** is more prejudicial
to **TRADE** and **LIBERTY**, than an **INLAND**
DUTY on *WINE* and *TOBACCO*.

Rumor, res sine teste, sine judice, maligna, fallax.
Seek Truth, not Ornament; and study only to be in
the Right, and to be understood. *Lock.*

L O N D O N:

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Humble Address, &c.



THE Publick *Revenue* of every State must be in Proportion to the Riches and Grandeur of that State. Whoever murmurs and repines at the raising of a Competency to support the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, and to preserve such a Force and Strength in the Kingdom as is absolutely necessary to protect us, and our Trade upon any emergent Occasion, is an Enemy to his native Country, and unworthy to live under his Government.

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An Humble Address to

However, this publick Revenue should be so levied and so collected as to be as little Clog, Impediment or Obstruction to Trade, as possible, and of no Prejudice to the Liberties of a free People.

When two different Kinds of Taxation are proposed to the Legislature, that should in right Reason take place, which is the best calculated to encourage the fair, upright and tributary Trader, to suppress all Clandestine and Undermining Ones, and is the greatest Preservative of our Liberties.

Whether a Land-Tax or a Tax upon Commodities be preferable upon these Considerations is what I shall examine into. And upon an equitable and impartial Enquiry we shall attempt to demonstrate by a Chain of plain and familiar Reasoning, accommodated to the lowest Understanding, that a Land-Tax is the most grievous, and therefore that a Tax upon Commodities is the most eligible.

Much empty Clamour has been disgorged against a general Excise, but to no other Purpose than to wind up the injudicious Part of the People to the greatest Pitch of Madness and Enthusiasm, no such Design ever entering into the Heart of any Man, but those who have exclaim'd so loudly against it. So far is the Scheme intended from saddling us with a general

the People of England.

general Excise, or having any Tendency thereto, that on the contrary, it will appear by the Sequel hereof, to be the most effectual Step to free us from what is properly a general Excise: I mean a Land-Tax.

Every one knows, that the Project in Agitation was thought of with a View to the Ease of the Landed Interest, the true Interest of Trade, the Increase of the Revenue without laying any New Tax upon the People, or without charging any New Duty on any Commodity whatever, and without putting the Merchant to greater Trouble, or the Consumer to greater Expence.

But, first, let us consider the Effects of a Land-Tax; from which this Design is to free us. And this to me has ever appear'd of the greatest Danger to our Liberties, as by discouraging and weakening our Trade it renders the People less able to defend them. For the Ease of the Land, and turning as much of the Current Money as possible into the Hands of the Landed Men is the strongest Safeguard, Barrier and Security to our Liberties, and the greatest Protection of our Trade in Times of imminent Danger.

Self-Preservation is the grand and primary Principle of human Nature. To fix and establish our Liberties upon such a Foundation, upon such a Rock, must be the most sovereign

The bad Effects of the Land Tax.

An Humble Address to

sovereign Preservative of them. And if we can fix them in the Hands of the Landed Part of the Nation, and make it for the Interest and Preservation of them, and their Posterity to uphold us in our Liberties, they must be allowed much safer in their Hands than any other. For while the Money and personal Riches of the Nation are chiefly in the Hands of the Landed Men, they then lie under the greatest Obligations, the strongest Ties to maintain the Liberties of the whole Nation. For if any Attack should be made upon Liberty, the Landholder would remain immoveable by his Land, and all his Dependents with an inflexible Concord and Unanimity would adhere to the Interest of their Lord, while he had Money and Riches, to oppose Tyranny and Arbitrary Power.

The Loss of Liberty to them is the Loss of their Titles, their Possessions and Property in their Estates; and therefore we may with the greatest Degree of Reason believe, they will ever be, not only the most hearty, but most successful Friends to Liberty; because they will have the greatest Interest in Liberty, and a fix'd immoveable Property, with a sufficiency of Wealth to defend it. Those who are only Proprietors of Money and portable Property, can never with that Security be rely'd on for the Support of our Liberties, as the Landed Men may; because their Circumstances are quite different. " For, as Mr. Lock justly observes, when a Nation

the People of England.

" Nation is running to Decay and Ruin, the Merchant and Monied Man, do what you can, will be sure to starve last: Observe it where you will, the Decays that come upon, and bring to Ruin any Country, do constantly first fall upon the Land." &c. Merchants and Monied Men can remove their Estates and Persons from us, in Times of Usurpation and Slavery into some Neighbour Nation, where they may think themselves and their Properties more secure.

This is no whimsical or imaginary Suggestion, but founded in Nature and Reason, and is what has been experienced by divers Nations. Did not the States of Holland commence their Strength, Grandeur and Formidableness from the Tyranny, Oppression and Persecution of other Nations? Did not such whose Property consisted in portable Commodities transplant themselves and their Effects in times of Persecution into the Low-Countries, where Liberty was enjoy'd, whilst the Landowners of these Countries, being poor, and having no other Dependence but on the bare Produce of their Lands, were unable to resist the Torrent of arbitrary Power? They were oblig'd tamely to submit to the Yoke, to undergo the most abject Slavery, and subject themselves to the Caprice and Will of an absolute Monarch.

But had the Landholders been possess'd of a proportionate Part of the Money and Riches of the Nation, they would have been able to resist the Torrent of arbitrary Power, and to maintain their Liberties and Properties more secure.

An Humble Address to

Nation, besides their Lands, they would have made Head against every Oppression, and supported the Liberties of their Fellow Subjects for their own Interest, and by their own Strength and Riches. For Liberty, like Justice in Law, can never be enjoy'd, but by those who have Interest in pursuing it, and Strength of Purse to hold out a long Contest and Struggle to procure and defend it.

From this plain and familiar Way of Reasoning, the Consequence I aim at is clear and obvious; viz. that every Oppression of the Landed Interest, is so far prejudicial to our Liberties as it renders the Guardians, Assertors and Protectors of them less capable of maintaining 'em, when there may be a Necessity for it.

But if we scrutinize minutely into the natural and inevitable Consequences of a Land-Tax, we shall find, that not only our LIBERTIES are the better secur'd by easing the Landholders, but that the taking off the Land-Tax is the most effectual Means to preserve and propagate our Commerce.

A Tax upon Land, no more than a Tax upon any Species of portable Commodities, will fall wholly on the Proprietor; For the Landlord in Time will raise his Rent in Proportion to the Tax, as well as the Proprietors of any Species of trafficable Commodities will raise the Price of his Goods. The only Difference

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the People of England

reference is this; that the Effects of a Land-Tax are not so immediately felt as those upon personal Property, but they grow upon us by gentle and imperceptible Gradations. So that when any ill Effects of a long continued Land-Tax upon our Trade glaringly appear, and discover themselves to the People, the Burthen cannot suddenly be taken off, but the Cure must be effected by a long Series of wise Measures, which must be of equal Duration to those which produced them. Like a Chronic Malady, that has been Ten Years contracting, which requires the same Number of Years Temperance, Phyfick and Patience to get thoroughly rid of it. As the Land-Tax has been of so many Years Continuance, and has spread and disseminated its self into the whole Produce of our Nation, it is full Time to think of removing it. And it will be to the eternal Glory of that Administration which shall lay the Foundation whereby to effect so great and momentous a Design.

A Land-Tax continued for many Years must raise the Price of all the Necessaries of Life, and of all the Produce of our Lands, which compose our Manufactures. Such a Tax is a general Excise, as nothing of our own Growth or Production can escape its Effects. For the Earth itself pays nothing, but the Produce of it pays all. The Landlord first raises his Rent to discharge the heavy Burden, and to support

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An Humble Address to

support his Family; the Tenant then raises the Produce of that Land to discharge his Rent, and support his Family. This soon diffuses itself through all the various Species of Commodities the Land yields, as Beef, Mutton, Bread, Butter and Cheese, Flax and Wool, &c. and every Thing necessary for our common Subsistence, as well as for making our Manufactures for Exportation, becomes dearer in Proportion to the Greatness and Duration of a Land Tax. This enhances the Price of Labour; for the Commodities being raised the Labourer cannot subsist without proportioning the Value of his Labour to the Value of those Things necessary to his Sustenance and Support.

When therefore a Tax upon all our Home Production has continued till it has augmented the Prices of our Home Manufactures, it must necessarily diminish our Exportations, and become destructive of the most beneficial Branch of our Trade. To satisfy ourselves that this has been our Case in *England*, we need only consider the great Increase on the Produce of our Land, since the first Commencement of the Land Tax. Our Meat, Bread and other common Necessaries of Life have been raised more than one fifth part in their Value, and the Price of Labour has encreased in Proportion; from whence it is a necessary Consequence that our Manufactures made of our own Produce, and work'd up by our Natives must

the People of England.

must be one Fifth dearer than before we had such a *Land-Tax*. And the true Cause why other Countries have engrossed so considerable a Part of our Trade, is, because they have no such Incumbrance upon the Produce of their Lands, and therefore they can greatly undersell us in the Staple Manufactures of our own Nation.

That our Manufacturers at Home feel the Effects of a Land-Tax is apparent and unquestionable from their frequent Insurrections in divers Parts of the Kingdom. These poor People, when they feel the Effects of such a Tax, though they see not the Cause, grow enraged with their Superiors, who they justly suppose should relieve them.

The bad Effects of a Land-Tax to our Trade are still more aggravated by considering, that if our *Taxes* are all laid upon Land, our Home Produce would all, in a small Revolution of Time, be raised in its Value in Proportion as the Value of the whole Tax bears to the Income of the Land; and all Superfluities and Luxuries of foreign Production would be so much decreased in their *Price* as our own would be raised by paying the Tax.

Thus our own *Commodities* growing dear by the Continuance of a Land-Tax, and foreign *Commodities* cheap by being exempted

An Humble Address to

from any Tax, our Inhabitants would be consuming the *Produce* of other Nations, whilst we were unable to export our own.

Were we in such a Condition as this, every one who consumed any thing of foreign *Production*, would give away so much of the Nation's Riches to other Countries. The Consequence of which would be in Time, that the most active and discerning Part of the People; when they beheld their Trade and their Wealth remov'd to other Countries, and their own Country impoverish'd, would soon follow and settle with them. So that in a Series of Years none but the Dregs of the mechanical Part of the People would be left in the Bowels of the Nation to support its Trade, and raise its common Force.

To illustrate the destructive Consequences of a Land-Tax a little further, I would suppose, as some have argued for, that the whole present *Revenue* of the State was raised from the Lands, which would at least amount to ten Shillings in the Pound; in such a Case, would not the Landholder raise his Rent accordingly? Certainly he would, and the *Tenant* must comply. For supposing the *Tenant* refuses, all those *Landholders*, who are capable of managing their own Lands, would take them into their own Hands, and then the Number of *Tenants* for those who could not occupy their own Lands, would be so numerous, that they would over-

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the People of England.

bid each other, till at length they came to a Standard of Rents, proportionably recompensing the *Landlords* for that Part of his Income deducted by the Burthen of the Tax.

It can never be imagined, that Men would retrench their Expences one Half, and submit to a meaner Degree of Life; we can never suppose their extraordinary Parsimony would supply so much of the Loss of their Estates as Ten Pounds in Twenty. No; That great Reluctancy visible in human Nature to sink in their Way of Life, to lower their Sail of Grandeur, and to deprive themselves of those Pleasures and Gayeties they have for a long Time been habituated to, manifests that *Gentlemen* will not easily be brought to live upon one Half of what they were wont. This is so obvious to every one that is not necessary to expatiate upon it. But admitting some few to submit to a Retrenchment of their Expences, and to proportion them to their neat Income, yet they would be so small a Minority as to have no Weight in the Ballance, so as to settle and establish the standing and determinate Price of the Rent of *Lands*. For the Standard Price of Rents would be ascertain'd and fix'd by the Disposition and Bent of the Majority of the *Proprietors*; which will always be for raising their Rents to such a Degree as to produce their accustom'd neat Profit. For which way soever the Majority inclines,

bid

An Humble Address to

the Minority in such a Case will always follow.

There is another Inconveniency to the Publick attending a Land-Tax, and that is from the Manner of collecting it. The proper Warrants, issued to the *Assessors* of every Parish, or District, are Injunctions to raise and levy a certain Sum out of those Districts; whereby the *Assessors* are empower'd to assign each Man his Proportion according to the Rent of the Land he possesses. Whence every Man, who by great Labour and Expence, improves his Land, and makes it more valuable and therefore may justly raise its Rent, is, by such Assessment oblig'd to pay more Money to the Crown for his extraordinary Industry; and he that by Neglect and Indolence suffers his Land to decay, and its Value to be reduced, is eas'd in his Taxes, for his ill Husbandry and Supineness; which is a great Discouragement to the Improvement and Culture of Land.

I appeal to every one, who liv'd before the Land-Tax was impos'd, whether all the common Necessaries of Life are not now at least one Fifth Part dearer than when the Tax was laid. And if that be Fact, from what Source could it arise? Not from the great Consumption of foreign Luxuries; because whoever indulges himself in feeding on them, makes no Use of the Necessaries of Life; but leaves his
Proportion

the People of England.

Proportion of them to the common Mafs: such a Man rather makes a Plenty than a Scarcity of his Country Commodities.

Neither can the Encrease of *Price* spring from converting many of the Necessaries of Life of our own *Production* into Superfluities or Luxuries; because those Luxuries, compos'd of our own *Production* are but in a small Degree luxurious, and make but a small *Proportion* when compared to those Things really necessary. And if we look through the whole Mafs of the *People*, we do not find one in ten or one in twenty addicted to any Luxuries of our *Home Production*.

But, if we enquire into the accustomed Rents of all the Lands in the Kingdom, and take them on an Average, we shall find them rais'd within these Forty Years near answerable to the whole *Land-Tax*, which has been levied; the Tenant must therefore raise his Produce accordingly.

These plain Observations, evident to the meanest Capacity, make it demonstrable that our long and heavy *Land-Tax* has been the only Cause of the Dearness of our home-made Commodities.

The next Thing natural to be enquired into, is, That if raising the *Revenue* from the Land be prejudicial to Trade, from what Quarter can

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it be raised not injurious to Trade? To this I would answer, That the best Way is to raise the publick Revenue from the Consumption of foreign *Luxuries* and *Superfluities* imported into our own Nation; and the Tax to be charged so high as there can be Means found out by the Government to oblige all to pay in Proportion to their Consumption; that none, or at least no considerable Quantity, should be consumed without paying the Tax in Prejudice to the fair and honest Trader. For, by raising the Revenue from the Consumption of foreign *Luxuries*, we shall make them dearer, and therefore have a less Consumption of than if cheaper, and consequently, have the greater Balance of Trade in our Favour. Besides, the *Taxes* being raised from the Consumption of these Things, that Branch of the Revenue would be raised from the rich and wealthy part of the People, nor would the poor *Manufacturers* and *Labourers* be any ways affected by it.

If this be admitted, the next Question is, Whether such a *Tax* is better raised from the *Merchant* on his *Importation*, or from the *Retailer* and nearer the Time of Consumption. And in this I think the latter preferable. For by collecting the *Duties* from the Retailer, our Ports may be render'd Free Ports, as to importing and exporting the same Commodities without any Trouble or Expence at the Importation, without advancing *Duties* or receiving Drawbacks. This Method lessen the Consumption

sumption of foreign Commodities, and procure us the Balance in Bullion.

Our *Merchants*, notwithstanding those *Luxuries* were not so plentifully consum'd here, might take them in Barter from his Correspondent, bring them into our own Ports, and re-export them to other Countries, which would consume them. Thus our *British* Merchants would become the *Carriers* of the World, our Navigation be improv'd, and the Ballance of *Trade* greatly augmented in our Favour.

It is very weak and ridiculous to suppose other Nations will take our Commodities, unless we take some nearly proportionate Quantity of theirs; so that we shall never obtain any considerable Balance by trading directly to one single Nation; but by carrying the *Luxuries* we receive from one Nation in Return for our Exports, into another, by a Series of Bartering we may in Time gain the Balance in Bullion of most Nations we have any Commerce with.

And this prodigious Advancement of Trade and Riches can never be effectually arrived at, but by having our own Ports open and free for *Importation* and *Exportation* without the least Molestation or Expence. Then might it be said of *England*, as Sir *William Temple* does of the *Dutch*, viz. "That the Freedom of our Ports, and Lowness of our *Customs* would
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An Humble Address to

both Strangers and Natives to bring Com-
modities hither, not only as to a Market, but
as to a Magazine, where they lodge till
they are invited Abroad to other and better
Markets.

Altho' on the Payment of Duties the Draw-
back is received on Re-exportation; yet the
Merchant, if he pays his Duty, and receives
no more Drawback than he paid, the Interest
of his Money is lost for the Time he keeps his
Goods in the Kingdom. And if he was to re-
ceive more on Exportation, than he paid on
Importation, then the publick Revenue would
be diminish'd; or if his Goods are Bonded,
the Crown always runs a Risque, and frequent-
ly sustains great Losses, which must be sup-
plied some other Way. So that consider the
Duties paid on Importation in whatever Light
you will, they will terminate in the publick
Loss, and prove detrimental to Trade.

The next Sorts of Commodities that in Rea-
son ought to be taxed, are the Luxuries of our
own Produce. For many of the Necessaries of
Life are the Ingredients which go to their
Composition, and are thereby wasted and de-
stroyed. But by raising one part of the Reve-
nue from them, would make them dearer, and
therefore lessen their Consumption. Hence
would arise these two good Effects. 1. That
fewer of the Necessaries of Life being destroy-
ed in such Luxuries, there would be greater
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the People of England.

Plenty of them, and consequently must be
thereby rendered cheaper; and the common
Necessaries of Life being cheaper, our Labou-
ers and Manufacturers would work for less,
and therefore our own Produce and Manu-
factures would be exported cheaper. 2. That
there would be fewer People enervated, and
rendered incapable of Service to the Publick,
by consuming such Luxuries when dear than
cheap.

But the popular Argument against a Pro-
ject for collecting the Revenue from foreign
Luxuries by an Inland Duty, nearer to the Time
of Consumption, and thereby easing the Land,
is, that our LIBERTIES are in Danger by the
Number of Officers employed in collecting the
Revenue in such a Manner.

As to the Security of our Liberties, that
depends on preserving an Equilibrium of Pow-
er between the Three States. And if the
Crown should be reduced in Power below its
just Share and Proportion, we should be in as
great Danger of falling into a Republican or
Aristocratical Government, as we should be of
coming under an absolute Monarchy, if the
Crown had more than its due Proportion of
Power.

To judge rightly of the Equality of Power
in the three States, it is necessary to consider in
what their respective Powers consist.

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An Humble Address to

The *Nobles*, as they are possessed of large Estates, and have such Honours and Titles as strike an Awe, and create a Reverence and Esteem in the Minds of the People, will always command a great Body of them, and therefore will be in little Danger of losing their Share of Power. Besides, they are invested with the supreme Jurisdiction in all secular Causes, and are the dernier Resort in the Administration of Justice. They likewise hold the Ballance between the *Prince* and the *People*; to maintain which, they are not only under the Ties of Honour, but the powerful and efficacious Principles of Self-Interest: For if the *Prerogative* be once extended beyond its due Limits and Boundaries, the Glory of the *Nobles* must be proportionably eclipsed; because, if the *Prerogative* was so far magnified and augmented as to empower the *Crown* arbitrarily to command the People, the *Nobles* themselves would become mere Cyphers in the State; their empty Titles, without Capacity of Resistance, as must be the Case upon such a Supposition, would carry but a low and despicable Idea in the Minds of the People. But,

It will ever be for the Interest of the *Prince* to support and uphold the Power and Dignity of the *Nobles*, they being his strongest Security against popular Factions, and clamorous Infatuations, which too frequently

the People of England.

quently causelessly agitate and inflame the Commonalty. We therefore need be under no dismal Apprehensions, that the *Nobility* will lose their just Share of Power, or that they will ever passively and tamely suffer the *Crown* to rob them of their Right.

The *Commons* of *England* consist of the whole Body of the Nation, by their *Representatives*, who are not only a very considerable Number, but for the most part Men of the greatest Estates amongst the Bulk of the People, and highly venerated and esteemed by the Generality. These *Gentlemen* have not only their Duty, as *Representatives* of the People, but their own personal Interest and Preservation, as *Commoners* and *Proprietors* of *Freehold*, to influence them to protect the *Liberties* and *Properties* of the People against any Encroachments of the *Crown*. To enable them to oppose any thing of this Kind, they have besides their own Estates, the Aid and Assistance of the Mass of the People, who, upon the least Degree of Reason, or even any bare Suggestion that their *Liberties* are abridged by the Enlargement of the *Prerogative*, would be ready to join them to keep the *Crown* within its own Sphere of Power.

And indeed most Ages have manifested, and daily Experience confirms the Truth of it, that the People of *England* have such an exquisite Relish for Liberty, that they are rather too credulous

An Humble Address to

credulous upon this Head, too easily led away and seduced by a small Part of that august Assembly, who shall clap on the Mark of Liberty, and thunder that in the Ears of the frantick Multitude. And as the greatest Part of the Nation is more affected by empty sound than solid Sense, it requires no extraordinary Skill to set the Multitude a raging against the best concerted Schemes. Sir Walter Raleigh goes so far as to say, speaking of the Rumours of the Multitude, "That they like Dogs at the Moon, when one barks all bark, and know not what they bark at."

And here, at this Juncture especially, I think it will not be improper, though a little digressional, to consider the Duty of a Representative with Regard to the Passions and Humours of People of this Stamp and Complexion.

Liberty could no more subsist without a limited Monarchy than it could with an absolute one; no discerning Representative and worthy Patriot therefore, will ever make the Voice of the headstrong and misguided Multitude the Rule and Standard of his Conduct, or countenance the modern Practice of giving Injunctions to Members of Parliament, as being destructive of our Constitution. Measures propos'd in Opposition to the general Cry, are not to be precipitately condemn'd upon the Authority of Noise, Clamor and Sophistry, nor the Welfare of the whole Community

the People of England.

Community to be postpon'd by Reason of the Prejudice, Interest or Partiality of a few.

I would not be understood to deny any Right in the Electors of Communicating their Sentiments to their Representatives, or to give them what Instructions, Information and Assistance they are capable of to direct them in forming their Judgment upon any momentous Affair. But it can never be thought reasonable and compatible with the Character of a Member of Parliament, that he shall be oblig'd to vote in the House according to the Instructions of his Electors; because the End of assembling for publick Conference is to reason upon, and unprejudic'dly examine into the Reasonableness or Unreasonableness of every Proposition that comes before them, always making the Publick Good the Criterion or Touchstone whereby to found their Resolutions. Was the Custom of injoyning Members to vote one Way without Regard to the Debates of the House to take place, the End of assembling and reasoning would be totally defeated.

Though many Boroughs and Counties may give wise Instructions to their Members, and form good and political Schemes for the Government of the whole, yet they would never form two alike. So that unless the Members have a discretionary Power of varying from, and voting contrary to, the Directions of their Principals, when for the Publick Good they find

An Humble Address to

find it just and equitable so to do, the *Members* could never come to one common Scheme for the Benefit of the whole Community. Besides,

In *Parliament* assembled the whole Body of the People is suppos'd to be present; and the only Reason for having Representatives, is, because the whole Body is too numerous to meet and assemble together. Now, if the People have made Choice of the ablest and best qualified Men to repose their Trust in, as must always be suppos'd, they must depend and rely wholly upon their Judgment and Integrity. For since the whole Body of any *County* or *Borough*, sending a Member, is incapable of being present in the publick Assembly, they cannot know the Reasons that may be there given, why the Instructions of any particular *Borough* ought not to be observed: And therefore it must be presum'd, that the whole *Borough*, if present with all its *Members* in the *House*, would, upon hearing better Arguments than had occur'd to them before, frequently alter their own Resolution without Doors, and act contrary to them within.

Unless therefore the *Members* are allowed to act discretionally in every *Debate* that comes before them, and have not their Understandings fetter'd and padlock'd, they can only be said to be the *Messengers* of the People; and not, with any Property, their *Representatives*;

the People of England.

Representatives; because they have not the same Power to act as the Body corporate would have had, if present with all its *Constituents*.

If indeed the Doctrine of our Modern *Malecontents* was to break in upon our *Constitution*, a Punctuality in observing Instructions, or carrying a Message would be the only Qualification for a *Member of Parliament*; a *Peasant* and a *Politician* may be equally good *Members*, a *Cobler* and a *Cato* equally brave *Senators*. However, to return to my chief Argument in View.

The *Representatives* in *Parliament*, having always the Affections of the Generality of the People, together with the Assistance of the *Nobles*, actuated thereto by Self-Preservation, will, always under the present Frame of Government, have a competent Force to repel any Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberties and Properties of the People.

I come next in order to consider, wherein consists the just Power of the *Crown* to balance with either of the other two.

And, if we take a View of the *Prince* in His *legislative Capacity*, it is certain no such Power is lodged there as in either of the other.

other. For the *King*, consider'd in that Relation, has no more Power than to put a Negative upon a Bill that shall be offered to be enacted as a Law. And such a Power as this will appear very trifling, if we consider, that the *Crown*, having nothing to support itself with, but the Concessions of the *Representatives* in *Parliament*, would always be under an indispenfible Necessity of assenting to every thing offer'd by *Parliament*. So that the Right of the *Royal Assent* to the Consummation of any Law, would dwindle to mere Figure and Form only: For the Power of Assenting and Dissenting, without the Power of Resisting, is the same as no Power at all.

The Proportion of Power therefore in the *Crown*, to make it equal with each of the other States, consists in having the *Executive Power*. This is the Power of appointing all *Civil* and *Military Officers* of the State, and bestowing Honours and Rewards upon such who shall have merited them: The *Crown*, having this Power, will always have a Body of Men attach'd to it; But while this Body is not superior to the Strength of either of the other two States, the *Crown* can never be properly said to have more than its just Share and Proportion of Power, consistent with our Constitution.

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There are many Disadvantages the *Crown* labours under more than both the other States, from having its Power arise from such a Source. And one of these is, that for every Post of Honour or Trust under the *Crown*, there are more *Competitors* than the *Crown* can possibly gratify. This, in the natural Course of things, creates many *standing* and irreconcilable Enemies; so that considering the Force and Number of them, the *Crown* has, in Reality, no more clear Power arising from all the Posts in its Gift than the Majority of its Friends, occasioned by their Enjoyment of Posts of Honour and Profit, after a Deduction from the whole of such a Number of Friends as are equal to the Enemies occasioned by Denials and Refusals of Preferment.

Those *Gentlemen*, who have happen'd to meet with Disappointments of that Sort, put on the Mask of *Patriotism*, and generally appear against the Measures of the *Administration* to conceal their true and uncounterfeit Motives: but these *Gentlemen*, should not in Reason be consider'd as *standing Friends* to their *Country*, but as *standing Enemies* to their *Prince*; and therefore it is highly reasonable that the *Prince* should have such a Number of *standing Friends* as are adequate to his *standing Enemies*, besides his just Equality of Power to ballance with the other Branches of the *Legislature*.

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Another great Disadvantage to the *Crown* springs from its Power being always subject to a Fluctuation. The Power of the other two States always proceeds from the same Fountain, and is steddily deriv'd to them through the same Channels; but the *Crown* can never be said to be so unless human Laws could be eternally perfect. For as *Trade* and *Commerce* are always Ebbing and Flowing, and the *Fashions, Modès and Humors* of the People always in a State of Mutation, the same *Laws* and *Constitutions*, which at one time are best calculated for the *Publick Weal*, at another, are most prejudicial.

As this is the Case, no one can deny but the different Effects of the same *Law* at different Times must be first discover'd by the *Ministers* of the *Prince*, who execute those *Laws*; and calculate the Advantages and Disadvantages arising therefrom; especially those *Laws* for raising the *Publick Revenue*. Whence it follows that all Proposals for repealing, enacting or altering any *Laws* or *Usages*; for raising the *Publick Supply* must generally proceed from the *Ministry*, who certainly must be allow'd to be the best Judges of their various Tendencies, and best capable of distinguishing their good or ill Effects.

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This however lays *Ministers* under the greatest Hardships, and reduces them always to an inextricable *Dilemma*: For if they, after discovering any ill Effects in the *Laws* or *Customs* of their Country, shall chuse to let the Distemper encrease, rather than provide a Remedy, and shall prefer their own Ease and Quiet to the Trouble and Fatigue of encountering a factious and clamorous Opposition, they are said to be unworthy of the Name of *Ministers*, and betray the Trust repos'd in them by their *Prince* and *Country*.

If on the other Hand they are resolute in their Duty, and will discharge themselves justly and honourably in their important Trusts, then, by Men whose Interest it is that they should not probe any Sore to the Bottom, they are loaded with scandalous Reproaches, Scoffs and Contumelies. Whatever Cause they may have to offer at any Alteration in the *Laws*, or whatever Reasons may be given in Support of any Project propos'd for the Publick Good, it is sufficient for their *Adversaries* and *standing Enemies* to alarm the People with the Loss of Liberty, Destruction of the Church, &c. according as the Tide of *Euthusiasm* runs. Mere Suggestions that their Measures proceed from private Motives, are calculated to strengthen the Arm of the *Crown*, and enrich and agrandize themselves; such Staple common Place Stuff as this rarely fails

An Humble Address to

fails to raise a Clamour against them: But this is common to good *Ministers* as well as bad and can be no *Criterion*, whereby to judge of the Honesty or Wisdom of their *Schemes*.

This infuriate and unaccountable Behaviour discovers itself at present against the Scheme for altering the Method of collecting the *Duties* on *Wine* and *Tobacco*. This Design has been most invidiously and wickedly represented as tending to strengthen the Power of the *Crown*, to enable the *Prince* to make himself absolute, and thereby to enslave the Nation: In a Word, that such a Project is totally destructive of a Trade and Liberty, tho' these very Men, who speak with so much Confidence, confess themselves ignorant of the whole of the Design.

But it cannot be deny'd by any Man but this Scheme will encrease the Revenue without laying any new Tax, will be highly beneficial to the fair Trader, and will be the greatest Discouragement to Smuggling and other unjustifiable Practices, which deserve a worse Appellation. All then that these Opposers of this Publick Blessing have left to say for themselves, is, that this Project will be dangerous to their Liberties; and one of their capital Arguments upon this Head, was, the Loss of *Trials* by *Juries*: But this now ceases to be an Objection, the Trader having the Pri-

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the People of England.

vilege of having his Cause tryed at *Westminster Hall*, or before the Commissioners.

These Objectors therefore are now reduced to one single Argument, viz. That the Encrease of Officers will be dangerous to our Liberties, by their wonderful Influence at Elections, &c. Now, if we can fairly and demonstratively get over this Stumbling-block, they are then drove out of every Thing, they ever had to say.

And this I shall lay down for a Truth, that the Encrease of Officers, by the proposed Scheme, will not be above One Hundred and Fifty. And now let us impartially consider, and I appeal to every Man's Conscience in the Kingdom, whether these Officers, Men of 40 or 50 *l.* a Year, who are generally rather indigent and necessitous than otherwise, being spread over the Nation, can have any considerable Power in Times of Elections?

Men of Credit and Repute rarely converse with these Officers; fair Traders have no further Concerns with them than what relates to their Inspection; Smuggling and Clandestine Traders will not then be so numerous, as at present, and those who are will never be so weak as to confide in one of these Officers, who is constantly mov'd from Place to Place,

and

An Humble Address to

and whose Bread depends upon his Integrity in his Office. With what Colour of Reason then can it be suppos'd that any Trader, either fair or unfair, would lay himself under the Restraint of an Officer? Or that an Officer would be so weak as to entrust his whole Dependence in their Hands? If then there are no Obligations on either Side, how can we imagine an Officer to ask, much less to compel a Trader to give his Vote?

But further, if there be such an Encrease of Officers for these Inland Duties, there will be a Diminution of Officers in the Customs. Now all *Customhouse Officers* are limited and confined to *Boroughs*, which are thickly sown upon the Sea-Coast; and if upon the Addition of these One Hundred and Fifty *Excise-Officers* there be a Diminution of Half that Number in the Customs, the Crown would be very far from receiving any Addition of Power by this Alteration; because the former are only one or two in a *Borough*, and the rest distributed over the Country, where their Influence can be only with Respect to County *Elections*; and therefore bear a much less Proportion to the Number of *Electors* in *Counties*, than *Half* the Number of *Customhouse Officers* would do in *Boroughs*.

And if to this we add, that if the present Scheme takes place, we shall save One Shilling in

the People of England,

in the Pound on the *Land-Tax*, the Crown will certainly lose many more Degrees of Power in Point of Influence at *Elections* than it can possibly gain by the Addition of One Thousand *Excisemen*. For the *Receivers* of the *Land-Tax* are all appointed by the Crown, are Men of considerable Fortunes and of great Power in their respective *Boroughs* and *Counties*: And I may venture to say, that taking all the *Receivers* in *England* at an Average they have more Influence over the People in favour of the Crown than all the *Excisemen* in their respective Districts.

Should it be objected, that the same Number of *Receivers* are continued under One Shilling in the Pound *Land-Tax* at present as there would be under Two Shillings, yet this is to be observ'd, that by this Design's taking place, all the *Receivers* lose one Half of their Income by having One Shilling instead of Two; and consequently they cannot be suppos'd to be so strongly attach'd to the Interest of the Government, nor can they afford to expend the same Sum in its Service. And now to draw to a Conclusion.

I undertook, agreeable to the Title of my *Pamphlet*, to demonstrate that a *Land-Tax*, is more prejudicial to *Trade* and *Liberty* than an *Inland Duty* upon *Wine* and *Tobacco*. Whether I have prov'd what I attempted must be left to the impartial World. However,

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From

An Humble Address to

From what I have offer'd to the Consideration of the Publick I think it very evidently appears, that the Power of the Crown is so far from being encreas'd by the Addition of a small Number of *Excise Officers*, that on the contrary, it rather appears to be greatly diminished. It can never be supposed therefore, but by the Splenetick Enemies of the *Administration*, that the Motives of the *Ministry* were to augment the Power of the Crown, but only to ease the *Land*, without laying any *New Tax*, and thereby to ease our *Exports*, and give new Life and Vigour to *Trade*; to encourage the fair *Trader*, and suppress all clandestine Practices; to ease our *Plantations* abroad, which may be rendered an immense Fountain of Treasures to *England*, and to prevent the *French* from making Inroads upon our *Tobacco Trade*, as they have already done upon our *Sugar*. These, and these only were the grand Motives for the Attempts of the *Ministry* to stem the Tide of popular Prejudice and Discontent. The private Interest of a few Persons, let their Opposition be ever so violent, will never intimidate a good *Minister* from pursuing the General Good.

Had not the *honourable Gentleman* in the *Administration* been convinc'd himself, and was he not able to convince others, who are as susceptible of Truth and Demonstration, that his Design must prove a national Good; a Good

the People of England.

for which Posterity will have his Name in the highest Esteem, we can never suppose that he would have thought of it; especially at a time when he was certain it would meet with the most virulent Opposition. 'Twas easy for him to have rais'd the *Supply* for the current service of the Year without wading through such a Scene of Calumny and Inveective. But we find that no Obstacles, no Difficulties or Embarrasements can divert him from steddily keeping sight of his Grand Point in View; the Good of the whole Community.

Before I conclude these Papers I cannot but reflect on the extraordinary Change of the Face of Affairs from what they were in a late Reign. It is something very remarkable to behold the same Men, who then propagated the Noise of *High-Church*, *Church* and *Queen*, *Passive Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*, to such a Degree that the People thought Liberty useles, if not criminal to be enjoy'd, now chop'd about with a Blast of Liberty to humour the Passions of the Multitude. It is something very surprising, I say, to view these Men with whom nothing would go down but *Church* and *King*, idolizing the licentious and unbounded Principles of *Liberty*, and *Republicanism*, destructive of both. Nor is it less marvellous to see others, who from exerting themselves to put a Stop to the Outrages of Party Zeal, join now with their Opposites and Antagonists in promoting another Storm of blind

An Humble Address to

Zealotism amongst the Vulgar, equally pernicious, equally subversive of our true Liberties, Church and Constitution.

Such Men surely can never be safely rely'd on to pilote the Common-Wealth; such Politicians, who from Ambition or Revenge artfully raise Storms and Tempests in the State, do by the People as Misers do by their honest thoughtless Drudges, to whom they lend Money under Pretence of Friendship, till they are unable to refund, and then make them Slaves for Life, at an under Price, as the only Preservative from a Goal.

These Politicians may also be properly termed the Pawn-brokers of the People's Affections, as making the same dishonourable Advantage of their Weakness, as the mercenary ones do of their Poverty: The Former is their Patriot just as the Latter is their Friend. These Gentlemen differ from Patriots as Pawnbrokers do from reputable Tradesman. As the worthy Tradesman sells to all for a reasonable Profit at one and the same Price, never deviating from his Standard, to take Advantage of the Poverty and Necessity of one, or the Profuseness and Extravagancy of the other; so the true Patriot amidst all the Hurricanes of popular Enthusiasm and popular Faction, steers steddily and resolutely the same Course, and never swerves from the Publick Good, but makes that the eternal Standard of his Conduct.

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the People of England.

When we see Men, who were the greatest Sufferers from that complicated malignant Spirit of Tyranny and High-Church, the Torrent of whose united Rage they were able to stem and reduce within their Proper Channels, with Difficulty shall we ascribe different Motives to their Actions, and believe a different Tenor of Behaviour. But when they offer themselves to us in another View, when they appear no less attach'd to the Prince in Times of Faction than to the People in Times of Usurpation, with Justice and Truth we conclude them the true, proper, and natural Preservers of Liberty and Prerogative, and in a Word, the Stamina of our Constitution.

F I N I S.

ERRATA, Page 3. line 13. for his read its. p. 22. l. 3. for Mark, read Mask. p. 23. l. 31. for Property, Propriety. Page 18. line 2. for bitbe read bitber.

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The first part of the document is a letterhead or title page, followed by a body of text. The text is extremely faint and difficult to read, but appears to be a formal document or report. The layout includes a header section, a main body of text, and a footer section. The text is oriented vertically on the page.