


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POSTHUMOUS  
**WORKS**  
O F  
**Mr. JOHN LOCKE:**

V I Z.

- I. Of the Conduct of the Understanding.
- II. An Examination of *P. Malebranche's* Opinion of *Seeing all things in God.*
- III. A Discourse of Miracles.
- IV. Part of a Fourth Letter for Toleration.
- V. Memoirs relating to the Life of *Anthony* first Earl of *Shaftsbury.*

To which is added,

- VI. His New Method of a Common-Place-Book, written originally in *French*, and now translated into *English.*

L O N D O N,

Printed by *W. B.* for *A.* and *J. Churchill* at the  
*Black Swan* in *Pater-Noster-Row.* 1706.

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L81P

## Advertisement to the Reader.

**T**HE ensuing Treatises are true and genuine Remains of the deceased Author whose Name they bear, but for the greatest part received not his last Hand, being in a great measure little more than sudden Views, intended to be afterwards revis'd and farther lookt into, but by Sickness, Intervention of Business, or preferable Enquiries, hapned to be thrust aside, and so lay neglected.

The Conduct of the Understanding he always thought to be a Subject very well worth Consideration. As any Miscarriages in that point accidentally came into his Mind, he used sometimes to set them down in Writing, with those Remedies that he could then think of. This Method, tho' it makes not that Haste to the End which one would wish, yet perhaps the only one that can be followed in the Case. It being here, as in Physick, impossible for a Physician to describe a Disease, or seek Remedies for it, till he comes to meet with it. Such Particulars of this kind as occur'd to the Author at a time of Leisure, he, as is before said, sat down in Writing; intending, if he had lived, to have reduc'd them into Order and Method, and to have made a complete Treatise; whereas now it is only a Collection of casual Observations, sufficient to make Men see some Faults in the Conduct of their Understanding, and suspect there may be more, and may perhaps serve to excite others to enquire farther into it, than the Author hath done.

The

## To the Reader.

The Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion, Of seeing all things in God, shews it to be a very groundless Notion, and was not publish'd by the Author, because he look'd upon it to be an Opinion that would not spread, but was like to die of its self, or at least to do no great Harm.

The Discourse of Miracles was writ for his own Satisfaction, and never went beyond the first Draught, and was occasion'd by his reading Mr. Fleetwood's Essay on Miracles, and the Letter writ to him on that Subject.

The fourth Letter for Toleration is imperfect, was begun by the Author a little before his Death, but never finish'd. It was design'd for an Answer to a Book entituled, A Second Letter to the Author of the three Letters for Toleration, &c. which was writ against the Author's third Letter for Toleration, about twelve Years after the said third Letter had been publish'd.

The Memoirs of the late Earl of Shaftsbury are only certain particular Facts sat down in Writing by the Author as they occur'd to his Memory; if Time and Health would have permitted him, he had gone on farther, and from such Materials have collected and compiled an History of that noble Peer.

## ERRATA.

Page 21. Line 3. for *that* read *than*, p. 21. l. 25. dele *but*, p. 76. l. 7. for *no* r. *an*, p. 80. l. 23. after *make* add *such*, p. 88. l. 15. for *obstrude* r. *obtrude*, p. 107. l. 10. for *stain'd* r. *strain'd*, p. 116. l. 7. dele *a* before *mistake*, p. l. 25. for *Cures* r. *Cure*, p. 141. l. 10. for *have* r. *made*, p. 240. l. 9. for *here*; for *you* r. *here* for *you*. p. 270. l. 8. for *is* r. *is not*.

O F

THE EXAMINATION OF P. MALEBRANCHE'S OPINION, OF SEEING ALL THINGS IN GOD, SHews IT TO BE A VERY GROUNDLESS NOTION, AND WAS NOT PUBLISH'D BY THE AUTHOR, BECAUSE HE LOOK'D UPON IT TO BE AN OPINION THAT WOULD NOT SPREAD, BUT WAS LIKE TO DIE OF ITS SELF, OR AT LEAST TO DO NO GREAT HARM.

OF THE

# CONDUCT

OF THE

# UNDERSTANDING.

Quid tam temerarium, tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantia, quam aut falsum sentire, aut quod non satis explorare perceptum sit & cognitum sine ulla dubitatione defendere? Cic. de Natur. Deorum, lib. 1.

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## INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. **T**HE last resort a Man has re-<sup>Introduction</sup>  
course to in the Conduct of  
himself, is his Understanding;  
for though we distinguish the Faculties of  
the Mind, and give the supreme Command  
to the Will, as to an Agent; yet the truth  
is, the Man which is the Agent determines  
himself to this or that voluntary Action, up-  
on some precedent Knowledge, or appear-  
ance of Knowledge in the Understanding.  
No Man ever sets himself about any thing  
but upon some view or other which serves  
him for a reason for what he does: And  
whatsoever Faculties he employs, the Un-  
derstanding with such Light as it has, well  
or ill informed, constantly leads, and by  
that Light, true or false, all his operative  
Powers are directed. The Will it self, how  
absolute and uncontrollable soever it may  
be thought, never fails in its Obedience to  
the Dictates of the Understanding. Tem-  
ples have their sacred Images, and we see  
what Influence they have always had over  
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*Introduction* a great part of Mankind. But in truth the Ideas and Images in Mens Minds are the invisible Powers that constantly govern them, and to these they all universally pay a ready Submission. It is therefore of the highest Concernment, that great care should be taken of the Understanding, to conduct it right in the search of Knowledge, and in the Judgments it makes.

The Logick now in use has so long possessed the Chair, as the only Art taught in the Schools for the Direction of the Mind in the Study of the Arts and Sciences, that it would perhaps be thought an affectation of Novelty to suspect, that Rules that have served the learned World these two or three thousand Years, and which without any complaint of Defects the Learned have rested in, are not sufficient to guide the Understanding. And I should not doubt but this Attempt would be censured as Vanity or Presumption, did not the great Lord *Verulam's* Authority justify it; who not servilely thinking Learning could not be advanced beyond what it was, because for many Ages it had not been, did not rest in the lazy Approbation and Applause of what was, because it was; but enlarged his Mind to what might be. In his Preface to his *Novum Organum* concerning Logick he pronounces thus, *Qui summas Dialecticæ partes*

*tribuerunt*

*tribuerunt, atque inde fidissima Scientiis præ-Introduction*  
*fidia comparari putarunt, verissime & optime*  
*viderunt intellectum humanum sibi permissum*  
*merito suspectum esse debere. Verum infir-*  
*mior omnino est malo medicina; nec ipsa mali*  
*expers. Siquidem Dialectica, quæ recepta est,*  
*licet ad civilia & artes, quæ in sermone &*  
*opinionem posita sunt, rectissime adhibeatur; na-*  
*tura tamen subtilitatem longo intervallo non*  
*attingit, & prensando, quod non capit, ad*  
*errores potius stabiliendos & quasi figendos,*  
*quam ad viam veritati aperiendam valuit.*

They, says he, who attributed so much to Logick, perceived very well and truly, that it was not safe to trust the Understanding to it self, without the Guard of any Rules. But the Remedy reach'd not the Evil, but became a part of it: For the Logick which took place, though it might do well enough in civil Affairs, and the Arts which consisted in Talk and Opinion, yet comes very far short of Subtily in the real Performances of Nature, and catching at what it cannot reach, has served to confirm and establish Errors, rather than to open a way to Truth. And therefore a little after he says, That it is absolutely necessary that a better and perfecter use and employment of the Mind and Understanding should be introduced. *Necessario requiritur ut melior & perfectior mentis & intellectus humani usus & adoperatio introducatur.*

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§ 2. There

Parts.

§ 2. There is, 'tis visible, great variety in Mens Understandings, and their natural Constitutions put so wide a difference between some Men in this respect, that Art and Industry would never be able to master; and their very Natures seem to want a Foundation to raise on it that which other Men easily attain unto. — Amongst Men of equal Education there is great inequality of Parts. And the Woods of *America*, as well as the Schools of *Athens*, produce Men of several Abilities in the same kind. Though this be so, yet I imagine most Men come very short of what they might attain unto in their several degrees by a neglect of their Understandings. A few Rules of Logick are thought sufficient in this case for those who pretend to the highest Improvement; whereas I think there are a great many natural Defects in the Understanding capable of Amendment, which are over-look'd and wholly neglected. And it is easie to perceive that Men are guilty of a great many Faults in the Exercise and Improvement of this Faculty of the Mind, which hinder them in their Progress, and keep them in Ignorance and Error all their Lives. Some of them I shall take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper Remedies for in the following Discourse.

§ 3. Be-

§ 3. Besides the want of determin'd Ideas, *Reasoning*, and of Sagacity, and Exercise in finding out, and laying in order intermediate Ideas, there are three Miscarriages that Men are guilty of in reference to their Reason, whereby this Faculty is hindred in them from that Service it might do and was design'd for. And he that reflects upon the Actions and Discourses of Mankind, will find their Defects in this kind very frequent, and very observable.

1. The first is of those who seldom reason at all, but do and think according to the Example of others, whether Parents, Neighbours, Ministers, or who else they are pleas'd to make choice of to have an implicit Faith in, for the saving of themselves the pains and trouble of thinking and examining for themselves.

2. The second is of those who put Passion in the place of Reason, and being resolv'd that shall govern their Actions and Arguments, neither use their own, nor hearken to other Peoples Reason, any farther than it suits their Humour, Interest, or Party; and these one may observe commonly content themselves with words which have no distinct Ideas to them, though, in other matters, that they come with an unbiass'd Indifferency to, they want not Abilities to talk and hear Reason, where they

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have



*Reasoning.* have no secret Inclination that hinders them from being untractable to it.

3. The third sort is of those who readily and sincerely follow Reason, but for want of having that which one may call *large, sound, round about Sense*, have not a full view of all that relates to the question, and may be of moment to decide it. We are all short sighted, and very often see but one side of a matter; our Views are not extended to all that has a connection with it. From this Defect I think no Man is free. We see but in part, and we know but in part, and therefore 'tis no wonder we conclude not right from our partial Views. This might instruct the proudest Esteemer of his own Parts how useful it is to talk and consult with others, even such as came short of him in Capacity, Quickness and Penetration: For since no one sees all, and we generally have different Prospects of the same thing, according to our different, as I may say, Positions to it, 'tis not incongruous to think, nor beneath any Man to try, whether another may not have notions of things which have 'scaped him, and which his Reason would make use of if they came into his Mind. The Faculty of Reasoning seldom or never deceives those who trust to it; its Consequences from what it builds on are evident and certain, but that which

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it ofteneft, if not only, misleads us in, *is, Reasoning.* that the Principles from which we conclude the Grounds upon which we bottom our Reasoning, are but a part, something is left out which should go into the reckoning to make it just and exact. Here we may imagine a vast and almost infinite Advantage that Angels and separate Spirits may have over us; who in their several degrees of Elevation above us, may be endowed with more comprehensive Faculties, and some of them perhaps have perfect and exact Views of all finite Beings that come under their Consideration, can, as it were, in the twinkling of an Eye, collect together all their scatter'd and almost boundless Relations. A Mind so furnish'd, what reason has it to acquiesce in the certainty of its Conclusions!

In this we may see the reason why some Men of Study and Thought, that reason right, and are Lovers of Truth, do make no great Advances in their Discoveries of it. Error and Truth are uncertainly blended in their Minds; their Decisions are lame and defective, and they are very often mistaken in their Judgments: The reason whereof is, they converse but with one sort of Men, they read but one sort of Books, they will not come in the hearing but of one sort of Notions; the truth is, they can-

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*Reasoning.* ton out to themselves a little *Goshen* in the intellectual World, where Light shines, and, as they conclude, Day blesses them; but the rest of that vast *Expansum* they give up to Night and Darkness, and so avoid coming near it. They have a pretty Traffick with known Correspondents in some little Creek, within that they confine themselves, and are dexterous Managers enough of the Wares and Products of that Corner with which they content themselves, but will not venture out into the great Ocean of Knowledge, to survey the Riches that Nature hath stored other Parts with, no less genuine, no less solid, no less useful, than what has fallen to their lot in the admired Plenty and Sufficiency of their own little Spot, which to them contains whatsoever is good in the Universe. Those who live thus mued up within their own contracted Territories, and will not look abroad beyond the Boundaries that Chance, Conceit, or Laziness has set to their Enquiries, but live separate from the Notions, Discourses and Attainments of the rest of Mankind, may not amiss be represented by the Inhabitants of the *Marian* Islands; which being separate by a large Tract of Sea from all Communion with the habitable Parts of the Earth, thought themselves the only People of the World. And though the straitness of the

Conve-

*Reasoning.* Conveniences of Life amongst them had never reach'd so far as to the use of Fire till the *Spaniards*, not many Years since, in their Voyages from *Acapuleo* to *Manilia* brought it amongst them; yet in the want and ignorance of almost all things, they looked upon themselves even after that the *Spaniards* had brought amongst them the notice of variety of Nations abounding in Sciences, Arts and Conveniences of Life, of which they knew nothing, they looked upon themselves, I say, as the happiest and wisest People of the Universe. But for all that no body, I think, will imagine them deep Naturalists, or solid Metaphysicians; no body will deem the quickest sighted amongst them to have very enlarg'd Views in Ethicks or Politicks, nor can any one allow the most capable amongst them to be advanced so far in his Understanding, as to have any other Knowledge but of the few little things of his and the neighbouring Islands within his Commerce; but far enough from that comprehensive enlargement of Mind which adorns a Soul devoted to Truth, assisted with Letters, and a free Consideration of the several Views and Sentiments of thinking Men of all sides. Let not Men therefore that would have a sight of what every one pretends, to be desirous to have a sight of Truth in its full extent,

*Reasoning.* extent, narrow and blind their own Prospect. Let not Men think there is no Truth but in the Sciences that they study, or the Books that they read. To prejudge other Mens Notions before we have looked into them, is not to shew their Darknes, but to put out our own Eyes. *Fry all things, hold fast that which is good,* is a Divine Rule, coming from the Father of Light and Truth; and 'tis hard to know what other way Men can come at Truth, to lay hold of it, if they do not dig and search for it as for Gold and hid Treasure; but he that does so must have much Earth and Rubbish before he gets the pure Metal; Sand, and Pebbles, and Dross usually lie blended with it, but the Gold is never the less Gold, and will enrich the Man that employs his Pains to seek and separate it. Neither is there any danger he should be deceived by the Mixture. Every Man carries about him a Touchstone, if he will make use of it to distinguish substantial Gold from superficial Glitterings, Truth from Appearances. And indeed the Use and Benefit of this Touchstone, which is natural Reason, is spoil'd and lost only by assumed Prejudices, overweening Presumption, and narrowing our Minds. The want of exercising it in the full extent of things intelligible, is that which weakens and extinguishes this noble Faculty

Faculty in us. Trace it, and see whether *Reasoning.* it be not so. The Day Labourer in a Country Village has commonly but a small pitance of Knowledge, because his Ideas and Notions have been confined to the narrow Bounds of a poor Conversation and Employment: The low Mechanick of a Country Town does somewhat out-do him; Porters and Coblers of great Cities surpass them. A Country Gentleman, who leaving Latin and Learning in the University, removes thence to his Mansion House, and associates with Neighbours of the same strain, who relish nothing but Hunting and a Bottle; with those alone he spends his time, with these alone he converses, and can away with no Company whose Discourse goes beyond what Claret and Dissoluteness inspires, Such a Patriot, formed in this happy way of Improvement, cannot fail, as we see, to give notable Decisions upon the Bench at Quarter Sessions, and eminent Proofs of his Skill in Politicks, when the Strength of his Purse and Party have advanced him to a more conspicuous Station. To such a one truly an ordinary Coffee-house Gleaner of the City is an errant Statesman, and as much superior to, as a Man conversant about *White-ball* and the Court, is to an ordinary Shopkeeper. To carry this a little farther. Here is one muffled up in the Zeal and Infallibility

*Reasoning.*

lity of his own Sect, and will not touch a Book, or enter into Debate with a Person that will question any of those things which to him are Sacred. Another surveys our Differences in Religion, with an equitable and fair Indifference, and so finds probably that none of them are in every thing unexceptionable. These Divisions and Systems were made by Men, and carry the mark of Fallible on them; and in those whom he differs from, and till he open'd his Eyes had a general Prejudice against, he meets with more to be said for a great many things than before he was aware of, or could have imagined. Which of these two now is most likely to judge right in our religious Controversies, and to be most stored with Truth, the Mark all pretend to aim at? All these Men that I have instanced in, thus unequally furnish'd with Truth, and advanced in Knowledge, I suppose of equal natural Parts; all the odds between them has been the different scope that has been given to their Understandings to range in, for the gathering up of Information, and furnishing their Heads with Ideas, Notions and Observations, whereon to employ their Minds, and form their Understandings.

It will possibly be objected who is sufficient for all this? I answer, more than can be imagined. Every one knows what his

his proper business is, and what, according to the Character he makes of himself, the World may justly expect of him; and to answer that, he will find he will have Time and Opportunity enough to furnish himself, if he will not deprive himself by a narrowness of Spirit; of those helps that are at hand. I do not say to be a good Geographer that a Man should visit every Mountain, River, Promontory and Creek upon the Face of the Earth, view the Buildings, and survey the Land every where, as if he were going to make a Purchase. But yet every one must allow that he shall know a Country better that makes often Sallies into it, and traverses it up and down, than he that like a Mill Horse goes still round in the same Tract, or keeps within the narrow Bounds of a Field or two that delight him. He that will enquire out the best Books in every Science, and inform himself of the most material Authors of the several Sects of Philosophy and Religion, will not find it an infinite Work to acquaint himself with the Sentiments of Mankind concerning the most weighty and comprehensive Subjects. Let him exercise the freedom of his Reason and Understanding in such a Latitude as this, and his Mind will be strengthened, his Capacity enlarged, his Faculties improv'd: And the Light which the remote and scatter'd parts

*Reasoning.* parts of Truth will give to one another, will so assist his Judgment, that he will seldom be widely out, or miss giving proof of a clear Head, and a comprehensive Knowledge. At least, this is the only way I know to give the Understanding its due Improvement, to the full extent of its Capacity, and to distinguish the two most different things I know in the World a logical Chicanner from a Man of Reason. Only he that would thus give the Mind its Flight, and send abroad his Enquiries into all Parts after Truth, must be sure to settle in his Head determin'd Ideas of all that he employs his Thoughts about, and never fail to judge himself, and judge unbiassedly of all that he receives from others, either in their Writings or Discourses. Reverence or Prejudice must not be suffered to give Beauty or Deformity to any of their Opinions.

*Of Practice and Habits.* § 4. We are born with Faculties and Powers capable almost of any thing, such at least as would carry us farther than can be easily imagined: But 'tis only the Exercise of those Powers which gives us Ability and Skill in any thing, and leads us towards Perfection.

A middle aged Plough-man will scarce ever be brought to the Carriage and Language of a Gentleman, though his Body be

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as well proportioned, and his Joints as sup-  
ple, and his Natural Parts not any way inferior. The Legs of a Dancing-Master, and the Fingers of a Musician fall at it were naturally without Thought or Pains into regular and admirable motions. Bid them change their Parts, and they will in vain endeavour to produce like motions in the Members not used to them, and it will require length of Time and long Practice to attain but some degrees of a like Ability. What incredible and astonishing Actions do we find Rope-dancers and Tumblers bring their Bodies to, not but that sundry in almost all manual Arts are as wonderful, but I name those which the World takes notice of for such, because on that very account, they give Money to see them. All these admir'd Motions beyond the reach and almost the conception of unpractis'd Spectators, are nothing but the mere effects of Use and Industry in Men, whose Bodies have nothing peculiar in them from those of the amazed lookers on.

As it is in the Body, so it is in the Mind; Practice makes it what it is, and most even of those Excellencies which are look'd on as natural Endowments, will be found when examined into more narrowly, to be the product of Exercise, and to be raised to that pitch only by repeated Actions.

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*Of Practice and Habits.* Some Men are remarked for Pleasantness in Railery; others for apologues and apposite diverting Stories. This is apt to be taken for the effect of pure Nature, and that the rather, because it is not got by Rules, and those who excel in either of them, never purposely set themselves to the study of it as an Art to be learnt. But yet it is true, that at first some lucky Hit which took with some Body, and gain'd him Commendation, encourag'd him to try again, inclin'd his Thoughts and Endeavours that way, till at last he insensibly got a facility in it without perceiving how, and that is attributed wholly to Nature, which was much more the effect of Use and Practice. I do not deny that Natural Disposition may often give the first rise to it; but that never carries a Man far without Use and Exercise, and 'tis Practice alone that brings the powers of the Mind as well as those of the Body to their Perfection. Many a good poetick Vein is buried under a Trade, and never produces any thing for want of improvement. We see the ways of Discourse and Reasoning are very different, even concerning the same matter, at Court and in the University. And he that will go but from *Westminster-Hall* to the *Exchange*, will find a different genius and turn in their ways of talking, and yet one cannot think that all

all whose lot fell in the City were born with different Parts from those who were bred at the University or Inns of Court. *Of Practice and Habits.*

To what purpose all this, but to shew that the difference so observable in Men's Understandings and Parts, does not arise so much from their Natural Faculties as acquired Habits. He would be laughed at that should go about to make a fine Dancer out of a Countrey Hedger, at past Fifty. And he will not have much better success, who shall endeavour at that Age to make a Man Reason well, or Speak handsomely who has never been used to it, tho' you should lay before him a Collection of all the best Precepts of Logick or Oratory. No body is made any thing by hearing of Rules, or laying them up in his Memory; Practice must settle the Habit of doing without reflecting on the Rule, and you may as well hope to make a good Painter or Musician extempore, by a Lecture and Instruction in the Arts of Musick and Painting, as a coherent Thinker, or strict Reasoner by a set of Rules, shewing him wherein right Reasoning consists.

This being so that Defects and Weakness in Mens Understandings, as well as other Faculties, come from want of a right use of their own Minds, I am apt to think the fault is generally mislaid upon

*of Practice and Habits.* Nature, and there is often a Complaint of want of Parts when the fault lies in want of a due improvement of them. We see Men frequently dextrous and sharp enough in making a bargain, who, if you reason with them about matters of Religion appear perfectly stupid.

*Ideas.*

§ 5. I will not here, in what relates to the right Conduct and Improvement of the Understanding, repeat again the getting clear and determin'd *Ideas*, and the employing our Thoughts rather about them, than about Sounds put for them, nor of settling the signification of Words which we use with our selves in the search of Truth, or with others in discoursing about it. Those hindrances of our Understandings in the pursuit of Knowledge, I have sufficiently enlarged upon in another place; so that nothing more needs here to be said of those Matters.

*Principles.*

§ 6. There is another fault that stops or misleads Men in their Knowledge, which I have also spoken something of, but yet is necessary to mention here again, that we may examine it to the bottom, and see the Root it springs from, and that is a Custom of taking up with Principles that are not self-evident, and very often not so much as  
true.

Principles. true. 'Tis not unusual to see Men rest their Opinions upon Foundations that have no more Certainty nor Solidity than the Propositions built on them, and embraced for their sake. Such Foundations are these and the like, *viz.* The Founders or Leaders of my Party are good Men, and therefore their Tenets are true; it is the Opinion of a Sect that is Erroneous, therefore it is false: It hath been long received in the World, therefore it is true; or it is new, and therefore false.

These, and many the like, which are by no means the measures of Truths and Falshood, the generality of Men make the Standards by which they accustom their Understanding to judge. And thus they falling into a habit of determining of Truth and Falshood by such wrong measures, 'tis no wonder they should embrace Error for certainty, and be very positive in things they have no ground for.

There is not any who pretends to the least reason, but when any of these his false Maxims are brought to the test, but must acknowledge them to be fallible, and such as he will not allow in those that differ from him; and yet after he is convinced of this, you shall see him go on in the use of them, and the very next occasion that offers argue again upon the same grounds. Would one not be ready to think  
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*Principles.* that Men are willing to impose upon themselves, and mislead their own Understanding, who conduct them by such wrong Measures, even after they see they cannot be relied on. But yet they will not appear so blameable as may be thought at first sight; for I think there are a great many that argue thus in earnest, and do it not to impose on themselves or others. They are persuaded of what they say, and think there is weight in it, tho' in a like Case they have been convinced there is none; but Men would be intolerable to themselves, and contemptible to others, if they should embrace Opinions without any ground, and hold what they could give no manner of reason for. True or False, Solid or Sandy, the Mind must have some Foundation to rest it self upon, and as I have remark'd in another place, it no sooner entertains any Proposition, but it presently hastens to some Hypothesis to bottom it on, till then it is unquiet and unsettled. So much do our own very Tempers dispose us to a right use of our Understandings if we would follow as we should the inclinations of our Nature.

In some matters of Concernment, especially those of Religion, Men are not permitted to be always wavering and uncertain, they must embrace and profess some

Tenents

Tenents or other; and it would be a shame, *Principles* may a Contradiction too heavy for any ones Mind to lye constantly under, for him to pretend seriously to be persuaded of the truth of any Religion, and yet not to be able to give any reason of one's belief, or to say any thing for his preference of this to any other Opinion; and therefore they must make use of some Principles or other, and those can be no other than such as they have and can manage; and to say they are not in earnest persuaded by them, and do not rest upon those they make use of, is contrary to Experience, and to alledge that they are not misled when we complain they are.

If this be so, it will be urged, why then do they not rather make use of sure and unquestionable Principles, rather than rest on such grounds as may deceive them, and will, as is visible, serve to support Error as well as Truth.

To this I answer, the reason why they do not make use of better and surer Principles, is because they cannot; But this Inability proceeds not from want of Natural Parts (for those few whose Case that is are to be excused) but for want of Use and Exercise. Few Men are from their Youth accustomed to strict Reasoning, and to trace the dependence of any Truth in a long

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train



*Principles.* train of Consequences to its remote Principles, and to observe its Connection; and he that by frequent practice has not been used to this employment of his Understanding, 'tis no more wonder that he should not, when he is grown into Years, be able to bring his Mind to it, than that he should not be on a sudden able to grave or design, dance on the Ropes, or write a good hand who has never practised either of them.

Nay, the most of Men are so wholly strangers to this, that they do not so much as perceive their want of it, they dispatch the ordinary Business of their Callings by rote, as we say, as they have learnt it, and if at any time they miss success, they impute it to any thing rather than want of Thought or Skill, that they conclude (because they know no better) they have in perfection; or if there be any Subject that Interest or Phancy has recommended to their Thoughts, their reasoning about it is still after their own fashion, be it better or worse, it serves their turns, and is the best they are acquainted with; and therefore when they are led by it into Mistakes, and their business succeeds accordingly, they impute it to any cross Accident, or Default of others, rather than to their own want of Understanding; that is, what no body discovers or complains of in himself. Whatsoever made

his

his Business to miscarry, it was not want of right Thought and Judgment in himself: He sees no such defect in himself, but is satisfied that he carries on his Designs well enough by his own reasoning, or at least should have done, had it not been for unlucky Traverses not in his power. Thus being content with this short and very imperfect use of his Understanding, he never troubles himself to seek out Methods of improving his Mind, and lives all his Life without any notion of close Reasoning, in a continued connection of a long train of Consequences from sure Foundations, such as is requisite for the making out, and clearing most of the Speculative Truths most Men own to believe and are most concerned in. Not to mention here what I shall have occasion to insist on by and by more fully, *viz.* that in many Cases 'tis not one series of Consequences will serve the turn, but many different and opposite deductions must be examined and laid together, before a Man can come to make a right judgment of the Point in question. What then can be expected from Men that neither see the want of any such kind of reasoning as this; nor if they do, know they how to set about it, or could perform it. You may as well set a Country Man who scarce knows the Figures, and never cast up a Sum of three parti-

*Principles.* Particulars, to state a Merchants long Account, and find the true balance of it?

What then should be done in the Case? I answer, we should always remember what I said above, that the Faculties of our Souls are improved and made useful to us, just after the same manner as our Bodies are. Would you have a Man Write or Paint, Dance or Fence well, or perform any other manual Operation dextrously and with ease, let him have never so much Vigour and Activity, Suppleness and Address naturally, yet no body expects this from him unless he has been used to it, and has employed Time and Pains in fashioning and forming his Hand or outward Parts to these motions. Just so it is in the Mind, would you have a Man reason well, you must use him to it betimes, exercise his Mind in observing the Connection of Ideas and following them in train. Nothing does this better than Mathematicks, which therefore I think should be taught all those who have the time and opportunity, not so much to make them Mathematicians, as to make them reasonable Creatures; for though we all call our selves so, because we are born to it if we please, yet we may truly say Nature gives us but the Seeds of it; we are born to be, if we please, rational Creatures, but 'tis Use and Exercise only that makes

*Principles.* makes us so, and we are indeed so no farther than industry and application has carried us. And therefore in ways of Reasoning which Men have not been used to, he that will observe the conclusions they take up, must be satisfied they are not at all rational.

This has been the less taken notice of, because every one in his private affairs, uses some sort of Reasoning or other, enough to denominate him reasonable. But the mistake is, that he that is found reasonable in one thing is concluded to be so in all, and to think or say otherwise, is thought so unjust an Affront, and so senseless a Censure, that no body ventures to do it. It looks like the degradation of a Man below the Dignity of his Nature. It is true, that he that reasons well in any one thing, has a Mind naturally capable of reasoning well in others, and to the same degree of strength and clearness, and possibly much greater, had his Understanding been so employed. But 'tis as true, that he who can reason well to Day about one sort of Matters, cannot at all reason to Day about others, though perhaps a Year hence he may. But wherever a Man's rational Faculty fails him, and will not serve him to reason, there we cannot say he is rational

*Principles.* rational, how capable soever he may be by time and exercise to become so.

Try in Men of low and mean Education, who have never elevated their Thoughts above the Spade and the Plough, nor look'd beyond the ordinary drudgery of a Day-Labourer. Take the Thoughts of such an one, used for many Years to one Tract, out of that narrow Compass he has been all his Life confined to, you will find him no more capable of reasoning than almost a perfect Natural. Some one or two Rules on which their Conclusions immediately depend, you will find in most Men have govern'd all their Thoughts; these, true or false, have been the Maxims they have been guided by: Take these from them, and they are perfectly at a loss, their Compass and Pole-Star then are gone, and their Understanding is perfectly at a Nonplus, and therefore they either immediately return to their old Maxims again as the Foundations of all Truth to them, notwithstanding all that can be said to shew their weakness; or if they give them up to their Reasons, they with them give up all Truth and further Enquiry, and think there is no such thing as Certainty. For if you would enlarge their Thoughts, and settle them upon more remote and surer Principles, they either cannot easily apprehend them, or if they

they can, know not what use to make of them; for long deductions from remote Principles, is what they have not been us'd to, and cannot manage.

What then, can grown Men never be improved or enlarg'd in their Understandings? I say not so, but this I think I may say, that it will not be done without Industry and Application, which will require more time and pains than grown Men, settled in their Course of Life, will allow to it, and therefore very seldom is done. And this very Capacity of attaining it by Use and Exercise only, brings us back to that which I laid down before, that it is only Practice that improves our Minds as well as Bodies, and we must expect nothing from our Understandings any farther than they are perfected by Habits.

The *Americans* are not all born with worse Understandings than the *Europeans*, tho' we see none of them have such reaches in the Arts and Sciences. And among the Children of a poor Country-man, the lucky chance of Education and getting into the World, gives one infinitely the superiority in Parts over the rest, who continuing at home, had continued also just of the same size with his Brethren.

He that has to do with young Scholars, especially in Mathematicks, may perceive how

*Principles.* how their Minds open by degrees, and how it is Exercise alone that opens them. Sometimes they will stick a long time at a part of a Demonstration, not for want of Will or Application, but really for want of perceiving the Connection of two Ideas; that, to one whose Understanding is more exercised, is as visible as any thing can be. The same would be with a grown Man beginning to study Mathematicks, the Understanding for want of use, often sticks in very plain way, and he himself that is so puzzled, when he comes to see the Connection, wonders what it was he stuck at in a case so plain.

*Mathematicks.*

§ 7. I have mentioned *Mathematicks* as a way to fettle in the Mind an habit of Reasoning closely and in train; not that I think it necessary that all Men should be deep Mathematicians, but that having got the way of Reasoning, which that study necessarily brings the Mind to, they might be able to transfer it to other parts of Knowledge as they shall have occasion. For in all sorts of Reasoning, every single Argument should be managed as a Mathematical Demonstration, the Connection and dependence of Ideas should be followed till the Mind is brought to the source on which it bottoms, and observes the coherence all along,

along, though in proofs of probability, one such train is not enough to settle the judgment as in demonstrative Knowledge. *Mathematicks.*

Where a truth is made out by one demonstration, there needs no farther Enquiry, but in probabilities where there wants demonstration to establish the truth beyond doubt; there 'tis not enough to trace one Argument to its source, and observe its Strength and Weakness, but all the Arguments, after having been so examined on both sides, must be laid in balance one against another, and upon the whole the Understanding determine its assent.

This is a way of reasoning the Understanding should be accustomed to, which is so different from what the illiterate are used to, that even learned Men oftentimes seem to have very little or no notion of it. Nor is it to be wondered, since the way of disputing in the Schools leads them quite away from it, by insisting on one topical Argument, by the success of which the truth or falshood of the Question is to be determined, and victory adjudg'd to the Opponent or Defendant; which is all one as if one should balance an account by one Summ charged and discharged, when there are an hundred others to be taken into consideration.

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This therefore it would be well if Mens Minds were accustomed to, and that early, that they might not erect their Opinions upon one single view, when so many other are requisite to make up the Account, and must come into the reckoning before a Man can form a right Judgment. This would enlarge their Minds, and give a due freedom to their Understandings, that they might not be led into Error by presumption, Laziness or Precipitancy; for I think no body can approve such a Conduct of the Understanding, as should mislead it from Truth, tho' it be never so much in fashion to make use of it.

To this perhaps it will be objected, that to manage the Understanding as I propose would require every Man to be a Scholar, and to be furnished with all the materials of Knowledge, and exercised in all the ways of Reasoning. To which I answer, that it is a shame for those that have time, and the means to attain Knowledge, to want any helps or assistance for the improvement of their Understandings that are to be got, and to such I would be thought here chiefly to speak. Those methinks, who by the Industry and parts of their Ancestors have been set free from a constant Drudgery to their Backs and their Bellies, should bestow some of their spare  
time

## the UNDERSTANDING.

time on their Heads, and open their Minds by some Tryals and Essays in all the sorts and matters of Reasoning. I have before mentioned *Mathematicks*, wherein *Algebra* gives new helps and views to the Understanding. If I propose these, it is not as I said, to make every Man a thorough Mathematician, or a deep Algebraist; but yet I think the study of them is of infinite use even to grown Men; first by experimentally convincing them, that to make any one reason well, it is not enough to have Parts wherewith he is satisfied, and that serve him well enough in his ordinary course. A Man in those Studies will see, that however good he may think his Understanding, yet in many things, and those very visible, it may fail him. This would take off that Presumption that most Men have of themselves in this part; and they would not be so apt to think their Minds wanted no helps to enlarge them, that there could be nothing added to the Acuteness and Penetration of their Understandings.

Secondly, the Study of *Mathematicks* would shew them the necessity there is in Reasoning, to separate all the distinct Ideas, and see the Habitues that all those concerned in the present enquiry have to one another, and to lay by those which re-

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late not to the Proposition in hand, and wholly to leave them out of the reckoning. This is that, which in other Subjects besides Quantity, is what is absolutely requisite to just Reasoning, though in them it is not so easily observed, nor so carefully practis'd. In those parts of Knowledge where 'tis thought Demonstration has nothing to do, Men reason as it were in the lump; and if upon a summary and confus'd View, or upon a partial Consideration, they can raise the appearance of a Probability, they usually rest content; especially if it be in a Dispute where every little Straw is laid hold on, and every thing that can but be drawn in any way to give colour to the Argument, is advanced with ostentation. But that Mind is not in a posture to find the Truth that does not distinctly take all the parts asunder, and omitting what is not at all to the Point, draw a Conclusion from the result of all the Particulars which any way influence it. There is another no less useful Habit to be got by an Application to Mathematical Demonstrations, and that is of using the Mind to a long train of Consequences; but having mentioned that already, I shall not again here repeat it.

As to Men whose Fortunes and Time is narrower, what may suffice them is not of that

that vast extent as may be imagined, and so comes not within the Objection.

No body is under an Obligation to know every thing. Knowledge and Science in general, is the business only of those who are at Ease and Leisure. Those who have particular Callings ought to understand them; and 'tis no unreasonable Proposal, nor impossible to be compass'd, that they should think and reason right about what is their daily Employment. This one cannot think them incapable of, without leveling them with the Brutes, and charging them with a Stupidity below the rank of rational Creatures.

§ 8. Besides his particular Calling for *Religion* the support of this Life, every one has a concern in a future Life, which he is bound to look after. This engages his Thoughts in *Religion*; and here it mightily lies him upon to understand and reason right. Men therefore cannot be excused from understanding the Words, and framing the general Notions relating to *Religion* right. The one Day of seven, besides other Days of Rest, allows in the Christian World time enough for this (had they no other idle Hours) if they would but make use of these vacancies from their daily Labour, and apply themselves to an improvement

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ment of Knowledge, with as much diligence as they often do to a great many other things that are useles, and had but those that would enter them according to their severall Capacities in a right way to this Knowledge. The Original make of their Minds is like that of other Men, and they would be found not to want Understanding fit to receive the knowledge of *Religion*, if they were a little encouraged and help'd in it as they should be. For there are instances of very mean People, who have rais'd their Minds to a great Sense and Understanding of *Religion*. And though these have not been so frequent as could be wish'd, yet they are enough to clear that Condition of Life from a necessity of gross Ignorance, and to shew that more might be brought to be rational Creatures and Christians (for they can hardly be thought really to be so, who wearing the Name, know not so much as the very Principles of that Religion) if due care were taken of them. For, if I mistake not, the Peasantry lately in *France* (a rank of People under a much heavier pressure of Want and Poverty than the Day-Labourers in *England*) of the Reformed *Religion*, understood it much better, and could say more for it than those of a higher Condition among us.

But

## the UNDERSTANDING.

But if it shall be concluded that the *Religion*.  
meaner sort of People must give themselves up to a brutish Stupidity in the things of their nearest Concernment, which I see no reason for, this excuses not those of a freer Fortune and Education, if they neglect their Understandings, and take no care to imploy them as they ought, and set them right in the knowledge of those things, for which principally they were given them. At least those whose plentiful Fortunes allow them the opportunities and helps of Improvements, are not so few, but that it might be hoped great advancements might be made in Knowledge of all kinds, especially in that of the greatest Concern and largest Views, if Men would make a right use of their Faculties, and study their own Understandings.

§ 9. Outward corporeal Objects that *Ideas*.  
constantly importune our Senses, and captivate our Appetites, fail not to fill our Heads with lively and lasting *Ideas* of that kind. Here the Mind needs not be set upon getting greater store; they offer themselves fast enough, and are usually entertained in such plenty, and lodg'd so carefully, that the Mind wants Room or Attention for others that it has more use and need of. To fit the Understanding there-  
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*Ideas.*

fore for such Reasoning as I have been above speaking of, care should be taken to fill it with moral and more abstract *Ideas*; for these not offering themselves to the Senses, but being to be fram'd to the Understanding, People are generally so neglectful of a Faculty they are apt to think wants nothing, that I fear most Mens Minds are more unfurnished with such *Ideas* than is imagin'd. They often use the Words, and how can they be suspected to want the *Ideas*? What I have said in the Third Book of my Essay, will excuse me from any other Answer to this Question. But to convince People of what moment it is to their Understandings to be furnish'd with such abstract *Ideas* steady and settled in it, give me leave to ask how any one shall be able to know, whether he be oblig'd to be just, if he has not establish'd *Ideas* in his Mind, of Obligation and of Justice, since Knowledge consists in nothing but the perceived Agreement or Disagreement of those *Ideas*; and so of all others, the like which concern our Lives and Manners. And if Men do find a difficulty to see the Agreement or Disagreement of two Angles which lye before their Eyes, unalterable in a Diagram, how utterly impossible will it be to perceive it in *Ideas* that have no other sensible Objects to represent them to the Mind but

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Sounds, with which they have no manner of *Ideas*. Conformity, and therefore had need to be clearly settled in the Mind themselves, if we would make any clear Judgment about them. This therefore is one of the first things the Mind should be employ'd about in the right Conduct of the Understanding, without which it is impossible it should be capable of reasoning right about those Matters. But in these, and all other *Ideas*, care must be taken that they harbour no Inconsistencies, and that they have a real Existence where real Existence is supposed, and are not mere Chimeras with a supposed Existence.

§ 10. Every one is forward to complain *Prejudices* of the *Prejudices* that mislead other Men or Parties, as if he were free, and had none of his own. This being objected on all sides, 'tis agreed, that it is a fault and an hindrance to Knowledge. What now is the Cure? No other but this, that every Man should let alone other's *Prejudices* and examine his own. No body is convinced of his by the Accusation of another, he recriminates by the same Rule and is clear. The only way to remove this great Cause of Ignorance and Error out of the World, is, for every one impartially to examine himself. If others will not deal fairly with

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their



*Prejudices*, their own Minds; does that make my Errors Truths, or ought it to make me in love with them, and willing to impose on my self? If others love Cataracts on their Eyes, should that hinder me from couching of mine as soon as I could? Every one declares against Blindness, and yet who almost is not fond of that which dims his Sight, and keeps the clear Light out of his Mind, which should lead him into Truth and Knowledge? False or doubtful Positions, rely'd upon as unquestionable Maxims, keep those in the dark from Truth, who build on them. Such are usually the *Prejudices* imbibed from Education, Party, Reverence, Fashion, Interest, &c. This is the Mote which every one sees in his Brother's Eye, but never regards the Beam in his own. For who is there almost that is ever brought fairly to examine his own Principles, and see whether they are such as will bear the trial; but yet this should be one of the first things every one should set about, and be scrupulous in, who would rightly conduct his Understanding in the search of Truth and Knowledge.

To those who are willing to get rid of this great hindrance of Knowledge, (for to such only I write,) to those who would shake off this great and dangerous Imposter  
*Prejudice*,

*Prejudice*, who dresses up Falshood in the likeness of Truth, and so dextrously hoodwinks Mens Minds, as to keep them in the dark, with a belief that they are more in the Light than any that do not see with their Eyes, I shall offer this one Mark whereby *Prejudice* may be known. He that is strongly of any Opinion, must suppose (unless he be self-condemned) that his persuasion is built upon good grounds; and that his Assent is no greater than what the Evidence of the Truth he holds forces him to; and that they are Arguments, and not Inclination or Phantasy that make him so confident and positive in his Tenets. Now if after all his profession, he cannot bear any Opposition to his Opinion, if he cannot so much as give a patient Hearing, much less examine and weigh the Arguments on the other side, does he not plainly confess 'tis *Prejudice* governs him? And 'tis not the evidence of Truth, but some lazy Anticipation, some beloved Presumption that he desires to rest undisturbed in. For if what he holds be as he gives out, well fenced with Evidence, and he sees it to be true, what need he fear to put it to the Proof? If his Opinion be settled upon a firm Foundation, if the Arguments that support it, and have obtained his Assent be clear, good and convincing, why should he be shy to have

*Prejudices.* have it tried whether they be proof or not? He whose Assent goes beyond his Evidence, owes this Excess of his Adherence only to *Prejudice*, and does, in effect, own it when he refuses to hear what is offered against it; declaring thereby, that 'tis not Evidence he seeks, but the quiet Enjoyment of the Opinion he is fond of, with a forward Condemnation of all that may stand in opposition to it, unheard and unexamined; which, what is it but *Prejudice*? *Qui equum statuerit parte inaudita altera, etiam si equum statuerit haud equus fuerit.* He that would acquit himself in this Case as a Lover of Truth, not giving way to any Pre-occupation, or Bias that may mislead him, must do two things that are not very common, nor very easy.

*Indifferen-  
cy.*

§ 11. First, he must not be in love with any Opinion, or wish it to be true, till he knows it to be so, and then he will not need to wish it: For nothing that is false can deserve our good Wishes, nor a desire that it should have the place and force of Truth; and yet nothing is more frequent than this. Men are fond of certain Tenets upon no other Evidence but Respect and Custom, and think they must maintain them, or all is gone, though they have never examined the Ground they stand on, nor have  
ever

ever made them out to themselves, or can *Indifferen-  
cy.* make them out to others. We should contend earnestly for the Truth, but we should first be sure that it is Truth, or else we fight against God, who is the God of Truth, and do the Work of the Devil, who is the Father and Propagator of Lies; and our Zeal, though never so warm, will not excuse us; for this is plainly Prejudice.

§ 12. Secondly, He must do that which he *Examine.* will find himself very averse to, as judging the thing unnecessary, or himself incapable of doing of it. He must try whether his Principles be certainly true or not, and how far he may safely rely upon them. This, whether fewer have the Heart or the Skill to do, I shall not determine; but this I am sure, this is that which every one ought to do, who professes to love Truth, and would not impose upon himself; which is a surer way to be made a Fool of than by being exposed to the Sophistry of others. The disposition to put any cheat upon our selves, works constantly, and we are pleased with it, but are impatient of being banter'd or misled by others. The Inability I here speak of, is not any natural Defect that makes Men incapable of examining their own Principles. To such, Rules of conducting their Understandings are useless, and

*Examine.*

and that is the Case of very few. The great number is of those whom the ill habit of never exerting their Thoughts has disabled: The powers of their Minds are starved by disuse, and have lost that Reach and Strength which Nature fitted them to receive from Exercise. Those who are in a Condition to learn the first Rules of plain Arithmetick, and could be brought to cast up an ordinary Summ, are capable of this, if they had but accustomed their Minds to Reasoning: But they that have wholly neglected the Exercise of their Understandings in this way, will be very far at first from being able to do it, and as unfit for it as one unpractised in Figures to cast up a Shop-Book, and perhaps think it as strange to be set about it. And yet it must nevertheless be confess'd to be a wrong use of our Understandings to build our Tenets (in things where we are concern'd to hold the Truth) upon Principles that may lead us into Error. We take our Principles at hazard upon trust, and without ever having examined them, and then believe a whole System, upon a Presumption that they are true and solid; and what is all this but childish, shameful, senseless Credulity.

In these two things, *viz.* an equal Indifferency for all Truth; I mean the receiving

*Examine.*

ing it in the Love of it as Truth, but not loving it for any other reason before we know it to be true; and in the Examination of our Principles, and not receiving any for such, nor building on them 'till we are fully convinced, as rational Creatures, of their Solidity, Truth and Certainty, consists that Freedom of the Understanding which is necessary to a rational Creature, and without which it is not truly an Understanding. 'Tis Conceit, Phansy, Extravagance, any thing rather than Understanding, if it must be under the constraint of receiving and holding Opinions by the Authority of any thing but their own, not phansied but perceived, Evidence. This was rightly called Imposition, and is of all other the worst and most dangerous sort of it. For we impose upon our selves, which is the strongest Imposition of all others; and we impose upon our selves in that part which ought with the greatest care to be kept free from all Imposition. The World is apt to cast great Blame on those who have an Indifferency for Opinions, especially in Religion. I fear this is the Foundation of great Error and worse Consequences. To be indifferent which of two Opinions is true, is the right temper of the Mind that preserves it from being imposed on, and disposes it to examine with that indifferency,

*Examine.*

ency, 'till it has done its best to find the Truth, and this is the only direct and safe way to it. But to be indifferent whether we imbrace Falshood for Truth or no, is the great road to Error. Those who are not indifferent which Opinion is true, are guilty of this; they suppose, without examining, that what they hold is true, and then think they ought to be zealous for it. Those, 'tis plain by their Warmth and Eagerness, are not indifferent for their own Opinions, but methinks are very indifferent whether they be true or false, since they cannot endure to have any Doubts raised or Objections made against them; and 'tis visible they never have made any themselves, and so never having examined them, know not, nor are concern'd, as they should be, to know whether they be true or false.

These are the common and most general Miscarriages which I think Men should avoid or rectifie in a right Conduct of their Understandings, and should be particularly taken care of in Education. The business whereof in respect of Knowledge, is not, as I think, to perfect a Learner in all or any one of the Sciences, but to give his Mind that Freedom, that Disposition, and those Habits that may enable him to attain any part of Knowledge he shall apply himself

to,

to, or stand in need of in the future Course *Examine.* of his Life.

This, and this only is well principling, and not the instilling a Reverence and Veneration for certain Dogmas under the specious Title of Principles, which are often so remote from that Truth and Evidence which belongs to Principles, that they ought to be rejected as false and erroneous, and is often the cause, to Men so educated, when they come abroad into the World, and find they cannot maintain the Principles so taken up and rested in, to cast off all Principles and turn perfect Scepticks, regardless of Knowledge and Virtue.

There are several Weaknesses and Defects in the Understanding, either from the the natural Temper of the Mind, or ill Habits taken up, which hinder it in its progress to Knowledge. Of these there are as many possibly to be found, if the Mind were thoroughly study'd, as there are Diseases of the Body, each whereof clogs and disables the Understanding to some degree; and therefore deserve to be look'd after and cured. I shall set down some few to excite Men, especially those who make Knowledge their business, to look into themselves, and observe whether they do not indulge some Weakness, allow some Miscarriages in the management of their intellectual

*Examine.*

Intellectual Faculty, which is prejudicial to them in the search of Truth.

*Observation.*

§ 13. Particular matters of Fact are the undoubted Foundations on which our civil and natural Knowledge is built: The benefit the Understanding makes of them is to draw from them Conclusions, which may be as standing Rules of Knowledge, and consequently of Practice. The Mind often makes not that Benefit it should of the information it receives from the accounts of Civil or Natural Historians, in being too forward, or too slow in making Observations on the particular Facts recorded in them.

There are those who are very assiduous in reading, and yet do not much advance their Knowledge by it. They are delighted with the Stories that are told, and perhaps can tell them again, for they make all they read nothing but History to themselves; but not reflecting on it, not making to themselves Observations from what they read, they are very little improved by all that croud of Particulars that either pass through, or lodge themselves in their Understandings. They dream on in a constant Course of reading and cramming themselves, but not digesting any thing, it produces nothing but an heap of Crudities.

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If their Memories retain well, one may *Observation.* say they have the Materials of Knowledge, but like those for Building, they are of no advantage, if there be no other use made of them but to let them lie heaped up together. Opposite to these there are others who lose the Improvement they should make of matters of Fact by a quite contrary Conduct. They are apt to draw general Conclusions, and raise Axioms from every particular they meet with. These make as little true benefit of History as the other, nay, being of forward and active Spirits receive more harm by it; it being of worse Consequence to steer one's Thoughts by a wrong Rule, than to have none at all, Error doing to busy Men much more harm, than Ignorance to the slow and sluggish. Between these, those seem to do best who taking material and useful hints, sometimes from single matters of Fact, carry them in their Minds to be judg'd of, by what they shall find in History to confirm or reverse these imperfect Observations; which may be establish'd into Rules fit to be rely'd on, when they are justify'd by a sufficient and wary Induction of Particulars. He that makes no such Reflections on what he reads, only loads his Mind with a Rapsody of Tales fit in Winter Nights for the Entertainment of others; and he that will im-

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prove

Observation.

prove every matter of Fact into a Maxim will abound in contrary Observations, that can be of no other use but to perplex and pudden him if he compares them; or else to misguide him, if he gives himself up to the Authority of that, which for its Novelty, or for some other Phanfy, best pleases him.

Bias.

§ 13. Next to these we may place those who suffer their own natural Tempers and Passions they are possess'd with to influence their Judgments, especially of Men and Things that may any way relate to their present Circumstances and Interest. Truth is all simple, all pure, will bear no mixture of any thing else with it. 'Tis rigid and inflexible to any bye Interests; and should the Understanding be whose Use and Excellency lies in conforming itself to it. To think of every thing just as it is in it self, is the proper business of the Understanding, though it be not that which Men always employ it to. This all Men at first hearing, allow is the right use every one should make of his Understanding. No body will be at such an open defiance with common Sense, as to profess that we should not endeavour to know, and think of things as they are in themselves, and yet there is nothing more frequent than to do the contrary; and Men are apt to excuse

excuse themselves, and think they have reason to do so, if they have but a pretence that it is for God, or a good Cause, that is, in effect for Themselves, their own Persuasion, or Party: For to those in their turns the several Sects of Men, especially in matters of Religion, entitle God and a good Cause. But God requires not Men to wrong or misuse their Faculties for him, nor to lie to others or themselves for his sake; which they purposely do who will not suffer their Understandings to have right Conceptions of the things proposed to them, and designedly restrain themselves from having just Thoughts of every thing, as far as they are concern'd to enquire. And as for a good Cause, that needs not such ill Helps; if it be good, Truth will support it, and it has no need of Fallacy or Falshood.

§ 14. Very much of kin to this is the hunting after Arguments to make good one side of a Question, and wholly to neglect and refuse those which favour the other side. What is this but wilfully to misguide the Understanding, and is so far from giving Truth its due value, that it wholly debases it: Espouse Opinions that best comport with their Power, Profit, or Credit, and then seek Arguments to support

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them

*Arguments.* them. Truth light upon this way, is of no more avail to us than Error; for what is so taken up by us, may be false as well as true, and he has not done his Duty who has thus stumbled upon Truth in his way to Preferment.

There is another, but more innocent way of collecting Arguments, very familiar among Bookish Men, which is to furnish themselves with the Arguments they meet with Pro and Con in the Questions they study. This helps them not to judge right, nor argue strongly, but only to talk copiously on either side, without being steady and settled in their own Judgments: For such Arguments gather'd from other Men's Thoughts, floating only in the Memory, are there ready indeed to supply copious Talk with some appearance of Reason, but are far from helping us to judge right. Such variety of Arguments only distract the Understanding that relies on them, unless it has gone farther than such a superficial way of examining; this is to quit Truth for Appearance, only to serve our Vanity. The sure and only way to get true Knowledge, is to form in our Minds clear settled Notions of things, with names annexed to those determin'd Ideas. These we are to consider, and with their several Relations and Habitues, and not amuse

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our selves with floating Names, and Words *Arguments.* of indetermin'd signification, which we can use in several Senses to serve a turn. 'Tis in the perception of the Habitues and Respects our Ideas have one to another, that real Knowledge consists; and when a Man once perceives how far they agree or disagree one with another, he will be able to judge of what other People say, and will not need to be led by the Arguments of others, which are many of them nothing but plausible Sophistry. This will teach him to state the Question right, and see whereon it turns; and thus he will stand upon his own Legs, and know by his own Understanding. Whereas by collecting and learning Arguments by heart, he will be but a retainer to others; and when any one questions the Foundations they are built upon, he will be at a Nonplus, and be fain to give up his implicit Knowledge.

§ 15. Labour for Labour sake is against *Haste.* Nature. The Understanding, as well as all the other Faculties, chooses always the shortest way to its end, would presently obtain the Knowledge it is about, and then set upon some new Enquiry. But this whether Laziness or Haste often misleads it and makes it content it self with improper ways of search, and such as will not serve the

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turn. Sometimes it rests upon Testimony, when Testimony of right has nothing to do, because it is easier to believe than to be scientifically instructed. Sometimes it contents it self with one Argument, and rests satisfied with that, as it were a Demonstration; whereas the thing under proof is not capable of Demonstration, and therefore must be submitted to the trial of Probabilities, and all the material Arguments Pro and Con be examined and brought to a Balance. In some Cases the Mind is determin'd by probable Topicks in Enquiries where Demonstration may be had. All these, and several others, which Laziness, Impatience, Custom, and want of Use and Attention lead Men into, are misapplications of the Understanding in the search of Truth. In every Question the Nature and Manner of the proof it is capable of should first be consider'd to make our Enquiry such as it should be. This would save a great deal of frequently misemploy'd Pains, and lead us sooner to that discovery and possession of Truth we are capable of. The multiplying variety of Arguments, especially frivolous ones, such as are all that are meerly verbal, is not only lost labour, but cumpers the Memory to no purpose, and serves only to hinder it from seizing and holding of the Truth in all those Cases which

which are capable of Demonstration. In *Haste.* such a way of proof the Truth and Certainty is seen, and the Mind fully possesses it self of it; when in the other way of assent it only hovers about it, is amused with Uncertainties. In this superficial way indeed the Mind is capable of more variety of plausible Talk, but is not enlarged as it should be in its Knowledge. 'Tis to this same Haste and Impatience of the Mind also, that a not due tracing of the Arguments to their true Foundation, is owing; Men see a little, presume a great deal, and so jump to the Conclusion. This is a short way to Phansie and Conceit, and (if firmly imbrac'd) to Opiniatry, but is certainly the farthest way about to Knowledge. For he that will know, must by the connection of the Proofs, see the Truth, and the ground it stands on; and therefore, if he has for haste skipt over what he should have examin'd, he must begin and go over all again, or else he will never come to Knowledge.

§ 16. Another Fault of as ill Consequence as this, which proceeds also from Laziness with a mixture of Vanity, is the skipping from one sort of Knowledge to another. Some Men's Tempers are quickly weary of any one thing. Constancy and Assiduity is what they cannot bear:



*Desultory.* The same Study long continued in, is as intolerable to them, as the appearing long in the same Cloths or Fashion is to a Court Lady,

*Smattering.* § 17. Others, that they may seem universally knowing, get a little smattering in every thing. Both these may fill their Heads with superficial Notions of things, but are very much out of the way of attaining Truth or Knowledge.

*Universal.* § 18. I do not here speak against the taking a taste of every sort of Knowledge; it is certainly very useful and necessary to form the Mind, but then it must be done in a different way, and to a different end. Not for Talk and Vanity to fill the Head with Shreds of all kinds, that he who is possess'd of such a Frippery, may be able to match the Discourses of all he shall meet with, as if nothing could come amiss to him; and his Head was so well a stor'd Magazine, that nothing could be propos'd which he was not Master of, and was readily furnish'd to entertain any one on. This is an Excellency indeed, and a great one too, to have a real and true Knowledge in all or most of the Objects of Contemplation. But 'tis what the Mind of one and the same Man can hardly attain unto; and the instances are so few of those who have in any measure approach'd towards

towards it, that I know not whether they *Universal* are to be propos'd as examples in the ordinary Conduct of the Understanding. For a Man to understand fully the business of his particular Calling in the Commonwealth, and of Religion, which is his Calling as he is a Man in the World, is usually enough to take up his whole time; and there are few that inform themselves in these, which is every Man's proper and peculiar Business, so to the bottom as they should do. But though this be so, and there are very few Men that extend their Thoughts towards universal Knowledge; yet I do not doubt but if the right way were taken, and the methods of Enquiry were order'd as they should be, Men of little Business and great Leisure might go a great deal farther in it than is usually done. To return to the business in hand, the End and Use of a little insight in those parts of Knowledge, which are not a Man's proper Business, is to accustom our Minds to all sorts of Ideas, and the proper ways of examining their Habitudes and Relations. This gives the Mind a freedom, and the exercising the Understanding in the several ways of Enquiry and Reasoning which the most skilful have made use of teaches the Mind Sagacity and Wariness, and a suppleness to apply it self more closely and dexterously to

*Universality.* to the Bents and Turns of the matter in all its re-searches. Besides this universal taste of all the Sciences, with an indifferency before the Mind is possess'd with any one in particular, and grown into love and admiration of what is made its darling, will prevent another Evil very commonly to be observ'd in those who have from the beginning been season'd only by one part of Knowledge. Let a Man be given up to the Contemplation of one sort of Knowledge, and that will become every thing. The Mind will take such a tincture from a familiarity with that Object, that every thing else, how remote soever, will be brought under the same view. A Metaphysician will bring Plowing and Gardening immediately to abstract Notions, the History of Nature shall signify nothing to him. An Alchymist, on the contrary, shall reduce Divinity to the Maxims of his Laboratory, explain Morality by *Sal, Sulphur* and *Mercury*, and allegorize the Scripture it self, and the sacred Mysteries thereof, into the Philosopher's Stone. And I heard once a Man who had a more than ordinary excellency in Musick, seriously accommodate *Moses* seven Days of the first Week to the Notes of Musick, as if from thence had been taken the Measure and Method of the Creation. 'Tis of no small Consequence to

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keep the Mind from such a possession, which I think is best done by giving it a fair and equal view of the whole intellectual World, wherein it may see the Order, Rank, and Beauty of the whole, and give a just allowance to the distinct Provinces of the several Sciences in the due Order and Usefulness of of each of them. *Universality.*

If this be that which old Men will not think necessary, nor be easily brought to; 'tis fit at least that it should be practis'd in the breeding of the young. The business of Education, as I have already observ'd, is not, as I think, to make them perfect in any one of the Sciences, but so to open and dispose their Minds as may best make them capable of any, when they shall apply themselves to it. If Men are for a long time accustom'd only to one sort or method of thoughts, their Minds grow stiff in it, and do not readily turn to another. 'Tis therefore to give them this freedom, that I think they should be made look into all sorts of Knowledge, and exercise their Understandings in so wide a variety and stock of Knowledge. But I do not propose it as a variety and stock of Knowledge, but a variety and freedom of thinking, as an increase of the Powers and Activity of the Mind not as an enlargement of its Possessions.

§ 17. This

*Reading.*

§ 19. This is that which I think great Readers are apt to be mistaken in. Those who have read of every thing, are thought to understand every thing too; but it is not always so. Reading furnishes the Mind only with Materials of Knowledge; 'tis Thinking makes what we read ours. We are of the ruminating kind, and 'tis not enough to cram our selves with a great load of Collections, unless we chew them over again, they will not give us Strength and Nourishment. There are indeed in some Writers visible instances of deep Thought, close and acute Reasoning, and Ideas well pursued. The Light these would give, would be of great use, if their Readers would observe and imitate them; all the rest at best are but Particulars fit to be turned into Knowledge; but that can be done only by our own Meditation, and examining the Reach, Force and Coherence of what is said; and then as far as we apprehend and see the connection of Ideas, so far it is ours; without that it is but so much loose matter floating in our Brain. The Memory may be stor'd, but the Judgment is little better, and the stock of Knowledge not increased by being able to repeat what others have said, or produce the Arguments we have found in them. Such a Knowledge as this is but Knowledge by hear-  
say,

say, and the ostentation of it is at best but *Reading.* talking by roat, and very often upon weak and wrong Principles. For all that is to be found in Books, is not built upon true Foundations, nor always rightly deduc'd from the Principles it is pretended to be built on. Such an Examen as is requisite to discover that, every Reader's mind is not forward to make; especially in those who have given themselves up to a Party, and only hunt for what they can scrape together, that may favour and support the Tenets of it. Such Men wilfully exclude themselves from Truth, and from all true benefit to be received by Reading. Others of more indifferency often want attention and industry. The Mind is backward in it self to be at the pains to trace every Argument to its Original, and to see upon what Basis it stands, and how firmly; but yet it is this that gives so much the advantage to one Man more than another in Reading. The Mind should, by severe Rules, be tied down to this at first uneasy Task, Use and Exercise will give it Facility. So that those who are accusom'd to it, readily, as it were with one cast of the Eye, take a view of the Argument, and presently, in most cases, see where it bottoms. Those who have got this Faculty, one may say, have got the true Key of Books, and  
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Reading.

the clue to lead them through the mizmaze of variety of Opinions and Authors to Truth and Certainty. This young beginners should be enter'd in, and shew'd the use of, that they might profit by their Reading. Those who are Strangers to it, will be apt to think it too great a clog in the way of Men's Studies, and they will suspect they shall make but small progress, if, in the Books they read, they must stand to examine and unravel every Argument, and follow it step by step up to its Original.

I answer, this is a good Objection, and ought to weigh with those whose Reading is design'd for much Talk and little Knowledge, and I have nothing to say to it. But I am here enquiring into the Conduct of the Understanding in its progress towards Knowledge; and to those who aim at that, I may say, that he who fair and softly goes steadily forward in a course that points right, will sooner be at his Journey's end, than he that runs after every one he meets, though he gallop all day full speed.

To which let me add, that this way of thinking on, and profiting by what we read, will be a clog and rub to any one only in the beginning; when Custom and Exercise has made it familiar, it will be dispatched in most occasions, without resting or interruption in the course of our Reading.

ding. The motions and views of a Mind <sup>Reading.</sup> exercis'd that way, are wonderfully quick; and a Man us'd to such sort of Reflections, sees as much at one glimpse as would require a long Discourse to lay before another, and make out in an entire and gradual deduction. Besides, that when the first Difficulties are over, the Delight and sensible Advantage it brings, mightily encourages and enlivens the Mind in Reading, which without this is very improperly called Study.

§ 20. As an help to this, I think it may be propos'd, that for the saving the long <sup>Intermedi-  
ate Princi-  
ples.</sup> progression of the Thoughts to remote and first Principles in every case, the Mind should provide it self several Stages; that is to say, intermediate Principles, which it might have recourse to in the examining those Positions that come in its way. These, though they are not self-evident Principles, yet if they have been made out from them by a wary and unquestionable deduction, may be depended on as certain and infallible Truths, and serve as unquestionable Truths to prove other Points depending on them by a nearer and shorter View than remote and general Maxims. These may serve as Land-marks to shew what lies in the direct way of Truth, or is quite besides.

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fides it. And thus Mathematicians do, who do not in every new Problem run it back to the first Axioms, through all the whole train of intermediate Propositions. Certain Theorems that they have settled to themselves upon sure Demonstration, serve to resolve to them multitudes of Propositions which depend on them, and are as firmly made out from thence, as if the Mind went afresh over every Link of the whole Chain that tie them to first self-evident Principles. Only in other Sciences great care is to be taken that they establish those intermediate Principles, with as much Caution, Exactness and Indifferency as Mathematicians use in the settling any of their great Theorems. When this is not done, but Men take up the Principles in this or that Science upon Credit, Inclination, Interest, &c. in haste without due Examination, and most unquestionable Proof, they lay a Trap for themselves, and as much as in them lies captivate their Understandings to Mistake, Falshood and Error.

§ 21. As there is a Partiality to Opinions, which, as we have already observ'd, is apt to mislead the Understanding; so there is often a Partiality to Studies, which is prejudicial also to Knowledge and Improvement. Those Sciences which Men are particularly

ticularly vers'd in, they are apt to value *Partiality* and extol, as if that part of Knowledge which every one has acquainted himself with, were that alone which was worth the having, and all the rest were idle, and empty Amusements, comparatively of no Use or Importance. This is the effect of Ignorance and not Knowledge, the being vainly puffed up with a Flatulency, arising from a weak and narrow Comprehension. 'Tis not amiss that every one should relish the Science that he has made his peculiar Study; a view of its Beauties, and a sense of its Usefulness, carries a Man on with the more delight and warmth in the pursuit and improvement of it. But the contempt of all other Knowledge, as if it were nothing in comparison of Law or Physick, of Astronomy or Chymistry, or perhaps some yet meaner part of Knowledge, wherein I have got some smattering, or am somewhat advanced, is not only the mark of a vain or little Mind, but does this prejudice in the Conduct of the Understanding, that it coops it up within narrow Bounds, and hinders it from looking abroad into other Provinces of the intellectual World, more beautiful possibly, and more fruitful than that which it had till then labour'd in; wherein it might find, besides new Knowledge, ways or hints whereby it

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*Partiality.* might be inabled the better to cultivate its own.

*Theology.*

§ 22. There is indeed one Science (as they are now distinguish'd) incomparably above all the rest, where it is not by Corruption narrow'd into a Trade or Faction, for mean or ill Ends, and secular Interests; I mean Theology, which containing the Knowledge of God and his Creatures, our Duty to him and our fellow Creatures, and a view of our present and future State, is the Comprehension of all other Knowledge directed to its true end; *i. e.* the Honour and Veneration of the Creator, and the Happiness of Mankind. This is that noble Study which is every Man's Duty, and every one that can be call'd a rational Creature is capable of. The Works of Nature, and the Words of Revelation, display it to Mankind in Characters so large and visible, that those who are not quite blind may in them read, and see the first Principles and most necessary Parts of it; and from thence, as they have Time and Industry, may be inabled to go on to the more abstruse parts of it, and penetrate into those infinite depths fill'd with the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge. This is that Science which would truly enlarge Men's Minds, were it study'd, or permitted to be study'd every where

where with that Freedom, love of Truth *Theology.* and Charity which it teaches, and were not made, contrary to its Nature, the occasion of Strife, Faction, Malignity, and narrow Impositions. I shall say no more here of this, but that it is undoubtedly a wrong use of my Understanding, to make it the Rule and Measure of another Man's; a use which it is neither fit for nor capable of.

§ 23. This Partiality where it is not permit- *Partiality*  
ted an Authority to render all other Studies insignificant or contemptible, is often indulg'd so far as to be rely'd upon, and made use of in other parts of Knowledge, to which it does not at all belong, and wherewith it has no manner of Affinity. Some Men have so used their Heads to Mathematical Figures; that giving a preference to the Methods of that Science, they introduce Lines and Diagrams into their Study of Divinity, or Politick Enquiries, as if nothing could be known without them; and others accusom'd to retir'd Speculations, run natural Philosophy into Metaphysical Notions; and the abstract generalities of Logick; and how often may one meet with Religion and Morality treated of in the terms of the Laboratory, and thought to be improv'd by the Methods and Notions of Chymistry. But he that will take  
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*Partiality.* care of the Conduct of his Understanding, to direct it right to the knowledge of things, must avoid those undue Mixtures, and not by a fondness for what he has found useful and necessary in one, transfer it to another Science, where it serves only to perplex and confound the Understanding. It is a certain truth, that *res nolunt male administrari,* 'tis no less certain *res nolunt male intelligi.* Things themselves are to be consider'd as they are in themselves, and then they will shew us in what way they are to be understood. For to have right Conceptions about them, we must bring our Understandings to the inflexible Natures, and unalterable Relations of things, and not endeavour to bring things to any præ-conceiv'd Notions of our own.

There is another Partiality very commonly observable in Men of Study, no less prejudicial nor ridiculous than the former; and that is a phantastical and wild attributing all Knowledge to the Ancients alone, or to the Moderns. This raving upon Antiquity in matter of Poetry, *Horace* has wittily describ'd and expos'd in one of his Satyrs. The same sort of Madness may be found in reference to all the other Sciences. Some will not admit an Opinion not Authoriz'd by Men of old, who were then all Giants in Knowledge. Nothing is to be put into the Treasury of Truth or Knowledge,

ledge, which has not the stamp of *Greece Partiality.* or *Rome* upon it; and since their Days will scarce allow that Men have been able to see, think or write. Others with a like Extravagancy, contemn all that the Antients have left us, and being taken with the Modern Inventions and Discoveries, lay by all that went before, as if whatever is call'd old must have the decay of Time upon it, and Truth too were liable to Mould and Rottenness. Men, I think, have been much the same for natural Indowments in all times. Fashion, Discipline and Education, have put eminent Differences in the Ages of several Countries, and made one Generation much differ from another in Arts and Sciences: But Truth is always the same; Time alters it not, nor is it the better or worse for being of Antient or Modern Tradition. Many were eminent in former Ages of the World for their discovery and delivery of it; but though the Knowledge they have left us be worth our Study, yet they exhausted not all its Treasure; they left a great deal for the Industry and Sagacity of after Ages, and so shall we. That was once new to them which any one now receives with veneration for its Antiquity; nor was it the worse for appearing as a Novelty, and that which is now imbrac'd for its Newness, will, to Posterity, be old, but not

*Partiality.* not thereby be less true or less genuine. There is no occasion on this account to oppose the Ancients and the Moderns to one another, or to be squeamish on either side. He that wisely conducts his Mind in the pursuit of Knowledge, will gather what Lights, and get what Helps he can from either of them, from whom they are best to be had, without adoring the Errors, or rejecting the Truths which he may find mingled in them.

Another Partiality may be observ'd, in some to vulgar, in others to heterodox Tenets: Some are apt to conclude, that what is the common Opinion cannot but be true; so many Mens Eyes they think cannot but see right; so many Mens Understandings of all sorts cannot be deceiv'd, and therefore will not venture to look beyond the receiv'd notions of the Place and Age, nor have so presumptuous a Thought as to be wiser than their Neighbours. They are content to go with the Crowd, and so go easily, which they think is going right, or at least serves them as well. But however, *vox populi vox Dei* has prevail'd as a Maxime, yet I do not remember wherever God deliver'd his Oracles by the Multitude, or Nature Truths by the Herd. On the other side, some fly all common Opinions as either false or frivolous. The Title of many-

many-headed Beast is a sufficient Reason *Partiality.* to them to conclude, that no Truths of Weight or Consequence can be lodg'd there. Vulgar Opinions are suited to vulgar Capacities, and adapted to the ends of those that govern. He that will know the Truth of things, must leave the common and beaten Tract, which none but weak and servil Minds are satisfy'd to trudge along continually in. Such nice Palates relish nothing but strange Notions quite out of the way: Whatever is commonly receiv'd, has the mark of the Beast on it; and they think it a lessening to them to hearken to it, or receive it; their Mind runs only after Paradoxes; these they seek, these they imbrace, these alone they vent, and so as they think, distinguish themselves from the Vulgar. But common or uncommon are not the marks to distinguish Truth or Falshood, and therefore should not be any bias to us in our Enquiries. We should not judge of things by Mens Opinions, but of Opinions by things. The Multitude reason but ill, and therefore may be well suspected, and cannot be rely'd on, nor should be followed as a sure Guide; but Philosophers who have quitted the Orthodoxy of the Community, and the popular Doctrines of their Countries have fallen into as extravagant and as absur'd Opinions



*Partiality.* nions as ever common reception countenanced. 'Twould be madness to refuse to breath the common Air, or quench one's Thirst with Water, because the Rabble use them to these Purposes; and if there are Conveniencies of Life which common use reaches not, 'tis not reason to reject them, because they are not grown into the ordinary Fashion of the Country, and every Villager doth not know them.

Truth, whether in or out of Fashion, is the Measure of Knowledge, and the Business of the Understanding; whatsoever is besides that, however Authoriz'd by Consent, or recommended by Rarity, is nothing but Ignorance, or something worse.

Another sort of Partiality there is, whereby Men impose upon themselves, and by it make their reading little useful to themselves; I mean the making use of the Opinions of Writers, and laying stress upon their Authorities, wherever they find them to favour their own Opinions.

There is nothing almost has done more harm to Men dedicated to Letters, than giving the name of Study to Reading, and making a Man of great Reading to be the same with a Man of great Knowledge, or at least to be a Title of Honour. All that can be recorded in Writing, are only Facts or Reasonings. Facts are of three sorts;

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1. Meerly of Natural Agents, observ-*Partiality.* able in the ordinary Operations of Bodys one upon another, whether in the visible Course of things left to themselves, or in Experiments made by Men, applying Agents and Patients to one another, after a peculiar and artificial manner.

2. Of voluntary Agents, more especially the Actions of Men in Society, which makes Civil and Moral History.

3. Of Opinions.

In these three consists, as it seems to me, that which commonly has the name of Learning; to which perhaps some may add a distinct Head of Critical Writings, which indeed at bottom is nothing but matter of Fact, and resolves it self into this, that such a Man, or set of Men, used such a Word or Phrase in such a Sense, *i. e.* that they made such Sounds the Marks of such Ideas.

Under Reasonings I comprehend all the Discoveries of general Truths made by human Reason, whether found by Intuition, Demonstration, or probable Deductions. And this is that which is, if not alone Knowledge, (because the Truth or Probability of particular Propositions may be known too) yet is, as may be suppos'd, most properly the business of those who pretend to improve their Understandings, and

*Partiality.* and make themselves knowing by Reading.

Books and Reading are look'd upon to be the great Helps of the Understanding, and Instruments of Knowledge, as it must be allowed that they are; and yet I beg leave to question whether these do not prove an hindrance to many, and keep several bookish Men from attaining to solid and true Knowledge. This, I think, I may be permitted to say, that there is no part where in the Understanding needs a more careful and wary Conduct, than in the use of Books; without which they will prove rather innocent Amusements than profitable Employments of our Time, and bring but small additions to our Knowledge.

There is not seldom to be found even amongst those who aim at Knowledge, who with an unwearied Industry, employ their whole Time in Books, who scarce allow themselves time to eat or sleep, but read, and read, and read on, but yet make no great Advances in real Knowledge, tho' there be no defect in their intellectual Faculties, to which their little progress can be imputed. The mistake here is, that it is usually suppos'd, that by reading, the Author's Knowledge is transfus'd into the Reader's Understanding; and so it is, but not by bare reading, but by reading and understanding what he writ. Whereby I mean, not harely comprehending what is affirmed

affirmed or denied in each Proposition (tho' *Partiality.* that great Readers do not always think themselves concern'd precisely to do) but to see and follow the train of his Reasonings, observe the Strength and Clearness of their Connection, and examine upon what they bottom. Without this a Man may read the Discourses of a very rational Author, writ in a Language and in Propositions that he very well understands, and yet acquire not one jot of his Knowledge; which consisting only in the perceived, certain, or probable Connection of the Ideas made use of in his Reasonings, the Reader's Knowledge is no farther encreas'd, than he perceives that, so much as he sees of this Connection, so much he knows of the Truth or Probability of that Author's Opinions.

All that he relies on without this Perception, he takes upon trust upon the Author's Credit, without any knowledge of it at all. This makes me not at all wonder to see some Men so abound in Citations, and build so much upon Authorities, it being the sole Foundation on which they bottom most of their own Tenets; so that in effect they have but a second Hand or implicate Knowledge, *i. e.* are in the right if such an one from whom they borrowed it, were in the right in that Opinion which they took from him, which indeed is no Knowledge at all.  
Writers

*Partiality.* Writers of this or former Ages may be good Witnesses of matters of Fact which they deliver, which we may do well to take upon their Authority; but their Credit can go no farther than this, it cannot at all affect the Truth and Falshood of Opinions, which have no other sort of Trial by Reason and Proof which they themselves made use of to make themselves knowing, and so must others too that will partake in their Knowledge. Indeed 'tis an advantage that they have been at the pains to find out the Proofs, and lay them in that order that may shew the Truth or Probability of their Conclusions; and for this we owe them great acknowledgements for saving us the pains in searching out those Proofs which they have collected for us, and which possibly, after all our pains, we might not have found, nor been able to have set them in so good a Light as that which they left them us in. Upon this account we are mightily behold- ing to judicious Writers of all Ages for those Discoveries and Discourses they have left behind them for our Instruction, if we know how to make a right use of them; which is not to run them over in an hasty perusal, and perhaps lodge their Opinions, or some remarkable Passages in our Memories, but to enter into their Reasonings, examine their Proofs, and then judge of the Truth  
or

or Falshood, Probability or Improbability of *Partiality* what they advance; not by any Opinion we have entertain'd of the Author, but by the Evidence he produces, and the Conviction he affords us, drawn from things themselves. Knowing is Seeing, and if it be so, it is madness to persuade our selves that we do so by another Man's Eyes, let him use never so many Words to tell us, that what he asserts is very visible. 'Till we our selves see it with our own Eyes, and perceive it by our own Understandings, we are as much in the Dark, and as void of Knowledge as before, let us believe any learned Author as much as we will.

*Euclid* and *Archimedes* are allowed to be knowing, and to have demonstrated what they say; and yet whoever shall read over their Writings without perceiving the Connection of their Proofs, and seeing what they shew, though he may understand all their Words, yet he is not the more knowing: He may Believe indeed, but does not know what they say, and so is not advanced one jot in Mathematical Knowledge by all his reading of those approv'd Mathematicians.

§ 24. The eagerness and strong bent of *Haste.* the Mind after Knowledge, if not warily regulated, is often an hindrance to it. It  
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still presses into farther Discoveries and new Objects, and catches at the variety of Knowledge, and therefore often stays not long enough on what is before it, to look into it as it should for Haste, to pursue what is yet out of Sight. He that rides Post through a Country, may be able, from the transient View, to tell how in general the Parts lie, and may be able to give some loose Description of here a Mountain, and there a Plain, here a Morass, and there a River; Woodland in one part, and Savanas in another. Such superficial Ideas and Observations as these he may collect in Galloping over it. But the more useful Observations of the Soil, Plants, Animals and Inhabitants, with their several Sorts and Properties, must necessarily scape him; and 'tis seldom Men ever discover the rich Mines, without some digging. Nature commonly lodges her Treasure and Jewels in Rocky Ground. If the Matter be knotty, and the Sence lies deep, the Mind must stop and buckle to it, and stick upon it with Labour and Thought, and close Contemplation, and not leave it till it has master'd the Difficulty, and got possession of Truth. But here care must be taken to avoid the other Extream: A Man must not stick at every useles Nicety, and expect Mysteries of Science in every trivial Question

*the UNDERSTANDING.*

tion or Scruple that he may raise. *He Haste.* that will stand to pick up and examine every Pebble that comes in his way, is as unlikely to return inrich'd and loaden with Jewels, as the other that travell'd full speed. Truths are not the better nor the worse for their Obviousness or Difficulty, but their Value is to be measur'd by their Usefulness and Tendency. Insignificant Observations should not take up any of our Minutes, and those that enlarge our View, and give Light towards farther and useful Discoveries, should not be neglected, though they stop our Course, and spend some of our Time in a fixed Attention.

There is another Haste that does often, and will mislead the Mind if it be left to its self, and its own Conduct. The Understanding is naturally forward, not only to learn its Knowledge by variety (which makes it skip over one to get speedily to another part of Knowledge) but also eager to enlarge its Views by running too fast into general Observations and Conclusions, without a due Examination of Particulars enough whereon to found those general Axioms. This seems to enlarge their Stock, but 'tis of Phantries not Realities; such Theories built upon narrow Foundations stand but weakly, and if they fall not of themselves, are at least very hardly to be supported

## Of the CONDUCT of

supported against the Assaults of Opposition. And thus Men being too hasty to erect to themselves general Notions and ill grounded Theories, find themselves deceived in their stock of Knowledge, when they come to examine their hastily assum'd Maxims themselves, or to have them attack'd by others. General Observations drawn from Particulars, are the Jewels of Knowledge, comprehending great Store in a little Room; but they are therefore to be made with the greater Care and Caution, lest if we take counterfeit for true, our Loss and Shame be the greater when our Stock comes to a severe Scrutiny. One or two Particulars may suggest hints of Enquiry, and they do well who take those Hints; but if they turn them into Conclusions, and make them presently general Rules, they are forward indeed, but it is only to impose on themselves by Propositions assum'd for Truths without sufficient warrant. To make Observations, is, as has been already remark'd, to make the Head a Magazine of Materials, which can hardly be call'd Knowledge, or at least 'tis but like a Collection of Lumber not reduc'd to Use or Order; and he that makes every thing an Observation, has the same useles Plenty and much more fallhood mixed with it. The Extrems on both sides are to be avoided

## the UNDERSTANDING.

ded, and he will be able to give the best *Haste.* account of his Studies who keeps his Understanding in the right mean between them.

§ 25. Whether it be a Love of that *Anticipation* which brings the first Light and Information to their Minds, and want of Vigour and Industry to enquire, or else that Men content themselves with any Appearance of Knowledge, right or wrong; which, when they have once got, they will hold fast. This is visible, that many Men give themselves up to the first Anticipations of their Minds, and are very tenacious of the Opinions that first possess them; they are often as fond of their first Conceptions as of their first Born, and will by no means recede from the Judgment they have once made, or any Conjecture or Conceit which they have once entertain'd. This is a fault in the Conduct of the Understanding, since this Firmness or rather Stiffness of the Mind is not from an adherence to Truth, but a submission to Prejudice. 'Tis an unreasonable Homage paid to Prepossession, whereby we shew a Reverence not to (what we pretend to seek) Truth; but what by hap-hazard we chance to light on, be it what it will. This is visibly a preposterous Use of our Faculties, and is a downright

*Anticipati-  
on.* right prostituting of the Mind to resign it thus, and put it under the power of the first Comer. This can never be allow'd, or ought to be follow'd as a right way to Knowledge, till the Understanding (whose business it is to conform it self to what it finds on the Objects without) can by its own Opiniatry change that, and make the unalterable Nature of things comply with its own hasty Determinations, which will never be. Whatever we phansy, things keep their Course; and their Habitues, Correspondencies and Relations, keep the same to one another.

*Resignati-  
on.*

§ 26. Contrary to these, but by a like dangerous Excess on the other side, are those who always resign their Judgment to the last Man they heard or read. Truth never sinks into these Mens Minds, nor gives any Tincture to them, but Camelion like, they take the Colour of what is laid before them, and as soon lose and resign it to the next that happens to come in their way. The Order wherein Opinions are propos'd, or receiv'd by us, is no Rule of their Rectitude, nor ought to be a Cause of their Preference. First or last in this Case, is the Effect of Chance, and not the Measure of Truth or Falshood. This every one must confes, and therefore should, in the

the pursuit of Truth, keep his Mind free *Resignati-  
on.* from the influence of any such Accidents. A Man may as reasonably draw Cutts for his Tenets, regulate his Persuasion by the cast of a Die, as take it up for its Novelty, or retain it because it had his first Assent, and he was never of another Mind. Well-weighed Reasons are to determine the Judgment; those the Mind should be always ready to hearken and submit to, and by their Testimony and Suffrage, entertain or reject any Tenet indifferently, whether it be a perfect Stranger, or an old Acquaintance.

§ 27. Though the Faculties of the Mind *Practice.* are improv'd by Exercise, yet they must not be put to a stress beyond their Strength. *Quid valeant humeri, quid ferre recusent,* must be made the Measure of every ones Understanding, who has a desire not only to perform well, but to keep up the vigor of his Faculties, and not to balk his Understanding by what is too hard for it. The Mind by being engag'd in a Task beyond its Strength, like the Body, strain'd by lifting at a Weight too heavy, has often its force broken, and thereby gets an Unaptness or an Aversion to any vigorous Attempt ever after. A Siney crack'd seldom recovers its former Strength, or at least the

*Of the CONDUCT of*

tenderness of the Sprain remains a good while after, and the Memory of it longer, and leaves a lasting Caution in the Man, not to put the Part quickly again to any robust Employment. So it fares in the Mind once jaded by an attempt above its Power, it either is disabl'd for the future, or else checks at any vigorous Undertaking ever after, at least is very hardly brought to exert its Force again on any Subject that requires Thought and Meditation. The Understanding should be brought to the difficult and knotty Parts of Knowledge, that trie the strength of Thought, and a full bent of the Mind by insensible Degrees; and in such a gradual Proceeding nothing is too hard for it. Nor let it be objected, that such a slow Progress will never reach the Extent of some Sciences. It is not to be imagin'd how far Constancy will carry a Man; however it is better walking slowly in a rugged Way, than to break a Leg and be a Cripple. He that begins with the Calf may carry the Ox; but he that will at first go to take up an Ox, may so disable himself, as not be able to lift a Calf after that. When the Mind, by insensible degrees, has brought it self to Attention and close Thinking, it will be able to cope with Difficulties, and master them without any Prejudice to it self, and then it may go

*the UNDERSTANDING.*

on roundly. Every abstruse Problem, every intricate Question will not baffle, discourage, or break it. But though putting the Mind unprepar'd upon an unusual Stress that may discourage or damp it for the future, ought to be avoided; yet this must not run it, by an over great shiness of Difficulties, into a lazy Sauntring about ordinary and obvious things, that demand no Thought or Application. This debases and enervates the Understanding, makes it weak and unfit for Labour. This is a sort of hovering about the Surface of things, without any insight into them or penetration; and when the Mind has been once habituated to this lazy Recumbency and Satisfaction on the obvious Surface of things, it is in danger to rest satisfy'd there, and go no deeper, since it cannot do it without pains and digging. He that has for some time accusom'd himself to take up with what easily offers it self at first view, has reason to fear he shall never reconcile himself to the fatigue of turning and tumbling things in his Mind to discover their more retired and more valuable Secrets.

'Tis not strange that Methods of Learning which Scholars have been accusom'd to in their beginning and entrance upon the Sciences, should influence them all their Lives, and be settled in their Minds by an

*Practise.* over-ruling Reverence, especially if they be such as universal Use has establish'd. Learners must at first be Believers, and their Master's Rules having been once made Axioms to them, 'tis no wonder they should keep that Dignity, and by the Authority they have once got, mislead those who think it sufficient to excuse them, if they go out of their way in a well beaten Tract,

*Words.*

§ 28. I have copiously enough spoken of the abuse of Words in another place, and therefore shall upon this Reflection, that the Sciences are full of them, warn those that would conduct their Understandings right, not to take any Term howsoever authorized by the Language of the Schools, to stand for any thing till they have an Idea of it. A Word may be of frequent Use and great Credit with several Authors, and be by them made use of, as if it stood for some real Being; but yet if he that reads cannot frame any distinct Idea of that Being, it is certain to him a mere empty Sound without a Meaning, and he learns no more by all that is said of it, or attributed to it, than if it were affirmed only of that bare empty Sound. They who would advance in Knowledge, and not deceive and swell themselves with a little articulated Air, should lay down this as a Fundamen-  
tal

tal Rule, not to take Words for things, nor *Words.* suppose that Names in Books signify real Entities in Nature, till they can frame clear and distinct Ideas of those Entities. It will not perhaps be allow'd if I should set down *substantial Forms* and *intentional Species*, as such that may justly be suspected to be of this kind of insignificant Terms. But this I am sure, to one that can form no determined Ideas of what they stand for, they signify nothing at all; and all that he thinks he knows about them, is to him so much Knowledge about nothing, and amounts at most but to a learned Ignorance. 'Tis not without all Reason supposed, that there are many such empty Terms to be found in some learned Writers, to which they had Recourse to etch out their Systems where their Understandings could not furnish them with Conceptions from things. But yet I believe the supposing of some Realities in Nature answering those and the like Words, have much perplex'd some, and quite misled others in the Study of Nature. That which in any Discourse signifies, *I know not what*, should be consider'd *I know not when*. Where Men have any Conceptions, they can, if they are never so abstruse or abstracted, explain them, and the Terms they use for them. For our Conceptions being nothing but Ideas, which



*Words.*

are all made up of simple ones. If they cannot give us the Ideas their Words stand for, 'tis plain they have none. To what purpose can it be to hunt after his Conceptions, who has none, or none distinct? He that knew not what he himself meant by a learned Term, cannot make us know any thing by his use of it, let us beat our Heads about it never so long. Whether we are able to comprehend all the Operations of Nature and the Manners of them, it matters not to enquire; but this is certain, that we can comprehend no more of them than we can distinctly conceive; and therefore to obstrude Terms where we have no distinct Conceptions, as if they did contain or rather conceal something, is but an Artifice of learned Vanity, to cover a Defect in an Hypothesis or our Understandings. Words are not made to conceal but to declare and shew something; where they are by those, who pretend to instruct, otherwise used, they conceal indeed something; but that that they conceal is nothing but the Ignorance, Error, or Sophistry of the Talker, for there is, in truth, nothing else under them.

*Wandering.*

§ 29. That there is constant Succession and flux of Ideas in our Minds, I have observ'd in the former part of this Essay, and every one may take notice of it in himself.

This I suppose may deserve some part of *Wandering* our Care in the Conduct of our Understandings; and I think it may be of great advantage, if we can by use get that power over our Minds, as to be able to direct that train of Ideas, that so since there will new ones perpetually come into our Thoughts by a constant Succession, we may be able by choice so to direct them, that none may come in view, but such as are pertinent to our present Enquiry, and in such order as may be most useful to the discovery we are upon; or at least, if some foreign and unfought Ideas will offer themselves, that yet we might be able to reject them, and keep them from taking off our Minds from its present pursuit, and hinder them from running away with our Thoughts quite from the Subject in hand. This is not, I suspect, so easy to be done as perhaps may be imagin'd; and yet, for ought I know, this may be, if not the chief, yet one of the great Differences that carry some Men in their Reasoning so far beyond others, where they seem to be naturally of equal parts. A proper and effectual Remedy for this wandering of Thoughts I would be glad to find. He that shall propose such an one, would do great Service to the studious and contemplative part of Mankind, and perhaps help unthinking Men to become thinking

*Wandering.*

thinking. I must acknowledge that hitherto I have discover'd no other way to keep our Thoughts close to their Business, but the endeavouring as much as we can, and by frequent Attention and Application, getting the habit of Attention and Application. He that will observe Children, will find, that even when they endeavour their uttermost, they cannot keep their Minds from stragling. The way to cure it, I am satisfy'd, is not angry Chiding or Beating, for that presently fills their Heads with all the Ideas that Fear, Dread, or Confusion can offer to them. To bring back gently their wandering Thoughts, by leading them into the Path, and going before them in the train they should pursue, without any Rebuke, or so much as taking notice (where it can be avoided) of their roving, I suppose would sooner reconcile and inure them to Attention than all those rougher Methods which more distract their Thought, and hindring the Application they would promote, introduce a contrary Habit.

*Distinction.* § 30. Distinction and Division are (if I mistake not the import of the Words) very different things; the one being the perception of a difference that Nature has plac'd in things; the other our making a Division where there is yet none; at least, if I may be

be permitted to consider them in this Sense, *Distinctions*  
I think I may say of them, that one of them is the most necessary and conducive to true Knowledge that can be; the other, when too much made use of, serves only to puzzle and confound the Understanding. To observe every the least difference that is in things, argues a quick and clear Sight, and this keeps the Understanding steady, and right in its way to Knowledge. But though it be useful to discern every variety is to be found in Nature, yet it is not convenient to consider every Difference that is in things, and divide them into distinct Classes under every such Difference. This will run us, if follow'd, into Particulars, (for every individual has something that differences it from another) and we shall be able to establish no general Truths, or else at least shall be apt to perplex the Mind about them. The Collection of several things into several Classes, gives the Mind more general and larger Views; but we must take care to unite them only in that; and so far as they do agree, for so far they may be united under the Consideration. For Entity it self, that comprehends all things, as general as it is, may afford us clear and rational Conceptions. If we would well weigh and keep in our Minds what it is we are considering, that would  
best

*Distinctions.* best instruct us when we should or should not branch into farther Distinctions, which are to be taken only from a due Contemplation of things; to which there is nothing more opposite than the Art of Verbal Distinctions, made at pleasure, in learned and arbitrarily invented Terms to be applied at a venture, without comprehending or conveying any distinct Notions, and so altogether fitted to artificial Talk, or empty Noise in Dispute, without any clearing of Difficulties, or advance in Knowledge. Whatsoever Subject we examine and would get Knowledge in, we should, I think, make as general and as large as it will bare; nor can there be any danger of this, if the Idea of it be settled and determined: For if that be so, we shall easily distinguish it from any other Idea, though comprehended under the same Name. For it is to fence against the intanglements of equivocal Words, and the great Art of Sophistry which lies in them, that Distinctions have been multiplied, and their Use thought so necessary. But had every distinct abstract Idea a distinct known Name, there would be little need of these multiplied Scholastick Distinctions, though there would be nevertheless as much need still of the Minds observing the differences that are in things, and discriminating them thereby one from another.

another. 'Tis not therefore the right way *Distinctions.* to Knowledge, to hunt after, and fill the Head with abundance of Artificial and Scholastick Distinctions, wherewith learned Mens Writing are often fill'd; and we sometimes find what they treat of so divided and subdivided, that the Mind of the most attentive Reader loses the sight of it, as it is more than probable the Writer himself did; for in things crumbl'd into Dust, 'tis in vain to affect or pretend Order, or expect Clearness. To avoid Confusion by too few or too many Divisions, is a great skill in Thinking as well as Writing, which is but the Copying our Thoughts; but what are the Boundaries of the Mean between the two vitious Excesses on both Hands, I think is hard to set down in words: Clear and distinct Ideas is all that I yet know able to regulate it. But as to Verbal Distinctions receiv'd and apply'd to common Terms, *i. e.* Equivocal Words, they are more properly, I think, the Business of Criticisms and Dictionaries than of real Knowledge and Philosophy, since they, for the most part, explain the meaning of Words, and give us their several Significations. The dexterous Management of Terms, and being able to *send* and *prove* with them, I know has and does pass in the World for a great part of Learning; but

*Distinctions.* but it is Learning distinct from Knowledge, for Knowledge consists only in perceiving the Habitues and Relations of Ideas one to another, which is done without Words; the intervention of a Sound helps nothing to it. And hence we see that there is least use of Distinctions where there is most Knowledge; I mean in Mathematicks, where Men have determin'd Ideas with known Names to them; and so there being no room for Equivocations, there is no need of Distinctions. In arguing, the Opponent uses as comprehensive and equivocal Terms as he can, to involve his Adversary in the Doubtfulness of his Expressions: This is expected, and therefore the Answerer on his side makes it his play to distinguish as much as he can, and thinks he can never do it too much; nor can he indeed in that way wherein Victory may be had without Truth and without Knowledge. This seems to me to be the Art of Disputing. Use your words as captiously as you can in your arguing on one side, and apply Distinctions as much as you can on the other side, to every Term, to nonplus your Opponent; so that in this sort of Scholarship, there being no Bounds set to distinguishing, some Men have thought all Acuteness to have lain in it; and therefore in all they have read or thought on, their great Business has been to amuse themselves

themselves with Distinctions, and multiply to themselves Divisions, at least, more than the nature of the thing required. There seems to me, as I said, to be no other Rule for this, but a due and right Consideration of things as they are in themselves. He that has settl'd in his Mind determin'd Ideas with Names affixed to them, will be able both to discern their differences one from another, which is really distinguishing; and where the penury of Words affords not Terms answering every distinct Idea, will be able to apply proper distinguishing Terms to the Comprehensive and Equivocal Names he is forc'd to make use of. This is all the need I know of distinguishing Terms; and in such Verbal Distinctions, each Term of the Distinction joyn'd to that whose signification it distinguishes, is but a new distinct Name for a distinct Idea. Where they are so, and Men have clear and distinct Conceptions that answer their Verbal Distinctions, they are right, and are pertinent as far as they serve to clear any thing in the Subject under Consideration. And this is that which seems to me the proper and only measure of Distinctions and Divisions; which he that will conduct his Understanding right, must not look for in the Acuteness of Invention, nor the Authority of Writers, but will find

*Distinctions.* find only in the Consideration of things themselves whether they are led into it by their own Meditations, or the information of Books.

An aptness to jumble things together, wherein can be found any likeness, is a fault in the Understanding on the other side, which will not fail to mislead it, and by thus lumping of things, hinder the Mind from distinct and accurate Conceptions of them.

*Similies.*

§ 31. To which let me here add another near of Kin to this, at least in Name, and that is letting the Mind upon the Suggestion of any new Notion, run immediately after Similies to make it the clearer to it self; which, though it may be a good way and useful in the explaining our Thoughts to others, yet it is by no means a right Method to settle true Notions of any thing in our selves, because Similies always fail in some part, and come short of that exactness which our Conceptions should have to things, if we would think aright. This indeed makes Men plausible Talkers; for those are always most acceptable in Discourse who have the way to let in their Thoughts into other Mens Minds with the greatest Ease and Facility, whether those Thoughts are well formed and correspond  
with

with things, matters not; few Men care to *Similies* be instructed but at an easy rate. They who in their Discourse strike the Phanſie and take the Hearers Conceptions along with them as fast as their words flow, are the applauded Talkers, and go for the only Men of clear Thoughts. Nothing contributes so much to this as Similies, whereby Men think they themselves understand better, because they are the better understood. But it is one thing to think right, and another thing to know the right way to lay our Thoughts before others with advantage and clearness, be they right or wrong. Well chosen Similies, Metaphors and Allegories, with Method and Order, do this the best of any thing, because being taken from Objects already known, and familiar to the Understanding, they are conceiv'd as fast as spoken; and the Correspondence being concluded, the thing they are brought to explain and elucidate is thought to be understood too. Thus Phanſie passes for Knowledge, and what is prettily said is mistaken for solid. I say not this to decry Metaphor, or with design to take away that Ornament of Speech; my business here is not with Rhetoricians and Orators, but with Philosophers and lovers of Truth; to whom I would beg leave to give this one Rule whereby to trie whether, in the Application  
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*Similes.*

plication of their Thoughts to any thing for the improvement of their Knowledge, they do in truth comprehend the Matter before them really such as it is in it self. The way to discover this is to observe, whether in the laying it before themselves or others, they make use only of borrowed Representations and Ideas foreign to the thing which are apply'd to it by way of Accommodation, as bearing some Proportion or imagin'd Likeness to the Subject under Consideration. Figur'd and Metaphorical Expressions do well to illustrate more abstruse and unfamiliar Ideas which the Mind is not yet throughly accustom'd to; but then they must be made use of to illustrate Ideas that we already have, not to paint to us those which we yet have not. Such borrow'd and allusive Ideas may follow real and solid Truth, to set it off when found, but must by no means be set in its place, and taken for it. If all our search has yet reach'd no farther than Simile and Metaphor, we may assure our selves we rather phantasy than know, and are not yet penetrated into the inside and reality of the thing be it what it will, but content our selves with what our Imaginations, not Things themselves, furnish us with.

§ 32. In

§ 32. In the whole Conduct of the Understanding, there is nothing of more moment that to know when and where, and how far to give Assent, and possibly there is nothing harder. 'Tis very easily said, and no body questions it, That giving and withholding our Assent, and the Degrees of it, should be regulated by the Evidence which things carry with them; and yet we see Men are not the better for this Rule; some firmly imbrace Doctrines upon slight grounds, some upon no grounds, and some contrary to appearance. Some admit of Certainty, and are not to be mov'd in what they hold: Others waver in every thing, and there want not those that reject all as uncertain. What then shall a Novice, an Enquirer, a Stranger do in the Case? I answer, use his Eyes. There is a Correspondence in things, and Agreement and Disagreement in Ideas, discernable in very different Degrees, and there are Eyes in Men to see them if they please, only their Eyes may be dimn'd or dazl'd, and the discerning Sight in them impair'd or lost. Interest and Passion dazels, the Custom of Arguing on any side, even against our Persuasions dimns the Understanding, and makes it by degrees lose the faculty of discerning clearly between Truth and Falshood, and so of

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adhering

Assent.

adhering to the right side. 'Tis not safe to play with Error, and dress it up to our selves or others in the shape of Truth. The Mind by degrees loses its natural Relish of real solid Truth, is reconciled insensibly to any thing that can but be dress'd up into any faint appearance of it; and if the Phanſie be allow'd the place of Judgment at first in sport, it afterwards comes by use to usurp it, and what is recommended by this Flatterer (that studies but to please) is receiv'd for good. There are so many ways of Fallacy, such Arts of giving Colours, Appearances and Resemblances by this Court-dresser, the Phanſie, that he who is not wary to admit nothing but Truth it self, very careful not to make his Mind subservient to any thing else, cannot but be caught. He that has a Mind to believe has half assented already; and he that by often arguing against his own Sense, imposes Falshoods on others, is not far from believing himself. This takes away the great distance there is betwixt Truth and Falshood; it brings them almost together, and makes it no great odds in things that approach so near, which you take; and when things are brought to that pass, Passion or Interest, &c. easily, and without being perceiv'd, determine which shall be the right.

§ 33. I have

§ 33. I have said above that we should *Indifferency* keep a perfect indifferency for all Opinions, not wish any of them true, or try to make them appear so; but being indifferent, receive and imbrace them according as Evidence, and that alone gives the attestation of Truth. They that do thus, *i. e.* keep their Minds indifferent to Opinions, to be determin'd only by Evidence, will always find the Understanding has perception enough to distinguish between Evidence or no Evidence, betwixt plain and doubtful; and if they neither give nor refuse their Assent but by that Measure, they will be safe in the Opinions they have. Which being perhaps but few, this Caution will have also this good in it, that it will put them upon Considering, and teach them the necessity of Examining more than they do; without which the Mind is but a receptacle of Inconsistencies, not the Store-House of Truths. They that do not keep up this Indifferency in themselves for all but Truth, not suppos'd, but evidenc'd in themselves, put colour'd Spectacles before their Eyes, and look on things through false Glasses, and then think themselves excus'd in following the false Appearances, which they themselves put upon them. I do not expect that by this way the Assent should in every

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*Indifferency.* every one be proportion'd to the Grounds and Clearness wherewith every Truth is capable to be made out, or that Men should be perfectly kept from Error: That is more than humane Nature can by any means be advanc'd to; I aim at no such unattainable Privilege; I am only speaking of what they should do who would deal fairly with their own Minds, and make a right use of their Faculties in the pursuit of Truth; we fail them a great deal more than they fail us. 'Tis Mismanagement more than want of Abilities that Men have reason to complain of, and which they actually do complain of in those that differ from them. He that by an Indifferency for all but Truth, suffers not his Assent to go faster than his Evidence, nor beyond it, will learn to examine, and examine fairly instead of presuming, and no body will be at a loss or in danger for want of embracing those Truths which are necessary in his Station and Circumstances. In any other way but this all the World are born to Orthodoxy; they imbibe at first the allow'd Opinions of their Country and Party, and so never questioning their Truth, not one of an hundred ever examines. They are applauded for presuming they are in the right. He that considers, is a Foe to Orthodoxy, because possibly he may deviate  
from

from some of the receiv'd Doctrines there. *Indifferency.*  
And thus Men without any Industry or Acquisition of their own, inherit local Truths (for it is not the same every where) and are inur'd to Assent without Evidence. This influences farther than is thought; for what one of an hundred of the zealous Bigots in all Parties, ever examin'd the Tenets he is so stiff in, or ever thought it his Business or Duty so to do? It is suspected of Lukewarmness to suppose it necessary, and a tendency to Apostacy to go about it. And if a Man can bring his Mind once to be positive and fierce for Positions, whose Evidence he has never once examin'd, and that in Matters of greatest Concernment to him, what shall keep him from this short and easie way of being in the right in cases of less moment? Thus we are taught to Cloth our Minds as we do our Bodies after the Fashion in vogue, and 'tis accounted Phantasticalness, or something worse not to do so. This Custom (which who dares oppose) makes the short-sighted Bigots, and the warier Scepticks, as far as it prevails. And those that break from it are in danger of Heresy; for taking the whole World, how much of it doth Truth and Orthodoxy possess together? Though 'tis by the last alone (which has the good luck to be every where) that Error and Heresy are judg'd of; for



*Indifferency.* Argument and Evidence signify nothing in the case, and excuse no where, but are sure to be born down in all Societies by the infallible Orthodoxy of the place. Whether this be the way to Truth and right Assent, let the Opinions that take place and prescribe in the several habitable parts of the Earth, declare. I never saw any reason yet why Truth might not be trusted to its own Evidence: I am sure if that be not able to support it, there is no Fence against Error, and then Truth and Falshood are but Names that stand for the same things, Evidence therefore is that by which alone every Man is (and should be) taught to regulate his Assent, who is then and then only in the right way when he follows it.

Men deficient in Knowledge are usually in one of these three States, either wholly ignorant, or as doubting of some Proposition they have either imbrac'd formerly, or at present are inclin'd to: Or lastly, they do with Assurance hold and profess without ever having examin'd, and being convinc'd by well-grounded Arguments.

The first of these are in the best state of the three, by having their Minds yet in their perfect Freedom and Indifferency, the likelier to pursue Truth the better, having no Biass yet clap'd on to mislead them.

§ 34. For

§ 34. For Ignorance with an Indifferency *Indifferency.* for Truth is nearer to it, than Opinion with ungrounded Inclination, which is the great source of Error; and they are more in danger to go out of the way, who are marching under the Conduct of a Guide, than 'tis an hundred to one will mislead them, than he that has not yet taken a step, and is likelier to be prevail'd on to enquire after the right way. The last of the three Sorts are in the worst Condition of all; for if a Man can be persuaded and fully assur'd of any thing for a Truth, without having examin'd what is there that he may not imbrace for Truth; and if he has given himself up to believe a Lye, what means is there left to recover one who can be assur'd without examining. To the other two this I crave leave to say, That as he that is Ignorant is in the best State of the two, so he should pursue Truth in a Method suitable to that State, *i. e.* by enquiring directly into the Nature of the thing itself, without minding the Opinions of others, or troubling himself with their Questions or Disputes about it, but to see what he himself can, sincerely searching after Truth, find out. He that proceeds upon others Principles in his Enquiry into any Sciences, though he be resolv'd to examine them

*Indifferency.* them and judge of them freely, does yet at least put himself on that side, and post himself in a Party which he will not quit 'till he be beaten out; by which the Mind is insensibly engag'd to make what defence it can, and so is unawares bias'd. I do not say but a Man should embrace some Opinion when he has examin'd, else he examines to no purpose; but the surest and safest way is to have no Opinion at all 'till he has examin'd, and that without any the least regard to the Opinions or Systems of other Men about it. For Example, were it my Business to understand Physick, would not the safer and readier way be to consult Nature her self and inform my self in the History of Diseases and their Cures, than espousing the Principles of the Dogmatists, Methodists or Chymists engage in all the Disputes concerning either of those Systems, and suppose it true, 'till I have try'd what they can say to beat me out of it. Or, supposing that *Hippocrates*, or any other Book, infallibly contains the whole Art of Physick, would not the direct way be to study, read and consider that Book, weigh and compare the parts of it to find the Truth, rather than espouse the Doctrines of any Party; who, tho' they acknowledge his Authority, have already interpreted and wire-drawn all his Text to their own Sense; the

the Tincture whereof when I have imbib'd, *Indifferency.* I am more in danger to misunderstand his true meaning, than if I had come to him with a Mind unprepossess'd by Doctors and Commentators of my Sect, whose Reasonings, Interpretation and Language which I have been us'd to, will of course make all chime that way, and make another, and perhaps the genuine Meaning of the Author seem harsh, stain'd and uncouth to me. For Words having naturally none of their own, carry that signification to the Hearer, that he is us'd to put upon them, whatever be the Sense of him that uses them. This, I think, is visibly so; and if it be, he that begins to have any doubt of any of his Tenets, which he receiv'd without Examination, ought, as much as he can, to put himself wholly into this state of Ignorance in reference to that Question, and throwing wholly by all his former Notions, and the Opinions of others, examine, with a perfect Indifferency, the Question in its Source, without any inclination to either side, or any regard to his or others unexamined Opinions. This I own is no easy thing to do, but I am not enquiring the easy way to Opinion, but the right way to Truth; which they must follow who will deal fairly with their own Understandings and their own Souls,

Question.

§ 35. The Indifferency that I here propose, will also enable them to state the Question right, which they are in doubt about, without which they can never come to a fair and clear decision of it.

Perseverance.

§ 36. Another Fruit from this Indifferency, and the considering things in themselves, abstract from our own Opinions and other Mens Notions, and Discourses on them, will be that each Man will pursue his Thoughts in that Method which will be most agreeable to the Nature of the thing, and to his apprehension of what it suggests to him; in which he ought to proceed with Regularity and Constancy, until he come to a well-grounded Resolution wherein he may acquiesce. If it be objected that this will require every Man to be a Scholar, and quit all his other Business, and betake himself wholly to study, I answer, I propose no more to any one than he has time for. Some Mens state and condition requires no great extent of Knowledge; the necessary Provision for Life swallows the greatest part of their Time. But one Man's want of Leisure is no excuse for the Oscitancy and Ignorance of those who have time to spare; and every one has enough to get as much Knowledge as is requir'd

quir'd and expected of him, and he that does not that, is in love with Ignorance, and is accountable for it.

§ 37. The variety of Distempers in Mens Minds is as great as of those in their Bodies, some are Epidemick, few scape them, and every one too, if he would look into himself, would find some Defect of his particular Genius. There is scarce any one without some Idiosyncrasy that he suffers by. This Man presumes upon his Parts, that they will not fail him at time of need, and so thinks it superfluous Labour to make any Provision before hand. His Understanding is to him like *Fortunatus's* Purse, which is always to furnish him without ever putting any thing into it before hand; and so he sits still satisfy'd, without endeavouring to store his Understanding with Knowledge. 'Tis the Spontaneous Product of the Country, and what need of Labour in Tillage? Such Men may spread their native Riches before the ignorant; but they were best not come to stress and trial with the Skilful. We are born ignorant of every thing. The Superficies of things that surround them, make impressions on the Negligent, but no body penetrates into the inside without Labour, Attention and Industry. Stones and Timber grow of themselves,

Perseverence.

elves, but yet there is no uniform Pile with Symmetry and Convenience to lodge in without Toil and Pains. God has made the intellectual World Harmonious and Beautiful without us; but it will never come into our Heads all at once, we must bring it home Peice-meal, and there set it up by our own Industry, or else we shall have nothing but Darknes and a Chaos within, whatever Order and Light there be in things without us.

Despondency.

§ 38. On the other side there are others that depress their own Minds, despond at the first Difficulty, and conclude that the getting an insight in any of the Sciences, or making any progress in Knowledge farther then serves their ordinary Business, is above their Capacities. These sit still, because they think they have not Legs to go as the others I last mention'd do, because they think they have Wings to fly, and can soar on high when they please. To these latter one may for answer apply the Proverb, *Use Legs and have Legs*. No body knows what strength of Parts he has 'till he has tried them. And of the Understanding one may most truly say, that its Force is greater generally than it thinks, 'till it is put to it. *Viresq; acquirit eundo.*

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And therefore the proper Remedy here <sup>Despondency.</sup> is but to set the Mind to work, and apply the Thoughts vigorously to the Business; for it holds in the struggles of the Mind as in those of War, *Dum putant se vincere vicere*; A persuasion that we shall overcome any Difficulties that we meet with in the Sciences, seldom fails to carry us through them. No body knows the strength of his Mind, and the force of steady and regular Application 'till he has tried. This is certain, he that sets out upon weak Legs, will not only go farther, but grow stronger too than one who with a vigorous Constitution and firm Limbs, only sits still.

Something of kin to this Men may observe in themselves when the Mind frights it self (as it often does) with any thing reflected on in gross, and transiently view'd confusedly and at a distance. Things thus offer'd to the Mind, carry the shew of nothing but Difficulty in them, and are thought to be wrapt up in impenetrable Obscurity. But the truth is, these are nothing but Spectres that the Understanding raises to it self to flatter its own Laziness. It sees nothing distinctly in things remote, and in a huddle, and therefore concludes too faintly, that there is nothing more clear to be discover'd in them. 'Tis but to approach nearer, and that Mist of our own raising

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raising that enveloped them, will remove; and those that in that Mist appear'd hideous Giants not to be grappel'd with, will be found to be of the ordinary and natural Size and Shape. Things that in a remote and confus'd view seem very obscure, must be approach'd by gentle and regular Steps; and what is most visible, easie and obvious in them first considered. Reduce them into their distinct Parts; and then in their due Order bring all that should be known concerning every one of those Parts, into plain and simple Questions; and then what was thought obscure, perplex'd, and too hard for our weak Parts, will lay it self open to the Understanding in a fair view, and let the Mind into that which before it was aw'd with, and kept at a distance from, as wholly mysterious. I appeal to my Reader's Experience, whether this has never happen'd to him, especially when busy on one thing, he has occasionally reflected on another. I ask him whether he has never thus been scar'd with a sudden opinion of mighty Difficulties, which yet have vanish'd, when he has seriously and methodically apply'd himself to the Consideration of this seeming terrible Subject; and there has been no other Matter of Astonishment left, but that he amus'd himself with so discouraging a prospect of his own raising about  
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a matter which in the handling was found to have nothing in it more strange nor intricate than several other things which he had long since, and with ease master'd. This Experience should teach us how to deal with such Bugbears another time, which should rather serve to excite our Vigor than enervate our Industry. The surest way for a Learner in this as in all other Cases, is not to advance by Jumps and large Strides; let that which he sets himself to learn next, be indeed the next, *i. e.* as nearly conjoyn'd with what he knows already as is possible; let it be distinct but not remote from it: Let it be new and what he did not know before, that the Understanding may advance; but let it be as little at once as may be, that its advances may be clear and sure. All the Ground that it gets this way it will hold. This distinct gradual growth in Knowledge is firm and sure, it carries its own Light with it in every step of its Progression in an easie and orderly train, than which there is nothing of more use to the Understanding. And though this perhaps may seem a very slow and lingering way to Knowledge, yet I dare confidently affirm, that whoever will try it in himself, or any one he will teach, shall find the advances greater in this Method, than they would in the same space of time have been in any other  
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he could have taken. The greatest part of true Knowledge lies in a distinct perception of things in themselves distinct. And some Men give more clear Light and Knowledge by the bare distinct stating of a Question, than others by talking of it in gross whole Hours together. In this, they who so state a Question, do no more but separate and disentangle the parts of it one from another, and lay them, when so disentangled, in their due order. This often, without any more ado, resolves the Doubt, and shews the Mind where the Truth lies. The Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas in question, when they are once separated and distinctly consider'd, is, in many Cases, presently perceiv'd, and thereby clear and lasting Knowledge gain'd; whereas things in gross taken up together, and so lying together in confusion, can produce in the Mind but a confus'd, which in effect is no, Knowledge; or at least when it comes to be examin'd and made use of, will prove little better than none. I therefore take the liberty to repeat here again what I have said elsewhere, that in learning any thing, as little should be propos'd to the Mind at once as is possible; and that being understood and fully master'd, to proceed to the next adjoining part yet unknown, simple, unperplex'd Proposition belonging to the mat-  
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what is principally design'd. Dependen-  
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§ 38. Analogy is of great use to the Mind in many Cases, especially in natural Philosophy, and that part of it chiefly which consists in happy and successful Experiments. But here we must take care that we keep our selves within that where in the Analogy consists. For Example, the acid Oyl of *Vitriol* is found to be good in such a case, therefore the Spirit of *Niter* or *Vmegar* may be us'd in the like case. If the good Effect of it be owing wholly to the Acidity of it, the trial may be justified; but if there be something else besides the Acidity in the Oil of *Vitriol*, which produces the good we desire in the case, we mistake that for Analogy, which is not, and suffer our Understanding to be misguided by a wrong supposition of Analogy where there is none. Analogy.

§ 39. Though I have in the Second Book of my Essay concerning Humane Understanding, treated of the Association of Ideas; yet having done it there Historically, as giving a view of the Understanding in this as well as its several other ways of operating, rather than designing there to inquire into the Remedies, ought to be applied

*Association.* plied to it. It will, under this latter Consideration, afford other matter of thought to those who have a mind to instruct themselves thoroughly in the right way of conducting their Understandings; and that the rather, because this, if I mistake not, is as frequent a cause of a Mistake and Error in us, as perhaps any thing else that can be named; and is a Disease of the Mind as hard to be cur'd as any; it being a very hard thing to convince any one that things are not so, and naturally so as they constantly appear to him.

By this one easie and unheeded miscarriage of the Understanding, sandy and loose Foundations become infallible Principles, and will not suffer themselves to be touch'd or question'd: Such unnatural Connections become by Custom as natural to the Mind, as Sun and Light. Fire and Warmth go together, and so seem to carry with them as natural an Evidence as Self-evident Truths themselves. And where then shall one with hopes of success begin the Cures? Many Men firmly imbrace Falshood for Truth; not only because they never thought otherwise, but also because thus blinded as they have been from the beginning, they never could think otherwise; at least without a vigor of Mind able to contest the Empire of Habit, and look into  
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*Association.* its own Principles; a freedom which few Men have the Notion of in themselves, and fewer are allow'd the practise of by others; it being the great Art and Business of the Teachers and Guides in most Sects, to suppress, as much as they can, this fundamental Duty which every Man owes himself, and is the first steady Step towards Right and Truth in the whole train of his Actions and Opinions. This would give one reason to suspect, that such Teachers are conscious to themselves of the Falshood or Weakness of the Tenets they profess, since they will not suffer the Grounds whereon they are built to be examin'd; when as those who seek Truth only, and desire to own and propagate nothing else, freely expose their Principles to the test, are pleas'd to have them examin'd, give Men leave to reject them if they can; and if there be any thing weak and unsound in them, are willing to have it detected, that they themselves, as well as others, may not lay any stress upon any receiv'd Proposition beyond what the Evidence of its Truth will warrant and allow.

There is, I know, a great Fault among all sorts of People of principling their Children and Scholars; which at last, when look'd into, amounts to no more, but making them imbibe their Teacher's Notions  
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*Association.* and Tenets, by an implicit Faith, and firmly to adhere to them whether true or false. What Colours may be given to this, or of what use it may be when practis'd upon the Vulgar, destin'd to Labour, and given up to the Service of their Bellies, I will not here enquire. But as to the ingenuous part of Mankind, whose Condition allows them Leisure, and Letters, and Enquiry after Truth; I can see no other right way of Principling them, but to take heed, as much as may be, that in their tender Years Ideas, that have no natural Cohesion come not to be united in their Heads, and that this Rule be often inculcated to them to be their Guide in the whole Course of their Lives and Studies, (*viz.*) that they never suffer any Ideas to be joyn'd in their Understandings, in any other or stronger Combination than what their own Nature and Correspondence give them; and that they often examine those that they find link'd together in their Minds, whether this Association of Ideas be from the visible Agreement that is in the Ideas themselves, or from the habitual and prevailing Custom of the Mind joyning them thus together in Thinking.

This is for Caution against this Evil, before it be thoroughly riveted by Custom in the Understanding; but he that would cure

*Association.* cure it when Habit has establish'd it, must nicely observe the very quick, and almost imperceptible Motions of the Mind in its habitual Actions. What I have said in another place about the change of the Ideas of Sense into those of Judgment, may be proof of this. Let any one not skill'd in Painting, be told when he sees Bottles and Tobacco-pipes, and other things so Painted, as they are in some places shewn, that he does not see Protuberancies, and you will not convince him but by the touch: He will not believe that by an instantaneous Legerdmain of his own Thoughts, one Idea is substituted for the other. How frequent instances may one meet with of this in the Arguings of the Learned, who not seldom in two Ideas that they have been accustom'd to join in their Minds, substitute one for the other; and, I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves. This, whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of Conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous Champions for Truth, when indeed they are contending for Error. And the Confusion of two different Ideas, which a customary Connection of them in their Minds hath made to them, almost one, fills their Head with false Views, and their Reasonings with false Consequences.



*Fallacies.*

§ 40. Right Understanding consists in the discovery and adherence to Truth, and that in the perception of the visible or probable Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, as they are affirm'd and deny'd one of another. From whence it is evident, that the right Use and Conduct of the Understanding, whose Business is purely Truth and nothing else, is, that the Mind should be kept in a perfect Indifferency, not inclining to either side, any farther than Evidence settles it by Knowledge, or the over-balance of Probability gives it the turn of Assent and Belief; but yet it is very hard to meet with any Discourse wherein one may not perceive the Author not only maintain (for that is reasonable and fit) but inclin'd and bias'd to one side of the Question, with marks of a desire that That should be true. If it be asked me, how Authors who have such a Bias and lean to it may be discover'd. I answer, by observing how in their Writings or Arguings they are often led by their Inclinations to change the Ideas of the Question, either by changing the Terms, or by adding and joining others to them, whereby the Ideas under Consideration are so varied, as to be more serviceable to their purpose, and to be thereby brought to an easier and

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nearer Agreement, or more visible and *re-* Fallacies, moter Disagreement one with another. This is plain and direct Sophistry; but I am far from thinking, that wherever it is found it is made use of with design to deceive and mislead the Readers. It is visible that Men's Prejudices and Inclinations by this way impose often upon themselves; and their Affections for Truth, under their Prepossession in favour of one side, is the very thing that leads them from it. Inclination suggests and slides into their Discourse favourable Terms, which introduce favourable Ideas, 'till at last by this means That is concluded clear and evident, thus dress'd up, which taken in its native state, by making use of none but the precise determin'd Ideas, would find no admittance at all. The putting these Glosses on what they affirm, these, as they are thought, handsome, easie, and graceful Explications of what they are discoursing on, is so much the Character of what is call'd and esteem'd Writing well, that it is very hard to think that Authors will ever be perswaded to leave what serves so well to propagate their Opinions, and procure themselves Credit in the World, for a more jejune and dry way of Writing, by keeping to the same Terms precisely annexed to the same Ideas, a sower and blunt Stiffness tolerable in Mathematicians only, who force their

*Fallacies.* their way, and make Truth prevail by irresistible Demonstration.

But yet if Authors cannot be prevail'd with to quit the looser, tho' more insinuating ways of Writing, if they will not think fit to keep close to Truth and Instruction by unvaried Terms, and plain unsophisticated Arguments, yet it concerns Readers not to be impos'd on by Fallacies, and the prevailing ways of Insinuation. To do this, the surest and most effectual Remedy is to fix in the Mind the clear and distinct Ideas of the Question stripp'd of Words; and so likewise in the train of Argumentation, to take up the Author's Ideas neglecting his Words, observing how they connect or separate those in the Question. He that does this will be able to cast off all that is superfluous; he will see what is pertinent, what coherent, what is direct to, what slides by the Question. This will readily shew him all the foreign Ideas in the Discourse, and where they were brought in; and though they perhaps dazled the Writer, yet he will perceive that they give no light nor strength to his Reasonings.

This, though it be the shortest and easiest way of reading Books with profit and keeping ones self from being misled by great Names or plausible Discourses; yet it being hard and tedious to those who have not

not accusom'd themselves to it; it is not to be expected that every one (amongst those few who really pursue Truth) should this way guard his Understanding from being impos'd on by the wilful, or at least undesign'd Sophistry, which creeps into most of the Books of Argument. They that write against their Conviction, or that next to them, are resolv'd to maintain the Tenets of a Party they are engag'd in, cannot be suppos'd to reject any Arms that may help to defend their Cause, and therefore such should be read with the greatest Caution. And they who write for Opinions they are sincerely persuaded of, and believe to be true, think they may so far allow themselves to indulge their laudable Affection to Truth, as to permit their esteem of it, to give it the best Colours, and set it off with the best Expressions and Dress they can, thereby to gain it the easiest entrance into the Minds of their Readers, and fix it deepest there.

One of those being the state of Mind we may justly suppose most Writers to be in, 'tis fit their Readers, who apply to them for Instruction, should not lay by that Caution which becomes a sincere pursuit of Truth, and should make them always watchful against whatever might conceal or misrepresent it. If they have not the skill of representing to themselves the Author's Sense

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*Fallacies.*

by pure Ideas separated from Sounds, and thereby divested of the false Lights and deceitful Ornaments of Speech; this yet they should do, they should keep the precise Question steadily in their Minds, carry it along with them through the whole Discourse, and suffer not the least alteration in the Terms, either by Addition, Subtraction, or Substituting any other. This every one can do who has a mind to it; and he that has not a mind to it, 'tis plain makes his Understanding only the Warehouse of other Men's Lumber; I mean false and unconcluding Reasonings, rather than a Repository of Truth for his own use, which will prove substantial, and stand him in stead when he has occasion for it. And whether such an one deals fairly by his own Mind, and conducts his own Understanding right, I leave to his own Understanding to judge.

*Fundamental Verities.*

§ 41. The Mind of Man being very narrow, and so slow in making acquaintance with things, and taking in new Truths, that no one Man is capable, in a much longer Life than ours, to know all Truths; it becomes our Prudence in our search after Knowledge, to employ our Thoughts about Fundamental and material Questions, carefully avoiding those that are trifling, and

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*Fundamental Verities.*

not suffering our selves to be diverted from our main even Purpose, by those that are merely incidental. How much of many young Mens time is thrown away in purely Logical Enquiries, I need not mention. This is no better than if a Man who was to be a Painter, should spend all his time in examining the Threads of the several Cloths he is to paint upon, and counting the Hairs of each Pencil and Brush he intends to use in the laying on of his Colours. Nay, it is much worse than for a young Painter to spend his Apprenticeship in such useles Niceties; for he at the end of all his pains to no purpose, finds that it is not Painting, nor any help to it, and so is really to no purpose. Whereas Men design'd for Scholars have often their Heads so fill'd and warm'd with Disputes on Logical Questions, that they take those airy useles Notions for real and substantial Knowledge, and think their Understandings so well furnished with Science, that they need not look any farther into the Nature of things, or descend to the Mechanical Drudgery of Experiment and Enquiry. This is so obvious a mismanagement of the Understanding, and that in the profess'd way to Knowledge, that it could not be pass'd by; to which might be joyn'd abundance of Questions, and the way of handling of them

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them in the Schools. What Faults in particular of this kind, every Man is, or may be guilty of, would be infinite to enumerate; it suffices to have shewn that superficial and slight Discoveries and Observations that contain nothing of moment in themselves, nor serve as Clues to lead us into farther Knowledge, should be lightly pass'd by, and never thought worth our searching after.

There are Fundamental Truths that lie at the bottom, the Basis upon which a great many others rest, and in which they have their Consistency. These are teeming Truths, rich in store, with which they furnish the Mind, and, like the Lights of Heaven, are not only Beautiful and Entertaining in themselves, but give Light and Evidence to other things, that without them could not be seen or known. Such is that admirable Discovery of Mr. *Newton*, that all Bodies gravitate to one another, which may be counted as the Basis of natural Philosophy; which of what use it is to the Understanding of the great Frame of our Solar System he has to the astonishment of the Learned World shewn, and how much farther it would guide us in other things, if rightly pursu'd, is not yet known. Our Saviour's great Rule, that *we should love our Neighbour as our selves*, is such a Fundamental

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talVerities.

damental Truth for the regulating human Society; that, I think, by that alone, one might without difficulty, determine all the Cases and Doubts in Social Morality. These, and such as these are the Truths we should endeavour to find out, and store our Minds with. Which leads me to another thing in the Conduct of the Understanding that is no less necessary, *viz.*

§42. To accustom our selves in any Question propos'd to examine and find out upon what it bottoms. Most of the Difficulties that come in our way, when well consider'd and trac'd, lead us to some Proposition, which known to be true, clears the Doubt, and gives an easie Solution of the Question, whilst Topical and Superficial Arguments, of which there is store to be found on both sides, filling the Head with variety of Thoughts, and the Mouth with copious Discourse, serve only to amuse the Understanding, and entertain Company without coming to the bottom of the Question, the only place of Rest and Stability for an inquisitive Mind, whose tendency is only to Truth and Knowledge. For Example, if it be demanded, whether the Grand Seignior can lawfully take what he will from any of his People? This Question cannot be resolv'd without coming to

*Bottoming.* to a certainty, whether all Men are naturally equal; for upon that it turns, and that Truth well settled in the Understanding, and carried in the Mind through the various Debates concerning the various Rights of Men in Society, will go a great way in putting an end to them, and shewing on which side the Truth is.

*Transferring of Thoughts.*

§ 43. There is scarce any thing more for the improvement of Knowledge, for the ease of Life, and the dispatch of Business, than for a Man to be able to dispose of his own Thoughts; and there is scarce any thing harder in the whole Conduct of the Understanding than to get a full mastery over it. The Mind, in a waking Man, has always some Object that it applies it self to; which, when we are lazy or unconcern'd, we can easily change, and at pleasure transfer our Thoughts to another, and from thence to a third, which has no relation to either of the former. Hence Men forwardly conclude, and frequently say, nothing is so free as Thought, and it were well it were so; but the contrary will be found true in several instances; and there are many Cases wherein there is nothing more resty and ungovernable than our Thoughts: They will not be directed what Objects to pursue, nor be taken off from those

those they have once fix'd on, but run away with a Man in pursuit of those Ideas they have in view, let him do what he can.

I will not here mention again what I have above taken notice of, how hard it is to get the Mind narrowed by a Custom of thirty or forty Years standing to a scanty Collection of obvious and common Ideas, to enlarge it self to a more copious Stock, and grow into an acquaintance with those that would afford more abundant Matter of useful Contemplation; 'tis not of this I am here speaking. The inconvenience I would here represent and find a Remedy for, is the difficulty there is sometimes to transfer our Minds from one Subject to another, in cases where the Ideas are equally familiar to us.

Matters that are recommended to our Thoughts by any of our Passions, take possession of our Minds with a kind of Authority, and will not be kept out or dislodg'd, but as if the Passion that rules, were, for the time, the Sheriff of the Place, and came with all the Posse, the Understanding is seiz'd and taken with the Object it introduces, as if it had a legal Right to be alone consider'd there. There is scarce any body, I think, of so calm a Temper who hath not sometime found this Tyranny on his Understanding, and suffer'd under the inconvenience of it. Who is there almost whose

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Mind, at some time or other, Love or Anger, Fear or Grief has not so fasten'd to some Clog, that it could not turn it self to any other Object. I call it a Clog, for it hangs upon the Mind so as to hinder its Vigour and Activity in the pursuit of other Contemplations, and advances it self little or not all in the Knowledge of the thing which it so closely hugs and constantly pores on. Men thus possess'd, are sometimes as if they were so in the worst Sense, and lay under the power of an Inchantment. They see not what passes before their Eyes; hear not the audible Discourse of the Company; and when by any strong Application to them they are rous'd a little, they are like Men brought to themselves from some remote Region; whereas in truth they come no farther than their secret Cabinet within, where they have been wholly taken up with the Puppet, which is for that time appointed for their Entertainment. The shame that such Dumps cause to well-bred People, when it carries them away from the Company, where they should bear a part in the Conversation, is a sufficient Argument, that it is a fault in the Conduct of our Understanding, not to have that power over it as to make use of it to those Purposes, and on those Occasions wherein we have need of its Assistance. The Mind should

should be always free and ready to turn it self to the variety of Objects that occur, and allow them as much Consideration as shall for that time be thought fit. To be ingrossed so by one Object, as not to be prevail'd on to leave it for another that we judge fitter for our Contemplation, is to make it of no use to us. Did this state of Mind remain always so, every one would, without scruple, give it the name of perfect Madness; and while it does last, at whatever intervals it returns, such a rotation of Thoughts about the same Object no more carries us forwards towards the attainment of Knowledge, than getting upon a Mill horse whilst he jogs on in his Circular Tract would carry a Man a Journey.

I grant something must be allow'd to legitimate Passions, and to natural Inclinations. Every Man, besides occasional Affections, has belov'd Studies, and those the Mind will more closely stick to; but yet it is best that it should be always at liberty, and under the free disposal of the Man, to act how, and upon what he directs. This we should endeavour to obtain, unless we would be content with such a flaw in our Understandings, that sometimes we should be as it were without it; for it is very little better than so in cases where we cannot make

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use of it to those purposes we would, and which stand in present need of it.

But before fit Remedies can be thought on for this Disease, we must know the several Causes of it, and thereby regulate the Cure, if we will hope to labour with success.

One we have already instanced in, whereof all Men that reflect have so general a Knowledge, and so often an Experience in themselves, that no body doubts of it. A prevailing Passion so pins down our Thoughts to the Object and Concern of it, that a Man passionately in Love, cannot bring himself to think of his ordinary Affairs, nor a kind Mother drooping under the loss of a Child, is not able to bare a part as she was wont in the Discourse of the Company or Conversation of her Friends.

But though Passion be the most obvious and general, yet it is not the only Cause that binds up the Understanding, and confines it for the time to one Object, from which it will not be taken off.

Besides this, we may often find that the Understanding when it has a while employ'd it self upon a Subject which either Chance, or some slight Accident, offer'd to it without the Interest or Recommendation of any Passion works it self into a warmth, and by degrees gets into a Career, wherein,  
like

*the UNDERSTANDING.*

like a Bowl down at Hill, it increases its motion by going, and will not be stop'd or diverted, though, when the heat is over, it sees all this earnest Application was about a trifle not worth a Thought, and all the pains employ'd about it, lost Labour.

There is a third sort, if I mistake not, yet lower than this; 'tis a sort of Childishness, if I may so say, of the Understanding, wherein, during the fit, it plays with, and dandles some insignificant Puppet to no end, nor with any design at all, and yet cannot easily be got off from it. Thus some trivial Sentence, or a scrap of Poetry will sometimes get into Mens Heads, and make such a Chiming there, that there is no stilling of it; no Peace to be obtain'd, nor Attention to any thing else, but this impertinent Guest will take up the Mind and possess the Thoughts in spite of all endeavours to get rid of it. Whether every one hath experimented in themselves this troublesome intrusion of some frisking Ideas which thus importune the Understanding, and hinder it from being better employ'd, I know not. But Persons of very good Parts, and those more than one, I have heard speak and complain of it themselves. The reason I have to make this Doubt, is from what I have known in a Case something of kin to this, though much od-  
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der, and that is of a sort of Visions that some People have lying quiet but perfectly awake in the dark, or with their Eyes shut. It is a great variety of Faces, most commonly very odd ones, that appear to them in train one after another; so that having had just the sight of one, it immediately passes away to give place to another, that the same instant succeeds, and has as quick an exit as its Leader, and so they march on in a constant succession; nor can any one of them by any endeavour be stop'd or retain'd beyond the instant of its appearance, but is thrust out by its Follower, which will have its turn. Concerning this Phantastical Phænomenon, I have talk'd with several People, whereof some have been perfectly acquainted with it, and others have been so wholly strangers to it, that they could hardly be brought to conceive or believe it. I knew a Lady of excellent Parts who had got past thirty without having ever had the least notice of any such thing; she was so great a Stranger to it, that when she heard me and another talking of it, could scarce forbear thinking we banter'd her; but sometime after drinking a large dose of dilute Tea (as she was order'd by a Physician) going to Bed she told us at next meeting, that she had now experimented what our Discourse had much a do to persuade

*the UNDERSTANDING.*

suade her of. She had seen a great variety of Faces in a long train, succeeding one another, as we had describ'd, they were all Strangers and Intruders, such as she had no acquaintance with before, nor sought after then, and as they came of themselves they went too; none of them stay'd a moment, nor could be detain'd by all the endeavours she could use, but went on in their solemn procession, just appear'd and then vanish'd. This odd Phænomenon seems to have a mechanical Cause, and to depend upon the Matter and Motion of the Blood or animal Spirits.

When the Phanſie is bound by Passion; I know no way to set the Mind free and at liberty to prosecute what Thoughts the Man would make choice of but to allay the present Passion, or Counter-balance it with another, which is an Art to be got by Study, and acquaintance with the Passions.

Those who find themselves apt to be carried away with the spontaneous Current of their own Thoughts, not excited by any Passion or Interest, must be very wary and careful in all the instances of it to stop it, and never humour their Minds in being thus triflingly busie. Men know the value of their corporal Liberty, and therefore suffer not willingly Fetters and Chains to be put upon them. To have the Mind captivated



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is, for the time, certainly the greater Evil of the two, and deserves our utmost Care and Endeavours to preserve the Freedom of our better part. And in this Case our Pains will not be lost; striving and struggling will prevail, if we constantly, in all such occasions, make use of it. We must never indulge these trivial Attentions of Thought; as soon as we find the Mind makes it self a business of nothing, we should immediately disturb and check it, introduce new and more serious Considerations, and not leave 'till we have beaten it off from the pursuit it was upon. This, at first, if we have let the contrary practice grow to an Habit, will perhaps be difficult; but constant endeavours will by degrees prevail, and at last make it easie. And when a Man is pretty well advanced, and can command his Mind off at pleasure from incidental and undesign'd pursuits, it may not be amiss for him to go on farther, and make attempts upon Meditations of greater moment, that at the last he may have a full power over his own Mind, and be so fully Master of his own Thoughts, as to be able to transfer them from one Subject to another, with the same ease that he can lay by any thing he has in his Hand, and take something else that he has a mind to in the room of it. This liberty of Mind is of great use both in Bu-  
siness

business and Study, and he that has got it will have no small advantage of ease and dispatch in all that is the chosen and useful Employment of his Understanding.

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The third and last way which I mentioned the Mind to be sometimes taken up with, I mean the Chiming of some particular Words or Sentence in the Memory, and, as it were, making a noise in the Head, and the like, seldom happens but when the Mind is lazy or very loosely and negligently employ'd. It were better indeed be without such impertinent and useless Repetitions. Any obvious Idea when it is roving causelessly at a venture, being of more use and apter to suggest something worth Consideration, than the insignificant buz of purely empty Sounds. But since the rousing of the Mind, and setting the Understanding on work with some degrees of Vigor, does for the most part presently set it free from these idle Companions; it may not be amiss whenever we find our selves troubled with them, to make use of so profitable a Remedy that is always at hand.

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EXAMINATION  
O F  
*P. MALEBRANCHE'S*  
O P I N I O N  
O F  
*Seeing all things in GOD.*

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An EXAMINATION of  
P. MALEBRANCHE's O-  
pinion of seeing all things in  
God.

1. THE acute and ingenious Author of the *Recherche de la Verité*, among a great many very fine Thoughts, judicious Reasonings, and uncommon Reflections has in that Treatise started the Notion of *Seeing all things in God*, as the best way to explain the Nature and Manner of the Ideas in our Understanding. The desire I had to have my unaffected Ignorance remov'd, has have it necessary for me to see whether this Hypothesis, when examin'd, and the parts of it put together, can be thought to cure our Ignorance, or is intelligible and satisfactory to one who would not deceive himself, take Words for Things, and think he knows what he knows not.

2. This I observe at the entrance that *Recherche de la Verité*, that *P. Malebranche* having enumerated, and in the following Chapters shew'd the difficulties  
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culties of the other ways, whereby he thinks human Understanding may be attempted to be explain'd, and how insufficient they are to give a satisfactory Account of the Ideas we have, erects this of *Seeing all things in God* upon their ruine as the true, because it is impossible to find a better. Which Argument so far being only *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam* loses all its Force as soon as we consider the weakness of our Minds, and the narrowness of our Capacities, and have but Humility enough to allow that there may be many things which we cannot fully comprehend, and that God is not bound in all he does to subject his ways of operation to the scrutiny of our Thoughts, and confine himself to do nothing but what we must comprehend. And it will very little help to cure my Ignorance, that this is the best of four or five Hypotheses propos'd, which are all defective; if this too has in it what is inconsistent with itself, or unintelligible to me.

3. The *P. Malbranche Recherche de la Verité*, l. 3. p. 2. c. 1. tells us that whatever the Mind perceives *must be actually present and intimately united to it*. That the things that the Mind perceives are its own Sensations, Imaginations, or Notions; which being in the Soul the modifications of it, need no Ideas to represent them. But all things exterior

terior to the Soul we cannot perceive but by the intervention of Ideas, supposing that the things themselves cannot be intimately united to the Soul. But because Spiritual things may possibly be united to the Soul, therefore he thinks it probable that they can discover themselves immediately without Ideas; though of this he doubts, because he believes not there is any Substance purely intelligible, but that of God; and that though Spirits can possibly unite themselves to our Minds, yet at present we cannot entirely know them. But he speaks here principally of material things, which he says certainly cannot unite themselves to our Souls in such a manner as is necessary that it should perceive them; because being extended, the Soul not being so, there is no proportion between them.

4. This is the Sum of his Doctrine contain'd in the 1st. Ch. of the 2d Part of the 3d Book, as far as I can comprehend it. Wherein, I confess, there are many Expressions which carrying with them, to my Mind, no clear Ideas, are like to remove but little of my Ignorance by their Sounds. *V.g. What it is to be intimately united to the Soul.* What it is for two Souls or Spirits to be intimately united; for intimate Union being an Idea taken from Bodies, when the Parts of one get within the Surface

face of the other and touch their inward Parts. What is the Idea of intimate Union I must have between two Beings that hath neither of them any Extension or Surface? And if it be not so explain'd as to give me a clear Idea of that Union, it will make me understand very little more of the nature of the Ideas in my Mind, when 'tis said I see them in God, who being *intimately united to the Soul* exhibits them to it; than when it is only said they are by the appointment of God produc'd in the Mind by certain motions of our Bodies, to which our Minds are united. Which however imperfect a way of explaining this Matter, will still be as good as any other that does not by clear Ideas remove my ignorance of the manner of my Perception.

5. But he says that *certainly material things cannot unite themselves to our Souls*. Our Bodies are united to our Souls, yes; but, says he, not after a *manner which is necessary that the Soul may perceive them*. Explain this manner of Union, and shew wherein the difference consists betwixt the Union necessary and not necessary to Perception, and then I shall confess this difficulty remov'd.

The Reason that he gives why *material things cannot be united to our Souls after a manner that is necessary to the Souls per-*  
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ceiving them, is this, *viz.* That *material things being extended, and the Soul not, there is no proportion between them*. This, if it shews any thing, shews only that a Soul and a Body cannot be united, because one has Surface to be united by, and the other none. But it shews not why a Soul united to a Body, as ours is, cannot, by that Body, have the Idea of a Triangle excited in it, as well as by being united to God (between whom and the Soul there is as little proportion, as between any Creature immaterial or material and the Soul) see in God the Idea of a Triangle that is in him, since we cannot conceive a Triangle whether seen in Matter, or in God, to be without extension.

6. He says, *There is no Substance purely intelligible but that of God*. Here again I must confess my self in the dark, having no notion at all of the *Substance of God*; nor being able to conceive how his is more intelligible than any other Substance.

7. One thing more there is, which, I confess, stumbles me in the very Foundation of this Hypothesis, which stands thus; we cannot *perceive* any thing but what is *intimately united to the Soul*. The reason why some things, (*viz.* material) cannot be *intimately united to the Soul*, is, because *there is no proportion between the Soul and them*.

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If this be a good Reason, it follows, that the greater the proportion there is between the Soul and any other being, the better, and more intimately they can be united. Now then I ask, whether there be a greater proportion between God, an infinite Being, and the Soul, or between finite created Spirits and the Soul. And yet the Author says, that *he believes that there is no Substance purely intelligible but that of God, and that we cannot intirely know created Spirits at present.* Make this out upon your Principles of *Intimate Union and Proportion*, and then they will be of some use to the clearing of your Hypothesis, otherwise *Intimate Union and Proportion* are only Sounds serving to amuse, not instruct us.

8. In the close of this Chapter he enumerates the several ways whereby he thinks we come by Ideas, and compares them severally with his own way. Which how much more intelligible it is than either of those, the following Chapters will shew; to which I shall proceed, when I have observ'd that it seems a bold determination, when he says, that it must be one of these ways, and we can see Objects no other. Which Assertion must be built on this good Opinion of our Capacities; that God cannot make the Creatures operate, but in ways conceivable to us. That we cannot

discourse

discourse and reason about them farther that we conceive, is a great Truth: And 'twould be well if we would not, but would ingenuously own the shortness of our sight where we do not see. To say there can be no other, because we conceive no other, does not, I confess, much instruct. And if I should say, that 'tis possible God has made our Souls so, and so united them to our Bodies, that upon certain motions made in our Bodies by external Objects, the Soul should have such or such Perceptions or Ideas, though in a way unconceivable to us; this perhaps would appear as true and as instructive a Proposition as what is so positively laid down.

9. Though the Peripatetick Doctrine of *Species* does not at all satisfy me, yet I think it were not hard to shew, that it is as easie to account for the difficulties he charges on it, as for those his own Hypothesis is laden with. But it being not my business to defend what I do not understand, nor to prefer the Learned Gibbrish of the Schools, to what is yet unintelligible to me in *P. M.* I shall only take notice of so much of his Objections as concerns what I guess to be the truth. Though I do not think any material *Species* carrying the resemblance of things by a continual flux from the Body we perceive, bring the

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perception

perception of them to our Senses; yet I think the perception we have of Bodies at a distance from ours, may be accounted for, as far as we are capable of understanding it, by the motion of Particles of Matter coming from them and striking on our Organs. In Feeling and Tasting there is immediate contact. Sound is not unintelligibly explain'd by a vibrating motion communicated to the Medium, and the Effluviiums of odorous Bodies, will, without any great difficulties, account for Smells. And therefore *P. M.* makes his Objections only against visible *Species*, as the most difficult to be explain'd by material Causes, as indeed they are. But he that shall allow extream smalness in the Particles of Light, and exceeding swiftnes in their Motion; and the great Porosity that must be granted in Bodies, if we compare Gold which wants them not, with Air, the medium wherein the Rays of Light come to our Eyes, and that of a Million of Rays that rebound from any visible Area of any Body, perhaps the  $\frac{1}{1000}$  or  $\frac{1}{10000}$  part coming to the Eye, are enough to move the *Retina* sufficiently to cause a sensation in the Mind, will not find any great difficulty in the Objections are brought from the impenetrability of Matter; and these Rays ruffling and breaking one another in the Medium which is full of them. As to what

what is said, that from one Point we can see a great number of Objects, that is no Objection against the *Species*, or visible Appearances of Bodies being brought into the Eye by the Rays of Light; for the bottom of the Eye or *Retina*, which, in regard of these Rays, is the place of Vision, is far from being a Point. Nor is it true, that though the Eye be in any one place, yet that the sight is performed in one Point; *i.e.* that the Rays that bring those visible *Species* do all meet in a Point; for they cause their distinct Sensations, by striking on distinct parts of the *Retina*, as is plain in Opticks; and the Figure they paint there must be of some considerable bigness, since it takes up on the *Retina*, an Area whose Diameter is at least thirty Seconds of a Circle, whereof the Circumference is in the *Retina*, and the Center somewhere in the Crystalline; as a little skill in Opticks will manifest to any one that considers that few Eyes can perceive an Object less than thirty Minutes of a Circle, whereof the Eye is the Center. And he that will but reflect on that seeming odd Experiment of seeing only the two outward ones of three bits of Paper stuck up against a Wall, at about half a Foot, or a Foot one from another, without seeing the middle one at all, whilst his Eye remains fixed in the same posture, must

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confess that Vision is not made in a Point, when 'tis plain, that looking with one Eye there is always one part between the extreams of the *Area* that we see, which is not seen at the same time that we perceive the extreams of it; though the looking with two Eyes, or the quick turning of the *Axis* of the Eye to the part we would distinctly view, when we look but with one, does not let us take notice of it.

10. What I have here said I think sufficient to make intelligible, how by material Rays of Light visible *Species* may be brought into the Eye, notwithstanding any of *P.M.*'s Objections, against so much of material Causes, as my *Hypothesis* is concern'd in. But when by this means an Image is made on the *Retina*, how we see it, I conceive no more than when I am told we see it in God. How we see it, is I confess, what I understand not in the one or in the other, only it appears to me more difficult to conceive a distinct visible Image in the uniform unvariable Essence of God, than in variously modifiable Matter; but the manner how I see either, still 'scapes my Comprehension. Impressions made on the *Retina* by Rays of Light, I think I understand; and motions from thence continued to the Brain may be conceived, and that these produce Ideas in our Minds, I am persuaded, but in a manner

to me incomprehensible. This I can resolve only into the good pleasure of God, whose ways are past finding out. And, I think, I know it as well when I am told these are Ideas that the motion of the Animal Spirits, by a Law establish'd by God, produces in me, as when I am told they are Ideas I see in God. The Ideas 'tis certain I have, and God both ways is the original Cause of my having them; but the manner how I come by them, how it is that I perceive, I confess I understand not; though it be plain Motion has to do in the producing of them: And Motion so modified, is appointed to be the cause of our having of them; as appears by the curious and artificial Structure of the Eye accommodated to all the Rules of Refraction and Dioptricks, that so visible Objects might be exactly and regularly painted on the bottom of the Eye.

11. The change of bigness in the Ideas of visible Objects, by Distance and Optick-Glasses, which is the next Argument he uses against visible Species, is a good Argument against them, as suppos'd by the Peripateticks, but when consider'd, would persuade one that we see the Figures and Magnitudes of things rather in the bottom of our Eyes than in God; the Idea we have of them and their Grandeur being still proportion'd to the bigness of the *Area*, on



the bottom of our Eyes, that is affected by the Rays which paint the Image there, and we may be said to see the Picture in the *Retina*, as when it is prick'd, we are truly said to feel the pain in our Finger.

12. In the next place where he says, that when we look on a Cube *we see all its sides equal*. This, I think, is a mistake; and I have in another place shewn, how the Idea we have from a regular Solid, is not the true Idea of that Solid, but such an one as by Custom (as the name of it does,) serves to excite our Judgment to form such an one.

13. What he says of seeing an Object several millions of Leagues, the very same instant that it is uncover'd, I think may be shewn to be a mistake in matter of fact. For by Observations made on the *Satellites of Jupiter*, it is discover'd that Light is successively propagated, and is about ten Minutes coming from the Sun to us.

14. By what I have said I think it may be understood how we may conceive, that from remote Objects material Causes may reach our Senses, and therein produce several motions that may be the causes of Ideas in us; notwithstanding what *P. M.* has said in this second Chapter against material Species. I confess his Arguments are good against those Species as usually understood

derstood by the Peripateticks. But since my Principles have been said to be conformable to the *Aristotelian* Philosophy, I have endeavour'd to remove the difficulties it is charged with as far as my Opinion is concern'd in them.

15. His third Chapter is to confute the Opinion of those who think our Minds have a power to produce the Ideas of things on which they would think, and that they are excited to produce them by the impressions which Objects make on the Body. One who thinks Ideas are nothing but Perceptions of the Mind annexed to certain motions of the Body by the Will of God, who hath order'd such Perceptions always to accompany such motions, though we know not how they are produced, does in effect conceive those Ideas or Perceptions to be only Passions of the Mind, when produced in it, whether we will or no, by external Objects. But he conceives them to be a mixture of Action and Passion when the Mind attends to them or revives them in the Memory. Whether the Soul has such a Power as this, we shall perhaps have occasion to consider hereafter; and this Power our Author does not deny, since in this very Chapter he says, *When we conceive a Square by pure understanding, we can yet imagine it, i. e. perceive it in our selves by tracing an Image of it on the Brain* Here then

then he allows the Soul power to trace Images on the Brain, and perceive them. This, to me, is Matter of new perplexity in his Hypothesis; for if the Soul be so united to the Brain as to trace Images on it, and perceive them, I do not see how this consists with what he says a little before in the first Chapter, *viz. That certainly material things cannot be united to our Souls after a manner necessary to its perceiving them.*

16. That which is said about Objects exciting Ideas in us by motion; and our reviving the Ideas we have once got in our Memories, does not, I confess, fully explain the manner how it is done. In this I frankly avow my Ignorance, and should be glad to find in him any thing that would clear it to me; but in his Explications I find these difficulties which I cannot get over.

17. The Mind cannot produce Ideas, says he, because they are *real Spiritual Beings*, i. e. Substances; for so the Conclusion of that Paragraph where he mentions it as an Absurdity to think they are *annihilated when they are not present to the Mind*. And the whole force of this Argument would persuade one to understand him so; though I do not remember that he any where speaks it out, or in direct terms calls them Substances.

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18. I shall here only take notice how inconceivable it is to me, that a Spiritual, *i. e.* an unextended Substance should represent to the Mind an extended Figure, *v. g.* a Triangle of unequal sides, or two Triangles of different Magnitudes. Next, supposing I could conceive an unextended Substance to represent a Figure, or be the Idea of a Figure, the difficulty still remains to conceive how it is my Soul sees it. Let this substantial Being be ever so sure, and the Picture never so clear; yet how we see it, is to me unconceivable. Intimate Union were it as intelligible of two unextended Substances, as of two Bodies, would not yet reach Perception, which is something beyond Union. But yet a little lower he *agrees*, that an Idea *is not a Substance*, but yet affirms, 'tis a *Spiritual thing*: This *Spiritual thing* therefore must either be a *Spiritual Substance*, or a Mode of a Spiritual Substance, or a Relation; for besides these I have no Conception of any thing. And if any shall tell me it is a *Mode*, it must be a Mode of the Substance of God; which, besides that it will be strange to mention any Modes in the simple Essence of God; whosoever shall propose any such Modes, as a way to explain the Nature of our Ideas, proposes to me something unconceivable, as a means to conceive what I do not yet know; and

and so bating a new Phrase, teaches me nothing, but leaves me as much in the dark as one can be where he conceives nothing. So that supposing Ideas real Spiritual things never so much, if they are neither Substances nor Modes, let them be what they will, I am no more instructed in their Nature, than when I am told they are Perceptions, such as I find them. And I appeal to my Reader whether that Hypothesis be to be prefer'd for its easiness to be understood, which is explain'd by real Beings, that are neither Substances nor Modes?

19. In the fourth Chapter he proves, that we do not see Objects by Ideas that are created with us; because the Ideas we have even of one very simple Figure, *v. g.* a Triangle, are not infinite, though there may be infinite Triangles. What this proves I will not here examine; but the reason he gives being built on his Hypotheses, I cannot get over, and that is, *That 'tis not for want of Ideas, or that infinite is not present to us, but 'tis only for want of Capacity and Extension of our Souls, because the Extension of our Spirits is very narrow and limited.* To have a limited Extension, is to have some Extension which agrees but ill with what is before said of our Souls, that they have no Extension. By what he says here and in other places, one would think he

were

were to be understood, as if the Soul being but of a small Extension could not at once receive all the Ideas conceivable in infinite space, because but a little part of that infinite Space can be apply'd to the Soul at once. To conceive thus of the Souls intimate Union with an infinite Being, and by that Union receiving of Ideas, leads one as naturally into as gross Thoughts, as a Country Maid would have of an infinite Butter-print, in which was ingraven Figures of all Sorts and Sizes, the several parts whereof being, as there was occasion, apply'd to her lump of Butter, left on it the Figure or Idea there was present need of. But whether any one would thus explain our Ideas, I will not say, only I know not well how to understand what he says here, with what he says before of *Union* in a better Sense.

20. He farther says, that had we a Magazin of all Ideas that are necessary for seeing things, they would be of no use, since the Mind could not know which to choose, and set before it self to see the Sun. What he here means by the Sun is hard to conceive, and according to his Hypothesis of *Seeing all things in God*, how can he know that there is any such real Being in the World as the Sun? Did he ever see the Sun? No, but on occasion of the presence of

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of the Sun to his Eyes, he has seen the Idea of the Sun in God, which God has exhibited to him; but the Sun, because it cannot be united to his Soul, he cannot see. How then does he know that there is a Sun which he never saw? And since God does all things by the most compendious ways, what need is there that God should make a Sun that we might see its Idea in him when he pleas'd to exhibit it, when this might as well be done without any real Sun at all.

21. He farther says, that God does not actually produce in us as many new Ideas as we every moment perceive different things. Whether he has prov'd this or no, I will not examine.

22. But he says, That *we have at all times actually in our selves the Ideas of all things.* Then we have always actually in our selves the Ideas of all Triangles, which was but now denied, *but we have them confusedly.* If we see them in God and they are not in him confusedly, I do not understand how we can see them in God confusedly.

23. In the fifth Chapter he tells us *all things are in God,* even the most Corporeal and Earthly, but *after a manner altogether Spiritual, and which we cannot comprehend.* Here therefore He and I are alike ignorant of these good words, *material things are in*  
God

*God after a Spiritual manner,* signifie nothing to either of us; and *Spiritual manner,* signifies no more but this, that material things are in God immaterially. This and the like are ways of speaking, which our vanity has found out to cover, not remove our Ignorance. But *material things are in God,* because *their Ideas are in God, and those Ideas which God had of them before the World was created, are not at all different from himself.* This seems to me to come very near saying, not only that there is variety in God, since we see variety in what is *not different from himself,* but that material things are God, or a part of him; which, though I do not think to be what our Author designs, yet thus I fear he must be forc'd to talk, who thinks he knows God's Understanding so much better than his own, that he will make use of the Divine Intellect to explain the Human.

24. In the sixth Chapter he comes more particularly to explain his own Doctrine, where first he says, *the Ideas of all Beings are in God.* Let it be so, God has the Idea of a Triangle, of a Horse, of a River just as we have; for hitherto this signifies no more, for we see them as they are in him; and so the Ideas that are in him, are the Ideas we perceive. Thus far I then understand God hath the same Ideas we have. This tells

tells us indeed that there are Ideas, which was agreed before, and I think no body denies, but tells me not yet what they are.

25. Having said that they are in God, the next thing he tells us is, that we can see them in God. His proof, that our Souls can see them in God, is because God is most straitly united to our Souls by his Presence, insomuch that one may say, God is the place of Spirits, as Spaces are the places of Bodies. In which there is not, I confess, one word that I can understand. For, First, In what sense can he say, that Spaces are the places of Bodies; when he makes Body and Space, or Extension to be the same thing. So that I do no more understand what he means, when he says, Spaces are the places of Bodies, than if he had said, Bodies are the places of Bodies. But when this Simile is apply'd to God and Spirits, it makes this saying, that God is the place of Spirits either to be merely Metaphorical, and so signifies literally nothing, or else being literal, makes us conceive that Spirits move up and down, and have their distances and intervals in God, as Bodies have in Space. When I am told in which of these Senses he is to be understood, I shall be able to see how far it helps us to understand the nature of Ideas. But is not God as straitly united to Bodies as to Spirits? For he is al-

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so present, even where they are, but yet they see not these Ideas in him. He therefore adds, *That the Soul can see in God the Works of God, supposing God would discover to it what there is in him to represent them,* viz. the Ideas that are in him. Union therefore is not the cause of this seeing; for the Soul may be united to God, and yet not see the Ideas are in him, 'till he discover them to it; so that after all I am but where I was. I have Ideas, that I know, but I would know what they are; and to that I am yet only told, that I see them in God. I ask how I see them in God? And 'tis answered, by my intimate Union with God, for he is every where present. I answer, if that were enough, Bodies are also intimately united with God, for he is every where present; besides, if that were enough, I should see all the Ideas that are in God. No, but only those that he pleases to discover. Tell me wherein this discovery lies, besides barely making me see them, and you explain the manner of my having Ideas: Otherwise all that has been said amounts to no more but this, that I have those Ideas that it pleases God I should have, but by ways that I know not; and of this Mind I was before, and am not got one jot farther.

26. In the next Paragraph he calls them *Beings, representative Beings*. But whether these Beings are Substances, Modes, or Relations, I am not told; and so by being told they are Spiritual Beings, I know no more but that they are something, I know not what, and that I knew before.

27. To explain this matter a little farther, he adds, *It must be observed, that it cannot be concluded, that Souls see the Essence of God, in that they see all things in God; because what they see is very imperfect, and God is very perfect. They see Matter divisible, figured, &c. and in God there is nothing divisible and figured: For God is all Being because he is Infinite, and comprehends all things; but he is not any Being in particular. Whereas what we see is but some one or more Beings in particular; and we do not at all comprehend that perfect simplicity of God which contains all Beings. Moreover, one may say, that we do not so much see the Ideas of things, as the things themselves, which the Ideas represent. For when, for Example, one sees a Square, one says not that one sees the Idea of a Square, which is united to the Soul, but only the Square that is without. I do not pretend not to be short-sighted; but if I am not duller than ordinary, this Paragraph shews, that P. M. himself is at a stand in this matter, and comprehends*

prehends not what it is we see in God, or how. C. 4. he says, in express words, that *it is necessary that at all times we should have actually in our selves the Ideas of all things*. And in this very Chapter, a little lower, he says, that *all Beings are present to our Minds*, and that we have *general Ideas antecedent to particular*. And, c. 8. that we are never without the *general Idea of Being*: And yet here he says, that *which we see is but one or more Beings in particular*. And after having taken a great deal of pains to prove, that *we cannot possibly see things themselves, but only Ideas*; here he tells us *we do not so much see the Ideas of things as the things themselves*. In this uncertainty of the Author what 'tis we see, I am to be excus'd, if my Eyes see not more clearly in his Hypothesis than he himself does.

28. He farther tells us in this sixth Chapter, that *we see all Beings, because God wills that That which is in him that represents them should be discover'd to us*. This tells us only, that there are Ideas of things in God, and that we see them when he pleases to discover them; but what does this shew us more of the Nature of those Ideas, or of the discovery of them, wherein that consists, than he that says, without pretending to know what they are, or how they are made, that Ideas are in our Minds

when God pleases to produce them there, by such motions as he has appointed to do it? The next Argument for our *seeing all things in God*, is in these words; *But the strongest of all the Reasons is the manner in which the Mind perceives all things: It is evident, and all the World knows it by Experience, that when we would think of any thing in particular, we at first cast our view upon all Beings, and afterwards we apply our selves to the consideration of the Object which we desire to think on.* This Argument has no other effect on me, but to make me doubt the more of the truth of this Doctrine. First, Because this which he calls the *strongest Reason of all*, is built upon matter of Fact, which I cannot find to be so in my self. I do not observe, that when I would think of a Triangle, I first think of *all Beings*; whether these words *all Beings* be to be taken here in their proper sense, or very improperly for *Being* in general. Nor do I think my Country Neighbours do so, when they first wake in the Morning, who, I imagine, do not find it impossible to think of a lame Horse they have, or their blighted Corn, till they have run over in their Mind *all Beings* that are, and then pitch on Dapple; or else begin to think of *Being* in general, which is *Being* abstracted from all its inferior

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riour Species, before they come to think of the Fly in their Sheep, or the Tares in their Corn. For I am apt to think that the greatest part of Mankind very seldom, if ever at all, think of *Being* in general, *i. e.* abstracted from all its inferior Species and Individuals. But taking it to be so, that a Carrier when he would think of a Remedy for his Gald-horse, or a Foot-boy for an Excuse for some fault he has committed, begins with casting his Eye upon all things; how does this make out the Conclusion? Therefore *we can desire to see all Objects, whence it follows, that all Beings are present to our Minds.* Which Presence signifies that we see them, or else it signifies nothing at all. They are all actually always seen by us; which, how true, let every one judge.

29. The words wherein he pursues this Argument stand thus, *Now it is indubitable that we cannot desire to see any particular Object without seeing it already, although confusedly, and in general. So that being able to desire to see all Beings, sometimes one, sometimes another, it is certain that all Beings are present to our Spirits; and it seems all Beings could not be present to our Spirits, but because God is present to it, i. e. he that contains all things in the simplicity of his Being.* I must leave it to others to judge how far it is blameable in me; but so it is, that

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I cannot make to my self the Links of this Chain to hang together; and methinks if a Man would have studied Obscurity, he could not have writ more unintelligible than this. *We can desire to see all Beings, sometimes one, sometimes another; therefore we do already see all things, because we cannot desire to see any particular Object, but what we see already confusedly and in general.* The Discourse here is about Ideas, which he says are real things and we see in God, I taking this along with me, to make it prove any thing, to his purpose, the Argument must, as it seems to me, stand thus: We can desire to have all Ideas, sometimes one, sometimes another; therefore we have already all Ideas, because we cannot desire to have any particular Idea, but what we have already *confusedly and in general.* What can be meant here by having any *particular Idea confusedly and in general,* I confess I cannot conceive, unless it be a Capacity in us to have them; and in that sense the whole Argument amounts to no more but this: We have all Ideas, because we are capable of having all Ideas, and so proves not at all that we actually have them by being united to God, who *contains them all in the simplicity of his Being.* That any thing else is, or can be meant by it, I do not see; for that which we desire to see, being

being nothing but what we see already (for if it can be any thing else, the Argument falls and proves nothing) and that which we desire to see, being, as we are told here, something particular, *sometimes one thing, sometimes another;* that which we do see must be particular too; but how to see a particular thing in general, is past my comprehension. I cannot conceive how a blind Man has the particular Idea of Scarlet confusedly or in general, when he has it not at all; and yet that he might desire to have it, I cannot doubt, no more than I doubt that I can desire to perceive, or to have the Ideas of those things that God has prepar'd for those that love him, tho' they be such as Eye hath not seen, nor Ear hath not heard, nor hath it enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive, such as I have yet no Idea of. He who desires to know what Creatures are in *Jupiter,* or what God hath prepar'd for them that love him, hath, 'tis true, a supposition that there is something in *Jupiter,* or in the place of the Blessed; but if that be to have the particular Ideas of things there, enough to say that we see them already, no body can be ignorant of any thing. He that has seen one thing hath seen all things; for he has got the general Idea of something. But this is not, I confess, sufficient to convince me, that



that hereby we see all things *in the simplicity of God's Being, which comprehends all things*. For if the Ideas I see are all, as our Author tells us, real Beings in him, 'tis plain they must be so many real distinct Beings in him; and if we see them in him, we must see them as they are, distinct particular things, and so shall not see them confusedly and in general. And what is it to see any Idea (to which I do not give a name) confusedly, is what I do not well understand. What I see I see, and the Idea I see is distinct from all others that are not the same with it: Besides, I see them as they are in God, and as he shews them me, Are they in God confusedly? or does he shew them me confusedly?

30. *Secondly, This seeing of all things, because we can desire to see all things, he makes a proof that they are present to our Minds; and if they be present, they can no ways be present but by the Presence of God, who contains them all in the simplicity of his Being.* This reasoning seems to be founded on this, that the reason of seeing all things, is their being present to our Minds; because God, in whom they are, is present. This, though the Foundation he seems to build on, is liable to a very natural Objection, which is, that then we should actually always see all things, because in God, who is present, they

they are all actually present to the Mind. This he has endeavour'd to obviate, by saying we see all the Ideas in God, which he is pleas'd to *discover to us*; which indeed is an answer to this Objection; but such an one as over-turns his whole Hypothesis and renders it useless and as unintelligible as any of those he has for that reason laid aside. He pretends to explain to us how we come to perceive any thing, and that is by having the Ideas of them present in our Minds; for the Soul cannot perceive things at a distance or remote from it. And those Ideas are present to the Mind, only because God, in whom they are, is present to the Mind. This so far hangs together, and is of a piece. But when after this I am told, that their Presence is not enough to make them be seen, but God must do something farther to discover them to me, I am as much in the dark as I was at first; and all this talk of their presence in my Mind explains nothing of the way wherein I perceive them, nor never will till he also makes me understand what God does more than make them present to my Mind, when he discovers them to me. For I think no Body denies, I am sure I affirm that the Ideas we have, are in our Minds by the Will and Power of God, though in a way that we conceive not, nor are

are able to comprehend. God, says our Author, is strictly united to the Soul, and so the Ideas of things too. But yet that Presence or Union of theirs is not enough to make them seen, but God must shew or exhibit them; and what does God do more than make them present to the Mind when he shews them? Of that there is nothing said to help me over this Difficulty, but that when God shews them, we see them; which in short seems to me to say only thus much, that when we have these Ideas we have them, and we owe the having of them to our Maker, which is to say no more than I do with my Ignorance. We have the Ideas of Figures and Colours by the Operation of exterior Objects on our Senses, when the Sun shews them us; but how the Sun shews them us, or how the Light of the Sun produces them in us; what, and how the Alteration is made in our Souls, I know not; nor does it appear by any thing our Author says, that he knows any more what God does when he shews them us, or what it is that is done upon our Minds, since the Presence of them to our Minds, he confesses, does it not.

31. *Thirdly*, One thing more is incomprehensible to me in this Matter, and that is, how the *Simplicity of God's Being* should contain in it a Variety of real Beings, so that

that the Soul can discern them in him distinctly one from another; it being said c. 5. That the Ideas in God *are not different from God himself*. This seems to me to express a Simplicity made up of Variety, a thing I cannot understand. God I believe to be a simple Being, that by his Wisdom knows all things, and by his Power can do all things; but how he does it, I think myself less able to comprehend, than to contain the Ocean in my Hand, or grasp the Universe with my Span. *Ideas are real Beings*, you say; if so, 'tis evident they must be distinct *real Beings*; for there is nothing more certain than that there are distinct Ideas; and they are in God, in whom we see them. There they are then actually distinct, or else we could not see them distinct in him. Now these distinct real Beings that are in God, are they either Parts or Modifications of the Deity, or comprehended in him as things in a place? For besides these three, I think we can scarce think of another way wherein we can conceive them to be in him, so that we can see them. For to say they are in him *eminenter*, is to say they are not in him actually and really to be seen, but only if they are in him *eminenter*, and we see them only in him, we can be said to see them only *eminenter* too. So that though it cannot be deny'd that  
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God sees and knows all things; yet when we say we see all things in him, it is but a metaphorical Expression to cover our Ignorance, in a way that pretends to explain our Knowledge; seeing things in God signifying no more than that we perceive them we know not how.

32. He farther adds, *That he does not believe that one can well give an account of the manner, wherein the Mind knows many abstract and general Truths, but by the Presence of him who can enlighten the Mind after a thousand different Fashions.* It is not to be deny'd that God can enlighten our Minds after a thousand different Fashions; and it cannot also be denied, that those thousand different Fashions may be such, as we comprehend not one of them. The Question is whether this talk of seeing all things in God does make us clearly, or at all, comprehend one of them; if it did so to me, I should gratefully acknowledge that then I was ignorant of nine hundred ninety nine of the thousand, whereas I must yet confess my self ignorant of them all.

33. The next Paragraph, if it proves any thing, seems to me to prove that the Idea we have of God is God himself, it being something as he says *uncreated.* The Ideas that Men have of God are so very different, that it would be very hard to say it was God himself.

self. Nor does it avail to say they would all have the same, if they would apply their Minds to the Contemplation of him; for this being brought here to prove that God is present to all Men's Minds, and that therefore they see him, it must also, in my Apprehension, prove that he being immutably the same, and they seeing him must needs see him all alike.

34. In the next Section we are told that we have *not only the Idea of Infinite, but before that of Finite.* This being a thing of Experience, every one must examine himself; and it being my misfortune to find it otherwise in myself, this Argument, of course, is like to have the less effect on me, who therefore cannot so easily admit the Inference, viz. *Thus the Mind perceives not one thing, but in the Idea it has of Infinite.* And I cannot but believe many a Child can tell twenty, have the Idea of a square Trencher, or a round Plate, and have the distinct clear Ideas of two and three, long before he has any Idea of *Infinite* at all.

40. The last Argument which he tells us is a Demonstration that we see all things in God, is this. *God has made all things for himself; but if God made a Spirit or Mind, and gave it the Sun for its Idea, or the immediate Object of its Knowledge, God would have made that Spirit or Mind for the Sun, and*  
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*not for himself.* The natural Inference from this Argument seems to me to be this, therefore God has given himself for the Idea, or immediate Object of the Knowledge of all humane Minds. But Experience too manifestly contradicting this, our Author hath made another Conclusion, and says thus, *It is necessary then that the Light which he gives the Mind, should make us know something that is in him, v. g. Because all things that come from God cannot be but for God.* Therefore a covetous Man sees in God the Money, and a Persian the Sun that he worships; and thus God is the *immediate Object* of the Minds, both of the one and the other. I confess this Demonstration is lost on me, and I cannot see the Force of it. All things 'tis true, are made for God, *i. e.* for his Glory; and he will be glorified even by those rational Beings, who would not apply their Faculties to the Knowledge of him.

41. But the next Paragraph explains this. *God could not then make a Soul for to know his works, were it not that that Soul sees God after a Fashion in seeing his Works, just after such a Fashion, that if he never saw more of him, he would never know any thing of a God, nor believe there was any such Being.* A Child, as soon as he is born, sees a Candle, or before he can speak, the Ball he plays with; these he *sees in God* whom

whom he has yet no Notion of. Whether this be enough to make us say that the Mind is made for God, and this be the Proof of it, other People must judge for themselves. I must own that if this were the Knowledge of God, which intelligent Beings were made for, I do not see but they might be made for the Knowledge of God without knowing any thing of him; and those that deny him, were made for the Knowledge of him. Therefore I am not convinced of the Truth of what follows, *That we do not see any one thing, but by the natural Knowledge which we have of God.* Which seems to me a quite contrary way of arguing to what the Apostle uses, where he says that *the invisible things of God, are seen by the visible things that he has made.* For it seems to me a quite contrary way of arguing, to say we see the Creator in, or by the Creatures, and we see the Creatures in the Creator. The Apostle begins our Knowledge in the Creatures, which lead us to the Knowledge of God, if we will make use of our Reason: Our Author begins our Knowledge in God, and by that leads us to the Creatures.

42. But to confirm his Argument, he says, *all the particular Ideas we have of the Creatures are but Limitations of the Idea of the Creator.* As for Example, I have the Idea of the Solidity of Matter, and of the

the Motion of Body, what is the Idea of God that either of these limits? And when I think of the Number ten, I do not see how that any way concerns or limits the Idea of God.

38. The Distinction he makes a little lower between *Sentiment* and *Idea*, does not at all clear to me, but cloud his Doctrine. His words are, *It must be observed, that I do not say that we have the Sentiment of material things in God, but that it is from God that acts in us; for God knows sensible things, but feels them not. When we perceive any sensible thing, there is in our Perception Sentiment and pure Idea.* If by *Sentiment*, which is the word he uses in French, he means the Act of Sensation, or the Operation of the Soul in perceiving; and by *pure Idea*, the immediate Object of that Perception, which is the Definition of Ideas he gives us here in the first Chapter, there is some Foundation for it, taking Ideas for real Beings or Substances. But taken thus, I cannot see how it can be avoided, but that we must be said to smell a Rose in God, as well as to see a Rose in God; and the Scent of the Rose that we smell, as well as the Colour and Figure of the Rose that we see, must be in God; which seems not to be his Sense here, and does not well agree with what he says concerning the Ideas we see in God, which

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I shall consider in its due place. If by *Sentiment* here he means something that is neither the Act of Perception nor the Idea perceived, I confess I know not what it is, nor have any Conception at all of it. When we see and smell a Violet, we perceive the Figure, Colour and Scent of that Flower. Here I cannot but ask whether all these three are *pure Ideas*, or all *Sentiments*? If they are all *Ideas*, then according to his Doctrine they are all in God; and then it will follow, that as I see the Figure of the Violet in God, so also I see the Colour of it, and smell the Scent of it in God, which way of speaking he does not allow, nor can I blame him. For it shews a little too plainly the Absurdity of that Doctrine, if he should say we smell a Violet, taste Wormwood, or feel Cold in God; and yet I can find no Reason why the Action of one of our Senses is apply'd only to God, when we use them all as well as our Eyes in receiving Ideas. If the Figure, Colour and Smell are all of them *Sentiments*, then they are none of them in God, and so this whole Business of seeing in God is out of Doors. If (as by what he says in his *Eclaircissements*, it appears to me to be his Meaning) the Figure of the Violet be to be taken for an *Idea*, but its *Colour* and *Smell* for *Sentiments*. I confess it puzzles me to know by what

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Rule it is, that in a Violet the purple Colour, whereof whilst I write this I seem to have as clear an Idea in my Mind as of its Figure, is not as much an Idea as the Figure of it; especially, since he tells me in the first Chapter here, which is concerning the Nature of Ideas, that *by this word Idea he understands here nothing else, but what is the immediate or nearest Object of the Mind when it perceives any thing.*

39. The *Sentiment*, says he in the next words, *is a Modification of our Soul.* This word *Modification* here, that comes in for Explication, seems to me to signify nothing more than the word to be explain'd by it; *V. g.* I see the purple Colour of a Violet, this, says he, is *Sentiment*: I desire to know what *Sentiment* is; that, says he, is a *Modification of the Soul.* I take the word, and desire to see what I can conceive by it concerning my Soul; and here, I confess, I can conceive nothing more, but that I have the Idea of Purple in my Mind, which I had not before, without being able to apprehend any thing the Mind does or suffers in this, besides barely having the Idea of Purple; and so the good word *Modification* signifies nothing to me more than I knew before; *v. g.* That I have now the Idea of Purple in it, which I had not some Minutes since. So that though they say Sensations are Mo-

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difications of the Mind, yet having no manner of Idea what that Modification of the Mind is, distinct from that very Sensation, *v. g.* the Sensation of a red Colour or a bitter Taste. 'Tis plain this Explication amounts to no more than that a Sensation is a Sensation, and the Sensation of red or bitter is the Sensation of *red* or *bitter*; for if I have no other Idea when I say it is a Modification of the Mind, than when I say it is the Sensation of *red* or *bitter*, 'tis plain Sensation and Modification stand both for the same Idea, and so are but two Names of one and the same thing. But to examine their Doctrine of Modification a little farther. Different Sentiments are different Modifications of the Mind. The Mind or Soul that perceives is one immaterial indivisible Substance. Now I see the white and black on this Paper, I hear one singing in the next Room, I feel the Warmth of the Fire I sit by, and I taste an Apple I am eating, and all this at the same time. Now I ask, take *Modification* for what you please, can the same unextended indivisible Substance have different, nay inconsistent and opposite (as these of white and black must be) Modifications at the same time? Or must we suppose distinct parts in an indivisible Substance, one for black, another for white, and another for red Ideas, and so of the

rest of those Infinite Sensations which we have in Sorts and Degrees; all which we can distinctly perceive, and so are distinct Ideas, some whereof are opposite, as Heat and Cold, which yet a Man may feel at the same time? I was Ignorant before how Sensation was performed in us, this they call an Explanation of it. Must I say now I understand it better? If this be to cure ones Ignorance, 'tis a very slight Disease, and the Charm of two or three insignificant words will at any time remove it, *probatum est*. But let it signify what it will when I recollect the Figure of one of the Leaves of a Violet, is not that a new Modification of my Soul, as well as when I think of its purple Colour? Does my Mind do or suffer nothing anew when I see that Figure in God?

40. The Idea of that Figure, you say, is in God; let it be so, but it may be there, and I not see it, that's allow'd; when I come to see it, which I did not before, is there no new Modification, as you call it, of my Mind? If there be, then seeing of Figure in God, as well as having the Idea of Purple, is a *Modification of the Mind*, and this Distinction signifies nothing. If seeing that Figure in God now, which a Minute or two since I did not see at all, be no new Modification or Alteration in my Mind, no different Action or Passion from what was be-

before, there is no difference made in my Apprehension between seeing and not seeing. The Ideas of Figures, our Author says, are in God, and are real Beings in God; and God being united to the Mind, these are also united to it. This all seems to me to have something very obscure and unconceivable in it when I come to examine Particulars; but let it be granted to be as clear as any one would suppose it; yet it reaches not the main Difficulty, which is in *seeing*. How after all do I see? The Ideas are in God, they are real things, they are intimately united to my Mind, because God is so, but yet I do not see them. How at last after all this Preparation, which hitherto is ineffectual, do I come to see them? And to that I am told, *when God is pleased to discover them to me*. This in good earnest seems to me to be nothing but going a great way about to come to the same place, and this learned Circuit thus set out, brings me at last no farther than this, That I see or perceive, or have Ideas when it pleases God I should, but in a way I cannot comprehend; and this I thought without all this ado.

41. This *Sentiment* he tells us in the next words, *'tis God causes in us, and he can cause it in us, although he has it not, because he sees in the Idea that he has of our Soul, that it is capable of them*. This I take to be said to shew

the Difference between *Sentiments* and *Ideas* in us. *V. g.* *Figures* and *Numbers* are *Ideas*, and they are in God. *Colours* and *Smells*, &c. are *Sentiments* in us, and not *Ideas* in God. *First*, As to our selves I ask, Why when I recollect in my memory a Violet, the purple Colour as well as Figure is not an *Idea* in me? The making then the Picture of any visible thing in my Mind, as of a Landſcape I have ſeen, compos'd of Figure and Colour, the Colour is not an *Idea*, but the Figure is an *Idea*, and the Colour a *Sentiment*. Every one I allow may uſe his words as he pleaſes, but if it be to instruct others, he muſt when he uſes two words where others uſe but one, ſhew ſome Ground of the Diſtinction. And I do not find but the Colour of the Marigold I now think of, is as much *the immediate Object of my Mind*, as its Figure; and ſo according to his Definition is an *Idea*. Next as to God, I ask whether before the Creation of the World, the *Idea* of the whole Marigold Colour as well as Figure was not in God? *God*, ſays he, *can cauſe thoſe Sentiments in us, becauſe he ſees in the Idea that he has of our Soul, that it is capable of them.* God before he created any Soul, knew all that he would make it capable of. He reſolv'd to make it capable of having the Perception of the Colour as well as Figure of a Marigold; he had then the

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*Idea* of that Colour that he reſolv'd to make it capable of, or elſe he made it capable (with reverence let it be ſpoken) of he knew not what: And if he knew what it ſhould be capable of, he had the *Idea* of what he knew, for before the Creation there was nothing but God, and the *Ideas* he had. 'Tis true the Colour of that Flower is not actually in God, no more is its Figure actually in God; but we that can conſider no other underſtanding, but in analogy to our own, cannot conceive otherwiſe but as the *Ideas* of the Figure, Colour and Situation of the Leaves of a Marigold is in our Minds, when we think of that Flower in the Night when we ſee it not; ſo it was in the Thoughts of God before he made that Flower. And thus we conceive him to have the *Idea* of the Smell of a Violet, of the Taſte of Sugar, the Sound of a Lute or Trumpet, and of the Pain and Pleaſure that accompanies any of theſe or other Senſations which he deſign'd we ſhould feel, though he never felt any of them, as we have the *Ideas* of the Taſte of a Cherry in Winter, or of the Pain of a Burn when it is over. This is what I think we conceive of the *Ideas* in God, which we muſt allow to have diſtinctly repreſented to him all that was to be in time, and conſequently the Colours, Odours, and other *Ideas* they were to produce in us.

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It cannot be so bold as to pretend to say what those Ideas are in God, or to determine that they are real Beings; but this I think I may say, that the Idea of the Colour of a Marigold, or the motion of a Stone, are as much real Beings in God, as the Idea of the Figure or Number of its Leaves.

42. The Reader must not blame me for making use here all along of the word *Sentiment*, which is our Author's own, and I understood it so little, that I knew not how to translate it into any other. He concludes, *That he believes there is no appearance of truth in any other ways of explaining these things, and that his of seeing all things in God, is more than probable.* I have considered with as much Indifferency and Attention as is possible; and I must own it appears to me as little or less intelligible than any of the rest; and the summary of his Doctrine, which he here subjoyns, is to me wholly incomprehensible. His words are, *Thus our Souls depend on God all manner of ways: For as it is he which makes them feel Pleasure and Pain, and all other Sensations, by the natural Union which he has made between them and our Bodies, which is nothing else but his Decree and general Will. So it is he, who by the natural Union which he has made betwixt the Will of Man, and the representation of Ideas, which*

*the Immensity of the Divine Being contains, makes them know all that they know; and this natural Union is also nothing but his general Will.* This Phrase of the Union of our Wills to the Ideas contain'd in God's Immensity, seems to me a very strange one, and what light it gives to his Doctrine I truly cannot find. It seem'd so unintelligible to me, that I guess'd it an Error in the Print of the Edition I us'd, which was the 4<sup>e</sup>. Printed at *Paris*, 78, and therefore consulted the 8<sup>e</sup>. Printed also at *Paris*, and found it *Will* in both of them. Here again *the Immensity of the Divine Being* being mention'd as that which contains in it the Ideas to which our *Wills* are united; which Ideas being only those of Quantity, as I shall shew hereafter, seems to me to carry with it a very gross Notion of this matter, as we have above remark'd. But that which I take notice of principally here, is, that this Union of our *Wills* to the Ideas contain'd in God's Immensity, does not at all explain our seeing of them. This Union of our *Wills* to the Ideas, or, as in other places of our Souls to God, is, says he, nothing but the Will of God. And after this Union, our seeing them is only when God discovers them, *i. e.* our having them in our Minds, is nothing but the Will of God; all which is brought about in a way

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we comprehend not. And what then does this explain more than when one says, our Souls are united to our Bodies by the Will of God, and by the motion of some Parts of our Bodies? *V. g.* the Nerves or animal Spirits have Ideas or Perceptions produc'd in them, and this is the Will of God. Why is not this as intelligible and as clear as the other? Here is the Will of God given, Union and Perception in both Cases; but how that Perception is made in both ways, seems to me equally incomprehensible. In one, God discovers Ideas in himself to the Soul united to him when he pleases; and in the other, he discovers Ideas to the Soul, or produces Perception in the Soul united to the Body by motion, according to Laws establish'd by the good Pleasure of his Will; but how it is done in the one or the other, I confess my incapacity to comprehend. So that I agree perfectly with him in his Conclusion, that *there is nothing but God that can enlighten us*; but a clear comprehension of the manner how he does it, I doubt I shall not have, 'till I know a great deal more of him and my self, than in this state of darkness and ignorance our Souls are capable of.

43. In the next, *Chap. 7.* he tells us, *there are four ways of knowing; the first is to know things by themselves*; and thus, he says,

says, *We know God alone*; and the reason he gives of it is this, because *at present he alone penetrates the Mind, and discovers himself to it.*

*First,* I would know what it is to penetrate a thing that is unextended. These are ways of speaking, which taken from Body, when they are apply'd to Spirit, signify nothing, nor shew us any thing but our Ignorance. To God's penetrating our Spirits, he joyns his *discovering himself*; as if one were the cause of the other, and explain'd it: But I not conceiving any thing of the penetration of an unextended thing, it is lost upon me. But next God penetrates our Souls, and therefore we *see him by a direct and immediate view*, as he says in the following words. The Ideas of all things which are in God, he elsewhere tells us, are not at all different from God himself; and if God's penetrating our Minds be the cause of our direct and immediate seeing God, we have a direct and immediate view of all that we see; for we see nothing but God and Ideas; and 'tis impossible for us to know that there is any thing else in the Universe; for since we see, and can see nothing but God and Ideas, how can we know there is any thing else which we neither do nor can see? But if there be any thing to be understood by this *penetration* of

of our Souls, and have direct view of God by this *penetration*, why have we not also a *direct and immediate view* of other separate Spirits besides God? To this he says, that there is none but God alone who at present penetrates our Spirits. This he says, but I do not see for what reason, but because it suits with his Hypothesis: But he proves it not, nor goes about to do it, unless the *direct and immediate view*, he says, we have of God, be to be taken as a proof of it. But what is *that direct and immediate view* we have of God that we have not of a Cherubim? The Ideas of Being, Power, Knowledge, Goodness, Duration, make up the Complex Idea we have of one and of the other; but only that in the one we joyn the Idea of infinite to each simple Idea, that makes our Complex one, but to the other, that of finite. But how have we a more *direct or immediate view* of the Idea of Power, Knowledge, or Duration, when we consider them in God, than when we consider them in an Angel? The view of these Ideas seem to be the same. Indeed we have a clearer proof of the Existence of God than of a Cherubim, but the Idea of either, when we have it in our Minds, seems to me to be there by an equally *direct and immediate view*. And 'tis about the Ideas which are in our Minds that I think

think our Author's enquiry here is, and not about the real Existence of those things whereof we have Ideas, which are two very remote things.

45. *Perhaps 'tis God alone*, says our Author, *who can enlighten our Minds by his Substance*. When I know what the *Substance* of God is, and what it is to be *enlightened by that Substance*, I shall know what I also shall think of it; but at present I confess my self in the dark as to this matter; nor do these good words of *Substance* and *Enlightening* in the way they are here us'd, help me one jot out of it.

46. He goes on, *one cannot conceive*, says he, *that any thing created can represent what is infinite*. And I cannot conceive that there is any positive comprehensive Idea in any finite Mind that does represent it fully and clearly as it is. I do not find that the Mind of Man has Infinity, positively and fully represented to it, or comprehended by it; which must be, if his Argument were true, that therefore God enlightens our Minds by his proper Substance; because no created thing is big enough to represent what is infinite; and therefore what makes us conceive his Infinity, is the presence of his own infinite Substance in our Minds: Which to me manifestly supposes, that we comprehend in our Minds God's infinite Substance,

Substance, which is present to our Minds; for if this be not the force of his Argument, where he says, *Nothing created can represent what is infinite; the Being that is without bounds, the Being immense, the Being universal, cannot be perceived by an Idea, i. e. by a particular Being, by a Being different from the universal infinite Being it self.* It seems to me that this Argument is founded on a supposition of our comprehending the infinite Substance of God in our Minds, or else I see not any force in it, as I have already said. I shall take notice of one or two things in it that confound me, and that is, that he calls God here *the universal Being*; which must either signify that Being which contains, and is made up as one comprehensive aggregate of all the rest, in which sense the Universe may be call'd *the universal Being*; or else it must mean Being in general, which is nothing but the Idea of *Being* abstracted from all inferiour divisions of that general Notion, and from all particular Existence. But in neither of these senses can I conceive God to be *the universal Being*, since I cannot think the Creatures either to be a Part or a Species of him. Next he calls the Ideas that are in God, *particular Beings*. I grant whatever exists is particular, it cannot be otherwise; but that which is particular in  
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Existence, may be universal in representation; which I take to be all the universal Beings we know, or can conceive to be. But let *universal* and *particular Beings* be what they will, I do not see how our Author can say, that God is an *universal Being*, and the Ideas we see in him *particular Beings*; since he in another place tells us, that the Ideas we see in God are not at all different from God. *But, says he, as to particular Beings it is not hard to conceive that they can be represented by the infinite Being which contains them, and contains them after a very spiritual manner, and consequently very intelligible.* It seems as impossible to me, that an infinite simple Being, in whom there is no variety nor shadow of variety, should represent a finite Thing, as that a finite Thing should represent an infinite; nor do I see how its *containing all things in it after a very spiritual manner, makes it so very intelligible*; since I understand not what it is to contain a material thing *Spiritually*, nor the manner how God contains any thing in himself, but either as an aggregate contains all things which it is made up of; and so indeed that part of him may be seen, which comes within reach of our view. But this way of *containing all things* can by no means belong to God, and to make things thus visible in him, is to make the material World  
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a part of him : Or else as having a power to produce all things, and in this way, 'tis true, God contains all things in himself, but in a way not proper to make the *Being* of God a representative of those things to us; for then his *Being* being the representative of the effects of that Power, it must represent to us all that he is capable of producing, which I do not find in my self that it does.

Secondly, *The second way of knowing things*, he tells us, is by *Ideas*, that is by something that is different from them; and thus we know things when they are not intelligible by themselves, either because they are Corporeal, or because they cannot penetrate the Mind, or discover themselves to it; and this is the way we know Corporeal things. This Reasoning I do not understand, First, Because I do not understand why a Line or a Triangle is not as intelligible as any thing that can be nam'd; for we must still carry along with us, that the Discourse here is about our Perception, or what we have any Idea or Conception of in our own Minds. Secondly, Because I do not understand what is meant by the penetrating a Spirit; and till I can comprehend these, upon which this reasoning is built, this reasoning cannot work on me. But from these Reasons he concludes, *thus it is in God, and by their Ideas*

*Ideas, that we see Bodies and their Properties; and 'tis for this reason that the knowledge we have of them is most perfect.* Whether others will think that what we see of Bodies, is seen in God, by seeing the Ideas of them that are in God, must be left to them. Why I cannot think so I have shewn; but the inference he makes here from it, I think few will assent to, that we know Bodies and their Properties most perfectly. For who is there that can say, he knows the Properties either of Body in general, or of any one particular Body perfectly? One property of Body in general is to have parts cohering and united together, for wherever there is Body, there is Cohesion of Parts; but who is there that perfectly understands that Cohesion? And as for particular Bodies, who can say that he perfectly understands Gold or a Loadstone, and all its properties? But to explain himself he says, *That the Idea we have of Extension, suffices to make us know all the Properties whereof Extension is capable, and that we cannot desire to have an Idea more distinct and more fruitful of Extension, of Figures, and of Motions, than that which God has given us of them.* This seems to me a strange proof that we see Bodies and their Properties in God, and know them perfectly, because God has given us distinct and fruitful Ideas

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of Extension, Figure and Motion; for this had been the same whether God had given these Ideas by shewing them in himself, or by any other way; and his saying, that God has given us as *distinct and fruitful Ideas* of them as we can *desire*, seems as if our Author himself had some other thoughts of them. If he thought we see them in God, he must think we see them as they are in themselves, and there would be no room for saying, God had given them us as *distinct* as we could desire: The calling them *fruitful*, shews this yet more; for one that thinks he sees the Ideas of Figures in God, and can see no Idea of a Figure but in God, with what thought can he call any one of them *Fecunde*, which is said only of such things as produce others? Which Expression of his seems to proceed only from this thought in him, That when I have once got the Idea of Extension, I can frame the Ideas of what Figures and of what Bigness I please. And in this I agree with him, as appears in what I have said *L. 2. C. 13.* But then this can by no means proceed from a supposition, that I see these Figures only in God; for there they do not produce one another, but are there, as it were, in their first Pattern to be seen, just such, and so many as God is pleas'd to shew them to us. But 'twill be said, our desire to see them,

is the occasional Cause of God's shewing them us, and so we see whatever Figure we desire. Let it be so, this does not make any Idea *Fecunde*, for here is no production of one out of another. But as to the occasional Cause, can any one say that is so? I, or our Author, desire to see an Angle next in greatness to a right Angle; did upon this God ever shew him or me such an Angle? That God knows or has in himself the Idea of such an Angle, I think will not be deny'd; but that he ever shew'd it to any Man, how much soever he desir'd it, I think may be doubted. But after all, how comes it by this means that we have a *perfect knowledge of Bodies and their Properties*, when several Men in the World have not the same Idea of Body, and this very Author and I differ in it? He thinks bare Extension to be Body, and I think Extension alone makes not Body, but Extension and Solidity; thus either he, or I, one of us, has a wrong and imperfect knowledge of Bodies and their Properties. For if Bodies be Extension alone and nothing else, I cannot conceive how they can move and hit one against another, or what can make distinct Surfaces in an uniform simple Extension. A solid extended thing I can conceive moveable; but then if I have a clear view of Bodies and their Properties

in God, I must see the Idea of Solidity in God, which yet I think by what our Author has said in his *Eclaircissements*, he does not allow that we do. He says farther, *That whereas the Ideas of things that are in God contain all their Properties, he that sees their Ideas may see successively all their Properties.* This seems to me not to concern our Ideas more, whether we see them in God, or have them otherwise. Any Idea that we have, whencesoever we have it, contains in it all the Properties it has, which are nothing but the relations it has to other Ideas, which are always the same. What he says concerning the *Properties* that we may *successively know them*, is equally true, whether we see them in God, or have them by any other means. They that apply them as they ought to the consideration of their Ideas, may successively come to the knowledge of some of their Properties; but that they may *know all their Properties*, is more than I think the reason proves, which he subjoyns in these words, *For when one sees the things as they are in God, one sees them always in a most perfect manner.* We see for example in God the Idea of a Triangle or a Circle; does it hence follow, that we can know all the *Properties* of either of them? He adds, that the manner of seeing them *would be infinitely perfect, if the Mind which*

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sees them in God was infinite. I confess myself here not well to comprehend his distinction between seeing after a manner [*tres-parfait*] most perfect and infinitely perfect; he adds, *That which is wanting to the knowledge that we have of Extension, Figures and Motion, is not a defect of the Idea which represents it, but of our Mind which considers it.* If by *Ideas* be meant here the real Objects of our Knowledge, I easily agree, that the want of Knowledge in us is a defect in our Minds, and not in the things to be known. But if by *Ideas* be here meant the Perception or Representation of Things in the Mind, that I cannot but observe in my self to be very imperfect and defectuous, as when I desire to perceive what is the Substance of Body or Spirit, the Idea thereof fails me. To conclude, I see not what there is in this Paragraph that makes any thing for the Doctrine of *Seeing all things in God.*

47. *The third way of knowing is by Consciousness or interior Sentiments; and thus he says, we know our Souls, and 'tis for this Reason that the Knowledge we have of it is imperfect, we know nothing of our Souls but what we feel pass within our selves.* This Confession of our Author brings me back, do what I can, to that Original of all our Ideas which my Thoughts led me to

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when I writ my Book, viz. Sensation and Reflection; and therefore I am forced to ask any one who is of our Author's Principles, whether God had not the Idea of mine, or of an human Soul before he created it? Next, whether that Idea of an humane Soul be not as much a *real Being* in God as the Idea of a Triangle? If so, why does not my Soul, being intimately united to God, as well see the Idea of my Soul which is in him, as the Idea of a Triangle which is in him? And what Reason can there be given why God shews the Idea of a Triangle to us, and not the Idea of our Souls, but this, That God has given us external Sensation to perceive the one, and none to perceive the other, but only internal Sensation to perceive the Operation of the latter? He that pleases may read what our Author says in the remainder of this, and the two or three next Paragraphs, and see whether it carries him beyond where my Ignorance stop'd, I must own that me it does not.

48. *This, [i. e. the Ignorance we are in of our own Souls,] says he, may serve to prove that the Ideas that represent any thing to us that is without us are not Modifications of our Souls; for if the Soul saw all things by considering its own proper Modifications, it should know more clearly its own Essence, or its own Nature than that of Bodies, and all*

*the Sensations or Modifications whereof it is capable, than the Figures or Modifications of which Bodies are capable. In the mean time it knows not that it is capable of any such Sensation by sight as it has of it self, but only by Experience; instead that it knows that Extension is capable of an infinite Number of Figures by the Idea that it has of Extension. There are, moreover, certain Sensations, as Colours and Sounds, which the greatest part of Men cannot discover whether they are Modifications of the Soul; and there are Figures which all Men do not discover by the Idea of Extension to be Modifications of Bodies. This Paragraph is, as he tells us, to prove, That the Ideas that represent to us something without us, are not Modifications of the Souls; but instead of that, it seems to prove that Figure is the Modification of Space, and not of our Souls. For if this Argument had tended to prove, That the Ideas that represent any thing without us were not Modification of the Soul, he should not have put the Mind's not knowing what Modifications it self was capable of, and knowing what Figure's Space was capable of, in opposition one to another; but the Antithesis must have lain in this, that the Mind knew it was capable of the Perception of Figure or Motion without any Modification of it self, but was not capable of the Perception of Sound or Colour with-*



out a Modification of it self. For the Question here is not whether Space be capable of Figure, and the Soul not; but whether the Soul be capable of perceiving, or having the Idea of Figure without any Modification of it self, and not capable of having the Idea of Colour without a Modification of it self. I think now of the Figure, Colour and Hardness of a Diamond that I saw some time since: In this Case I desire to be informed how my Mind knows that the thinking on, or the Idea of the Figure, is not a Modification of the Mind; but the thinking on, or having an Idea of the Colour or Hardness, is a Modification of the Mind. 'Tis certain there is some Alteration in my Mind when I think of a Figure, which I did not think of before, as well as when I think on a Colour that I did not think of before. But one I am told is seeing it in God, and the other a Modification of my Mind. But supposing one is seeing in God, is there no Alteration in my Mind between seeing and not seeing? And is that to be call'd a Modification or no? For when he says seeing a Colour, and hearing a Sound is a Modification of the Mind, what does it signifie but an Alteration of the Mind from not perceiving to perceiving that sound or Colour? And so when the Mind sees a Triangle, which it did not see

see before, what is this but an Alteration of the Mind from not seeing to seeing, whether that Figure be seen in God or no? And why is not this Alteration of the Mind to be called a Modification, as well as the other? Or indeed what Service does that Word do us in the one Case or the other, when it is only a new Sound brought in without any new Conception at all? For my Mind when it sees a Colour or Figure is alter'd, I know, from the not having such or such a Perception to the having it; but when to explain this, I am told that either of these Perceptions is a Modification of the Mind, what do I conceive more, than that from not having such a Perception my Mind is come to have such a Perception? Which is what I as well knew before the word *Modification* was made use of, which by its use has made me conceive nothing more than what I conceived before.

49. One thing I cannot but take notice of here by the by, that he says, That *the Soul knows that Extension is capable of an infinite Number of Figures by the Idea it has of Extension*, which is true. And afterwards he says, that *there are no Figures, which all Men do not discover by the Idea they have of Extension to be Modifications of Body*. One would wonder why he did not say *Modifications of Extension*, rather than as he does the

the Modifications of Body, they being discover'd by the Idea of Extension; but the Truth would not bear such an Expression. For 'tis certain that in pure Space or Extension, which is not terminated, there is truly no distinction of Figures, but in distinct Bodies that are terminated, there are distinct Figures, because simple Space or Extension being in it self uniform, inseparable, immoveable, has in it no such Modification or Distinction of Figures. But it is *capable*, as he says, but of what? Of Bodies of all sorts of Figures and Magnitudes, without which there is no Distinction of Figures in Space. Bodies that are solid, separable, terminated and moveable, have all sorts of Figures, and they are Bodies alone that have them: And so Figures are properly Modifications of Bodies, for pure Space is not any where terminated nor can be, whether there be or be not Body in it, it is uniformly continued on. This that he plainly said here, to me plainly shews that Body and Extension are two things, though much of our Author's Doctrine be built upon their being one and the same.

50. The next Paragraph is to shew us the Difference between Ideas and Sentiments in this, that *Sentiments are not tied to words; so that he that never had seen a Colour, or felt Heat, could never be made to have those*

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*Sensations by all the Definitions one could give him of them.* This is true of what he calls *Sentiments*; and as true also of what he calls *Ideas*. Shew me one who has not got by Experience, *i. e.* by seeing or feeling the Idea of Space or Motion, and I will as soon by words make one who never felt what Heat is, have a Conception of Heat, as he that has not by his Senses perceiv'd what Space or Motion is, can by words be made to conceive either of them. The reason why we are apt to think these Ideas belonging to Extension, got another way than other Ideas, is because our Bodies being extended, we cannot avoid the Distinction of parts in our selves; and all that is for the support of our Lives, being by Motion apply'd to us, it is impossible to find any one who has not by Experience got those Ideas; and so by the use of Language learnt what words stand for them, which by Custom came to excite them in his Mind, as the Names of Heat and Pleasure do excite in the Mind of those who have by Experience got them, the Ideas they are by use annexed to. Not that Words or Definitions can teach or bring into the Mind one more than another of those I call simple Ideas; but can by use excite them in those, who having got them by Experience, know certain Sounds to be by use annexed to them as the Signs of them.

51. Fourth-

51. *Fourthly, The fourth way of knowing, he tells us, is by Conjecture, and thus only we know the Souls of other Men, and pure Intelligences, i.e.* We know them not at all; but we probably think there are such Beings really existing in *rerum natura*. But this looks to me besides our Author's Business here, which seems to be to examine what Ideas we have, and how we came by them. So that the thing here considered, should in my opinion be not whether there were any Souls of Men or pure Intelligences any where existing, but what Ideas we have of them, and how we came by them. For when he says, we know not Angels, either *in themselves, or by their Ideas, or by Consciousness*, what in that place does *Angel* signify? What Idea in him does it stand for? Or is it the Sign of no Idea at all, and so a bare Sound without Signification? He that reads this seventh Chapter of his with Attention, will find that we have simple Ideas as far as our Experience reaches, and no farther. And beyond that we know nothing at all, no not even what those Ideas are that are in us, but only that they are Perceptions in the Mind, but how made we cannot comprehend.

52. In his *Éclaircissements* on the nature of Ideas, p. 535. of the Quarto Edition, he says, that *he is certain that the Ideas of things*  
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*are unchangeable.* This I cannot comprehend, for how can I know that the Picture of any thing is like that thing, when I never see that which it represents? For if these words do not mean that Ideas are true unchangeable representation of things, I know not to what purpose they are. And if that be not their meaning, then they can only signify, that the Idea I have once had will be unchangeably the same as long as it recurs the same in my Memory; but when another different from that comes into my Mind, it will not be that. Thus the Idea of an Horse, and the Idea of a Centaur, will, as often as they recur in my Mind, be unchangeably the same; which is no more than this, the same Idea will be always the same Idea; but whether the one or the other be the true representation of any thing that exists, that, upon his Principles, neither our Author nor any body else can know.

53. What he says here of *universal Reason* which *enlightens* every one, *whereof all Men* partake, seems to me nothing else but the Power Men have to consider the Ideas they have one with another, and by thus comparing them, find out the relations that are between them; and therefore if an intelligent Being at one end of the World, and another at the other end of the World, will consider twice two and four together,  
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he cannot but find them to be equal, *i. e.* to be the same Number. These Relations 'tis true, are *infinite*, and God, who knows all things, and their Relations as they are, knows them all, and so his Knowledge is infinite. But Men are able to discover more or less of these Relations, only as they apply their Minds to consider any sort of Ideas, and to find out intermediate ones, which can shew the Relation of those Ideas, which cannot be immediately compared by *justa-positio*n. But then what he means by that *infinite Reason* which Men consult, I confess my self not well to understand. For if he means that they consider a part of those Relations of things which are infinite, that is true; but then, this is a very improper way of speaking, and I cannot think that a Man of his Parts would use it to mean nothing else by it. If he means, as he says, *p. 536.* That this infinite and universal Reason, whereof Men partake, and which they consult, is the Reason of God himself; I can by no Means assent to it. *First*, Because I think we cannot say God reasons at all; for he has at once a View of all things. But Reason is very far from such an Intuition, it is a laborious and gradual Progress in the Knowledge of things, by comparing one Idea with a second, and a second with a third, and that with a fourth, &c. to find the Relation

lation between the first and the last of these in this Train, and in search for such intermediate Ideas, as may shew us the Relation we desire to know, which sometimes we find, and sometimes not. This way therefore of finding Truth, so painful, uncertain, and limited, is proper only to Men or finite Understandings, but can by no Means be suppos'd in God; it is therefore in God Understanding or Knowledge. But then to say that we partake in the Knowledge of God, or consult his Understanding, is what I cannot receive for true. God has given me an Understanding of my own; and I should think it Presumption in me to suppose I apprehended any thing by God's Understanding, saw with his Eyes, or shared of his Knowledge. I think it more possible for me to see with other Men's Eyes, and understand with another Man's Understanding, than with God's; there being some Proportion between mine and another Man's Understanding, but none between mine and God's. But if this *infinite Reason which we consult*, be at last nothing but those infinite unchangeable Relations which are in things, some of which we make a Shift to discover, this indeed is true, but seems to me to make little to our Author's Purpose, of seeing all things in God; and that if we see not all things by the natural Union of our Minds

*Q. Whether I have taken the Author's Sense with right here?*

with the universal and infinite Reason, we should not have the Liberty to think on all things, as he expresses it, p. 538. To explain himself farther concerning this universal Reason, or as he there calls it by another Name, Order, p. 539. he says, That God contains in himself the Perfections of all the Creatures that he has created, or can create, after an intelligible manner. Intelligible to himself, that's true, but intelligible to Men, at least to me, that I do not find, unless by containing in himself the Perfections of all the Creatures be meant, that there is no Perfection in any Creature, but there is a greater in God, or that there is in God greater Perfection than all the Perfection in the Creatures taken together. And therefore though it be true what follows in the next words, that it is by these intelligible Perfections that God knows the Essence of every thing; yet it will not follow from hence, or from any thing else that he has said, that those Perfections in God, which contain in them the Perfections of all the Creatures, are the immediate Objects of the Mind of Man, or that they are so the Objects of the Mind of Man, that he can in them see the Essences of the Creatures. For I ask in which of the Perfections of God does a Man see the Essence of an Horse or an Ass, of a Serpent or a Dove,

of

of Hemlock or Parsley? I for my part, I confess see not the Essence of any of these things in any of the Perfections of God, which I have any Notion of. For indeed I see not the distinct Essence either of these things at all, or know wherein it consists. And therefore I cannot comprehend the Force of the Inference, which follows in these words, Then the intelligible Ideas or Perfections that are in God, which represent to us what is out of God, are absolutely necessary and unchangeable. That the Perfections that are in God are necessary and unchangeable, I readily grant: But that the Ideas that are intelligible to God, or are in the understanding of God (for so we must speak of him whilst we conceive of him after the manner of Men) can be seen by us; or, that the Perfections that are in God represent to us the Essences of things that are out of God, that I cannot conceive. The Essence of Matter, as much as I can see of it, is Extension, Solidity, Divisibility and Mobility; but in which of the Perfections of God do I see this Essence? To another Man, as to our Author perhaps, the Essence of Body is quite another thing; and when he has told us what to him is the Essence of Body, it will be then to be consider'd in which of the Perfections of God he sees it. For example, let it be pure Ex-

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tension

tion alone, the Idea then that God had in himself of the Essence of Body before Body was created, was the Idea of pure Extension; when God then created Body he created Extension, and then Space, which existed not before, began to exist. This, I confess, I cannot conceive; but we see in the Perfections of God the *necessary* and *unchangeable* Essences of things. He sees one Essence of Body in God and I another; Which is that *necessary* and *unchangeable* Essence of Body which is contained in the Perfections of God, his or mine? Or indeed how do or can we know there is any such thing existing as Body at all? For we see nothing but the Ideas that are in God, but Body itself we neither do nor can possibly see at all; and how then can we know that there is any such thing existing as Body, since we can by no means see or perceive it by our Senses, which is all the way we can have of knowing any corporeal thing to exist? But 'tis said, God shews us the Ideas in himself, on occasion of the presence of those Bodies to our Senses. This is *gratis dictum*, and begs the thing in question; and therefore I desire to have it prov'd to me that they are present. I see the Sun or an Horse; no, says our Author, that is impossible, they cannot be seen, because being Bodies they cannot be

united

united to my Mind, and be present to it. But the Sun being risen, and the Horse brought within convenient distance, and so being present to my Eyes, God shews me their Ideas in himself: And I say God shews me these Ideas when he pleases without the presence of any such Bodies to my Eyes. For when I think I see a Star at such a distance from me, which truly I do not see, but the Idea of it which God shews me, I would have it prov'd to me that there is such a Star existing a million of million of Miles from me when I think I see it, more than when I dream of such a Star. For till it be prov'd that there is a Candle in the Room by which I write this, the supposition of my seeing in God the Pyramidal Idea of its flame upon occasion of the Candles being there, is begging what is in question. And to prove to me that God exhibits to me that Idea upon occasion of the presence of the Candle, it must first be prov'd to me that there is a Candle there, which upon these Principles can never be done.

Farther, We see the *necessary* and *unchangeable* Essences of things in the perfections of God. Water, a Rose, and a Lion, have their distinct Essences one from another, and all other things; what I desire to know are these distinct Essences? I confess I neither see them in nor out of God, and in

P 2

which

which of the Perfections of God do we see each of them?

Pag. 504. I find these words, *It is evident that the Perfections that are in God which represent created or possible Beings, are not at all equal: That those for example that represent Bodies, are not so noble as those for example that represent Spirits; and amongst those themselves, which represent nothing but Body, or nothing but Spirits, there are more perfect one than another to infinity. This is conceiveable clearly, and without pain, though one finds some difficulty to reconcile the simplicity of the Divine Being with this variety of intelligible Ideas which he contains in his Wisdom.* This difficulty is to me insurmountable, and I conclude it always shall be so, till I can find a way to make Simplicity and Variety the same. And this difficulty must always cumber this Doctrine, which supposes that the Perfections of God are the representatives to us of whatever we perceive of the Creatures; for then those Perfections must be many, and diverse, and distinct one from another, as those Ideas are that represent the different Creatures to us. And this seems to me to make God formally to contain in him all the distinct Ideas of all the Creatures, and that so that they might be seen one after another. Which seems

seems to me after all the talk of abstraction to be but a little less gross Conception than of the Scatches of all the Pictures that ever a Painter draws, kept by him in his Closet, which are there all to be seen one after another, as he pleases to shew them. But whilst these abstract Thoughts produce nothing better to me than this, I the easier content my self with my Ignorance which roundly thinks thus. God is a simple Being, Omniscient, that knows all things possible; and Omnipotent that can do or make all things possible. But how he knows, or how he makes, I do not conceive: His ways of knowing as well as his ways of creating, are to me incomprehensible; and if they were not so, I should not think him to be God, or to be perfecter in knowledge than I am. To which our Author's Thoughts seem in the close of what is above cited, somewhat to encline, when he says, *The variety of intelligible Ideas which God contains in his Wisdom;* whereby he seems to place this variety of Ideas in the Mind or Thoughts of God, as we may so say, whereby 'tis hard to conceive how we can see them, and not in the Being of God, where they are to be seen as so many distinct things in it.

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A  
DISCOURSE  
OF  
MIRACLES.

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P 4



A  
DISCOURSE  
OF  
MIRACLES.

**T**O discourse of Miracles without defining what one means by the word Miracle, is to make a shew, but in effect to talk of nothing.

A Miracle then I take to be a sensible Operation, which being above the comprehension of the Spectator, and in his Opinion contrary to the establish'd Course of Nature, is taken by him to be Divine.

He that is present at the fact, is a Spectator: He that believes the History of the fact, puts himself in the place of a Spectator.

This Definition, 'tis probable, will not escape these two Exceptions.

1. That hereby what is a Miracle is made very uncertain; for it depending on the Opinion of the Spectator, that will be a Miracle to one which will not be so to another.

In answer to which, it is enough to say, that this Objection is of no force, but in the Mouth of one who can produce a definition of a Miracle not liable to the same exception,

exception, which I think not easie to do; for it being agreed, that a Miracle must be that which surpasses the force of Nature in the establish'd, steady Laws of Causes and Effects, nothing can be taken to be a Miracle but what is judg'd to exceed those Laws. Now every one being able to judge of those Laws only by his own acquaintance with Nature, and notions of its Force (which are different in different Men) it is unavoidable that That should be a Miracle to one, which is not so to another.

2. Another Objection to this Definition, will be, that the notion of a Miracle thus enlarged, may come sometimes to take in Operations that have nothing extraordinary or supernatural in them, and thereby invalidate the use of Miracles for the attesting of Divine Revelation.

To which I answer, not at all, if the Testimony which Divine Revelation receives from Miracles be rightly consider'd.

To know that any Revelation is from God, it is necessary to know that the Messenger that delivers it is sent from God, and that cannot be known but by some credentials given him by God himself. Let us see then whether Miracles, in my sense, be not such credentials, and will not infallibly direct us right in the search of Divine Revelation.

It is to be consider'd, that Divine Revelation receives Testimony from no other Miracles, but such as are wrought to witness his Mission from God who delivers the Revelation. All other Miracles that are done in the World, how many or great soever, Revelation is not concern'd in. Cases wherein there has been, or can be need of Miracles for the confirmation of Revelation are fewer than perhaps is imagin'd. The heathen World amidst an infinite and uncertain jumble of Deities, Fables and Worships had no room for a divine Attestation of any one against the rest. Those owners of many Gods were at liberty in their Worship; and no one of their Divinities pretending to be the one only true God, no one of them could be suppos'd in the Pagan Scheme to make use of Miracles to establish his Worship alone, or to abolish that of the others; much less was there any use of Miracles to confirm any Articles of Faith, since no one of them had any such to propose as necessary to be believ'd by their Votaries. And therefore I do not remember any Miracles recorded in the *Greek* or *Roman* Writers, as done to confirm any one's Mission and Doctrine. Conformable hereunto we find *St. Paul*, *1 Cor. i. 22.* takes notice that the *Jews* ('tis true) requir'd Miracles, but as for the *Greeks* they look'd after something

thing else; they knew no need or use there was of Miracles to recommend any Religion to them. And indeed it is an astonishing Mark how far the God of this World had blinded Mens Minds, if we consider that the Gentile World receiv'd and stuck to a Religion, which, not being deriv'd from Reason, had no sure Foundation in Revelation. They knew not its Original nor the Authors of it, nor seem'd concern'd to know from whence it came, or by whose Authority deliver'd; and so had no mention or use of Miracles for its Confirmation. For though there were here and there some pretences to Revelation, yet there were not so much as pretences to Miracles that attested it.

If we will direct our Thoughts by what has been, we must conclude that Miracles as the credentials of a Messenger delivering a Divine Religion, have no place but upon a supposition of one only true God; and that it is so in the nature of the thing, and cannot be otherwise, I think will be made appear in the sequel of this Discourse. Of such who have come in the name of the one only true God, professing to bring a Law from him we have in History a clear account but of three, viz. *Moses*, *Jesus* and *Mahomet*. For what the *Persees* say of their *Zoroaster*, or the *Indians* of their  
Brama

*Brama* (not to mention all the wild Stories of the Religions farther East) is so obscure or so manifestly fabulous, that no account can be made of it. Now of the three before mention'd, *Mahomet* having none to produce, pretends to no Miracles for the vouching his Mission; so that the only Revelations that come attested by Miracles, being only those of *Moses* and *Christ*, and they confirming each other, the business of Miracles, as it stands really in matter of Fact, has no manner of difficulty in it; and I think the most scrupulous or sceptical cannot from Miracles raise the least doubt against the Divine Revelation of the Gospel.

But since the Speculative and Learned will be putting of Cases which never were, and it may be presum'd never will be; since Scholars and Disputants will be raising of Questions where there are none, and enter upon Debates whereof there is no need; I crave leave to say, that he who comes with a Message from God to be deliver'd to the World, cannot be refus'd belief if he vouches his Mission by a Miracle, because his credentials have a right to it. For every rational thinking Man must conclude as *Nicodemus* did, *We know that thou art a teacher come from God, for no Man can do these signs which thou dost, except God be with him.*

For

For example, *Jesus of Nazareth* professes himself sent from God: He with a word calms a Tempest at Sea: This one looks on as a Miracle, and consequently cannot but receive his Doctrine: Another thinks this might be the effect of Chance, or Skill in the Weather and no Miracle, and so stands out; but afterwards seeing him walk on the Sea, owns that for a Miracle and believes: Which yet upon another has not that force, who suspects it may possibly be done by the assistance of a Spirit: But yet the same Person seeing afterwards our Saviour cure an inveterate Palsie by a word, admits that for a Miracle, and becomes a Convert: Another over looking it in this instance, afterwards finds a Miracle in his giving sight to one born Blind, or in raising the Dead, or his raising himself from the Dead, and so receives his Doctrine as a Revelation coming from God. By all which it is plain, that where the Miracle is admitted, the Doctrine cannot be rejected; it comes with the assurance of a Divine Attestation to him that allows the Miracle, and he cannot question its Truth.

The next thing then is, what shall be a sufficient inducement to take any extraordinary Operation to be a Miracle, *i. e.* wrought by God himself for the attestation of a Revelation from him.

And

And to this I answer, the carrying with it the Marks of a greater power than appears in opposition to it. For,

1. First, This removes the main Difficulty where it presses hardest, and clears the matter from doubt, when extraordinary and supernatural Operations are brought to support opposite Missions, about which methinks more Dust has been rais'd by Men of leisure than so plain a matter needed. For since God's Power is paramount to all, and no opposition can be made against him with an equal force to his; and since his Honour and Goodness can never be suppos'd to suffer his Messenger and his Truth to be born down by the appearance of a greater Power on the side of an Impostor, and in favour of a Lie; wherever there is an opposition, and two pretending to be sent from Heaven clash, the signs which carry with them the evident marks of a greater Power, will always be a certain and unquestionable evidence that the Truth and Divine Mission is on that side on which they appear. For though the discovery how the lying wonders are or can be produc'd, be beyond the Capacity of the Ignorant, and often beyond the Conception of the most knowing Spectator, who is therefore forc'd to allow them in his apprehension to be above the force of natural Causes

and

and Effects; yet he cannot but know they are not Seals set by God to his Truth for the attesting of it, since they are oppos'd by Miracles that carry the evident marks of a greater and superior Power, and therefore they cannot at all shake the Authority of one so supported. God can never be thought to suffer that a Lie, set up in opposition to a Truth coming from him, should be back'd with a greater Power than he will shew for the Confirmation and Propagation of a Doctrine which he has reveal'd, to the end it might be believ'd. The producing of Serpents, Blood and Frogs by the *Egyptian* Sorcerers and by *Moses*, could not to the Spectators but appear equally miraculous; which of the Pretenders then had their Mission from God? And the truth on either side could not have been determin'd if the matter had rested there. But when *Moses's* Serpent eat up theirs, when he produc'd Lice which they could not, the decision was easie. 'Twas plain *Jannes* and *Jambres* acted by an inferiour Power, and their operations, how marvellous and extraordinary soever, could not in the least bring in question *Moses's* Mission; that stood the firmer for this opposition, and remain'd the more unquestionable after this, than if no such signs had been brought against it.

So

So likewise the number, variety and greatness of the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of the Doctrine deliver'd by *Jesus Christ*, carry with them such strong marks of an extraordinary Divine Power, that the Truth of his Mission will stand firm and unquestionable, till any one rising up in opposition to him shall do greater Miracles than he and his Apostles did. For any thing less will not be of weight to turn the Scales in the Opinion of any one, whether of an inferior or more exalted understanding. This is one of those palpable Truths and Trials of which all Mankind are judges; and there needs no assistance of Learning, no deep thought to come to a certainty in it. Such care has God taken that no pretended Revelation should stand in competition with what is truly Divine, that we need but open our Eyes to see and be sure which came from him. The marks of his over-ruling Power accompany it; and therefore to this day we find, that wherever the Gospel comes, it prevails to the beating down the strong Holds of *Satan*, and the dislodging the Prince of the Power of Darknes, driving him away with all his living wonders; which is a standing Miracle, carrying with it the Testimony of Superiority.

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What

What is the uttermost Power of natural Agents or created Beings, Men of the greatest reach cannot discover; but that it is not equal to God's Omnipotency is obvious to every one's Understanding; so that the superior Power is an easie, as well as sure guide to Divine Revelation, attested by Miracles, where they are brought as Credentials to an Embassy from God.

And thus upon the same grounds of superiority of Power, uncontested Revelation will stand to.

For the explaining of which, it may be necessary to premise,

1. That no Mission can be look'd on to be Divine, that delivers any thing derogating from the Honour of the one, only, true, invisible God, or inconsistent with natural Religion and the rules of Morality: Because God having discover'd to Men the Unity and Majesty of his Eternal Godhead, and the truths of natural Religion and Morality by the light of Reason, he cannot be suppos'd to back the contrary by Revelation; for that would be to destroy the evidence and use of Reason, without which Men cannot be able to distinguish Divine Revelation from Diabolical Imposture.

2. That it cannot be expected that God should send any one into the World on purpose

to inform Men of things indifferent, and of small moment, or that are knowable by the use of their natural Faculties. This would be to lessen the Dignity of his Majesty in favour of our Sloth, and in prejudice to our Reason.

3. The only case then wherein a Mission of any one from Heaven can be reconciled to the high and awful Thoughts Men ought to have of the Deity, must be the Revelation of some supernatural Truths relating to the Glory of God, and some great concern of Men. Supernatural Operations attesting such a Revelation may with reason be taken to be Miracles, as carrying the marks of a superior and over-ruling Power, as long as no Revelation accompanied with marks of a greater Power appears against it. Such supernatural signs may justly stand good, and be receiv'd for Divine, *i. e.* wrought by a Power superior to all, 'till a Mission attested by Operations of a greater force shall disprove them: Because it cannot be suppos'd God should suffer his Prerogative to be so far usurp'd by any inferior Being as to permit any Creature, depending on him, to set his Seals, the marks of his Divine Authority, to a Mission coming from him. For these supernatural signs being the only means God is conceiv'd to have to satisfy Men as rational Creatures

tures of the Certainty of any thing he would reveal, as coming from himself, can never consent that it should be wrested out of his hands, to serve the Ends and establish the Authority of an inferior Agent that rivals him. His Power being known to have no equal, always will, and always may be safely depended on, to shew its superiority in vindicating his Authority, and maintaining every Truth that he has reveal'd. So that the marks of a superior Power accompanying it, always have been, and always will be a visible and sure guide to Divine Revelation; by which Men may conduct themselves in their examining of revealed Religions, and be satisfied which they ought to receive as coming from God; though they have by no means ability precisely to determine what is, or is not above the force of any created Being; or what Operations can be perform'd by none but a Divine Power, and require the immediate Hand of the Almighty. And therefore we see 'tis by that our Saviour measures the great Unbelief of the *Jews*, John xv. 24. saying, *If I had not done among them the works which no other Man did, they had not had sin, but now have they both seen and hated both me and my father*; declaring, that they could not but see the Power and Presence of God in those many Miracles he

did,

did, which were greater than ever any other Man had done. When God sent *Moses* to the Children of *Israel* with a Message, that now according to his promise he would redeem them by his hand out of *Egypt*, and furnish'd him with Signs and Credentials of his Mission; it is very remarkable what God himself says of those Signs, *Exod.* iv. 8. *And it shall come to pass, if they will not believe thee, nor hearken to the voice of the first sign* (which was turning his Rod into a Serpent) *that they will believe, and the voice of the latter sign* (which was the making his Hand leprous by putting it in his Bosom;) God farther adds, v. 9. *And it shall come to pass, if they will not believe also these two signs, neither hearken unto thy voice, that thou shalt take of the water of the river and pour upon the dry land: And the water which thou takest out of the river shall become blood upon the dry land.* Which of those Operations was or was not above the force of all created Beings, will, I suppose, be hard for any Man, too hard for a poor Brick-maker to determine; and therefore the Credit and certain Reception of the Mission, was annex'd to neither of them, but the prevailing of their Attestation was heighten'd by the increase of their number; two supernatural Operations shewing more power than one, and three more than two.

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God

God allow'd that it was natural, that the marks of greater Power should have a greater Impression on the Minds and Belief of the Spectators. Accordingly the *Jews*, by this estimate judg'd of the Miracles of our Saviour, *John* vii. 31. where we have this account, *And many of the people believed on him, and said, when Christ cometh will he do more miracles than these which this Man hath done?* This perhaps, as it is the plainest, so it is also the surest way to preserve the Testimony of Miracles in its due force to all sorts and degrees of People. For Miracles being the Basis on which divine Mission is always establish'd, and consequently that Foundation on which the Believers of any divine Revelation must ultimately bottom their Faith, this use of them would be lost, if not to all Mankind, yet at least to the simple and illiterate (which is the far greatest part) if Miracles be defin'd to be none but such divine Operations as are in themselves beyond the power of all created Beings, or at least Operations contrary to the fix'd and establish'd Laws of Nature. For as to the latter of those, what are the fix'd and establish'd Laws of Nature, Philosophers alone, if at least they can pretend to determine. And if they are to be Operations performable only by divine Power, I doubt whether any Man

learn'd

learn'd or unlearn'd, can in most cases be able to say of any particular Operation that can fall under his Senses, that it is certainly a Miracle. Before he can come to that certainty, he must know that no created Being has a power to perform it. We know good and bad Angels have Abilities and Excellencies exceedingly beyond all our poor Performances or narrow Comprehensions. But to define what is the utmost extent of Power that any of them has, is a bold undertaking of a Man in the dark, that pronounces without seeing, and sets bounds in his narrow Cell to things at an infinite distance from his Model and Comprehension.

Such definitions therefore of Miracles, however specious in Discourse and Theory, fail us when we come to use, and an application of them in particular cases. 170.

*These Thoughts concerning Miracles, were occasion'd by my reading Mr. Fleetwood's Essay on Miracles, and the Letter writ to him on that Subject. The one of them defining a Miracle to be an extraordinary operation performable by God alone: And the other writing of Miracles without any definition of a Miracle at all.*

Q 4

J. LOCKE.



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Part of a  
**FOURTH LETTER**  
FOR  
**TOLERATION, &c.**

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Part of a  
FOURTH LETTER  
FOR  
TOLERATION, &c.

SIR,

A Fresh revival of the Controversie formerly between you and me, is what I suppose no body did expect from you after twelve Years silence. But Reputation (a sufficient cause for a new War) as you give the world to understand, hath put Resolution into your Heart, and Arms into your Hands to make an Example of me, to the Shame and Confusion of all those who could be so injurious to you, as to think you could quit the Opinion you had appear'd for in Print, and agree with me in the matter of Toleration. 'Tis visible how tender even Men of the most settled Calmness, are in point of Reputation, and

and 'tis allow'd the most excusable part of human Frailty; and therefore no body can wonder to see a *report thought injurious* labour'd against with might and main, and the Assistance and Cause of Religion itself taken in and made use of to put a stop to it. But yet for all this there are sober Men who are of Opinion, that it better becomes a Christian Temper that Disputes, especially of Religion, should be waged purely for the sake of Truth, and not for our own: Self should have nothing to do in them. But since as we see it will crowd it self in, and be often the principal Agent, your ingenuity in owning what has brought you upon the Stage again, and set you on work, after the ease and quiet you resolutely maintain'd your self in so many Years, ought to be commended, in giving us a view of the discreet choice you have made of a method suited to your purpose, which you publish to the World in these words, p. 2. *Being desirous to put a stop to a Report so injurious (as well as groundless) as I look upon this to be, I think it will be no improper way of doing it, if I thus signify to you and the Reader, that I find nothing more convincing in this your long Letter, than I did in your two former; giving withall a brief Specimen of the answerableness of it. Which I choose to do upon a few Pages at the beginning,*

*ing, where you have placed your greatest Strength, or at least so much of it, as you think sufficient to put an end to this Controversie.*

Here we have your Declaration of War, of the grounds that mov'd you to it, and of your compendious way to assured Victory; which I must own is very new and very remarkable. You choose a few Pages out of the beginning of my third Letter; in these, you say, *I have placed my greatest Strength.* So that what I have there said being baffled, it gives you a just triumph over my whole *long Letter*; and all the rest of it being but pitiful, weak, impertinent Stuff, is, by the overthrow of this forlorn hope, fully confuted.

This is called answering by *Specimen.* A new way, which the World owes to your Invention, an evidence that whilst you said nothing you did not spare thinking. And indeed it was a noble Thought, a Stratagem, which I believe scarce any other but your self would have found out in a Meditation of twice twelve Years, how to answer Arguments without saying a word to them, or so much as reciting them; and by examining six or seven Pages in the beginning of a Book, reduce to nothing above three hundred Pages of it that follow. This is indeed a *decisive stroke* that lays all flat before

before you. Who can stand against such a Conqueror, who by barely attacking of one, kills an hundred? This would certainly be an admirable way, did it not degrade the Conqueror, whose business is to do; and turn him into a meer talking Gazetteer, whose boasts are of no consequence. For after slaughter of Foes, and routing of Armies by such a dead-doing Hand, no body thinks it strange to find them all alive again safe and sound upon their Feet, and in a posture of defending themselves. The event, in all sorts of Controversies, hath often better instructed those who have, without bringing it to trial, presumed on the weakness of their Adversaries. However, this which you have set up, of confuting without arguing, cannot be deny'd to be a ready way, and well thought on to set you up high, and your Reputation secure in the thoughts of your believing Readers, if that be (as it seems it is) your business. But, as I take it, tends not at all to the informing their Understandings, and making them see the Truth and grounds it stands on. That perhaps is too much for the profane Vulgar to know; it is enough for them that you know it for them, and have assured them, that you can, when you please to condescend so far, confound all that any one offers against your Opinion. An implicit Faith of your being

being in the right, and ascribing Victory to you, even in points whereof you have said nothing, is that which some sort of Men think most useful, and so their Followers have but Tongues for their Champion to give him the Praise and Authority he aims at, 'tis no matter whether they have any Eyes for themselves to see on which side the Truth lies. Thus methinks you and I both find our account in this Controversie under your management; you in setting your Reputation safe from the blemish it would have been to it that you were brought over to my Opinion; and I in seeing (if you will forgive me so presumptuous a word) that you have left my Cause safe in all those parts you have said nothing to, and not very much damaged in that part you have attacked, as I hope to shew the indifferent Reader. You enter upon your *Specimen*, p. 2. by minding me that *I tell you*, "That I doubt not but to let you see that if you will be true to your own Principles, and stand to what you have said, you must carry your some degrees of Force to all those degrees which in words you declare against, even to the Discipline of Fire and Faggot." And you say, *if I make my word good; you assure me you will carry a Faggot your self to the burning what you have written for so unmerciful and outrageous a Discipline:*

*Discipline: But 'till I have done that, you suppose the Discipline you have endeavour'd to defend, may remain safe and unhurt, as it is, in its own nature, harmless and salutary to the World.*

To promise fairly is then the part of an honest Man when the time of performance is not yet come. But it falls out unluckily here; for you who have undertaken, by answering some parts of my second Letter, to shew the *answerableness* of the whole, that instead of answering, you promise to retract, if I *make good my word*, in proving upon *your own Principles you must carry your some degrees of Force to Fire and Faggot.*

Sir, My endeavours to make my word good, have lain before you a pretty competent time, the World is witness of it, and will, as I imagine, think it time for you, since you your self have brought this question upon the Stage, either to acknowledge that I have made my word good, or by invalidating my Arguments, shew that I have not. He that after a Debt of so many Years, only promises what brave things he will do hereafter, is hardly thought upon the *Exchange* to do what he ought. The account in his Hand requires to be made up and balanced; and that will shew not what he is to promise, but, if he be a fair Man, what he is to perform. If the Schools  
make

make longer allowances of time, and admit evasions for satisfaction, 'tis fit you use your privilege, and take more time to consider; only I crave leave in the mean while to refer my Reader to what I have said on this Argument, *Chap. 4.* of my third Letter, that he may have a view of your way of answering by *Specimen*, and judge whether all that I have there urged be answered by what you say here, or what you promise here be ever like to be performed.

The next Sample you give to shew the *answerableness* of my Letter, is not much more lucky than the former; it may be seen, *p. 3.* and *4.* where you say, *That I tell you, p. 1.* "That you have alter'd the Question"; *for it seems, p. 26, you tell me the Question between us, is,* "Whether the Magistrate has any Right to use Force, to bring Men to the True Religion?" *Whereas, p. 76. you your self, I say, own the Question to be, Whether the Magistrate has a Right to use Force in matters of Religion?" Which Affirmation of mine, you must take leave to tell me, is a meer Fiction, for neither p. 76. nor any where else, do you own the Question to be, what I say you do.*

*And as to "using Force in matters of Religion (which you say are my words, not yours.) if I mean by it the using Force to bring*  
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Men to any other Religion besides the True; you are so far from owning the Question to be, Whether the Magistrate has a Right to use Force for such a purpose, that you have always thought it out of question, that no Man in the World, Magistrate or other, can have any Right to use either Force, or any other means that I can name, to bring Men to any False Religion, how much soever he may persuade himself that it is True.

It is not therefore from any Alteration, but from the true State of the Question, that "You take occasion, as I complain without cause, to lay load on me, for charging you with the Absurdities of a Power in the Magistrates to punish Men, to bring them to their Religion." But it seems, having little to say against what you do assert, you say, I find it necessary my self to alter the Question, and to make the World believe that you assert what you do not, that I may have something before me which I can confute.

In this Paragraph you positively deny, that it is any where owned by you as the Question between us, Whether the Magistrate has a Right of using Force in matters of Religion? Indeed these words are not as they are cited in p. 76. of your former Letter; but he that will turn over the Leaf, may, in p. 78. read these words

of yours, viz. that, You refer it to me, whether I in saying, no body has a Right, or you in saying, the Magistrate has a Right in using Force in matters of Religion, have most reason. Though you positively tell me, That neither p. 76. nor any where else, do you own the Question to be what I say you do. And now let the Reader judge between us. I should not perhaps have so much as taken notice of this, but that you who are so sparing of your Answer, that you think a brief Specimen upon some few Pages of the beginning of my Letter, sufficient to confute all I have said in it, do yet spend the better part of two Pages on this; which if I had been mistaken in, it had been of no great Consequence; of which I see no other use you have, but to cast on me some civil Reflections of your Fashion, and fix on me the imputation of Fiction, meer Fiction; a Compliment which I shall not return you, though you say, "USING FORCE IN MATTERS OF RELIGION, are my words, not yours. Whether they are your words or not, let p. 78. of your former Letter decide, where you own your self to say, that "The Magistrate has a Right to use Force in matters of Religion." So that this, as I take it, is a Specimen of your being very positive in a mistake, and about a plain matter of fact,

about an Action of your own, and so will scarce prove a *Specimen* of the answerableness of all I say in my Letter, unless we must allow that Truth and Falshood are equally answerable when you declare against either of them.

The next part of your *Specimen* we have p. 4, 5. where you tell me that I undertake to prove, that "If upon your grounds the "Magistrate be obliged to use Force to "bring Men to the true Religion; it will "necessarily follow, that every Magistrate "who believes his Religion to be true, is "obliged to use Force to bring Men to his

*Now because this undertaking is so necessary for me; and my whole Cause seems to depend upon the success of it: You shall the more carefully consider how well I perform it. But before you do this, it will be fit to let me know, in what sense you grant my Inference, and in what sense you deny it. Now that every Magistrate, who upon just and sufficient grounds believes his Religion to be true, is obliged to use some moderate Penalties (which is all the Force you ever contended for) to bring Men to his Religion, you freely grant; because that must needs be the True Religion; since no other can, upon such grounds, be believed to be true. But that any Magistrate, who upon weak and deceitful grounds, believes a False Religion to be*

true

*true (and he can never do it upon better grounds) is obliged to use the same (or any other) means, to bring Men to his Religion, this you flatly deny; nor can it by any Rules of reasoning, be inferred from what you assert.*

Here you tell me you grant my Inference in this sense, *viz. That every Magistrate who upon just and sufficient grounds believes his Religion to be true, is bound to use Force to bring Men to it.*

Here you grant that every Magistrate, without knowing that his Religion is true, is oblig'd, upon his believing it to be true, to use Force to bring Men to it; indeed you add, who believes it to be true upon just and sufficient grounds. So you have got a Distinction, and that always sets off a Disputant, though many times it is of no use to his Argument. For here let me ask you who must be judge whether the grounds upon which he believes his Religion to be true, be just and sufficient? Must the Magistrate himself judge for himself, or must you judge for him? A third Competitor in this Judgment I know not where you will find for your turn. If every Magistrate must judge for himself, whether the grounds upon which he believes his Religion to be true, are just and sufficient grounds, your limitation of the use of Force to such only as believe upon just and sufficient grounds,

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bating that it is an ornament to your Stile and Learning, might have been spared, since it leaves my Inference untouch'd in the full Latitude I have express'd it concerning every Magistrate, there not being any one Magistrate excluded thereby from an obligation to use Force to bring Men to his own Religion by this your distinction. For if every Magistrate who upon just and sufficient grounds believes his Religion to be true, be obliged to use Force to bring Men to his Religion, and every Magistrate be himself Judge, whether the *grounds*, he believes upon, *be just and sufficient*; it is visible every Magistrate is obliged to use Force to bring Men to his Religion; since any one who believes any Religion to be true, cannot but judge the grounds upon which he believes it to be true, are just and sufficient; for if he judged otherwise, he could not then believe it to be true. If you say, you must judge for the Magistrate, then what you grant is this, That every Magistrate who upon grounds that you judge to be just and sufficient believes his Religion to be true, is obliged to use Force to bring Men to his Religion. If this be your meaning, as it seems not much remote from it, you will do well to speak it out, that the Magistrates of the World may know who to have recourse to in the difficulty you put upon them,

them in declaring them under an Obligation to use Force to bring Men to the true Religion; which they can neither certainly know, nor must venture to use Force to bring Men to upon their own persuasion of the Truth of it, when they have nothing but one of these two (*viz.*) Knowledge or Belief that the Religion they promote is true, to determin them. Necessity has at last (unless you would have the Magistrate act in the dark, and use his Force wholly at random) prevailed on you to grant that the Magistrate may use Force to bring Men to that Religion which he believes to be true; but, say you, his belief must be *upon just and sufficient grounds*. The same necessity remaining still, must prevail with you to go one step farther, and tell me whether the Magistrate himself must be Judge, whether the grounds upon which he believes his Religion to be true, be just and sufficient, or whether you are to be judge for him. If you say the first, my inference stands good, and this Question, I think is yielded, and at an end. If you say you are to be Judge for the Magistrates, I shall congratulate to the Magistrates of the World the way you have found out for them to acquit themselves of their Duty, if you will but please to publish it, that that they may know where to find you; for



in truth, Sir, I prefer you, in this case, to the Pope; though you know that old Gentleman at *Rome* has long since laid claim to all Decisions of this kind, and alledges Infallibility for the support of his Title; which indeed will scarce be able to stand at *Rome*, or any where else, without the help of Infallibility. But of this perhaps more in the next Paragraph.

You go on with your *Specimen* in your next Paragraph, *p. 5.* which I shall crave leave of my Reader to set down at large, it being a most exact and studied peice of artificial Fencing, wherein, under the cover of good Words, and the appearance of nice Thinking, nothing is said; and therefore may deserve to be kept not as a *Specimen* of your answering, for as we shall see you answer nothing, but as a *Specimen* of your skill in seeming to say something where you have nothing to answer. You tell me that I say, *p. 2.* that "I suppose that you will grant me (*what he must be a hard Man indeed that will not grant*) that any thing laid upon the Magistrate as a Duty, is some way or other practicable. Now the Magistrate being obliged to use Force in matters of Religion, but yet so as to bring Men only to the true Religion, he will not be in any capacity to perform this part of his Duty, unless the Religion he is to promote

" promote, be what he can certainly know, or else what it is sufficient for him to believe to be the true: Either his Knowledge or his Opinion must point out that Religion to him, which he is by force to promote." *Where, if by knowing, or knowledge, I mean the effect of strict Demonstration; and by believing or Opinion, any sort of assent or persuasion how slightly soever grounded: Then you must deny the sufficiency of my division; because there is a third sort or degree of persuasion which though not grounded upon strict Demonstration, yet in firmness and stability, does far exceed that which is built upon slight appearances of probability; being grounded upon such clear and solid proof, as leaves no reasonable doubt in an attentive and unbiassed Mind: So that it approaches very near to that which is produced by Demonstration, and is therefore as it respects Religion, very frequently and familiarly called in Scripture not Faith or Belief only, but Knowledge, and in divers places full Assurance; as might easily be shewn, if that were needful. Now this kind of persuasion, this Knowledge, this full Assurance Men may, and ought to have of the true Religion: But they can never have it of a false one. And this it is, that must point out that Religion to the Magistrate, which he is to promote by the method you contend for.*

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Here the first thing you do is to pretend an uncertainty of what I mean by *Knowing or Knowledge, and by Believing or Opinion*. First, As to knowledge, I have said *certainly know*. I have call'd it *Vision, Knowledge and Certainty, Knowledge properly so called*. And as for Believing or Opinion, I speak of *Believing with assurance*, and say, that Believing in the highest degree of Assurance, is not Knowledge. That whatever is not capable of Demonstration, is not, unless it be self-evident, capable to produce Knowledge, how well grounded and great soever the Assurance of Faith may be wherewith it is received. That I grant that a strong Assurance of any Truth settled upon prevalent and well-grounded Arguments of Probability is often called Knowledge in popular ways of talking; but being here to distinguish between Knowledge and Belief, to what degrees of Confidence soever raised, their Boundaries must be kept, and their Names not confounded, with more to the same purpose. P. 2, 3, and 4. whereby it is so plain, that by Knowledge, I mean the effect of strict Demonstration; and by Believing or Opinion, I mean any degree of persuasion even to the highest degree of Assurance; that I challenge you your self to set it down in plainer and more express terms. But no Body can blame you for not finding your Adversary's

Adversary's meaning, let it be never so plain, when you can find nothing to answer to it. The reason therefore which you alledge for the denying the sufficiency of my division, is no reason at all. Your pretended reason is because there is *a third sort or degree of Persuasion; which, though not grounded upon strict Demonstration, yet in Firmness and Stability does far exceed that which is built upon slight appearances of probability, &c.* Let it be so, that there is a degree of persuasion not grounded upon strict Demonstration, far exceeding that which is built upon slight appearances of probability. But let me ask you what reason can this be to deny the sufficiency of my division, because there is, as you say, a third sort or degree of persuasion, when even that which you call this third sort or degree of persuasion is contained in my division. This is a *Specimen* indeed, not of answering what I have said, but of not answering; and for such I leave it to the Reader. *A degree of persuasion, though not grounded on strict Demonstration, yet in Firmness and Stability far exceeding that which is built upon slight appearances of probability, you call here a third sort or degree of persuasion.* Pray tell me which are the two other sorts; for Knowledge upon strict Demonstration, is not Belief or Persuasion, but

but wholly above it. Besides, if the degrees of firmness in Persuasion make different sorts of Persuasion, there are not only three, but three hundred sorts of Persuasion; and therefore the naming of your third sort was with little ground, and to no purpose or tendency to an Answer; though the drawing in something like a distinction be always to the purpose of a Man who hath nothing to answer, it giving occasion for the use of many good words; which, tho' nothing to the point, serve to cover the Disputants saying nothing under the appearance of Learning, to those who will not be at the pains to examine what he says.

You say, *Every Magistrate is by the Law of Nature under an Obligation to use Force to bring Men to the True Religion.* To this I urge, that the Magistrate hath nothing else to determine him in the use of Force for promotion of any Religion one before another, but only his own Belief or Persuasion of the Truth of it. Here you had nothing to do, but fairly to grant or deny; but instead thereof you first raise a groundless Doubt as I have shewn about my Meaning, whereof there could be no doubt at all to any one who would but read what I had said; and thereupon having got a pretence for a distinction, you solemnly tell the World *there is a*  
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third sort of Persuasion, which, though not grounded on strict Demonstration, yet in Firmness and Stability, does far exceed that which is built upon slight appearances of Probability, leaving no doubt, approaching near to Knowledge, being full Assurance. Well, the Magistrate hath a Persuasion of Firmness and Stability, has full Assurance; must he be determin'd by this his full Assurance in the promoting of that Religion by Force, of whose Truth he is in so high a degree of Persuasion so fully assur'd? No, say you, *it must be grounded upon such clear and solid proof as leaves no reasonable doubt in an attentive and unbiass'd Mind.* To which the Magistrate is ready to reply, that he, upon his grounds, can see no reasonable doubt, and that his is an attentive and unbiass'd Mind, of all which he himself is to be Judge, till you can produce your Authority to judge for him; though, in the Conclusion, you actually make your self judge for him. 'Tis *such a kind of Persuasion, such a full Assurance must point out to the Magistrate that Religion he is to promote by Force, which can never be had but of the true Religion:* Which is in effect, as every one may see, the Religion that you judge to be true, and not the Religion the Magistrate judges to be true. For pray tell me, must the Magistrate's full Assurance point  
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out to him the Religion which he is by Force to promote, or must he by Force promote a Religion, of whose Truth he has no Belief, no Assurance at all? If you say the first of these, you grant that every Magistrate must use Force to promote his own Religion, for that is the Religion whereof he has so full Assurance, that he ventures his eternal state upon it. Ay, say you, that is for want of *attention*, and because he is not *unbiass'd*. 'Tis like he will say the same of you, and then you are quits. And that he should by Force promote that Religion which he believes not to be true, is so absurd, that I think you can neither expect it, or bring your self to say it. Neither of these therefore being Answers that you can make use of, that which lies at the bottom, though you give it but covertly, is this, That the Magistrate ought by Force to promote the Religion that you believe with full assurance to be true. This would do admirably well for your purpose, were not the Magistrate intitled to ask, who made you a Judge for him in the Case? And ready to retort your own words upon you, that 'tis want of *attention* and *unbiass'dness* in you, that puts your Religion past doubt with you upon your proofs of it. Try when you please with a *Bramin*, a *Mahometan*, a *Papist*, *Lutheran*, *Quaker*, *Anabaptist*, *Presbyterian*,

*byterian*, &c. you will find if you argue with them, as you do here with me, that the matter will rest here between you, and that you are no more a Judge for any of them than they are for you. Men in all Religions have equally strong persuasions, and every one must judge for himself; nor can any one judge for another, and you last of all for the Magistrate, that the ground you build upon, that *Firmness and Stability of Persuasion in the highest degree of Assurance leaves no doubt, can never be had of a false Religion* being false, all your talk of full Assurance pointing out to the Magistrate the true Religion that he is obliged by Force to promote, amounts to no more but his own Religion, and can point out no other to him.

However, in the next Paragraph you go on with your *Specimen*, and tell me, *Hence appears the Impertinency of all I discourse, p. 2, 3, 4. concerning the difference between Faith and Knowledge: Where the thing I was concern'd to make out, if I would speak to the purpose, was no other but this, That* "there are as clear and solid grounds for the belief of False Religions, as there are for the belief of the True: Or, that Men may both as firmly and as rationally believe and embrace False Religions as they can the True." *This, you confess, is a point,*

point, which, you say, when I have well cleared and established, it will do my business, but nothing else will. And therefore my talk of Faith and Knowledge, however it may amuse such as are prone to admire all that I say, will never enable me, before better Judges, from the Duty of every Magistrate to use moderate Penalties for promoting the true Religion, to infer the same Obligation to lie upon every Magistrate in respect to his Religion, whatever it be.

Where the Impertinency lies will be seen when 'tis remember'd, that the Question between us is not what Religion has the most clear and solid grounds for the belief of it, much less whether *there are as clear and solid grounds for the belief of False Religions, as there are for the belief of the True*, i. e. whether Falshood has as much Truth in it as Truth it self? A Question, which, I guess, no Man, but one of your great Pertinency, could ever have propos'd. But the Question here between you and me, is what must point out to the Magistrate that Religion which he is by Force to promote, that so he may be able to perform the Duty that you pretend is incumbent on him by the Law of Nature; and here I prov'd, that having no certain demonstrative knowledge of the true Religion, all that was left him to determin him in the application

application of Force (which you make the proper Instrument of promoting the true Religion) for the promoting the true Religion, was only his Persuasion, Belief, or Assurance of the true Religion, which was always his own; and so in this state, the Religion which by Force the Magistrates of the World must of necessity promote, must be either their own, or none at all. Thus the Argument standing between us, I am apt to think the World may be of Opinion, that it had been pertinent to your Cause to have answer'd my Argument, if you had any thing to answer; which, since you have not done, this *Specimen* also of the facility wherewith you can answer all I have said in the third Letter, may be joyned to the former, and be a *Specimen* of something else than what you intended it. For in truth, Sir, the endeavouring to set up a new Question absurd in itself, and nothing at all to the purpose, without offering any thing to clear the difficulty you were press'd with, will, to understanding Readers, appear pertinent in one that sets himself up for an arant Drawcanfir, and is giving *Specimens* of himself, that nothing can stand in his way.

'Tis with the same pertinency that to this Proposition, *That there are as clear and solid grounds for the belief of a false Religion as there are for the belief of the true*, you

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joyn this following as an equivalent, Or that Men may both as firmly and as rationally believe and imbrace false Religions as they can the true; and you would fain have it thought that your Cause is gain'd, unless I will maintain these two absurd Propositions, which my Argument has nothing to do with. And you seem to me to build upon these two false Propositions.

I. That in the want of Knowledge and Certainty of which is the true Religion, nothing is fit to set the Magistrate upon doing his Duty in employing of Force to make Men consider and imbrace the true Religion, but the highest Persuasion and full Assurance of its Truth. Whereas his own Persuasion of the Truth of his own Religion, in what degree soever it be, so he believes it to be true, will, if he thinks it his Duty by Force to promote the true, be sufficient to set him on work. Nor can it be otherwise, since his own Persuasion of his own Religion, which he judges so well grounded as to venture his future state upon it, cannot but be sufficient to set him upon doing what he takes to be his Duty in bringing others to the same Religion.

II. Another false Supposition you build upon is this, that the true Religion is al-  
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ways imbrac'd with the firmest assent. There is scarce any one so little acquainted with the World, that hath not met with instances of Men most unmovably confident, and fully assur'd in a Religion which was not the true. Nor is there among the many absurd Religions of the World, almost any one that does not find Votaries to lay down their Lives for it; and if that be not *firm Persuasion* and *full Assurance* that is stronger than the love of Life, and has Force enough to make a Man throw himself into the Arms of Death, it is hard to know what is *firm Persuasion* and *full Assurance*. Jews and Mahometans have frequently given instances of this highest degree of Persuasion. And the *Bramins* Religion in the East is entertain'd by its Followers with no less assurance of its truth, since it is not unusual for some of them to throw themselves under the Wheels of a mighty Chariot, wherein they on solemn Days draw the Image of their God about in procession, there to be crush'd to Death, and sacrifice their Lives in honour of the God they believe in. If it be objected, that those are examples of mean and common Men; but the great Men of the World, and the Heads of Societies, do not so easily give themselves up to a confirm'd Bigotry. I answer, The persuasion they have of the truth of their

own Religion, is visibly strong enough to make them venture themselves, and use Force to others upon the belief of it. Princes are made like other Men, believe upon the like grounds that other Men do, and act as warmly upon that Belief, though the grounds of their Persuasion be in themselves not very clear, or may appear to others to be not of the utmost Solidity. Men act by the strength of their Persuasion, though they do not always place their Persuasion and Assent on that side on which, in reality the strength of Truth lies. Reasons that are not thought of, not heard of, not rightly apprehended, nor duly weighed, make no impression on the Mind: And Truth, how richly soever stor'd with them, may not be assented to, but lie neglected. The only difference between Princes and other Men herein, is this, that Princes are usually more positive in matters of Religion, but less instructed. The softness and pleasures of a Court, to which they are usually abandon'd when young, and Affairs of State which wholly possess them when grown up, seldom allow any of them time to consider and examine that they may embrace the true Religion. And here your Scheme, upon your own supposition, has a fundamental Error that over-turns it. For you affirming that Force your way apply'd,

is the *necessary* and *competent means* to bring Men to the true Religion, you leave Magistrates destitute of these necessary and competent means of being brought to the true Religion, tho' that be the readiest way, in your Scheme the only way, to bring other Men to it, and is contended for by you as the only method.

But farther, you will perhaps be ready to reply, that you do not say barely, that Men may not as firmly, but that they cannot as firmly and as rationally believe and embrace False Religions as they can the True. This, be it as true as it will, is of no manner of advantage to your Cause. For here the question necessary to be consider'd in your way of arguing, returns upon you, who must be Judge whether the Magistrate believes and embraces his Religion rationally or no. If he himself be Judge, then he does act rationally, and it must have the same operation on him as if it were the most rational in the World. If you must be Judge for him, whether his Belief be rational or no, why may not others judge for him as well as you? or at least he judge for you, as well as you for him; at least till you have produc'd your patent of Infallibility and Commission of Superintendency over the Belief of the Magistrates of the Earth, and shewn the Commission where-

by you are appointed the director of the Magistrates of the World in their Belief, which is or is not the true Religion? Do not think this said without cause, your whole Discourse here has no other tendency, but the making your self Judge of what Religion should be promoted by the Magistrates Force; which, let me tell you by the way, every warm Zealot in any Religion, has as much a right to be as you. I beseech you tell me are you not *persuaded*, nay, *fully assured*, that the Church of *England* is in the right, and all that dissent from Her are in the wrong; why else would you have Force us'd to make them consider and conform? If then the Religion of the Church of *England* be as you are *fully assured*, the only true Religion, and the Magistrate must ground his Persuasion of the truth of his Religion on such clear and solid Proofs as the true Religion alone has, and no false one can have, and by that Persuasion the Magistrate must be directed in the use of Force (for all this in effect, you say, in the sixth and beginning of the seventh Pages) what is this but covertly to say, that it is the Duty of all Magistrates to use Force to bring Men to imbrace the Religion of the Church of *England*: Which since it plainly follows from your Doctrine, and I think you cannot deny to be your O-

pinion,

pinion, and what in effect you contend for, you will do well to speak it out in plain words, and then there will need no more to be said in the Question.

And now I desire it may be consider'd what advantage this supposition of Force, which is suppos'd, puts into the Magistrates Hands by the Law of Nature to be us'd in Religion, brings to the true Religion, when it arms five hundred Magistrates against the true Religion, who must unavoidably in the state of things in the World, act against it, for one that uses Force for it. I say, that this use of Force in the Magistrates Hand is barely suppos'd by you from the benefit it is like to produce; but it being demonstration that the prejudice that will accrue to the true Religion from such a use of Force is five hundred times more than the advantage can be expected from it, the natural and unavoidable inference from your own ground of benefit, is, that God never gave any such Power to the Magistrate; and there it will rest till you can, by some better Argument prove the Magistrate to have such a Power: To which give me leave to add one word more.

You say the Magistrate is obliged by the Law of Nature to use Force to promote the true Religion; must he stand still and do nothing till he certainly know which is the

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true



true Religion? If so, the Commission is lost, and he can never do his Duty; for to certain Knowledge of the true Religion he can in this World never arrive. May he then act upon *firm Persuasion and full Assurance grounded upon such clear and solid proofs as the true Religion alone has, and no false one can have.* And then indeed you have distinguish'd your self into a safe retreat. For who can doubt but your *third sort or degree of Persuasion*, if that be your meaning, will determine the Magistrate to the true Religion, when it is grounded on those which are the Proofs only of the true Religion, which if it be all that you intend by your *full Assurance* (which is the Title you give to this your *third sort or degree of Persuasion*) I must desire you to apply this in answer to my Argument. I say, Magistrates in general have nothing to determine them in their application of Force but their own Persuasion; and your Answer is, the Magistrates of the true Religion have their own Persuasion to determine them; but of all the other Magistrates, which are above an hundred, I might say a thousand to one, you say nothing at all; and thus, by the help of a distinction, the Question is resolv'd. I say the Magistrates are not in a capacity to perform their Duty, if they be oblig'd to use Force to promote the true Religion,

ligion, since they have nothing to determine them but their own Persuasion of the Truth of any Religion; which in the variety of Religions which the Magistrates of the World have imbrac'd, cannot direct them to the true. Yes, say you, their Persuasion who have imbrac'd the true Religion, will direct them to the true Religion. Which amounts at last to no more but this, That the Magistrate that is in the right, is in the right. A very true Proposition without doubt; but whether it removes the difficulty I propos'd any better than begging the Question, you were best consider. There are five hundred Magistrates of false Religions for one that is of the true; I speak much within compass; 'tis a Duty incumbent on them all, say you, to use Force to bring Men to the true Religion. My Question is, how can this be compass'd by Men who are unavoidably determin'd by the Persuasion of the truth of their own Religion? 'Tis answer'd, they who are of the true Religion will perform their Duty. A great advantage surely to true Religion, and worth the contending for, that it should be the Magistrates Duty to use Force for promoting the true Religion, when in the state of things that is at present in the World, and always hitherto has been, one Magistrate in five hundred will use Force to promote

mote the true Religion, and the other four hundred ninty nine to promote false ones?

But perhaps you will tell me, That you do not allow that Magistrates who are of false Religions, should be determined by their own Persuasions, which are *built upon slight Appearances of Probability*; but such as are *grounded upon clear and solid Proofs*, which the true Religion alone has. In answer to this, I ask, Who must be Judge whether his Persuasion be grounded on clear and solid Proofs, the Magistrate himself or you for him? If the Magistrate himself, then we are but where we were; and all that you say here, with the Distinction that you have made about several sorts of Persuasion, serves only to lead us round about to the same place: For the Magistrate, of what Religion soever, must notwithstanding all you have said, be determined by his own Persuasion. If you say you must be Judge of the Clearness and Solidity of the Proofs upon which the Magistrate grounds the Belief of his own Religion, it is time you should produce your Patent, and shew the Commission whereby you act.

There are other Qualifications you assign of the *Proof*, on which you tell us *your third sort or degree of Persuasion is grounded*; and that is such, as leaves no reasonable  
Doubt

*Doubt in an attentive and unbiass'd Mind*: Which unless you must be Judge what is a reasonable Doubt, and which is an attentive and unbiass'd Mind, will do you no manner of Service. If the Magistrate must be Judge for himself in this case, you can have nothing to say to him; but if you must be Judge, then any Doubt about your Religion will be unreasonable, and his not embracing and promoting your Religion will be for want of Attention and an unbiass'd Mind. But let me tell you, give but the same Liberty of judging for the Magistrate of your Religion to the Men of another Religion, which they have as much Right to as you have to judge for the Magistrate, of any other Religion in the Points mentioned, all this will return upon you. Go into *France* and try whether it be not so. So that your Plea for the Magistrate's using Force for promoting the true Religion, as you have stated it, gives as much Power and Authority to the King of *France* to use it against his dissenting Subjects, as to any other Prince in *Christendom* to use it against theirs; name which you please.

The Fallacy in making it the Magistrate's Duty to promote by Force the only true Religion, lies in this, That you allow your self to suppose the Magistrate, who is of your Religion, to be well grounded, attentive

tentive and unbiass'd, and fully and firmly assured that his Religion is true; but that other Magistrates of other Religions different from yours are not so: Which what is it but to erect your self into a State of Infallibility above all other Men, of different Persuasions from yours, which yet they have as good a Title to as your self.

Having thus advanc'd your self into the Chair, and given your self the Power of deciding for all Men which is and which is not the true Religion, it is not to be wonder'd that you so roundly pronounce *all my Discourse, p. 2, 3, 4. concerning the Difference between Faith and Knowledge to be Impertinency*; and so Magisterially to tell me, *That the thing I was there concern'd to make out, if I would speak to the purpose, was no other but this, that there are as clear and as solid grounds for the Belief of false Religions, as there are for Belief of the true: Or, that Men may both as firmly and as rationally believe and imbrace false Religions as they can the true.*

The Impertinency in these two or three Pages I shall leave to shift for it self, in the Judgment of any indifferent Reader; and will only, at present, examine what you tell *I was concern'd to make out, if I would speak to the purpose.*

My

My Business there was to prove, That the Magistrate being taught that it was his Duty to use Force to promote the true Religion, it would thence unavoidably follow, that not having Knowledge of the Truth of any Religion but only Belief that it was true, to determine him in his Application of Force, he would take himself in Duty bound to promote his own Religion by Force; and thereupon Force would inevitably be used to promote false Religions upon those very grounds upon which you pretend to make it serviceable only to the true: And this, I suppose, I have in those Pages evidently proved, though you think not fit to give any other Answer to what I there say, but that it is impertinent; and I should have proved something else, which you would have done well, by a plain and clear Deduction, to have shewn from my words.

[The two following Leaves of the Copy are either lost or mislaid.]

After this new Invention of yours, of answering by Specimen, so happily found out for the ease of your self and other Disputants of Renown, that shall please to follow it, I cannot presume you should take notice of any thing I have to say:  
You

You have assum'd the Privilege, by shewing your strength against one Argument, to pronounce all the rest baffled; and therefore to what purpose is it to offer Difficulties to you, who can blow them all off with a Breath? But yet to apologize for my self to the World, for being of Opinion that it is always from want of *Consideration, Attention, or being unbiass'd*, that Men with *Firmness of Persuasion* imbrace, and with *full Assurance* adhere to the wrong side in Matters of Religion, I shall take the Liberty to offer the famous Instance of the two *Raynolds's*, Brothers, both Men of Learning and Parts; whereof the one being of the Church of *England*, and the other of the Church of *Rome*, they both desiring each other's Conversion to the Religion which he himself was of, that they writ to one another about it; and that with such Appearance of solid and clear grounds on both sides, that they were wrought upon by them: Each chang'd his Religion, and that with so *firm a Persuasion* and *full an Assurance* of the Truth of that which he turn'd to, that no Endeavours or Arguments of either of them could ever after move the other, or bring him back from what he had persuaded him to. If now I should ask to which of these two *full Assurance* pointed out the true Religion, you

no doubt, if you would answer at all, would say, To him that embrac'd that of the Church of *England*, and a Papist would say the other: But if an indifferent Man were ask'd whether this *full Assurance* was sufficient to point out the true Religion to either of them, he must answer, No; for if it were, they must necessarily have been both of the same Religion.

To sum up then what you answer to my saying, "It cannot be the Magistrate's Duty to use Force to promote the true Religion, because he is not in a Capacity to perform that Duty; for not having a certain Knowledge, but only his own Persuasion to point out to him which is the true Religion, if he be satisfied 'tis his Duty to use Force to promote the true Religion, it will inevitably follow, that he must always use it to promote his own." To which you answer, That a Persuasion of a low degree is not sufficient to point out that Religion to the Magistrate which he is to promote by Force; but that a *Firmness and Stability of Persuasion, a full Assurance is that which is to point out to the Magistrate that Religion which he is by Force to promote.* Where if by *Firmness and Stability of Persuasion and full Assurance*, you mean what the Words import, 'tis plain you confess the Magistrates

Magistrate's Duty is to promote his own Religion by Force; for that is the Religion which his *firm Persuasion* and *full Assurance* points out to him. If by *full Assurance* you mean any thing but the Strength of Persuasion, you contradict all that you have said about *Firmness* and *Stability*, and *Degrees of Persuasion*; and having in that Sense allow'd the Sufficiency of my Division, where I say, "Knowledge or Opinion must point out that Religion to him, which he is by Force to promote;" retract it again, and instead thereof under the Name of *full Assurance*, you substitute and put in *true Religion*, and so Firmness of Persuasion is in effect laid by, and nothing but the Name made use of: For pray tell me, Is Firmness of Persuasion, or being of the true Religion, either of them by it self, sufficient to point out to the Magistrate that Religion which it is his Duty to promote by Force? For they do not always go together. If being of the true Religion by it self may do it, your mentioning Firmness of Persuasion grounded on solid Proof that leaves no Doubt, is to no purpose, but to mislead your Reason; for every one that is of the true Religion, does not arrive at that high Degree of Persuasion, that *full Assurance*, which approaches that which is very near to that which is produced

duced by Demonstration. And in this Sense of *full Assurance*, which you say Men may have of the true Religion, and can never have of a false one, your Answer amounts to this, That *full Assurance* in him that embraces the true Religion, will point out the Religion he is by Force to promote: Where 'tis plain, that by *Fulness of Assurance* you do mean not the Firmness of his Persuasion that points out to him the Religion which he is by Force to promote (for any lower Degree of Persuasion to him that embraces the true Religion would do it as certainly; and to one that embraces not the true Religion, the highest Degree of Persuasion would even in your Opinion do nothing at all) but his being of the true Religion, is that which alone guides him to his Duty of promoting the true Religion by Force. So that to my Question, how shall a Magistrate who is persuaded that it is his and every Magistrate's Duty to promote the true Religion by Force, be determin'd in his Use of Force, you seem to say his *firm Persuasion* or *full Assurance* of the Truth of the Religion he so promotes must determine him; and presently, in other Words, you seem to lay the Stress upon his actually being of the true Religion. The first of these Answers is not true; for I have shewn, that Firmness of

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Persuasion may and does point out to Magistrates false Religions as well as the true: And the second is much what the same, as if to one who should ask what should enable a Man to find the right way who knows it not, it should be answered, the being in it. One of these must be your meaning, (choose which you please of them) if you have any meaning at all in your sixth and beginning of the seventh Page, to which I refer the Reader; where, if he find nothing else, he cannot fail to find a *Specimen* of School-play, of talking uncertainly in the utmost Perfection, nicely and artificially worded, that it may serve for a *Specimen* of a Master-piece in that kind, but a *Specimen* of the answerableness of my Letter will require, as I imagine, a little more plain dealing. And, to satisfy Readers, that have not attain'd to the admiration of skilfully saying nothing; you must directly inform them, whether Firmness of Persuasion be or be not sufficient in a Magistrate to enable him to do his Duty in promoting the true Religion by Force, or else this you have pitch'd on will scarce be a Sample of the answerableness of all I have said.

But you stand positive in it, and that is like a Master, that it cannot be infer'd from the Magistrate's being oblig'd to promote by Force the true Religion, that every Magistrate

gistrate is oblig'd to promote by Force his own Religion. And that for the same reason you had given before, more perplex'd and obscurely, *viz.* *Because there is this perpetual advantage on the side of the true Religion, that it may and ought to be believ'd on clear and solid grounds, such as will appear the more so, the more they are examin'd: Whereas no other Religion can be believ'd so, but upon such appearances only, as will not bear a just examination.*

This would be an answer to what I have said, if it were so that all Magistrates saw the preponderancy of the grounds of Belief, which are on the side of the true Religion; but since it is not the grounds and reasons of a Truth that are not seen, that do or can set the Magistrate upon doing his Duty in the case; but 'tis the persuasion of the Mind, produc'd by such Reasons and Grounds as do affect it, that alone does or is capable to determine the Magistrate in the use of Force, for performing of his Duty; it necessarily follows, that if two Magistrates have equally strong Persuasions concerning the Truth of their Religions respectively, they must both be set on work thereby, or neither; for though one be of a false, and the other of the true Religion, yet the principle of Operation, that alone which they have to determine them, being

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equal

equal in both, they must both be determin'd by it; unless it can be said, that one of them must act according to that Principle, which alone can determine, and the other must act against it; that is, do what he cannot do; be determin'd to one thing, by what at the same time determines him to another. From which incapacity in Magistrates to perform their Duty, if it be their Duty by Force to promote the true Religion, I think it may justly be concluded, that to use Force for the promoting any Religion, cannot be their Duty.

You tell us, 'tis by the Law of Nature Magistrates are oblig'd to promote the true Religion by Force. It must be own'd, that if this be an Obligation of the Law of Nature, very few Magistrates over-look it, so forward are they to promote that Religion by Force which they take to be true. This being the case, I beseech you tell me what was *Huaina Capac* Emperor of *Peru* oblig'd to do? who being persuaded of his Duty to promote the true Religion, was not yet within distance of knowing or so much as hearing of the Christian Religion, which really is the true, (so far was he from a possibility to have his Belief grounded upon the solid and clear Proofs of the true Religion.) Was he to promote the true Religion by Force? That he either did nor  
could

could know any thing of, so that That was morally impossible for him to do. Was he to sit still in the neglect of his Duty incumbent on him? That is in effect to suppose it a Duty and no Duty at the same time. If upon his not knowing which is the true Religion, you allow it his Duty to promote it by Force, the Question is at an end: You and I are agreed, that it is not the Magistrate's Duty by Force to promote the true Religion. If you hold it in that case to be his Duty, what remains for him to do but to use Force to promote that Religion which he himself is strongly, nay perhaps to the highest degree of firmness persuaded is the true? Which is the granting what I contend for, that if the Magistrate be oblig'd to promote by Force the true Religion, it will thence follow, that he is oblig'd to promote by Force that Religion which he is persuaded is the true; since, as you will have it, Force was given him to that end, and it is his Duty to use it, and he has nothing else to determine it to that end but his own Persuasion. So that one of these two things must follow, either that in that case it ceases to be his Duty, or else he must promote his own Religion, choose you which you please  
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# MEMOIRS

Relating to the LIFE of

## ANTHONY

First EARL of

## SHAFTSBURY.

To which are added,

Three Letters writ by the E. of SHAFTSBURY while Prisoner in the Tower; one to King CHARLES II. another to the Duke of YORK, and a third to a noble Lord; found with Mr. LOCKE'S MEMOIRS, &c.



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# MEMOIRS

Relating to the LIFE of

## ANTHONY

First EARL of

## SHAFTSBURY.

**B**EING at *Oxford* in the beginning of the Civil War (for he was on that side as long as he had any hopes to serve his Country there) he was brought one day to King *Charles I.* by the Lord *Falkland* his Friend, then Secretary of State, and presented to him as having something to offer to his Majesty worth his Consideration. At this Audience he told the King that he thought he could put an end to the War if His Majesty pleas'd, and would assist him in it. The King answer'd, that he was a very young Man for so great an undertaking

dertaking. Sir, reply'd he, that will not be the worfe for your Affairs, provided I do the buſineſs; whereupon the King ſhewing a willingneſs to hear him, he diſcourſ'd to him to this purpoſe.

The Gentlemen and Men of Eſtates who firſt engaged in this War, ſeeing now after a Year or two that it ſeems to be no nearer the end than it was at firſt, and beginning to be weary of it, I am very well ſatisfied would be glad to be at quiet at home again, if they could be aſſur'd of a redreſs of their Grievances, and have their Rights and Liberties ſecur'd to them. This I am ſatisfied is the preſent Temper generally through all *England*, and particularly in thoſe parts where my Eſtate and Concerns lie; if therefore your Maſtey will impower me to treat with the Parliament Garifons to grant them a full and general Pardon, with an aſſurance that a general Amniſty (Arms being laid down on both ſides) ſhould reinſtate all things in the ſame poſture they were before the War, and then a free Parliament ſhould do what more remain'd to be done for the ſettlement of the Nation.

That he would begin and try the Experiment firſt in his own Country, and doubted not but the good ſucceſs he ſhould have there, would open him the Gates of other adjoining Garifons, bringing them the news

of Peace and Security in laying down their Arms.

Being furniſh'd with full power according to his deſire, away he goes to *Dorſetſhire*, where he manag'd a Treaty with the Garifons of *Pool*, *Weymouth*, *Dorcheſter*, and others; and was ſo ſucceſſful in it, that one of them was actually put into his Hands, as the other were to have been ſome few days after. But Prince *Maurice* <sup>Prince Maurice.</sup> who commanded ſome of the King's Forces, being with his Army then in thoſe Parts, no ſooner heard that the Town was ſurrender'd but he preſently march'd into it, and gave the pillage of it to his Soldiers. This Sir *A.* ſaw with the utmoſt diſpleaſure, and could not forbear to expreſs his Reſentments to the Prince; ſo that there paſs'd ſome pretty hot words between them; but the violence was committed, and thereby his deſign broken. All that he could do was, that he ſent to the other Garifons, he was in Treaty with, to ſtand upon their guard, for that he could not ſecure his Articles to them, and ſo this deſign prov'd abortive and died in ſilence.

This Project of his for putting an end to a Civil War which had ſufficiently harras'd the Kingdom, and no body could tell what fatal Conſequences it might have, being thus fruſtrated, it was not long before his active

active Thoughts, always intent upon saving his Country (the good of that being that by which he steer'd his Counfels and Actions through the whole Course of his Life) it was not long before he fet his Head upon framing another design to the same purpose. The first Project of it took its rise in a Debate between him and Serjeant *Fountain* in an Inn at *Hungerford*, where they accidentally met, and both disliking the continuance of the War, and deploring the ruin it threatn'd, it was started between them, that the Countries all through *England*, should arm and endeavour to suppress the Armies on both sides. This Proposal, which, in one Night's debate, look'd more like a well-meant Wish than a form'd Design; he afterwards consider'd more at leisure, fram'd and fashion'd into a well-order'd and practical Contrivance, and never left working in it 'till he had brought most of the sober and well intencion'd Gentlemen of both sides all through *England* into it. This was that which gave rise to that third sort of Army, which of a sudden started up in several parts of *England*, with so much terror to the Armies both of King and Parliament, and had not some of those who had engaged in it, and had undertaken to rise at the time appointed failed, the *Club-men*, for so they were call'd, had been strong enough

*Club-men.*

enough to carry their Point, which was to make both sides lay down their Arms, and if they would not do it, to force them to it, to declare for a general Amnesty; to have the then Parliament dissolv'd, and to have a new one call'd for redressing the Grievances and settling the Nation. This undertaking was not a Romantick Phansie, but had very promising grounds of success; for the Yeomanry and Body of the People had suffered already very much by the War, and the Gentry and Men of Estates had abated much of their Fierceness, and wished to return to their former Ease, Security and Plenty, especially perceiving that the Game, particularly on the King's side, began to be plaid out of their Hands, and that it was the Soldiers of Fortune who were best look'd upon at Court, and had the Commands and Power put into their Hands.

He had been for some time before in *Dorsetshire*, forming and combining the parts of this great Machine, 'till at length he got it to begin to move. But those who had been forward to enter into the design not being so vigorous and resolute, when the time was to appear and act; and the Court, who had learnt or suspected that it had its Rise and Life from him, having so strict an Eye upon him that he could not maintain Correspondence with distant Countries, and animate

imate the several parts as it was necessary, before it was his time to stir, He receiv'd a very civil and more than ordinary Letter from the King to come to him at *Oxford*; but he wanted not Friends there to inform him of the danger it would be to him to appear there, and to confirm him in the suspicion that the King's Letter put him, that there was something else meant him, and not so much kindness as that expressed. Besides, the Lord *Goring*, who lay with an Army in those parts, had orders from Court to seize him, and had civilly sent him word, that he would come such a day and dine with him. All this together made him see that he could be no longer safe at home, nor in the King's Quarters; he therefore went, whither he was driven, into the Parliament Quarters, and took shelter in *Portsmouth*. Thus for endeavouring to save his King and Country he was banished from the side he had chosen. And the Court that was then high in hopes of nothing less than perfect Conquest and being Masters of all, had a great aversion to moderate Counsels, and to those of the Nobility and Gentry of their Party, who were Authors or Favourers of any such Proposals as might bring things to a Composition. Such well-wishers to their Country, though they had spent much, and ventur'd all on the King's side when

when they appear'd for any other end of the War but dint of Arms, and a total reduction of the Parliament by Force, were counted Enemies; and any contrivance carried on to that end was interpreted Treason.

A Person of his Consideration thus rejected and cast off by the King, and taking Sanctuary with them, was receiv'd by the Parliament with open Arms; and though he came in from the other side and put himself into their Hands without any terms, yet there were those among them that so well knew his worth, and what value they ought to put upon it, that he was soon after offer'd considerable Employments under them, and was actually trusted with command without so much as ever being question'd concerning what he knew of Persons or Counsels on the other side, where they knew that his great Penetration and forward Mind would not let him live in ignorance among the great Men who were most of them his Friends, and all his Acquaintance.

But though he was not suffer'd to stay among those with whom he had embark'd and had liv'd in confidence with, and was forc'd to go over to the Parliament, he carried thither himself only, and nothing of any bodies else; he left them and all their Concerns, Actions, Purposes, Counsels

fels perfectly behind him, and no body of the King's side could complain of him after the day he went from his House, where he could be no longer safe, that he had any memory of what he had known when one of them.

This Forgetfulness so becoming a Gentleman and a Man of Honour, he had establish'd so firmly in his own Mind, that his resolution to persist in it was like afterwards to cost him no little trouble. Mr. *Denzil Hollis*, (afterwards the Lord *Hollis*) had been one of the Commissioners employ'd by the Parliament in the Treaty at *Uxbridge*, he had there had some secret and separate Transactions with the King; this could not be kept so secret, but that it got some vent, and some of the Parliament had some notice of it. Mr. *Hollis* being afterwards attacked in Parliament by a contrary Party, there wanted nothing perfectly to ruin him, but some Witness to give credit to such an Accusation against him. Sir *A. Ashley Cooper* they thought fit for their purpose, they doubted not but he knew enough of it, and they made sure that he would not fail to embrace such a fair and unfought-for opportunity of ruining Mr. *Hollis*, who had been long his Enemy upon a Family Quarrel, which he had carried so far, as, by his power in the House, to hinder him from sitting

sitting in the Parliament upon a fair Election for that Parliament. Upon this presumption he was summon'd to the House, and being called in, was there asked, whether when he was at *Oxford*, he knew not, or had not heard something concerning Mr. *Hollis's* secret Transaction with the King at the Treaty at *Uxbridge*. To this Question he told them he could answer nothing at all; for though possibly what he had to say would be to the clearing of Mr. *Hollis*, yet he could not allow himself to say anything in the case, since whatever answer he made, it would be a confession that if he had known any thing to the disadvantage of Mr. *Hollis*, he would have taken that dishonourable way of doing him a prejudice, and wreak his revenge on a Man that was his Enemy.

Those who had brought him there pressed him mightily to declare, but in vain, though threats were added of sending him to the Tower. He persisting obstinately silent was bid to withdraw, and those who had depended upon his discovery being defeated, and consequently very much displeas'd, mov'd warmly for his Commitment; of which he, waiting in the Lobby, having notice, unmov'd expected his doom, though several of his Friends coming out were earnest with him to satisfy the House, but

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he kept firm to his Resolution, and found Friends enough among the great Men of the Party that oppos'd Mr. *Hollis* to bring him off; who very much applauded the Generosity of his Carriage, and shew'd that Action so much to deserve the Commendation, rather than the Censure of that Assembly, that the angry Men were asham'd to insist farther on it, and so dropt the Debate.

Some Days after Mr. *Hollis* came to his Lodging, and having in terms of great Acknowledgement and Esteem express'd his Thanks for his late behaviour in the House with respect to him; he reply'd, that he pretended not thereby to merit any thing of him, or to lay an obligation on him; that what he had done was not out of any consideration of him, but what was due to himself, and he should equally have done, had any other Man been concern'd in it, and therefore he was perfectly as much at liberty as before to live with him as he pleas'd. But with all that he was not so ignorant of Mr. *Hollis's* worth, nor knew so little how to put a just value on his Friendship, as not to receive it as a very great and sensible Favour, if he thought him a Person worthy on whom to bestow it. Mr. *Hollis* not less taken with his Discourse than what had occasion'd it, gave him fresh and repeated

repeated assurances of his sincere and hearty Friendship, which were receiv'd with suitable Expressions. And thus an old Quarrel between two Men of high Spirits and great Estates, Neighbours in the same County, ended in a sound and firm Friendship, which lasted as long as they liv'd.

This Passage brings to my Mind what I remember to have often heard him say concerning a Man's obligation to silence in regard of Discourse made to him or in his presence. That it was not enough to keep close and uncommunicated what had been committed to him with that caution, but there was a general and tacit trust in Conversation, whereby a Man was oblig'd not to report again any thing that might be any way to the Speaker's prejudice, though no intimation had been given of a desire not to have it spoke of again.

He was wont to say, that Wisdom lay in the Heart and not in the Head, and that it was not the want of Knowledge, but the perverseness of the Will that fill'd Mens Actions with Folly, and their Lives with Disorder.

That there was in every one, two Men, the Wise and the Foolish, and that each of them must be allowed his turn. If you would have the Wise, the Grave, and the Serious always to rule and have the sway,

the Fool would grow so peevish and troublesome, that he would put the wise Man out of order, and make him fit for nothing: He must have his times of being let loose to follow his Phantasies and play his Gambols, if you would have your business go on smoothly.

I have heard him also say, that he desired no more of any Man but that he would talk: If he would but talk, said he, let him talk as he pleases. And indeed I never knew any one penetrate so quick into Mens Breasts, and from a small opening, survey that dark Cabinet as he would. He would understand Mens true Errand as soon as they had open'd their Mouths and begun their Story in appearance to another purpose.

Sir *Rich. Onslow* and He were invited by Sir *J. D.* to dine with him at *Chelsea*, and desired to come early, because he had an Affair of Concernment to communicate to them. They came at the time, and being sat, he told them he had made choice of them both for their known Abilities, and particular Friendship to him, for their advice in a matter of the greatest moment to him that could be. He had, he said, been a Widower for many Years, and began to want some body that might ease him of the trouble of House-keeping, and take some  
care

care of him under the growing Infirmities of old Age; and to that purpose had pitch'd upon a Woman very well known to him by the experience of many Years, in fine, his House-keeper. These Gentlemen who were not Strangers to his Family, and knew the Woman very well, and were besides very great Friends to his Son and Daughter, grown up, and both fit for Marriage, to whom they thought this would be a very prejudicial Match, were both in their Minds opposite to it; and to that purpose Sir *Rich. Onslow* began the Discourse; wherein, when he came to that part, he was entering upon the description of the Woman, and going to set her out in her own Colours, which were such as could not have pleas'd any Man in his Wife. Sir *Anthony* seeing whither he was going, to prevent any mischief, beg'd leave to interrupt him, by asking Sir *J.* a Question, which in short was this, *whether he were not already married?* Sir *J.* after a little demur, answer'd, yes truly he was married the Day before. Well then, reply'd Sir *Anthony*, there is no more need of our Advice; pray let us have the honour to see my Lady and wish her Joy, and so to dinner. As they were returning to *London* in their Coach, I am oblig'd to you, said Sir *Rich.* for preventing my running into a Discourse which could never have been for-

given me, if I had spoke out what I was going to say. But as for Sir J. he methinks ought to cut your Throat for your civil Question. How could it possibly enter into your Head to ask a Man who had solemnly invited us on purpose to have our advice about a Marriage he intended, had gravely proposed the Woman to us, and suffered us seriously to enter into the Debate, *whether he were already married or no.* The Man, and the Manner, reply'd Sir *Anthony*, gave me a suspicion that having done a foolish thing, he was desirous to cover himself with the Authority of our Advice. I thought it good to be sure before you went any farther, and you see what came of it. This afforded them entertainment till they came to Town, and so they parted.

Soon after the Restauration of King *Charles II.* the Earl of *Southampton* having dined together at the Chancellor's, as they were returning home, he said to my Lord *Southampton*, yonder Mrs. *Ann Hide* (for so as I remember he stiled her) is certainly married to one of the Brothers. The Earl who was a Friend to the Chancellor, treated this as a Chimæra, and ask'd him how so wild a phanſie could get into his Head. Assure your self, Sir, reply'd he, it is so. A conceal'd Respect, however suppress'd, shew'd it self so plainly in the Looks, Voice  
and

and Manner, wherewith her Mother carv'd to her, or offer'd her of every Dish, that 'tis impossible but it must be so. My Lord *S.* who thought it a groundless conceit then, was not long after convinc'd by the D. of *York's* owning of her, that Lord *Ashley* was no bad guesſer.

I shall give one instance more of his great Sagacity, wherein it prov'd of great use to him in a case of mighty consequence. Having reason to apprehend what Tyranny the Usurpation of the Government by the Officers of the Army under the Title of the Committee of Safety might end in; he thought the first step to Settlement was the breaking of them, which could not be done with any pretence of Authority, but that of the Long-Parliament. Meeting therefore secretly with Sir *Arthur Haselrig*, and some others of the Members, they gave Commissions in the name of the Parliament to be Major General, one of the Forces about *London*, another of the West, &c. and this when they had not one Soldier. Nay, he often would tell it laughing, that when he had his Commission his great care was where to hide it. Before this he had secur'd *Portsmouth*; for the Governor of it, Coll. *Metlam*, being his old Acquaintance and Friend, he ask'd him one Day, meeting him by chance in *Westminster-Hall*, whether  
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he would put *Portsmouth* into his Hands if he should happen to have an occasion for it; *Metbam* promis'd it should be at his devotion. These Transactions, though no part of them were known in particular, yet causing some remote preparations, alarm'd *Wallingford-House*, where the Committee of Safety sat, and made them so attentive to all Actions and Discoveries that might give them any light, that at last they were fully persuaded there was something a brewing against them, and that matter for Com-motions in several parts was gathering. They knew the Vigour and Activity of *Sir A. Asbley* and how well he stood affectionated to them, and therefore suspected that he was at the bottom of this matter. To find what they could, and secure the Man they most apprehended, he was sent for to *Wallingford-House*, where *Fleetwood* examined him according to the suspicions he had of him; that he was laying designs in the West against them, and was working the People to an Insurrection that he intended to head there. He told them, he knew no obligation he was under to give them an account of his Actions, nor to make them any Promises; but to shew them how ill grounded their suspicions were, he promis'd that he would not go out of Town without coming first and giving him an account of it.

*Fleetwood*

*Fleetwood* knowing his word might be rely'd on, satisfy'd with the promise he had made, let him go upon his Parole. That which deceiv'd them in the case, was, that knowing his Estate and Interest lay in the West, they presum'd that That was his Post, and there certainly if any stir was he would appear, since there lay his great Strength, and they had no body else in view who could supply his room and manage that part. But they were mistaken, *Hasselrig* upon the knowledge that they should have *Portsmouth*, forwardly took that Province; and he who had Instruments, and work in the Army quarter'd in and about *London*, and knew that must be the place of most Business and Management, and where the turn of Affairs would be, had chosen that.

*Lambert*, who was one of the Rulers at *Wallingford-House*, happen'd to be away when he was there, and came not in till he was gone: When they told him that *Sir A. Asbley* had been there, and what had pass'd, he blam'd *Fleetwood* for letting him go, and told him they should have secur'd him, for that certainly there was something in it that they were deceiv'd in, and they should not have parted so easily with so busie and dangerous a Man as he was. *Lambert* was of a quicker sight, and a deeper reach than *Fleetwood*, and the rest of that Gang, and knowing

knowing of what moment it was to their security to frustrate the contrivances of that working and able Head, was resolv'd if possibly he could, to get him into his Clutches.

Sir *A. A.* coming home to his House in Street in *Covent Garden* one Evening, found a Man knocking at his Door. He ask'd his Business; the Man answer'd, it was with him, and so fell a discoursing with him. Sir *A. A.* heard him out, and gave him such an answer as he thought proper, and so they parted, the Stranger out of the Entry where they stood into the Street, and Sir *A. A.* along the Entry into the House; but guessing by the Story the other told him, that the Business was but a pretence, and that his real Errand he came about was something else; when he parted from the Fellow went inwards, as if he intended to go into the House, but as soon as the Fellow was gone, turn'd short and went out, and went to his Barber's, which was just by; where he was no sooner got in and got up Stairs into a Chamber, but his Door was beset with Musketeers, and the Officer went in too with others to seize him; but not finding him, they search'd every Corner and Cranny of the House diligently, the Officer declaring he was sure he was in the House, for he had left him there just now; as was true,

true, for he had gone no farther than the corner of the *Half-Moon-Tavern*, which was just by to fetch a file of Soldiers that he had left there in the *Strand* out of sight, whilst he went to discover whether the Gentleman he sought were within or no; where doubting not to find him safely lodg'd he return'd with his Mirmidons to his House, sure, as he thought, of his Prey; but Sir *A. A.* saw through his made Story and gave him the Slip. After this he was fain to get out of the way and conceal himself under a disguise; but he hid himself not lazily in a hole, he made War upon them at *Wallingford-House* incognito, as he was, and made them feel him, though he kept out of sight. \* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \* \* Several Companies of their Soldiers drew up in *Lincolns-Inn-fields* without their Officers, and there put themselves under the command of such Officers as he appointed them. The City began to rouse it self, and to shew manifest signs of little regard to *Wallingford-House*, and he never left working till he had rais'd a Spirit and Strength enough to declare openly for the old Parliament, as the only legal Authority then in *England* which had any pretence to claim and take on them the Government. For *Portsmouth* being put into the Hands of Sir *Arthour Haselwig*, and the City shewing their

their inclination, the Countries readily took into it, and by their concurrent weight reinstated the excluded Members in their former Administration. This was the first open step he made towards the wresting the Civil Power out of the Hands of the Army; who having thought *Richard, Oliver's* Son, unworthy of it had taken it to themselves, executed by a Committee of their own Officers, where *Lambert* who had the chief Command and Influence in the Army had plac'd it, till he had model'd things among them, so as might make way for his taking the sole Administration into his own Hands; but *Sir A. A.* found a way to strip him of that as soon as the Parliament was restor'd.

The first thing he did was to get from them a Commission to himself, and two or three more of the most weighty and popular Members of the House, to have the power of General of all the Forces in *England*, which they were to execute jointly. This was no sooner done but he got them together, where he had provided abundance of Clerks who were immediately set to work to transcribe a great many Copies of the form of a Letter, wherein they reciting, that it had pleas'd God to restore the Parliament to the exercise of their Power, and that the Parliament had given to them a Commission to Command the Army, they therefore

therefore commanded him (*viz.* the Officer to whom the Letter was directed) immediately with his Troop, Company, or Regiment, as it happen'd, to march to *N.* These Letters were directed to the chief Officer of any part of the Army who had their Quarters together in any part of *England*. These Letters were dispatch'd away by particular Messengers that very Night, and coming to the several Officers so peremptorily to march immediately, they had not time to assemble and debate among themselves what to do; and having no other intelligence but that the Parliament was restor'd, and that the City and *Portsmouth*, and other parts of *England*, had declar'd for them; the Officers durst not disobey, but all, according to their several orders, march'd some one way, and some another; so that this Army which was the great strength of the Gentlemen of *Wallingford-House*, were by this means quite scatter'd and render'd perfectly useless to the Committee of Safety, who were hereby perfectly reduc'd under the power of the Parliament as so many disarm'd Men to be dispos'd of as they thought fit.

'Tis known, that whilst the Long-Parliament remain'd entire, *Mr. Denzil Hollis* was the Man of the greatest sway in it, and might have continu'd it on, if he would have follow'd *Sir A. A's.* advice. But he was a haughty

a haughty stiff Man, and so by straining it a little too much, lost all.

From the time of their Reconcilement already mention'd, they had been very hearty Friends; it happen'd one Morning that Sir *A. A.* calling upon Mr. *Hollis* in his way to the House, as he often did, he found him in a great heat against *Cromwell* who had then the Command of the Army, and a great interest in it. The provocation may be read at large in the Pamphlets of that time, for which Mr. *Hollis* was resolv'd, he said, to bring him to Punishment. Sir *A. A.* dissuaded him all he could from any such attempt, shewing him the danger of it, and told him 'twould be sufficient to remove him out of the way, by sending him with a Command into *Ireland*. This *Cromwell*, as things stood, would be glad to accept; but this would not satisfy Mr. *Hollis*. When he came to the House the matter was brought into debate, and it was mov'd, that *Cromwell*, and those guilty with him, should be punish'd. *Cromwell*, who was in the House, no sooner heard this, but he stole out, took Horse, and rode immediately to the Army, which, as I remember, was at *Triploe-Heath*; there he acquainted them what the *Presbyterian* Party was a doing in the House, and made such use of it to them, that they who were before in the power of the Parliament,

now

now united together under *Cromwell*, who immediately led them away to *London*, giving out Menaces against *Hollis* and his Party as they march, who with *Stapleton* and some others, were fain to fly, and thereby the Independent Party becoming the stronger, they, as they call'd it, purg'd the House, and turn'd out all the *Presbyterian* Party. *Cromwell*, some time after, meeting Sir *A. A.* told him, I am beholden to you for your kindness to me, for you, I hear, were for letting me go without Punishment, but your Friend, God be thank'd, was not wise enough to take your advice.

*Monk*, after the death of *Oliver Cromwell*, and the removal of *Richard*, marching with the Army he had with him into *England*, gave fair promises all along in his way to *London* to the Rump that were then sitting, who had sent Commissioners to him that accompanied him. When he was come to Town, though he had promised fair to the Rump and Commonwealth Party on one hand, and gave hopes to the Royalists on the other, yet at last agreed with the *French* Ambassador to take the Government on himself, by whom he had promise from *Mazarine* of assistance from *France* to support him in this undertaking. This bargain was struck up between them late at Night, but not so secretly but that his Wife who had posted her self

self

self conveniently behind the Hangings, where she could hear all that pass'd, finding what was resolv'd, sent her Brother *Charges* away immediately with notice of it to Sir *A. A.* She was zealous for the Restauration of the King, and had therefore promised Sir *A.* to watch her Husband, and inform him from time to time how matters went. Upon this notice Sir *A.* caus'd the Council of State, whereof he was one, to be summon'd, and when they were met, he desir'd the Clarks might withdraw, he having matter of great importance to communicate to them. The Doors of the Council Chamber being lock'd, and the Keys laid upon the Table, he began to charge *Monk* not in a direct and open Accusation, but in obscure Intimations, and doubtful Expressions, giving ground of suspicion, that he was playing false with them, and not doing as he promis'd. This he did so skilfully and intelligibly to *Monk*, that he perceiv'd he was discover'd, and therefore in his answer to him fumbled and seem'd out of order; so that the rest of the Council perceiv'd there was something in it, tho' they knew not what the matter was; and the General at last averring, that what had been suggested was upon groundless suspicions, and that he was true to his Principles, and stood firm to  
what

what he had professed to them, and had no secret designs that ought to disturb them, and that he was ready to give them all manner of satisfaction; whereupon Sir *A. A.* closing with him, and making a farther use of what he had said than he intended. For he meant no more than so far as to get away from them upon this assurance which he gave them. But Sir *A. A.* told him, that if he was sincere in what he had said, he might presently remove all Scruples, He should presently take away their Commissions from such and such Officers in his Army, and give them to those whom he named, and that presently before he went out of the Room. *Monk* was in himself no quick Man, he was guilty, alone, among a Company of Men who he knew not what they would do with him; for they all struck in with Sir *A. A.* and plainly perceiv'd that *Monk* had design'd some foul Play. In these straits being thus close press'd, and knowing not how else to extricate himself, he consented to what was propos'd, and so immediately before he stir'd, a great part of the Commissions of his Officers were changed, and Sir *Edward Harley*, among the rest, who was a Member of the Council, and there present, was made Governor of *Dunkirk* in the room of Sir *William Lockbart*, and was sent away immediately to take possession of  
X it.

it. By which means the Army ceas'd to be at *Monk's* devotion, and was put into hands that would not serve him in the design he had undertaken. The *French* Ambassador, who had the Night before sent away an Express to *Mazarine*, positively to assure him that things went here as he desir'd, and that *Monk* was fix'd by him in his Resolution to take on himself the Government, was not a little astonish'd the next day to find things taking another turn, and indeed this so much disgrac'd him in the *French* Court, that he was presently call'd home, and soon after broke his Heart.

This was that which gave the great turn to the Restoration of King *Charles II.* whereof Sir *A.* had laid the Plan in his Head a long time before, and had carried it on. \*\*\*\*\*

*Quantus*

*Quantus hic situs est ex titulis, quod raro, discas.*

Baro ASHLEY de Wimborne St. Giles,

Deinde Comes Shaftsburiensis,

Cancellarius Scaccarii. *Ararii* Triumvir,

Magnus Angliæ Cancellarius,

CAROLO Secundo a Sanctioribus & Secretioribus Conciliis, &c.

*Hæc non Sepulchri ornamenta, sed viri.*

*Quippe quæ nec Majoribus debuit nec favori.*

*Comitate, acumine, suadela consilio, animo, constantia, fide,*  
*Vix Parem alibi invenias, Superiorem certè nullibi.*

*Libertatis Civilis, Ecclesiasticæ*

*Propugnator strenuus, indefessus.*

*Vitæ publicis commodis impensæ memoriam & laudes,*

*Stante libertate, nunquam oblitterabit*

*Tempus edax, nec edacior Invidia.*

*Servo pecori inutilia, invisâ magna exempla.*

\*\*\*\*\*

*Three Letters writ by the E. of Shaftsbury whilst Prisoner in the Tower; one to King Charles II. another to the D. of York; a third to a Noble Lord; found with Mr. Locke's Memoirs, relating to the Life of Anthony first Earl of Shaftsbury.*

TO KING CHARLES II.

SIR,

THE Almighty God, the King of Kings permitted *Job* to dispute with him, and to order his Cause before him; give me leave therefore, great Sir, to lay my Case before your Majesty, and to plead not only my Innocence but my Merits towards your Majesty; for *my Integrity will I hold fast, and will not let it go; my Heart shall not reproach me so long as I live.*

I had the honour to have a principal hand in your Restauration, neither did I act in it, but on a principle of Piety and Honour: I never betray'd (as your Majesty knows) the Party or Councils I was of. I kept no Correspondence with, nor I made no secret Addresses to your Majesty; neither did I endeavour or obtain any private Terms or Articles for my self, or Reward for what I had or should do. In whatever I did toward the Service of your Majesty, I was solely acted by the sense of that Duty I owed to God, the English Nation, and your Majesty's

ty's just Right and Title. I saw the Hand of Providence that had led us through various forms of Government, and had given Power into the Hands of several sorts of Men, but he had given none of them a Heart to use it as they should; they all fell to the Prey, sought not the Good or Settlement of the Nation, endeavoured only the enlargement and continuance of their own Authority, and grasp'd at those very Powers they had complain'd of so much, and for which so bloody and so fatal a War had been rais'd and continu'd in the Bowels of the Nation. I observ'd the Leaders of the great Parties of Religion both Laity and Clergy ready and forward to deliver up the Rights and Liberties of the People, and to introduce an absolute Dominion, so that the Tyranny might be establish'd in the Hands of those that favour'd their way, and with whom they might have hopes to divide the present Spoil, having no eye to Posterity, or thought of future things. One of the last Scenes of this Confusion was General *Lambert's* seizing of the Government in a Morning by force of Arms, turning out the Parliament and their Council of State; and in their room erecting a Committee of Safety. The news of this gives a great surprize to General *Monk*, who commanded the Army in *Scotland*. \* \* \* \*

X 3

To

To the D. of YORK.

SIR,

I Humbly confefs I never thought my Person or my Principles acceptable to your Royal Highness; but at that juncture of time and occasion when I was committed, I had no reason to expect you should be my severe Enemy. Reputation is the greatest concern of great Dealers in the World; Great Princes are the greatest Dealers; no Reputation more their Interest, than to be thought merciful, relievers of the Distressed, and Maintainers of the ancient Laws and Rights of their Country. This I ever wish may attend your Royal Highness, and that I may be one instance of it.

To the Lord—

My Lord,

I Had prepared this for your meeting in December, but that being adjourned to the 3d of April, an Age to an old infirm Man; especially shut up in a Winter's Prison; forgive me if I say you owe your self and your Posterity as well as me, the endeavouring to remove so severe a President on one of your Members; such as I may truly say is the first of the kind, and I pray heartily may be the last. Your intercession to his Majesty if it be general, is not like to be refused; if you are single, yet you have done honourably and what I should have done for you. A

Esper Ch. 4.  
Ver. 13, 14.

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A NEW  
METHOD  
OF A  
Common-Place-Book.

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Translated out of French from the Second  
Volume of the *Bibliothèque Universelle*.

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X 4



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EPISTOLA.] *A Letter from Mr. Locke to  
2. Mr. Toignard, containing a New and Easie  
Method of a Common-Place-Book, to which  
an Index of two Pages is sufficient.*

AT length, Sir, in obedience to you,  
I publish my *Method of a Com-  
mon-Place-Book*. I am asham'd that I de-  
ferr'd so long complying with your Re-  
quest, but I esteem'd it so mean a thing  
as not to deserve publishing in an Age  
so full of useful Inventions as ours is.  
You may remember that I freely com-  
municated it to you, and several others,  
to whom I imagin'd it would not be un-  
acceptable. So that it was not to reserve  
the sole use of it to my self, that I de-  
clin'd publishing it. But the regard I  
had to the Publick, discourag'd me from  
presenting it with such a Trifle. Yet my  
Obligations to you, and the Friendship be-  
tween us, compel me now to follow your  
Advice. Your last Letter has perfectly de-  
termin'd me to it, and I am convinc'd that  
I ought not to delay publishing it, when  
you tell me that an Experience of several  
Years

3. Years has shew'd its Usefulness to you  
and several of your Friends to whom  
you have communicated it. There is  
no need I should tell you how useful it  
has been to me after five and twenty  
Years Experience, as I told you eight  
Years since, when I had the honour to  
wait on you at *Paris*, and when I might  
have been instructed by your learned and  
agreeable Discourse. What I aim at now  
by this Letter, is to testify publickly  
the Esteem and Respect I have for you,  
and to convince you how much I am, Sir,  
your, &c.

*Before I enter on my Subject, it is fit to  
acquaint the Reader, that this Tract is dis-  
posed in the same manner that the Common-  
Place-Book ought to be disposed. It will  
be understood by reading what follows,  
what is the meaning of the Latin Titles  
on the top of the backside of each Leaf, and  
at the bottom of this Page.*

EBIONITÆ.] *In eorum Evangelio, quod  
secundum Hebræos dicebatur, historia  
quæ habetur Matth. xix. 16. & seqq.  
ut alia quadam, erat interpolata in hunc  
Modum; Dixit ad eum alter divitum  
Magister quid bonum faciens vivam?  
Dixit ei Homo legem & Prophetas fac.  
14. Respondit ad eum, feci. Dixit ei: vade,  
vende*

## ADVERSARIORUM METHODUS.]

4. I take a Paper Book of what size I please. I divide the two first Pages that face one another by parallel Lines into five and twenty equal parts, every fifth Line black, the other red. I then cut them perpendicularly by other Lines that I draw from the top to the bottom of the Page, as you may see in the Table prefixed. I put about the middle of each five spaces one of the twenty Letters I design to make use of, and a little forward in each space the five Vowels one below another in their natural Order. This is the *Index* to the whole Volume how big soever it may be.

The *Index* being made after this manner, I leave a Margin in all the other Pages of the Book, of about the largeness of an Inch in a Volume in Folio, or a little larger, and in a less Volume, smaller in proportion.

If I would put any thing in my COMMON-PLACE-BOOK, I find out a Head to which I may refer it. Each

5. Each Head ought to be some important and essential Word to the matter in hand, and in that Word regard is to be had to the first Letter, and the Vowel that follows it; for upon these two Letters depend all the use of the *Index*.

I omit three Letters of the Alphabet as of no use to me, *viz.* K. Y. W. which are supplied by C. I. U. that are equivalent to them: I put the Letter Q. that is always followed with an U. in the fifth space of Z. By throwing Q. last in my *Index*, I preserve the regularity of my *Index*, and diminish not in the least its extent; for it seldom happens that there is any Head begins with Z. U. I have found none in the five and twenty Years I have used this Method. If nevertheless it be necessary, nothing hinders but that one may make a Reference after Q. U. provided it be done with any kind of distinction; but for more exactness a place may be assign'd for Q. U. below the *Index*, as I have formerly done. When I meet with any thing that I think fit to put into my *Common-Place-Book*, I first find a proper Head. Suppose, for example, that the V Head be EPISTOLA, I look into the *Index* for

ADVERSARIORUM METHODUS.]

V for the first Letter and the following  
6. Vowel which in this instance are E. I.

If in the space mark'd E. I. there is any number, That directs me to the Page design'd for words that begin with an E. and whose first Vowel, after the initial Letter, is I. I must then write under the word *Epistola* in that Page what I have to remark. I write the Head in large Letters, and begin a little way out into the Margin, and I continue on the Line in writing what I have to say. I observe constantly this Rule, that only the Head appears in the Margin, and that it be continued on without ever doubling the Line in the Margin, by which means the Heads will be obvious at first sight.

If I find no number in the *Index* in the space E. I. I look into my Book for the first backside of a Leaf that is not written in, which in a Book where there is yet nothing but the *Index* must be *p. 2.* I write then in my *Index* after E. I. the number 2. and the Head *Epistola* at the top of the Margin of the second Page, and all that I put under that Head in the same Page, as you see I have done in the second Page of this *Method.* From that time the Class E, I, is wholly in possession of

7. of the second and third Pages. They are to be employ'd only on words that begin with an E. and whose nearest Vowel is an I, as *Ebionitæ* (see the bottom of the third Page) *Episcopus*, *Echinus*, *Edictum Efficacia*, &c. The reason why I begin always at the top of the back-side of a Leaf, and assign to one Class two Pages that face one another, rather than an entire Leaf, is, because the Heads of the Class appear all at once, without the trouble of turning over a Leaf.

Every time that I would write a new Head, I look first in my *Index* for the Characteristic Letters of the word, and I see by the number that follows, what the Page is that is assigned to the Class of that Head. If there is no number, I must look for the first back-side of a Page that is blank. I then set down the number in the *Index*, and design that Page with that of the right side of the following Leaf to this new Class. Let it be, for example, the word *Adversaria*; if I see no number in the space A. E. I seek for the first back-side of a Leaf, which being at *p. 4.* I set down in the space A. E. the number 4. and in the fourth Page, the Head ADVERSARIA with all that I write under it, as I have already informed you. From this time the fourth Page with

ADVERSARIORUM METHODUS.] with  
 V the fifth that follows is reserved for the Class  
 8. A. E. that is to say for the Heads that begin with  
 an A, and whose next Vowel is an E; as for  
 instance *Aer*, *Aera*, *Agefilaus*, *Acheron*, &c.

When the two Pages designed for one Class are  
 full, I look forwards for the next back-side of a  
 Leaf that is blank. If it be that which imme-  
 diately follows, I write at the bottom of the  
 Margin in the Page that I have filled the Let-  
 ter V, that is to say *Verte, turn over*; as like-  
 wise the same at the top of the next Page. If  
 the Pages that immediately follow are already  
 filled by other Classes, I write at the bottom of  
 the Page last filled, the number of the next  
 empty back-side of a Page. At the beginning  
 of that Page I write down the Head, under  
 which I go on with what I had to put in my  
*Common-Place-Book*, as if it had been in the same  
 Page. At the top of this new back-side of a  
 Leaf I set down the number of the Page I fil-  
 led last. By these Numbers which refer to one  
 another, the first whereof is at the bottom of  
 one Page, and the second is at the beginning of  
 another, one joyns Matter that is separated as  
 if there was nothing between them. For by this  
 reciprocal reference of Numbers one may turn  
 as one Leaf all those that are between the two e-  
 ven as if they were pasted together. You have

an example of this in the third and fourteenth  
 Pages.

9. Every time I put a number at the bottom of  
 a Page, I put it also into the *Index*; but when  
 I put only an V, I make no addition in the *In-  
 dex*; the reason whereof is plain.

If the Head is a Monosyllable and begins  
 with a Vowel, that Vowel is at the same time  
 both the first Letter of the word, and the Cha-  
 racteristick Vowel. Therefore I write the  
 the word *Ars* in A a and O s in O o.

You may see by what I have said, that one  
 is to begin to write each Class of words on the  
 back-side of a Page. It may happen upon that  
 account, that the back-side of all the Pages  
 may be full, and yet there may remain several  
 Pages on the right Hand which are empty.  
 Now if you have a mind to fill your Book, you  
 may assign these right sides which are wholly  
 blank, to new Classes.

If any one imagins that these hundred Clas-  
 ses are not sufficient to comprehend all sorts of  
 Subjects without confusion; he may follow the  
 same Method, and yet augment the number to  
 five hundred, in adding a Vowel. But having ex-  
 perienc'd both the one and the other Method, I  
 prefer the first; and usage will convince those who  
 shall try it how well it will serve the purpose aim'd  
 V. at, especially if one has a Book for each Science

Y

upon

ADVERSARIORUM METHODUS.] upon which one makes Collections, or at least two for the two Heads, to which one may refer all our Knowledge, viz. Moral Philosophy and Natural.

You may add a third, which may be called the *Knowledge of Signs*, which relates to the use of words, and is of much more extent than meer Criticism.

As to the Language in which one ought to express the *Heads*, I esteem the Latin Tongue most commodious, provided the Nominative Case be always kept to, for fear left in words of two Syllables, or in Monosyllables that begin with a Vowel, the change which happens in oblique Cases should occasion Confusion. But it is not of much Consequence what Language is made use of, provided there be no mixture in the Heads of different Languages.

To take notice of a place in an Author from whom I quote something, I make use of this Method: Before I write any thing, I put the Name of the Author in my *Common-Place-Book*, and under that Name the Title of the Treatise, the size of the Volume, the Time and Place of its Edition, and (what ought never to be omitted) the number of Pages that the whole Book contains. For example, I put into the Class

M. A

II. M. A. *Marsham, Canon Chronicus Aegyptiacus, Graecus, & Disquisitiones fol. Lond. 1672. p. 626.* This number of Pages serves me for the future to mark the particular Treatise of this Author, and the Edition I make use of. I have no need to mark the place, otherwise than in setting down the number of the Page from whence I have drawn what I have wrote, just above the number of Pages contained in the whole Volume. You will see an example in *Acherusia*, where the number 259 is just above the number 626, that is to say, the number of the Page where I take my Matter, as just above the number of Pages of the whole Volume. By this means I not only save my self the trouble of writing *Canon Chronicus, Aegyptiacus, &c.* but am able by the Rule of Three to find out the same Passage in any other Edition, by looking for the number of its Pages; since the Edition I have used, which contains 626, gives me 259. You will not indeed always light on the very Page you want, because of the breaches that are made in different Editions of Books, and that are not always equal in proportion; but you are never very far from the place you want, and it is better to be able to find a Passage in turning over a few Pages, than to be oblig'd to turn over a whole Book to find

Y 2

it

ADVERSARIORUM METHODUS.] it, VI 2. as it happens when the Book has no *Index*, or when the *Index* is not exact.

ACHERON.] *Pratum, ficta mortuorum habitatio, est locus prope Memphin, juxta paludem quam vocant Acherusiam, &c.* This is a Passage taken out of *D. Siculus*, the Sense whereof is this: The Fields where they feign that the Dead inhabit, are only a place near *Memphis* near a Marsh call'd *Acherusia*, about which is a most delightful Country, where one may behold Lakes and Forests of *Lotus* and *Calamus*. It is with reason that *Orpheus* said, the Dead inhabit these places, because there the *Egyptians* celebrate the greatest part and the most august of their Funeral Solemnities. They carry the Dead over the *Nile*, and through the Marsh of *Acherusia*, and there put them into subterraneous Vaults. There are a great many other Fables among the *Greeks* touching the state of the Dead, which very well agree with what is at this day practised in *Egypt*. For they call the Boat in which the Dead are transported, *Baris*; and a certain piece of Money is given to the Ferry-man for a Passage, who, in their Language, is called *Charon*. Near this place is a Temple of *Hecate* in the Shades, &c. and the Gates of *Cocytus* and *Lethe* shut

13. shut up with Bars of Brass. There are other Gates which are call'd the Gates of *Truth*, with the Statue of Justice before them, which has no Head. *Marsham* <sup>259</sup>/<sub>626</sub>

EBIONITÆ.] vende omnia quæ possides, & divide  
 14. pauperibus, & veni, sequere me. Cœpit autem  
 Dives scalperè caput suum, & non placuit ei.  
 Et dixit ad eum Dominus: quomodo dicis  
 Legem feci & Prophetas? cum scriptum sit in  
 lege, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum: &  
 ecce multi fratres tui filii Abrahæ amicti sunt  
 stercore, morientes præ fame, & domus tua  
 plena est bonis multis, & non egreditur omni-  
 no aliquid ex ea ad eos. Et conversus dixit  
 Simoni Discipulo suo sedenti apud se: Simon,  
 fili Johannæ, facilius est camelum intrare per  
 foramen acûs quam divitem in regnum cœlorum.  
 Nimirum hæc ideo immutavit Ebion quia  
 Christum nec Dei Filium, nec <sup>noystruw</sup> ~~noystruw~~, sed  
 nudum interpretem Legis per Mosem data  
 agnoscebat.

In the Gospel of the Ebionites, which they  
 called the Gospel according to the Hebrews,  
 the Story that is in the XIXth of St. Matt.  
 and in the 16th and following Verses, was  
 changed after this manner: One of the rich  
 Men said to him: Master, what shall I do that I  
 may have life? Jesus said to him: Obey the  
 Law and the Prophets. He answer'd, I have done  
 so. Jesus said unto him, go, sell what thou hast,  
~~divide~~ <sup>divide</sup> it among the Poor, and then come, and fol-  
 low me. Upon which the rich Man began to scratch  
 his head, and to dislike the advice of Jesus. And the  
 Lord said unto him, how can you say you have done  
 as

15. as the Law and Prophets directs you, since  
 it is written in the Law, Thou shalt love thy  
 Neighbour as thy self, and there are many of  
 thy brethren, Children of Abraham, who are  
 almost naked, and who are ready to dye with  
 hunger, while thy house is full of good things,  
 and yet thou givest them no help nor assistance.  
 And turning himself towards Simon his Disci-  
 ple who sat near him: Simon, Son of Johanna,  
 said he, it is easier for a Camel to go through  
 the eye of a Needle, than for a rich Man to  
 enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Ebion  
 chang'd this Passage, because he did not be-  
 lieve Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, nor  
 a Law-giver, but a meer interpreter of the  
 Law of Moses. Grotius <sup>316</sup> 166.

\* \* \*

Y 4

HARE



HÆRETICI] Nostrum igitur fuit eligere & optare meliora, ut ad vestram correctionem ad-  
 16. tum haberemus; non in contentione & emulati-  
 one & persecutionibus, sed mansuetè consolando,  
 benevolè hortando; leniter disputando, sicut  
 scriptum est, servum autem Domini non oportet  
 litigare, sed Mitem esse ad omnes, docibilem,  
 patientem, in modestia corripientem diversa  
 sentientes. Nostrum ergo fuit velle has partes  
 expetere: Dei est volentibus & petentibus  
 donare quod bonum est. Illi in vos sevant,  
 qui nesciunt cum quo labore verum inveniatur,  
 & quam difficile caveantur errores. Illi in  
 vos sevant, qui nesciunt quam rarum & ar-  
 dum sit carnalia phantasmata pie mentis  
 serenitate superare. Illi in vos sevant, qui  
 nesciunt cum quanta difficultate sanetur oculus  
 interioris hominis ut possit intueri solem suum.....  
 Illi in vos sevant qui nesciunt quibus suspiriis  
 & gemitibus fiat ut ex quantalacunque parte  
 possit intelligi Deus. Postremo illi in vos sevi-  
 ant qui nullo tali errore decepti sunt, quali  
 vos deceptos vident. In Catholicâ enim Ec-  
 clesiâ, ut omittam sincerissimam sapientiam,  
 ad cuius cognitionem pauci spirituales in hac  
 vitâ perveniunt, ut eam ex minimâ quidem  
 parte quia homines sunt, sed tamen sine du-  
 bitatione cognoscant; ceteram quippe vir-  
 tam non intelligendi vivat is, sed credendi  
 simplicitas tutissimam facit. Augustinus. Tom.

17. vi. Col. 116. Fol. Basilæ: 1542. contra  
 Epist. Manichæi, quam vocant Fundamenti.  
 “ We were of Opinion, that other Methods  
 “ were to be made choice of, and that to reco-  
 “ ver you from your Errors, we ought not to  
 “ persecute you with Injuries and Invectives, or  
 “ any ill Treatment, but endeavour to procure  
 “ your attention by soft Words and Exhorta-  
 “ tions, which would shew the tenderness we  
 “ have for you: according to that Passage of  
 “ Holy Writ, The Servant of the Lord ought  
 “ not to love Strife and Quarrels, but to be  
 “ gentle, affable, and patient towards all Man-  
 “ kind, and to reprove with modesty those who  
 “ differ from him in Opinion.....Let them only  
 “ treat you with rigour who know not how dif-  
 “ ficult it is to find out the Truth, and avoid  
 “ Error. Let those treat you with rigor who  
 “ are ignorant how rare and painful a Work  
 “ it is calmly to dissipate the Carnal Phantoms  
 “ that disturb even a Pious Mind. Let those  
 “ treat you with rigor, who are ignorant of  
 “ the extream difficulty that there is to purifie  
 “ the Eye of the Inward Man, to render him  
 “ capable of seeing the Truth, which is the Sun  
 “ or Light of the Soul. Let those treat you  
 V “ with rigor, who have never felt the Sighs  
 20. “ and Groans that a Soul must have before  
 it

CONFESSIO FIDEI] Periculofum nobis admo-  
 18. dum atq; etiam miferabile est, tot nunc fides  
 exiftere, quot voluntates: & tot nobis doctri-  
 nas esse quot Mores: & tot causas blasphe-  
 miarum pullulare quot vitia sunt: dum aut ita  
 fides fcribuntur ut volumus, aut ita ut volumus  
 intelliguntur. Et cum fecundum unum Deum  
 & unum Dominum, & unam baptifma etiam  
 fides una fit, excidimus ab eâ fide quæ fola  
 eft: & dum plures fiunt, id esse cœperunt  
 ne ulla fit; Confcii enim nobis invicem fumus  
 poft Nicæni conventus Synodum nihil aliud  
 quam fidem fcribi. Dum in verbis pugna eft,  
 dum de novitatibus quæftio eft, dum de ambi-  
 guis occasio eft, dum de Autoribus querela eft,  
 dum de ftudiis certamen eft, dum in confenfu  
 difficultas eft, dum alter alteri anathema esse  
 cœpit, prope jam nemo eft Chrifti, &c. Jam vero  
 proximi anni fides, quid jam de immutatione in  
 fe habet? Primum quæ Homoufion decernit  
 taceri: fequens rurfum quæ Homoufion decernit  
 & prædicat. Tertium deinceps quæ Ufiam simpli-  
 citer a patribus præfumptam, per indulgentiam  
 excufat. Poftremum quartum, quæ non excufat,  
 fed condemnat, &c. De fimilitudine autem  
 filii Dei ad Deum Patrem, quod miferabi-  
 lis noſtri temporis eft fides, ne non ex toto,  
 fed tantum ex portione fit fimilis? Egregii  
 fcilicet arbitri cœleftium sacramentorum con-  
 quiftores, invifibilium myfteriorum profeflio-  
 nibus

19. nobis de fide Dei calumniatur, annuas atq;  
 Menſtruas de Deo fides decernimus, decre-  
 tis pœnitemus, pœnitentes defendimus, defen-  
 ſos anathematizamus, aut in noſtri aliena,  
 aut in alienis noſtra damnamus & morden-  
 tes invicem jam abſumpti fumus invicem.  
 Hilarius p. 211. in lib. ad Constantium  
 Auguſtum. Baſil. 1550. fol. " It is a thing  
 equally deplorable and dangerous, that  
 there are at preſent as many Creeds as  
 there are Opinions among Men, as many  
 Doctrines as Inclinations, and as many  
 ſources of Blaſphemy, as there are Faults  
 among us, becauſe we make Creeds arbitra-  
 rily, and explain them as arbitrarily. And  
 as there is but *one Faith*, ſo there is but  
 one only God, one Lord, and one Baptiſm.  
 We renounce this *one Faith* when we make  
 ſo many different Creeds, and that diverſity  
 is the reaſon why we have no true Faith  
 among us. We cannot be ignorant, that  
 ſince the Council of Nice, we have done  
 nothing but made Creeds. And while we  
 fight againſt Words, litigate about new Que-  
 ſtions, diſpute about Equivocal Terms, com-  
 plain of Authors, that every one may make  
 his own Party triumph, while we cannot agree,  
 while

HÆRETICI.] " it can obtain any knowledge  
 20. " of the Divine Being. To conclude, let  
 " those treat you with rigor, who never have  
 " been seduced into Errors, near a kin to  
 " those you are engaged in. I pass over in  
 " silence that pure Wisdom, which but a  
 " few Spiritual Men attain to in this Life;  
 " so that though they know but in part, be-  
 " cause they are Men, yet nevertheless they  
 " know what they do know with certainty:  
 " For in the Catholick Church, it is not pene-  
 " tration of Mind, nor profound Knowledge,  
 " but simplicity of Faith, which puts Men in a  
 " state of safety.

*Barbari quippe homines. Romane imo potius  
 Humane eruditionis expertes, qui nihil omni-  
 no sciunt nisi quod a Doctoribus suis audiunt:  
 quod audiunt hoc sequuntur, ac sic necesse est  
 eos, qui totius literatura ac scientia ignari,  
 sacramentum divine legis doctrina magis quam  
 lectione cognoscunt, doctrinam potius retinere  
 quam legem. Itaq; eis traditio magistrorum  
 suorum & doctrina inveterata, quasi lex est,  
 qui hoc sciunt quod docentur. Heretici ergo  
 sunt, sed non scientes. Denique apud nos  
 sunt Heretici, apud se non sunt. Nam in  
 tantum se Catholicos esse judicant ut nos  
 ipsos titulo Heretica appellationis insipient.  
 Quod ergo illi nobis sunt & hoc nos illis.*

Nos

Nos eos injuriam, divine generationi facere  
 21. certi sumus, quod minorem Patre Filium dicant.  
 Illi nos injuriosos Patri existimant, quia aequales  
 esse credamus. Veritas apud nos est; sed illi  
 apud se esse presumunt. Honor Dei apud nos  
 est: sed illi hoc arbitrantur, honorem divinita-  
 tis esse quod credunt. Inofficiosi sunt, sed illis  
 hoc est summum Religionis officium. Impii sunt,  
 sed hoc putant esse veram pietatem. Errant  
 ergo, sed bono animo errant, non odio sed af-  
 fectu Dei, honorare se Dominum atq; amare  
 credentes. Quamvis non habeant rectam fidem,  
 illi tamen hoc perfectam Dei estimant caritatem.  
 Qualiter pro hoc ipso falsa opinionis errore in  
 die Judicii puniendi sunt, nullus scire potest  
 nisi Juxta. Interim idcirco eis, ut reor, pa-  
 tientiam Deus commodat, quia videt eos, et si  
 non recte credere, affectu tamen pre opinionis  
 errare. *Salvianus.* <sup>162</sup><sub>339</sub>

This Bishop speaks here of the *Arian* *Goths*  
 and *Vandals*. " They are, says he, *Barbari-*  
 " *ans*, who have no tincture of the *Roman* *Po-*  
 " *liteneis*, and who are ignorant of what is very  
 " commonly known among other Men, and  
 " only know what their Doctors have taught  
 " them, and follow what they have heard  
 " them say. Men so ignorant as these, find  
 " themselves under a necessity of learning the  
 " Mysteries of the Gospel rather by the in-  
 " structions that are given them, than by Books.  
 The

HERETICI] The Tradition of their Doctors,  
 22. and the received Doctrines are the only Rule  
 " they follow, because they know nothing but  
 " what they have taught them. They are  
 " then Hereticks, but they know it not. They  
 " are so in our account, but they believe it not ;  
 " and think themselves so good Catholicks,  
 " that they treat us as Hereticks, judging of  
 " us as we do of them. We are persuaded  
 " that they believe amiss concerning the Di-  
 " vine Generation, when they maintain the  
 " Son is inferiour to the Father ; and they ima-  
 " gine that we rob the Father of his Glory  
 " who believe them both to be equal. We  
 " have the Truth on our side, and they pre-  
 " tend it is on theirs. We give to God his  
 " due Honour, and they think they honour  
 " him better. They fail in their Duty, but  
 " they imagine they perform perfectly well ;  
 " and they make true Piety to consist in  
 " what we call Impious. They are in a Mi-  
 " stake, but with a great deal of Sincerity,  
 " and it is so far from being an effect of their  
 " Hatred, that it is a mark of their Love of  
 " God, since by what they do they imagine they  
 " shew the greatest Respect for the Lord, and Zeal  
 " for his Glory. Therefore tho' they have not  
 " true Faith, they nevertheless look upon that


which

23. " which they have, as a perfect Love of God.  
 " it belongs only to the Judge of the Universe  
 " to know how these Men will be punished for  
 " their Errors at the last Day. Yet I believe  
 " God will shew Compassion towards them, be-  
 " cause he sees their Heart is more right than  
 " their Belief, and that if they are mistaken, it  
 " is their Piety made them err.

CON-

CONFESSIO FIDEI] while we anathematize  
 24. one another, there is hardly one that adheres  
 “ to *Jesus Christ*. What change was there not  
 “ in the Creed last Year! The first Council or-  
 “ dained a silence upon the *Homousion*; the se-  
 “ cond establish'd it and would have us speak;  
 “ the third excuses the Fathers of the Council,  
 “ and pretends they took the word *Ousia* simply;  
 “ the fourth condemns them instead of excusing  
 “ them. With respect to the likeness of the  
 “ Son of God to the Father, which is the Faith  
 “ of our deplorable Times, they dispute whe-  
 “ ther he is like in whole or in part. These  
 “ are rare Folks to unravel the secrets of Hea-  
 “ ven. Nevertheless it is for these Creeds about  
 “ invisible Mysteries that we calumniate one  
 “ another, and for our Belief in God. We make  
 “ Creeds every Year, nay every Moon, we re-  
 “ pent of what we have done, we defend those  
 “ that repent, we anathematize those we defend-  
 “ ded. So we condemn either the Doctrine of  
 “ others in our selves, or our own in that of o-  
 “ thers, and reciprocally tearing one another to  
 “ pieces, we have been the cause of each others  
 “ ruine.

F I N I S.



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