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AN *Ed. Hodges*  
ESSAY  
UPON  
GOVERNMENT:  
OR, THE *J. Currier*  
NATURAL NOTIONS  
OF  
GOVERNMENT,

Demonstrated  
In a Chain of CONSEQUENCES from the  
Fundamental Principles of SOCIETY.

By which,  
All the Nicest Cases of Conscience relating to Govern-  
ment may be, and many of 'em are here resolv'd, with  
respect to the Authority of Government in General:  
The End and Manner of Making and Executing Laws:  
The Measure of Submission to Princes, and the Law-  
fulness or Unlawfulness of Revolutions:

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In a Method altogether New.

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By THO. BURNETT, D. D. Prebendary of  
*Sarum*, and Rector of *Westkington* in *Wiltshire*.

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The SECOND EDITION, with ADDITIONS.

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
T O

*James Mountagu, Esq;*

O F

*Lackham, in the County of Wilts.*

*S I R,*



THE favourable Reception this little treatise has met with, and especially from those whose Judgment I ought to have regard to, has encouraged me to publish it a second time: And that I may do it with the greater advantage, I beg leave it may appear under your Patronage.

It will be always an Honour to any work to have the countenance of a Person of your eminent Character,

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whose

DEDICATION.

whose shining Virtues give a fresh Lustre to your Noble and Antient Family, as your daily endeavours for the publick good render you a common Blessing to your Country.


But it is not on this account only that I address my self to you, considering you as a Great Man, but as a Great Friend, from whom I have received many, and great Favours, and I am glad of this opportunity of publickly acknowledging my obligations to you, and assuring you, that I am, with the utmost gratitude,

Honoured Sir,

Your most Obedient,

Humble Servant,

T. BURNETT.



THE  
PREFACE.

**T**HIS Treatise sets before the Reader a little System of Political Philosophy, to explain and demonstrate the Notion of Government; which as it is often of very dangerous consequence for men to be mistaken in; so is it of equal importance to Society, to have it rightly and perfectly understood: The way to attain this with any certainty, is to fix it upon certain and undeniable Principles, and if from a due application of those general truths to particular cases, like the Artificer's Square and Rule to his work, we find such a natural relation and agreement, as will solve all the several Phænomena of the point, we cannot much fail of what we aim at.

This was what I propos'd to my self, resolving to lay aside all prejudice and partiality, and to follow

## The P R E F A C E.

*follow the freedom of my own thoughts, to see whether Reason alone would conduct us, if it were sincerely listned to; And this method I have all along persued, and from the fundamental Principles of Society, which all men universally agree in, I have been naturally led on, as by a thread, thro' that intricate maze of error and confusion, with which this subject is intangled, to an uniform consistent Scheme of notions, such as will answer all the occasions of Government, and account for all the difficulties of it. And for this reason, as I think I have found the truth, that has been so much sought and inquir'd after; so I present it to the Reader just as I found it, without any other dress or ornament, but that of its own native beauty and simplicity.*

*And this I have chosen to do on purpose, that it might carry the clearer evidence and conviction along with it: For the forming a right notion of Truth, is like taking the just proportion of a body; the only way to do it, is to strip it of its dress, and view it in its naked form.*

*But however plain and demonstrative these notions may seem to me, yet I should not have ventur'd them to the press, had they not appear'd as rational to others, and those too not  
only*

## The P R E F A C E.


*only men of learning and judgment, but of contrary parties and opinions in this controversy.*

*For to publish ones thoughts in matters of dispute, is but like stripping to run the Gantelope, where every one that differs in his opinion, will be sure to condemn you of error, and seldom fails to lash you severely for it. This hazard I had been very careful to avoid, had I not been sensible of the absolute necessity there is of some such treatise as this at this time, when so much pains has been taken to unsettle peoples minds, and sow the seeds of rebellion and discontent amongst us; When open attempts are made to bring in the Pretender, to the utmost hazard of our Religion and Liberties, by exposing us to Popery and Arbitrary Power, and that too by the means of an Intestine War, by which the Nation must have been involv'd in blood and ruin; And all this under a Pretence of a Title, which the Laws have set aside, and themselves have many of 'em abjur'd, and against the Establish'd Right of a Prince, endued with all the Great and Noble Qualities that can make any Prince a Blessing; who can have no other views, nor any other interest, but to make us a Flourishing and Happy People: And when we hear men every day justifying these  
attempts,*



The P R E F A C E.

*attempts, and lamenting the misfortune of their disappointment, as if they long'd like the Israelites to be in Egypt again; It concerns every one, at this time especially, who has any true regard for the Protestant Religion, or the Interest of his Country, to bring in what assistance he is able, to the maintenance and support of that Happy Settlement, upon which our present Peace and future Safety, and all the other valuable Blessings of Society, do intirely, under God, depend. This is the chief End of publishing these Papers, and if they will in any wise contribute to it, either by settling the Notions of such as are in doubt, or setting those right who are mistaken, or reducing those that are misled, I shall think my time and labour well imploy'd, and my self very Happy in having been the Instrument of so much good to them and my Country.*



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A N  
E S S A Y  
U P O N  
G O V E R N M E N T, &c.

**M**Y design in the following papers is, to endeavour to establish a right Notion of Government from natural and certain Principles; a Work at first view not very easy to be done, considering how much men differ on this subject, and how intricate and intangled they have made it.

Amongst the many that have wrote upon this Point, there are but few who agree in the same Scheme; and amongst the many Schemes that have been drawn, I doubt there are hardly any, which are not imbarass'd with some obstinate difficulty, that the Author would be glad to be fairly rid of.

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*The several Notions of Government.*

As to the late Civil Wars, 'tis pretty well known, what Notions of Government went current in those Days. When Monarchy was to be subverted, we know what was necessary to justify the Fact; and then, because it was convenient for their purpose, it was undoubtedly true in the Nature of Things, *That Government had its Original from the People, and the Prince was only their Trustee, to execute the Office they had put into his hand, which they might resume when they saw fit.*

This was the Doctrine that was commonly receiv'd, and the only Doctrine that relish'd in those Times.

But afterwards, when Monarchy took its Place again, and a new Scene of things appear'd upon the Stage, another Notion of Government came in Fashion, *Then Government had its Original entirely from God, and the Prince was accountable to none but Him; so that let Him do what he would, He was not to be oppos'd, and what Injury soever we might suffer by Him, we must wait for a Redress, till the Day of Judgment.*

*Then Princes were tuti Imperii Majestate, their Majesty was their Protection, and their Character their Sanctuary, and as they were intrusted by none but God, so there was nothing left for Subjects, but the Glory of obeying.* These  
Notions

Notions of Government went glibly down, according to the Times, they were vented in.

And now, upon another turn of things, when People have a liberty to speak out, a new Set of notions is advanced; *now Passive Obedience is all a mistake, and instead of being a duty to suffer oppression, 'tis a Glorious Act to resist it; and instead of leaving Injuries to be redress'd by God, we have a natural Right to relieve our selves.*

Now amidst these contradictions, which have each been manag'd with art and dexterity, 'tis hard to find where the Truth lies. Each notion has pass'd for true Sterling in its turn; and if we were to judge by the same Rule, that such Principles are too commonly receiv'd by, we must then judge according to our Interest, and according to the humour of the Times we live in; and tho' we may not happen to be right, yet we shall generally be allow'd to be so, and we are sure to be of the strongest Side.

But after all, there is a Right, and a Wrong, however Prejudice, or Interest has perplex'd, and entangled them, and as it will be a very fair step to the discovery of the Right, if we can find what Notions are Wrong, so I will endeavour to lay down some Propositions, as Rules for this purpose, by which we may form a certain Judgment, and when we have by this

means clear'd away the Rubbish, we may the more easily find the Jewel, that lies buried in such a Heap of Confusion.

*Principles to be granted.*

NOW these Rules I will build upon such Principles only, as the greatest Part, if not all Mankind are agreed in: And therefore I will take it for granted,

PRINCIPLE I.

*First*, THAT as the Wisdom of God made the World for some End, so whatever that End was, it is the duty of every man to pursue it to his power.

PRINCIPLE II.

*Secondly*, THAT whatever Means are in the nature of things necessary to that End, the same are so many Laws, and Rules of Action, and so many necessary and natural duties to be observ'd in the pursuit of that End.

PRINCIPLE III.

*Thirdly*, THAT Means, as such, are only for the sake of the End, and by consequence as the End must be more valuable than the Means, so the value of the Means must rise or fall, and our duty and obligation to make use of 'em, must be greater,

or

or less, according as they are more, or less necessary to the End: And if so, from hence it will follow,

That when any thing, which is in its own nature a necessary Means to an End, shall, by being applied in such and such a manner, prove destructive of that End; so far as it is our duty to pursue the End, so far it is our duty to reject that application.

These are such Principles as few will disallow; and I believe it will hardly be denied me further,

PRINCIPLE IV.

*Fourthly*, THAT the End for which God made the World, was to do Good, or, in other words, that every thing might be Happy according to its Nature, and by consequence as Mankind are of a sociable Nature, and cannot be truly Happy without Society, it must have been one End of that Wisdom, that made us for our Happiness, that we should be united in Society, and therefore it must be our duty, not only to support Society, but to do it in such a Way, as is most for its Happiness. (See Principle I.) And therefore all notions must be false, and all actions unlawful, that tend either to the Destruction, or Misery of Society.

PRIN-

## PRINCIPLE V.

*Fifthly*, BY the Happiness of Society is to be meant chiefly, the Security of every one's Rights, and Properties.

## PRINCIPLE VI.

I WILL take it for granted, and I believe most men are pretty well agreed, that Government is necessary to the Happiness of Society, and by consequence it must be an indispensable Truth, that Government ought to be maintain'd. (Principle II.) And therefore those notions of Government must be false, and those actions unlawful, which tend to the destruction of Government, that is, which tend to the making of Government precarious, and the introducing disorder and confusion. And if so,

Then, should we so far ascribe the Power of the Government to the People, as to give them a Right to resume it, when they please; as this would undoubtedly make Government precarious, and tend to Civil discord and confusion, this notion must necessarily be false, and such an action of the People unlawful. But then,

## PRINCIPLE VII.

*Seventhly*, AS Government is only a means to an End, and as the End is to be preferr'd before the means, so it must by con-

consequence be a certain Truth, That in Government the End must chiefly be regarded, and therefore that notion of Government must be false, and that action unlawful, which is contrary to the End, and Reason of Government.

And as all men, I suppose, will agree in this, that the End of Government is the Happiness of Society; That notion of Government must be false, and that action unlawful, that is contrary to the Happiness of Society. And if so,

Then, should Government be so far ascrib'd to God, as to give the Prince an absolute Authority over his People, to dispose of their Rights, as he sees fit, without any Power in the People to oppose it; as this must make the Happiness of Society precarious, and tend to their utter misery and ruin, this notion must necessarily be false. But yet, for the same Reason,

## PRINCIPLE VIII.

*Eighthly*, SHOULD a Resistance of Governors be so far allow'd, that upon every mere pretence of oppression, or indeed upon every real injury, it may be lawful for Subjects to resist; as this would not only make *Government* precarious, but would hazard the peace and happiness of Society, this notion must by consequence be false, and that Resistance unlawful. And if so,

Then

Then from hence it will follow, that, as there is a Resistance lawful, so there is a Non-Resistance necessary both to the safety of Government, and the welfare of Society. And if so,

## P R I N C I P L E IX.

FROM all these Considerations put together, it will follow, as a certain undeniable Truth, that that notion of Government must be the only true one, which secures the Government from the Insults of Rebellion, and protects the People from the Oppression of Tyranny.

These are all the Principles I desire to be granted; these I think are such, as will hardly be denied; and if so, from these we may be enabled to form to our selves a certain, and regular Scheme of Government, such as I believe, all Men will agree in, that are govern'd by right Reason, which is then only said to be right, when it agrees with the Natures, and Reasons of things.

To make a short Essay of this kind, is the design of this treatise, and to do it the more clearly, it will be necessary, first, to shew what I mean by Government; and for this Purpose, I think it may not be improper to look back, and inquire after its Original, and search out the Root, from whence it grew.

*The*

*The Original of Government.*

AND as to this it is certain, that whether 'twas deriv'd from God, or Men, the Original Reason, and Occasion of it was, the Corruption, or Imperfection of human Nature.

For, tho' there would have been something like Government in a State of Purity and Innocence, (had Mankind continued in that State) as there would have been a difference of Degrees, of Superiority and Inferiority, as of Parents, and Children, and tho' they would probably have had some Rules of Order, as there are suppos'd to be amongst the Angels of Heaven, yet there would have been nothing like (what we call) Government now in this State of Corruption we are in; that is, there would have been nothing like a Government of Coercion.

For 'tis evidently demonstrable from Principles of Reason, That the State of Man's Innocence was a State of Perfection, wherein, as Reason was given us for our Guide, so all our Powers and Faculties, our Rational Will, and Bodily Operations were intirely Subject to its direction, and therefore as there was no need of any other Laws, than what our Reason would furnish us withal, in things that lay within

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its

its reach, so we have no ground to think there would have been any other. But whatever Reason should have injoin'd us, either to do, or avoid; whilst we had continued in this Perfection, every one would have observ'd of his own voluntary Motion, and no sooner would our Understandings have approv'd any thing as necessary, but our Wills would have prompted us to action.

This was undoubtedly the true State of Man's Innocence, and in such a State as this is, all Government would be absolutely useless, and unnecessary, but that in our own bosoms.

For where men are intirely govern'd by Reason, there can be no Covetousness, nor Ambition; no Envy, nor Ill-nature; no Jealousies, nor Fears; no Inclosure, nor Property; no *Meums*, nor *Tuums*, but all things would naturally be common: no man would have any Right to any thing, more than another; nor any man have any Right to more than he should want; nor any longer than those wants should continue; and every man's wants would be regulated by Reason; so that as God made enough of every thing for every one's necessities, so right Reason would not admit of any contention, because in the nature of things there could be no Reason for it.

†

And

And had Man continued in this State, wherein every one was a Law unto himself, and had a Court of Chancery in his own breast, what need could there be of any other Laws, any other Government, but this?

But now in this our corrupted State, we have a strange backwardness very often to what our Reason approves, and as great a proneness to what it forbids; so that we stand in need of what a State of Innocence would have had no occasion for.

This I lay down as the Original of Government, and tho' there is no part of this notion, that I do not think I have a substantial Demonstration for, yet I propose it only as a notion, which I shall lay no great stress upon, and whether true or false, it is not very material to my following design.

However, thus much is certain, and allow'd on all Hands, That whatever a State of Innocence might have occasion for, Reason alone, in the State that we are now in, is not a sufficient guide, and security to us: But 'tis evident, we want external motives to excite us to, and encourage us in what is good, and powerful restraints to keep us from what is bad; without which, considering the Exorbitancy of mens Passions, Mankind would insult and inroach upon one another; the stronger would oppress,

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press, and over-run the weaker, and the World would run into confusion.

And from hence it was, either by human Contrivance, or divine Appointment, that Mankind became form'd into regular Societies for the security of each other's Rights, and Properties, and devis'd such Laws of Incouragement to Virtue, and Restraint from Vice, as they have thought most suitable and proper for that End. And,

*Definition of Government.*

THE due Administration, Application, or Execution of these Laws, which the Society has devis'd for the security of their several Rights and Properties, I call Government; which definition, as I think it cannot be well disputed, so I shall all along take it for granted.

*What is to be meant by the Society.*

BUT here it is to be observ'd, that when I use these Words (*which the Society has devis'd*) I do not mean by this, that all the whole Society, in every member of it, must be personally consenting to the making of every Law, before it be enacted a Law of the Society; this cannot be in the nature of the thing, and therefore the making

king of Laws must necessarily be intrusted by every Society in some particular hands, and as some methods must be appointed, and some rules observ'd in the doing of it, so when any Law is decreed by those persons, after that method, and according to those rules appointed by the Society, I call that a Law of the Society.

Thus far then, I think, the Case is plain, that the Original Reason of Government was the Imperfection, or Corruption of human Nature; and if the Security of the Rights, and Properties of the Society, is, as it is certainly, the End of all Government (Principle IV. and V.) from hence it will follow,

That the Determination of Property must necessarily have been before the settlement of Government; this being only a Means for the securing of Property, and by consequence Government could not be founded in any *Primary* Law of Nature, if Property it self was not.

Now by a Law of Nature, I mean some Necessity in the nature of things, obliging me to do such, or such an action, from the relation, that that action bears to such, or such a necessary End.

And when I use the Word *Primary* Law of Nature, I refer to the Two different States of Mankind, the first before, the other after the Fall: And according to these  
two

two different States, I suppose there are different Sorts of natural Laws, and different Rights, and Obligations.

For whatever is in the nature of things absolutely necessary to our Happiness, either to be done or enjoy'd, Nature gives us a Law, as to that thing, and not only lays an Obligation on us, but conveys a natural Right to us, either to do, or enjoy it; and as 'tis evident there are a great many more things necessary to our Happiness, since our nature became corrupted, than before, so by consequence there must be a great many more natural obligations, and natural Rights in this, than in the former State. And accordingly I distinguish the Laws and Rights of Nature into *Primary*, and *Secondary* Laws and Rights; and 'tis in this sense that I say, Government could not be founded in any *Primary* Law of Nature; that is, there cou'd be no natural Necessity of it in a State of pure Nature, for the securing of Property, if there was no such thing as Property to be secur'd by it.

*Definition of Property.*

NOW by Property I mean, such a Right to any thing, as to make it my own, exclusive of all others Right, or Claim to it: And that there could be no such thing as  
this

this in a State of Purity, except in our first Parents themselves, seems to me, I must confess, little less, than demonstratively certain.

For a State of Purity is a State, where all things are govern'd by right Reason; and as Reason is then only Right, when it agrees with the natures and reasons of things, so no man could have any natural Right to any thing any farther, or any longer, than as Reason should judge he had a natural want of it; and had Mankind continued in this State of Purity, as all their wants would have been regulated by Reason, so (it were easy to prove, if there were occasion) all things would have continued common, as I said before.

But when this State of Purity was lost, and instead of all their Operations being govern'd by Reason, the Flesh began to lust against the Spirit, and the Members to wage war against the Mind, when mens Lusts, and Appetites grew heady, and extravagant, as their wants would naturally increase by the increase of their Lusts, so from the increase of their wants, there would arise a necessity of larger supplies, and these larger supplies would naturally beget monopolies and inclosures, and those inclosures would as naturally beget contention, and contention as naturally beget confusion.

Now



[ 24 ]

Now whether out of an obvious sense of this, Mankind might not of themselves agree upon a certain division of such portions of lands, as they thought convenient for their families.

Or whether our First Parents, who were the only persons, who could have any pretence to any Property in any thing, might not make a distribution to their children, and allot them their respective portions for the prevention of dispute.

Or whether they might not leave their Children at liberty to take what they pleas'd, and give them some general Rule of Property, *That whatever any one should possess, he should enjoy, as his own*, which we call the Law of Occupancy: And so as families increas'd, they might transplant themselves, and whilst they had the range of the World before them, they might take to themselves without Injury to any one, what they should find their occasion requir'd.

Whether it might be this, or any other Way, it is not possible to determine at this distance, nor is it indeed very material to be inquir'd into, were it not to gratify our curiosity: Which way soever the division came, 'tis certain, that one time, or other there was some division, or appropriation made, and from this division there arose a Property.

And

[ 25 ]

And now the great Question comes in place, How Mankind happen'd to fall into this method of securing their Properties, which we call Government, whether by the Appointment of God, or by the Agreement, and Contrivance of Men.

*Whether Government be from God, or Man?*

THIS is the great business in dispute, and one would wonder how 'tis capable of being a dispute, if men wou'd but examine things not with their prejudices, but their Reasons.

I must confess, 'tis plausibly alledg'd, that considering how necessary Government is to the welfare of Mankind, it would be an unworthy reflection upon the Wisdom, and Goodness of God, to have left the World without such a provision, as is absolutely necessary to their Happiness; and therefore some conclude, that Government was the Appointment of God himself.

This, I say, is very plausibly alledg'd, and if there were any thing in Government so dark and intricate, as not to be discover'd by natural Reason, we may conclude it was made known by Revelation.

Because he who made us to be Happy, as is already suppos'd, (Principle IV.) cannot let us want any thing necessary to our Happiness; and if we cannot come at it in

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an ordinary, we may conclude, he will supply us in an extraordinary way.

But there can be nothing of this nature suppos'd in the whole business of Government; there is nothing that can require any such extraordinary Revelation concerning it.

A X I O M I.

FOR 'tis self evident, that Mankind, as being naturally sociable creatures, are naturally capable of entering into Societies of themselves, without an extraordinary Revelation; and that therefore there needs no extraordinary commission from God to empower them to do, what he has already, by their very nature, directed them to.

A X I O M II.

*Secondly*, SINCE Mankind, as is suppos'd, are made to be happy; 'tis self-evident, that Mankind, when form'd into regular Societies, have no need of any extraordinary commission from God, to make such Laws as they think necessary to their Happiness, these being only the means for the attainment of that End, that he himself made 'em for: And if so, then

A X I O M III.

*Thirdly*, IT can be as little doubted, but that there can be no need in such a  
Case,

Case, of any extraordinary commission from God, to give men Power to execute those Laws, they had a natural Power to make; this being nothing more, but a Power to make use of the necessary means for the attainment of a necessary End.

These are plain Truths, not capable of dispute, and from these we shall easily resolve this point. For, if Mankind needed no extraordinary Revelation to teach them to enter into Societies; and if they needed no Revelation to teach them to make such Laws, as might be necessary for their Happiness, and if they needed no Revelation to give them Power to apply those Laws to that End, according as the circumstances of such Societies should require, in which the whole notion of Government is absolv'd; then 'tis beyond contradiction plain, That there is no Reason to ascribe the Original of Government to God, so far as relates to the outward formation of Societies, and the making, and executing Laws.

These Things, as they are within the reach of Reason, so they are ordinarily left to the determination of Reason, and there was probably never any Government in the world, excepting that of the *Jews*, that can in this respect be said to be *Jure Divino*.

*The Authority of Government only  
from God.*

BUT yet it does nevertheless appear, and that too from this very argument I have urg'd, That the sole foundation of this Power of making and executing Laws, and the reason of our obligation to submit to them, is deriv'd intirely from the authority of God.

For we see the very reason of forming Societies in the way of Government, is founded in the Happiness of Mankind, as the End, which God at first design'd, and the only reason of their Right to exercise any Power in those Societies, is, its being a necessary means to that End.

And therefore 'tis God's having made Mankind for Happiness, and Government's being necessary to that Happiness, which is the true, and only Foundation of the authority of Government.

So that 'tis a certain, and indisputable truth in the nature of things, that it is by God alone, that *Kings reign, and Princes decree Justice*, that Government in general is of Divine Authority.

And indeed, as this is the only true foundation, so it is the only sure support of it. For without this, I cannot see, how  
we

we can give any account of Government at all.

*The Authority of Government not from  
the People.*

FOR if the Authority of Government arises meerly from an agreement of a People with one another, it will follow from thence, That no Governor can lawfully exercise any other Power over any one, than every one has a Power to agree to; and by consequence no Government can have Power to take away Life, because no man has an absolute Power to dispose of it.

But if we ascribe the Authority of Government to God, and consider it in the view that we have set it, as a necessary means in the nature of things for the Attainment of a necessary End appointed by God, we have then a Right given us by God to use it, as a means in order to that End, and therefore so far as the taking away the life of a man is necessary to the security of any Society, That Society has a Right to take it away, even by God's own appointment.

Nay, the argument holds good even in a private case, and the same reason will justify every man to do the same thing in his own defence; and as 'tis universally  
allow'd

allow'd to do so, so 'tis the only Reason, that will do it; but 'tis much stronger, when offer'd in behalf of a Society, as much as the whole is better than a part.

Besides, if Government were founded only upon the agreement of a People one with another, as every one has a Soul and Reason of his own, and not only a natural Right to judge and chuse for himself, but also to act according to his own, and not another's Judgment, any farther than it becomes his own; so I must freely own, upon this Principle, I do not at present see, how any man can be in duty oblig'd to submit to any other Government, than what he himself approves, and agrees to; which, as it is a notion that would make Government precarious, and tends to disorder and confusion, we have already shewn it must necessarily be false (Principle VI.)

But if Government be founded upon the natural appointment of God, as being in the nature of things a necessary means to our Happiness, it then becomes every one's duty to support it, and by consequence to submit to the Laws of it, tho' perhaps he may not approve of them; and has not personally agreed to them; and if the Laws be such, that he cannot in conscience comply with what they command, he must patiently bear the penalties they inflict. And this is the meaning of that Expressi-

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on of St. Paul, Rom. 13. 1, 2, 3, &c. which has given such occasion for dispute; That we are to be Subject to the Laws of the Higher Powers of every Society, because *all Power is from God, and the Powers that be, are ordained of God*: That is, because every Society has a Power from God to make such Laws, as are necessary for the welfare of that Society, and every Ruler intrusted by the Society with the execution of those Laws, executes that Authority, that it is ordain'd by God, and therefore is not to be resisted in the execution of those Laws.

*The Authority of Government from God,  
but the Form from Man.*

SO that to sum up all in one word, we see the foundation upon which the Authority of Government is built, is, the Authority of God, who having made us for Happiness, has thereby given us a Right to Government, as it is a necessary means to that Happiness.

And therefore upon this Principle, Mankind being by nature sociable Creatures, have naturally run into Societies of themselves, and have linkt themselves into common bodies, and devis'd such Laws for the Happiness of the whole, as their several circumstances have required.

And

[ 32 ]

And as the different circumstances of people have created different Interests, so these different Interests have created different Societies and Governments, wherein they have not only different Laws, but different Forms of Administration.

And therefore some Societies are govern'd by a Monarchy, others by an Aristocracy, others by a Democracy; and of these some are absolute, others mixt, some are dependent, others independent.

So that in short, as the welfare of Society is the End and reason of all Government, so the different Interests of different Societies is the reason of the different Forms of it: And as it cannot be doubted, but that these different Forms were devis'd by Men, so tho' the Authority of Government be from God, yet the appointment of the Persons to execute that Authority is purely, and intirely the Ordinance of Man. And this gives an account of that Expression, *1 Pet. 2. 13. of being Subject to every Ordinance of Man for the Lord's Sake*, by which is meant, that those who are intrusted with the Government of Societies in any kind of Form, are only the Ordinance of Men, but yet tho' they are so, they are nevertheless to be submitted to, for the Lord's sake, because they execute that Power in behalf of the Society, which every Society has from God.

Conse-

[ 33 ]

*Consequences from the foregoing Principles.*

THUS far then, I think, we have clear'd our way; and if so, from hence we may be able to deduce some such certain, and evident Corollaries, as will give us a just, and easy view into all the nicest cases relating to Government.

COROLLARY I.

*The Reason of Power in Princes, and Obedience in Subjects.*

First, FROM hence we may certainly discover the true Nature of all Political Power, and the true Reason of our Obedience and Submission to it.

For if it be true, as we have suppos'd (Principle IV.) That God made Mankind for Happiness, and that they should live together in Society: And if it be likewise true, as we have thence inferr'd (Page 26.) That God thereby authorises every Society to put themselves under such Forms, and to make and execute such Laws and Rules, as they shall find necessary for their Happiness; it will hence follow, by an obvious consequence, That tho' it be left to the Society to judge what is necessary, yet the

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Power

Power of making that into a Law, and obliging others to submit to it, is intirely deriv'd from God.

And as this Power must necessarily be intrusted by every Society in some particular hands, and ought to be executed according to some certain Rules, so whatsoever those Persons, so intrusted, shall think necessary to be done, the Society ought to be determin'd by; and whatever Laws they shall make according to those Rules, are by consequence to be esteem'd the will and command of God; unless he has in time past, and till he shall in time to come, signify his will, that it shall be otherwise.

And as the Administration of these Laws must necessarily be intrusted in one, or more hands, whom we call Governours; so whatever these Governours shall do according to those Laws, is so far done by the Authority of God.

And as those Laws cannot be disobey'd without sin, so neither can those Governours be resisted, or oppos'd in the execution of those Laws, without rebellion, and that not only against them, but also against God, by whose authority they act.

#### COROLLARY II.

*Secondly*, IF Government be necessary to the welfare of Society, and if it be true, as we have inferr'd from thence (Principle

ple VI.) That those notions are false, and therefore ought to be avoided, that tend to disorder and confusion; from hence it will follow,

#### *Unity and Order to be preserv'd.*

THAT every Society ought to provide, and every member of that Society submit to such methods, as they think necessary for Unity and Order.

And since the Authority of God is the only foundation, and the only sure support of Government, and, by consequence, of Unity and Order; and since 'tis evident to every understanding, That without a due sense of this Authority of God, which I call Religion, there can be no certain basis for Truth, or Justice, or Confidence amongst Men, which are the bonds and ligaments of Society, the joints, by which its members are united; but on the contrary all falsehood, and deceit, avarice, and ambition, rapine, and violence, murther, and oppression, malice and revenge will be lawful, so far as they can be secret, and without the reach of human Laws; it will follow,

That it ought to be the care of every Society, that Religion be establish'd, and maintain'd amongst them.

This is so necessary, that even Atheistical Politicians advise its Preservation and Encouragement, merely out of a principle of



worldly policy, as being so serviceable to the ends and purposes of Government, as if it had been only the invention of men.

And therefore they who are enemies to Religion, are so far enemies to Society, and traitors to the Government they live under.

*Unity and Order in Religion.*

**BUT** then as Religion ought to be the Care of every Society, as necessary to Unity and Order, so it ought to be equally their Care, that Unity and Order in Religion be maintain'd.

And as Religion cannot be maintain'd without some Form of worship, and some Rules of Order, so it will follow, That in every Society, there ought not only to be some such Form, and Rules establish'd, but also that that Form, and those Rules be so contriv'd, as far as possible, that every member of the Society may unite in them, and conform to them.

And since we have already shewn in the foregoing Corollary, That the Laws of a Society are to be obey'd, as the Laws of God, so far as they are agreeable to his Will; it will follow, That every member of a Society ought to comply with that Form of Worship, and submit to those Rules of Order establish'd amongst them, so far as they are not contrary to God's Will.

And

And therefore, so far as any one wilfully opposes such Rules of Unity and Order establish'd by any Society, as a means of its Preservation, so far he is an enemy to the Society, and disobedient to God, by whose authority they are injoin'd:

For tho' 'tis certain, that Religion, as such, is not the business of Government, the chief end of which is the security of our Rights, and Properties (Principle V.) yet so far as Unity, and Order may be a necessary means of preserving the peace, and welfare of Society, and thereby a means of preserving the Rights, and Properties of it, so far it may fall under the Power of any Society, or Government, as they have a natural Right to all such means, as are necessary to their preservation.

And if so, from hence it will follow,

*To Govern by Parties a false Maxim.*

**THAT** it must be a false Maxim of Policy in any Society, to govern by Factions and Parties, that is, by division, either in Church, or State.

For every division in any degree, is in a Political, what we call a disease in a Natural Body, which as it weakens its strength, so it tends to its destruction; and tho' these diseases may be kept under by skilful heads, and seasonable applications, and their natural tendency may be restrain'd a while, yet they

they always impair the constitution for the present, and no man can be sure of the event.

*Divide and Rule* has been an antient, and 'tis a certain Maxim for a Kingdom divided against it self, divide about what they will, whether sacred, or civil matters; 'tis all one, such a Kingdom cannot stand.

And as it was observ'd of old in the conquest of this Nation by the *Romans*, that our home-bred discords made way to it, (*dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur,*) so we may observe of any other people. For we rarely find any Government over-turn'd, but division had a hand in the work.

And therefore 'tis the Interest of every Society to encourage unity, and heal divisions.

And for the same Reason it will follow,

*Divisions in Society to be healed.*

Secondly, THAT where any divisions happen in a Society, they ought as far as possible to remove all occasions of them, and apply all proper methods for the cure of 'em.

And as Unity is, as we have shewn, the duty of every member of a Society, not only out of respect to the authority of God, but also the welfare of Society, so every member of the Society ought to unite, as far as possible, and if out of weakness, they can:

cannot comply in every thing they ought; yet they ought out of duty and interest, to comply in every thing they can.

For where there is a Rightful Power to command, there is a duty to obey, and we see every Society has a Power granted them by God to injoyn every thing, that they think necessary for the Happiness of the Society, and by consequence every thing necessary to Unity and Order, without which Society cannot be maintain'd.

*The Magistrates Power in Religious Matters.*

BUT then, as the Authority from God is founded only in the nature of things (for we are here speaking only of natural Principles, without supposing any Revelation as yet) so it must be such an authority, as the nature of things will allow of; that is, such as cannot command, or injoin any thing contrary to the nature of things, that is contrary to the nature of God, or Man, or contrary to the natural Relation of things with respect either to Truth, or Goodness.

And therefore, as it is evidently contrary to the Goodness, and therefore to the Will of God, to authorize any thing that is injurious to our innocent fellow creatures, so all such rules of Unity and Order, as are of this nature, are absolutely unlawful and unjust, unless it could be suppos'd, that the welfare of the Society could not be maintain'd,



tain'd, nor the Rights and Properties of it secur'd without them :

And so likewise, as it is apparently the Right of every rational creature granted by God Himself, nay, as it is a duty requir'd of every rational creature, that he govern himself by Reason, and by consequence that every one should judge, and choose for himself, so it is unlawful for any Society to impose any Rules of Worship, or Religious Order upon their members, which they in their judgment cannot lawfully comply with: Because this is not only to deprive them of their natural Right of judging for themselves, but also to require what they cannot do, without a breach of their duty to God.

And therefore whatever Power Societies have to put themselves under Religious regulations, yet it can be only under this limitation, that they leave it in the power of every member of it, to comply, or not comply with them, according as they conceive them to be lawful, or unlawful, that is, that there be a Liberty of Conscience.

But nevertheless where the Religious regulations impos'd are allow'd to be lawful, and no Scruple of Conscience is rais'd against them, there the Society have a power to command, and the People are under an Obligation to obey, according to the Laws of Nature.

But

But here you'll say, If every Society has a Power to appoint what Modes of Worship, and what Rules of Order, they think necessary, they must by consequence have a Power to appoint what persons shall perform Religious Offices, which some think of dangerous consequence to assert.

*The Magistrates Power over the Priesthood.*

BUT be it how it will, it is certainly true in a State, where we suppose no other Revelation of God's Will concerning these matters, but the natures of things to guide the Reasons and Operations of Mankind.

In such a state, I say, 'tis certainly true: For if Religious Offices must be perform'd, the persons must be appointed either by God, or Man; if by God, since we suppose no other Revelation, but the nature of things, there must then be some commission granted by God in the nature of things to some particular persons, by which God must be suppos'd to have given them an Authority to execute those Offices before, and above all other People: But this, I suppose, is what no man will pretend to, and therefore all those things must be determin'd by Men according to the rules of the Society, who are left the only Judges of what is convenient, where God has not yet reveal'd his Will; and those persons who are thus dedicated to God's service according

ing to the Rules of every such Society, are as much the Ministers of God, as if they had been sent by an extraordinary Commission from God himself.

But where God has thought fit to reveal his Will, there the Society are no longer Judges of these things: their own Reason is no longer their Guide, but God's Revelation; and tho' before they had a Power to do, and injoin, what they thought fit, here they are to act as God enjoins, and their Power is determin'd by the Rule of Revelation.

But then, as this Revelation is their Rule, so they are not to be determin'd by it any farther, than it reveals; and by consequence where the Revelation is silent, there is no reveal'd Rule, and therefore there must be the same Power remaining in the Society, which they had before that Revelation was given.

And therefore, tho' every Society has a natural Power to appoint the Persons, and prescribe the Qualifications for Religious Offices, where God has left them only to their own Reasons, yet if God has by any Revelation appointed those Offices to some particular Persons, and has given them the appointment of others under some certain Regulations, there the Power of the Society is limited, and they have no more  
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Power to act contrary to this, than they have Power to act contrary to God's Will.

And indeed, as no Society can lawfully act any thing, but what they think is for the welfare of the Society, so they can have no reason to act contrary to such a revealed appointment, unless they could suppose, that God did not know what was best to be done in every Society, or would prescribe any thing, that is not for the welfare of the Society.

The Question therefore in this case is, what Revelation God has made concerning it, either directly, or indirectly, whether he has expressly appointed any particular men to execute Religious Offices before him, or whether he has given any commission to them to appoint others, and how far that commission reaches. For so far as there is such a Revelation, so far all Authority is bounded, and the Power of the Society can reach no farther, than to regulate the execution of these Offices, and to appoint such things both as to the Persons, and their Offices, as God has not determin'd by that Revelation.

And as this ought to be done by the Society, so it ought to be done in such a manner, as they shall think best for the support of Unity and Order, and the security of the Rights and Properties of the Society.

## COROLLARY III.

*The Rule of Laws, and the Measure of Obedience.*

*Thirdly*, IF it be true according to the Principles we have laid down, That the Welfare, or Happiness of the Society is the End of all Government, then it must be the End of every thing that is done in the way of Government, and by consequence must not only be the End of making and administering Laws, but also the End of all Obedience, and Submission.

And if so, from hence we are taught a certain Rule, by which all Laws ought to be made, and a certain measure, according to which all Governours ought to be obey'd.

*The Rule of Conscience in making Laws.*

*First*, IF the Welfare of the Society be the End, and therefore the Rule of making Laws, it ought by consequence to be the End, and the only End of every Person intrusted in that concern: And tho' the persons so intrusted, are the absolute Judges of what is for the Welfare of the Society, and therefore may make what Laws they please, yet it is certainly an Abuse of their Power, for which they are highly answerable to God, should they oppose any thing, that

that they think is, or agree to any thing they think is not, for the Welfare of the Society they are acting for.

And if, as we have already suppos'd, (Principle 5.) The Welfare of Society consists in the security of its Rights and Properties, then as the whole is made up of parts, so each Person, as a member, and part of the whole, has a claim to be secur'd in his Rights and Properties.

*How far our Rights are to be maintain'd.*

BUT then, as the whole is more valuable than any part, so the security of every particular person ought to be consulted, and provided for, only so far as is consistent with the Welfare of the whole.

And if so, no Maxims of Policy can be just, nor any Laws be Lawful, that deprive any one of his Right, or intrench on his Property, any farther than as the Welfare of the whole requires it.

And as the Laws, that are made for the security of our Rights, are in their nature to be suppos'd for the Welfare of the whole, so long as they are allow'd to continue in Force; so no man can be lawfully depriv'd of his Rights under any pretence of the Publick Good, any farther than those Laws allow.

And by consequence, should any person, or authority whatsoever dispose of the Rights

Rights of any member of the Society for any other reason, or in any other manner, than the Laws of the Society direct, they would not only do an Injury to him, but would also so far act contrary to the Welfare, as they act contrary to the Laws of the Society.

*The Power of every Society to alienate Rights.*

BUT then, as the Society has a Power to make, so by consequence for the very same reason, they must have a Power to alter Laws, and therefore a Power to alter, or alienate our Rights.

But yet, as the security of every man's Right and Property ought to be provided for, in making Laws, as has been just now prov'd, so far as consists with the Welfare of the whole; so it will not be Lawful, even for them, to alter any Law on purpose to alienate any particular Right, any farther, than as they are convinced, the necessary support of the Society requires it.

For 'tis certain from the very nature of Government, that every member of a Society has a Right to be protected in every thing he enjoys by the Rules of the Society.

But yet it is as certain, That no man can have a Right to injure the Society, as it is certain, that the whole is better than a Part.

And

And therefore, As the End of making Laws is the security of the Rights of the Society, so whatever Rights those Laws give any private person, or persons, they are naturally suppos'd to be granted only so far, as they are consistent with the security of the Publick :

And therefore whenever those persons, who are intrusted by the Society, shall judge any Rights, the Laws have given us, inconsistent with the security of the whole Society, they very lawfully may, and 'tis very expedient they should, alter those Laws, and alienate those Rights, which they never could intend by those Laws to give.

And therefore, tho' in making and repealing Laws, it be necessary to inquire into the Rights of the particular persons concern'd, and how far they shall intrench upon those Rights in their proceedings, yet where the Publick security requires any thing as necessary to be done, there a Private Injury ought to be no Bar against that, which appears to be necessary to the Publick Good.

But then, As that cannot be a necessary means to an End, where the End can be attain'd without those means, so that cannot be said to be necessary to the Welfare of the Publick, without which the Welfare of the Publick may be maintain'd.

And

And therefore we ought not to deprive any one of his Rights, without a due satisfaction to him, under any pretence of the Publick Good, where the Publick Good can be secured another Way.

To illustrate this a little, let us recollect a known Case. In a late Reign there was a Bill in Parliament for the Exclusion of the then Duke of *York*, from his Succession to the Crown. The Laws of the Land had given him a Right, and the King, and Parliament had a Right in themselves, to alienate that Right, if they should think it necessary for the security of the Rights and Properties of the Society.

Now, tho' Birthright was a Popular Cry at that Time, yet that was a weak Objection to the Thing, if the Welfare of the whole required it to be done.

And therefore the proper Question in that, and all such like cases ought to be, how far 'tis necessary to the Publick Good, that is, how far the Rights and Properties of the Society can be secur'd without this, or that proceeding.

And upon a strict enquiry into this, had they who are the only Judges of this matter, I mean, the King and Parliament, agreed in their Opinion, and pass'd the Bill, He would immediately have lost his Right, and should he afterwards have laid any claim to the Succession, he would have  
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been guilty of High Treason, and should any one have pretended to assert his Right, he would have been guilty of Rebellion.

But should the King, and Parliament have pass'd the Bill upon any other consideration, than as they conscientiously thought it indispensably necessary to the Preservation of the Society in their Rights and Properties; should the Parliament have mov'd it out of prejudice to the man, or the King have consented to it for the madness of the People; or should either have done it out of any other motive, than as they were thro'ly satisfied, 'twas so necessary to be done, that the Rights of the Society could not be secur'd any other way, they would have been guilty of great Injustice, and Oppression.

But we had been concluded nevertheless. For we are not Judges of their actions, much less their Intentions; but they are the Judges, and the only Judges of the Publick Good, and therefore we are to submit to their determinations, unless we will make all our Laws useles, our Constitution and Government precarious; which, whatever notion tends to, we have already shewn to be False (*Principle VI.*)

And thus we are directed to a certain Rule to guide our consciences in making Laws, which is, the Welfare of the Society in the Security of their several Rights,  
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and Properties. And as no Laws ought to be made, but with an Eye to this End, so from hence it will follow,

*The Necessity of putting Laws in Execution.*

T H A T whatever Laws are made, ought therefore to be put in execution, so as to attain the End they were made for.

'Twas a Reproach the *Romans* cast upon the *Athenians*, that they shew'd their wisdom in making good Laws, but their folly in neglecting to observe and execute them.

And 'twas a Just Reproach, no doubt. For 'twere every whit, as well to have no Laws at all, as not to have them executed, and observ'd.

But then, As it is necessary, that Laws once made, should be carefully executed, so they ought to be executed only for the End, for which they were made; and by consequence not in any other Sense, than they are supposed to be made in, nor for any other End, than for the Welfare of the Society in the security of their Rights and Properties.

And therefore should any person prosecute, or any officer execute any Law upon any member of the Society, who has offended against it, and is therefore justly liable to it, out of prejudice, or passion, malice, or revenge, or any other principle, but the Welfare of Society, tho' they really do

do nothing, but what the Law requires, and do actually promote the Interest of the Society, yet they are highly blameable for what they do; And tho' they are not blameable in respect of the Society they belong to, yet they are blameable in the sight of God, who has made, not our own humour, and private resentments, or any other thing, but the Welfare of the Society, the End of every thing that is to be done in the way of Government, whether in making, or executing Laws.

But should any Person endeavour to pervert the natural meaning of the Law by any art, or dexterity, he is master of, or by any authority, he is invested with, and so get it executed in any other sense, than he thinks was intended by it, he would be highly blameable upon that account, not only in respect of God, but the Society.

Nay, tho' he should do it upon this Principle only, that he thinks it for the Welfare of the Society, that the Law should be taken in the sense he gives it, yet if he is sensible it is not the true sense, that is, the sense that was intended by the makers of the Law, 'tis certainly an offence against God, and the Society. Because God has oblig'd us to submit to the Rules of the Society, and the Society having appointed such, and such persons, the only Judges of their Welfare, and what Laws are necessa-

ry for that purpose, we are by consequence requir'd by God, and the Society, not only to submit to the Laws they make, but also to the sense they make them in, so far as it is a lawful sense.

And therefore, so far as we shall endeavour to impose any private sense upon the Law, contrary to what we think was intended by it, so far we endeavour to pervert the Rules, and Orders of the Society, by making the Welfare of the whole to depend upon our private Judgment.

*Secondly*, If the end of making, and executing Laws be the Welfare of the Society, in the security of their Rights and Properties, from hence we have a Rule for the regulation of the Laws, and the manner of the execution of 'em in every wise and good Government.

*How Laws are to be Regulated and Executed.*

FOR if this be the End of all Laws, it is not only necessary to every wise, and good Government, that there be good Laws made, but that they be manag'd so, as shall be thought best to answer the End of their making, and by consequence such as shall be most likely to be observ'd.

And therefore *First*, As no man can doubt, but that those Laws are most likely to be observ'd, which are few in number, and therefore easie to be known and remember'd,

member'd, and plain in their meaning, and therefore easie to be understood, so it seems to be a necessary care of every Society, that the Laws be as few, and as plain, as possible.

*Laws to be Few and Plain.*

A Multitude of Laws Politicians have always look'd upon, and Societies have always found, a burthen, and 'twas a complaint of *Tacitus*, that whereas *Rome* had formerly abounded with horrid, and detestable vices, so in his time, it was as much pester'd with a multitude of mischievous and unnecessary Laws, which prov'd a remedy as bad as the disease.

But it is, doubtless, a much greater burthen to a Society, when its Laws are express'd in such terms, as are doubtful, and ambiguous, because this will not only produce continual disputes, but will make all their Rights uncertain, and precarious.

And therefore from hence it will follow, That 'tis the Interest of every Society to exclude all such persons from making Laws, whose private advantage it may be to perplex, and intangle the sense of them.

*Laws to be Gentle and Easie.*

AGAIN, If the Laws of a Society ought to be made so, as that they may most probably be observ'd, then, as they ought  
to

to be as few, and as plain, so they ought to be as gentle, and easie, as possible. And therefore,

*First*, It seems to be a necessary care of every Society, not to make any such Laws, as they know, or may reasonably think before-hand, a great part of the Society will not submit to, unless the Welfare of the Society so far requires it, as that it cannot be secur'd any other way.

Let the Principle upon which they will oppose the Law, be what it will, whether weakness, or perverseness, 'tis all one, for since it will not be observ'd, it should not be injoin'd; Because such opposition may beget confusion, which, as it may hazard the peace and welfare of the Society, ought therefore to be avoided, as unlawful, unless the hazard be greater on the other side.

And as the Reason of making, and continuing Laws is the same, so from hence it will follow,

That, if they ought not to make Laws, which they know before-hand will be oppos'd, for the same Reason it does not seem proper to continue such Laws, as they afterwards find, are so oppos'd;

And therefore as all Laws ought to be so made, so they ought for the same reason to be so alter'd, as far as possible, that they may be observ'd by All. But still this is to be understood, so far only as consists with the Welfare of Society. *No.*

*Nothing Burthensome to be Impos'd without Necessity.*

A G A I N, If all Laws ought to be as gentle and easie, as possible, then it seems to be a necessary care of every Society, that no more burthens be impos'd upon its members, than are absolutely necessary for the Welfare of the Whole.

And as every member of the Society is a sharer in the Welfare of the Whole, so all such Impositions ought to be so order'd, as that every one shall bear a share in the burthen.

But then, as the Welfare of the Whole consists in the security of the Rights, and Properties of the Society, and by consequence as they must have the most benefit by such security, who have most to lose, and therefore most to be secur'd, so they ought to bear the greatest share of the burthens that are impos'd.

And therefore whatever burthens are laid upon the Society, ought, as far as possible, to be equally proportion'd, according to the several Rights and Properties of the several members of the Society.

Thus we have a Rule for making Laws, and from the same Principle we have,

*How to Regulate the Execution of Laws.*

*Secondly*, A Rule whereby to regulate the manner of the execution of 'em.

For



For if the End of making Laws be the Welfare of the Society in the security of their Rights, and Properties, it is not only necessary to every good Government that the Laws be executed with an Eye to the End for which they were made, viz. The security of Right and Property, but also in such manner, as that End shall be best attain'd, and our Rights and Properties best secur'd.

We have already observ'd, that it is a just Reproach to make Laws that we never execute; but yet it is certainly the very same thing, whether the execution of Laws be totally neglected, or whether they be executed in such a manner, as that the End, which was intended, cannot be attain'd.

For tho' a Law be never so wisely contriv'd for the security of Right and Property, yet if in obtaining the benefit of that Law, I must spend more time, and be at more charge, than my Right, and Property is worth, 'tis the same thing to me, as if there were really no such Law.

*Short Injustice, the Persian Proverb says, is better than long Justice.*

And therefore it seems to be a necessary care of every good Government, that in the manner of executing the Laws of the Society, no such unnecessary delays be allow'd, as shall frustrate the just proceedings

ings of the Law, nor any such burthensome charges be requir'd, as shall defeat the benefit, and intention of it.

Thus we see what improvements may be made of this Principle: It might be carried a great way farther, if there were occasion, but this is sufficient for a general hint; it furnishes us, you see, with an infallible Rule for the Making and Executing Laws: And from the same Principle we have

*The Measure of Submission to Governours.*

Secondly, A like certain Rule, by which to measure our submission to Governours, who, according to our definition of Government, are the Administrators of the Laws.

This has been the subject of great disputes, and, as it has been manag'd, it has been made a matter of very great difficulty; whereas, according to these Principles, which I have here laid down, there is nothing capable of a more easy and certain resolution.

For if the Welfare of Society be, as we have shewn (Principle IV. VII.) the End of every thing, that is done in the way of Government, it must by consequence be the End of all Authority and Obedience.

And tho' the Authority of Government be from God, as we have shewn (page 29,

30, 31, 32.) and tho' Obedience be therefore due to Governours out of duty to God, from whom their Authority is derived, yet God cannot be suppos'd to command any such Obedience to any Governour, nor can any Person pretend to exact Obedience from any People, any farther, than He is their Governour.

And therefore when any such Governour shall cease to govern them, his Right to their Obedience must cease too.

And since according to our foremention'd definition (page 20.) Government is the Administration of such Laws, as the Society has devis'd for the security of their Rights and Properties, it will follow,

That a Man must then cease to Govern his People, when he either ceases intirely to act, by Death, or Resignation, by Abdication or Conquest, or when he ceases to act for the security of the Rights and Properties of the Society he is set over, That is,

When he either actually invades the Rights and Properties of the Society, or lays aside those Laws that are made for their Security.

When therefore any Governour does this, as He thereby ceases to Govern that People, so that People are discharged from their Obedience to Him, as their Governour, and the reason of their Allegiance being

being ceas'd, their duty and obligation must likewise cease.

This seems to be a necessary and unavoidable consequence, and this I take to be the foundation of all Oaths to Conquerors, *viz.* That their late Governour ceases to govern them.

And certainly, if ceasing to be a Governour in the Case of Conquest, will justify the alienation of our Allegiance, where he ceases to govern, not by any act of his own, not by voluntarily refusing to govern, nor by neglecting the Rights and Welfare of his People, but is depriv'd of his Government by rapine, and violence, perhaps contrary to the inclination, and true interest of the People; I say, if this will justify, as all allow, the argument is much stronger in the case suppos'd, where a Prince shall voluntarily invade, or designedly overturn the Rights of the Society.

Unless any one will be so extravagantly absurd, as to call that Government, which is contrary to the very notion of Government, where instead of administering, and executing Laws, he acts directly contrary to 'em, and instead of protecting and maintaining the Rights of his People, he becomes an oppressor and destroyer of them, both which are as directly opposite to Government, as Light is to Darkness, or Health to Sickness.

But that we may make this still clearer, let us state the Argument another Way;

We have already prov'd, That every Governour acts by the Authority of God; and therefore has a Divine Right to his Subjects Obedience (page 31, 32.) yet as that Right is founded upon that Commission; He can by consequence have no Right to obedience; farther than his Commission reaches, and therefore where he has no authority to command, the People can be under no Obligation to obey: And if so,

Then since the Welfare of Society is the End of all Government, and since the Authority of Government, and the Obedience of Subjects is founded only on this bottom, as they are necessary to that End, (ib. page 25.) The Welfare of Society must by consequence be the Bounds both of the Subjects Duty, and the Government's Authority, and therefore God cannot be suppos'd to allow any Government to command, nor require any People to obey, any farther than it is for the Welfare of Society.

And as the Welfare of the Society consists in the security of their Rights and Properties, and as the Laws that are made for their security, are suppos'd to be for their Welfare, so long as they are in Force, so when any Governour shall invade the Rights of his Subjects, or lay aside those Laws, which are made for their security,

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as he acts contrary to the Welfare of the Society, so he acts without Authority, and Commission from God, and therefore can have no Right to be obey'd.

In a Word, As every Governour has his Commission from God for the Welfare of his People, so that which gives him a title to their Obedience, gives them a title to his Protection.

And as He who invades the Rights of the Prince or Governour, must thereby forfeit all claim to his Protection, so He who invades, or destroys the Rights of his People, by the same reason, forfeits his claim to their Obedience.

The Rights of both are founded on the same bottom; The Welfare of the Society is the end and reason, and rule of both: 'Tis the very reason of the Authority of Government, as it is deriv'd from God, and 'tis the reason of this or that Family's being appointed to execute that Authority by the Society.

And therefore when Governours act contrary to the Welfare, that is, contrary to the Laws of the Society, they act contrary to the Reason of Government and Obedience; and that they shou'd be obey'd in such a case, is contrary to the Intention of God and Man.

And as no Governour, who is but the Administrator of the Law, can have a  
Right

Right to punish his Subjects for not doing, what by Law it was not their duty to do, much less for not doing, what by Law it was their duty not to do, so on the other hand, no Subject can be under any Obligation to submit to that punishment, which the Governour had not a Legal Right to inflict.

This Argument contains the Sense and Substance of what is, or I think, ought to be meant, by that which is so often talk'd of in this Dispute, viz. *a Prince's breaking the Original Contract*, that is, his acting contrary to the Original Reason of Government.

For as the End and Reason for which all Rulers were originally intrusted with their power and privileges by their respective Societies, and for which such Societies put themselves under their several respective Forms of Government, was the security of their Rights and Properties; so whosoever first took that Trust upon him, took it for this End, and upon this Condition; and by consequence there is a Tacit Contract suppos'd in the very nature of the Trust it self, That upon his discharging his duty to them, they will be under such obligations to him, because 'tis given by the People, and taken by the Prince for this very End and Reason. And as this End is the foundation of all Government; so

so where-ever any Government is, this Tacit Contract is necessarily suppos'd to go along with it, as being founded in the very nature of the thing: And as this Tacit Contract is the Bond of Union between the Governour and the People, so when this contract is broke, the Bond of Union is broke; and by consequence the Society is as much discharg'd from the obligations of that Union, as if that contract had never been made.

And as a Prince must necessarily be said to break his contract, and by consequence dissolve his Union with his People, when he willfully and designedly acts contrary to the end and reason of his Trust; so his People are by consequence discharged from their obligations to him, and may lawfully defend themselves against him.

And therefore in such a case 'tis undoubtedly certain, That Governours may be lawfully oppos'd, and resisted.

Thus far must be true in general.

*What Resistance of Governours may be Lawful.*

But the Question is, what kind of Resistance this must be; for some sort of Opposition and Resistance, all men allow.

All men allow, That should a Prince command any thing unlawful, either by the Laws of God, or his Kingdom, we are obliged

obliged to disobey; which is a kind of Opposition, and Resistance.

Or should a Prince invade our Rights, where the Law has provided a remedy in the Case; all Men allow, that it is not unlawful, to oppose that invasion in the way of the Law, and to make use of that remedy against the Prince.

This therefore is not the Resistance in dispute; but the Question now is, what we may do, as to a forcible Resistance of him, so that supposing a Prince should invade the Rights of his subjects, where they can have no remedy by Law, or should command any thing unlawful to be done, and make them suffer in their Rights for not obeying, how far they are oblig'd to submit to that suffering, or whether they may oppose and resist him by violence.

Now in Answer to this, I will only observe, That if according to the 4th and 5th Principles, The Welfare, and by consequence the Rights and Properties of the Society ought to be maintain'd, then we must have a Right by the Law of Nature to all those means, that are absolutely necessary to that End, which all Societies are oblig'd to maintain, (Principle IV.) and by consequence any sort of Resistance must be Lawful, so far as it is necessary to the security of our Rights and Properties.

But

But then, as that only can be said to be necessary to an End, without which that End cannot be attain'd; so that Resistance only can be Lawful, without which our Rights and Properties cannot be secur'd.

When therefore any Prince invades the Rights of the Society, or lays aside those Laws, which are made for their security; and the Society has no imaginable way left to maintain those Laws, and to secure and defend those Rights, but by open and violent Resistance, that Resistance is by consequence necessary, and lawful.

But here then the Question will be, what Rights those are, which be of such Importance to the Society, as that its Welfare cannot be secur'd without them?

For we have already observ'd in the Eighth Principle, that tho' it be lawful to resist in case of Oppression, yet it is not so in every Oppression.

For 'tis very certain, a Society may have Rights, which tho' they should be invaded, yet are not so essential to its Welfare, as that when they are lost, the Welfare of the whole must be destroy'd.

The Welfare of the whole consists undoubtedly in the Welfare of its parts, and therefore the Rights of the parts are the Rights of the whole in some sense; but yet it would not be Lawful for a Society to take Arms upon a private Injury and

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[ 66 ]

Oppression, even tho' there should be no other way to get it redress'd.

Because this may be done either thro' rashness or neglect, or the Prince may be mistaken or misled; or if not, however the Welfare of the whole does not depend upon a private injury, and the Prince himself may nevertheless be very intent upon the Welfare of the whole.

But suppose the Injury be publick and universal, and the Prince invades the Rights of the Society in common, yet there are likewise some common Rights of the Society, which their Welfare does not so depend upon, as that their Happiness shall be destroy'd by the loss of 'em.

For perhaps their Rights may be only invaded in some few single instances, without any visible design to subvert the constitution of the Society.

Or perhaps it may be only in some such cases, which if continued, might be of dangerous consequence, and tend to the destruction of the Society, but singly are no great oppression in themselves.

And therefore in such cases it would not be lawful to rise against a Prince, because the Welfare of the whole does not require it; Nay the Welfare of the whole requires the contrary, because this would make all Government precarious, and destroy all Peace and Order in Society.

But

[ 67 ]

But where the Prince or Government shall designedly invade the Rights of the Society without redress, and by the course of his proceedings shall evidently shew, that he intends to invert the constitution, so that whereas there are Laws made, as Rules for him in the preservation of their Rights and Properties, he will not make those Laws, but his own Will, his Rule, by the means of which the Welfare of the Society will become precarious; by the Sixth and Seventh Principles it will be lawful for the Society to relieve themselves.

But then it must be with this proviso, That the remedy be not worse than the disease.

For if the methods we take to right ourselves, will in human probability make the Society more unhappy, than our suffering the present Injuries from the Prince will do; we have then a greater obligation to suffer, than resist, and that from the very reason of our Resistance, *viz.* The Welfare of the Society.

And therefore since 'tis plain to all mens Observation, That a violent and tumultuary Resistance of Princes is commonly attended with war and desolation, blood and ruin, it will follow,

That whatever we suffer from our Princes, unless the injury and oppression be of such great importance to us, as to coun-

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[ 68 ]

tervail the hazard of these consequences, and sad effects of our Resistance, we are oblig'd to suffer and submit to them; because 'tis more for the Welfare of the Society so to do, as 'tis better, of the two evils to chuse the least.

And tho' they happen to have the burthen continued upon them for some time, tho' it be ever so long, yet if they are oblig'd to consult the Welfare of the Society, they are oblig'd to suffer still, either till they have a prospect of righting themselves without the hazard of those dismal effects of their Resistance, or else till they are like to be as miserable by their suffering, as they can probably be by their Resistance.

And that a Society may certainly be in many cases, but especially when their Religion is at stake, the preserving of which, as it is of more and greater consequence, than the loss of all other things besides, as much as the soul is better than the body, so it will be always a just reason for Resistance, whatever the Society suffer by it.

But when I speak of Religion here, I must not be understood to speak of the Religion of some particular persons only:

For if every private person had a power to raise an insurrection against his Prince, upon the account of his Religion, this would open a gap to continual Rebellion, and therefore must be false by the Sixth  
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[ 69 ]

and Seventh Principles, because it would make all Government precarious, and hazard the Peace and Welfare of Society.

And therefore it is to be observed, That as I am all along speaking of the Rights of the Society, so when I speak of their Religion, I mean, the Religion of the Society, that is the national establish'd Religion: And this is then only said to be at stake, when the Laws that are made for the security of that Religion are laid aside, and such methods are visibly taken for the introducing a contrary Religion, as are contrary to Law in an Arbitrary Tyrannical way, without the consent and contrary to the judgment of the Society.

And therefore in such a case, every Society has a power to defend their Rights, which the Prince is endeavouring to take away, because the consequence of not Resisting, may tend more to the Misery of the Society, than the consequences of Resisting can do; as much as the loss of Heaven to themselves or their posterity, is of more importance and concern to them, than the loss of all other things besides.

And if so, from hence it is plain, that the foundation of Government, Obedience and Resistance, is the same: They all stand upon the same foot, and are all branches of the same root, and there is the same reason for All, as there is for any of 'em.

And

And therefore, if it be a good argument for the Divine Authority of Government, as we have before shewn, (*Page 31.*) That it is a necessary means to the Happiness of the Society, a necessary End appointed by God in the very nature of things; it will follow, that it must be as good an argument of a Divine Commission for Resistance, when 'tis a necessary means to the same End, which, as it is the only thing that can make it Lawful, so it is the only Rule to judge by, when and how far it may be so.

But who shall be judge of this necessity, is the Question; and it has always been the great difficulty in stating this controversy.

But after all, I take it to be such a difficulty, as has arisen chiefly from the manner of stating and handling this point.

For many, who have wrote upon this subject, have, too commonly, contented themselves with what they thought a confutation of the doctrine of Non-Resistance in general, from thence inferring the lawfulness of the contrary; but not having determin'd the just bounds, how far we are oblig'd to suffer, before it can be lawful to Resist, they have left the point they contend for, altogether useless, if not dangerous.

For

For tho' it be lawful to Resist in case of oppression, yet we have shewn it is not so in every oppression (*Principle VIII.*) and therefore, unless they shew us, how far we are to bear oppression, before we Resist, they really do nothing to any purpose, but on the contrary, put a sword into madmens hands, and set open a door to Rebellion, and Confusion.

They shew us indeed a remedy for our grievances, but 'tis such a one, as we had as well be without, as not to know when, and how to use it, without the same danger, as when we had it not: And 'tis this, that has given occasion for this puzzling Question, Who shall be Judge?

Whereas, as we have here set the case, there does not seem any room for this objection.

For, as we have here laid down a Rule, by which we are to measure our Submission to Princes, every one must be a Judge of Resistance, so far as he is a Judge of this Rule.

And therefore, since we have here shewn, that it is not lawful to make head against our Prince upon a private injury, nor,

*Secondly,* For a publick, unless it be of dangerous consequence to the Constitution, and such as is notoriously intended for its destruction,



[ 72 ]

destruction, and such too, as he refuses to redress; nor,

*Thirdly*, Even then, unless the damage the Society actually does, or which is the same thing, unavoidably will, suffer by it, if not prevented, be as great a misery to them, as the consequences of their Resistance will probably be.

And since this may happen in Civil matters, but especially when Religion is at stake, which it certainly is, when the Laws that are made for its security, are laid aside, and another contrary Religion introducing, by methods contrary to Law, without the consent, and against the judgment of the Society,

1. Then, As every sensible honest man, who understands the Constitution and Laws, is capable of judging of these things, that is, is capable of judging when a Prince is acting contrary to the Laws of the Establish'd Religion, and setting up another in its stead;

2. And as every sensible man is capable of comparing the present injuries the Society suffers, with blood, and plunder, and all the sad consequences of Civil War;

3. And as every sensible man is capable of judging whether there be a prospect of righting themselves without the hazard of these sad consequences;

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[ 73 ]

So every sensible man must by consequence be capable of judging, when it may be lawful to Resist.

But tho' every sensible man may be a competent judge in this case, to the satisfaction of his own conscience, yet in such a Government as ours is, where the Interests of the People are intrusted in some particular hands, as amongst us in Lords and Commons, who have a Right in the disposal of affairs; as they are therefore the best and the per judges, how far the Rights of the Society are invaded, and what is necessary for their security; so it seems but natural to conclude, where a Parliament can be had, that no Resistance ought to be made, till the Parliament has declar'd their unsufferable grievances, and sought unsuccessfully for redress.

And therefore, 'tis the interest of the Society to have frequent Parliaments, as a necessary means of security to the constitution. For as the constitution cannot well be supposed capable of being overturn'd upon a suddain, so in the case of any Injury to the Society, by frequent Parliaments, we can never be without a convenient opportunity, and a proper method of relief.

But as it was not so in former Reigns, so where the Judgment of Parliament could not be had, every man was then to judge

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for himself, and to act according to his conscience.

But then, as the proper method for redress of grievances in a Parliamentary Monarchy, is by the way of Parliaments; so by consequence, in case of an injury, or oppression from our Princes in those times, the first thing every one ought to have endeavour'd after, was, the Liberty of a Parliament; which if the Prince would consent to, then all other extraordinary methods would be unlawful; For 'tis the necessity of Resistance that alone can make it Lawful.

And as that can never be a necessary means to an End, where the End can be attain'd without those means, so that can never be necessary to the security of the Rights and Properties of the Society, without which they may be otherwise secur'd; and by consequence Resistance can never be said to be necessary, where the Prince is willing to redress the grievance, and consent to any other reasonable means of their security.

And therefore, could it be suppos'd that the Lords, and Commons could agree to declare for Resistance in such a case, that Declaration would doubtless be unlawful.

And tho' they must be suppos'd the best Judges of the several Interests of the Society, yet as they are but a part of the Society,

Society, we are not oblig'd by the Rules of the Constitution to act according to their Judgment, any farther than we our selves are satisfied, 'tis Lawful, and by consequence we cannot be oblig'd to Resistance by any Declaration they should make, any otherwise than we our selves should judge it necessary.

There may be many cases, where I may be oblig'd not to act without the Judgment of others; but there can be no case, where I can be oblig'd to act against my own, where the morality of the action is in dispute.

And since we have already shewn, that every sensible man is capable of Judging, when it may be Lawful to Resist, and thereby satisfy himself in joining with any Declaration of Parliament, where it can be had, or in using any other methods, he thinks to be necessary, where the Judgment of Parliament cannot be had, he ought not by consequence to join with any such Judgment of Parliament, any farther than he is convinced within himself it is a Just and Lawful Judgment, and may Justly and Lawfully be join'd with.

As this is a Matter of the last importance, so we ought to be very wary how we act in it, and therefore we ought never to venture on an attempt of this nature, without being sure of the ground we go on.

A wise and good man would not do any thing, that may reasonably be doubted, whether it be Lawful; and therefore tho' we are as certain, as we can be of any thing, that Resistance is Lawful, yet we should in prudence, *rather choose to suffer too much, than Resist too soon.*

The utmost degree of what is Lawful, is the very edge of sin, and one would not willingly come so near, as to split the hair.

And therefore whensoever we think it necessary to Resist, the Necessity of our Resistance ought to be very certain; The Injury suffer'd ought to be so very notorious, that every eye may see it, and the danger to be prevented ought to be so very apparent, that no reasonable man can doubt of it.

For this is a remedy for the diseases of the Body Politick, like those, that are sometimes used for the Natural Body, which either Kill, or Cure; and therefore we ought to be tender in the Use of 'em, unless it be in an evidently dangerous, and desperate case.

But tho' in such a case a People may have a Right to Resist, yet here a material Question will arise, Whether a People may not give away their Rights, and by consequence their Right of Resistance?

For since, as we have before shewn, (Pag. 33, 34.) every one is oblig'd in duty  
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to God to obey the Laws of the Society, so far as they are agreeable to the Will of God; if the Society has made a Law to forbid Resistance, and thereby given away their Right to it, it must be therefore unlawful to Resist, so far as they had a Power to make that Law, and give away that Right.

But that they have not a Power to make such a Law, and give away this Right, is as certain a truth, as that they have not a Power to act contrary to the Will of God.

For we have already shewn (*Principle IV.*) That it is the Will of God, that the Happiness of Society be maintain'd, and by consequence, that such Resistance be made by every Society, as in the nature of things is absolutely necessary to secure and maintain their Happiness. And therefore for any Society to make a Law against all Resistance absolutely, is to forbid that, as unlawful, which God has made necessary; and therefore to do that, which they have not a Power to do, because 'tis contrary to the Will of God.

It may seem strange to some to say this, which is a Doctrine so contrary to the common prejudices; but we see it must be so in the nature of things, if the Welfare of Society ought to be maintain'd.

But yet it may be plausibly urg'd in this case, That every one has a Power to dis-  
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pose of his own, and if he thinks fit, may make himself a slave; he may either give away his Rights and Property, or he may oblige himself not to defend 'em, whenever they shall be taken from him; And what a man may do of himself, he may do by another, that is duly commission'd to act for him; and whatever is so done by another for him, lays as great an Obligation on him to perform it, as if it were done in his own person.

And therefore, as in every Society, there is a necessity, that the affairs of the Publick be intrusted in some particular hands to act for the whole; so whatever those Persons so intrusted do for the Society, must be understood, as done by the whole, and to lay as great an obligation on every member of the Society, as if it had been done by themselves in person: And therefore if they make a Law to give away our Rights, or forbid the necessary defence of 'em, every member of the Society is by consequence to be suppos'd under a necessary obligation to keep that Law.

But in Answer to this; Tho' it must be allow'd, as an undoubted truth, That every one has a Power to dispose of his own Rights, so far as they are his own, consider'd simply, and of himself alone; yet if he be consider'd relatively, as a member of Society, so far as the Rights of

of others depend upon his defending and maintaining his own; they are not then intirely his own, and he has no such Right to give 'em up, but on the contrary, is under an Obligation to defend 'em, it being the duty of every member of the Society, to do what is necessary to the Welfare of the Society.

This may be illustrated by the Case of the Robber who takes away our goods, tho' the goods perhaps be such, as we are content to lose, and give up our Right to, rather than prosecute the offender; yet so far as the non-prosecution of the offender, may be of ill consequence to Society, as we are members of Society, and oblig'd to support the Welfare of Society, we are under an obligation in conscience to prosecute, and the Society has a Right to that prosecution. And should an Oath be given us not to prosecute, that Oath, wou'd be *Ipsa Facto* void, as being an Oath against a Prior Obligation, an Oath against doing Justice, and therefore an unlawful Oath.

And by the same reason, if Resistance be a real Duty, and a Right, which in cases of necessity the Society may demand of us, when an Oath of Allegiance is given to Subjects, it must be understood in such a sense, as 'tis Lawful to be perform'd in, and by consequence in such a sense, as to allow of such Resistance, as the Society has

has a Right to, otherwise it would be an Oath to the Prince to do wrong to the People, and therefore an unlawful Oath, and by consequence, *Ipsò Factò* void.

And so likewise as to the other part of the argument, tho' a man may do that by another, which he has a Power to do of himself, and is as much oblig'd by what is so done, as if it were done by himself, yet nothing can be said to be done by another for us, so as in Equity and Reason to lay an Obligation on us any farther, than as he who does the thing, is impower'd and commission'd by us; or as the thing he does, is agreeable to the End and Reason of that commission he receiv'd from us.

Should an Attorney for Instance, or a Guardian, that is impower'd to act in our stead in the security of our Rights, give away those Rights he was impower'd to preserve; it cannot be said, he had a commission to do this, or that this ought to oblige in reason, and conscience, where we have a power to help our selves. And for the same reason, tho' in every Society, the Rights of the whole are suppos'd to be intrusted in some particular hands, yet as this is done only for support of Government, the End of which is, the Welfare of Society in the security of their Rights and Properties; it will follow, that those persons so intrusted to act for the whole, are not

not to be understood to have any commission to do any thing, that is contrary to the End and Reason of their trust and commission; and by consequence they must be understood to have no commission, and therefore no Right to inflave the Society, by giving up their common Rights and Properties, or forbidding us to defend 'em in a case of necessity, this being contrary to the very End and Reason of that Constitution, by which they are impower'd to act for the Society. They have a power, no doubt, to give away any Right, the alienation of which is absolutely necessary to the Welfare of the whole, and if we could suppose we had any Right granted to us, of resisting our Governours in any such manner, or for any such Reasons, as is inconsistent with the Welfare of the whole, they have, doubtless, a Power to give it away, (and if they should not give it away, 'twou'd be void in it self, as being in the nature of things unlawful;) because, by the Seventh Principle, any action is unlawful that is contrary to the Welfare of the Society: But to give away all our Rights and Properties at once, or, which is the same thing, to forbid us the means, that are so necessary to their preservation, that they cannot be secur'd without them, this they have no more Power or Right to do, than they have a Right to authorize

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Thieves and Murtherers to take away our lives, or goods, or to oblige us not to defend our selves against them.

The case is the same both with Prince and People; for as the Prince, who is the Minister of God for good, cannot be suppos'd to have any commission from God, to ruin or destroy his people; so neither can they who are intrusted with the affairs of any Society to contrive and manage for the Welfare of the whole, be in reason suppos'd to have any commission to give away their Rights or Properties, in which their Welfare does consist. (Principle V. P. 14.)

But on the contrary, they are oblig'd in Duty to God and their Country, to maintain and defend their trust, and by consequence are oblig'd to such Resistance, as is absolutely necessary to that End.

This is so very plain a case, that I dare appeal to any one's common Reason, tho' never so great a Bigot to his Notions, whether he should not think it a Trayterous and Unlawful part, should they who are intrusted with the Interests of a Society, knowingly and wilfully give 'em up into the absolute disposal of their Prince: And if it be unlawful to give them up, it must be then their duty to defend them, and by consequence it must be equally their duty to defend them by all such ways and means,

means, as are absolutely necessary for their defence.

And therefore, as I said before (page 73, 74.) in all such Governments, as ours is, where the Interests of the Society are intrusted with a Parliament, as they are oblig'd in duty to defend them, so in a regular course of things, where a Free Parliament can be had, the First Defence of our Rights should begin there, and nothing should be done by others, till they have us'd their best endeavours for redress.

And if a Free Parliament cannot be had, or if they have endeavour'd for relief in vain, then every one must be left to his own conscience, to act as he thinks best for the Welfare of the Society, according to the foregoing limitations; (page 71, 72.)

Thus, I think, we have a full resolution of this Point, and such a one as seems impossible to be false, if my foregoing Principles be true.

But yet, I'm very sensible, notwithstanding this, there are many with whom this doctrine of Resistance will not relish, by reason of that impious, and horrid abuse of it in the barbarous murder of King *Charles I.*

As there are others, on the other hand, who are as much afraid of Non-Resistance,



lest it should strike at the Revolution in favour of King *William*.

Whereas 'tis evident, these extremes in opinion can never be justified on either hand.

For we have already shewn, there is a Lawful Resistance, tho' it may be abus'd; and there is a Non Resistance necessary, tho' it be often mistaken; and the light we have now set them both in, will give us a just view of those events, the one of Great and Glorious, the other of Scandalous and Execrable Memory.

*The Late Civil War condemn'd.*

*First*, According to the Principles here laid down, we have a horrid Idea set before us of the detestable Murther of King *Charles* the First, and the ierrgular and unjust proceedings of the People in that unnatural Civil War.

For, *First*, We have shewn, that a few single Instances to the prejudice of a people, is not a sufficient cause of Resistance, if the Prince, upon the people's putting in a claim to their Rights, and informing him of the wrong, is willing to redress the Injury; and if he shou'd not be willing to do this,

*Secondly*, We have shewn (page 66, 67.) That even then it will not be lawful to resist, unless the Injury be a greater misfe-

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ry to the Society, than the consequence of Resistance is like to be. And if so,

Then nothing can justify that Civil War. For tho' it must be confess'd, that some irregular actions were done by the King, yet it must be confess'd too on the other hand, that they were such, as he was advis'd were lawful to be done, and such as when done, were no great oppression in themselves.

And as for the bad consequences of his proceedings in those particulars, when his people express'd their uneasiness at them, and put in a claim to their Rights in Parliament, he was not only willing to redress their present grievance, but to comply with any means, that could be thought reasonable to prevent any future inconvenience: And this he did in so full a manner, that even the then pretended Parliament themselves voted his concessions satisfactory.

And when he had done this, as Resistance could be no longer necessary, so it could by consequence be no longer lawful.

And therefore to proceed in the manner they did, must be Rebellion in the highest degree, or else there could be no such thing in nature.

But granting he had made no satisfaction to his people, nor given any new security for their Rights and Properties; nay, supposing he had continued to oppress them,

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yet we have further shewn, that in such a case, the King only forfeits his Right, and ceases to Govern his People, and by consequence can forfeit no more than his Government.

As He refuses them his Protection, so they may refuse him their Obedience, but this does not give them any Power over his Person;

And therefore for them to put him to death, even tho' they had been the whole body of the people, but much more for a few particular persons to do it, and that too contrary to the general sense of the people, must be murder in the highest degree, or there can be no such thing in nature.

This is not only true from the Principles laid down; but it is also evident, even from our famous *Magna Charta*, so often quoted to justify Resistance; even this puts the Person of the King out of the People's Power, even whilst it gives them a Power to distress him in his Castles, or use any other means for their security; and sure if this be of any authority, the King has as much Right to the benefit of it on his part, as the People can pretend on theirs; and if it gives them a privilege to secure their own Rights, so it gives him a Right to be secured in his Person.

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So that this must be a horrid and detestable wickedness, if Murder and Rebellion be so:

And therefore they who pretend to justify this Fact, must be men of barbarous and cruel Minds, and govern'd more by their passions than their consciences.

If such Principles and such Practices upon such Pretences were to be allowed, they would make the Rights of Princes and the Peace of Society, the most precarious thing that can be, and lay us open to the Insults of every *Massinello*, who has but impudence enough to charge the Government with Popery or Tyranny, or being in a *French*, or *Dutch* Interest, and cunning enough to time it with some popular discontent.

And therefore as by the Sixth Principle already laid down, these notions must necessarily be false, and such facts unlawful; so they ought to be abhor'd and discourag'd by every wise and good Man, who has any regard to his duty or interest, to the Society's peace, or his own safety.

But tho' our notions of Government do thus evidently demonstrate the unlawfulness of those practices in the late Civil Wars, yet they do,

*The Revolution justified.*

*Secondly, As fairly justify the late Revolution.*

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For

[ 88 ]

For if it be lawful to oppose a Prince, and withdraw our Obedience, as we have shewn, (page 67.) when he either invades the Rights of the Society, or lays aside those Laws that are made for their security, and especially when our Religion is at stake.

And if our Rights and Religion were at stake, when we saw all our mounds pull'd down, and our inclosure laid open, and a contrary Religion setting up amongst us; when a dispensing Power was maintain'd to void all the Laws that were made for our security, and such Persons put into Places of Trust, as our Laws forbid to be intrusted: When our Properties were to be held at the Will of the King, who evidently shew'd, it should be no longer than he should find it for his purpose not to destroy them.

If our Rights and Religion were at stake, when Popery was planting it self in our Universities, and the members depriv'd of their Legal Properties contrary to *Law*, for not doing that, which was contrary to *their Oaths*, to make room for Papists unqualified by *Law*, and all this with a High Hand by the bare Authority of the King, only because he would, and for this End only, as was notoriously evident, that he might corrupt the fountain, from whence our  
Religion

[ 89 ]

Religion is to be nourish'd and supported, and the lower streams to be supplied.

If our Rights and Religion were at stake, when under these Oppressions, the injur'd subjects put in their claim to their Rights by humble and obedient Petitions, which was the only method in their power, because a Free Parliament could not be had, but all without any redress or prospect of it; nay with an assurance of the contrary from the King himself, who, tho' they endeavour'd to convince him of his error, that he was acting contrary to Law, yet nevertheless declar'd, he would be obey'd.

And when all these proceedings were supported by the Power of a standing Army, without the consent, and contrary to the Judgment of the Parliament, and some part of that Army commanded by Popish Officers, and a great Part of it made up of *Irish* Papists, who were by Interest and Principle engag'd to destroy, both our Properties and Religion.

If our Rights and Religion were at stake in these cases, as no reasonable man can, and, I believe, no unprejudiced Man will, and I'm sure, in those times no sensible man did question, but on the contrary, the circumstances were so notorious, and the danger so apparent, not from one, or two single Instances, but from a continued Series of Actions, that every heart was  
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fill'd with Fears, and Complaints were heard in every mouth, Then certainly we had, or there can be no such thing, as a just and lawful Cause of Resistance. And if it was just to proceed thus far, considering the Prince we had to do withal, was not only inflexibly bigotted to Popery, and resolutely bent upon the ruin both of our Religion and Constitution, but one, who could be bound by no ties of conscience, as being regardless both of his Promises and Oaths, and therefore could neither with safety nor prudence be confided in; it must therefore be necessary in the nature of things, and by consequence, be just and lawful, if the Welfare of the Society ought to be supported in the security of their Rights and Properties, to seek out some other methods to secure them by: And since they, who were then intrusted with the Rights of the Society, and were the proper, and only Judges of what was best for the Society, establish'd the Crown upon a Protestant Prince, as the best, and as it was apparently the only way to secure the Rights and Religion of Protestants, against the like attempts and hazards for the future; it must by consequence be the duty, as well as 'tis the interest of every member of the Society to submit to it. (C O R. I. page 33.) had it stood upon no other foot but this.

But

But the Right and Title of his present Majesty, does not depend upon this alone: He Injoys his Crown by an Hereditary Right devolv'd upon Him from the Princess *Sophia*. And this Right was settled and confirm'd to Her by all that Legal Power and Authority, that can give any Right in any Society, that is, by the Power of the Crown, and Parliament, with whom all the Rights of our Society are lodg'd.

So that if His present Majesty has not a Right to Govern us, it must be either upon this account, that the Crown and Parliament, have not any Right to determine the Succession of the Government, or else that the Succession has not been Legally settled by a Lawful King, and Parliament.

This is the hinge of the whole dispute; And as to the first of these, It is very certain, that as the Right of Governing any Society is the Ordinance of Men, and therefore may be determin'd, and settled by Men, so every Society must have a General Right to it, according as is best for their own Welfare, (*Page 45.*) And as we have this Right in common with other Societies, from the nature and reason of things, so we have it likewise by our particular Constitution, as being a Right declar'd by Law, to be inherent in the Crown and Parliament. So that whatsoever is so done

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[ 92 ]

by the Crown and Parliament, they have a Natural and Legal Right to do, and as the interests of the Society is lodg'd in them, the Society must be determin'd by 'em: And since this is the foundation of our present Settlement, and the King succeeds to the Throne by this, as He must have a Legal Right to Govern, we must be oblig'd in Duty to Obey.

The only remaining Difficulty is, Whether this Settlement was Legally made by a Lawful King, and Parliament?

Now as to this Objection, it may be answer'd, That, tho' this Settlement was made in the Reign of King *William*, who had not a Regular Hereditary Right, yet if the Revolution was, as we have prov'd it Lawful, as being a necessary, and therefore Lawful Means for the attainment of a Lawful End, He must therefore be a Lawful and Rightful King: And by consequence must have a Power and Right to do, what any other Lawful King could do.

But when we consider further, That by the Law and Constitution of our Kingdom, the Authority of the King in Possession is allow'd, however He came by that Possession, and that All Acts of Parliament pass'd by Him, are equally to be Obey'd, as of equal Force with theirs, whose Titles were indisputable, (as Dr. *Higden* has demon-

[ 93 ]

demonstrated) then this Act of Parliament for the Settlement of the Crown, must be as valid and obliging as any other Act of any other King and Parliament could be, that is, it must give the King as good a Title to the Crown, and make it as much the People's Duty to Obey, as any [other Act of Parliament could do.

But here we may still consider further, That this Settlement was not only made by King *William*, but was afterwards confirm'd by the Authority of Queen *Ann*, whose Right and Title every one allow'd, even they who refuse Allegiance to the King: And if she had a Right, as undoubtedly she had, then she had a Right to do in Her Reign, what the Crown had a Right to do in any Reign, and since she, an undoubtedly Lawful Queen, has confirm'd the Succession in the Protestant Line, by the concurrence of an undoubtedly Lawful Parliament, (which they had an Inherent Right to do) it will follow, that His present Majesty had, as just a Right to the Succession, and has now as just a claim to our Allegiance, as Reason, and Law can give Him.

And as the same Power, that could and did settle it thus, could and did actually exclude all others, and therefore hath not only given Him a Right, but has by consequence given Him the only Right; so it is

is the Duty of every Subject not only to receive Him for their Prince, but for their only Rightful and Lawful Prince, against all other Pretenders whatsoever.

COROLLARY, OR INFERENCE IV.

*Lastly*, IF all the Principles we have laid down, and the Reasonings thereupon be True, from hence we are taught the Obligations, that Governors and Subjects have upon 'em, and the Duties that are severally requir'd of 'em, in order to an happy Government.

For if the End of all Government be the Welfare of Society, then He only can be a good Governor, and they only good Subjects, who consult the Publick Good in their several capacities; The Prince the Welfare of His Subjects, and the Subjects the Welfare of their Prince.

And as the Publick Welfare consists in the security of the Society in their Rights and Properties; so it is not only the Duty, but the Interest of a Prince, to maintain the Rights of his People, and the People to support the Rights of the Prince.

And as the Laws of the Society are the Rules of the several Rights of the Society, so those several Rights cannot be secur'd, unless those Laws be the Rule of their several Actions; that is, unless the People observe every thing, that the Laws re-

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quire, and the Prince command nothing, but what the Laws allow.

And as Laws are not only made, as Rules, but as a common Security to the Rights of the Society, so the common Security must necessarily consist in the punctual execution of the Laws, and so far as the Society are wanting in this respect, that is, so far as the Prince shall pretend to dispense with them, and the People be careless in the Execution of 'em, so far they are defective in their Duty, and wanting to the Common Good and Security.

For as the Prince and People are but one Society, united together for the Welfare of the whole, they must have a Right to each others duty, as necessary to the Common Good, and by consequence so far as either part, that is, either Prince, or People are wanting in their respective duties to each other, so far they are wanting to the Common Good, which God has oblig'd them to consult.

And therefore those Persons, who shall contribute towards this, by magnifying the Prerogative of the Crown so far, as to oppress and destroy the Rights of the People, or under a pretence of maintaining the Rights of the People, shall lessen the Security of the Crown, are equally Enemies to the Common Good, and equally False to God, and their Country.

Thus



Thus we have gone thro' the Essentials of Government, relating both to the Governours, and Subjects, and shewn the Obligation they have to one another; By the same Principles we may be able to model our notions of the several Forms of it, and it particularly shews us in the first place, how far any Form of Government may be alter'd.

## COROLLARY V.

*How far any Form of Government may be alter'd.*

We have already shewn, that ever Society has an Inherent Right, to put themselves under any Form of Government that is absolutely necessary to their own Welfare, according to their several circumstances; and as all Forms of Government were originally the Ordinances of men, so they are by consequence alterable by men, and therefore there can be no such Right of Governing in any Person, or Family, as is properly, and in its own nature Indefensible: But then, tho' all Forms of Government were the Ordinances of men, yet as they were Ordain'd for the Welfare of Society, so far, and no farther ought they to be alter'd, than the Welfare of the Society requires the alteration.

And

And since the Welfare of the Society consists, as we have shewn, in the security of the Rights and Properties of the Society, that Form of Government only can be said to require an alteration, under which the Rights and Properties of the Society cannot be secur'd:

And as they who are intrusted with the Interests, and imploy'd to Act for the Welfare of the Society, are the only proper Judges of its Welfare, so by consequence they are not only the proper Judges, when, and what alterations shall be made, but they are the only Persons, that can make 'em. And therefore in any particular Constitution, suppose this of ours in this Kingdom, where the Interests of the Society are put into the hands, and left to the disposal of the Crown, and Parliament, tho' this Form of Government was originally the Ordinance of the Society, and is therefore alterable by the Society, yet it is not to be done by any other Persons, nor in any other manner, than by the concurrence of the Crown and Parliament. The Crown cannot do it without the Parliament, nor the Parliament without the Crown. For tho' we suppose the Rights of Princes are intirely owing to the People, and tho' the People had a Power originally in themselves, not to have united under that Form, yet after they have consented, and submitted

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ted to it, the Power they had once, is given away, so long as that Union continues, and the Power and Prerogative they have given their Prince are as much His Right, whilst He does the duty of their Prince, as the Privileges they reserve to themselves are Theirs.

And therefore as he cannot Lawfully invade their Privileges without Tyranny and Oppression, so neither can they Lawfully resist His Power, nor Intrench on His Prerogative without Treason and Rebellion.

And by Consequence in such a Case, no alteration can be made by either, without the mutual consent of Both.

This must necessarily be true, I say, so long as this Union and Constitution continues:

But should this Union and Constitution expire of it self, or be any otherwise broken and dissolv'd, by which the People are discharg'd from their Obligations to their Prince, and are by consequence reduced to the state they were in, before that Union and Constitution was made, as they have then the same Natural Right to settle themselves again, either in the same, or any other Form, as if they had never been settled before; so whatever the Persons in that Case do, who are intrusted with the Interests of the Society, every Member of the Society is oblig'd to submit to.

But

But here then the Question will be, How this Union and Constitution can Expire of it self, or can be so broken and dissolv'd, as to put the Society into such a State, as if that Union and Constitution had never been made.

Now this may be, *First*, Upon a supposition that the Royal Family, by whom the Society has agreed to be Govern'd in Succession, is extinct, and so no Person has any Legal Claim to Govern them; In such a Case the Society may put themselves under any other Persons, or any other Form, because the former Constitution is expir'd: Or,

*Secondly*, The Union and Constitution may be dissolv'd, when the Prince will not submit to the Terms and Conditions of the Constitution, nor perform the Contract by which they are united: For as the End and Reason of Government is the Welfare of Society in the security of their Rights and Properties, so the different Forms and Constitutions are only several means to this End:

And therefore when a Prince takes upon Him the Government of a People, it is in the nature of the thing suppos'd, and He does thereby virtually Contract and Agree, not only to consult the Welfare of that People, but to do it in that way, that they have appointed: So that for Instance

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in such a Government as ours, where we have not only our particular Rights and Properties, assur'd to us by Law, but also such a certain Form and Constitution, where no Rights can be alien'd, nor Laws be made, but by the Advice and Consent of Parliament, it is in the nature of the thing suppos'd, and He who takes upon Him this Government, does thereby tacitly Contract, that He will not only preserve our Rights and Properties, but that He will Govern in this way, and according to the methods of this Constitution.

And therefore when a King shall invade our Rights and Properties, and wilfully and designedly take them from us, and thereby destroy the very End and Reason of his Authority; or when he will not govern us by Law, nor with the Advice and Consent of Parliament; he overturns the Society, and dissolves the Constitution, the Bond and Union between him and the Society, by which alone he becomes their Head, and they become his People: And if after due applications and proper methods, such as are prescrib'd before; He persists in this Injury without redress, the People are as much discharg'd from him, as if he had never been their Head; and by Consequence may lawfully consult their own Welfare in any other Way, that is necessary to that End, as if that Constitution

tion had never been made. And whatever they do in such a case, who are then intrusted with the Interests of the Society, to act in that Juncture for the Welfare of the whole, 'tis the duty of the whole to submit to; because they are in that case the higher Powers, and indeed for that time the whole Power; which Power is agreed on all hands, 'tis absolutely unlawful to resist or disobey, either by opposing what they have a Right to do, or by refusing what they have a Right to impose.

This gives us a Right Notion of Revolutions in Government, and as it shews us how far Revolutions may be Lawful, so it teaches us how they are to be regularly manag'd, and by what method they ought to be confirm'd, which is not, we see, by Popular Tumults, or by any domestick Military Force, imposing such a change upon us, because they have strength enough to do it, but it ought to be done by the whole Society, that is, by the Consent and Approbation of such Persons, with whom the Interests of the Society are intrusted.

Indeed, in the Case of a Revolution brought about by the Conquest of a Foreign Force, where we are put under a necessity of submitting to the Conqueror in such a way, and upon such Terms as He shall

shall impose, here no certain Rules can be prescrib'd, as being an extraordinary case: Only in general it may be said, that as the only just Foundation of submitting to Conquerors, is, the necessity of it to the Welfare of the Society, so they, who undertake to settle that Submission, ought to get the best Terms they can for the Society, that is, not only for themselves, but for the Whole, and this ought to be the End of every step they take in the Settlement of that Submission.

But in the case before us, we have suppos'd a Revolution to arise from the natural dissolution of the Constitution, by which, tho' the Society have an Inherent Right, to put themselves under any other Form, and make what alterations they think fit, yet it cannot be regularly said to be done by the Society, unless it be done by such Persons only, as are appointed by the Society for that purpose; by which it may appear to be the Act of the Society, and it cannot be Lawfully done by them, for any other End, or upon any other reason, than as it is necessary for the Welfare of the Whole.

And this gives us occasion to reflect with pleasure, upon the kind Providence of God, in our late Revolution, by which, He not only deliver'd us, and our Posterity, from the apparent ruin of our Liberties and Religion,

ligion, but also gave us a happy opportunity, of doing it by the concurrence of the whole Society, in a regular Convention of Lords and Commons; And by this means, having left no room for reasonable men to object against the thing, or the manner of it, He has provided both for our safety, and our satisfaction.

COROLLARY VI.

*What Form of Government is best.*

FROM the Principles of Government before laid down, as we have resolv'd the former point, how far any Form of Government may be alter'd; so here we may be instructed in that famous Question, What Form of Government is best?

This is a frequent Question in the Schools; but 'tis much more so among Politicians, and of fatal consequence to many Societies.

Amongst us in *England*, 'tis a kind of Heresy in Politicks, not to give the Preference to Monarchy; And indeed, as Monarchy is the most antient and universal, so one would be apt to conclude it the most natural, and therefore the most eligible Form:

And of all Forms of Monarchy, the absolute would probably be best, could we suppose our Princes would be always wise and good; could we be always sure of Per-  
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sons, whose intire aim would be the Welfare of their People, and whose prudence would always direct them for the best; and cou'd we be sure, they would be always in wise and good hands, an absolute Form of Monarchy would seem best fitted, to answer all the occasions of the Publick.

But considering the infirmity and corruption of human Nature, it cannot be expected, but that we must sometimes fall into the hands of weak or wicked Princes, or that good and wise Princes may sometimes fall into the hands of wicked and designing Counsellors: And therefore since we can never hope, but such an absolute Dominion must, some time, or other, degenerate into Tyranny and Oppression; this must be a false Notion of Government, as tending to the destruction of the End of Government.

And since we have already shewn, that Government is only a means to an End, which End is the Welfare of Society, in the security of their Rights and Properties; if Monarchy be the best Form of Government, That by consequence must be the best Form of Monarchy, where the Rights and Properties of the Society are best secur'd: And as the Rights of any Society are most likely to be best secur'd, where nothing can be done in relation to their Rights, without the Advice and Consent

of all Parties concern'd, and where every Estate and Condition of Men in the Society have a share in the disposal of the Affairs of the Society; so that Form of Monarchy must by consequence be best, which is establish'd upon this foundation, which we call a limited mixt Monarchy.

But however perfect and natural a Form of Government Monarchy of any kind may be, yet it can only be said to be generally best, but not absolutely and universally so: For if the different Forms of Government arose, as we have suppos'd, from the different circumstances and interests of people, it will follow, That the Goodness of any Form can only be measur'd by the particular circumstances and interests of the People, that are subject to it: And as the Interests of People vary with their circumstances, so the Forms of Government may be various, and yet each be best in its proper Place, and by consequence one Form of Government may be best for this People, another for that: But yet what particular Form would be best for any particular People, would be a very hard matter to distinguish nicely, were we now to form a new Society in a wild and uncivilized country.

For to judge of this exactly, it would be necessary perfectly to understand the nature and situation of the place, the temper

[ 106 ]

per and circumstances of the people, the manner of their subsistence with themselves, and their relation to, and dependence upon others;

And yet, after all, when we perfectly understand this, whether there be any particular Form of Government so necessary to the Welfare of any people, as that they would not be able to subsist under any other, 'tis very hard to say.

Tho' by a long Observation of the United Provinces, Politicians tell us, it is so with them; and that no other Government but that they live under, could possibly be maintain'd amongst them; yet as Monarchy seems to be the most perfect, and the most natural Form, so we may reasonably think, that, generally speaking, that Form of Monarchy, which is already shewn to be best in its own nature, would be generally best for any People.

And where they have varied from it at any time, as far as I can find, it has not arisen from any inconsistency there is in Monarchy, as such, to the Interests of those Societies that are otherwise modell'd; but only from some accidental circumstances relating to the then present time and place, or the then present temper of the people, when those Societies were form'd.

And

[ 107 ]

And therefore in the first Formation of a Society, the particular occasions that then offer themselves, seem to be the Rule, and the only Rule for the first Formation of the model of their Government. But when a Society is already form'd, and a model of Government has been long establish'd, the only Rule of judging in this case, is the Welfare of the Society under it: And as the Welfare of the Society does not consist in the largeness and extent of their Dominions, much less in the Grandeur and Flutter of their Princes, but in the enjoyment of their Rights and Properties; so when any Government has been long continued, and the People live easily and comfortably under it, and have a prospect of continuing so, and for that reason may be thought to like it best, That Government no doubt is best for that People:

And if so, then since the Government of *England* is not only a Monarchy, and such a kind of Monarchy, as is best in its self, as being limited and mix'd, where every State and Condition of Men in the Society, have a share in the disposal of their Rights and Properties, but also such a Monarchy, as we have lived for many ages easily and comfortably under, and have a prospect of continuing so for ever; and therefore such a Monarchy as we universally

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fally like ; it will follow from hence, by an unavoidable consequence, That this Form of Government is best for *England*.

And by consequence it must be a standing Maxim of *English* Politicks, That this Form of Government ought to be maintain'd; that is, it ought to be maintain'd, as it is establish'd in *England*; and therefore not only as a Monarchy, or Kingly Government in one Person ; but also such a sort of Kingly Government, as is limited and mix'd, where no Laws can be made by the King, but by the concurrence of the People, that is, by the Advice and Consent of Parliament.

And as this is already prov'd to be the best Form of Government upon this consideration, That in it every State and Condition of Men in the Society, have a share in the disposal of their several Rights; And as there are different Estates and Conditions of men amongst us, consider'd either as Clergy, or Laity, having not only different and distinct Rights upon this account, but also as they are distinguish'd into Lords, and Commons :

And as the Parliament is made up of all these, so it will follow, That if the Monarchy ought to be maintain'd under the Parliamentary Limitation establish'd in *England*; it ought to be so, as that each of these different Conditions of Men, consider'd

[ 109 ]

der'd as Lords and Commons, and Clergy, may enjoy their respective Parliamentary Rights, and Privileges, so as each to have a share in the disposal of Affairs.

This is the Constitution of the Monarchy of *England*, and therefore whatsoever tends to the preservation or destruction of this, in any one of these several respects, is so far preservative or destructive of the Interest of *England*, and by consequence ought either to be avoided, or pursued.

If therefore we reflect upon this Constitution of the Monarchy, and what is necessary to its Preservation in its several parts, that is, what is necessary for the support and preservation of the Monarchy it self, consider'd as the Government of a single Person; or, 2<sup>dly</sup>, What is necessary for its support and preservation, consider'd in conjunction with the Two Houses of Parliament, that a due ballance between 'em be maintain'd; or, 3<sup>dly</sup>, What is necessary to its support and preservation, as a Parliamentary Monarchy made up of the Three Estates of the Kingdom, under the Influence of their Head; if, I say, these things be consider'd distinctly, this will give us all the general Maxims of Policy, relating to the Constitution of our Monarchy.

What these Maxims are, may easily be discover'd by any one of any observation  
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[ 110 ]

and experience, and 'twould be useful to every *English* Subject, to have a distinct and perfect Knowledge of them; but since the just consideration of that matter would swell this Paper beyond its bounds, and make it less useful for my design; I think it proper to proceed no farther, till I have more leisure and convenience.

Thus you have a View of natural Politics, relating both to the duties of Governours and Subjects, set forth in a series of necessary and unavoidable consequences from evident, and undoubted Principles.

I leave every one to judge, whether it be true, or not.

But as Truth is the necessary Relation, that things bear to one another, as to agreement, or disagreement, when from certain Principles, we are able to form consistent Schemes of things, all hanging together in a regular chain, one part necessarily depending on the other, in a natural and easy connexion, this looks very like a connexion of Truths.

This I take to be the only way of coming to any certainty in the knowledge of any truth, and this is the method I have here taken, and this I have persued with that Indifference, which becomes every one that would not be deceiv'd.

I have had no Regard to interest, prejudice, or party, but only to the discovery  
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[ 111 ]

of Truth, and as I have not wish'd to find it, rather on one side, than another, so, if I am mistaken, I am not in love with error, but am ready to renounce, upon due conviction, whatever shall appear to be so.

But then it is to be observ'd, That as I take my notions to be necessary consequences from certain and undoubted Principles, the only true way to convince me of mistake, is to shew me some error, either in the Principles laid down, or the consequences deduced from them: For so long as these are allow'd to be true, and no flaw be discover'd in these respects, if Demonstration be argument, my Scheme cannot be false.

Thus, therefore, I leave it with the Reader, and if any one shall think fit to oppose what I have said, if he consider the Subject with the impartiality of a Philosopher, and treat the author with the civility of a Gentleman; I shall be very glad to be better inform'd, and think myself oblig'd to him, if I am Wrong, that he would give himself the trouble to set me Right.

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