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HINTS

FOR

AN ANSWER

TO THE

Letter of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman

OF THE

East-India Company,

TO THE

RIGHT HON. ROBERT DUNDAS,

DATED 13TH JANUARY, 1809.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE approaching termination of the exclusive privileges of the East-India Company, has naturally given birth to a very general enquiry into the wisdom of the system, upon which the commercial intercourse between this country, and our possessions in the East, has hitherto been conducted. Of those who have engaged in the public discussion of this momentous question, the gentlemen whose correspondence with Lord Melville has recently been published, are the most conspicuous, and certainly not the least able disputants. That these letters should have excited a very general attention, is by no means surprising. A much less distinct and elaborate statement of the case of the East-India Company, would, under the same circumstances, have been sufficient to awaken the curiosity of every man, who feels any interest in a question, to which probably but very few are wholly indifferent. Of the justice of the reasoning, and the accuracy of the statements, contained in the celebrated letter of the 13th January 1809, very different opinions may be entertained; but in one point—a sentiment of satisfaction that the public are at length in possession of that document—all parties will probably concur. The adherents of the

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Company congratulate themselves, on the appearance of an argument, to which, in their opinion, no satisfactory answer can be opposed. They, on the other hand, who consider the monopoly at present enjoyed by that great corporation, as inimical to the best interests of the country, are not sorry that we are now, fairly and fully, in possession of the grounds upon which the East-India Company rest their claim to a further extension of the term of their monopoly—that we have at last an explicit and intelligible defence of their pretensions, compiled with much industry and circumspection, by men of acknowledged experience and ability—unanimously approved by the body, to whom the Court of Proprietors have committed the direction of their commerce, and the sovereignty of the East—and sent forth into the world, as their deliberate exposition of the principles, upon which they hope to perpetuate the exclusion of an immense majority of the merchants and capitalists of this kingdom, from all participation with them, in the trade of nearly one half of the habitable world. It is the object of the following pages to examine in detail, the arguments by which Mr. Parry and Mr. Grant have supported these pretensions, and the facts upon which those arguments depend. If it should appear, that the reasonings of those gentlemen are inconsistent with the most simple, and indisputable principles, of political and commercial policy—and that their facts are directly opposed to all that

that can be collected from the most authentic sources of information on the state of India;—if it can be shewn, that the united talent and information of the Directors of the East-India Company, directed to this single object, have failed in establishing any one of the positions, by which they hope to gain from Parliament the renewal of their Charter; it will not perhaps be too much to conclude, that those positions are in themselves fundamentally erroneous, or at least that no concessions ought to be made, till some further, and more convincing proof is advanced that any thing can safely be conceded.

Whatever opinion may be entertained upon the merits of the Letter of the Directors, the praise of a clear statement of the arguments by which they maintain their opinions, will not be denied them. The single purpose of this publication, being to controvert the facts and the principles advanced by the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, in their letter of the 13th of January 1809, such extracts from that letter, as are necessary to illustrate the argument, have been here republished, and subjoined to the remarks, which have occurred to the writer of these pages.

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IT is of the utmost importance, in the investigation of any controverted question, that the disputants on either side should ascertain how far their views of the point in debate coincide, before they enter upon any discussion of those topics, on which they are at variance. The writers of the letter, on which it is the purpose of these pages to animadvert, have, in conformity to this principle, commenced their argument, by stating what they consider, as the foundation of the whole subsequent discussion—that, in providing for the future management of India, the Legislature is to introduce no alterations, “ incompatible with the continuance or not reducible to a consistency,” with the system established by the regulations of 1784 and 1793.

“ Satisfied, by this declaration, that His Majesty’s
 “ Government understand the interests of this country
 “ and of British India too well, to intend any alteration
 “ that would subvert or endanger the system by which
 “ those vast possessions have been acquired, governed,
 “ and improved, and by which alone they can be held,
 “ to the mutual benefit of their immense population and
 “ of the paramount state, the Court must, of course,
 “ believe,

“ believe, that the propositions which have just been
 “ quoted, are supposed to be compatible with the con-
 “ tinuance of that system, or reducible to a consis-
 “ tency with it. These suppositions the Court are now
 “ called upon to examine; and they will endeavour to
 “ do so with the respect due to the authority with which
 “ they have to treat, with the duty which they owe
 “ to their constituents, and with that regard for the
 “ interests of their country, which they do not intend,
 “ nor feel themselves required to sink, in supporting
 “ the integrity of the present Indian system.”

It may not perhaps be very easy, at once to discover the whole length to which this general assumption may lead—or to understand, in what the “integrity of the present Indian system” may be supposed to consist. It seems however sufficient to observe, in reply to this fundamental proposition, that as the restrictions on the commerce of the East will terminate by law, in 1814, it will be for Parliament to investigate the whole subject unfettered by any past regulations. The Charters of 1784 and 1793, may or may not have been founded upon very wise principles of national policy. The investigation of that question may be an important enquiry for the historian of those days, or an interesting question for the consideration of a mere political theorist. It will however hardly be contended, that the Parliament of these kingdoms is to approach to the decision of this great question—a decision, upon which much of the happiness of a large proportion of the human race depends

depends—tied down to a servile adherence to former precedents!—that in discharging the most awful and important trust, which has ever been committed to any legislative assembly upon earth, they are to reject without inquiry, any principle which may be submitted to their consideration—if it is not to be found in the former Charters of the East-India Company! To say that the magnitude of the question should induce us to adhere to a system, of which we have already some experience, is to assume, that experience has not proved the system in question to be inconsistent with the interest both of the governors and the governed, (an assumption perhaps which some may be disposed to dispute) and that, if those grants were prudent and politic at the time at which they were made, it will therefore be prudent and politic to continue and renew them in the present very altered circumstances of the world.

Waving, however, any further consideration of the basis on which the Directors propose to treat with Parliament, for the renewal of their Charter, we will proceed to examine the arguments by which they hope to obtain a further prolongation of their monopoly.

“ With respect to the Private Trade, the Company
 “ are not governed by narrow considerations of com-
 “ mercial profit or commercial jealousy; and, in fact,
 “ the Indian trade, as an object of gain, has gradual-
 “ ly ceased to be of importance, either to the Com-
 “ pany or to individuals.”

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That the Company are not "governed by narrow considerations of commercial profit," is a position which will not be very much disputed by those who have ever looked at their periodical accounts, or who have any knowledge of the manner in which their commercial concerns have hitherto been conducted. That they are equally exempt from the influence of "commercial jealousy," may not indeed be so readily conceded;—nor is it a very convincing proof of their superiority to such emotions, that they continue to press the exclusion of the Merchants of this kingdom from a trade, which they state to have gradually ceased, as an object of gain, to be of importance to them. It is not indeed very easy to find any other explanation of their anxiety to retain a traffic, which they admit is in their hands unprofitable.

But, allowing that, in this acknowledgment of their ill success in the Indian trade, the Directors have given a very correct representation of their own experience, their conclusion, that, that trade has also ceased to be an object of importance to individuals, hardly seems to be a very fair consequence. Does it follow that the enterprize, and sagacity, and undivided attention of the individual merchant, will be exerted without reward, because the East-India Company have in the same field been unsuccessful? The Directors, probably, will not seriously maintain, that their commercial knowledge and ability is an exact

measure

measure of the commercial ability and knowledge possessed by the great body of merchants of this country, and that it is impossible that other men should be more active than their agents, and other speculations more wisely conducted than their own?

"The Court are actuated by a thorough persuasion, that the unlimited freedom, for which some persons have, of late years, contended, would have political consequences more injurious to the power of this country and of British India, than the advantages anticipated by sanguine minds, from an enlargement of the commerce, could compensate, if those advantages were to be realized; and that, moreover, the expectation of such advantages is unfounded, resulting from general presumptions, which are contradicted by the nature of the Indian people, climate, and productions, and by the experience of more than two centuries."

The political consequences which are made the grounds of refusing a perfect freedom in the trade to our Indian possessions will be considered hereafter; but it is denied that any advantages are expected by the merchants and manufacturers, which "the nature of the Indian people, productions, and climate," do not entitle them to entertain. Had the Directors been more conversant with the feelings and sentiments of the mercantile body, in the great outports of this kingdom, they would have known that, in those circles, no sanguine hopes of considerable *immediate* benefit, from the opening of the Indian trade, are indulged;

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and that the prevailing opinion among that class of men is, that the progress of commerce in India, as in every other part of the world, must be slow ; but, that though slow, it will be gradual, and certain.

“ Now, with respect to the benefits supposed to be
 “ derivable from opening the trade with India, it is, in
 “ the first place, to be observed, that no material en-
 “ largement, if any enlargement at all, is to be ex-
 “ pected in the exports of our manufactures to that
 “ quarter. The records of the Company, for two
 “ centuries, are filled with accounts of their endea-
 “ vours to extend the sale of British products in India,
 “ and of the little success which has attended them.
 “ The French, Dutch, and other European nations
 “ trading thither, have equally failed in introducing
 “ the manufactures of Europe there. This was not
 “ owing to their trading chiefly in the form of Com-
 “ panies ; the Americans, who within the last twenty
 “ years have entered into the Indian commerce, and
 “ traded largely, not as a Company, but by numerous
 “ individuals, each pursuing his own scheme in his own
 “ way, in which course no part of the East is left
 “ unexplored, carry hardly any European manufac-
 “ tures thither, their chief article for the purchase of
 “ Indian goods being silver ; and such has been the
 “ state of the trade from Europe to India since the
 “ time of the Romans. This state results from the
 “ nature of the Indian people, their climate, and their
 “ usages. The articles of first necessity their own
 “ country furnishes, more abundantly and more
 “ cheaply than it is possible for Europe to supply
 “ them. The labour of the great body of the common
 “ people only enables them to subsist on rice, and to
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“ wear a slight covering of cotton cloth ; they, there-
 “ fore, can purchase none of the superfluities we offer
 “ them.”

That the merchants of this country do entertain those expectations of *ultimate* benefit, from the opening of the Indian trade, which the Chairman and Deputy Chairman attribute to them, is indeed not to be denied ; nor do they apprehend that those expectations are wholly unreasonable. To prove the fallacy of these hopes, the Directors have recourse to two principal arguments ; 1st. that there is not at present, and that there is no prospect that there will be hereafter, any considerable demand in India for the produce or manufactures of this country ; and 2dly. that there is not in Great-Britain, or in the continent of Europe, any market for the produce, or manufactures of the East, which is not already abundantly supplied by the imports of the Company. Upon the first of these positions, it may be observed, that it proceeds upon the very inadmissible assumption, that the population of India is always to remain, in regard to the consumption of our manufactures, exactly in their present condition ; and that India is to form an exception—the single exception, in the history of the world, to the general truth, that a free commercial intercourse between civilized and uncivilized nations, has invariably been the precursor of a rapid advancement among the latter of all the arts and habits of cultivated society—that

with the increase of those arts and habits, the commerce to which they were indebted for their origin, has proportionably augmented—that a free trade, is at once the parent, and the offspring, of every liberal art, and every useful science. But, say the Directors, “*the nature* of the Indian people, their climate, and their usages,” form an insuperable obstacle to the operation among them, of these simple, and as it might have been supposed, universal principles of human society, or rather of human nature. What! are not these libelled subjects of the Company, men? Have they not the common tastes, and feelings, and dispositions of men? Are the Bramin and the Hindoo, among all the sons and daughters of Adam, alone contented with “articles of the first necessity,” when superfluities and luxuries are placed within their reach? But experience and fact, we are told, have decided the question. For two centuries the Company has been endeavouring to extend the sale of British produce in India, and, as they admit, with very little success. Of the early records of their transactions, we certainly know but little, and we are inclined to suspect that much is not to be known. But in their more recent history, a very careless enquirer might perhaps discover some events, and some traces of a policy, which would afford a satisfactory solution of the phenomenon in question, without recurring to the revolting supposition, that there is in the Indian people any inherent incapacity

incapacity for improvement. That a great corporation, conducting its affairs by the agency of a numerous train of servants, unconnected with each other, and very remotely, if at all interested in the welfare of their employers, intrusted without any previous discipline, with the conduct of the most delicate and perplexing mercantile transactions, and surrounded with all the pomp of Asiatic state, at a period of life which the sobriety of European manners dedicates to study and seclusion; that a trade so conducted should not easily have been extended, is, indeed, not very unaccountable. But is there not in the constitution of the East-India Company, another circumstance which still more clearly explains why India has for so many generations, been connected with European traders, without having made any progress in European arts or in European civilization? The truth is simply this, their character of merchants has been sunk in their character of sovereigns. To the maintenance and extension of their territorial empire, objects merely mercantile have been sacrificed without hesitation or reluctance. Every European whom merit or fortune has thrown into any political, financial, or judicial station in the Peninsula, feels a distinct and personal interest in the permanency and extension of the empire of the Directors. The viceroys and judges of India, are bound to its support by every motive of vanity, ambition, and interest. In the *commercial* prosperity

prosperity of the Company, none are directly concerned but the Holders of East India Stock; and even their interest, in the augmentation of the trade, is little more than nominal. If then it should be unhappily imagined, by these rulers of the East, that their sovereignty can only be maintained by depressing the immense population of India, by keeping them in ignorance of those arts and habits of civilized life which might one day expand and elevate their minds, can it be doubted, that this imperial policy would be inflexibly pursued, though it were demonstrably ruinous to their interests as traders? that their objects of state would be enforced by the united zeal and activity of the whole of their military and civil servants in India, and that the lamentations of a few merchants in Leadenhall Street, over the wreck of their commercial prospects, would be either unheard, or heard only to be derided? Are these speculations gratuitous or imaginary? Let the Letter of Mr. Parry and Mr. Grant answer that question. Among the objections they advance, against the destruction of their monopoly, it is one, that it would tend to enrich India rather than Britain, and would facilitate the progress of the former to independence. The impoverishment of India therefore, and the retardation of its progress in any of those tastes and feelings, which constitute the chief ornament of social life, however slow and imperceptible that progress might be, forms a fundamental part of the policy of the Company.

Company. In other words, it is their policy to sacrifice every thing to their political, and nothing to their commercial interests; no wonder that their subjects "can purchase none of their superfluities we offer them."

But it is not only the English Company who have been unsuccessful in their attempts to extend the sale of the manufactures of Europe; the French and Dutch, and more recently the Americans, have equally failed in the efforts they have made for the attainment of the same object. To the case of the French and Dutch Companies, much of what has been already said of the management and policy of the present rulers of India will, with some modifications, apply.

The American trade, which has been conducted by individuals is, indeed, differently circumstanced. Why then have the citizens of the United States made all their payments, not in manufactures, but in specie? For this plain reason, probably;—the Americans are not a manufacturing people. The merchants of Boston and New York pay for every cargo of woollens or hardware, which they ship for India, the expence of freight across the Atlantic—the charges of their agents and shippers in this country—the increased rate of insurance which, during the last twenty years (the period of their participation in this trade) has been raised by the dangers of war, scarcely less upon the risks of neutral, than those of the belligerent—add to this, the increased

increased length of the voyage and the facility of shipping a quantity of the precious metals by the smuggling trade with the South American Continent, without deviating a league out of the course of their voyage; and can it be insisted, that the failure of the Americans to introduce manufactured articles into India, is a proof of any indisposition in the population of nearly one half of the habitable world to use these articles, which are little less than essential among the other half? The experiment, we will venture to assert, has never been fairly made. We are taunted with the reproach of being visionaries and speculators, for wishing that it should be attempted. We would reply to that reproach, that, in our humble conception, no visions are so frantic, no speculations so monstrous and wild as theirs, who can seriously believe that, from the Cape of Good Hope eastward, to the Streights of Magellan, the world is destitute of those tastes and dispositions which, under every other latitude, are found to be the master passions of the human character; who believes this monstrous proposition, not only without proof, but in defiance of all evidence, and in contradiction to all experience.

“To these facts and observations, arising from the nature and circumstances of the people and countries of India, one remarkable argument may be added, furnished by our own experience at home. In the Charter of 1793, provision was made for the export of British manufactures to India, by any individuals

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“who might choose to embark in that trade. The Company were required to find them tonnage to a certain extent, which has always been allotted at a rate of freight cheaper outward, as well as for the returns, than the Company themselves pay, or as the Court think, than private ships could furnish it. But, in all the time that has elapsed since, very few applications, and these to a small extent, have been made, for leave to export the woollens, metals, and other staples of this country, on private account, the chief applications having been for the freight of wine, for the consumption of Europeans.”

The Directors have still, however, yet another instance to advance of an unsuccessful attempt to introduce the manufactures of Europe into the East. The private traders who have engaged in that traffic under the Charter of 1793 have, it seems, carried on a very insignificant commerce, and that little with the European, and not the native inhabitants of India. Now if any thing could prove to demonstration, how little dependence these acute and well informed advocates of the Indian monopoly place in the whole argument for its continuance, derived from the difficulty which has hitherto been found in introducing European manufactures into the Peninsula; the adoption of such reasoning as this, must amount to such a demonstration. To pinion men down by every restriction which “commercial jealousy” could devise;—to bid them send their goods in the ships of their commercial rivals, and in such proportions by each ship, as these rivals

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should determine;—to deny them any power of regulating the time of sailing;—to compel them to apply for freight and to pay, or give security for the payment of that freight, six months before the shipment of their goods;—to call in October for lists of the quantities and qualities of these goods, of which their rivals were to have the carriage in the following April;—to subject them to forfeiture of their freight for non-delivery of those lists;—to afford them no means of removal from an overstocked market; and no factors but such as were licensed by, and dependent on those rivals;—to limit the residence of these agents to the distance of ten miles from their own settlements; and then, because when thus shackled and handcuffed, they have made but little progress in introducing their manufactures into the East;—to turn upon them and say, “ See, you have done nothing—you find that India has “ no market for your articles, and that you have no “ prospect of increasing your exports”—may, if meant as a sort of practical joke, be passable enough, but if intended as serious argument, is really little else but insult. The slave dealers who reproached with stupidity and ferocity the unhappy beings whom the stupidity of their owners degraded, and the ferocity of their drivers brutalized, were hardly less just, or less reasonable.

“ Let it be inquired, in the next place, whether the “ adoption of so great a change in our Indian system, “ would

“ would be followed by the discovery of such new and “ valuable productions of the East, as would serve “ materially to augment the trade of this country with “ the Continents of Europe and America; for, with “ regard to the supply of our home consumption of “ Indian commodities, it cannot be asserted, that the “ importations already made by the Company and “ individuals do not abundantly suffice for it, or may “ not, at any time, be extended to the exigencies of “ the market; in which, it may be noted, that a “ preference is given to the cotton and silk manufac- “ tures of our own country, and to some of the “ tropical productions brought from our West-Indian “ Colonies. Nor can it be asserted, that new adven- “ turers in the Eastern trade, fitting out from Great “ Britain, could, with any profit to themselves, fur- “ nish the home consumption on cheaper terms than “ it is now supplied; for both the Company, and “ British individuals resident in India, must have an “ advantage over such adventurers in the provision of “ goods there (British residents in the freight also), “ and yet, of late, the great Indian staple of cotton “ piece goods has been a losing article in this country.”

Come we now to the enquiry, whether we could find in the Indian market any articles which we might import into Europe, as a return for the commodities which we hope to be able to carry from hence. And here we must again protest against the assumption of the Directors, that the subjects of their immense empire, would not be most materially ameliorated by the influence of a free trade, carried on between this country and India. That the demand for the piece

goods of the Peninsula, is, at present, very inconsiderable, and that the supply is consequently small, we do not dispute; but, would not that demand progressively increase, as the price of these articles progressively diminished?—and would not the Hindoo, tempted by our manufactures, and instructed by our agents, learn to work up these goods at an expence incalculably less than that at which they are made at present?—and should we not have in these articles, when so reduced in price, a sufficient and a profitable return for our exports? These improvements are not the work of a day it is true; and, for want of some returns immediately, the trade by which these improvements are to be fostered and created, will, it is said, be destroyed in its cradle. We reply, first, that the free traders would find, at the first opening of the commerce of the East, some returns for their exports by supplanting the present trade of the Company—a scheme which we suspect they will prove hardy enough to undertake, notwithstanding the assurance of the Directors of the hopelessness of such a project. We reply, in the second place, that the enumeration of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman does *not* comprehend all, or even all the most material exportable articles of the East;—that our merchants would probably ship tallow, and hides, from the Cape, and rice, and flax, from the Peninsula, even if the enumerated articles of export did not at first supply a suf-

a sufficient return for the manufactures of Sheffield or Glasgow;—that the traders of Liverpool and Bristol would not be under the necessity of returning to the ports of Great Britain in ballast, so long as the decrees of Napoleon, and the fears of Russia, impede the supplies we have usually received from the European Continent.

Thus much in answer to the apprehensions, that our expected trade to the Peninsula will be blighted in its infancy, by the want of returns for our exports. But when we look forward to the probable future state of India, it really becomes difficult to treat with respect, the fears (perhaps we should say the hopes) of the Directors, that the East would not ultimately be able to make adequate returns for the exports of Great Britain. Considering the cheapness of labour, throughout almost the whole of these extensive countries—the docility and mechanical ingenuity of all classes of their population—keeping it in mind that they have already, in no slight degree, learnt the value of those luxuries, which opulence would bring within their reach—and remembering that the operations of banking, and all the other arts which experience has contrived to facilitate the details of commerce, are familiar to them—and that in the love of external pomp they are surpassed by no nation upon earth—can any man believe—can such men as Mr. Parry and Mr. Grant (except indeed when seated in the chairs of the Company)

pany) believe, that such a people as this, will not be roused into exertion when the gratification of their taste, their vanity, and their love of gain, will be the immediate reward?

These prospects we are told, however, are illusory, and opposed to fact. "From the *nature of the Indians* and their division into castes, it is not so easy among them as in Europe, to meet an increased demand by increased production."* We have much respect for the experience, and the most absolute confidence in the veracity of Mr. Parry and Mr. Grant, but we are notwithstanding, somewhat distrustful of the accuracy of this representation. We speak from high authority (and if the assertion is questioned that authority will be produced), in saying, that the reverse of this statement is correctly true, that the division of the Indians into castes, very much facilitates the introduction among *any particular* caste, of any new habits, fashions, or usages, which may be adopted by the men of principal authority and influence among them; and that so far from any difficulty existing in producing an increased supply of Indian manufactures to meet any new and unusual demand, that there are to be found throughout the whole extent of Hindostan, large numbers of persons belonging to all the different manufacturing castes, who are prevented only by

* See page 29.

want of employment, from engaging in their respective hereditary occupations. Immense numbers of weavers especially, are to be found in this situation. So much for the alledged incapacity of the Indians, to meet any increased demand in consequence of their division into castes. What impediments may arise from the "*nature of the Indian people,*" we have already considered. The sentiments, as well as the sceptre of Aurengzebe, seem to have passed into the hands of these imperial traders.

"The chief commodities suited to the European market, which India has hitherto been found to produce, are spices, pepper, drugs, sugar, coffee, raw-silk, saltpetre, indigo, raw cotton, and above all, cotton manufactures of singular beauty and in endless variety."

To return to the consideration of the several articles of export from India enumerated by the Directors. The tonnage of the Company we are informed, is sufficient for the importation from India of all the spices, pepper, drugs, sugar, coffee, raw-silk, salt-petre, indigo, raw cotton, and cotton manufacture, which the present consumption of Europe demands. We are disposed to admit the truth of this statement, and even to go one step further, and allow, that, supposing the monopoly continued, we do not think it at all improbable that the present tonnage of the Company will always be sufficient for the importation of so much

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of those articles, as the consumption of Europe will on that supposition at any future time demand. Most of these articles can now be purchased by the rich alone, "and being articles of luxury (say the Directors), can only have a limited consumption." As long as they continue articles of luxury (if by that term is meant costly articles), so long unquestionably they will not come into the hands of those who have but little to spare, except for the necessaries of life; but why need it be supposed that this is always to be the case? That a Corporation, feeling little or no interest in the extension of their trade, will not so encourage the productions of these commodities as to bring them within the reach of the lower classes of European society, experience has certainly proved, but is it probable, that free traders will be equally remiss in extending the consumption of the articles of their trade, by lessening in every possible manner the expence of cultivating and producing them? Three of the enumerated articles of Indian import, silk, cotton, and hemp, cannot however, it seems, ever form any great staple in the imports from the Peninsula, in consequence of the competition of Italy, Georgia, and Russia. With respect to hemp, it is to be observed, that the uncertainty of the supply from the political circumstances of Russia, very materially diminishes the probability of any very formidable rivalry from that country. The raw silks of Italy are produced with much more expence

expence than those of India, and though it is true that all the expenses of the voyage from the Peninsula, are saved on the import of the Italian article, yet it is also true, that the specific gravity of silk renders it a very convenient and therefore a very advantageous part of a shipment from the East. Whatever advantages the cottons of Georgia may possess from the vicinity of that country, yet in any competition with the productions of India, the superior quality of the article which experience has shewn, might, under an improved state of culture, be raised and imported from thence, would always give an indisputable preference to the Indian trader, in every market in which the finer kinds of cotton were in request. With respect to the three last articles, it is also to be observed, that the amelioration in the state of Indian manufactures and husbandry, which the advocates for a free trade to the Peninsula confidently and as we think not unreasonably expect, as the result of that measure, will give to the products of that country, great additional advantages, in a competition with the manufactures or produce of any other part of the world.

"But were it indeed otherwise, where, in the present circumstances of the European Continent, could new commodities, imported into this country from India, find a vent, when many of those already made, and of articles which the Continent used to take off, remain in our warehouses?"

In failure of every other argument, to prove that no extension of the present trade with India can be made with advantage to the importer, we are at last referred to the present state of the European Continent.

We have before had occasion to hint a suspicion of some lurking distrust in the minds of the Directors themselves, of their own reasonings, and we are the more confirmed in that suspicion, by their condescending to seek support from such an argument as this.

Is it so clear that the present is to be the permanent state of the Continent? May we not, without the imputation of being very visionary speculators, hope, that the time is not far distant, when an empire acquired and maintained by means which humanity never sanctioned, will be overturned by the sure though tardy vengeance of insulted nature. It is not indeed, it is not an unwholesome lesson for all unlimited sovereigns, whether they rule as individuals or as companies, to learn, that dominion acquired by plunder, is but too certainly destroyed by the same means which were used for its acquisition; that the bloodshed which precedes the establishment of a despotic throne, is but the first and the least sanguinary act in the fatal tragedy, which despotism has too frequently exhibited upon the great theatre of the world. But if the Directors will compel us to examine how this great question

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is affected by the present circumstances of Europe; if they will have us introduce this element into our calculations; why then we ask, are there no circumstances in the present state of Europe or of Great Britain, which call upon the Parliament of those kingdoms for immediate relief? Have we no manufacturers unemployed, or employed only in the destruction of the public peace and security? Have we no unusual impediments to commercial speculation, which can only be removed by opening new channels for our enterprise? and it is at this time, under such "present circumstances," that we are called upon to throw the whole traffic with 400 millions of people into the hands of a Bankrupt Company, of a Company who by their own confession, are ceasing to look to that trade as an object of gain, and whose decreasing capital bears but too just a proportion to the progressive diminution of their exports? But it will be objected, the legislature would in vain endeavour to appease present disturbances, and to allay present heats, by holding out the prospect that in the year 1814, a new trade will be opened to our needy manufacturers. That the legislature will not so create new resources for the present supply of these manufacturers, we admit; but will they not create consolatory expectations? will it not be an additional and powerful argument in the mouth of those who are exerting their authority and influence to promote internal peace and good order amongst us, if

they can say to these unfortunate sufferers, that their representatives are not indifferent to their distress, that the influence of this mighty Company has weighed less with them than the wants and necessities of their constituents, and that the government has established some claim to the gratitude of their subjects by omitting no measure which could be devised for their relief? To us, in truth, a view of present circumstances would lead to very different conclusions from those formed by the Directors, were not such considerations really undeserving of serious attention, in forming a decision of which it is not too much to affirm, that the consequences will be felt in ages, when all the awful projects and apprehensions which now agitate every corner of the civilized world will be consigned to oblivion.

It would really be diverting, if the subject were not too serious for mirth, to observe the language held by these incorporated merchants on the subject of their monopoly. "The refusal of the Company to make concessions" to the people of these realms, are supposed by their official advocates to have been the origin of certain unfounded complaints. Truly this new dynasty might well take a lesson of courtesy from some of the abdicated sovereigns of the East. The florid exuberance of style in which the stately language of oriental diplomacy is clothed, is at least some token of real or assumed respect for those to whom it is addressed, and to us ordinary folks, it would scarcely seem less

less preposterous should these new potentates embellish the entries in their ledgers and day-books, with the tropes and rhetoric of those very eloquent personages, than that they should adopt in these their state papers the dignified tone of European cabinets. This, however, we admit is mere verbal criticism, and though in point of taste, we think such sort of phraseology is not the most happily selected, we are not very solicitous to dispute that matter with them.

" And hence may appear the inapplicability of that
 " argument, which has sometimes been urged in favor
 " of enlarging, or rather opening the Indian trade to
 " individuals, 'that they should be allowed to bring
 " ' home the surplus produce of India which the Com-
 " ' pany did not require.' There can be no room for
 " additional importations, when the ordinary scale
 " proves too large. But in the use of this plausible
 " plea, respecting surplus produce, there was always
 " a great fallacy. It seemed to imply, that there was
 " a stock of commodities in India which continually re-
 " mained undisposed of, whereas nothing is more evi-
 " dent, than that the productions of any country will
 " be regulated by the demand, and that no agricul-
 " turists or manufacturers will go on from year to year
 " to produce that for which they have no sale. The
 " term, as connected with the Company, might also
 " convey the idea, that they were the only purchasers
 " in the country; whereas, at that very time, British
 " residents and foreign nations had the privilege of
 " exporting goods to the western world, and there
 " was a great coasting and internal trade from one
 " part of India to another. But the argument for
 " permitting

“ permitting individuals to export the surplus produce,
 “ included fully, though not professedly, the principle
 “ of transplanting British capital to India, in order to
 “ raise produce there ; a principle which, it may be
 “ thought, this country has already carried sufficiently
 “ far in its other distant dependencies, and which
 “ could not be applied to India without political con-
 “ sequences.”

The concession which the Company refused to make, is one which we apprehend will never be solicited again, “ a liberty to bring home the surplus produce of India, which the Company did not require,” that is we suppose a permission to go into the Indian market to buy up whatever refuse articles the Company’s agents might be unwilling to purchase. To granting this certainly not very presumptuous request, the Directors it seems had two objections; 1st. That there was no surplus produce to be found in the Peninsula, inasmuch as the supply of Indian wares would not of course regularly exceed the regular demand of the purchasers of those articles. Now, admitting the accuracy of this statement, one of two consequences we submit, must have been the inevitable result of permitting these buyers of surplus produce to enter into the market—either they would have found nothing to purchase, and would have desisted from the attempt—or their intervention would have *created* a surplus produce, and they would then have been able to ship whatever cargoes they might have chanced to require.

require. This latter result we certainly imagine would have been the consequence of such a concession, and so probably thought the Directors; nor is it a matter of much surprize, that, under the influence of such expectations, they should have refused to grant the desired indulgence. Another principle it seems of very alarming import was also included in this request of our merchants, “ the principle of transplanting British capital to India, in order to raise produce there.” Of the evils likely to arise from the adoption of such a principle, the Court of Directors appear to entertain no small apprehension, and indeed, no man will reproach them with having in their own *commercial* transactions been guilty of this fatal error.

But why, may we not ask, should this transfer of British capital to India be deprecated, as a policy pregnant with so much evil? If, by being transplanted to a kindlier soil, it can be rendered more productive;—if its increased returns are to be poured back into the bosom of the country from which itself was derived;—if, instead of lying as it now lies, and as in our advanced state of society it must always, in some degree remain, uncultivated and unimproved, it were used to call forth the activity, to stimulate the invention, and to ameliorate the condition of millions of our fellow creatures and fellow subjects, and, by a chain of causes as immutable as the course of nature itself, ultimately to ameliorate our own;—would any wise man

man lament such an employment of our wealth—would any body of men, wholly exempt from “ commercial jealousy,” lament it? To the very hasty and imperfect sketch we have attempted to give of the probable effect of a free trade, on the vast regions now under our dominion in the East, we refer for the proof, the only proof which the nature of this discussion enables us now to give, of the justice of those expectations.

Resolved, however, to justify, at all events, the severity of their refusal to the merchants of this country of any participation, even in the surplus produce of Indja, the Directors next, (not wholly in consistency with their former argument) proceed to observe, that some surplus produce (taking that term as applicable to all that exceeds the wants of the Company themselves) may be raised within their empire, but that “ British Residents and foreign Merchants have the privilege of exporting goods to the Western world.”—We can easily understand, that it may be much more convenient to the Company to acquiesce in a “ surplus” trade, carried on by British Residents and foreign Merchants, than in any commerce in which British Merchants should immediately participate.—British Residents are not very dangerous rivals, and “ foreign Merchants” are to be found under that, or some other equally convenient ambiguity of name, in

in almost every traffic established on the face of the globe.

“ With respect to the Americans, they owe their advancement and success in the Indian trade to the treaty made with them by our Government in 1794, to the belligerent state of Europe since that time, and, above all, to the neutral character they possessed, which enabled them to navigate more cheaply, more expeditiously, as well as more safely than our merchants or the Company could, and to supply many parts of the European Continent and of South America, to which our ships had no access. These, with the increase of the consumption of eastern commodities among themselves, are the true causes of the growth of the American trade with India; and even the abolition of the Company’s privileges would not have transferred the share they acquired of it to our merchants, because it could not have lessened the advantages under which the Americans then carried it on, nor have gained us either the supply of their internal demand, or admission to many ports which were open to them. What the Company could do, in the way of regulation, to reduce the inequality between the American traders and our own merchants, you know, Sir, was effected, as soon after the expiration of the treaty of 1794 as His Majesty’s Government thought expedient.”

Among those foreign merchants, into whose hands this trade has fallen, the Americans are, unquestionably, our most formidable and active rivals; and the Directors feel it especially important to shew, that the intervention of that enterprising people into

the commerce of the East, has not been owing to any "erroneous policy on the part of the Company."—Several European nations having (we are informed) from the native Sovereigns of India, the right of possessing settlements and carrying on trade there, "we could not interrupt the exercise of it, whilst "they remained at peace with us." To which of the European nations does this description apply at present? and may not that policy be, without injustice, stigmatised as unwise, which has, at an immense expence of blood and treasure, expelled the nations of Europe from their trade and settlements in the East—not for the purpose of rendering those settlements advantageous to Great-Britain—not for the purpose of "bringing that trade into the Thames," but to give the citizens of the United States, still greater facilities in underselling us, not only in their own markets, but in Turkey, in South America, in the North of Europe, in short, in every market in which we still might have entered into competition with them? That competition it seems, however, would have been ineffectual. The advantages of their "neutral character" enabled the Americans to carry on this trade so "cheaply and expeditiously," that even "the abolition of the Company's privileges "would not have transferred the share they acquired "of it to our merchants."—Some counterpoise against these advantages, might, it is supposed, have been found

found in the power which, as sovereigns of India, the Company possessed of laying additional duties upon this American traffic, but all that could be done in the way of regulation, was, it appears, "effected, "as soon after the expiration of the treaty of 1794, "as His Majesty's Government thought expedient."—That treaty expired in 1806, since which period we have completed the conquest of all the settlements of which the nations of Europe were in possession throughout India; and is it to be contended, that the wealth of Great Britain is to be squandered in making distant conquests, of which a neutral is to reap all the benefit?—that we have conquered Batavia and the Mauritius, without having acquired a right of regulating the traffic of those settlements for our own benefit? Great, indeed, are the advantages of neutrality, if it can claim such privileges as these; if, in addition to all the means of cheapness, security and dispatch, with which the American trader can navigate the ocean, he is to be admitted to a free trade with all the settlements which our arms have acquired, exempted from those duties and restrictions which every state has an unquestionable right to impose upon the trade of foreigners, with its own colonial establishments, and is to possess these advantages, not in common with our own merchants, but in preference to them, and even to their absolute exclusion.

Upon this part of the subject, it becomes, however, unnecessary to enlarge, from our being, fortunately, in possession of a most important and conclusive proof of the ruinous effect of this preference of American to British traders, in the letter of the Marquis Wellesley, dated at Fort William, 30th September 1800. To this most interesting document, we beg leave to refer those who may doubt whether, in this instance at least, the policy of the Company has not been "erroneous."

Among the terrors which have taken possession of the Company, in the prospect of a free intercourse between this country and the East, the fear of a "ruinous competition in the markets, both at home and abroad, appears to be the most predominant." Upon this subject something has already been advanced in the course of these remarks, and much more, at a more convenient opportunity, might easily be offered. Strange, indeed, are the apprehensions with which men are haunted, when their reason and their memory have submitted to the dominion of fancy. History has been written to no purpose, and philosophy has commented on it in vain, if, in these days, men, to whom both philosophy and history are familiar, are still watching with anxiety the proportionate amount of exports and imports, and trembling, lest the prodigality of our merchants should plunge us into a traffic, of which all the loss would be sustained by Britain, and
all

all the benefit acquired by India.—If, indeed, our merchants acted in corporations, and not as individuals,—had they no personal interest, to stimulate their activity and to awaken their circumspection,—had they, in short, all the vices of joint stock companies, there might be some justice in these alarms. Considering the expectations, however, which the Company entertains of the total dissolution of their own commercial existence, the concern which they express for the future mercantile disasters of the country, must be admitted to be at least a very liberal and disinterested anxiety.

"And, in the first place, it would, in substance and in form, entirely abolish the qualified monopoly which the Company still enjoys of the Indian trade. The admission of all private merchants, at their pleasure, and of their ships, into that trade, would make it as perfectly free as the trade to our American or West-Indian colonies. There would, as to India, be an end of all exclusive privilege of trade."

We are now to consider the effects of the proposed change upon the East-India Company and upon British India. Of these the first is, "that the admission of all private merchants at their pleasure and of their ships into the Indian trade, would, in substance and in form, entirely abolish the qualified monopoly which the Company still enjoys" of that trade. To say the honest truth, we are not very well able to refute this reasoning. However sceptical other men may be, we
feel

feel ourselves compelled to admit, that the destruction of the Company's monopoly would be inconsistent with its existence, and that they would not alone be able to speculate in the Indian trade, when other men might engage in it at their pleasure. Having therefore very fairly made this concession, we are relieved from the necessity of examining the very elaborate argument, with which it has so ably and irresistibly been supported.

In the other alleged mischievous consequences of throwing open the Indian trade, we are not disposed quite so readily to acquiesce; the mere enumeration is however not a little alarming. The destruction of the Company in their political capacity; a ruinous competition in the markets both at home and abroad; disappointment and consequent discontent; a violation of the territorial rights of the Directors; the destruction of all East-Indian sales by public auction; the abandonment of their factories; want of employment among the commercial branch of their civil servants; the impracticability of procuring bills upon Great Britain; the disuse of their ships; the ruin of the China trade; the sacrifice of our revenue; and the loss of India! Awful indeed is the responsibility of those whose task it is to legislate for the world, but to legislate under the apprehension, that consequences such as these are dependent on their decisions, may well overwhelm the weak and intimidate the firmest minds. In this deba-

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ting age and nation, but few, probably, amongst us, and but very few indeed of our legislators, can be so little versed in political dispute, as not to be on their guard against that sort of *ruse de guerre*, which is so commonly practised in almost every description of public controversy. To overwhelm an opponent with a detail of the miseries and destruction, to which his measures or his projects tend, while all proof of the approach of those miseries, and the probability of that destruction, is withheld—in stating the evils to which the adoption of one alternative will lead, to omit any mention of the mischiefs which will probably be consequent upon the other—to attribute to the schemes of your adversary all the wretchedness and disaster, for which the mismanagement of preceding generations has prepared the way, are among the most cheap and easy arts to which men, diffident of the opinions for which they are disputing, are accustomed to resort. But though this species of attack is easy, the assailant can thus impose upon his antagonist a duty sufficiently arduous. It throws upon him the burden of disproving the widest and most sweeping assertions, and subjects him, when his proof is completed, to the mortification of being told, that he has left untouched the particular views and arguments, upon which the conclusions of his opponent depend. He, however, who voluntarily engages in the contest, has no right to complain of those practices, which the usages, rather than the laws

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of political warfare, have established. So far, therefore, as it may be practicable, compatibly with that brevity which it is our purpose to ensure, we will proceed to consider in order the several disastrous consequences, which the Directors assure us will be the result of opening the trade to the Peninsula.

“ The loss of the Indian monopoly, such as it was left by the Act of 1793, would lead, by no slow process, to the entire subversion of the Company, both in their commercial and political capacity, and of that system which the Legislature has appointed for the government of British India, of which system the Company forms an integral and essential part.”

First then it seems that the subversion of the Company in their commercial and political capacity, will be the consequence of the loss of the Indian monopoly. Some men might question whether this consequence, admitting its probability, would really be an event much to be deprecated; with the political part of that subject, however, we have at present no concern.

That the subversion of the Company, in its commercial capacity, would be the issue of the proposed alteration, is, we certainly think, very highly probable; and why should that result be lamented? Could the loss of a trade, to which they have ceased to look as an object of gain, cause any diminution of their revenue? or rather, would not the duties, which, as sovereigns of the Peninsula, they would levy upon the then augmented

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mented trade of their empire, be a source of revenue of which they are now wholly destitute. That some direct influence may be acquired by their authority in the markets of the East, over those by whom those markets are supplied, may be allowed; but it must also be remembered, that trade is a system of reciprocal obligation, and that any power so gained will be pretty fairly balanced by the dependence which, in the same transactions, will be necessarily incurred. Nor is it in the estimate of the consequences, of which the loss of their monopoly might be productive, to be forgotten, that much of an indirect, but most powerful influence, might be acquired, by displaying themselves to the Asiatic world in pomp and splendour, befitting their exalted station, not as the brokers and pedlars of Europe truckling for some paltry bargain, but boldly claiming the sovereignty of India, and becoming in profession what, in intention and policy, they have so long sought to be.

“ If the change itself did not occasion the fall of the Company, the disappointments which the private adventurers could not fail to experience would, by them, be charged to the influence of the remaining privileges of the Company, and they would not rest until the whole were extinguished.”

Descending at length to less momentous considerations, the Directors discover, amongst the evils which a free trade with India would call into being, one calamity

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lamity which does not at first sight appear to wear a very alarming aspect. "The disappointments of private traders would be charged to the influence of the remaining privileges of the Company." That complaints and reproaches would be more effectual to undermine whatever privileges the Company might then retain, than they have been to subvert those of which they are now in possession, is not very credible; at least, the Company having made a fair experiment of the inutility of concessions, would have then a much stronger argument, to disprove the policy of yielding to such complaints, than any of which they are in possession at present.

The justice of the territorial claims of the Directors, it is not within the object of these pages to discuss.

"With the cessation of their Indian trade, their
 "Indian subordinate factories, which have been reared
 "in the course of more than a century, and which
 "are the seats of the best manufactures produced in
 "the country, must be abandoned, and all the com-
 "mercial branch of their civil servants be thrown out
 "of employ. Their purchases of goods at home, for
 "the Indian market, must also cease, with the circu-
 "lation of money which has enabled them to support
 "their credit in England, and to provide for the pay-
 "ment of bills, which it has been long and necessarily
 "the practice to draw on them from India; a practice
 "which, under such a change of circumstances, could
 "not be continued: and, in general, the great aid
 "which the political affairs of British India have, at
 "all

"all times, derived from the commercial credit and
 "resources of the Company, with the reciprocally
 "beneficial co-operation of the different parts of the
 "Company's system, must thus be destroyed. In
 "like manner, the Company must cease to employ
 "the numerous class of excellent ships they have en-
 "gaged for the Indian trade, ships constructed for
 "warlike defence as well as for commerce, and ren-
 "dered expensive only, by being necessarily destined
 "and fitted for the performance of political services."

Of the ruinous effects of throwing open the Indian trade, the next which the Directors proceed to consider, are the abandonment of their factories, want of employment for their commercial servants, the impracticability of finding bills upon Great Britain, the disuse of their shipping, and the want of means of conveying naval and military stores. To all this representation, the answer appears perfectly simple and obvious. If the effect of the opening of the Indian trade will be permanently to diminish the commercial dealings between this country and the East—in that case, much of the evil here stated, may not improbably result from the adoption of that measure. That such will not be the effect of an open trade, we have already endeavoured to prove, and we trust not wholly without success. But supposing what for the purpose of the present argument, it is amply sufficient to suppose, that the trade with the East when conducted by individual merchants, will be only equal in amount to that which the Company carries on at present, will

not the subordinate Indian factories be as necessary for the conduct of that trade, as of the commercial dealings which are now transacted there? and will not the commercial servants of the Directors, in proportion to their skill and experience be fully occupied as consignees or as correspondents of the private traders of Great Britain? That those factories would, in the case supposed, cease to be the establishments of the East-India Company, and that those commercial servants would (*quoad* their commercial character) cease to be the servants of the Company, may perhaps be conceded, but as these factories and commercial servants constitute a part of that mercantile system of the Company, "to which they have ceased to look as an object of gain," and which is in truth rather a burden and a loss; in what manner can the Directors be injured by this mercantile disunion from a connexion which, so far as it is mercantile, is of no advantage to them, while all the rights of sovereignty over their servants, and of territorial property in their factories, are maintained inviolate.

The same reasoning will extend to the other supposed injurious consequences of an open trade, which are at present under our consideration. The private commerce, which is to occupy the markets, now supplied by the Company, is not very likely to be carried on without the intervention of Bills of Exchange, nor is it very easy to conceive how the annual amount of these bills

bills should, (on the supposition upon which we are now proceeding) be less in the one system than in the other.

But on the destruction of their monopoly, it seems, the ships now chartered by the Company must be laid up, since being built for warlike *defence* as well as commerce, they would be unsuited to the purposes of private merchants, and the supplies of naval and military stores, which have usually been conveyed in them, must consequently cease to be exported. Why the means of "warlike defence" are not as necessary for the individual merchant as for the Company, yet remains to be told. Why a corporation possessing a capital of £22,567,953 and burdened with a debt exceeding that capital by more than 6 millions, should be better able to take up very expensive shipping than the merchants of these realms — whose capital engaged only in one branch of trade (the West Indian) exceeds the amount of the Company's capital and debt put together — is still to be discovered, and why, these merchants, who we are informed will be unable to assort any cargoes for the Indian market, should refuse to give the Company freight for their warlike stores in their half empty vessels, on pretty reasonable terms, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman have left us to enquire.

It is however unnecessary to deny, that the disuse of a large proportion of the shipping at present engaged in

in the trade to India, would be among the very probable consequences of throwing open that trade to private speculation. But in truth we do not think that the case of the Directors will be much indebted to this argument. On the contrary, we are inclined to suspect, that it is a concession which they have somewhat unwisely and unwarily made. Visionary as our merchants may be, they have not yet learned to speculate so wildly as to charter ships of eight, ten, or twelve hundred tons burden, for a voyage which can be made with incomparably more cheapness, safety, and dispatch, by vessels of one half or one third of that tonnage. The Company, true to their principle of despising all "narrow considerations of commercial profit" have indeed neglected this as well as other calculations, which to men, to whom considerations of that kind are familiar, might have appeared important. That British Merchants should refuse to take up the shipping now chartered by the Company, can we suppose arise only from this—that the Company's ships are not well adapted for the trade in which they are engaged. For what reason then have they so long been employed? To that question, some have replied, by referring to the influence of the Shipping Interest in the Court of Directors, others by calling to mind the habitual carelessness and imprudence of Joint Stock Companies—the Chairman and Deputy Chairman by telling us that they "are destined and fitted for the performance

performance of political services" adopting the last as the most authoritative explanation of the practice in question, still it seems impossible to evade the conclusion that here at least the commercial interests of the Company have been sacrificed to their interests as sovereigns—that so far as this most material article of expence is concerned, their imperial is incompatible with their mercantile character, and that, if in no other yet certainly in this respect, the trade with India will be more cheaply and advantageously conducted by private merchants than by the East-India Company.

" But there is no reason to believe the evils would
 " end here. The monopoly of the China trade, which
 " it is proposed to continue, would not be safe.
 " British ships, when permitted to range at pleasure
 " through the Indian seas, however interdicted from
 " that trade, would attempt to participate in it, either
 " by resorting to it as the country ships do, under
 " color of carrying on the coasting trade, or by other
 " means obtaining teas, and the other productions of
 " China, at the most convenient Indian ports. Love
 " of gain, disappointments in other ways, the hope
 " of impunity, would stimulate their conductors to
 " break through restrictions imposed in this country.
 " British subjects, who now navigate the Indian Seas,
 " sail from some one of our established settlements
 " there, and are amenable to the laws of it: it would
 " not be so with men having no domicile in India. In
 " ranging the numerous islands and coasts of the
 " Eastern Seas, where they would be unknown, and
 " whence they could not be followed to England by
 " complaints,

“ complaints, the probability of impunity might tempt
 “ them to commit upon the weak natives, accustomed
 “ to repose confidence in Englishmen, acts of injustice
 “ and licentiousness, which would wound the national
 “ character, raise complaints throughout India, and
 “ set the people against us.”

There are but two other points in the letter of the Directors to which we shall solicit the attention of our readers. 1st. The apprehensions entertained that our private merchants, “ ranging the numerous islands and coasts of the Eastern Sea,” would be tempted to “ commit upon the weak natives, accustomed to repose confidence in Englishmen, acts of injustice and licentiousness, which would wound the national character, raise complaints throughout India, and set the people against us.” The same fears apply to China, with this difference only: that there we should set the Emperor against us. That men will be licentious where they can be so with impunity, we are not so ignorant of men as not to believe, nay, were we incredulous upon this point, perhaps a glance at the history of Modern India itself might suffice for our conviction. But that men will be habitually licentious where they have a strong immediate private interest in restraining their passions, we are not so wholly unacquainted with the power of self-interest as to think very probable. If the ruinous competition in the Indian Market of which the Directors speak is not a phantom of their own

own creation; it is surely somewhat incredible that men with their hands full of unsaleable wares, should not rather assume the obsequious civility of the private tradesman, than the insolent licence which in the mere agent of a vast Joint Stock Company, would be natural and intelligible.

“ In China, where the effects of such a spirit would
 “ be most to be feared, we could exercise no authority,
 “ sufficient to controul men not within the reach of the
 “ Indian Governments, or to defeat their schemes and
 “ associations for eluding the laws. Practice would
 “ embolden them, and time increase their numbers.
 “ It is hardly conceivable they would not venture upon
 “ irregularities which would offend the Chinese Government, who, whilst the delinquents escaped to
 “ England with impunity, would doubtless take satisfaction of the national factory; and the pride and
 “ jealousy of that government, alarmed by repeated
 “ instances of this nature, from the desultory visits of
 “ a new order of Englishmen, insubordinate to the
 “ representatives of the nation, might determine to
 “ dismiss the whole together.”

The inconveniences anticipated from the petulance of our traders in Borneo or Sumatra, would, we conjecture, however, produce very little alarm at Leadenhall Street, if the sensibility of the Directors were not excited for the preservation of the peace and good order of China also. We are aware that the apprehensions entertained by the Directors on this ground are not confined to themselves, but that many

men, who have no immediate personal interest in the continuance of the monopoly of the Company in the China trade, are disposed to acquiesce in the justice of these alarms, and such, indeed, appear to be the views of His Majesty's Ministers in their observations of the 2d March 1812. Upon this question, we wish to suggest a few considerations, which may tend to shew the fallacy of the representations which have been so assiduously circulated, in relation to this part of the subject: and, 1st. we must observe, that the agents of the Company at Canton are the mere factors of a great commercial establishment, and not the servants of the Sovereigns of India. No one, who knows any thing of the haughty spirit of the Court of Pekin, will, for a moment believe that the agents of the Company can derive any protection from the violence or insults of the Emperor of China, from their connection with a body of merchants, whose power that magnificent person considers probably with the most supreme indifference; and for whose occupation, except as it may supply him with some of the conveniences of life, he doubtless entertains the most unqualified contempt. So far, then, the individual merchant will, at least, be on an equality with the agent of the Company—that they will be equally destitute of any means of acquiring respect or toleration, except what they may derive from the good character for submissiveness and orderly beha-

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viour, which they may respectively establish. That this is a very difficult task to any description of men need not be denied; nay, we will even say, that, however we might feel as merchants, we should, as men, be sorry if it were otherwise than difficult. But, in considering which of the two classes of persons, who would be engaged in that occupation, would be most likely to conduct themselves with the deference and regularity which Chinese pride or policy might exact, it seems hardly questionable, but that the master supercargo and seamen of a Bristol or Liverpool trader, would far surpass in quietness and docility the commander and crew of a China ship in the employ of the Company: and if the comparison should be extended to the factors on shore, the result would be still more clearly in favour of the agent of the private merchant.

In the first place, it must be remarked, that the East-India Company are in possession of the market—and that the private trader could only hope to make a profitable voyage by supplanting, in some degree, so powerful a rival.—To this end, the arts of insinuation and address would be the most obvious and natural path.

2dly. The inferior bulk and peaceful appearance of the ships of the private trader, would tend much to diminish any jealousy which the government of China might entertain of the objects of the individual

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merchant.

merchant. But that the same government should feel some apprehensions of the immense armaments of the East-India Company, is considering the paltry marine by which that great Empire is defended, no very extraordinary or unwarrantable instance of suspicion.

3d. It would hardly escape the penetration of that very jealous people, that much less was to be feared from any number of insulated individuals, than from a body of men whose identity of interest and connexion with one common head, would enable them to conduct any lawless enterprize which they might be supposed to meditate, with vigour, celerity, and effect.

4th. The complement of one of the Company's China ships is very much larger in proportion to its tonnage, than the crew which any private merchant would hire for the navigation of the vessels, which would be fitted out from Liverpool or Glasgow. There would consequently be little danger of any long or frequent absence of the common seamen, from the vessels of the latter. Attention to the ordinary business of the ship, and the task of taking in the cargo and necessary stores, would provide ample occupation for that number of hands, which the economy of private speculation would prescribe. Idleness and consequently licentiousness would of course prevail most in that service, in which the duty to be performed was least constant and laborious.

5th. From

5th. From the system adopted by the Company of bringing home the produce of their China trade in large fleets, which sail at stated intervals—their ships lie at Canton for a much longer period than would be necessary, to take in the cargo which could be sent to Europe in the single vessels of private-traders—how much in such a situation, delay must increase the temptation of committing those excesses, which are so much apprehended, it seems hardly necessary to mention.

6th. It is supposed, that the superior respectability of the captains and crews employed by the East-India Company and their larger establishments of petty officers, would insure a more prompt and ready obedience and greater severity of discipline in their vessels, than could be obtained in the ships of mere private adventurers. Without entering into a comparison which must be useless and might be offensive, it may be sufficient to say in reply to that suggestion, that if our merchant service contains any men of talent, resolution, integrity, and experience, who are not numbered among the servants of the East-India Company, such are precisely the men whom any merchant would select for his masters and supercargo, in a voyage of such importance and difficulty as that in question. If such men are to be found (which it is to be presumed will not be disputed) and if when found, they would be selected for trust and command in a voyage to China

China (which probably few will doubt), why are we to anticipate any defect of discipline in vessels so commanded. Obedience is the fruit of fear or affection or respect, nor is it easy to understand how the captain of a Company's ship, should be more able or more likely to excite these emotions, than such officers as we have already described.

7th. It is obvious that, in proportion as the trade carried on between this country and China increased, the importance of that intercourse would rise in the estimation of the government of the latter country. Prejudice and ignorance may do much, but their power has its limit. The Mandarins will at last believe, that a traffic which supplies them with any luxuries, amusements, or gratifications, of which, without that traffic, they would have been destitute, cannot be wholly unworthy even of their attention and support. If a free trade with China will have the effect of extending the commerce of China, which it is not very easy to question, may we not reasonably hope, that their deep rooted jealousy of foreign connexion will at length be overcome, by daily experience of the substantial comforts and advantages of which that connexion might be made productive.

To some, however, all these considerations may perhaps appear insufficient, to shew that the extension of the trade with China, to private merchants, would not excite all the jealousy on the part of the Chinese government

government of which the Directors are apprehensive. To allay the fears, the excessive fears, as they appear to us, of such persons, we would venture lastly to propose, as a practical method of obviating the supposed inconvenience, that all British subjects at Canton, and generally throughout the parts of China, should be placed under the control of a consul, to be appointed for that purpose by His Majesty; that he should be entrusted with very large and ample powers of laying under arrest; and even, if necessary, of punishing by fine or imprisonment, on board any British ships in the port of Canton, any person or persons who might be guilty of any species of excess, by which the Chinese government or any of its officers were likely to be molested; and that, to provide for the due execution of his orders, he should be entrusted with an authority (for that purpose only) over all the seamen and others belonging to any British vessel lying in that port; of such a measure the minor regulations and details would be for the consideration of Parliament.

“ If this extreme case be not supposed, which however is too probable and too momentous in its consequences to be hazarded, can it be doubted, that whilst the duties on tea continue at even the fourth part of what they are at present, private English ships adventuring to the Eastern Seas will not, by means of country vessels and intermediate ports, if by no other means, procure teas, and revive the practice of smuggling

“ smuggling them into this kingdom? The consequence seems inevitable, and the ships of our own country, especially if allowed to chuse their port of discharge, as the proposed change seems to require, would have facilities, which those of foreign Europe or America could not command. How the immense revenue, now derived by Government from the very high duties on tea, could, under such circumstances, be realized, or a substitute found for them, may be an important, and, to all appearance, a most difficult subject of enquiry.”

To the indiscriminate admission of private merchants into the trade with China, the Directors have however another objection, though like cautious advocates, they have very wisely postponed the mention of that argument, which they expected to *tell* most forcibly; to the conclusion of their enumeration of the evils impending over us, by the projected alterations in our Indian system, “ the immense revenue now received by government, from the very high duties on tea,” would it appears be with very great difficulty “ realized.” The grounds of this supposition are not very intelligibly stated. We collect, however, from the whole of the Letter of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, that this supposed defalcation in the revenue, is expected to arise from a system of smuggling, to which it is believed the opening of the trade with China will give peculiar facilities, and from the adventurers in that trade “ being allowed,” as the proposed

proposed change seems to require, “ to chuse their own port of discharge.” Of the history of smuggling, the Writer of these pages is willing to confess, that he knows but little; and in the absence of any reasoning, to shew the probability of the extension of this practice, in consequence of the projected alterations in the system of our China and Indian trade, it certainly becomes difficult to disprove the assertion which has been made by the Directors. There appear notwithstanding to be one or two considerations, which might excuse some degree of incredulity, as to the justice and accuracy of this opinion. Of all men, Mr. Parry and Mr. Grant will be the last to deny, that whatever other effect the opening of the commerce of the East may produce, it will, at least, be the cause of a great competition in our own markets, and that in consequence of that competition, the prices of tea, as of every other article of import from those countries, will be “ reduced still lower ” than they are at present. Now, in what consists the temptation to smuggle teas from Canton to Liverpool, or (what for our present purpose amounts to the same thing) from Boston to Liverpool, upon the present system of Chinese monopoly? First, the article is brought into the market here, free from the expence of the *ad valorem* duties, which, in a lawful voyage, would be payable upon the sales at the East-India House in London. Secondly, the East-India Company, having in the fair market a monopoly

monopoly of the article, regulate both the quantities and the qualities of the teas they purchase in China, so as to keep up the price of that commodity in the markets of Great-Britain. The smuggler consequently not only sells his wares exempt from the duty, but he sells them in a market in which the value of the article is unnaturally and very considerably raised. Thirdly, the East-India Company may be supposed, like most other similar establishments, to make their purchases at a rate somewhat exceeding the fair value of the commodities they purchase. The smuggler has all the advantage of the circumspection and wariness of individual self-interest in making up his charges. He therefore brings his goods into a market, in which his only rival is one who has bought at a higher rate than himself. But now suppose the trade with China to be thrown open to private merchants. The smuggler, it is true, will still have the advantage over the fair trader of saving upon his sales the duties payable to government. But neither will he come into market artificially raised, nor will his competitors in the market be less active, cautious, or intelligent, than himself, in purchasing their commodities. So far then, it does not seem very intelligible, that a free trade should increase the gains of smugglers, or augment their numbers. But there is a remedy against this apprehended evil, exceedingly simple, efficacious, and obvious. A "ruinous competition" will of course

course increase the amount of sales and consequently the whole amount of the duties upon these sales. Some diminution, therefore, in the duties, might be made without any diminution in the revenue, or in other words, the temptation to smuggling may, at no expence to the public, be considerably diminished. Farther, by admitting the private trader into a participation in the Chinese trade, the legislature would at once raise in the fair merchants and their agents, a whole army of Custom-House Officers as vigilant, because as much interested in the detection of frauds, as the persons who are officially entrusted with the discharge of that duty; and, lastly, by removing from the port of London, a considerable proportion of the imports from the East, we should, in some degree, render useless all the wonderful and unequalled facilities, which, notwithstanding its expensive establishment of revenue officers, that port possesses for evading the execution of the laws. For these, among other, reasons we are very sceptical as to the injury, which it is supposed the customs will sustain, from the projected alteration in the system of British intercourse with the East.

Among other monopolies, it has been the object of the petitioners to Parliament, to destroy that which is now enjoyed by the port of London, in the exclusive possession of all the import of East-Indian commodities. That this proposal would excite great alarm and very

loud clamour, they by whom it was made of course expected—that this clamour should be made not only the substitute, but the single substitute for argument, has excited no astonishment; but it has been somewhat surprizing to the merchants of the great outports of this kingdom, that *they* should have been called upon to disprove the policy of throwing the whole of this immense traffic into one of the cities of this empire, to the exclusion of all the outports of Great-Britain and Ireland. The least which can be expected of men who are soliciting so immense an exclusive privilege, is that they should be provided with a clear and producible defence of the justice of their demands. Hitherto they have found it either prudent or necessary to decline so hazardous an attempt. We may collect however from what has hitherto appeared upon this subject, that the great grounds of argument of the persons “interested in the port of London,” will, when they condescend to argue the question at all, be as follows:—

1st. It may be said that there is a large body of men now occupied in the City of London, in the service of the East-India Company, who would by the proposed alteration be thrown out of employ, and that much of the capital invested in their respective trades, by the wholesale tea-dealers and others connected with the Company, would be rendered unprofitable.

The

The importance of these considerations no man will be disposed to dispute; but when their just weight shall have been allowed them, to what will it amount? The sum and substance of human wisdom, consists in compromising well between opposite difficulties—the completion of human folly, in refusing to avoid a greater evil, by submitting to a less. The shippers and warehousemen, and tea-dealers of the City of London, will scarcely attempt to prove that the national detriment which we shall sustain by their loss of employment, is greater than what will be incurred by refusing to nine hundred and ninety-nine of every thousand of the merchants and manufactures of this country, all commercial intercourse with one half of the habitable world. Their case may be an efficient make-weight in the balance of argument, but if brought forward as a single counterpoise to the considerations to which it is opposed, its influence is absolutely imperceptible. That much individual loss and disappointment would be sustained by these classes of men, it is needless to deny; but, perhaps, that loss has been somewhat overstated. Much of the labour and the capital now engaged in the East-India trade in the metropolis, would probably be transferred to the outports, and much might advantageously be diverted to other occupations. But above all it must not be forgotten, that the evil sustained by the citizens of London, would be the exact measure and the immediate cause of the benefit acquired

quired by the inhabitants of the provinces; and that to the community at large it is a matter of little or no moment, whether *Titius* in London, or *Sempronius* in Liverpool, is enriched by the East-Indian trade. The case of these persons is (as far as it is worthy of our attention) a case for compensation.

2dly. It may be urged in behalf of the Port of London, that the coasting trade is materially promoted by the import of East Indian goods being restricted to the Thames. We doubt much whether, in point of fact, this statement is correct. The inland navigation from London has, of late years, been so much improved, and the overland communication with every town and village in the country, has been rendered so cheap, easy, and expeditious, that, except for very bulky articles indeed (and such are not the goods enumerated by the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, as constituting the imports of India) it does not seem very likely, nor indeed is it to be believed that much tonnage is engaged in the coasting trade. But not to dispute the fact, let us consider what it is which we sacrifice to this object, when, for the promotion of it, we abandon the whole imports of the East to the port of London. First, all the risks incurred of loss by capture in the Channel (which, if the port of discharge were at Cork, or Liverpool, or Bristol, would be avoided) are necessarily sustained by ships which are compelled to discharge their cargoes in the Thames.

Thames. Secondly, the consumers of tea, or any article of import from the East, have, in addition to the price of the article itself, to pay a profit to the broker and wholesale dealer in London, which, if the sales were conducted at the outports, might be saved. Thirdly, all the costs of carriage inland or coastwise, and of double warehousing, are likewise a charge upon the commodity, which might be materially diminished by opening the outports to the reception of East Indian merchandize. Fourthly, the principle upon which this argument proceeds, would, if extended to its fair consequences, lead to very extraordinary results indeed. If it be expedient to ship teas in coasting vessels from the Thames to the Humber, rather than to permit a direct importation into the latter river, why not extend the same reasoning to the import of sugar? why not to that of hides, or hemp, or tallow? Why, to the great and manifest injury of the coasting trade, are chairs and tables suffered to be sold in the public streets which have not made a probationary voyage to Leith or to the Orkneys? Why all this—except that we have discovered that though the promotion of the coasting trade is a good thing, yet that it is not the first of all political objects—that it is of much less importance, for instance, than the cheapness of all articles of universal use and dispatch in their arrival at their destined markets.

Third,

Third, the last objection which we anticipate to the admission of the outports to a participation in the commerce of the East, is, that the present mode of collecting the *ad valorem* duties on teas and other articles by public sales, could not be conducted without great loss to the revenue, except in the sale room of the East-India Company. In answer to this assertion, we will venture to suggest three plans for that purpose; either of which we apprehend would, if adopted by Parliament, provide for the collection of these duties in Glasgow or Liverpool, as effectually as if they had been raised upon sales in Leadenhall Street.

1st. All the different kinds of tea might be classed numerically, according to the quality and value; the duty payable upon a given quantity of each class to be a settled and permanent sum—that sum to be assessed by the principal revenue officer at each port, upon all the different classes of tea which might be found in any particular cargo. This system has long been acted upon in America and with complete success.

2dly. The sales of tea might still take place as at present in the port of London, and general averages might be taken, by which the estimated value of the article as imported into the other ports of the empire should be regulated. Upon this principle the tax on sugar is at present raised, or

3dly. The

3dly. The public sales might take place at the different ports of discharge. Public warehouses might be provided for the reception of the goods, and the sales take place in the different ports of the kingdom at stated and convenient intervals, under the inspection of the same officer or officers to be appointed for that purpose. By these persons, returns to be authenticated as might be provided, would be made from time to time to the proper office in London, and upon his reports the *ad valorem* duties might be easily and unobjectionably raised.

“But a more serious consequence than all these would still remain. A free trade to India would, unavoidably, draw after it the residence of numerous and continually increasing Europeans there, whatever prohibitions might, at first, be opposed to their settling in the country. When all restraint to the importation of ships and goods is taken off, men must be allowed to follow their property, and to remain at the place where they land it till they have disposed of it: they must be allowed to navigate the Indian Seas, and to return to the same place when their business calls them: they will thus, insensibly, and with hardly reasonable grounds for opposition, domiciliate themselves; nor would an unsuccessful trade prevent them, but many would seek to indemnify themselves on shore for their losses by the voyage. The instances of such settlements will be numerous, and it will be impossible for any police to follow up the cases of individuals, and continually to exercise a rigorous system of exclusion. This has
“ not

“ not hitherto been done, though attended with comparatively little difficulty; and the attempt would soon, under the new order of things, be abandoned as hopeless. Colonization must, in such case, follow. Large communities of Europeans will struggle for popular rights: new feelings with respect to the mother country, new interests and attachments will then spring up; and in a region so remote, so rich and so populous, and so accustomed to yield to the ascendancy of the European character, the tendency and process of these things cannot be difficult to conceive.”

Having said thus much upon those parts of the letter of Mr. Parry and Mr. Grant, which appear to have a more immediate and pressing importance, we shall not detain our readers long with commenting upon the preceding passage. For himself, the writer of these pages must most explicitly disavow any intention of giving his very insignificant opinion in favor of the present independence of India. He is deeply impressed with the conviction that disaster and wretchedness would be the certain and immediate consequences of such a revolution; that a race of men in a state of society such as that in which the mass of the population of India is placed at present are morally incapable of acquiring or maintaining political liberty, or of justly appreciating its value were they able to acquire it. But at the same time he humbly conceives that neither in Hindoostan, or in any other country upon earth, it is the wisest mode of preserving subordination, to keep

keep men in a state of ignorance and depression;—to debar them from any communication with their superiors in education and in knowledge, and to diminish by every means which ingenuity can devise, the number of those sympathies and common interests which connect the governors and the governed. To ordinary apprehensions it appears not very intelligible, how the increase of British settlers should be hostile to the permanency of the British Government in India. Rapidly as our empire in the East has grown, and widely as it has extended, however beneficent its influence, or noble its form, it will be laid prostrate with the first blast of the tempest, unless the roots and fibres by which it is upheld are deeply and tenaciously dispersed throughout the whole population of the Indian Peninsula.

But strange are the inconsistencies of terror. While the Chairman and Deputy Chairman feel their thrones tottering under them, in the prospect of their own countrymen settling in their dominions, they are throwing open their harbours, their cities, and their factories to foreign merchants and to foreign intrigue, “ to establish *foreign* influence, and to aggrandize *foreign* power in India.”* Granting, however, that they may have some pretext of danger to justify their timidity, must not ages elapse before any British power

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* See Lord Wellesley's Letter, page 34.

in the Peninsula can become so formidable as to threaten the repose of its present sovereigns? And shall we throw from us the means of rendering this empire independent of the trade of America and Europe;—of acquiring wealth sufficient to baffle the force of the most formidable conqueror who ever menaced the happiness of the world;—of extending commerce and civilization, and opulence, over an immense portion of the habitable globe, because some two or three hundred years hence, India may shake off the authority of the Court of Directors! Human foresight is not strong enough to calculate the value or the probability of such remote contingencies. In matters of state policy, as in the details of private life, we must, in some degree, be content to live *extempore*.

There is one among the many objections which might be made to these very hasty remarks, which we are anxious not to leave unnoticed. We are, it may be said, contemplating as a desirable event, the introduction into India of a system of mechanical labour, which would form a dangerous competition to the manufactories established amongst ourselves. They who entertain this apprehension can certainly have but very slightly considered the essential distinction between our own staple commodities and those of the Peninsula, or the state of the machinery of this country, to the production of which all the science and accumulated experience of Europe has been made to contribute.

It

It must further be observed, that the cheapness of labour in India, will long prevent the establishment or use of expensive machinery in the manufactures of that country. As an illustration of the superiority which this circumstance must at all times give to our own merchants in a trade with any part of the world, in which the same means of facilitating labour are unknown we refer to the calculation subjoined to these pages, extracted from a letter published by Mr. Lee of Manchester, than whom no man has a more accurate practical acquaintance with subjects of this nature. (See page 75).

Having said thus much as to the letter of Mr. Parry and Mr. Grant, the writer of these sheets trusts he shall be excused, if he adds one word as to his motives in giving publicity to these observations, that they are neither very original or very profound, he does not need to be told, but having written them to answer a temporary purpose, he has not aimed to give any new view of this most important subject, but to recall to mens recollection those acknowledged principles and obvious truths which it appeared to him to be the object of the letter of the Directors to discredit. No authorities have been quoted, because without incumbering a discussion which has already very greatly exceeded its intended limits, they could not have been introduced. In the approaching parliamentary enquiry into the subject of the East-Indian Charter, an opportunity will perhaps

perhaps be afforded of substantiating in a much more ample manner than would have been practicable here, the accuracy of the facts, and the justice of the reasoning, which are barely glanced at in these pages. The author feels that what he has written must depend for support on its own value, and can derive not a particle of weight from his name or authority; he is therefore the less unwilling to say, in justification of his own literary pretensions, and as an apology for numberless defects of composition, that he has been compelled to write what he now submits to the judgment of the public, in a few hours snatched with difficulty in the course of one week, from pressing professional avocations.

Mr. LEE'S

Mr. LEE'S Calculation of Labour in Britain and India.
The Quantity of Mule Spindles in Great Britain, appears, by actual survey to be—

4,200,000, producing a quantity of Cotton Yarn, at least equal to that which can be spun in the same time by *Four Millions Two Hundred Thousand Persons*, in India; the wages of each are supposed at 2d. per Day; but in Britain—

70,000 Persons would produce the same Effect, by Machinery, at 20d. per day; consequently—

1 Person in Britain will be equal to—

60 in India; but, in consequence of a more expensive apparatus, and various contingencies, I will state that—

1 Person is equal to 40 in India;

$40 \times 2d = 6s. 8d.$ which is the value of labour for Spinning in India, to correspond with that of *one person* in Britain, or as 6s. 8d. to 1s. 8d.

It is, therefore, evident that one Spinner by Machinery in Britain will produce yarn at one fourth the price that it costs for the same Quantity of Workmanship in India; supposing the Wages of the former to be 1s. 8d. and of the latter to be 2d. per day.

The following statement is a comparison of the cost of labour in producing Yarns, in Britain, and India, for One Pound Weight, from No. 40 à 250, and likewise of the Value of the Labour and Material *combined*.

No.	Hanks Spun per Day in both per Spindle.	BRITISH.			INDIA.							
		Cotton.		Labour.	Cost.	Cotton.		Labour.	Cost.			
		s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.			
40	2 . 00	1	6	1	0	2	6	3	3	4	3	7
60	1 . 75	2	0	1	6	3	6	3½	5	8½	6	0
80	1 . 50	2	2	2	2	4	4	4½	8	10½	9	3
100	1 . 40	2	4	2	10	5	2	5	11	11	12	4
120	1 . 25	2	6	3	6	6	0	5	16	0	16	5
150	1 . 00	2	10	6	6	9	4	6	25	0	25	6
200	0 . 75	3	4	16	8	20	0	6	44	7	45	1
250	0 . 50	4	0	31	0	35	0	8	83	4	84	0

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