


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A X  
COLLECTION  
OF  
POLITICAL TRACTS.



DUBLIN:  
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M, DCC, XLVIII.

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P R E F A C E.

*THE Works of those wise and great Men, who have been employed in publick Transactions, have always been esteemed, by the best Judges, of the utmost Consequence and of the highest Entertainment; as they enable us to trace the secret Springs of Events, and to form a true Judgment of Princes and the Conduct of their Ministers; to oppose the dangerous Attacks on Liberty, and settle the just Bounds of Prerogative.*

*With a View to the Prosecution of this Design the following Tracts are now collected together; but it may not perhaps be thought impertinent to acquaint the Reader that, in the Infancy of the late Opposition, some of them were ushered into the World from a printing Press under the Sanction of a late noble Duke, handed privately about, and very difficult to be procured; others were more openly published, but appeared at different Periods of Time, and amongst weekly Productions.*

*The Importance of the Subjects and the Elegance, with which they were treated, were their first Recommendation, and will, I doubt not, always secure them the public Esteem.*

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[ 1 ]

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T H E  
Occasional W R I T E R.

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*Fidens animi atque in utrumque paratus.*  
VIRG.

---

Most Noble SIR,

I AM one, whose Ambition it hath been, ever since I came into the World to distinguish myself as a Writer; in which, I fairly confess, I had not only the View of raising my Reputation, but that of establishing my Fortune. A Prospect, which seemed very reasonable in a Time of general Peace and universal Affluence; in an Age so particularly polite, that it is even the Fashion to appear knowing in all the elegant Arts and Sciences; and that to whatever Branch of them a Genius shall think fit to turn himself, he is sure it will be to one that is in Vogue.

The first Essays of my Pen made a good deal of Noise in the World; they filled foreign Journals, and were translated into several Languages. The

B  
Sorbonne,

[ 2 ]

*Sorbonne*, and both our Mother Universities, returned me Thanks for having reconciled several Disputes, and solved several Difficulties in Chronology and History, which had perplexed the learned World, from the impartial *Eusebius*, down to the circumstantial *Prideaux*; my philosophical Poems were received with the greatest Applause; and it is well known, that if the gay Part of the World read my *Anti-Lucretius* for Amusement, the gravest Divines have not disdained to borrow Arguments from it in their Disputes with the Materialists.

Animated by such Success, in one Part of my Aim, I proceeded with indefatigable Labour, till continual Disappointments, in the other, rendered me at length more indifferent to that imaginary good Applause, and less patient of that real Evil, Want. I began then to compare my Condition with that of several great Authors both antient and modern; and finding upon the Comparison that they had not been better treated than myself, I was soon led by my Reflections to discover the true Reason of our ill Fortune in the World; I was soon convinced that they and I had been on a wrong Pursuit; that Ministers of State pay no Respect to the brightest Talents, when they are misapplied, and esteem all Talents to be so, which are not wholly employed about the present Time, and principally dedicated to the Service of their Administration; neither can I say this Proceeding is unjust, how much soever I suffer by it.

If we write for Posterity, we must not complain that the Care of rewarding our Merit is left to Posterity; and if we neglect to serve the State, those, who are appointed to preside over it, break no Rule of Equity when they neglect us. *Spencer* has been amply recompenced by Posterity for his *Fairy Queen*; but the wise Treasurer *Burleigh* declined the Payment of an hundred Pounds, which Queen *Elizabeth* ordered

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ordered him, and left this admirable Poet to starve. Had *Spencer* applied himself to more serious Studies, had he excelled in Physicks, in Metaphysicks, or even in the first Philosophy, or in Theology, instead of excelling in Wit and Poetry, the *amabiles Insaniæ* of *Horace*, his Usage would have been the same no doubt. Even the greatest Productions of these Studies are but Trifles in the Account of a consummate Statesman, and may properly enough be distinguished from the others in his Sense, by the Title of *Insaniæ severiores*.

Our *English* Ministers, to their Honour be it spoken, have at all times proceeded upon this admirable Principle; the most excellent Sermons, the most elaborate Treatises, have not been sufficient to procure the Advancement of some Divines, whilst a sorry Pamphlet or a spiritual Libel has raised others to the highest Dignities of the Church. As it has fared with mere Divinity, so has it fared with mere Eloquence; as one never caused the Divine, so the other never caused the Lawyer to be distinguished. But we know that if either of them be employed in a Court Cause, he never fails of making his Fortune. The same Fate has attended Writers of another Kind; the celebrated *Tatlers*, and *Spectators*, had no Reward except from Bookfellers and Fame. But when those Authors made the Discovery I have made, and applied their Talents better, in writing the *Englishman* and the *Freeholder*, one was soon created a Knight, and the other became Secretary of State. In short, without enumerating any more Instances, I may confidently affirm, that this has been the Case from the Days of *Burleigh* to this Time; how much sooner it began to be so, I hope, Sir, you will not give me the Leisure to enquire.

From the Moment I resolved to become a State-Writer, I mentally devoted myself to your Service, and I do it now in this publick and most solemn

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Manner.



[ 4 ]

Manner. Employ me, Sir, as you please; I abandon myself intirely to you; my Pen is at your Disposition, and my Conscience in your keeping. Like a Lawyer, I am ready to support the Cause, in which, give me Leave to suppose that, I shall be soon retained with Ardour; and, if Occasion be, with Subtilty and Acrimony. Like a *Swiss*, I will behave myself with equal Boldness and Fidelity; my Pen is my Fortune, and I think it as honourable to offer it, as offer my Sword, without enquiring in a general Battle, or in private Skirmishes, at what Relation or Friend I strike. I cancel at once all former Obligations and Friendship, and will most implicitly follow your Instructions in Panegyrick on Yourself and Friends, in Satyr on your Adversaries, in writing for or against the same Subject, just as your Interest, or even your Passions, may render it expedient.

I am not ignorant that when *Carneades* offered to argue for Virtue, and then against it, *Cato* proposed to drive that great Philosopher and Orator out of *Rome*. But *Cato* was a Man of narrow Principles and of too confined an Understanding. He considered Virtue abstractedly, without any Regard to Time, to Place, and to that vast Variety of Conjunctions, which happen in the Course of human Affairs. In common Life, Morality is no doubt necessary, and therefore Legislators have been careful to enforce the Practice of it; but whenever Morality clashes with the Interest of the State, it must be, and it always has been, laid aside. These are my Opinions, and it is a great Comfort to my Conscience to find them confirmed by the Practice of some reverend Persons, whose Examples ought to be of greater Weight with me, than that of a wretched *Pagan*; I shall therefore shew myself neither squeamish nor whimsical in pursuing the Enterprize to which I offer my Services, but shall remain

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remain firmly persuaded, that all the moral Vices, I may be occasionally guilty of in so good a Course, will be exalted into political Virtues.

After this plain and honest Account, which I have given of myself, it may be allowed me to say, that you cannot find a Person better qualified for your Service, or more worthy to be listed among those, who draw their Pens in your Cause, and of whom I am willing to hope that you have a greater and an abler Body in Reserve, than you have hitherto judged proper to bring into the Field.

It is evident, that a Minister, in every Circumstance of Life, stands in as much need of us publick Writers as we of him; in his Prosperity he can no more subsist without daily Praise, than we without daily Bread, and the farther he extends his Views, the more necessary are we to his Support. Let him speak as contemptuously of us as he pleases, for that is frequently the Manner of those, who employ us most, and pay us best; yet will it fare with his Ambition as with a lofty Tree, which cannot shoot its Branches into the Clouds, unless its Root work into the Dirt, from which it rose, on which it stands, and by which it is nourished.

If a Minister falls into Adversity, shall he take up the Pen in his own Defence? Would not the Case be as deplorable for him to be left to write, as for a Prince to be left to fight in his own Quarrel? Believe me, Sir, whenever Fortune abandons you, (and who knows how soon that may happen?) you will find yourself in a very forlorn State. At the Name of your Successor, those Crowds, that attend your Levee, will vanish like Spirits at the Dawn of Day. None will remain about you, but such as no other Administration will condescend to employ; and we may therefore very probably behold you, which would be a pitiful Sight indeed, endeavouring to secure a safe Retreat with *H*— on one Side

B 3

of

[ 6 ]

of you, and *Leb*—— on the other, two grotesque Personages, exactly paired and nearly allied, but surely as little fit to support a Minister in his Decline, as to adorn his Triumph. In such a Turn as this, you may depend on my utmost Efforts to keep up a Spirit for you, and I can make no doubt of being seconded by several of my Fellow-Writers, since I am certain you will not scruple to share some Part of that Fortune, which your Industry and Parsimony have raised, with those who unite to save the Whole; and since we shall be reasonable enough not to expect above Sixpence in the Pound out of it, which cannot well amount to more than fifteen or twenty thousand Pounds. A trifling Sum for so great a Service and so weighty a Purse!

You may perhaps, after all I have said, be still apt to think that these are wild Discourses, which have no other Foundation but my Desire to render myself necessary. You may refine too much in your Reflections on my Conduct, and too little in those you make on your present Situation; or if you judge rightly of this, it is not impossible but you may depend too much on your own Vigilance and Dexterity. Should any of those Flatterers, who often betray their Patrons into a fatal Security, speak to you much in the same Manner, as Sleep addresses himself to *Palinurus* in the fifth Book of the *Æneis*.

— *Palinure, ferunt ipsa æquora classẽ,*  
*Æquatæ spirant auræ, datur hora quieti;*  
*Pone caput, fessosque oculos furare labori.*

You would answer, I am persuaded, as this Pilot did.

*Mene salis placidi vultum, fluctusque quietos*  
*Ignorare jubes? mene huic confidere monstro?*

But

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But *Palinurus* slept, and you know the Consequence.

Be not therefore displeas'd, if a sincere and zealous Servant rowzes you, admonishes you not to trust too much to Appearances, and shews you Danger when perhaps you least expect it. You have sail'd long in a smooth Sea with gentle and favourable Gales. We believe your Courage and your Abilities extremely great, but we believe it implicitly; for you have not had foul Weather enough to give any considerable Proofs of either. These Circumstances, which might be abus'd to inspire Security, I urge as Reasons why you should be alarmed; for the Element you have to deal with is by the Laws of Nature inconstant; and therefore the longer you have been without a Storm, the more Reason you have to expect one. There is no surer Prefage of an Hurricane than just such a dead Calm as I have observ'd for some Time.

To speak without a Figure; I would not have you flatter yourself, that the undisturbed Quiet you have so long enjoyed is merely owing to your own Integrity and political Merit, or to the uncommon Prosecution of Hawkers and Pamphleteers, which has been carried on by the Direction of one of your principal Instruments, and indeed a most vigorous Statesman. This Quiet, Sir, is owing to deep and inveterate Designs, which it becomes me to lay before you, without any Regard to the Censure I may incur, of revealing private Conversation, and of Breach of Trust. Know then that from the Time you came into a Fulness of Power, many were shocked at the Manner, in which you seized it, and at the Use you made of it. They said that both were hurtful, indecent, and even shameless. They went still farther, and affirmed, that your Conduct was foolish with Regard to your own Interest, since it was foolish for a Man to trust to one

B 4

single

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single Expedient of Government, who had several in his Power; and especially to such an Expedient as that of Money, which would equally serve to support him or hang him. These Persons however, notwithstanding their Discontent, resolved to lie quiet, till your Male-Administration should become so glaring as to justify their Opposition, even in his Majesty's Sight; they said they would not follow your Example, and upon that Occasion they remembered with some Sharpness how you did your utmost to distress the King's Affairs, upon the first Disgust you received; nay they were malicious enough to call to mind some personal Reflections\*, which the Heat of your Imagination, and your Familiarity with Majesty, betrayed you into, and for which they saucily wished what I dare not name. These seditious Spirits flattered themselves that you would do your own Business when you had the full Swing of your Power. They were acquainted, they said, with the Presumption and Distrust, with the Boldness and Puffanimity, with the Indiscretion and Cunning, and with fifty other Contradictions, which made up your Character; and upon these they depended for putting a speedy End to your Administration. This End they imagine to be now at Hand, for thus they reason. A Minister, who is attacked on his Management of the publick Revenue, and has all the Advantages of Money and Authority on his Side, may escape though he is guilty; but if he is innocent, the Proceedings against him in such a Case must necessarily confirm his Power, and establish his Reputation; nothing more desirable than such an Attack can happen to him. But our present Minister, say these Malignants, directly stops all Enquiry; in publick he evades giving such Accounts as the Representatives of

\* See a Pamphlet called *An Answer to an infamous Libel*, intitled, Sedition and Defamation displayed.

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of the People have a Right to demand; in private he is modest and discreet enough to laugh at those, who think him such a Fool as to furnish Proofs against himself. Can a Minister keep his Ground long, who has no other Defence than an implied Confession of his Guilt? Will such a Behaviour be endured in a Nation hitherto free, and where there remain at least some Sparks of Honour and of Love of the Country?

These and many other Reflections, which for Brevity sake I omit, upon your particular Conduct, and upon our domestick Affairs, are frequently thrown out. But, Sir, I confess to you, that I tremble when I hear the same Persons discourse concerning the State of the Nation with regard to her foreign Interests. They affirm and they offer to demonstrate, that the Affairs of *Europe* never were in greater Confusion, and that the Part we take upon ourselves is such an one, as no Nation ever acted which was not betrayed, or whose Ministers were not infatuated. That you are so, they say, is past Dispute, whether you have conducted these Affairs yourself, or have left them to those Men of eminent Talents, who are concerned in this Part of your Administration; they insist that nothing could have happened to us, if you had intirely neglected our foreign Interests, worse than what you have brought upon us, by running into the other Extreme. For they ask, what is the Fruit of your continual Negotiations, supported by a vast Expence, and carried on as busily as if the Welfare of *Great Britain* had been at Stake in every Dispute, which has happened on the Continent? They answer for you, and they defy you to contradict them, that we have made the Quarrels of other People our own, and that we find ourselves engaged as Principals, in some Cases where we have but a very remote Concern, and in others where we have

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no Concern at all. That our Commerce suffers and runs the Risque of being lost, not for a Time, but for ever, in several Branches, much more beneficial to us than the Ostend Trade, and that our Right to keep those important Possessions, which were yielded to us in the most solemn and authentick Manner, is come, by Dint of Negotiation, from being indisputable, to be called in Question. In a Word, that to restore the publick Tranquility, and to settle our own Interests, we must engage in a new War, and conclude a new Peace; that you have contrived to make it impossible for us to do One, without fighting against the very Principle for which we have fought ever since the Revolution, or to attempt the other without lying under the particular Circumstance, that our principal Allies will be as much in earnest as our Enemies to wrest out of our Hands the chief Advantages which we obtained by the Treaty of *Utrecht*. At the Time when these Treaties were made, continue they, your *Great Minister* cried aloud, and spared not. He complained, as much as any Man, that the exorbitant Power of *France* was not sufficiently reduced, and that the Barriers of our Allies, on the *Rhine* and in the *Netherlands*, were left too weak; and is it under his Administration that we are to see a Pretence given to the *French*, and an Opportunity thrown into their Hands, of strengthening their Power, and of extending their Barriers? When I tell these Objectors that your *Brother* answers for the Court of *France*, they laugh in my Face, and reply, well he may, and so might any of those, who were in the *French* Interest, have done at the Time when the Triple Alliance was broken, and *France* was encouraged by *England* to fall upon the *Dutch*. The Ministers, who are answered for, would be as weak as he, who answers for them, if they did not see the Advantage in the present  
Juncture,

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Juncture, and did not take a secret malicious Pleasure in making us, who contributed so much to reduce their Power, become the Instruments of raising it again. In the Case of a War then, we have, according to this reasoning, which really, Sir, has an Air of Truth, nothing so much to fear as the Assistance of our chief Ally; and in the Case of a Treaty, not only *France*, but *Holland* likewise, must be against us in that important Article of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, and in all particular Advantages of Commerce, which we have enjoyed, and may find it reasonable to pretend to. The late Duke of *Orleans*, as dear a Friend as he was to us, insisted strenuously, that we should give up the Places before-mentioned; pretended a Promise to this Effect, and himself obliged in Honour to see this Promise kept. Every one, who knows any Thing of the Transactions of those Times, knows with how envious an Eye the *Dutch* beheld the separate Privileges in Trade, and the sole Possession of *Gibraltar*, and of the Island of *Minorca*, which we obtained at the last Peace, and what Lengths they would have gone to facilitate the Negotiations, which at that Time they opposed, if they might have been admitted to a Share in these Advantages.

The Danger of an immediate Invasion, and the Engagements entered into by the Emperor and the King of *Spain* to insult us with their Fleets, and to conquer *Great Britain* and *Ireland* for the Pretender, have been very industriously propagated by those, who are already in your Pay, and by me, who stand a Candidate for this Honour, but am hitherto a Volontier in your Service. I am sorry to tell you, Sir, but Heaven forbid that I should conceal so material a Circumstance from your Knowledge; we do not succeed. We raise a Spirit, but this Spirit turns against you. There are more People than ever against the Pretender; and Zeal for supporting  
the

the present Establishment never ran higher. But this Zeal is not any longer without Knowledge; it is directed to its proper Object, and there is no Possibility of leading it hoodwinked to serve any other Purposes. Some incredulous Wretches there are, who smile when we talk to them of Invasions and the Pretender, and who content themselves to reply that the Machine is very seasonably introduced, and according to the Rules of Art. The greater Number take Fire, and lay this new Distress, which we threaten them with, at your Door; for, they say, that we disobliged *Spain* some Years ago, to tie the Emperor the more firmly to us, and that we have since that Time disobliged the Emperor, by affecting a closer Correspondence, and greater Union of Councils with *France* than ever was known between the two Nations. They send us to that excellent Treatise, *the Barrier Treaty vindicated*, to learn our true and lasting Interest in foreign Alliances, and there they pretend that we shall find the Condemnation of all your Measures; they lament the miserable Scene, which they apprehend may soon be opened, his Majesty's foreign Dominions exposed to all the Calamities of War, and perhaps in Danger of being lost; we ourselves struggling against domestick Enemies, and defending our Coasts against Invasions; these Mischiefs brought upon us by a Conjunction of the Emperor, our old Ally, with the King of *Spain* his Rival; a Conjunction so unnatural that nothing but the highest Resentment at our Behaviour to them both could have brought it about; in short, to finish up the Picture, *Great Britain* reduced in this Distress to lean solely upon *France*, and the Faith of that Court to become our chief Security.

Upon the whole Matter, your Enemies, Sir, the Substance of whose private Conversation I have now honestly reported to you, conclude very insolently that

that you have filled up the Measure of your Iniquity and your Folly, and that you must sink, or the Nation must sink under the Weight of that Calamity, which you have brought and suffered to be brought upon her.

As shocking as this Account must be to your Ears; I promise myself that the Sincerity and Plainness, with which I have given it, will be agreeable to you; and that you will receive into your Bosom a Man whose Affection for your Person and Zeal for your Service, must be above all Suspicion, after giving you Intelligence of so high a Nature, without any Stipulation for the Discovery.

I expect to hear from you in eight Days from the Date hereof; if I do not, you shall hear again from him, who is,

Most Noble SIR,

Your Honour's

Most devoted Servant,

From my Garret,  
Jan. 1726-7.

The Occasional Writer.

The

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## The Occasional Writer.

Number II.

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To the same.

Most Noble SIR,

I Think myself obliged in Honour to let the World know, that you have treated all my Proposals to write in your Service with a Contempt unusual from one in your Station; for I have seen the Times when every little poultry Prostitute of his Pen found Countenance and Encouragement. These Wretches are sure of both, whenever there are any bad Measures to be justified, or any bold Strokes to be given; and the croaking of these Ravens has always, in my Imagination, boded some Mischief or other to the Commonwealth.

For this Reason, I took upon me the Character of a most infamous Libeller in my first Address to you,

you, that I might be able to make a surer Judgment of our present Condition, and know better what Expectations to entertain; so that I own I am most agreeably disappointed in not receiving any Letter or Message from you. I own, that instead of biting you, I am fairly bit myself.

Some malicious Refiners may pretend, perhaps, that an Address of such a Nature, made in so publick a Manner, could meet with no other Treatment, even from a Minister, who was willing to accept the Proposal. Malice, I say, may refine thus, and endeavour to depreciate a virtuous Action, which cannot be denied, by supposing such Motives to it as cannot be proved. The Practice is too common, and especially where Men are divided into Parties, where publick Disputes create and nourish private Animosities, and where perpetual Feuds irritate the natural Malignity of the Heart. But far be it from me to judge with so little Charity; I am willing to believe, Sir, that you declined the Offers made you, not on Account of the publick Address, by which they were conveyed, but because you disdained to support a virtuous Administration by a venal Pen.

When I meet a Man with loaded Pistols in his Pocket, or a Dagger under his Cloak, I suspect that he is going upon no very honourable Designs. House-breakers and Coiners have been detected, by having their Tools found about them. Informers, Spies, and hireling Scribblers are the Tools of an evil Statesman; and when I see all such discouraged, and none of them about a Minister, I think myself obliged to suppose that his Designs are honourable, and his Measures directed to the publick Good.

I take this Opportunity therefore of begging your Pardon for the Trial I presumed to make. The Liberty indeed was great; but since it has turned so vastly to your Honour, I hope to be the more easily



easily forgiven. Shall I own it, Sir? My Hopes go still farther; you disdain'd me under the feigned Character, which I assumed; from the same Principle of Honour, from the same Consciousness of Merit, you will, nay, you must afford me some Share of your Esteem, when I appear, as I intend to do for the future, under my own. These Papers shall breathe nothing but Zeal to promote the Honour of his Majesty, the Security of our present happy Establishment, and in one Word, the Good of our Country. The same Spirit, which animates you and me, shall animate them; and I cannot doubt of your Approbation, when I co-operate with you to these Purposes, which were certainly the sole Inducements you had to enter into Business; as it is manifest that you continue at the Head of Affairs for no other Reasons.

The Truth is, however, (for I think it becoming a Friendship, which is likely to grow as intimate as ours, that I should disguise nothing from you) two Things have lately happened, which gave some little Shock to my good Opinion of you. The first is an Unwillingness you manifested, that the true State of the national Debts should be known by the Nation, and the severe Censure you passed on such Persons, as were desirous to give their Countrymen a fair Account of their Condition in a Part so essential, that our being a Nation, or not a Nation, depends almost entirely, in this Crisis, on our running or not running farther into Debt. The other is the Publication of a Pamphlet supposed to be written by your Direction, which is evidently designed to keep us no less in the dark as to all our Affairs abroad.

As to the first, that Matter has been taken up already; and will, I doubt not, *in all Places, and in all Manners*, be so thoroughly sifted, that we shall no longer be at a Loss, either as to the Revenue,

and the real Charges upon it, or as to the whole Management of it. In which Examination, Sir, let me advise you, as a Friend, to act an ingenuous Part, that Suspicions may not increase, and that I may not be obliged to write to you in a Stile, to which I shall turn my Pen with Reluctancy.

As to the latter, I hope, it will be likewise examined; and if I was able to take such a Task on myself, I should, I am persuaded, in doing so, but make a second Trial of you to your Glory, and knit the Bands of our Friendship the closer, by answering a Pamphlet of so pernicious Consequence, and writ with so ill a Design. But I know my own Unfitness to inform, to instruct, and to rouse our Countrymen, some from their Lethargy, and some from their golden Dreams. I may toll the Alarm-Bell, but Persons of greater Strength and Skill must be called upon to raise it, and to ring it out in the Ears of the Nation.

We are grown more easy, nay, more willing than ever, to be imposed upon; and we do more than half the Work of those, who find their Account in deluding us. Almost every Man considers himself as a single Person; those few, who extend their Considerations farther, seldom or never carry them beyond the narrow System of a Family, or a Party. And thus it happens, that private Interest is become the Criterion, by which Judgments are formed upon publick Affairs. The Man, whoever he be, who is at any Time in Fashion, has nothing to do but to hold out that Purse, which the more he empties it, the surer he is to fill. After which let him declaim imperiously, and assert boldly, without regarding Proof, or condescending to argue; let one of his Tools write a Pamphlet in much the same Strain, and the Work is done, the Opinion of Mankind is settled, the Crowd repeats what the Orator has said, and the Author writ; the Clamour

mour is echoed back on all Sides, and these Echoes, the Reverse of all others, strengthen by Repetition. Thus the Corrupt lead the Blind, and the Blind lead one another; the still Voice of Reason is drowned in popular Clamour, and Truth is overwhelmed by Prejudice.

This is a true Account of what happens frequently; it is so far from being a Description drawn from Imagination, that I could give several Instances, and perhaps shall have Occasion to quote some, of such gross Impositions on the common Sense of Mankind, offered in this Manner, and offered with Success, as no one would be bold enough to attempt putting on the weakest Man in *Britain* in private Conversation.

There are therefore, God knows, but too many Reasons for him to despond, who entertains a Thought of prevailing on the Generality of People, to lay aside their Prejudices, to check their Passions, and to consider the State of the Nation in a due Extent, and in a true Light; and yet such is our Condition, such a Crisis are we in, that if we do not take and execute this Resolution now, it may very probably be out of our Power to do it hereafter to any good Purpose.

In our Senate we hear of great Dangers, which we have to apprehend from abroad; and, if we believe what is said in a foreign \* State, we are exposed to very great ones at home. I am willing to hope, that both one and the other are magnified; but they may grow to be such in Reality as they are represented to be, if we do not take more than ordinary Care; first, to weigh in a just Balance *each* of the many Evils, which threaten the Nation; and secondly, if we do not penetrate into *every one* of the Causes, which have combined them to bring upon us. Should we fail in the first Point, we may increase

\* *Vide* Letters from *Stockholm*.

increase our Dangers from abroad, by over-rating those at home, and by applying ourselves solely to prevent the latter. But I believe no one thinks us disposed to run into this Extreme; we are much more likely to run into the other, and to increase our Dangers at home, by over-rating those, which we apprehend from abroad. Should we fail in the second Point, and neglect to penetrate into all the Causes, which combine to bring our present Distress upon us, palliative Remedies alone will be applied, in the Use of which we may very probably expire after a tedious Langour, but from which we cannot expect a radical Cure.

Convinced therefore, that if we neglect the present Moment, if every Man does not think and write, and speak and act for his Country at this Time, according to his best Talents, and according to the Opportunities, which he has of exerting them, we shall soon be in every Sense a ruined Nation.

I confess, that I am impatient, however low my Hopes of Success run, till some abler Pen accepts the Invitation, which *the Enquirer into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain* gives to every Member of this Community, till an Enquiry is made, according to the Right which he is pleased to allow, into our present State, and into the Measures, which have led to it. But then this Enquiry must be made upon better Principles, and with an honest View than he has, who made this, which lies before me; the Person, who accepts his Invitation, should be one, who would blush to follow his Example; for he acts the Part of an Apologist, where he professes to act that of an impartial Inquirer; he seems very zealous for the *Success* of the Cause, which he pleads, and very indifferent what *Means* he employs to procure this *Success*; many Things are disguised, many are concealed, and hardly any are represented in their



their natural and proper Light. Fallacy, Sophism, and a puerile Declamation, swell the elaborate Treatise; but there was a Design perhaps, as well as Habit, in such a Manner of Writing upon this Occasion, since a bad Cause must be defended by such Means; and, therefore, by such Pens as would disgrace and weaken a good one; since it may possibly appear upon a fair Examination, that the Cause he is retained in is none of the best.

If this should appear, I am apt to believe, that those, who set him at work, will not be much concerned; they could not look on this Pamphlet as any Thing better than a momentary Expedient to mislead and inflame. If it has that Effect, if it serves to keep up the Delusion till all the Jobs, which are to be done, are done; the Ends, which they proposed to themselves, are perhaps answered. But if this Nation should awaken to a Sense of their true Interest, and if the *British Spirit* should once more revive amongst us, it might very well happen that these Persons would have made a faulty Reckoning; for surely, after having exercised the Justice of the Nation, by censuring in one Parliament a Treaty of Peace, which has been approved in another, it will not be thought strange, if we punish at one Time or another those, who have negotiated us out of Peace and Tranquility, into War and Confusion, although the Wisdom of the Nation should think fit to support for the present the Measures of these Ministers.

The *Enquirer* supposes the whole Face of Affairs in *Europe* to have received the great Alteration, which he is so much surprized at, within the Space of the last Year; but I cannot agree with him, that the Turn has been so sudden as he represents it. *The Calm hardly to be paralleled by any past Prospect*, as this great Master of Style expresses himself by a Figure of *Hibernian Rhetorick*, was accompanied,

as Calms frequently are, by many Signs of an approaching Storm; which Signs did not escape the Observation of the Sailors, and even Passengers in our Vessel, though they escaped that of our able Pilots, who were it seems all that while in a most serene Security. The particular Evils, which we apprehend at present, were known to our Ministers above a Year ago; if it be true, as the *Enquirer* affirms, that the Treaty of *Hanover*, and Negotiations, in Consequence of it, are *the Steps, which the Court of Great Britain thought fit to take as soon as possible, after the Danger we were in appeared evident beyond all Contradiction*. But before the particular Danger appeared, the general Danger was evident enough. When the Treaty of *Vienna* was made, our Ship struck; but we had been sailing among Rocks and Shoals long before, ever since we quitted our Port, and launched out to Sea, on the wise Errand of convoying other People safe to theirs.

He therefore, who is desirous to make the Enquiry proposed, in such a Manner as may be of real Use to the Publick, must take up Things much higher than this partial Writer was instructed to do. Many Things happened during the Congress of *Cambray*, which deserve to be explained; and there are Treaties both previous and subsequent to the Quadruple Alliance, which deserve to be commented upon.

Nay, there seems to be a Necessity of going farther back than this Reign, or even than this Century, if we design to be thoroughly acquainted with the Original of our present Distress. When we have taken a general Survey of the Conduct of *Britain*, with relation to the Affairs of *Europe*, for about two hundred Years, we shall come much better prepared to discover our true Point of Interest; and by observing how we have departed from it, we shall learn how to return to it.

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This Part I will venture to undertake; and what I shall say upon it, may serve at least as an Introduction to that Work, which, I hope, will be performed by some abler Hand.

The Foundations of the Grandeur of *France*, and those of the Grandeur of the House of *Austria*, were laid very near at the same Period. *Ferdinand* and *Isabella* began the latter; and in *Charles V.* their Grandson, and almost immediate Successor, it was carried up to that exorbitant Height, which made *Europe* tremble under his Reign, under that of his Son, and upon some Occasions even later. The Progress, which *France* made, was not so rapid, but was perhaps as sure; she shared with her Rival the Spoils of the House of *Burgundy*, by the Address and Vigour of *Lewis XI.* who not only extended the Bounds, and strengthened the Frontier of that close compact Body, (whose very Figure is an Addition to the Force of it) but assured its inward Tranquility better, and rendered that Monarchy more formidable than it had been in the Time of his Predecessors, when the Authority of the Prince was less.

The forming of two such Powers, in *Europe*, made it the Interest of all other Princes and States, to keep as much as possible a Balance between them. And here began that Principle of *English* Policy to be established, which, however true and wise in itself, has hardly ever been truly and wisely pursued.

We should take Things rather too high, if we went up to the Reign of King *Henry VII.* though even there some Observations are to be made, which have relation to our present Subject.

Frequent and important Occasions of acting on this Principle presented themselves in the Time of *Henry VIII.* Some he took, some he neglected, and some he managed ill; for to say the Truth, the

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the whole Conduct of this Prince was a continued Course of Extravagance, Violence, and Levity; his Vices glared through the best Actions of his Life. He exercised the Tyranny, and practised the bloody Precepts of the Church of *Rome*, even while he was delivering us from the papal Yoke. His Deliberations for Peace or War seemed often to have a Mixture of Humour in them, and his own Passions, as well as *Wolsey's*, made him hold the *Balance of Europe*, if he did hold it, with an uneven Hand.

The Reformation, which began in his Time in *Germany*, and which was completed by *Edward VI.* and by Queen *Elizabeth*, in *England*, gave Occasion to a new Division of Interests; and made it of the utmost Importance to the Welfare of this Nation, not only to preserve a Balance between the two great Powers of *Europe*, but to support the Protestant Cause against them both. The first of these was to be done by throwing as much as the Occasion might require of our Weight, sometimes into one, and sometimes into the other of these Scales; but the latter could be effected by nothing less than a constant Adherence to that Side, which was for a long Time the weakest, and which, I doubt, is so still.

Both these Principles were pursued by Queen *Elizabeth*, with the greatest Wisdom, and with the greatest Success. To illustrate this fully, it would be necessary to run through the Annals of her glorious Reign. But a few general Observations will suffice for our present Purpose. When she came to the Crown, the Nation was divided between two powerful Parties, exasperated by religious Zeal; *Ireland* was Papist, *Scotland* was under the immediate Influence of *France*, and the Queen of that Kingdom, married to the Dauphine of *France*, disputed her Title to the Crown of *England*. In short, the surest Support she had amidst all these Difficulties,

ties, besides the Firmness of her Mind, and the Penetration of her Understanding, was in *Philip II.* whom she disobliged, by refusing to make him her Husband; and who could not fail of being on many Accounts, as he proved to be, her most implacable and dangerous Enemy; she kept Measures for a while with him, nay, perhaps, with the Court of *Rome*, and soon settled her Government, and established her Power; her own Kingdom was the first and principal Object of her Care; and she judged very wisely, that, in order to be considerable abroad, she must begin by making herself so at home. Her Revenue was administered with the utmost Frugality, Industry was encouraged, Manufactures improved, and Commerce extended; she was far from neglecting foreign Alliances, but her Negotiations were conducted with great Art, and little Expence, and the Engagements she took were always necessary, seldom chargeable. She supported the Protestant Cause in *France*, with good Offices, with Loans of Money; and upon some pressing Occasions with Troops. But she never depended on the Gratitude of *Henry IV.* and was neither surprized nor unprepared when he made Returns very unworthy of the Obligations he had to her. The *Dutch* could not have sustained their Revolt from *Spain*, nor have formed their Commonwealth, without her Assistance. She helped them powerfully, but she exacted cautionary Towns from them, as a Security for her Reimbursement, whenever they should be in a Condition to pay; and in the mean Time as a Check, to keep them under the Influence and Direction of *England*. By such Methods as these, her own Country grew rich and flourishing, while she not only preserved a Balance of Power abroad, but contributed extremely to reduce *Spain* from being the Terror of *Europe*, to that low State, into which it fell under the Successors of King *Philip II.*

The Reign of King *James I.* is not to be read without a Mixture of Indignation and Contempt. He came to the Crown with great Advantages; but a bad Head, and a worse Heart, hindered him from improving any of them. He lost the Opportunity of uniting the two Kingdoms, he suffered his Revenue to be ill administered, his Ministers were notoriously corrupt, and he himself very profuse.

Instead of asswaging, he fomented Disputes by his Pedantry; established such Principles of Government, and raised such a Spirit in the Clergy, as could hardly fail to produce the terrible Effects, which followed in the Reign of his Son.

Such a Management of domestick Affairs would have put it out of his Power, if it had been his Inclination to act a wiser Part in foreign Affairs; but he had no such Inclination. Twelve Years he suffered himself to be amused with the *Spanish Match*; he countenanced at least the Popish, and he absolutely neglected the Protestant Interest, both in *France* and *Germany*. Instead of helping the Dispositions, which appeared, to take the Imperial Crown out of the House of *Austria*, he favoured the Cause of that Family, and abandoned his own Children to the Resentment of the Emperor and the Popish League. When the thirty Years War began in 1618, the Liberty of *Germany*, and the whole Protestant Interest, were in the utmost Peril. The sole Measures, which he took for the Support of either, consisted in simple Embassies, ridiculous Letters, and languid Negotiations. Queen *Elizabeth* defeated the ambitious Designs of the *Spanish* Branch of the *Austrian* Family; King *James* favoured those of the *German* Branch of the same Family.

Over the succeeding Reign, and all that followed, to the Restoration of King *Charles II.* let us draw a Veil.

During this Time the Decay of the *Spanish* Monarchy increased apace, the Liberties of *Germany* were asserted, and the Power of the Emperor bounded by the Treaties of *Westphalia*; but another Power, That of *France*, began to rise very fast on the Foundations laid long ago. *Richelieu* and *Mazarine* had given that Crown a great Superiority in the Affairs of *Europe*, and the Prince, who wore it, resolved to maintain and augment this Superiority, at the Expence of all his Neighbours.

The Attack, which *Lewis XIV.* made upon the *Low Countries* in 1667, shewed both in the Manner of it, and in the Pretence taken for it, what *Europe* had to expect from this Prince. On this Occasion the Triple Alliance was made, and happy had it been if the same Principles of Policy had continued to prevail. But the King, who sat on our Throne, with better Sense and more Courage than his Grandfather, was at least as unfit as he to defend the Liberties of *Europe*, and perhaps more unfit to defend the Protestant Interest.

King *Charles II.* joined his Councils and his Arms to those of *France*; and when he could not openly assist, he privately abetted the Usurpations of that Crown. He might, by conforming to the Desires of his People, who were in his and their true Interest, have had the immortal Honour of preserving a Balance of Power in *Europe*; but he chose the eternal Infamy of helping to destroy this Balance; and not content to be the Ally of a Prince, whose Enemy he ought to have been, he condescended to be his Instrument, and even his Pensioner. This Conduct, which took so much Strength from that Side, which was already too weak, and which added so much to that, which was already too strong, established the absolute Superiority of *France*, and left *Spain, Germany, Italy,* and the seventeen Provinces,

Provinces, nay and *Britain* too in Consequence, at her Mercy.

This terrible Face of Things did not mend on the Accession of King *James II.* to the Throne. Whatever his Politicks were, Religion would have got the better of them. Bigotry must have cemented a close Union between him and the King of *France*, who was alone able and willing to assist him in the Work he had undertaken at home. But the Greatness of our Danger, as it sometimes happens, saved us; and in saving us, saved all *Europe*. The Revolution in our Government caused a total Change in our Conduct. A Prince, who had been long at the Head of a weak but resolute Opposition to *France*, mounted our Throne; and the Principles of maintaining a Balance between the great Powers of *Europe*, and of supporting the Protestant Interest, came once more into Fashion in this Kingdom, after having been for near a Century, either neglected, or acted against.

The Body of the Nation resumed these Principles with Warmth, and has supported them ever since with unparalleled Spirit and Vigour. But let it be said without Offence, since it may be said with Truth, and since it is necessary that it should be said upon this Occasion, we have not pursued them with as much Wisdom as Zeal. If we have erred in our Politicks since the Revolution, it is sure we have erred on the right Side. But Errors on the right Side are Errors still, and may, in Time, prove as fatal as Errors on the other; and are in one respect at least more dangerous, as they are less attended to at first, or guarded against.

Between all Extremes there is a certain middle Point, which Men of Genius perceive, and to which Men of Honour adhere in private and in publick Life.

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Thus Avarice and Prodigality are at an immense Distance; but there is a Space marked out by Virtue between them, where Frugality and Generosity reside together. Thus again, to abandon those, whom it is our Interest to support, is an Excess of Folly; and to support the Interests of other People, to the Ruin of our own, is an Excess of Folly likewise. But there are Lines described by Prudence, between these two Excesses, within which our common Interests meet, and may proceed together.

It would be an invidious as well as tedious Task, to go through all the Instances, which might be produced; wherein we have, under Pretence of preserving a *Balance of Power in Europe*, gratified the Passions of particular Men, and served the Turns of private Interest, till we have rendered that Principle, in a reasonable Pursuit of which our Safety, and our Glory consist, the Occasion of real Danger to the Interest, and of Reproach to the Wisdom of our Nation. A few of these Instances will suffice to deduce the *Progress* of our *mistaken Policy*, to evince the *Truth* of what has been advanced in *general*, and to fix the Application of the whole to the *present Conjuncture*; wherein I apprehend, that we are about to pay the Price not only of late *Errors*, but a *long Series* of *Errors*.

The War, which began in 1688, was no doubt a very necessary War. It was necessary to extinguish the Rebellion in *Scotland*; it was necessary to reduce *Ireland*; it was necessary to assert the new Establishment of our Government. These were our *immediate Interests*; but we had *remote Interests* likewise concerned, which were of themselves sufficient to engage us to enter, at least as Allies and Friends, into the War. The *Empire* was in danger by the taking of *Philipburgh*, and other Enterprizes of the *French*; and *Holland* lay once more open to their Invasions, by the seizing of *Bonne*. In the Course

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Course of this War, *Ireland* was reduced; all the Efforts against the Government in *England* and *Scotland* were defeated; and by the Peace, *France* acknowledged King *William*.

As unfortunate as we had been on the *Rhine* and in *Flanders*, every Thing, which the *French* had taken in the Course of the War from our Allies, was restored at *Ryswick*; and *Luxembourg*, which *France* had usurped before the War, was likewise given up. Thus far all was well. The Points, which *England* contended for, were carried; and our Allies recovered by Treaty more than they had lost by War.

If a common Guaranty of this Treaty had been entered into as soon as those Powers acceded, who refused to sign when *England* and *Holland* did; the Tranquillity of *Europe* would have been better secured, than it was at this Time, or at the Peace of *Nimeghen*; at least *England* would have engaged, as far as it became her to do, even upon the Principle of maintaining the Balance of Power, and no farther.

But instead of taking this Step, we took another, which proved fatal in its Consequences. The Death of *Charles II.* King of *Spain*, without Children, was then in Prospect. The Pretensions of *France* were known, and its Power had been lately felt. Whenever the Case should happen, a War seemed to be unavoidable. But this War must have been made by *France* alone, for the Conquest of the *Spanish* Monarchy; which, as powerful as we then thought her, and as insolent as she really was, she would not have engaged in lightly. Neither could she have supported it, if she had, since even with *Spain* on her Side she could not have supported the last, if the Mines of *Peru* had not been *unaccountably* left open to her.

On the Apprehension, however, of such a War, and on the specious Pretence of preserving a Balance



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of Power in *Europe*, the *Partition Treaties* were made; that is, without the Knowledge of the King of *Spain*, we disposed of his Inheritance; without the Consent of the Emperor, and in Concert with his adverse Party, we settled the Rights contested between the House of *Austria* and *Bourbon*; and we engaged to make this *Partition* good by *Arms*.

I do not enter into the Reasons for and against this Treaty, which may be drawn from the particular Stipulations contained in it, but content myself to observe in general, what impolitick Measures we were at this Period betrayed into, by an over-weening Desire to preserve the Balance of Power; and how much Reason we have to be always on our Guard against Errors of this Kind, since a *Prince*, whom *Genius* and *Experience* had rendered the greatest Man of his Age, was not exempt from them, but drew both *England* and *Holland* fatally into them.

Whenever this Balance is in real Danger by the exorbitant Growth of one Power, or by the Union of more, other Princes and States will be alarmed of course. All of them ought, and most of them will take Measures for their common Security. But the *wise Councils* amongst them will, upon every such Occasion, proportion their Measures, and the Engagements they enter into, not according to the Nature of the Danger *considered generally*, but according to the *immediate* or *remote* Relation, which it has to *each* of them, and according to the *Strength*, *Situation*, or any other Circumstance, which may be peculiar to each of them.

To do otherwise, would be to lose Sight of our own particular Interest in the Pursuit of a common Interest. It would be nothing better than setting up for the *Don Quixotes* of the World, and engage to fight the Battles of all *Mankind*. The State, which keeps its *own particular Interest* constantly in  
View,

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View, has no invariable Rule to go by; and this Rule will direct and limit all its Proceedings in foreign Affairs; so that such a State will frequently take *no* Share, and frequently a *small* Share in the Disputes of its Neighbours, and will never exert its *whole* Strength, but when its *Whole* is at Stake. But a State, who neglects to do This, has no Rule at all to go by, and must fight to negotiate. and negotiate to fight again, as long as it is a State; because, as long as it is a State, there will be Disputes among its Neighbours, and some of these will prevail at one Time, and some at another, in the perpetual Flux and Reflux of human Affairs.

If the Kings of *France* and *Spain*, and the Emperor, had made an Agreement amongst themselves, about the Succession to the Dominions of *Spain*, consistent with the common Interest of *Europe*, and considering the Partiality, which the Court of *Spain* had, at that Time, for the House of *Austria*, there was little Room to fear, that such an Agreement would have been too favourable to the House of *Bourbon*. If any such Partition had been made, I say, no Objection would have remained, either as to the Right or Manner of making it, and we might have escaped a War. If these Princes had done nothing of this Kind, we might have been engaged upon the King of *Spain's* Death, as I said before, in a *defensive War*, for preserving the Dominions of our old Allies, and the Liberties of *Europe*, against the Usurpations of our antient Enemy. But instead of waiting to be *Auxiliaries* in a *defensive War*, we put ourselves under a Necessity of being *Principals* in an *offensive one*; and by affecting to secure the Balance of Power, when we had neither Call nor Right to meddle, we reduced our Affairs to this *absurd Alternative*, that we must either make an offensive War as Principals, against the Emperor and *Spain*, in order to conquer for *France*, which was equally im-  
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politick and unjust, or against *France* and *Spain*, in order to conquer for the Emperor, under the greatest Disadvantages possible; which happened to be the Case.

The Partition Treaties forced the King of *Spain*, to make a Will in favour of the House of *Bourbon*; and the *Spaniards* threw themselves into the Arms of *France*, to prevent the Dismemberment of their Monarchy.

Thus was the Balance of Power lost by our meddling where we had nothing to do, even before it could have been in Danger, if we had not meddled at all. We lost it, and the Emperor knew that we must restore it for our own Sakes, which could be done no otherwise than by conquering for him; and This he left us to do the best we could. While we fought his Battles, he lent us the *Austrian* Title, the Person of his Son, the present Emperor, and little else. We neglected every Thing, and sacrificed every Thing in the Prosecution of this Quarrel. But the imperial Councils were so far from neglecting any Thing, or sacrificing any Thing to it, that they seemed wholly taken up for some Years in settling the Affairs of *Hungary* to their Satisfaction; and they sacrificed to an idle Refinement in Politics the greatest Opportunity, which we ever had, or must ever hope to have; I mean that of *destroying the naval Power of France*, by the taking of *Toulon*. This they deliberately and almost avowedly hindered.

If ever People were called upon to think of their own immediate Interests, we were so at this Time. Whether we could then have put an End to the expensive War, we were engaged in for the House of *Austria*, in a Manner consistent with the publick Interest of *Europe*, I am not able to determine. Certain it is in Fact, that far from entertaining any such Thoughts, we redoubled our Spirit, and our Efforts

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Efforts in the Prosecution of the War. As we acquired new Allies, we enlarged our Engagements; and as we obtained new Victories, we extended our Views. The grand Alliance formed by King *William*, for restoring a Balance of Power in *Europe*, proposed no other Objects than *sufficient Barriers, Security to Trade, and reasonable Satisfaction to the House of Austria*\*. These were thought, by that great Prince, all the Points necessary to be contended for. But instead of confining ourselves to so narrow a Plan, we judged that the Balance of Power could not be effectually restored, unless we wrested the whole *Spanish* Monarchy from the House of *Bourbon*, to give it to the House of *Austria*. For this Prize we fought, and fought with as little Regard to all other Interests, as if we had defended our own Altars, and our own Houses.

Must we not acknowledge upon this Occasion, Sir, the Shortness of human Foresight? The very Measure, which we pursued at so great Expence of Blood and Treasure, (because nothing leis could secure the Balance of Power in *Europe*, and even the Trade of this Kingdom, and the Protestant Succession, against the Invasions of *France* and the Pretender) that very Measure would, it seems, have put all these into the utmost Peril.

If we had succeeded in our Attempts to set the Crown of *Spain* on the Head of the present Emperor, and his Brother the Emperor *Joseph* had lived; would our Danger from the Union of these two Brothers not have been at least as great, as that, which is apprehended from the Union of the present Emperor, and of the present King of *Spain*, Rivals almost from their Cradles, and by a long Course of Opposition, such inveterate Enemies, that they could hardly be kept, as the Enquirer assures us, within the Bounds of common Decency towards one another, by all

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\* Vide G. Al. Art. 8.

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*the Address of two powerful Mediators in a publick Treaty?* Might not the same *Address*, as *threw* these *Enemies into one another's Arms*, (for it will appear they did not *run* thither so unaccountably) and united them in *Designs destructive to the Commerce and Rights of other Nations*, have succeeded equally well between the two Brothers, especially since in this Case there would have been but Half the Work to do? The Union would have been formed to our Hands, and our *Address* could only have been shewn, in giving such proper Provocations, as might have inspired the Designs.

Would *Charles* have been less favourable to the Trade of his Brother's Subjects, at any Place in the *Austrian Dominions*, than *Philip* shews himself to the Trade of the Subjects of *Charles*? Would *Joseph* not have concurred to assist his Brother to regain *Gibraltar*, and the Island of *Minorca*; at least, as zealously, as we can suppose, that *Charles* concurs to assist *Philip*, either by good Offices, or, if you please to have it so, by Force of Arms? Would not a League between the two Brothers have been as much a *Papish League*, as that, which we are so much alarmed at, between the surviving Brother, and the present King of *Spain*? Would not the first have made Use of the Pretender, as the latter is said to do, and he every Prince or State, with whom we happen to be at Variance, may be provoked to do? In short, I may safely challenge the Author of the *Enquiry*, as great a Casuist as he is, to shew any Difference between the two Cases, which I have compared together, except this, that we might have been exposed to greater Dangers from that Settlement of *Europe*, which we fought to bring about, than we are, or can probably be exposed to, from that, which we were so solicitous to prevent. But the Case is still stronger than I have put it. For even after the Death of the Emperor

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peror *Joseph*, his present Imperial Majesty, continued his Claim to the whole *Spanish Monarchy*; and *You*, and *I*, and *many* of us, continued to support his Claim, and opposed, with all our Force, the Negotiations of Peace, which were begun upon a different Principle. Happily we failed of Success. The many, who remonstrated, *that we are hastening apace, to make him a Power too great, and too formidable; and that we should find in him, at last, the Enemy we then dreaded only in another*, prevailed. Had they not, in what a Condition should we have been at this Time? Would the Emperor have been more grateful, or less powerful, with the Crown of *Spain* and the *Indies*, added to so many others? If the Union between him, and the King of *Spain*, is so formidable to us, how much more Reason should we have had, to apprehend the Consequences to our Trade, and in the End to our Liberties, and our Religion, themselves; if these divided Powers, had been united in the same *ungrateful Person*, as it is the Mode at present to call the Emperor?

If *Don Carlos* should marry the eldest Arch-Duchess, if the Emperor should die without Issue Male, if the King of *France* should die without Issue Male, if the Prince of *Asturias* should die without Issue Male, and the Princes of the Blood in *France* and *Spain* should not support the Validity of the Renunciations, all which is within the Bounds of Possibility; "*Don Carlos may be at once Emperor, King of France, and King of Spain; and have the vast Strength and Riches of all these Powers united and centered in him.*" This terrible Object stares our speculative Enquirer in the Face, and disturbs his Head. It disturbs very probably those excellent Heads, who set him a scribbling, who can see so far into Futurity at present; and who, not very long ago, were unable to discern the nearest and most probable Events. Let us consider now, what  
Consequence



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Consequence of this Kind might have happened ; if, for securing a Balance of Power in *Europe*, the present Emperor had been likewise King of *Spain*. If then the King of *France*, instead of marrying the Daughter of *Stanislaus*, had married the eldest Daughter of the Emperor, which surely had been within the Bounds of Possibility ; there would remain but one Chance at this Time, *viz.* The Emperor having a Son, to save us from the Combination of such a Power, as would in reality form what we commonly, though improperly, call *Universal Monarchy* ; since there would be nothing else, which could hinder *Lewis XV.* from being King of *France*, of *Spain*, and of the *West-Indies*, Master of all the *Austrian* Dominions ; and, by Consequence, Emperor. The Truth I would inculcate by what I have said is this, that as the *Partition Treaty* threw too much Weight into the Scale of *Bourbon*, to the Destruction of the Balance of Power in *Europe* ; so the necessary Consequence of the War we made to restore this Balance must have been, if we had succeeded according to our Desires, to destroy it again, by throwing too much Weight into the Scale of *Austria*. This has been proved by the Event, and the *Enquirer* demonstrates it, or he demonstrates nothing.

As far, therefore, as we have brought this Deduction, that is, to the End of the last War ; it is manifest that the Notion of preserving a Balance of Power in *Europe* has, for the Reasons touched upon above, and which every Man will extend in his own Thoughts, proved to us like an *Ignis fatuus* ; in the Pursuit of which we have been led from Difficulty to Difficulty, and from Danger to Danger.

If we enquire whether the Treaties of *Utrecht* and *Baden* did afford us an Opportunity of correcting our Errors, and of profiting by our Experience, it will be found that they did ; since all the Points, which

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which had been in Contest were then settled, and this Settlement acquiesced in by all the Parties to the War, except the Emperor, who kept up still his Claim against *Philip V.*

But the keeping up this Claim could not have endangered the publick Tranquility, He was unable to attack *Spain* for want of a maritime Force, or even *Sicily*, which was covered besides by the Guaranty of the Neutrality of *Italy* ; and this Neutrality served likewise to hinder *Spain* from attacking him. There might have been a War of the Pen, and there could have been no other between them.

At the worst, if the King of *Spain* had invaded any Part of *Italy*, the Guarantees of the Neutrality might easily have prevented such an Attempt ; and in so doing they would have observed the Treaties, and kept the Peace, far from breaking either the one or the other.

In such a State of foreign Affairs, we had certainly an Opportunity of looking carefully after our own. The King of *Spain* had no Pretence to ask for any Alteration in the Settlement so lately established with his own Consent ; and the Emperor could not have complained of his Majesty for observing Treaties, which he would not have made, but which he found made ; nor for refusing to enter into a new War on this Account.

Whether we improved this Opportunity, or not, what our present Condition is, and by what Steps we have been reduced to it, I leave to the Enquiry of some Person more capable than myself. Let it suffice, that I have endeavoured to remove some Delusions, which have affected even Men of the best Understandings, and the best Intentions ; and to prepare the Minds of my Countrymen to consider, at this critical Point of Time, what our national Interest really is, without being biassed in their Judgments,

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Judgments, by what they may have thought of it on any former Occasions.

I am,

Most Noble SIR,

Your Honour's

Most devoted Servant,

February 3,  
1746-7.

The Occasional Writer.

P. S. Just after I had sent these Sheets to the Press, a Paper, intitled, *A Letter to the Occasional Writer*, was brought to me. I have read this stiff pedantick Piece, with more Attention than it deserves, though I read it cursorily; and, notwithstanding the Pains which the Author takes to pass for you, I am ready to acquit you of the Scandal. You would certainly have written better, and your Pen at least would not have appeared so near a-kin to that of the *Craftsman Extraordinary*.

Who this Author supposes the *Occasional Writer* to be, I cannot guess. Such a Wretch as he describes is, I believe, to be found no where, nor even such an Image of Guilt and Misery any where, except in the *Horrors of his own Mind*. I shall therefore, with a *decent Contempt* for this scurrilous Scribbler, and without any Concern about his *imaginary* Correspondent, continue these inoffensive Letters, in great Tranquility and Sedateness, as often as Occasion invites me, or as I find myself in the Humour.

The

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## The Occasional Writer.

Number II.

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To the same.

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— *Quis te, Juvenum confidentissime, nostras  
Fussit adire Domos? Quidve hinc petis? inquit. At ille,  
Scis Proteu, scis ipse; neque est te fallere cuiquam.*  
VIRG.

Most Noble SIR,

WHEN I writ the Postscript to my last Letter, I believed firmly that the Answer to the *Occasional Writer* was neither writ by you, nor published by your Order. Many Considerations determined me to this Opinion. For Instance; I could not think, that in order to vent yourself in a Fit of Railing, you would draw a Picture out of your own Imagination, which cannot pass for that of the Person, who writ to you, even in the low and vile Character

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Character he assumed, and which you will hardly venture to own that you meant to be the Resemblance of any Man in *Britain*. I could not persuade myself that you would give Occasion, as I apprehend very much that you may have done, to the drawing of another Picture *after the Life*, which no one will mistake, and which you will not be curious to place in your Collection of Paintings. I have, with the rest of Mankind, a great Regard for some of your Friends; but I have, with the rest of Mankind likewise, a great Regard for your particular Enemies, among whom it seemed impossible to me that you, who know them so well, should presume to find either Slaves or Criminals, or insolvent Debtors. I dare affirm, that there is not one of them, who ever *mortgaged his Estate for more than its value*, or *reduced himself near the Necessity of living by Contribution*.

These are some of the Motives, which induced me to acquit you of the Scandal, as I then thought it, of writing this Paper. But upon better Information, and farther Reflection, I have changed my Opinion; and I see nothing inconsistent with my Respect for you, in believing that you did write it.

As great an Advantage, as it is in all the Affairs of Life for a Man to keep his Temper, it is often excusable, and perhaps sometimes even Praise-worthy, to lose it. When a Minister is contradicted in Matters relating to his Administration, and when busy People shall presume to ask his Reasons, instead of submitting to his Authority, can we wonder if his Passion transports him into Rhodomontades, and if he behaves himself a little wildly? But when the Virtue of a Minister like you, whose whole Life has been one bright Example of publick and private Virtue, shall be suspected, so far as to be tempted to Passion; who can refuse him even Applause, if his generous Soul, transported with a  
just

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just Indignation, breathes forth such Expressions, as might, upon a less Occasion, pass for indecent Ribaldry?

This was your Case, most noble Sir, in the Trial, which I presumed lately to make, with too much Boldness perhaps, but surely with a very good Design. A Man writes to you from his Garret, describes himself as a prostitute Scribbler, and offers you the Service of his Pen; this, and this alone appears to you; upon which a noble Indignation seizes you, and you strike boldly, though you strike in the Dark; there is really somewhat fine in this Sally of Resentment, and it confirms, in the highest Degree, the Sentiments I have long entertained of your Integrity, of your Ability, and of a certain Grace, which accompanies and give a Lustre to every Part of your Conduct.

The Share I have had in this Adventure, affords me great Satisfaction. Your Anger fell on a feigned Character, and hurts me not; but the Honour of having drawn an Answer from a *first Minister*, and an Answer *in print*, accrues to me, and is such a one, as the greatest of our weekly Authors could never boast.

Give me Leave therefore to be transported in my Turn, but to be transported with Joy, and to insert an Abstract of your Answer in this Paper, as *Balzac* placed at the Head of his Works a Letter from the Cardinal *de Richlieu*. I consult my own Honour, it must be confessed, in doing this, but I consider still more that just Applause and Admiration, which I, with the rest of the World, am obliged on this Occasion to give you.

To those Parts of the *Occasional Writer's* Letter, which shew that you are at this Juncture in want of such Services, as the Scoundrel he personated might be fit to do, you make no Reply. The

Want

Want you seem to admit, but the Offer of Service you reject; let the Publick hear in what Manner.

*Abstract of the M——r's ANSWER to the Occasional Writer.*

Pag. 1. "THO' you have not signed your Name, I know you. Because, a Man, who is without all Principles of Honesty, who in no one thing can be relied upon, a Betrayer of his Friend, a Traitor to his Prince, an Enemy to his Country, a perjured, ungrateful, unfaithful Rascal, must be *You*; one, who is a Composition of all these, can be only *You*.

Pag. 2. "You are an infamous Fellow, who make a Reputation of doing Mischief; and *Herostrotus* and *Nero*, were not greater Villains than *You*.

"You are of so profligate a Character, that in your Prosperity no Body envied you, and in your Disgrace no Body pities you.

"You were in the Interest of *France*, and of the *Pope*, as hath appeared by your Writings, and you went out of the Way to save yourself from the Gallows.

Pag. 3. "You are a Fellow, who have no Conscience at all, or a damnable complying one; and if you would lend it to me, it *would be of no use to me*.

"You have *no Abilities*; you are an *emancipated Slave*, a *proscribed Criminal*, and an *insolvent Debtor*; and I am not in such a desperate forlorn Condition, to employ a Fellow, who hath *no Talents*.

Pag. 4. "You have been a Traitor, and should be used like one. And I love my Master so well, that I will never advise him to use you, *lest you should jostle me out of my Employment*.

"The

"The Majority are of my Opinion. One Side rails at you, the other dislikes you; and that *Palinurus* would deserve to be drowned indeed, who let you have the Rudder, if he could help it. Pag. 5. "I do not value what *You* or *your Company* say of me; neither am I to be frighted with a *parliamentary Scrutiny*. You rail at me, because you envy me; and I despise all that a Man in the Impotence of Disgrace can do against me, who could never terrify me in the Zenith of his Power."

*Then follow these admirable Arguments.*

Pag. 6, 7, 8. "I. You may talk what you will of *France*, *Spain*, and the Emperor, Power is fluctuating, and perhaps, I know who is *Britain's* Enemy as well as another. II. Though we did lend the Emperor a helping Hand, we are not to let him do what he pleases; and when we set him up, it was good Politicks, and now it is equally good to take him down. III. *I don't question* but we shall humble him. IV. I must tell you plainly. You and I, as to *foreign Affairs*, differ widely *in Opinion*. V. When our Neighbours grow saucy and encroaching, it is high Time to look about us, and not to be taken *napping*. VI. I know you are like the Emperor, because he is like yourself in Ingratitude; and you hate our Friend *France*, because you were well received there.

"If any Body says any Thing of me, pray, tell them ALL THESE THINGS. But for all that, I will not *give you an Employment*.

"I know you to be so hot-headed, that when you have read this, you will vent all your Malice against me. But I do not value it; for I would rather have you my Enemy than my Friend.

"Change

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“ Change your Names, and be as abusive and  
 “ scurrilous as you please, I shall find you out. I  
 “ am *Aristæus*; you are *Proteus*. You may change  
 “ to a Flame, a Lyon, a Bull, or a Bear, I shall  
 “ know you, baffle you, conquer you, and con-  
 “ temn you. All your Opposition will redound to  
 “ my Honour and Glory. And so, Sir, I scorn  
 “ your proffered Services. Sir,  
 “ *Your most, &c.*”

How great! how free! how bold! how gene-  
 rous! Well may those, who have the Honour of a  
 near Approach to you, extol the noble Openness of  
 your Nature, which displays itself in this uncommon  
 Manner; and think that Temper in a Statesman  
 truly admirable, which loses itself so gloriously. Did  
 ever Minister speak so plainly, or lay himself so open  
 to any Man, and especially to such a Man, as you  
 supposed yourself writing to at that Time? Far from  
 discovering Hatred and Contempt of such Wretches,  
 Persons in your Situation have generally encouraged,  
 and even feared them. Nay, they have sometimes  
 aspired to be themselves of that Class; and *Seneca's*  
*Apocolocyntosis* upon *Claudius*, is not the sole Instance  
 of Ministers, who have dipped their Pens in Satyr,  
 to rail at the Memory of a dead Prince.

But now, after this honourable Declaration,  
 which you have made, after this great Example,  
 which you have given, let every mercenary Scrib-  
 bler, every Tool of secret Service, tremble and de-  
 spair. Long may you live, most noble Sir, the just  
 Model of a Minister, who scorns the Assistance of  
 Flattery, Falshood, Artifice, or Corruption.

I have devoted myself to your Service, and shall  
 certainly attend you through every Stage of your  
 Fortune; as long as we both draw vital Air, you  
 shall feel the Effects of my Zeal in your Cause, and  
 I promise you very solemnly, that from hencefor-  
 ward

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ward I will live for no other Purpose; so that I am  
 persuaded, you will hear with Pleasure the *three En-*  
*gagements*, which I think it proper to take with the  
 Publick and with you.

The first is, that my Pen shall constantly preserve  
 Decency and good Manners; and shall never be  
 stain'd with any Abuse of particular Persons. I  
 will chastise Vice, I will expose Folly, and I will  
 combat Error, wherever I find them. But I will  
 never touch upon any unalterable Defects in Figure,  
 in Family, in Birth, in any kind whatsoever; much  
 less will I allow myself to hint at any particular  
 Scandal, or even to mention any real Misfortune,  
 which may equally befall the best and the worst of  
 Men; unless I am forced by my Subject to it, and  
 unless I can soften the Evil by the very Manner of  
 recalling it to Memory. To attack a Vice, a Folly  
 or an Error, is Correction. To attack the Person,  
 is Defamation. He, who writes on Invective, does  
 a silly Thing, because he loses his End; and the  
 wisest of Men has said, *He that uttereth Slander is a*  
*Fool*. Even Truth loses its Force in an Invective,  
 as it does in a Panegyrick; in one, it is thrown  
 into the Lump with Malice, in the other, with  
 Flattery; and he, who is guilty of the first, that is,  
 he who writes against the Man, not against his  
 Crimes, his Follies, or his Errors, seldom proves  
 any thing more than his own Envy, and the other's  
 Superiority. To conclude this Head, he, who  
 writes an Invective, does a base and wicked Thing;  
 because his Design is to disturb the Quiet, and de-  
 stroy the Peace of another Man, but not to reform  
 him, or to serve the Publick. The Pen of such a  
 Writer, like one of those Scourges, of which the  
 profound *Meibomius* has writ so learnedly, while it  
 chastises the Person, serves only to provoke the  
 Vice,

The



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The *second* Obligation, which I lay myself under, and which equally becomes a Man, who writes in the Cause of Truth, is that of intire *Disinterestedness*.

I know the Generosity of your Nature, I know what Places and Pensions have been the Rewards of some very mean Performances in Verse and Prose; and that R. R. State-Writer, of whom we are obliged to ask Blessing, is most certainly not at the Head of our Profession. These Examples, and a due Consideration of the Importance of my Services, teach me sufficiently what Expectations I might entertain, without any Risque of a Disappointment. But I have neither Ambition of this Kind, nor Avarice. My Fortune is above wanting the Necessaries, and my Philosophy above wanting the Superfluities of Life. I therefore discharge you from all Obligation of rewarding my Services; and I wish for the sake of your Ease, your Honour, and your Safety, my Example was likely to be follow'd.

When we behold a great Man among a Croud of disinterested Friends, we know that they follow his Virtues, and his Merit; when we hear an Orator bring over the Majority of an unprejudiced Audience to his Opinion, we must impute it to the Force of his Eloquence. But surely it is as rare for a Minister to have disinterested Friends, as an unprejudiced Audience, so that a Number of Followers can be of no Proof of his personal Virtues, or a Majority of his Eloquence.

The Ancients placed great Happiness in their *inemptæ dapes*; I would rather you should place yours in the *inempti amici*. But alas! Sir, as amiable as you are, this Happiness will hardly fall to your Lot, in our degenerate Age; and I know not whether to maintain your Power, you may not be forced to tarnish the Lustre of your glorious Administration. The King has indeed the Hearts of the People; his Service will always be supported by a national Con-

currence,

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because his Views are always directed to the national Good. This Part is easy and secure, but when once Men come to distinguish between the King's Service and yours, there will arise another Part not so easy nor secure. You have blended them pretty artfully together hitherto, but I doubt the Discrimination is at Hand. When that comes, you will be reduced to a melancholy Alternative; which I beg you to think of, and to prepare for. To quit your Power and your Pretensions, and to quit them before you have established in your Room that dear *Brother* of yours, who does you so much Service at Home, by tiring the ———, and the Nation so much Honour Abroad by diverting the C—— of F——, would indeed be hard. But, on the other Hand, be pleas'd to consider that this Nation has gone very far into Corruption already, that there is a Point of Corruption, to which no Nation can arrive and recover their Liberties, if they are lost; or even preserve them, if they are not lost, according to *Machiavel's* Observation; and that whoever is the Instrument of plunging his Country irretrievably into this Abyss, I use a Word you seem fond of, will fall into a terrible Abyss himself, and have no Superiority any where, but where the *Briber* stands before the *Bribed*, as the *Devil* stands before the *Sinner*.

You see, Sir, how my Zeal transports me, and carries me upon the least Hint, which may be improved to your Honour or Service, even out of my Subject. I return to it, and the *third Engagement*, which I take is to observe a strict Impartiality.

To do otherwise, would be to act contrary to my Nature, and to the Dictates of my Reason. I have a natural Abhorrence of Injustice, and I consider'd, when I first drew my Pen, in how particular a Manner it behoves us political Writers to be on our Guard, against falling into any Partiality. The  
Judge

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Judge is circumscribed by Forms, to the Observance of which he is bound; he has the Law open before him; the Parties, on whom he sits in Judgment, are generally indifferent to him, and far from having any of his Passions awaken'd, the whole Man is sometimes prone to Sleep. When there is Room to suspect a Judge of Partiality in a particular Case, it is agreeable to the Practice of some Countries that he should decline presiding at the Trial, or be obliged to withdraw at the Requisition of the Party. With all these, and many other Precautions, which wise Constitutions have establish'd, it is neither easy nor safe for the venerable Sages of the Law to exercise Partiality. But we political Writers are not under the same Restraints, and are expos'd to strong Temptations. No Forms are prescribed to regulate our Proceedings; no particular Laws, adapted to the particular Cases, which may occur, lie open before us. The general Law of Reason is the only Rule we have to follow; the Application of this Rule requires the most nice Exactness, and we are obliged to make this Application often, in pronouncing Judgment on Men and Things, when we are the most warmly engaged in those civil Contests, which the Duty of our Profession exposes us to, and even when our Tempers are ruffled by Opposition. From which Consideration, the Difficulty of preserving a strict *Impartiality* may evidently appear; give me Leave, however, to illustrate this Matter a little farther.

In the *Athenian* Commonwealth, the Citizen, who took no Side, was deem'd indifferent to the publick Good, and was branded for his infamous Neutrality. Now, if such an Obligation as this lay upon every private Citizen, in that *democratical* Government, it is certain, that we publick Persons, at least, ought to think ourselves under the same Obligation, even in this limited Monarchy of ours.

Indiffe-

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Indifference must be a Crime in us, to be rank'd but one Degree below Treachery; for deserting the Commonwealth is next to betraying it. Our Duty must oblige us in all publick Disputes to take the best Side, and to espouse it with Warmth; this Warmth will beget Warmth; for *you know*, Sir, that the worst Side is not always the worst defended. Provocations will multiply daily, and we may be attack'd in the most sensible Parts. You, Sir, yourself, may for aught I know be insulted, and your spotless Character may be defiled by some saucy Scribbler; in this licentious Age, nothing is held sacred; under the specious Pretence of Free-thinking, the Providence, and the very Being of God, have been openly call'd in Question, and Reflections on your Administration may possibly steal into the World.

Suppose, for a Moment, that any Thing so monstrous as this should happen, that you should be directly inveighed against, or which perhaps is more poignant ironically commended, and then consider how difficult it would be for a professed Admirer of you, heated in the Contest, to keep his Temper, and to preserve his Impartiality; you must agree with me, the Task would be extremely difficult.

But I am sure you will agree likewise, that as difficult as it would be, a conscientious Man ought to impose it upon himself.

The ill Effects of Partiality in us political Writers, when it carries us to give unjust and false Representations of Men and Things, will not be thought of little Moment by you, who labour for Fame, and expect a great Part of the Reward from Posterity, as Posterity is to receive a great Part of the Advantages, which your *wise* and *virtuous* Administration procures, in *reviving*, *supporting*, and *extending Credit*, in *opening so comfortable a Prospect of the Payment of our Debts*, in *strengthening us abroad*

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by

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by so many beneficial Alliances, and above all in amending our Morals, by the total Discouragement of every kind of Artifice and Corruption.

The Civil Magistrate may give away a Man's Estate, or take away his Life; but we can do, and often have done more; we set the general Characters and particular Actions of Men in what Light we please, and deliver them down, sometimes very unjustly, under the most amiable, or the most hateful Colours to future Ages; for the rash Sentence we pronounce is eagerly received, and as eagerly transmitted by those, who are animated with the same Passion.

In this Manner are unjust, and even false Representations established. They become the general Opinion of Mankind, and then, although our Works should grow out of Date as fast as a Gazette, which it must be confessed happens very frequently; yet still the Mischief is done, the Historian perpetuates the Slander, which the Politician broached, and triumphs in the cotemporary Authority, upon which he writes to serve the present Turn, or to satisfy Resentment of Party; such Persons as have no other Crime but that of differing in Opinion from us, and such Events as have no other Demerit, but our Dislike of the Persons, who bring them about, are loaded with Infamy. Posterity is imposed upon as well as the present Age, and the Children continue the Fathers Vengeance, without having the Fathers Provocation.

This faint Sketch of some Consequences that follow the Partiality of political Writers, and of the Danger wherein we all stand of being transported by our own Passions, or hurry'd by those of other People, so far to be answerable for such Consequences, may suffice to shew how much Reason there is for a Man, who undertakes the Career I am entering upon, to be watchful over himself, and

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and to lay himself under as strong a Restraint as I do by this solemn Engagement.

Indeed, as the World goes, it is only by running into Extremes that a State-Writer can effectually please his Party, or serve himself; the Eye of Party sees nothing but quite white, or quite black, observes no Degrees between them, and can distinguish no middle Colour that partakes of both. The greatest Genius in Writing, may be exposed to share the Fate of the greatest *Genie* in Painting. *Annibal Carache*, who followed Nature and Truth with the utmost Exactness, found his noblest Works discountenanced and neglected. He thereupon advised *Guido* and *Caravagio*, his two favourite Scholars, to take quite another Manner, to trace nothing faithfully, but to outrage all they represented, the one by painting in the darkest, and the other in the lightest Manner. By these Means both of them were sure of Admirers, and both of them grew rich.

To imitate these Painters, is all our Party-Writers aim at; whether their Manner be black or white, Satyr, or Panegyrick, no Matter. Their Principle is to lay their Colours on thick, and to be equally in an Extreme. But I hope, for my own Part, to prove that I am not of this Number. On the contrary, I will endeavour to excel in a much more difficult Way, in Softenings and middle Tints; and yet by these to form a Manner so strong, as shall be sufficient for my own Reputation, and for your Service. To you, who have so fine a Taste in Painting, this Attempt will, I flatter myself, be agreeable, and will secure the Continuance of your Favour to,

most noble SIR,

your Honour's

most devoted Servant,

the Occasional Writer.

February 13,  
1726-7.

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The



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*The first* VISION of CAMILICK.

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*In Hoc SIGNO vinces.*

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HAVING as yet given the Reader little besides grave Discourses on publick Matters, and foreseeing that, during the Session of Parliament, I shall be obliged to continue daily in the same Track, I am willing to take this Opportunity of presenting him with something, which has no Relation at all to publick Affairs, but is of a Nature purely amusing, and entirely void of Reflection upon any Person whatsoever.

My Friend *Alvarez* (a Man not unknown to many here, by his frequent Journies to *England*) did some Time since make me a Present of a *Persian* Manuscript, which he met with while he followed the Fortunes of *Meriweis*. An exact Translation of the first Chapter has been made, at my Request, by the learned Mr. *Solomon Negri*, and is as follows.

CAMILICK'S VISION.

IN the Name of God, ever merciful, and of *Haly* his Prophet. I slept in the Plains of *Bagdad*, and I dreamed a Dream. I lifted my Eyes, and I saw a vast Field, pitched with the Tents of the mighty, and the strong ones of the Earth in Array of Battle. I observed the Arms and Ensigns of either Host. In the Banners of the one were pictured a Crown and Sceptre; and upon the Shields of the Soldiers were engraven Scourges, Chains, Iron Maces, Axes, and all

all kinds of Instruments of Violence. The Standards of the other bore the Crown and Sceptre also; but the Devices on the Shields were the Balance, the Olive Wreath, the Plough-Share, and other emblematical Figures of Justice, Peace, Law, and Liberty. Between these two Armies, I saw a King come forth, and sign a large *Roll of Parchment*; at which loud Shouts of Acclamation were heard from every Quarter. The *Roll* itself flew up into the Air, and appeared over their Heads, encompassed with Rays of Glory. I observed that wherever the second Army moved, this glorious Apparition attended them; or rather the Army seemed only to move, as That guided or directed. Soon after, I saw both these Hosts engaged, and the whole Face of the Land overspread with Blood. I saw the King, who had signed and broken that *sacred Charter*, drink out of a golden Cup, fall into Convulsions, gasp and die.

I then saw another King take his Place; who in the most solemn Manner, engaged to make the Words contain'd in the *Roll* the Guide of his Actions; but notwithstanding This, I saw both Armies again encounter. I saw the King a Prisoner. I saw his Son relieve him, and I saw the Chiefs of the other Army put to Death. Yet that victorious Son himself bow'd his Head to the *Parchment*; which now appear'd with fuller Lustre than before. Several other Battles ensued, with vast Slaughter on both Sides; during which the *celestial Volume* was sometimes clouded over; but still again exerted its Rays, and after every Cloud appear'd the brighter. I observed those Heroes, who fought beneath it, though ever so unfortunate, not once to abate their Courage, while they had the least Glimpse of that heavenly Apparition in their View; and even Those, whom I saw overthrown, pierced with ghastly Wounds, and panting in Death, resign'd their

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Lives

Lives in Smiles, and with Eyes cast up to that glorious Object. At last the long Contention ceased. I beheld both Armies unite and move together under the same Influence. I saw one King twelve Times bow down before the bright Phænomenon; which from thence-forward spread a Light over the whole Land; and, descending nearer to the Earth, the Beams of it grew so warm as it approach'd, that the Hearts of the Inhabitants leap'd for Joy. The Face of War was no more. The same Fields, which had so long been the Scene of Death and Desolation, were now cover'd with golden Harvests. The Hills were cloath'd with Sheep. The Woods sung with Gladness. Plenty laugh'd in the Valleys. Industry, Commerce, and Liberty danced hand in hand through the Cities.

While I was delighting myself with this amiable Prospect, the Scene entirely changed. The Fields and Armies vanish'd; and I saw a large and magnificent Hall, resembling the great *Divan* or Council of the Nation. At the upper End of it, under a Canopy, I beheld the *sacred Covenant* shining as the Sun. The Nobles of the Land were there assembled. They prostrated themselves before it, and they sung an Hymn. *Let the Heart of the King be glad; for his People are happy! May the Light of the Covenant be a Lanthorn to the Feet of the Judges; for by This shall they separate Truth from Falshood. O Innocence, rejoice! for by this Light shalt thou walk in Safety; nor shall the Oppressor take hold on thee. O Justice, be exceeding glad! for by this Light all thy Judgments shall be decreed with Wisdom; nor shall any Man say thou hast err'd. Let the Hearts of all the People be glad! for This have their Grandfathers died; in This have their Fathers rejoiced; and in This may their Posterity rejoice evermore!*

Then all the Rulers took a solemn Oath to preserve it inviolate and unchanged, and to sacrifice their

their Lives and their Fortunes, rather than suffer themselves or their Children to be deprived of so invaluable a Blessing.

After This, I saw another and larger Assembly come forward into the Hall, and join the first. These paid the same Adorations to the *Covenant*; took the same Oath; they sung the same Hymn; and added a solemn Form of Imprecation to this Effect. *Let the Words of the Roll be for ever in our Eyes, and graven on our Hearts; and accursed be He, who layeth Hands on the same. Accursed be He, who shall remove this Writing from the People; or who shall hide the Law thereof from the King. Let that Man be cut off from the Earth. Let his Riches be scatter'd as the Dust. Let his Wife be the Wife of the People. Let not his first-born be rank'd among the Nobles. Let his Palace, be destroy'd. Let his Gardens be as a Desert, having no Water. Let his Horses and his Horsemen be overthrown; and his Dogs devour their Carcases! —* In the midst of these Execrations enter'd a Man, dress'd in a plain Habit, with a Purse of Gold in his Hand. He threw himself forward into the Room, in a bluff, ruffianly Manner. A Smile, or rather a Sneer, sat on his Countenance. His Face was bronzed over with a Glare of Confidence. An arch Malignity leer'd in his Eye. Nothing was so extraordinary as the Effect of this Person's Appearance. They no sooner saw him, but They all turned their Faces from the Canopy, and fell prostrate before him. He trod over their Backs, without any Ceremony, and marched directly up to the Throne. He opened his Purse of Gold; which he took out in Handfuls, and scattered amongst the Assembly. While the greater Part were engaged in scrambling for these Pieces, he seized, to my inexpressible Surprise, without the least Fear, upon the sacred *Parchment* itself. He rumbled it rudely up, and crammed it into his Pocket. Some of the People

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began to murmur. He threw more Gold, and they were pacified. No sooner was the *Parchment* taken away, but in an Instant I saw half the august Assembly in Chains. Nothing was heard through the whole Divan, but the Noise of Fetters, and Clank of Irons. I saw Pontiffs in their ecclesiastical Habits, and Senators, clad in Ermine, linked together like the most ignominious Slaves. Terror and Amazement were impressed on every Countenance, except on That of some few, to whom the Man continued dispersing his Gold. This he did, till his Purse became empty. Then he dropt it; but then too, in the very same Moment, he himself dropt with it to the Ground. That, and the Date of his Power, at once expired. He sunk, and sunk for ever. The radiant *Volume* again rose; again shone out, and re-assumed its Place above the Throne; the Throne, which had been darkened all this Time, was now filled with the Effulgence of the Glory, which darted from it. Every Chain dropped off in an Instant. Every Face regained its former Chearfulness. Heaven and Earth resounded with *Liberty! Liberty!* and the HEART OF THE KING WAS GLAD WITHIN HIM.

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On L U X U R Y.

A DISCOURSE on *Operas*, and the gayer Pleasures of the Town may seem to be too trifling for the important Scene of Affairs, in which we are at present engaged; but I must own my Fears, that they will bear too great a Part in the Success of a WAR, to make the Consideration of them foreign to it. A very little Reflection on History will suggest

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suggest this Observation; that every Nation has made either a great or inconsiderable Figure in the World, as it has fallen into *Luxury* or resisted its Temptations. What People are more distinguished than the *Persians* under *Cyrus*, nursed up in Virtue, and inured to Labour and Toil? Yet (in the short Space of 220 Years\*) they became so contemptible under *Darius*, as scarce to give Honour to the Conqueror's Sword. The *Spartans*, and the Long-Rulers of the World, the *Romans*, speak the same Language; and I wish future History does not furnish more *modern* Examples.

When the Mind is enervated by *Luxury*, the Body soon falls an easy Victim to it; for how is it possible to imagine, that a Man can be capable of the great and generous Sentiments, which Virtue inspires, whose Mind is fill'd with the soft Ideas, and wanton Delicacies that Pleasure must infuse? And were it possible to be warm'd with such Notions, could it ever put them in Execution? For Toils and Fatigues would be Difficulties unsurmountable to a Soul dissolved in Ease. Nor are these the imaginary, speculative Ideas of a Closet; but such as have been the Guide and Policies of the wisest States. Of This we have the most remarkable Instance in *Herodotus*. "The *Persians*, after  
 " their great and extended Conquests, desired *Cyrus*  
 " to give them Leave to remove out of their own  
 " barren and mountainous Country, into one more  
 " blest by the Indulgence of Providence. But that  
 " great and wise Prince, revolving the Effect in  
 " his Mind, bid them do as they would; telling  
 " them, at the same Time, that for the future  
 " they must not expect to command, but obey;  
 " for Providence had so order'd it, that an effeminate Race of People were the certain Produce of a  
 " delicious Country." What Regard the great Hi-

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\* *Liv.* lib. 9. cap. 19.

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storian had to this Opinion, may be easily collected from his reserving it for the Conclusion of this excellent Piece. And the Case is directly the same, whether *Pleasures* are the natural Product of a Country, or adventitious Exoticks. They will have the same Effect, and cause the same extended Ruin. How often have they revenged the Captive's Cause, and made the Conqueror's Sword the Instrument of his own undoing? *Capua* destroy'd the bravest Army, which *Italy* ever saw, flush'd with Conquest, and commanded by *Hannibal*. The Moment *Capua* was taken, that Moment the Walls of *Carthage* trembled. What was it that destroyed the Republick of *Athens*, but the Conduct of *Pericles*;\* who by his pernicious Politicks first debauched the People's Minds with Shews and Festivals, and all the studied Arts of *Ease* and *Luxury*; that he might, in the mean Time, securely guide the Reins of Empire, and riot in Dominion? He first laid the Foundation of *Philip's* Power; nor had a Man of *Macedon* ever thought of enslaving *Greece*, if *Pericles* had not first made them Slaves to Pleasure. † That great Statesman *Tiberius* clearly saw what was the surest Instrument of arbitrary Power; and therefore refused to have *Luxury* redressed, when Application was made to him in the Senate for that Purpose. Artful Princes have frequently introduced it with that very View. *Davilla* tells us, that in an Interview and Semblance of Treaty with the King of *Navar*, *Catharine* of *Medicis* broke the Prince's Power more with the insidious Gayeties of her Court, than many Battles before had done. But there is a single Passage in § *Herodotus*, which will supply the Place of more Quotations. "When *Cyrus* had received an Account that the *Lydians*" had

\* *Plut. in Pericl. & Demost. Orat.*

† *Tac. An. lib. 2. cap. 33.*

§ *Herod. lib. 1. cap. 155.*

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"had revolted from him, he told *Cræsus*, with a good deal of Emotion, that he had almost determined to make them all Slaves. *Cræsus* begged him to pardon them; but, says he, that they may no more rebel, or be troublesome to you, command them to lay aside their Arms, to wear long Vests and Buskins. Order them to sing and play on the Harp; to drink and debauch; and you'll soon see their Spirits broken and themselves changed from Men into Women; so that they will no more rebel, or be uneasy to you for the future." And the Event answered the Advice. They are puny Politicians, who attack a People's Liberty directly. The Means are dangerous, and the Success precarious. Notions of Liberty are interwoven with our very Being; and the least Suspicion of being in Danger fires the Soul with a generous Indignation. But He is the Statesman formed for Ruin and Destruction, whose wily Head knows how to disguise the fatal Hook with Baits of Pleasure, which his artful Ambition dispenses with a lavish Hand, and makes himself popular in undoing. Thus are the easy, thoughtless Crowd made the Instruments of their own Slavery; nor do they know the fatal Mine is laid, till they feel the goodly Pile come tumbling on their Heads. This is the finished Politician; the darling Son of *Tacitus* and *Machiavel*.

But, thanks to Providence, the sacred Monuments of History extend the short contracted Span of human Life, and give us Years in Books. These point out the glorious Landmarks for our Safety; and bid us be wise in Time, before *Luxury* has made too great a Progress among us. *Operas* and *Masquerades*, with all the politer Elegancies of a wanton Age, are much less to be regarded for their Expence (great as it is) than for the Tendency, which they have to deprave our Manners. *MUSICK* has something

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something so peculiar in it, that it exerts a willing Tyranny over the Mind, and forms the ductil Soul into whatever Shape the Melody directs. Wise Nations have observed its Influence, and have therefore kept it under proper Regulations. The \* *Spartans*, vigilantly provident for the People's Safety, took from the famed *Timotheus's* Harp the additional Strings, as giving his Musick a Degree of Softness inconsistent with their Discipline. The divine *Plato* is expressly of Opinion, that the *Musick* of a Country cannot be changed, and the *publick Laws* remain unaffected. Heroes will be Heroes, even in their Musick. Soft and wanton are the warbled Songs of † *Paris*; but † *Achilles* sings the godlike Deeds of Heroes. A noble, manly Musick will place Virtue in its most beautiful Light, and be the most engaging Incentive to it. A well wrought Story, attended with its prevailing Charms, will transport the Soul out of itself; fire it with glorious Emulation; and lift the Man into an Hero; but the soft *Italian* Musick relaxes and unnerves the Soul, and sinks it into Weakness; so that while we receive their *Musick*, we at the same Time are adopting their *Manners*. The Effects of it will appear in the strongest Light from the Fate of the People of *Sybaris*; a Town in *Italy*, strong and wealthy; bless'd with all the Goods of Fortune, and skill'd in all the Arts of Luxury and Ease; which they carry'd to so great an Excess, that their very *Horses* were taught to move and form themselves as the *Musick* directed. Their constant Enemies, the People of *Crotona*, observing This, brought a great Number of Harps and Pipes into the Field, and

\* *Cicero lib. 2. de leg. cap. 39.*

† *Hor. lib. 1. Od. 15.*

—— Grataque foeminis,  
Imbelli cithara, carmina divides.

‡ *Hom. Iliad. 9. 189.*

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and when the Battle began, the Musick play'd; upon which these well-bred Horses immediately began to dance; which so disconcerted the whole Army, that 300,000 were kill'd, and the whole People destroyed. Though this Story seems a little *fabulous*, yet it contains, at least, a very good Moral.——What Effect *Italian* Musick might have on our polite Warriors at *Gibraltar*, I cannot take upon me to say; but I wish our *Luxury* at home may not influence our Courage abroad.

An ANSWER to the \* London Journal of Saturday, December 21, 1728.

THE Family of the *Publicolæ* are surely very numerous. I pretend to no Acquaintance with them, and I desire none. Far be it from me therefore to assign to any one of the *Fraternity* his particular Lucubration. I do not presume to say, for Instance, that such a Piece was written by *BEN*, or such a one by *ROBIN*; but I can plainly distinguish, in their Productions, a Difference of *Style* and *Character*. In *some*, I feel myself lulled by a regular, mild, and frequently languid Harangue; such as often descends upon us from the *Pulpit*. In *others*, I observe a crude, incoherent, rough, inaccurate, but sometimes sprightly Declamation; well enough fitted for *popular Assemblies*, where the *Majority* is already convinced.

The *Publicola* of the 7th of *December* quite jaded me. I handled the *numb Fish*, till I fancied a Torpor seized my Imagination; and perhaps you may think,

\* This Paper was supposed to be then under the Direction of *Benjamin* Lord Bishop of \*\*\*\*\*.



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think, that I am hardly yet recovered from the Consequences of that Accident. However, I shall venture to play a little with the *Publicola* of this Day; for I think I can go through an Answer to his Paper. He returns the Ball at least, and keeps up the Game.

Before I come to This, give me Leave to premise a Word or two more.

As different as the *Publicolæ* are in other Things, in one they are all alike. They are scurrilous and impatient. They call Names, and grow angry at a Sneer. *Raleigh* laid down his Pen, rather than continue such a *Bear-Garden* Contest. I took it up and answered them for once in their own Style; but they must not expect so much Complaisance from me any more. The Matters we enter upon are serious, and by me they shall be treated seriously and calmly. I shall consider the Dignity of the Cause I plead for; the Cause of Truth; the Cause of my Country; and I shall look down with Contempt on the *Invectives* and *Menaces*, which they may throw out; and by which they will suit their *Style*, with great Propriety, to their *Subject*.——But let us come to the Point.

The *Publicola*, of this Day, sets out with stating, in an half Light, a Question, which hath been much debated in the World. No Man that I know of (no reasonable Man I am sure) did ever find Fault that we avoided a *War*. Our national Circumstances are so well known, they are so severely felt, that *Ministers*, who maintained *Peace*, and procured to their Country the Blessings of *Peace*, *Quiet*, *Improvement of Trade*, *Diminution of Taxes*, *Decrease of Debts*, would be almost the Objects of publick Adoration. But the Exception taken to our Conduct hath been This; that we provoked a *War* first, and shewed a Fear of it afterwards. People recall the Passages of three Years past. They wish  
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we had practised *greater Caution* at that Time; but then the same People very consistently wish that we had exerted *greater Vigour* since. If the Honour and Interest of his late Majesty, and of the *British* Nation, say they, were so severely wounded by the publick or private Treaties of *Vienna*, that it was fit to keep no longer any Measures, even such as have been thought of Decency, with the *Emperor* and the King of *Spain*; why this Fear of disobliging them? Why this long Forbearance under all the Insult offered to us by the *Spaniards*? If we were in a Condition, by our own Strength, and by our Alliance with *France*, to enter, with a Prospect of Success, into an immediate War; why, again, have we chosen to defer it, under so many Provocations to begin it? Why have we endured some of the worst Consequences of a *War*, without taking those Advantages, which acting offensively would undeniably have procured to us? But if all This was quite otherwise, continue the same *political Reasoners*; if the Honour and Interest of his late Majesty, and of the *British* Nation, were not so severely wounded; if we were, neither by our own Strength, nor by the Alliance of *France*, in a Condition to risque a *War*; nay more, if Things were so unfortunately jumbled, that perhaps *this War* would have been more to our own Detriment than to That of our *Enemies*, (as the *Publicolæ* have more than once insinuated in their Papers) what could we mean, three Years ago, when Matters were carried to greater and harsher Extremities, than it is possible to find any Example of, amongst civilized Nations, since the Quarrels of *Charles* the Vth, and *Francis* the Ist? If our *principal Ally* would have been dangerous to our Interests, in the Operations of a *War*, and is indiffeacent to them in the Negotiations of *Peace*, (for this hath been insinuated too from the same Quarter) what a *Treaty* was that, which procured

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us *this Ally*? What *Assurances* were those, which made us depend upon him? The Difficulty of these Dilemmas cannot, I think, be solved; and *Those*, who attempt it, deceive themselves, whilst they mean to deceive the People.

But we are told that *we went into a War, as far as the Reason of Things* would give us Leave. It seems then that the *Reason of Things* would neither give us Leave to protect our *Trade*, nor to make Reprizals, when our *Merchants* were plundered. If these Words are to pass for any Thing more than empty Sound, it will follow either that *Publicola* is capable of affirming the grossest Untruth in a Paper, addressed to the *People of England*; or that our Situation is worse than the least sanguine of our Friends ever thought it, or the most malicious of our Enemies ever represented it. Very bad indeed must it be if the *Reason of Things* obliged us to bear from the *Spaniards*, at this low Ebb of their maritime Power, what would not have been borne when their proud *Armada* covered the Seas; what would hardly have been borne, even in the Reign of King *James I.*

But, God be praised! this is not our Case; and therefore *Publicola* must be content to lie under the Imputation, which he hath drawn on himself by the Boldness of his Assertions.

He is frequently guilty of this Fault; and the Words, which immediately follow those I have quoted, afford a strong Instance of it. *We did not, says he, take the Galleons and bring them home; but we block'd them up; which as compleatly answered the true End and Design of sending that Fleet, as the actual taking of them. The Design was to keep the Money out of their Hands (the Spaniards) and so disable them to carry on the Project of the Treaty of Vienna.* Very well. This Matter is brought to a short Issue. The Blockade of the *Galleons* is over. Our Fleet is come back from the *West-Indies*. The *Galleons* are either

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either come or coming. The *Spaniards* therefore are, according to *Publicola*, no longer disabled from carrying on the Project of the *Vienna Treaty*. I ask then, have they abandoned, have they renounced these Projects? If our Fleet blocked up the *Galleons* till this was done, he is in the Right. This answered the Design of sending it. If they should, after this, *break their Faith, and renounce the most sacred Obligations*; none but *they* are to be complained of.

*Publicola* would have us believe, indeed, that they have renounced these *Projects*; that they *have granted us the main Things in Dispute*; and that the *Congress* is only to settle *other Affairs of less Importance*; but this I deny; and he shall be obliged to confess either that he advances, here again, a bold Untruth; or that he reckons our keeping *Gibraltar* not amongst the *main Things in Dispute*, but amongst those of *less Importance*. Let him shew me, if he can, in the *Preliminaries*, a *particular and express Confirmation* of our Right to this Place, made by the *Spaniards*. I will undertake to shew him the *general Words*, by which the *Spaniards* will pretend in the *Congress*, as it is notorious they do every where and on all Occasions, that they have still a Right to demand the Restitution of *Gibraltar*, and that this Right is to be discussed in the *Congress*.

I know it hath been said more than once, in a very publick Place, and in a very solemn Manner, that *Gibraltar* should not be even mentioned at the *Congress*; but it would be impertinent to lay any Stress on the Assurances of a *Person*, who hath presumed to give so many groundless ones already; and who either hath been banter'd most egregiously himself, or hath made no Scruple of bantering his Country.

Here then is one *main Point of our Interests*, to mention no more, still unsettled; not because the

*Spaniards*

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*Spaniards* have flown off from any Agreement they had come to about it; because it was never settled; and yet the *Galleons* are left at Liberty to come home.

If asserting our Right to *Gibraltar*, and some other Things, which were founded so high by an Acquaintance of yours, Mr. *Publicola*, (the Author of the *Enquiry*) had no Share in the Ends, which were proposed by sending our Fleet to the *West-Indies*, such strange incomprehensible Ends may, for aught I know, have been compleatly answered; but if these Points, so essential to *Great-Britain*, were any of the *main Things in Dispute*; if they were any of the Ends proposed by what is called *distressing* the *Spaniards*; then is it false to assert that these Ends have been *compleatly answered*.

When we consider what Numbers of able and useful Subjects was lost in the Expedition to the *West-Indies*; and that we are, at least, as far off from a Settlement of Interests with *Spain* now, as we were before that Expedition was undertaken, it is impossible not to feel great and unaffected Concern.

If it be asked, what was to be done? I shall answer, that all, which *Publicola* advances against taking the *Galleons*, is trifling.

*First*, if *Blocking up* the *Galleons* in the *Spanish* Ports was of such Consequence, *Taking* them would have been a more effectual Measure to all the same Purposes.

*Secondly*, if we had taken them (as Mr. *Hosier* could have done) we should have had a Chance the more for taking the *Flota* too; which stole away to *Europe*, whilst our Squadron lay rotting before *Portobello*.

*Thirdly*, if we had taken this Treasure, we should have had in our Hands a sufficient Security for indemnifying our *Merchants*; who have been the *only Sufferers*, by the Depredations of the *Spaniards*: whilst the *French* and *Dutch* have sailed securely; and to one *Body* of whom (I mean the *South-Sea Company*) the King of *Spain* owes, for former Seizures,

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Seizures, unjustly made, as much perhaps as his Proportion in the Treasure of the *Galleons* amounts to.

*Fourthly*, to have *taken* the *Galleons* would not have been liable to the same Inconveniencies, as we have severely felt by pursuing another Measure. The Expedition would have been soon over. The Expence of Lives and Treasure would have been infinitely less. It would have cost little or nothing to have kept the *Spaniards* out of their Money by a *Seizure*, as long as the true *Reason of Things* should have required it; whereas it hath cost us more than all that Money is worth, to keep them out of it by a *Blockade* only for a Time; and for a Time, which hath not been sufficient to secure us against their *Designs*, or to make them lay aside their *Pretensions*. *But if we had taken them* (says *Publicola*) *we should have taken the Money of other People, as well as of the Spaniards. We should have been Pyrates.* Let us see how this hangs together. If we had restored immediately to the Proprietors their respective Shares, as he supposes we must have done, the Brand of *Piracy* would not have stuck upon us. But suppose we had thought fit not to restore their Shares to the *Spaniards*, till our Differences with the Court of *Madrid* had been settled; should we have been *Pirates* in that Case? He will be laughed at, who affirms it. Would the King of *Spain's* Share in this Treasure have been no Loss to him? Would he not have missed the extravagant *Indulto*, which he is now going to receive on this immense Treasure? Should we have been *Pirates* for punishing, in this Manner, a Prince, who actually besieged one of our Fortresses; who actually detained the Ships and seized the Estates of our Merchants; and whose Subjects every Day killed, robbed and plundered the Subjects of *Great Britain*?

But I go a Step farther; for if we stop with *Publicola*, it will be always short of the Mark; and we



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we shall never exhaust the Subject, as I desire to do, because I desire to find the Truth, and to be sure that I find it. What hath been said hitherto, hath been said on the Supposition of a *Seizure* only; and I hope the Scruples of *Publicola's* timorous Conscience are appeas'd. I hope he hath found out, by this Time, that such a *Seizure* might have been carried on without *Piracy*. But suppose it had been a *Capture*, not a *Seizure*; such a *Capture* as can never be made but in Time of open War; such a *Capture* as intitles the *Captors*, by our Laws, to the whole Profit of the Prize. Why then we had commenced a War against *Spain* by this Action; as *Spain* had done long before against us by a thousand Hostilities. Why then Vice-Admiral *Hofier*, and the Officers and Seamen of his Squadron, had been in the same Case as Sir *Charles Wager*, and the Officers and Seamen of his Squadron were in the last War; and I do not remember that these gallant Men were ever prosecuted as *Pirates* at home; or reputed such abroad; or oblig'd to refund any Part of the Treasure they had taken.

Upon the whole Matter, *Publicola's* Argument proves nothing in the present Case; or it proves that even when we are at War with *Spain*, we must not presume to attack these *sacred Galleons*. Other Nations are always interest'd in them, as well as the *Spaniards*. It will therefore be always unlawful, according to this excellent Casuist, to make Prize of them; and he is desid to distinguish himself out of this Absurdity.

Having now gone through what Mr. *Publicola* calls, I know not why, the *Subject in general*, we will examine the second Part of his Epistle. I pass over all the *Billingsgate*, with which he ushers in this Part; though I could make myself and you too very merry, if I would apply his Criticisms on what *Raleigh* says, concerning *one Promise*, to the Interpretation

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pretation, which was given to *another Promise*; by which we might have learn'd, amongst many other curious Distinctions, the Difference between a *direct Promise* and a *Promise ministerially worded*; but I shall leave him to his Phrenzy, and proceed soberly to shew you that he *says nothing*; or that, which is *worse than nothing*, in every Line of this Performance in which he seems to triumph with such vast Complacency.

The Point he labours is to shew that the *Promise* made by the Lord *Stanhope* to restore *Gibraltar*, which hath not been comply'd with; and the Destruction of the *Spanish Fleet* on the Coast of *Sicily*, threw the Court of Madrid into the Arms of the Emperor; and were the true Root and real Cause of all that thorough Hatred and deep Malice shewn in the Treaty of *Vienna*; and by Consequence that all our present Difficulties with *Spain* proceed from hence; from Causes laid many Years ago; and when the present Ministers were not in Power. My Business shall not be to blame or to excuse any Ministers; but to make a true Deduction of Facts; and to reason clearly and justly upon them; and I charitably hope, that I may bring *Publicola* to do so in Time; if for no other Reason, at least by obliging him to take Shame to himself so often; for though I am not so bloody-minded as *Publicola*, who talks as if he had Heads in his Power, yet I assure him that I will not let him alone whilst, amongst other Enormities, he makes it his Business to bury Truth and common Sense under such weekly Heaps of Rubbish,

I shall shew immediately that in whatever Terms or Manner we suppose Lord *Stanhope* to have made a Promise of restoring *Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, it will be of no Avail to *Publicola's* Purpose. But since he hath told us what he hath heard, and *Raleigh* hath told us what he hath heard (for neither of them can pretend to speak on their own Knowledge, concerning

cerning this Affair) I will likewise take Leave to state what I have been informed of, upon better Authority than what my *Adversary* hath often writ upon in his affirmative Style.

I have been inform'd then that Lord *Stanhope* had been induced, or seduced (call it which you please) by the late *Regent of France* to make an *Overture* of this kind at the Court of *Madrid*. Lord *Stanhope*, says our Author, might think that *Gibraltar* was to be *honestly given up for valuable Considerations*. He might so; and he was so honest a Man, so sincere a Lover of his Country, that if he had thought in another Manner, no Consideration of *private Interest*, no Regard to the Service of a *Ministry*, could have prevailed on him to make, nor even to entertain the Motion. But have a Care of your *Insinuations*, Mr. *Publicola*; and learn to make them with a little more Delicacy. The Case is vastly different *now*. The Sense of our *august Monarch* is known. The Sense of the *whole Nation* hath been loudly proclaimed; and I believe no *Minister*, how presuming soever, will venture, at this Time, to say that *Gibraltar* may be honourably or advantageously given up; and therefore no *virtuous Minister* will think he can honestly give it up; or conspire in *Measures*, which may create the Appearance of a *Necessity* so to do.--- But to return to my Narration.

If such an *Overture* was made by Lord *Stanhope*, it was made to prevail on the Court of *Spain* to desist from the *Enterprize* they had then in hand; an *Enterprize*, which we should have been obliged to prevent, if the Treaty of *Quadruple Alliance* had never been made, by Virtue of our *Guaranty to the Neutrality of Italy*. That this *Overture* was not received is evident; since the *Spaniards* went on with their *Expedition*, which ended in the Destruction of their *Fleet*. Now call this an *Overture*, as I do; or call it a *Promise*, as *Publicola* will affect to do; it was

was *vacated* to all Intents and Purposes by the *Spaniards*, who refused to comply with the *Condition*, on which it was and only could be grounded.

It hath been said by some, that this *Promise* was renew'd afterwards, to pacify the *Spaniards* for the Loss of their Ships, and for their Defeat in *Sicily*; but this deserves Explanation; and will not stand in the Light, which *those*, who urge it, desire it should.

It is, I believe, true that the *French*, who first induced us to make this *Overture*, would on the Pretences just now mention'd, and on the Pretence of the Hopes, which the *Regent* had continued to give the *Spaniards*, have obliged us to acknowledge this *vacated Promise* as a subsisting Obligation; but I have been inform'd that this was refused flatly to the *Minister* sent over hither upon that Occasion, and to the *Regent* himself by our *Minister* abroad. The *Promise* then continued *vacated*; and we were as much disentangled from the Snares, which our *good Allies* laid for us, as if no such *Promise* or *Overture* had been ever made.

But farther. If a *Promise* of this kind had been made on our Part, even after the Expedition to *Sicily*, which there is no Colour to affirm, yet *that Promise* must likewise have been *void*, since it was made so, to all Intents and Purposes, by the King of *Spain's* Accession to the \* *Quadruple Alliance*.

That all *Possessions* are mutually confirmed by *that Treaty*, except such as are *specify'd* in it, cannot be deny'd. The Possession of *Gibraltar* was therefore again confirmed to us by the King of *Spain*, when he acceded to *that Treaty*; unless he can shew that our Possession of it was *excepted*; or can produce any *private Article* or *Declaration*, which made a *Reservation of his Right to this Place*, notwithstanding the Cession of it made at *Utrecht*. But nothing of This can be shewn; and it hath been said, I believe truly,

\* *Vide* the Treaty.

ly, that a *contrary Declaration* was made solemnly and publickly by the *British Minister* in *Holland*, at the very Time when the *Accession* was signed.

Thus far then the Way is clear before us. When we came *Mediators* to the *Congress* of *Cambray* (for such we were at *that Place*, though we have the Misfortune to find ourselves principally and almost solely concerned in the Disputes to be settled at *Soissons*) the King of *Spain* had no *Right*, nor *Pre- tence of Right* to demand of *Great-Britain* the Resti- tution of *Gibraltar*. Indeed, if he had then such a *Pretence*; if a *Promise*, on our Part, to restore this Place to him, which *Promise* we refused to execute, had then subsisted, how could he have accepted of our *Mediation*?

Ay, but (says this poor hunted Author, who doubles and shifts and works and tries, at any Rate to save himself) Lord *Stanhope*, according to *Ra- leigh's* own Confession, was first in this *Affair*, and laid the *Foundation* of this *Expectation* in the *Spaniards*. — 'Tis plain the *Spaniards* had such *Assurances*. It is allow'd you, at least for Argument sake, that Lord *Stanhope* was first in this *Affair*. The *Spaniards* had such *Assurances*. Make your most of it. These *Assurances* were discharged. These *Promises* were re- leased; and whatever Lord *Stanhope* can be supposed to have done or said about *Gibraltar* hath no more Relation to the *present Dispute*, than what was done or said about *Gibraltar* in the Time of King *Rod- rigue* and the *Count Julian*; so that our Author is building up a *Right* for the *Spaniards* upon Founda- tions, which were demolished as soon as laid. He is building up a *Right*, or he is building up *nothing*; for to talk, as he does, of *Expectations*, in Cases of this Nature, without establishing a *Right*, real or plausible, is too frivolous to deserve an Answer.

Let me illustrate this by a familiar Instance; for Things cannot be made too plain to him. I will suppose

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suppose him a *Clergyman*. I will suppose that by Merit, of some kind or other, he gets a *Promise* of a *Bishoprick*. After this, he does something, incon- sistent with such a Promotion. He forfeits all *Title*. He renounces all *Pretensions* to it. Shall his Advo- cate be admitted to insist that, notwithstanding all this, he expects to be a *Bishop still*; and, instead of grounding his *Expectations* on his *Right*, ground his *Right* on his *Expectations*? No certainly; such an Advocate would be his'd out of Court, and would deserve at least to have his Gown pull'd over his Ears.

But the *Spaniards* are not so chimerical. They ground their *Expectations*, and what they call their *Right*, on a *new Engagement* taken by us, as they say, since all the *Transactions*, mention'd above, were over; on a *private Article*, in a *Treaty* made with them in 1721, stipulating the Contents of a LETTER to be written by the *late King*; and on the *Letter*, written in pursuance of *this Article*, the original of which they offer to produce; and which they pretend to be a *positive Engagement* to restore *Gibraltar* to them.

With what Front now could *Publicola* affirm, that what *Raleigh* says about the *Letter* is no- thing to his Purpose; unless this *mysterious Letter* had been wrote before this same kind of a verbal *Promise* was made? — If this *mysterious* or *ministerial Letter* had been writ before Lord *Stanhope's* *Promise* was made, it would have been nothing to *Raleigh's* Purpose; because his Purpose was to shew that the Demand, which the *Spaniards* now make of *Gibraltar*, cannot be made on any Thing, which pass'd in Lord *Stanhope's* Time; but it was extreme- ly to his Purpose to shew that *this Letter* was writ after Lord *Stanhope's* Death. Had *Publicola* taken upon him to ridicule the plainest and easiest Demon- stration in *Euclid*, he could not have render'd him- self

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self more ridiculous than he does upon this Occasion.

I am at a Loss what Words to use. I have debarr'd myself from using *hard ones*; and none but the *hardest* are equal to what this *Writer* deserves. Let him pass then without any Animadversion from me. Let the *Reader* pronounce Sentence upon him.

To sum up the whole on this Head. *Publicola* was to prove that my Lord *Stanhope's* Promise to restore *Gibraltar* is one of the Reasons of the present *Obstinacy of the Spaniards*, and by Consequence of our present *Difficulties*. Now it is notorious that in Fact the *Spaniards* ground their Demand on something, which pass'd whilst he was alive. *Publicola* says it never appear'd that the present Ministry came in to such *Assurances*. If he means the *Assurances* given by my Lord *Stanhope*, and long ago made null, he is most certainly in the Right, for a very obvious Reason. But if he means the *Assurances* still insisted upon, I have nothing to say but this. *These Assurances*, or what the *Spaniards* call by that Name, were given in the Year of our Lord 1721.

The second Reason assign'd, by this profound Politician, for the *Obstinacy of the Spaniards*, is the *Resentment*, which hath lain at their Hearts, ever since we destroyed their *Fleet*. Here are no *Proofs* offered; nor can there be any, which are *direct*; because the Assertion relates to what passes, and hath pass'd these many Years, in the Hearts of the King, Queen and Ministers of *Spain*. It is a Fact, which we are to take on the bare Word of *this Author*, or to reject. I make no Scruple of rejecting it, because the *probable Reasons* against it seem to me of much greater Weight than his *single Authority* in any Case, and especially in a Case of this Nature. The *Spaniards* were certainly not very well pleased with us for destroying their *Fleet*. But doth it follow from hence that the *Resentment*, which they conceived

ceived upon this Occasion, operates thus strongly still? How often were the *French* beaten by us in the last War? Were not whole Squadrons of their *Ships* destroyed? How many of their *Armies* were defeated? How many of their *Towns* were taken? notwithstanding which, we see with Pleasure, the most perfect *Harmony*, the most intimate *Friendship*, subsist between their *Court* and ours; even from the Time when their *Disgraces* were recent, and when their *Resentment* against us must have run the highest, if it was true that *Resentment*, and not the *Ragione di Stato* (as the *Italians* call it) govern'd the Conduct of Princes. But the *Spaniards* are more vindicative than the *French*. This may be said perhaps by People, who are apt to support one Affirmation by another, and to call That Proof. But then how came it to pass that the *Spaniards* were so soon reconciled to the *French*, and entered into such close Alliances with them immediately after the Campaign of 1718? If the *British Arms* beat the *Spanish Fleet*, the *French Arms* took the *Spanish Towns* at the same Time. The near Relation and the antient *Friendship* between the two Courts of *France* and *Spain*; it may be said again, render'd their Reconciliation easy. But this would be to suppose what is quite contrary to the natural Course of human Passions. According to that, the Court of *Spain* must have been infinitely more piqued against their own *Family*, for joining in Opposition to them with the *Emperor*, who had been so long their common *Enemy*, than against the Court of *Britain*, who had not the same *Ties* to them, and who acted for an *old Ally*. This is natural and probable. Nay, when we consider how many Marks of the utmost *Resentment* were shewn at that Time by the *Spanish* to the *French Court*; how many Intrigues the former carry'd on to subvert the Government, and to raise a Rebellion in *France*; I think we may justify affirming that this is true in

Fact. And yet how soon was all this forgot at *Madrid*? How soon was the Reunion of the two Courts brought about in the closest Manner, and cemented by *Marriages*?

The King and Queen of *Spain* might look on the Proceedings of the *French*, in this Affair, as a *political Quarrel* and a *national Wrong*; but they look'd on an Affair, which happen'd a few Years afterwards, as a *personal Injury* and *Affront*. I mean the sending back the *Infanta* in so abrupt, so unprepared a Manner, without any softening, and with so many aggravating Circumstances. Never *Resentment* run higher, nor was express'd in Terms of greater Passion, than that of the Court of *Madrid* upon this Occasion; and yet one or two Sacrifices, a little Address, and a little Management pacify'd all; united the two Courts again; and restored to the *French*, in a short Time, such an Influence in *Spain*, that it is marvellous we, who depend so much upon it, should not yet have found the least Effect from it in our Favour.

I have dwelt on these Observations, in order to shew to what poor Expedients *those Writers* are reduced, who attribute the *present Obstinacy* of the *Spaniards*, to the *beating their Fleet above nine Years ago*. Surely it is strange that the *Cardinal de Fleury* should have been able, in *seven or eight Months Time*, to re-establish a good Correspondence and Friendship between the two Courts of *France* and *Spain*, after so great and so sensible an *Affront* as *Philip* and his *Queen* thought was put upon them by his *Predecessor in the Ministry*; and that *our Ministers* should not be able, in the Course of *as many Years*, to atone for what *their Predecessors* did; nor to pacify the *Resentment* of the *Spaniards* for their *Loss* of the *Fleet* in an *Action*, which they might have avoided; and which they render'd, in some Sort, unavoidable to us. It is impossible to believe that such an *Incident*

dent should Produce these Effects; which seem to *strengthen*, rather than to grow *weaker*, the farther they are removed from this *supposed Cause* of them. There must be something more recent than this *Anger* at a *Loss*, long since sustain'd and *repair'd* too, as I believe. Perhaps we may begin to make some *Discovery* of this kind, when we examine the *next Article*; to which I shall proceed as soon as I have made a few *Reflections* more on this Head, which *Publicola* most prudently suggests to me, and which will be of wonderful Service to his Cause.

*Nor does the Quadruple Alliance* (says he; but he must mean the King of *Spain's* Accession to this *Alliance*) being after the *Promise* (that is, *Lord Stanhope's Promise* or *Overture*, concerning *Gibraltar*) *prove the Spaniards had given up their Expectations founded on that Promise; but only that they were not, at that Time, in proper Circumstances to insist upon it.* I have shewn how silly it is to talk of *Expectations*, without any *Right* to expect; and how the *Right* of the *Spaniards* to *Gibraltar*, acquired by *Lord Stanhope's Promise*, or *Overture*, either *real* or *supposed*, was extinguish'd before the Year 1721. But I agree that if they had then had even a *real Right*, they must have submitted to give it up, as they did at that *Time*, because of the *Circumstances*, into which they were fallen. Let me ask *Mr. Publicola* what reduced them to these *Circumstances*? He must answer, it was *beating their Fleet*. They had been as obstinate *before* that *Time*, as it is possible for them to be *now*. *Alberoni* talk'd at least as high as the *Marquis de la Paz*. But they grew complying as soon as this *Hostility* was committed. Might not the taking their *Galleons* have had the same Effect lately? Would not our *incomparable Ministers*, who *run up and down the World negotiating and making Treaties*, with so much *Credit* to themselves, and so much *Honour* and *Advantage* to the Nation,



have done better (I speak it with due Submission to their approved Wisdom) to imitate, than to blame the Conduct of their *Predecessors*? From 1721, to 1725, we heard of nothing but the *happy and flourishing* State of our Affairs. This must have been owing, according to *Publicola*, to the *Circumstances* the *Spaniards* were in; and therefore this must have been owing to the Defeat which they received in the *Mediterranean*. How came we to hear from the very same Persons, that all our *Difficulties* and the *Distresses* we are in at present, ought to be dated before the Year 1721? Surely, to be in a *flourishing State*, a Nation must be in a *secure State*; and how could that be true, if, during the *four Years* I have mention'd, a powerful Neighbour meditated *Revenge*, and only waited an Opportunity of striking home? How could it be declared, even from the *Throne*, that \* *nothing more than the Forms of a Congress were wanting to establish the publick Tranquility*, if the grand Quarrel between *us* and *Spain* did, in Effect, subsist at that Time?

There are People so very regardless of *Truth*, and so very indifferent to the Shame of being convicted of *Falshood*, that they never consider, when they affirm a Fact, any Thing more than the *present Expediency*. Strange, almost incredible Instances of this might be quoted. I pass them over in Silence for many Reasons; and, amongst others, for this Reason, that some of them are too recent to be forgot. I stick to the Point before me; and shall conclude it by observing that when *Publicola* assigns all the *Difficulties*, which we have labour'd under, since the Year 1725, to what pass'd before the Year 1721, he is confuted not only by the Reasons I have urged, which seem to me unanswerable, but likewise

\* *Vide* the King's Speech at the Opening of the Session, 1721.

wife by an *Authority*, which every Man will allow to be *decisive*.

The next *Article* to be consider'd is this. *Raleigh*, who was not satisfy'd with *Publicola's* Way of accounting for our *present Difficulties*, and for the close Alliance between the Emperor and *Spain*, had ascribed both to our Refusal of the *sole Mediation* at *Cambray*. He is accused of maliciously concealing the Truth, and of imputing that to *ill Management*, *extraordinary Refinement* and *great Tenderness*, which was the *Result of true Reason*. Now I think I can demonstrate that *Publicola* is ignorant of the *Truth*; or that he conceals it, I will not say *corruptly*, but *unfairly*.

That the *Treaty of Vienna* was *actually and in Form sign'd*, before it could be so much as known at *Vienna* that we had refused the *sole Mediation*, I might grant in one *Sense*, and for the sake of Argument; (though I do not believe that the Fact is just as he states it) and yet I might safely deny the same Thing in the *only Sense*, in which this Fact can be of the least Use to our *Author*. I can grant that *this Treaty* might be sign'd in *Form* at *Vienna*, before it could be known there, in *Form*, that we had refused the *sole Mediation*; before the *Couriers* from *Cambray* to *London*, from *London* to *Paris*, from *Paris* to *Madrid*, from *Madrid* to *Vienna* could perform their Journeys, and the several Courts could hold their Councils and make their *Dispatches*. But the *certain Knowledge* of our refusing this *Mediation* might very well arrive at *Vienna* before the *Treaty* was signed; nay, the *Treaty* might be signed upon this Knowledge, by *Virtue* of *Instructions* given with this *Contingency* specify'd in them. I say this might be the Case; and therefore to affirm this Fact; in the Terms *Publicola* affirms, is nothing to the Purpose. What *Raleigh* advanced may still be true.

That full Powers were given by *Spain* to carry on the *Treaty of Vienna* four Months before this Offer of the *Mediation*, is most certainly true; and therefore there is as much Reason to be astonished that early Measures were not taken to prevent it, as there is that other Measures, than what we have seen pursued, were not taken to prevent the Effects of such a *Treaty*. Could it be an absolute Secret to our *Ministers*, (who ought to be well inform'd; since they have had such immense Sums for *secret Service*, as were never heard of before their Time) that *Spain* was negotiating at *Vienna*, during these four Months? Could it be a Secret to them that, from the Death of the Duke of *Orleans*, and about a Year, at least, before this *Treaty* was concluded, the *Spanish Ministers* were full of Fears and Jealousies about the compleating the *Infanta's* Marriage with the King of *France*? If these Things, which were not quite unknown to most private Persons, who observed the Course of publick Events, and who sought Information about them, did not escape the Intelligence of our *Ministers*, how could a Consideration of the Circumstances, which the Court of *Spain* was in at that Period, escape their Sagacity?

From the Time of the Accession of the King of *Spain* to the *Quadruple Alliance*, the whole Management of the Court of *Madrid* had been left to the Duke of *Orleans* and his Cardinal *du Bois*; and if we were drawn into the *Treaty* made at *Madrid* in 1721, by this *Prince* and his *Minister*, as I verily believe we were; it is easy to see *who* was thank'd for this by the *Spaniards*, and how watchful *France* hath constantly been to seize and improve every Occasion of rendring our Title to *Gibraltar* disputable, and of wresting this important Place out of our Hands. We came then into the Congress of *Cambray* joint Mediators with the *French*, between the Emperor and the King of *Spain*, but not with equal Advan-

Advantage; not with an equal Share in the Confidence of *one* of the *other*, perhaps, a little diminish'd; for it is not unlikely that the *private Treaty*, made at *Madrid* with the King of *Spain*, whilst we were Mediators at *Cambray* between him and the Emperor, might give Umbrage at least to the *latter*. I know not whether this Step did not even occasion some Complaint, though not in *Form* perhaps, from the *Imperial Ministers*.

In this State of Things, and in this Disposition of all Parties, what could it be imagined that the *Spaniards* should turn themselves to, on the Foresight of a Rupture of all Intimacy, and even Correspondence with *France*? Could they resolve to leave themselves without *any Ally* with so many *Enemies*, and with their Interests still unadjusted? Could they resolve to run the Risque, in this Condition, of falling back into a State of War, when they were about to purchase Peace at a Price, which they thought so dear? Could they resolve to run the Risque, in this Condition, of falling back into a State of War, when they were about to purchase Peace at a Price, which they thought so dear? Could they resolve to abandon themselves intirely to *Great Britain*, who had hitherto shewn so much Partiality to the Emperor, still their Enemy, and whose principal Intercourse with them had been managed hitherto by *France*, to whom they expected soon to become *Enemies*? Certainly they could not resolve upon this, even as I have stated the Case; much less could they do so, if they had such an inveterate Rancour at Heart, as *Publicola* represents. What then could our *Ministers* imagine the *Spaniards* should do upon a Foresight of the *Infanta's* being sent back, and by Consequence of breaking with *France*? I will venture to say, for it is plain and evident, that if they thought any Thing on this Affair, they must think the very Thing, which the

*Spaniards* did. The *Spaniards* began to treat at *Vienna*, that they might prepare for the worst; and they delayed concluding their *Treaty*, till what they feared happened. Give me Leave to add, that it was easy to see that, whenever the Ministers of *Philip* and the *Imperialists* should come to examine their Master's Interest together, they would soon find these Interests not so hard to reconcile, nor their Want of *Mediators* so great, as they had imagined, whilst Rivalship and Pique kept them at a Distance; and that there were Men of great Weight in the Emperor's Court, whose private Interest must render them particularly zealous to promote this Union. All this happened; and it affords a pregnant Instance of what I said above, that *Reason of State* will determine the Conduct of Princes; not *old* *stale*, *Resentments*.

From what hath been thus stated I desire to make some *Inferences*, and to recommend them to *Publicola's* Consideration.

*First* then. It appears more ridiculous than ever to talk of the *Promise of Gibraltar* and the *Loss of their Fleet* as lying at the Hearts of the *Spaniards* and breaking out upon this Occasion. Neither must it be said absolutely, that our refusing the *sole Mediation* at *Cambray* threw *Spain* into the Arms of the Emperor. In what Respect this Step might contribute to it, will be said presently. But the principal and determining Cause of *Spain's* uniting so closely with the Emperor, was the sending back the *Infanta*.

*Secondly*, However sudden the immediate Resolution for the Departure of this Princess from *France* might be; yet this Design had been long in Agitation; so long, that the Suspicion of it had been entertained by the *Spaniards*, and was even publicly owned by their *Ministers* very many Months before they

they sent their *full Powers* for carrying on a *Treaty* at *Vienna*.

*Thirdly*, There was surely, in the whole Progress of this Affair, Notice enough to alarm any reasonable Men; and Time enough to prepare for the Consequences of a Breach between *France* and *Spain*. During the Life of the Duke of *Orleans*, he had, and it could not well be otherwise, the chief Credit at *Madrid*. But it was obvious enough that, by sending back the *Infanta*, his Successor would furnish us with a fair Opportunity of attempting at least to get between *France* and *Spain*, as *France* had stood between *Spain* and *us*, and of maintaining ourselves in that Post. This indeed was an Object of the utmost Importance; which deserved more than all our Negotiations have cost us; and which it is not impossible might have been accomplished for less. Whenever it shall appear that we took all the Measures, in our Power, in a proper Manner, and at a proper Time, for this great End, infinite Honour will accrue to our *Ministers* without Dispute.

*Fourthly*, If we had been as much prepared, as one would think we might in so many Months have been, we should have had some great Advantages, which, if we were unprepared for these Events, and even surprized at them, it was impossible we should reap.

The *sole Mediation* could not indeed have been sooner offered than it was; because it could not be offered till *Spain* had broke with *France*, and then it was offered to us. Nay, if it had been offered sooner, I agree that we could not have accepted it sooner, for Reasons of *Policy* and even of *Decency*. But if we had been prepared for these Events, we might have struck a great Stroke, as the Generality of the World thought, and continue to think, by accepting the *Mediation* in Form, as soon as it was offered. In the Case supposed of *preparatory Measures*.

*asures* taken by us, on a Foresight of such a *Conjuncture*, it is probable that *Spain* would not have been extravagant enough to precipitate so bad a Bargain as she made for herself in the *Vienna Treaty*. Having no *Mediator* nor even *Ally*, she was under a Necessity of granting almost any Terms to the Emperor, provided she secured the *main Points*, which she had in View. But, sure of our Support, and she might have had Assurances sufficient for her to depend upon, it is impossible to think she would have carried her Concessions farther than she needed to have done. In this Case, none of those *Engagements* (which were talked of, but which have never yet appeared) so injurious to *Britain* could have been taken; and we might have had perhaps the Satisfaction of seeing the Peace of *Europe* consummated by the Reconciliation of *two Princes*; the Adjustment of whose Interests had been so long our Care; and whose Union is, without Doubt, in general, and unless some particular Circumstances of a very extraordinary Nature hinder it, the common Advantage of all those, who desire to see a *Balance* of Power preserved in the western World. But I go farther. I will suppose that we had not been able to soften *Spain*; or that we had not attempted it, which perhaps was the Case; that *Spain* looked on us with a jealous, and even a revengeful Eye; and in short that the *Mediation* was offered to us without any Design that we should concern ourselves in it, and purely for Form sake; yet surely, even in this Case, some Advantage might have been taken by our immediate Acceptance of it. Our Conduct, at least, would have been free from any Objection; and *Spain* and the Emperor would have been left without any Colour of Excuse. Might not such a Step have retarded the Conclusion of this famous *Treaty*? Might not Time have been gained; and

and would not the least Time, in this Case, have been of the greatest Moment to us?

*Fifthly*, When the *Mediation* was offered us, we could not know how soon the *Treaty* would be signed. It cannot be pretended that we did. Our *Refusal* of it therefore must have been grounded purely on these two Considerations, (so often urged in Defence of this Measure) that the *Spaniards* were our *inveterate Enemies*, and that we were in *Alliance* with the *French*. What is meant by being in *Alliance* with the *French*, and making this a Distinction between our Relation to *them* and our Relation to the *Spaniards*, I am at a Loss to find. We were surely in *Alliance* with *one Nation*, as well as the *other*, from the Moment the King of *Spain* acceded to the *Quadruple Alliance*, and the Matters still unsettled at *Cambray* were solely relative to him and to the Emperor. If it be meant that we thought the *French* our Friends, and knew that the *Spaniards* waited only for a pretended Occasion to break out into Enmity with us; I think this Reason will prove the very contrary of what it is advanced to prove. Did we suspect that something contrary to our Interest, something dangerous to us, was working up in the Negotiation of *Vienna*; and did we for this very Reason decline an Opportunity of coming at some Knowledge of what was in Agitation there? Did we, for this very Reason, refuse the *best Means* we could have hoped for, of keeping up our antient Friendship with the *Imperial Court*, and of being in a Condition to check the Court of *Spain*? such Arguments as these will not pass; and whoever produces them hath too mean an Opinion of the rest of Mankind, and too presumptuous an Opinion of his own Sufficiency. On the Part of *France*, no Objection could have been made to us, if we had accepted this *Mediation*; for either the Points to be meditated upon were *pure Trifles*; such as the *Titles*, and other Matters

Matters of as little Weight, referred to the Congress of *Cambray*; in which Case our accepting the *sole Mediation* must have been quite indifferent to the *French*; or these Points were of *Moment to the general Interest*; and in this Case, the *French* ought to have desired that we should continue in the *Mediation*, for the same Reasons, which ought to have determined us to do so. If the Friendship and Confidence between *us* and the *French* was not so strict as it hath been represented, they did not deserve the Compliment we made them. If this Friendship and Confidence were so strict, they might and they would have trusted us with Pleasure. Every one knows how concerned and alarmed the *French* were at the Resentment, which the King of *Spain* shewed on this Occasion. Their first Care was to try all possible Means of pacifying him. If we could have been one of these Means, their Obligations to, and their Confidence in us must have increased. We might have treated for them, when they could not treat for themselves. Instead of this, by Dint of Management, we so disposed Affairs, that the *French* in a short Time treated for *us* with the Emperor and the King of *Spain*, with whom we could not treat for our selves.

The *last Inference* I shall make, from all that hath been said, is this. As sending back the *Infanta*, was the certain and immediate Cause of *throwing Spain into the Arms of the Emperor*; so our Refusal of the *sole Mediation* may justly be deem'd an accessory Cause of it. This *Refusal* might give Occasion to carry the *Engagements* of these *two Princes* farther than it was for our Interest that they should go. At least, our *Acceptance* of it was the *sole, probable Measure*, in that Instant, of preventing such *Engagements*; for this Union of the Emperor and the King of *Spain* is not, in itself, so terrible. *Spain* might be as well, nay better for *us* and for all *Europe*,

in the Arms of the Emperor than of *France*; and if this Union is become *formidable* to us, we may thank for it our *own Management*, through a long Series of Business, and through divers Revolutions of Affairs; our too much Neglect of *Spain*; our too much Dependence on *France*; our being, upon all Occasions, indefatigably busy about the Interests of *other People*, and leaving to other People the Conduct of *our own*; of which surely a more strange Example cannot be imagined than that, which is before our Eyes. We would not attempt, nay we would not consent to be *Mediators*, when we stood in that Character, and could stand in no other, notwithstanding all the Reasons for it in that *nice Conjunction*. Such was our Delicacy. But we have admitted and (may I be allowed to say so?) we have courted *France* to act as *Mediator*, where she is a *Party*; for *France* is a *Party* to the *Treaty of Hanover*; and the *Treaty of Hanover*, with the *Treaty of Vienna*, give Occasion *jointly* to the Congress of *Soissons*, and all the present Negotiations.

That *France* is a *Party* in our Quarrel, we have been often told; and that she would act as such, we have been often assured. She was to make *besieging Gibraltar* a *Casus Fæderis*. She was to march an Army into *Roussillon*. What was she not to do?— But we have seen her act hitherto no Part but that of a *Mediator*; a *common Friend*; but *unconcerned* in the Quarrel. No good Effect hath yet appeared, even from her Offices as *Mediator*. If, by these Offices, she hath kept us *from acting for ourselves*, and made us prefer a *precarious Dependence* to a *vigorous War*, I am sure the Effect of her acting in this Character hath been a *bad one for Britain*.

Nothing can be more plain than that Chain of Causes and Effects, which hath dragged us into our *present Difficulties*; and as these *Difficulties* increased, the *Obstinacy* of *Spain* must of Course increase likewise.

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If *that Court* had never thought of getting *Gibraltar* out of our Hands, the State we brought ourselves into was sufficient to suggest the Design to them. When once *Spain* had purchased the Emperor's Alliance, (I may use this Expression; the *Treaty of Vienna* will justify it) she might flatter herself that he would adhere to her, even in *unreasonable Expectations*; since he had no more to expect from *us*, and had so much to receive from *her*. As soon as we had sagely declined having to do with her, or for her, unless in Concert with *France*, with whom she would have nothing to do at that Time, *France* employed all possible Means to be reconciled to her. Intrigues of every Sort, *ecclesiastical* and *secular*, were set on Foot. They succeeded; and *Spain* saw she had nothing to apprehend. What she had to hope, I determine not, from *this Party* to the *Hanover Treaty*. The *other Princes* and *States*, who acceded to *this Treaty*, acceded in *such a Manner*, as it is easy to prove (if *Publicola* should think fit to deny it) that we could have little to hope and *Spain* little to apprehend from *their Engagements*, in her Disputes with us about our *immediate Interests*.

All *other Powers* soften'd towards each other by Degrees; and by Degrees *We* got deeper into the Quarrel. *Spain*, from having *no Ally*, came to have *many*; some more, some less to be *depended on*; none to be *fear'd*. From having a *Multitude of Disputes*, she came to have *none*, except with *us*. *We*, on the other Hand, from having *none of our Interests in Dispute*, are come to see hardly *any others in Controversy*. From feeling ourselves back'd by *several Allies*, we are come, at least in the *Points of direct Relation* to us, to have in Effect *no Ally but one*; and with that *one* we own that we are *dissatisfy'd*; nay we own that we are *afraid* of him. The *Writer*, I am answering, insinuates both; nay, he does it almost in *express Words*. He complains of the *Indifference*

*difference of France* in support of our Interests; and of the *Danger* of engaging in a *War*, in Concert with *France*. Who would have thought it. Mr. *D'Anvers*? Here is the *London Journal* contradicting the *Enquiry*; and I am able to point out to you many gross Instances of his doing the same Thing. Here is *Publicola* accounting for our *present Difficulties*, now they are come upon us, by the *very Arguments*, which were urged against the *Hanover Treaty*, and which proved that the *natural Consequence* of *that Treaty* was just what the *Event* hath shewn it to be. Those, who wrote against the *Enquiry*, foretold what would happen. *Publicola* justifies the *Ministry*, by complaining that it hath happen'd!

I will mention but one Instance more of this Kind; and that shall be with Relation to the *Ostend Company*. *The grand Quarrel*, says *Publicola*, was between *Us* and *Spain*. *The Ostend Trade*, about which such a *Noise* hath been made, was more the *Concern* of our Neighbours, both by *Treaty* and *Interest*, than our own.—Now I will leave the World to decide by *whom* all this *Noise* about the *Ostend Trade* hath been made. Did not you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, and several other Writers, maintain that *this Company* was of but *little Concern* to us, in Opposition to the whole Party, on the contrary Side, who took all possible Pains, both within Doors and without, to prove that the *Ostend Trade* was a Point of the *utmost Concern* to *Britain*, and even equal to *Gibraltar* itself? Nay the Author of the *Enquiry* (who hath now the Mortification to see himself given up, in every material Article, by *both Parties*; even by *Those*, who set him to work) goes so far, p. 57. of that memorable Performance, as to assert that *Gibraltar* would be of *no Importance* to us, if the *Ostend Company* should be suffer'd to subsist; and having labour'd that Point, with all his Strength, for no less than twenty Pages together, concludes it thus; *that*

that not only our own East and West India Trade, and that of the Dutch, will be ruin'd by the Ostend Company, which will be the immediate Effect of it (or rather is so already in some Degree) but also that the Contagion will spread to many other Branches of the British and Dutch Trade; and convey along with it the Riches, the Strength, and the naval Power to the same Spanish Netherlands.

But were it so that Holland alone would be the Sufferer by the Ostend Trade; (which is far from being the Case;) yet the Ruin of Holland must carry along with it, in the End, the RUIN OF BRITAIN.

Such Absurdities as these would provoke Merriment in a Case of less Consequence; but they provoke Indignation in a Case, where the Honour and Interest of our King and Country are so deeply concern'd.

Into this State were our foreign Affairs brought, when his present Majesty came to the Crown. I mention this the rather, because they, who now think it for their Interest to date the Rise of all this Mischiefe so much backwarder than it can consistently with Truth be dated, may possibly find it for their Interest hereafter, if new and almost unavoidable Difficulties should come upon us, in Consequence of what they have done in a FORMER REIGN, to date the Rise of them as much too forward. Let it then be remember'd that all, which hath happen'd in THIS REIGN, is no more than a Prolongation of the same Scene. The great Scenes of the World are not to be shifted at our Pleasure. They must be continued sometimes, when we are convinced the most that they are weakly framed. Opportunities must be waited for, and we trust they will happen. We are sure they will be improved by the Capacity, the Vigour, the Experience and Valour of our august Monarch. A seasonable and powerful Effort hath often broke through the most complicated Evils.

Evils. A Word hath often effected what the most tedious Negotiations, such as we have been accustom'd to, could never have brought about.

I have now done with Mr. Publicola for this Time; and I hope for good and all. If my Letter is grown into a greater Length than I designed, this hath been owing principally to an earnest Desire of setting these Matters (so often and so grossly misrepresented) in a just and clear Light. I have advanced no Facts, but such as are of a publick Notoriety; such as I know to be true; and such as I do verily believe to be so, upon such Grounds as reasonable Men have always thought sufficient to constitute, in Cases of this Nature, the highest Probability. I have endeavoured to push no Consequence, nor to strain any Argument farther than I have judged it would evidently bear; for whatever Publicola may think, which concerns me little, I assure you, Mr. D'Anvers, that I would not have given myself this Trouble, small as it is, of answering him for any other Reason but this; that, in order to get well out of our present Difficulties and Dangers, it is necessary to know truly how we came into them; and that he therefore, who contributes to dispel from before the Eyes of Mankind those Mists of Error, which are so industriously raised at this Time, does some Service to his King and his Country.

I am, SIR, &c.

JOHN TROT.

REMARKS

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REMARKS on a late Pamphlet, intitled, *Observations on the Conduct of GREAT-BRITAIN, &c. In a Letter to CALEB D'ANVERS, Esq;*

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Written in the Year, 1729.

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THE late Pamphlet, intitled, *Observations on the Conduct of Great-Britain, &c.* being chiefly designed as an Answer to my first Letter on the pretended Project of a TRUCE, it may be thought incumbent on me to justify what I have written; for though this Piece (which consists of nothing but *Inconsistencies, Contradictions, Prevarications, and downright Falshoods*) is already sunk into that Contempt, which it deserves; yet when a *private Person* launches into Politicks, it is his Duty to pay some Regard to an Adversary, who produces the least Marks of Authority, however mean and despicable his Performance may be thought.

The Shortness of Time will, I hope, excuse any little Inaccuracies of Stile, or trivial Mistakes, that I may happen to fall into through the Course of these Remarks, which every Body will perceive required Haste.

I shall pass over all his little Sophistry on the *Freedom of Writing*, as well as his dirty Imputations of *Libelling, Disaffection*, and ill Designs against the *Government* (those trite, worn-out Topicks of every wretched Scribbler against you for above these two Years past) and come directly to the Points, upon which

which the whole Stress of his Arguments, such as they are, depends.

The first Objection, which he undertakes to confute, is the *supposed Inactivity of our Squadrons, and the Depredations committed by the Spaniards upon our Merchants in the West-Indies.*

In order to do this, he hath given us, what he calls the *Instructions* to Admiral *Hosier*, and the other Commanders of our Squadrons in those Parts.

I shall not enquire from *whom* he received these Lights; though it seems very extraordinary that a *little, obscure Pamphleteer* should be favoured with Papers of such a private Nature, as have been sometimes refused, even upon Applications in *Parliament.*

Neither will I offer to dispute whether these Instructions are *genuine* and *authentick*; tho' there are several Things in them, which have a suspicious Aspect. By the *first Orders*, given to Admiral *Hosier*, it looks as if *those*, who sent him, did not understand the Service they sent him upon; for they direct him to block up the *Flota* and *Galleons* in the Port of *Cartagena*; which is indeed a proper Port to look for the *Galleons* in; but the *Flota* was never there, since the *Spaniards* traded to that Country. By the *second Instructions*, they seem to be sensible of their Mistake, by giving him distinct Orders to take Care of the *Flota*; which makes it probable that, at first, they took the *Flota* and *Galleons* to be the *same Fleet*, and did not know that *one* came from *Peru*, and the *other* from *Mexico.*

Neither can I find out the Reason for preferring the *Galleons*, in these *Instructions*, to the *Flota*; for if keeping the *Spanish Treasure* from going home was the Intent of that Expedition, the *Flota* was as material an Attention as the *Galleons*, having as much Money aboard them; and both might have been intercepted, had our Fleet been rightly stationed at first, *viz.* in the Bay of *Matanzas* in the Island of *Cuba,*

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*Cuba*, where they might have stayed much more conveniently than at the *Bastimentos*.

Indeed stopping the *Flota* is made the next Point to stopping the *Galleons*; but considering the Port, from whence it comes, and the Course it steers, it was almost impossible that a Squadron, lying at the *Bastimentos*, should intercept them, or gain any Intelligence of them.

In another Part of these Orders, Admiral *Hofier* is instructed to PERSUADE the Spaniards to let him take them; which I confess looks, at first Sight, somewhat *romantick* and *ridiculous*.

These Particulars, I say, might render the whole liable to Suspicion; but though I could not help taking some Notice of them, I would not be thought to infer from hence the Impossibility of their being *authentick*; for though I have a very bad Opinion of the *Pamphleteer*, I cannot think that he would dare to impose upon the World in a Matter of such Consequence; but since it was thought necessary to give the Publick some Satisfaction in this Affair, I could wish he had favoured us with ALL these Instructions at Length and entire, (for this does not appear to be the Case) that we might have been able to form a true Judgment, upon a View of the *Whole*, which cannot be so well done by *Scraps* and *Extracts*.

However, it appears from these Orders themselves (as he hath thought fit to publish them) that stopping the *Galleons* was to be their chief Care; and that they were not to *risque the Success of it upon any Account*. I will therefore leave it to the Judgment of Mankind, whether any prudent Officer, under such a *strict* and *particular Injunction*, would run the least Hazard of failing in that *main Point*, by endeavouring to protect our *Merchants*. It is certain, at least, that the *Spaniards* did, and do still continue their Outrages with very little Molestation, and

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and without any *considerable Reprisals* made on our Parts. Nay, the Commanders of our Squadrons were so far from giving any Assistance to our Merchants in those Seas, that it is well known the Exigencies of the publick Service obliged them to make such an *Impress* on their Ships (to supply the great Loss and Destruction of the Men, on board our Squadrons) as rendered them unable to perform their Voyages.

His reasoning therefore, on this Head, is reduced to one of these Points; either first, that the *naval Force*, sent to those Parts, was not sufficient to perform such *different Services*; or secondly, that our Admiral and Commanders did apprehend themselves to be *confined* or *embarrassed* by *some Cautions and Limitations*; or thirdly, that they either *neglected*, or did not *understand* their Duty; which would be such a Reflection upon the Skill, Courage and Integrity of those *excellent Officers*, as will not easily pass upon the World.

The *Pamphleteer* hath produced Part of one Letter from Admiral *Hofier*; in which he gives an Account, contrary to the general Opinion here till this Time, that the *Spaniards* had disembarked their Treasure, and sent it back to *Panama*, before he arrived at the *Bastimentos*; upon which this Writer observes, that he could not have taken any Thing but *empty Hulks*; and then seems to think himself very smart in asking, *Whether such a Pledge would have had much Influence on the Counsels of Spain?* To which I reply, first, that this is nothing to the Purpose; because it is plain, that the Admiral had no Power to seize the *Galleons*, in case they had not been unloaded; so that his Arrival could have no other Effect, than that of their own *Advice-Boat*, to make them *secure their Treasure*. Secondly, I do not think it would have been such bad Policy to have taken even the *empty Hulks*, or burnt them in the

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the Port, (so that the *Spaniards* could have made no farther Use of them) and to have sailed immediately to *Vera Cruz*, and seized the Flota, instead of lying so long to watch empty Hulks, till our own Ships became rotten, and almost *empty Hulks* themselves.

I could wish, for the farther Information and Satisfaction of the Publick, that the *Pamphleteer* had found it convenient to give us the Sight of all Admiral *Hofier's* Letters; for no doubt he must have sent several, during his long and disastrous Continuance on that Station; from whence perhaps we might have had some farther Light into this Affair, or collected at least what his Opinion was of the Nature of his *Instructions*, and the Conduct of that *Expedition*. However, it is well known in what manner he expressed himself, upon several Occasions, both at *Jamaica*, and in Letters to his Friends in *England*.

I am ready to subscribe, with the greatest Pleasure and Sincerity, to all the Encomiums, which this Writer makes on Sir *Charles Wager*; whom I know to be a Gentleman of the most amiable Character both in *publick* and *private Life*. I am confident that no Difficulties or Dangers could deter him from doing his Duty; that no Temptations could prevail upon him to betray his Trust; and that he did not want the greatest Skill and Abilities to execute it. I have the same good Opinion of Sir *John Jennings*, and other Commanders, who were sent upon those Services; and when the *Pamphleteer* was in his panegyric Strain, I could wish that he had done Justice to their Characters; and likewise paid some small Tribute of Gratitude to the Memory of those *brave Officers*, who had the Misfortune to perish (I was going to say, were sacrificed) in the Service of their Country.—But they

they are dead, and have it not now in their Power to *justify themselves*, or to *accuse others*.

But to return——I do not find by the Orders given to Sir *Charles Wager*, the 22d of *December* 1726, that he was empowered to intercept any Ships with *Stores*, *Ammunition*, or *Provisions*, bound for the *Spanish Camp*, then in Sight of *Gibraltar*, in order to besiege it; nor instructed, even by the soft Endeavours of *Persuasion*, or otherwise, to get them or their Cargo into his Possession, to disable them from beginning Hostilities; notwithstanding the same Orders directed him to reinforce the Garrison of *Gibraltar*, which was then going to be besieged, by sending the *Land-forces* then on board Admiral *Hopson's Squadron*, and, in case of Need, to give all the Relief and Assistance he was able to the said Garrison; though I have been credibly informed, the *Spaniards* were permitted to pass by our Squadron, even under the Stern of the Admiral, and safely landed *Stores*, *Provision*, *Ammunition* and other Necessaries for the Siege of that Place.

If this be true, as I am assured it is, I should be glad to know for what Reason his Instructions ran in that soft Strain; or why so much Complaisance was shewn to the *Spaniards*, upon the Occasion of such an undisguised Design against that important Fortrefs. I am the more desirous to know this, because I am sure it could not proceed from any want of Vigilance or Zeal in that *brave* and *excellent Officer*, who is a Man of too established a Character to suffer in any Body's Opinion, by the oblique and ungenerous Insinuation of this Writer, after all his Compliments, that he was not attended with his former good Fortune.

The *Pamphleteer*, having thus refuted the Objections against the *supposed Inactivity* of our Squadrons, by producing some Parts of the *Instructions* to the Commanders of them; and shewn, as he tells us,

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that the Losses of our Merchants have not been owing to any Want of that Care, which the Government ought always to take for the Protection of our Trade; he proceeds, in the next Place, to give us some Account of those Captures, which he says are not near so considerable as they have been represented; and having prefaced this Part likewise with a great many angry Reflections, he produces a List of twenty-six Ships, which he would have us believe to be ALL, that we have really lost.—His Address in cooking up this Account is very remarkable.

1. We are told this is an exact List of all such Ships as have been taken by the Spaniards in the West-Indies, since the Conclusion of the Treaty of Hanover. But why should he confine it thus to Place and Time? I mentioned, indeed, only three Years past, by Reason of the frequency of the Captures during that Time; but if I had undertaken to give the Publick an Account of all our Losses, I should certainly have begun my Account a great deal farther back; much less should I have limited it to the West-Indies; since I presume that Ships taken in the Ocean and other Seas, are as much Losses to our Merchants, as those taken in America, and that they have the same Right to expect Reparation for them.

2. This is a List of such Captures only, as have been, at any time, conveyed to the Knowledge of the Government, either by the immediate Complaints of the Merchants concerned in those Captures; their Representations to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations; or the Accounts transmitted by his Majesty's Ministers and Consuls abroad, which is what I suppose he means by the most authentick Testimonies. But is it to be inferred from hence, as he seems to do, that no more Losses have been sustained than what have been thus formally complained of? I grant, indeed, that no Merchant can expect Reparation, who

who does not give in the Particulars of his Losses; but it is well known that many of these Sufferers did not do this; which might proceed from different Causes. Several Merchants, who reside in our Plantations and Settlements abroad, might not have Opportunity to transmit the Particulars of their Losses, and authorize their Agents to make a regular Complaint; for, if I am not misinformed, some Complaints were actually brought in, after the Account was closed, and therefore not inserted in it. Others might neglect to do it, by despairing of Success; and thinking, perhaps, that the Prospect of Reparation would not answer the Trouble of complaining.

The Publick, I believe, will soon see a true Account of our Losses, by the Depredations of the Spaniards, both in the West-Indies and in other Seas, from a proper Period of Time; which will more fully shew the fallacy of this partial List, which ought to be resenting with the utmost Indignation, as an Insult on the Misfortunes and Calamities of the British Merchants.

I am told that the Pamphleteer had a Design to oblige us likewise, in this Piece, with a Counter-List of those Ships, which we have taken from the Spaniards, during the late Disturbances; and that this was actually printed, but afterwards cancelled and suppressed. I am sorry to hear that any Motives could induce so impartial a Writer to rob us of this Catalogue, which was not only very proper, but would no doubt give great Satisfaction to the Publick.

The only Objection, says the Pamphleteer, that remains to be answer'd upon this Point of the Spanish Depredations, is with Regard to Letters of Marque and Reprisal; by which the Traders might have been authorized to make themselves Reparation. He acknowledges that the Merchants, in the Situation we were

then in, with Regard to Spain, had a Right, both by our own Law and that of Nations, to demand such Letters. He then proceeds to justify the Ministry (which I hope wants no Justification) by shewing that such Letters were not refused. Those are his Words. But how does he shew it? Why, he gives us two Instances of Owners of Ships, who did apply for them, upon an Order publish'd in the Gazette, and were actually refused; and does not produce one Instance of any Man whatsoever, to whom they were granted.

He tells us indeed, by Way of Apology for this Refusal, that the preliminary Treaty having been for some Time negotiating at Paris, his late Majesty thought proper to defer issuing these Commissions, till he should see the Success of that Negotiation. He adds that the preliminary Articles were sign'd at Paris, the 20th of May, and that Draughts of Instructions to the Lords of the Admiralty, for granting Letters of Marque, were sign'd by his late Majesty after the 21st of April. As therefore the preliminary Treaty had been some Time negotiating at Paris, the Question is whether it was not actually negotiating at the Time, when this Order was publish'd in the Gazette; and if it was, why was the Order publish'd at all? since it could only tend to putting the Merchants upon equipping Ships for this Service (as I am told several did at Bristol) to no purpose, and at a great Expence.

This therefore is such a Justification of the Ministry, as I am sure you, Mr. D'Anvers would be afraid to publish.

He proceeds, in the last Place, to expose the Clamour, that hath been raised against the Negotiations at Soissons, and the Project of Accommodation, which hath caused so much Disquiet.

I confess it gives me some Pleasure to find that I was right in my Conjecture, that if any such Project was really in Agitation, it would not bear the Name

Name of a Truce; for lo! it is not call'd a Truce; it is a provisional Treaty; though, for my Part, I am not able to discover any Difference between them, unless it be in the Sound; for a provisional Treaty does not seem to imply, any more than a Truce, a final Determination of all the Differences, which is so much wanted, but only a Suspension of them for a Time.

The preliminary Treaty was, properly speaking, a provisional Treaty, as it was to provide for something farther at the Congress; but that the Negotiations at this Assembly should end in a provisional Treaty only, is not what we had Reason to expect from the Assurances so often given us.

I cannot forbear observing, in this Place, the various Denominations, under which this Treaty hath pass'd. At first, we were promised a full, formal and establish'd Peace; but soon after the Conclusion of the last Session, it was call'd, in the foreign Prints, a Pacification; and after that an Idea of a Pacification; then it was a Truce, and bore that Name in all Papers, foreign and domestick, for several Months together; at last, according to this Writer, it is neither a Peace, nor a Pacification, nor an Idea of a Pacification, nor a Truce, but a provisional Treaty.

Well! if a Peace could not be obtain'd, and a Truce would not go down; e'en let it be a provisional Treaty; or what else they please. I scorn to insist upon Names with these Gentlemen; but will examine the Treaty itself, as it is given us by the Pamphleteer.

It is somewhat strange that a Writer, who takes upon himself such an Air of Authority, should condescend to borrow his Materials from the Post-Boy; and more strange, that he should charge me with affecting to call this Treaty a Truce; when he cannot be ignorant that the Post-Boy, from which he quotes the Articles, as well as the Dutch Prints,

from whence the *Post-Boy* translated them, and *all Papers*, for at least two Months before I wrote my *first Letter*, call'd it constantly by *that Name*.

When I first undertook this Examination of the pretended Project of a *Truce*, I treated it as *chimerical*, or the *Invention of ill designing Men*, and argued from the *Defects of the Articles*, that I could not believe them to be *genuine*. What therefore could induce *this Writer* to affirm, *that we have not so much as pretended to shew that this Project is deficient, in not providing for all those Points, that have been the Subject of the late Disputes between Great-Britain and foreign Powers*; when the whole Tenor of *that Letter* was to prove the *Defects* of it, by a very circumstantial Induction of Particulars?—But in this he not only advances a *Falshood*, but contradicts himself, as such Writers are apt to do; for in the very Page before this Assertion, *that we have not so much as pretended to shew that this Project is deficient*, he tells us, *that he shall make some Observations on the OBJECTIONS, which these Writers have made to it.*

Neither can it surely be forgot, that the Author of the *British Journal* represented *this Project*, and these *very Articles*, in the same Manner, as *chimerical*, and charged me with trumping them up, *in order to asperse the Ministers with odious Designs*. He called them besides *unintelligible Projects, dark Things* and *ill meant Reports, which bear no Sign of Credibility, and do not deserve the Name of Intelligence*; so that when *these Articles* had been given up, in this Manner, by a *Writer* (who, I was informed, had Access to a *Person in Authority*) it would have been ridiculous to enter into a farther Detail of the *Defects* of them.—But now (according to the usual *Inconsistency* of these Men, and their *desultory Method of Reasoning*) we are to unbelieve every Thing, which we were taught to believe about *six Weeks ago*.

ago. These *unintelligible Projects*, which it was *Faction* at that Time even to mention, are now acknowledged to be really *genuine*; the whole Success of our Negotiations is put upon them; and they are made the Basis of our *future Settlement*.—Some farther Observations therefore are now become seasonable and requisite.

He tells us that, by *this Treaty*, we obtain the *plainest and most direct Acknowledgment and Confirmation of our Right to all our Possessions, and to all our Privileges in Trade*; even those, which had been disputed, *in Opposition to preceding Treaties*. But in what Manner is this *Acknowledgment and Confirmation* obtained? The *Pamphleteer* proves it thus. By *the second Article, the Treaties of Utrecht, Rastad and Baden, the Treaty of the Hague in 1717, together with the Quadruple Alliance, and ALL the Treaties and Conventions, antecedent to 1725, the preliminary Articles, and the Convention signed at the Pardo, are made the Basis and Foundation of the present Treaty*; and being expressly confirmed by it, without any Restriction of Time, whatever hath been stipulated in our Favour, in any of those *Treaties and Conventions*, receives a new and perpetual Sanction by this.—Upon which I observe.

1. That I cannot comprehend how a *temporary Treaty*, which I take a *provisional Treaty* to be, can give a *perpetual Sanction* to any Thing.

2. Can a *Treaty* be properly called *perpetual* (though not expressly limited to any Time) or be said to give a *perpetual Sanction*, which does not finally adjust one Point in Dispute, but leaves them to the Determination of *Commissioners*, and consequently subject to future Debates?

3. Supposing this Treaty leaves us upon the Foot of former *Treaties*; is it not well known that the Sense of *some of those Treaties* hath been disputed; and

and may they not be disputed again, and occasion the same Disturbances?

I will instance only in the Case of *Gibraltar*. As the *second Article* of *this Treaty* is to the very same Effect as the *second Article* of the *preliminary Treaty*; (both of which relate to our *Possessions in general*; for *Gibraltar* is not particularly mentioned in either) I cannot see how we are better secured against the Pretensions of *Spain to this Place*, than we were by the *preliminary Articles*; and is it not notorious that the *Spaniards* have insisted, and do yet insist, that their Pretensions, founded upon a *Promise* under the Hand of his late Majesty, in the Year 1721, are confirmed by the said *Preliminaries*? As they insist therefore to have this *pretended Promise* cleared and adjusted in the Congress in *their Favour*; so, as we maintain, on the other hand, that *these Pretensions to Gibraltar*, however founded, are given up by this *second Article*, it is equally incumbent upon us to insist that the *Preliminaries* should be so explained in *our Favour*, as to exclude all Doubts and Questions upon them for the future; for as this is the most important Point with Relation to *Great-Britain*, it is reasonable that it should be secured to us, in this Treaty, by a particular Article to explain it; as some other Things of less Consequence have been, which seem to require no Explanation, and are as fully and clearly provided for, in the *second Article* of this Treaty.

It must be farther observed, says the Pamphleteer, that by this Article, and by the third and fifth, we are effectually secured from all the dangerous Engagements, contained in the publick and private Treaties of Vienna. — Those dangerous Engagements were, as he tells us,

1. That the trading Subjects of the Emperor should be treated in the Dominions of Spain MORE FAVOURABLY than those of Great-Britain. But this appears

pears to be false from the *Treaty* itself, which mentions only that they should be treated as the *most favoured Nations*, which *other Treaties* provide for us, who are to be always looked upon as *Gens amicissima*; and consequently whatever Privileges the *Emperor*, or any other Prince, may obtain for their Subjects, from his *Catholick Majesty*, must be conceded to us, at the same Time, by Virtue of those former Treaties. But how are we now secured from the dangerous Engagements of the *Vienna Treaty*, unless by a Declaration of his *Catholick Majesty*, that he never understood to grant, by the said Treaty of *Vienna*, any Privilege contrary to the Treaties confirmed with us, nor to give to the Subjects of his *Imperial Majesty* any greater Advantages than those, enjoyed by any other Nations? This is no more than what both the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* have from the Beginning declared. Yet as this hath been a laboured Point, and strenuously asserted by us, as well in Parliament as elsewhere, and made the Basis of the *Hanover Treaty*, as of the utmost Importance to this Kingdom; a *Declaration* only, in this Case, can be of no more Force and Virtue than it hath hitherto been, whilst the *Vienna Treaty* subsists in every Part, as much as it did the first Day it was made.

2. That the Emperor, in case his good Offices were ineffectual, would assist his Catholic Majesty to recover Gibraltar by Force. — This likewise does not appear by the Treaty; nor did his *Imperial Majesty*, as far as I ever heard, give the *Spaniards* the least Assistance, when they actually besieged that Fortrefs.

3. That Spain would by Arms assist the Emperor in carrying on the Ostend Trade, which is to be suspended by this Treaty. It must be own'd indeed, that the *Dutch* are extremely happy, if this *Provision* content them, in having such Advocates, or rather

ther Champions, to support their Quarrels; whilst our Fleets and Armies, at the Expence of our Treasure, and the Lives of so many brave Men, have procured them these Concessions, and they remain unactive in all Parts, reaping the Benefit of our Quarrels, and driving on the Trade of the whole World; and are at the same Time courted, to say no more, to espouse their own Interest.

And here it must be repeated, that though it has been disputed whether the *Ostend* Charter is an Infraction of former Treaties; yet since it is made a *Point*, and insisted upon to be prejudicial to our Commerce, and we are bound by Treaties to support the *Dutch* in these *Pretensions*; it might seem perhaps absolutely necessary to have this Affair finally adjusted, so as never to break out again; or at least to be revived in any short Time; by which *Europe* may be engaged in the like Quarrel; in which *England* must bear the greatest Part, if she is not made the *only Principal*; and therefore it is not so absurd to expect that the Emperor should put an End to this Dispute by *revoking his Charter*.

But it is pretty extraordinary that, considering the great Interest we have in this Affair, (as it is affirm'd) and the *Point* we have made of it, there should be no Notice taken of *us*, in the Article, which provides for its Suspension, nor so much as a Compliment made to *us* for our generous Interposition.

4. *And lastly*, (pray observe him!) *our Apprehensions were, that there might be Engagements in Favour of the Pretender*.—Alas! how do the *Observations* fall short of that Spirit, which appear'd in the *Enquiry*? There we see the Author rousing up the Nation to a just Resentment of those *dangerous Engagements in Favour of the Pretender*. We see him affirming, with the greatest Confidence, that soon after the Publication of the *Vienna* Treaties of Peace and

and Commerce, they had *positive Intelligence, and Intelligence from more than one Person, and such as could be intirely depended on, that one express Article of this Alliance between the Emperor and Spain contain'd an Obligation in Favour of the Pretender*. We have not his Authority for it only, but the Assurance of a certain Gentleman in Parliament, that he *knew*, and was *absolutely convinced* of the Truth of this. We had the *Addresses* of the whole Kingdom justly inflamed on this Occasion. We had his Excellency Mr. *Isaac Lebeup's* vigorous Remonstrances at the Diet of *Ratisbon*, in the very Teeth of the Emperor, concurring in and affirming the same Charge. Nay, we had still much greater Authority, even Authority from the *Throne*; for, did not his late Majesty declare that \* he had *certain and undoubted Intelligence* that it was resolved to attempt an *Invasion* of these Kingdoms, in Consequence of a *secret Article* to this Purpose? And, was not the *Imperial Minister* ordered to depart the Kingdom, in a very abrupt Manner, for denying any such *Engagement or Design* in his Master's Name? And after all these repeated *Assurances*, after all these extraordinary Steps, are we fallen so low as to acknowledge that we had *Apprehensions only that there might be such Engagements*?—If this *Scribbler* takes upon him to advance Facts of less Consequence, he may depart from them (as he generally does, when *Expedients* are wanting) without hurting any Body; but in Affairs of this high Nature, he ought not to meddle, let who will be his Instructor, without good Grounds and sufficient Authority.

For my Part, I was always willing to believe (for the Honour of his *late Majesty* and the *British Nation*, as well as out of Regard to *Those*, who drew, or advised, or approved *that Speech*) that we had something more than *bare Apprehensions* to justify

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\* Vide his Speech at the Opening of the Session in 1727.



us in such *Declarations* and *extraordinary Proceedings*; for the *Honour of the Crown* is a Thing of a very sacred Nature, and ought not to be trifled with on any Occasion, or made an Instrument to serve *ministerial Purposes*.

King *James* the first observes very justly (in a *Speech* to his Parliament, in the first Year of his Reign; which is, perhaps, the *best* he ever made) that *Speeches from the Throne* should be plain and sincere. By Sincerity, says he, I mean that Uprightness and Honesty, which ought to be in a King's whole *Speeches and Actions*; that as far as a King is, in Honour, above his Subjects, so far should he strive, in Sincerity, to be above them all; and that his Tongue should be the true *Messenger of his Heart*.

Yet *this King*, at the latter End of his Reign, was drawn in by *Buckingham* to make a false Representation of the *Spanish* Affair to his Parliament: which had its Effect so far, as to make *Buckingham* a little popular for the present, at his Majesty's Expence; but as soon as the People found themselves imposed upon, they gave no Credit to the *Affertions* and *Affurances* of this lying Minister any more.

Nay, we have a much later and more remarkable Instance of the Effect of any supposed Endeavours to prostitute the *Honour of the Crown*; for it cannot be forgot that a certain Gentleman thought fit to make it an *Article of Impeachment* against the late Earl of *Oxford*, that he had corrupted the sacred Fountain of Truth, and put *Falshoods* into the Mouth of Majesty, in order to obtain the Sanction of Parliament to his traiterous Proceedings.

I hope this Digression, upon so important a Point, will not be thought unseasonable. But I now return to the *provisional Treaty*.

If it is really true, that the Emperor and the King of *Spain* did enter into all, or any of these dangerous Engagements, I could wish to see them formally

formally renounced and annihilated; for I still think that a solemn Cassation of the *Treaties of Vienna* would secure these our most important Interests more effectually than is done by the fore-mentioned Articles, that leave them upon the precarious Foot of former *Treaties*, which we have already found ineffectual to these Ends.

For, when different Interpretations have been put upon the same *Treaties* by different Powers; when Objections have been started on both Sides; when contrary Claims and Pretensions have been made, and embroiled *Europe* for several Years; what other effectual Method can be used to secure us against the like Disputes and Disturbances for the future, than finally to adjust the Sense of such *Treaties*, and confirm the respective Rights, Privileges and Possessions of the Powers concerned, in the plainest, most direct and explicate Manner?

And if the Powers, with whom we are concerned, do really understand these *Articles* in the same Sense, which the Pamphleteer hath put upon them, why should they refuse to make us easy by a particular Explanation? Or, if they do actually refuse this, is there any Room to doubt, that they have some Reasons for preferring dark and ambiguous Terms?

But it may be objected, says the Pamphleteer, that I have mispent my Time and Labour, in endeavouring to silence the Clamours, which have been raised against that particular Form of a Peace, which hath been the Object of our late Negotiations, since it does not appear that the King of *Spain* is disposed to accept even of these Terms. Why truly that is a very material Objection, and may arise perhaps from a determined Resolution of his *Catholick Majesty* not to come to any Terms with us, after what hath passed, without obtaining his favourite Ends.

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He tells us indeed but two Lines before, in his usual self-contradicting Stile, *that none of the Powers concern'd have hitherto given just Cause to conclude that they will reject it.* Now, methinks, where there is an *apparent Disposition not to accept it*, there is *some Cause to conclude that they will reject it*; but whatever Reasons there may be against it *abroad*, I am sure there are many at *home*.

It is, at best, by his own Confession, only a *Plan* or a *Project*, which is not yet accepted. But let us suppose it accepted, for Argument sake. Nay, let us go farther, and, for Argument sake likewise, suppose it to be a *good one*; the Question will still return, whether we have taken the *shortest*, the *least dangerous*, or the *least expensiv*e Methods to accomplish it. But to glory in *Measures*, which have not *succeeded*, whether commendable or not, and have only a *bare Probability of Success*, is certainly very extraordinary.

Lastly, let us examine this Affair with respect to the Time we have been about it. The *Pamphleteer* indeed says, and seems to triumph upon it, that this Progress *towards the Establishment of a general Peace hath been made in a few Months, after the Opening of the Congress.* But how much *Time*, as well as *Money*, did we spend in *Expeditions, Embassies, Negotiations, Preliminaries and Ratifications*, before the *Congress was open'd*? Nay, though we date the present Disturbances but *three Years* back, it is certain that we have not been in a State of *perfect Amity*, and *free Commerce* with *Spain* for above these *seven Years* past; but by the great Sagacity and Penetration of *certain Gentlemen* (to say nothing of *secret Service-Money*) we have at last, according to *this Writer*, some Hopes of being, one Time or another, in almost as good a Condition as we were in, before our Affairs were thus embroil'd.

This

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This puts me in mind of Sir *Epicure Mammon*, in the *Alchymist*; who, when he had spent his *whole Estate* in search of the *Philosopher's Stone*, was comforted after all his *Cost*, though disappointed of his *main End*, with the Hopes of getting a *little something to cure the Itch*.

He tells us, at the Conclusion, *that this Nation never acted a Part more suitable to its Dignity and Character*; and that *to the Firmness and Fidelity of our Allies*, and to *these Measures we owe our present Tranquility*. I shall say nothing of that *glorious Part*, which we have been lately acting; nor of the *Firmness and Fidelity* of our *Allies*. I neither know what they engaged to do, nor what they have *actually done for us*. But to boast of the *present Tranquility*, when we are at best only in a State of *political Purgatory* between *Peace* and *War*; when our *Ships* are every Week taken, as in Time of *War*; when we are at all the *Expences*, and under almost all the *Inconveniences* of a *War*; to talk and boast of *Tranquility*, I say, at such a Time, must either be an egregious Banter on the *Ministry*, or an Insult on the *Nation*; and let the *Pamphleteer* take his Choice.

I have but one Thing more to mention, before I conclude; which is, that the Author of this wretched Pamphlet hath the Insolence to make the *regal Character* subservient to his Designs. Whatever *Measures*, or whatever *Conduct* he finds it necessary to approve, are the *King's Measures*, and the *King's Conduct*. This is a mean Artifice, which hath been constantly practiced of late by these Men, when other Arguments are wanting. But I hope it will put a Stop to your Enquiries; for every *Englishman* hath a Right, by our Laws, to judge and debate these Affairs; and I am sure *his Majesty* will abhor the Thoughts of abridging this Liberty, though *weak and wicked Men* endeavour  
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to screen themselves under the Protection of his  
*sacred Name.*

*I am, SIR, &c.*

W. RALEIGH.

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*An ANSWER to the Defence of the Enquiry into the  
Reasons of the Conduct of GREAT BRITAIN,  
&c. In a Letter to CALEB D'ANVERS, Esq;*

SIR,

AS soon as I heard that the Author of the \* *En-  
quiry* had condescended to take Notice of a LET-  
TER, which you thought fit to publish in your  
*Journal* of the 4th of *January* last, I resolv'd to  
make my Acknowledgments to him for so great an  
Honour, and to desire you to convey them into the  
World. This Duty should have been discharged  
immediately, if I had not been diverted from it by  
Avocations of a very different Nature; and if I had  
not observed, on a Review of the present Dispositi-  
ons,

\* The following was the Motto to this Answer to the  
*Defence, &c. viz. Nor can we conceive a more abject Ser-  
vility of Conduct, than for a People, so long famed for  
Commerce and Bravery, to see their darling Good, and  
their peculiar Glory, the Pledge of their Liberty, and Life  
of all their Property, just going to be forcibly and unrighteous-  
ly torn from them; and tamely to look on without one Strug-  
gle for so great a Blessing, or one hearty Effort against the  
Invaders of it. What can we become, if we give our Con-  
sent to such Ruin by our own supine Indolence and Insensi-  
bility; and suffer ourselves to be stript of our boasted  
Strength and Ornament at once; but a Nation, the most  
despicable of all Nations under Heaven; exposed to the  
Contempt and Insults of the World about us here below,  
and render'd utterly unworthy, by our own Conduct, of the  
Care of Providence above us?* ENQUIRY, Page 86.

ons, that there was no Reason in force to make a  
very speedy Reply necessary. What I am going to  
say now will, I think, justify me for what I have  
said already, in the Opinion of Mankind; and at  
least in the secret Thoughts even of the *Author* and  
*Defender* of the *Enquiry*; and as this Effect of the  
little additional Trouble I am about to give myself  
is the principal, nay, the sole good one, which I  
dare expect, we are in Time for that, and by Con-  
sequence I shall not lose my Labour by my Delay.

This *Author* hath thrown several Matters in my  
Way, to which it is proper I should say something  
before I enter into that, which is strictly the Sub-  
ject of our present Dispute.

He declares upon this Occasion, with all possible  
*Seriousness*, that ' he hath not writ, or dictated, or  
' advanced; or, directly or indirectly, had the least  
' Part in the writing or publishing any *Paper*,  
' which hath appear'd in the World, in any Form,  
' from the Time of writing the *Enquiry*, and from  
' some Time before that, to the 20th of *January*  
' 1728-9. He makes this Declaration, and for that  
' Space of Time, particularly with a View to *Pa-  
pers* printed in the *London Journal*; in all which  
' he hath been utterly unconcern'd either directly or  
' indirectly.'

Far be it from me to question the Truth of so  
solemn a Declaration. I give entire Credit to it;  
and I freely own that he hath Reason to complain of  
*Me* for insinuating, at least, that he had a Hand in  
the *London Journals*. The little Share I have had in  
the *Paper War* hath not given me many Opportu-  
nities of knowing the *Combatants*; and the Produ-  
ctions, on one Side, gave me little Curiosity to en-  
quire after the Authors of them. But I found it  
universally affirm'd, and no where contradicted,  
that this Gentleman had a Hand in the *Weekly Papers*  
just mention'd. The Persons, who recommended  
*these*

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*these Papers*, countenanced the Opinion; and were glad, perhaps, that so *considerable a Name* should give them an *Authority*, which might supply whatever else they wanted. Nay, I found amongst those who were acquainted with *this Author*, and who profess a particular Regard for him, some, who were *angry* at him on this very Account; some, who were *sorry* for him; but none, who doubted the Truth of the Fact. What may have given Occasion to so general a Concurrence, he can best tell. I urge these Circumstances only to shew, how I was led into an Error. It was indeed *Error*, not *Malice*. But still I think myself obliged to take this Occasion of asking his Pardon; and I do it *with all possible Seriousness*, as he made his *Declaration*, and from the Bottom of my Heart; because I am as much convinced, that he neither *abetted, encouraged, nor paid* the Authors of *these Papers*, as I am that he was not himself the *Author* of them.

It cannot be imputed to me, that I have any Thing to answer for, on Account of the *personal Severities*, which *this Author*, in a very pathetick Manner, complains of. We must acknowledge, and we ought to lament, that our *publick Papers* have abounded in *Scurrility*. One would be tempted to imagine, that the *Saturnalia*, were held all the Year round in *Britain*; for those, who can do nothing but *rail*, have had their Encouragements to *write*; and I am persuaded that *this Gentleman's* Candour will oblige him to confess, that nothing but a thorough *Contempt* hinders Complaints from being made against the Writers of his *own Side*, much better grounded and supported by much stronger Instances, than he can produce against the Writers of the *opposite Side*, in his *own*, or in any *other Case*. For my Part, I should be extremely sorry to have it said of me, with Truth, that I had *rail'd* at any Author, instead of answering, or even in

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in answering his Book; and less than any would I be guilty of this Crime, for such it is, towards *one*, who defends, with so much Uniformity of Conduct, the *Liberty of the Press*, that *Corner-Stone* of *publick Liberty*. He, who will support *what hurts himself*, because he thinks it the *Support of the whole Liberty we enjoy*, shall meet with nothing from me, but that, which he deserves from all Mankind, the utmost Respect, whenever he leaves me the Power of shewing it, consistently with the Regard I owe to *Truth* and to my own *necessary Defence*.

He will not, I hope, think it inconsistent with this Respect for his *Person*, or with that, which I have for *some of his Writings*, if I cannot bring myself up to have the same for his *Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain*; or for his *Defence of this Enquiry*. He appears to have a paternal Fondness for the *first* of these Treatises, which amounts even to a *Partiality*; the more surprizing, because it is found in *one*, who can boast so *numerous* and so *fair* an *Offspring*. I should not have attempted to draw him out of an Error, which he seems to indulge with so great a Satisfaction, if he had not made it necessary for me. Since he hath done so, I will offer some Observations on the *Enquiry* itself, before I come to the *Defence*.

The Circumstance, upon which he seems to triumph a little, (that the *Enquiry* was not *answer'd*) he will permit me to say is often a very equivocal Proof of the *Merit* of a Book. The same *Mouths*, it seems, *which pronounced the Enquiry to be a mean and despicable Performance*, have more than once *express'd in Print their earnest Desire that some able Hand would answer it*. From what Mouths he took this, I know not. But surely the Testimony of those, who desired some *able Hand* would answer what they judg'd to be *mean and despicable*, is an odd  
Testimony

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Testimony for him to quote; since it could proceed from nothing but a Design to *ridicule* him.

Though the *Enquiry* was not answer'd in *Form*, yet I believe that several, perhaps all the Points, on which his System lean'd, were occasionally examin'd, and sufficiently refuted by you, Mr. D'ANVERS, and by others. If no more was done, I take the Reason to have been plainly this. The ministerial Air of *Authority* and *Information*, assumed in it, made even those, on whom this Air did not impose, judge that it was prudent to wait till *Time* and *Events* should open the Scene a little more; and as the Scene open'd, they perceived that the *Enquiry* was daily answer'd, in the most effectual Manner, to their Hands; so that the Author might have waited all his Life, perhaps, for *something more of this Sort*, if he had not thought fit to seize an Opportunity of *defending* it, not more worthy his Notice, than several others before given him; and if my Respect for him, and my Desire to stand fair in his Opinion, had not determin'd me to make him a *Reply*.

As to the *Effect* of the *Enquiry*, which he thinks so considerable, that it *awaken'd Multitudes out of a dull and languid State into Life and Vigour*; and that it was not found to *procure Slumbers either to those, who liked it, or to those, who disliked it*; I, who was most certainly one of those, who either *liked* or *disliked* it, can affirm with the greatest Truth, that it did not *procure me Slumbers*, it did not *keep me awake*. Some of the *Facts*, advanced in it, were strange and surprizing; but then they were destitute of any *Proof*, except the strong Affirmations of the *Author*, and Collections of *Circumstances* so extremely *trivial*, that they became *burlesque*, as soon as they were seriously apply'd. A bare Exposition of any real Danger from the *Pretender* would have *waked Multitudes into Life and Vigour*, though the *Enquiry* had never

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never been written. But I apprehend that so many Pages spent on *Wharton's Rambles*, *Ripperda's Chit-chat*, Hear-says of what *one great Man* writ concerning what *another great Man* said, *three Muscovite Ships* coming to *Spain*, *Embarkations*, which were never made, and *Armies*, which were never assembled, could have no other Effect, than to compose Multitudes into *perfect Tranquility*, and to confirm the Opinion of their *Security on this Head*. Any Surmises of an Engagement, on the *Emperor's* Part, to assist *Spain* in the Recovery of *Gibraltar* by Force, could provoke no Indignation (whatever else it might provoke) nor cause any Alarm. We knew *Gibraltar* to be impregnable to the *Spaniards*, before *Ripperda* declared it to be so; and what Assistance the *Emperer* could give them towards reducing this Place, unless he had in his Service some of Mr. *WALLER's winged Troops* and *Pegasean Horse*, we were not able to discover. As to the *Emperor's* real Engagement in *this Article* towards *Spain*, and as to the Engagements of *Spain* towards the *Emperor*, on the *Article* of trading to the *West-Indies*, we soon knew what they were; and with this Knowledge our Alarm ceased. What was said in the long *Dissertations*, about the *Ostend Company*, caused likewise little or no Emotion in us. Our Interest was plainly not that of *Principals*, till the *Dutch* had the Address to make us so, by their Accession to the *Treaty of Hanover*; and the Conduct of our own Court, who beheld, with so much *Indifference*, the Rise and Progress of *this Company*, had taught us to be *indifferent* about it. These Considerations and many others, which I omit, hinder'd the *Enquiry* from having the *Effect*, which *this Gentleman's* paternal Fondness makes him believe it had. The Part, if I may have to say so, was *over-acted*. But still I see no Reason that he has to be concern'd, because one Way or other the *End* of writing it was an-



answered. The *Enquiry* was the *Book of a Day*, like some little Animals on the Banks of the River *Hypanis*, which came to Life in the Morning, fulfilled all the Ends of their Creation, and died before Night.

There is a Point, on which the Author and Defender of the *Enquiry* values himself and his Book very much; I mean the strict Regard to *Truth*, which he assures us he observed in writing. Now though I am ready to agree that this Author has always a great Regard to *Truth*, yet I affirm that I could write a Book as big as the *Enquiry*, filled with nothing but Demonstrations of his *Errors* in Matters of Fact. Too much Confidence in the Informations he received, too much Haste in composing, and above all that Fire, which is apt to over-heat the Imagination of *polemical Writers*, must have caused these Errors. It is impossible to account any other Way, how a Gentleman of *nice Honour*, *remarkable Sincerity*, and even *exemplary Piety*, instead of making his *Propositions* constantly the Result of the *Evidence* he found, upon a thorough Examination, true, should, through a whole Book, have constantly suited his *Evidence* to a certain Set of *Propositions*; and how *Facts* and *Dates*, as *stubborn Things* as they are in the Hands of *other Men*, should grow soft as Wax under his *Touch*.

But it is not my Design to enter into a Disquisition of this Sort. It would shew ill Nature, which I hope I have not; and it would be now of no use whatever. I must however *defend myself*, as unwilling as I am to *offend him*; and therefore since he contradicts what I said, *viz.* that *he had been given up in every material Article of the Enquiry*; I think myself obliged to prove it. *How easy are such Words as these*, says our Author, *but how hard to support them?* Now I do assure him that *these Words*, as far as they may be thought *harsh* or *impolite*, will at no

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Time fall easily from my Tongue or Pen; but he will find that it is easy for me, upon this Occasion, to *support* them. I will confine myself to the *four great Points* of Danger, arising from the *Vienna Treaties*, and mentioned already. Let us see whether he has been *given up* in them or not.

According to the *Enquiry*, we were in Danger of losing not only our *East* and *West-India Trade*, but many other Branches of the *British Trade*, by the Privileges *supposed* to be granted to the *Emperor's Subjects*, and from the Enjoyment of which Privileges we are debarred. Nay, it was very strongly insinuated that even the Ruin of *Britain* was involved in this Point. If this had been the Case, and if the Treaty of *Vienna* had thus settled the Matter, there would have been Occasion for all the Outcries, which we meet with in the *Enquiry*, and for still more. But our most knowing Merchants *gave up this Point*, as soon as they read and considered the several Clauses; and it is notorious that the contracting Powers declared, as soon as they heard of the Objection, that their Meaning was not to give these Privileges to the *Imperial Subjects* above other Nations; and that they would *explain* the Text accordingly, if any *Ambiguity* made it necessary. But in Truth there was little or no *Ambiguity* in the Matter, except what the Representations of it occasioned; for without entering any deeper into it, let us observe that the *Answers*, which this Author gives to the *Objection*, which he was forced, from the Notoriety of the Thing, to make to himself, are *evasive* and *fallacious*; for since the same Liberty of entering the *Spanish Ports* in the *West-Indies*, in case of Distress by *bad Weather*, or for *Refreshment*, is granted to us by the Treaty of 1670, and is granted to the *Imperial Subjects* by the Treaty of *Vienna*, does it follow that more is granted to *them* than to *Us*; because the *Liberty* granted to us hath

hath *ceased* for many Years? If we have not made use of the *Liberty*, the Fact affirmed is nothing to the Purpose. If we have been denied it, such Denial is an Infraction of the *Treaty* of 1670, and proves that we have had Injustice done us by the Practice of the *Spaniards*; but doth not help to prove that we have had any done us by their Concessions to the *Emperor*, with *whom* they may keep this *Article*, perhaps, as little as they have done with *us*; and *who* is not likely to have the same Means of obliging them to it as *we* have in our Power, whenever we please to employ them.

How the *eighth Article* of the *Treaty* of *Utrecht* came to be quoted, on this Occasion, is to me marvellous. That Article is made general to *all Nations*; but was particularly directed against the *French*; who, even at that Time, continued to obtain Licences to send Ships to trade in the *South-Sea*, as they had done all the War. But the *Treaty* of *Utrecht* confirms the *Treaty* of 1670; and the Stipulation, that 'no Licence, or any Permission at all shall, at any Time, be given to the *French*, or any other Nation whatsoever—to sail, traffick, &c. to the Dominions subject to the Crown of *Spain* in *America*,' cannot surely be construed to deprive *us* of the Right of going into *those Parts*, in the Cases allowed by the *Treaty* of 1670. This seems so clear, that I may pronounce the *Gentleman* given up, on this Head, by the most knowing Merchants, and by every Man, who can read and understand what he reads.

But I may go farther; for it appears even from the 5th Article of the *provisional Treaty* itself, (which is said to secure us from the *dangerous Engagements* contained in the *Treaties* of *Vienna*, with relation to *Trade*) that the King of *Spain* 'never understood to grant, by the said *Treaty*, any Privileges contrary to the *Treaties* confirmed above; nor to

' give

' give to his *Imperial Majesty* any greater Advantages than those enjoyed by *other Nations* in their Commerce; his *Imperial Majesty* adopting for his Subjects the above-mentioned Declaration, made in the Name of his *Catholick Majesty*.' And it is very observable that *this Article* seems to be inserted in the *Treaty*, merely upon the *Surmises* of the Ministers of *France*, *Great-Britain* and *Holland*, who have *PRETENDED* (as it is said in the *Introduction* to it) that in the *Treaty* of Commerce, concluded at *Vienna*, on the 1st of *May*, 1725—there were *divers Clauses*, which *clash'd* with *Articles* of *several Treaties* of Commerce, anterior to the Year 1725, &c.

If therefore the *natural Sense* of the *Vienna Treaty* itself, as well as the *Declaration* of their *Imperial and Catholick Majesties*, as soon as the *Objection* was first started, and their Offer to remove any *supposed Ambiguity* in *this Article* of the *Vienna Treaty*, were not sufficient to satisfy us; what farther Satisfaction shall we receive by the *provisional Treaty*, in case it should be accepted, which contains only the very *same Declaration*?—But this hath been sufficiently explain'd already by your Correspondent *Raleigh*.

As to the *Ostend Trade*, he thinks that I myself cannot be against him, *unless in the Degree of the Importance of it*. Now this is the very Point, upon which he must be *given up*, in this Case, if he is *given up* at all. I never heard that any Man was wild enough to affirm that the Trade, carry'd on from *Ostend*, was of *no Consequence whatever* to *us*. But the Question is, whether *that Trade* be of that *Degree of Importance* to *us*, which he represents. He asks, *who of those I oppose hath declared against him in this?* I answer, the very Person I quoted in the Passage he had before his Eyes, when he ask'd this Question. He says, in the *Enquiry*, that our

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East and West-India Trade will be ruin'd by the Ostend Company; that they are so already, in some Degree; that the Contagion will spread to other Branches; in short, that this Trade will carry Riches, Strength, and naval Power from Us to the Spanish Netherlands. What says *Publicola*? The Ostend Trade, about which such a Noise hath been made (he must mean by the *Enquirer*, since the *Enquirer* made more Noise about it than all the other Writers put together) was more the Concern of our Neighbours, both by Treaty and Interest, than our own. I appeal now, in my Turn; and I appeal to the *Enquirer* himself. Is not one of these Representations directly contrary to the other? Does not *Publicola* diminish the Consequences of the Ostend Trade to us, and treat it even lightly? Does not he magnify it, in the strongest Terms, and make our All depend on the Obstruction of it? Does not *Publicola*, an Author whom I oppose, give him up?

We are now come to the Danger, much insisted upon in the *Enquiry*\*, of having Gibraltar wrested out of our Hands by Force, (if it be possible) unless we will basely yield it up; and this Danger is grounded on a supposed † mutual Engagement between the Emperor and King of Spain, contain'd in a secret offensive Treaty. The Writer of the *Enquiry* confesses, that the Imperial Resident read to some of our Ministers the Words, which he said were the Contents of the Article, which his Master had enter'd into, relating to Gibraltar; the which implied, that his Master had engaged to use his good Offices for the Restitution of Gibraltar; Now from hence, because this Resident read all that related to this Point, and did not shew the whole Treaty to us, any more than we thought ourselves obliged to shew to the Imperial Ministers the Treaties of 1721; (which we made at Madrid with one of the Parties, between whom we were at that Time

\* Page 57.

† 34, 35.

Time Mediators, in the Congress at Cambray;) from hence, I say, the *Writer* I am answering concludes that the Truth of what he imputes to the Emperor stands confirm'd; but the offensive Alliance hath appear'd hitherto no where, except in his Writings; and the Article relating to Gibraltar, in the defensive Alliance between the Emperor and King of Spain, is surely as contrary as possible to all that he hath advanced. By that Article it appears, that the Spaniards affirm'd a Promise on our Part to restore Gibraltar. In Consideration of this Promise, the Emperor declares he will not oppose this Restitution, if it be made amicably; that if it be necessary, he will employ his good Offices, and even his Mediation, if the Parties desire it. Till therefore the *Enquirer* can shew another Article between the contracting Powers in the Vienna Treaties, about Gibraltar, this must be reputed the sole Article of that Kind, and by Consequence a flat Contradiction to all, that he hath said on this Occasion; so that if his own Side do not give him up in this Case, both they and he will be given up, I fear, in the Opinion of every other Man in Europe; to which I shall add (since the Observation lies fairly in my Way) that every Man, who knows any Thing of the Interest of Europe, knows it as much the Interest of the Emperor, that Britain should keep Gibraltar, as it is the Interest of one of our Allies, that we should lose the Possession of this Place; and yet we have been taught, by some profound Statesmen, to apprehend the Emperor's Efforts to take it from us, and to rely on the Assistance of France to preserve it to us.

I have reserved to the last the greatest of all those Dangers, which are represented in the *Enquiry*; and that is the Danger of the Pretender.

It is there affirmed, \* 'That one express Article of the Alliance, between the Emperor and

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' Spain,

\* Page 52.

Spain, contained an Obligation in Favour of the Pretender, and a Stipulation to make the Attempt for him in England, before opening the War in any other Parts.' Nay, *this Author* was so well informed of all these Proceedings, that he gives us the particular Engagements, which the Pretender, in return, took towards the Emperor and Spain. All these Things are asserted in the strongest Manner, as founded on *positive Intelligence*; on *Intelligence from more than one Person*; on *undoubted Intelligence, and such as could be entirely depended on*. Now I suspect that the *Enquirer* would think me very impertinent, if I should seem to question the *Authority* of his Intelligence; and yet I verily believe, that I have better Reasons to do so, than he had to depend upon it, when he writ the Words I have quoted. But we will wave saying any Thing more on a Point, on which it is proper for *neither* of us to *speak plain*. His *good Opinion* of the *Intelligence* communicated to him will not give it the Stamp of *Infallibility*; nor will my *bad Opinion* destroy its *Credit*. The World will therefore judge, or rather has judged, of the Validity of what he does not explain, by the Force or Weakness of the *other Circumstances*, which he enlarges upon; and by observing whether the Course of *Events* hath justified this boasted Intelligence or not. I have just mentioned above the chief of *these Circumstances*; and notwithstanding the great Respect I have for *this Author*, nothing shall oblige me to treat them more seriously. I will shew him however, that the Course of *Events* hath destroyed all the *Use* he pretended to make of these *Circumstances*, and that it has contradicted, instead of confirming his Intelligence. He says, † 'That the vigorous Resolutions taken, and the Preparations and Dispositions made by *Great-Britain*, suspended the Execution of this Design. The *Spaniards*

† Page 15.

found themselves obliged to send Part of their Ships from *Cadiz* and *St. Andero* to the *West-Indies*; and the *Muscovite* Ships returned home.'—— Very well! The Event does not yet justify the *Intelligence*; but that is accounted for. The Execution of the Design was *suspended for the present*. The Design went on then; and the Preparations for an *Invasion* by Consequence. It must have been so; for we find in the *Enquiry* §, 'That the Design thus suspended was afterwards prevented by the Appearance of a *British Fleet* on the *Spanish Coast*.' Now let me desire you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, to take the Trouble of turning to Sir *John Fenning's* Letter, dated *August 10, 1726*, and made publick here; in which you will find the *Spaniards* so little prepared to *invade* us, that when he came on their Coast, they seemed to be in the greatest Consternation; that all the Troops they could assemble did not exceed three thousand Men; and that these were in very bad Condition.

I ask now, is the *Intelligence* of the *Enquirer*, upon this Head, supported by any Thing but his own Affirmation? Is it not contradicted by the whole Course of Events? Does there appear the least Reason to believe that he had a sure Foundation to build upon, when he made such bold Assertions, and of such a Nature? The *secret offensive Treaty*, which he talks so much of, has never appeared, nor any Footsteps of it; and many People are apt to believe that it never existed any where but in *some People's luxuriant Fancy*. The *several Treaties* made at *Vienna* in 1725, between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, have been long publick; and when it was observed, *some where or other*, that nothing was contained in them like what the *Enquirer* had asserted, the *Enquirer* was given up. He was said to be *mistaken*. The *Article*, in favour of the *Pretender*, was said to be in some

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§ Page 97.

*other Treaty*; and afterwards in no *formal Treaty*. It was not a *Treaty*. It was an *Engagement*. This may be called, by some ill-bred People, *shuffling*; but sure I am that it must pass for a direct *giving up* of *this Author*; who will find, perhaps, if he pleases to enquire into the Particulars of what passed on this Occasion, that the Person, who *gave him thus up*, had some Share in *setting him to work*.

After this, it is hardly worth Notice, that the Author of the *Observations on the Conduct of Great-Britain* has *given him up* likewise; for the utmost, which this *Writer* ventures to say, when he comes to speak of *this Engagement*, asserted by the *Enquirer* to be contained in an Article of a *Treaty*, is this; *our Apprehensions were that there might be Engagements in favour of the Pretender*. Let the *Enquirer* consider again, whether I was in the wrong to advance, that he had been *given up*, even by his *own Side*.

Having justified what I presumed to advance, concerning the *Enquiry*, I come now to the *Defence* of it.

The Gentleman begins this *Defence* by *stating the Case* (so he calls it) *as he did in the Enquiry*; and then he proceeds to *take Notice of what hath followed since the Date of that Book*; that is to say, he represents the Matter in Dispute, just as it suits his Purpose; leaving out many Things necessary to set the whole in a true Light; asserting some Things, which have been never proved; and others, which I think never can be proved; making what Insinuations, drawing what Conclusions he thinks fit; and, in a Word, begging the Question in almost every Line. It is hard to conceive for what Purpose this is done. The Reason given, I am sure, is not a good one; since the *principal Facts and Reasonings, upon which the Strength of all that can be said must be founded*, are so far from seeming to be forgot, that they seem to be the only Things remembered, or thought

thought of at this Time, and are the common Topics of almost every Conversation. There must therefore be some *other Reason* for this Method of Proceeding; and I can guess but *one*. This *Method* may perhaps be thought proper to catch unwary Readers, and to give a particular Bias to their Minds, with which they are to read and to judge of all that follows. I could make use of the *same Art*; and, without being at much Pains, draw up a *State of the Case* very contrary to that, which he hath drawn, and at least as *plausible*. But I think the Proceeding too unfair to copy after it. I have indeed no Reason to do so; since, very indifferent to all other Considerations, I seek nothing in this Dispute, but the Discovery of the Truth; and therefore, as I will receive nothing but what is supported by the Evidence of *Fact*, and the Force of *Argument*, so I will not presume to attempt imposing any Thing, void of *both*, upon others. Besides, *this Gentleman* undertakes to *consider what I have advanced, either against any Thing, in which he can be supposed to be concerned; or upon any Subject of Debate, (of this Debate he means) which appears to him to be of Importance*; so that if I am able to refute all that he objects to me, in the *Defence of this Enquiry*, I refute all Objections of any *Importance*, to what I have said in my *former Letter* to you; and then I imagine that his *State of the Case* will do him no great Honour, and his Cause little good.

The first Point, on which I am attack'd by the *Defender* of the *Enquiry* is, on *the Turn*, (so he calls it) which I have given to the *very Beginning of this whole Scene*. He means the *Vienna Alliance*. Let us see therefore whether it is *He* or *I*, (for one of us may, perhaps, have done so) who hath endeavour'd, in treating this Subject, to turn every Thing to the Service of some *other Cause* than that of *Truth*.



In the *Enquiry*, he represented the *Vienna Alliance*, as to the Manner, and as to the Matter of it, to be one of the most astonishing *Phænomena*, which ever appear'd in the political World. What Surprize to see two Princes, Rivals almost from their Infancy, two Powers, that could hardly be kept within the Bounds of common Decency towards one another, privately running into one another's Arms, as he expresses himself? What a Surprize to see the *Emperor* abandon the Mediation of *Great-Britain* and *France*; to the first of whom he and his Family owed so many Obligations; and to the last of whom, in Conjunction with the first, he owed the Acquisition of *Sicily*, and the other Advantages of the *Quadruple Alliance*? What a Surprize to see *Spain* abandon this Mediation, just in the Moment, (as my Adversary has extremely well observed) when the Interests of the Duke of *Parma* were in Agitation; Interests, which *Spain* had extremely at Heart; and in the supporting which, she had Reason to think herself sure of Success against the *Emperor*; because the Mediators had taken secret Engagements with her to favour these Interests, by one of the *Treaties* made at *Madrid* in 1721? What a Surprize to see *Spain* do this, and in doing it, not only forego the Advantages, which the Mediators had procured and were to procure for her, in many Respects; particularly in that favourite Point, the Succession of *Don Carlos*; but make so bad a Bargain for herself at *Vienna*, that the *Emperor*, according to this Author, and indeed I think according to the Truth, gain'd every Thing, and particularly the Guaranty of his own Succession?

All this, it must be confess'd, appear'd wonderful, and excited a strong Curiosity to know what were the Springs of so great, and, according to these Representations, so sudden a Revolution of Counsels and Interests. But here we were dropp'd. The *Enquirer* spent much Time, and took much Pains  
to

to shew what *did not occasion it*; but I have not observed, that he pretended to shew what *did*; unless he meant, that we should take, for Causes of it, those terrible Designs, which he imputes to the *Emperor* and the King of *Spain*. Our *Ministers*, who seem to have foreseen so little that *France* and *Spain* might break; and that the *Negotiations*, then on Foot, might be thrown into Confusion, or take some new Course, by this Rupture; grew it seems prodigiously alert and sagacious afterwards. They did not foresee what happen'd; but they discover'd strange Mysteries of Iniquity, conceal'd under this Transaction, when it had happen'd; and these Mysteries we find pompously unfolded in the *Enquiry*, with all the *Improvements* and *Embellishments*, which the Author's luxuriant Fancy could bestow upon them. Now supposing these Discoveries to have been real, the Things so discover'd can be look'd upon no otherwise than as Circumstances of the general Measure; the Measure, which the *Emperor* and *Spain* took, of treating by themselves and for themselves; and therefore they wanted to be accounted for as much as the Measure itself; but upon this Head, I say, the *Enquirer* gave us no Satisfaction. Far from explaining to us what might induce *Spain* to take such a Resolution, at that particular Point of Time, rather than at any other; he did not afford us the least Hint to guess, why we should take it at all; and yet so strange an effect must have had some very considerable Cause; too considerable certainly to be absolutely a Secret, and even beyond the Reach of Conjecture.

This remarkable Defect was, I believe, felt by every Person, who read the *Enquiry*; and therefore, in the Progress of the Dispute, the Writers of the same Side thought it incumbent upon them to assign some Cause, which might appear proportionable to such extraordinary Effects; and which, at the same

Time, might not be inconsistent with what their great Master, the *Enquirer*, had advanced. The Task was not easy; and indeed they have succeeded accordingly. Some laid the *Cause* of all in that *inveterate Rancour*, which they supposed the Court of *Spain* to have conceived against us, on two Accounts; the Promise made by Lord *Stanhope* about *Gibraltar*, and the Defeat of the *Spanish Fleet* in the *Mediterranean*. When this was exploded, and I think it was so as soon as examined, they had Recourse to another System; a very strange one indeed; for it declares that the *Emperor, France, and Great-Britain*, the three contracting Powers with *Spain* in the *Quadruple Alliance*, acted the most perfidious Part imaginable in that whole Proceeding; such a Part as *Ferdinand the Catholick, or Lewis the XIth*, would have startled at. The Succession of *Don Carlos* was, it seems, \* a Point, which all the Powers of *Europe* strenuously opposed; which the *Emperor*, who had already obtained his Desires, in the Affair of *Sicily*, could not be for; to which the *French* were averse; which *Great-Britain* had Reason to oppose and prevent; and which it was plain that the *Spaniards* could never carry in a *Congress, where every Party was an Enemy to their Intentions*. Surely nothing so extravagant; nothing so insolent as this was ever yet advanced! If you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, had presumed even to insinuate any Thing like it, I believe you would have been prosecuted with all the Severity possible; and I am sure you would have been given up by all your Friends. Neither can I conceive how the *Enquirer*, who is so zealous an Assertor of our Honour in the Observation of *Treaties*, could pass by such an Imputation as this, without darting his Thunder at the impious Head, who devised the Slander; unless he thinks it an irremissible Sin to account for any Thing in Contradiction to himself; and a venial Fault to accuse *Great-Britain and France,*

\* *British Journal, Jan. 4.*

*France*, as well as the *Emperor*, of something worse than a Violation of *Treaties*; even of making them with a Design to break them; and of obliging a Prince, by long *Negotiations*, and by a *War*, to accept Conditions, which they never intended should be made good to him.

Amongst others, I presumed, at last, to account for this great *Event* upon Principles, which I believed to be true, notwithstanding all that I read, in the *Enquiry*; and which I still believe to be true, notwithstanding all that is said against them, in the *Defence of the Enquiry*.

The *Defender* begins with quoting two or three Passages, which relate to the sending back the *Infanta*, and the Point of the *sole Mediation*, out of my *Letter* to you; and then, without disproving the Facts, or so much as mentioning the Argument grounded upon them, he pretends that the whole is hypothetical; and thinks it would be a full and sufficient Reply to me, to frame a *Scheme on the other Side, and to oppose Supposition to Supposition; and one arbitrary Interpretation of Appearances to another; after which he proceeds to frame such a Scheme; partly on Facts, which he would have us believe true; and partly, as he says himself, from his own Invention; and this he thinks proper to oppose, in a ludicrous Manner, to the Account I have given.*

Now, if it shall appear, on Examination, that I have built upon undeniable Facts, and have reason'd justly, instead of building on *Suppositions*, and giving *arbitrary Interpretations to Appearances*, this *Author's* Smartness will turn upon himself; and, instead of shewing that I deserved no Answer, he will only have shewn that he was unable to give me a good one.

Let us enter into this Examination.

I affirm'd, and I do still affirm, that from the Death of the Duke of *Orleans*, the *Spanish Ministers* were

were full of Fears and Jealousies about the completing the *Infanta's* Marriage with the King of *France*. Neither do I find any Thing urged in the *Defence* of the *Enquiry*, to destroy the Credibility of this Fact. Indeed, if it was proper to descend into Particulars of so delicate a Nature, it would not be at all difficult to demonstrate, from a Consideration of the Change, which was made in the *French* Ministry, and of the Difference of personal Situations, Interests and Views, that altho' there never could have been Room for such Fears and Jealousies as these, while the Duke of *Orleans* had lived, yet there was great Room for entertaining them, under the Administration of his *Successor*. But this is not all. These Fears and Jealousies increased and strengthen'd daily, in the Minds of the *Spanish* Ministers; and if *this Author* pleases to enquire, I believe he will find, or else his *Prompters* deal very unfairly by him, that the Delay and Excuses of the Court of *France* about performing the Ceremony of the *Fiancialles*, which *Spain* expected should have been perform'd soon after the Time, at which the Duke of *Orleans* dy'd, confirm'd, in the highest Degree, the Suspicions already taken. The Ceremony of the *Fiancialles* would have secured the Marriage. What other Effect then could Excuses and Delays in this Affair produce, but that, which I have mention'd?

The *Enquiry* \* says, that the Resolution of the Court of *France*, relating to the *Infanta*, did not come, nor not in Suspicion, to *Madrid*, till March 8. N. S. 1724-5. If he means the particular Resolution of sending her back at such a determinate Time, that is nothing to the Purpose, how much soever the Affirmation might impose, when it was made use of at first, and before this Matter had been sufficiently canvass'd. But if the Resolution of sending the *Infanta*

\* Page 15.

*santa* back, at some Time or other; in plain Terms, the Resolution of not completing her Marriage with the King of *France*, be meant; then, I say, that I might very justly have set this Assertion down in the List of those, which are made in the Book without a strict Regard to *Truth*; for it is undeniably true, that the *Spanish* Ministers, in foreign Courts, entertain'd this Suspicion above a Year before that Time. It is equally true, that several Months before that Time they spoke of this Measure, as a Thing they expected; and I add, that several private Persons, at least, writ from *Madrid*, in the same Stile, to their Correspondents in other Countries. Of all this I am as sure, as I am sure I now hold a Pen in my Hand; or that a Pamphlet, call'd a *Defence of the Enquiry*, is now lying before me; and therefore neither the Authority of the *Enquiry*, nor any better Authority can persuade me, that the Suspicion of a Design to send the *Infanta* back from *France* did not come to *Madrid* till March 1724-5; because it would be absurd to believe, that the Ministers of that Court were less inform'd or less jealous about an Affair, of this Importance, than private Persons; or that the repeated Advices, which must have come from the *Spanish* Ministers abroad, made no Impression upon those at home.

This Fact is, I think, pretty well established; and the others I am to mention will occasion no Dispute. They are these. The *Spaniards* \* first took the Resolution of throwing off the *Mediation*, and of treating at *Vienna* in Nov. 1724; and *Ripperda's* full Powers were signed, according to the *Enquiry*, on the 22d of that Month; that is, about a Year after the Death of the Duke of *Orleans*. Soon after this, the *Negotiation* was begun; but the *Treaties*, in which it terminated, were not signed till the last of *April* and the first of *May*, 1725.

These,

\* *Enquiry*, Page 15.

These, I presume, are *Facts*, and not *Suppositions*. Let it now be considered how I argue upon them; and whether my Reasoning be nothing more than an *arbitrary Interpretation of Appearances*, as the Author of the *Defence* hath rashly pronounced, but not ventured to attempt to prove. The Sum of my Argument is this. Since the *Spaniards* expected that the *Infanta* would be, a little sooner, or a little later, sent back from *France*, they expected to find themselves, a little sooner, or a little later, obliged in Honour to shew a due Resentment of this *Affront*: to send back the Princesses of the House of *Bourbon* from *Spain*; and to break off that Correspondence, which had subsisted between the two Courts, from *Spain's* Accession to the *Quadruple Alliance*; and which had been so intimate, during the Life of the Duke of *Orleans*. They could not foresee how long this Rupture might last; because they could not foresee how soon a Change would be made in the *French* Ministry, and Satisfaction be given them for this *Affront*; but they could not fail to foresee, that if this *Event* should happen, during the Congress of *Cambray*, something worse than the *Affront* would follow, and they must remain in the most abandoned Condition imaginable; broke with *one Mediator*; not sure of the *other*; the *Emperor* in Possession of *Sicily*; and the reciprocal Condition, in favour of *Don Carlos*, not effectually secured to them. These Things are so intimately and necessarily tied together, that I can as little discover how it is possible to allow the *first Fact*, which regards the Suspicions and Expectations of the *Spaniards*, and deny the *Consequences*, which follow; as I can see how it is possible to contradict, with the least Appearance of Reason, a *Fact* so publicly known, supported by so many Circumstances, and justify'd by so many Consequences as the *first* is. The probable Arguments employed in the *Defence*, and which, it may be

be pretended, will serve to prove that though the *Fact* were true, and the Suspicion I have insisted on, was entertained by the Court of *Madrid*; yet that it did not produce the Effects of throwing *Spain* into the Engagement she took at *Vienna*, will be considered presently.

Thus far then, as we have a Deduction of *Facts*, not of *Suppositions*; so we have a Thread of consequential Arguments, not a Rhapsody of *arbitrary Interpretations of Appearances*. The Case is fairly stated; and no *imaginary Scheme* is offered to be imposed for *Truth*. The Probability, which results from this State, is confirmed, and I think turned into Certainty by the *Event*. By the State above-mentioned, it was probable that *Spain* would take Measures, in Time, against the Distress, to which she must foresee that she stood exposed. Accordingly, the *Spaniards* began to treat at *Vienna*, before the *Infanta* was sent from *France*, (which is a Fact allowed on all Hands) that they might prepare for the worst; and when I add, that they delayed concluding their Treaty, or that the Conclusion of their Treaty was delayed, till what they feared happened; what do I affirm more than what my *Adversary* allows? He has said, at first, that the *Treaty of Peace* was signed at *Vienna*, before what *Spain* feared from *France* was known there. He has corrected that Assertion; and has said, that as the *Treaty of Peace* was agreed to at *Vienna* before what *Spain* feared from *France* was known at *Vienna* to have happened; so it was signed before the Refusal of *Britain* could be known there; that is, the Refusal of the *sole Mediation*. The *first Point* then is yielded to me. The *Spaniards* did not actually sign at *Vienna*, till the News came thither, of the *Infanta's* being actually sent from *France*; though they had settled and agreed their Terms with the *Imperialists*, on the Knowledge that she would be sent away. On the *second Point*, all that I urged,

as Fact or Argument, stands in the same Force it did before; for I desire *this Author* may not be indulged in a Liberty I shall never take with him, nor any one else; the Liberty of carrying my Affirmations, by strained Constructions, farther than the plain and natural Import of the Terms I employ.

In Opposition to *Publicola*, I shewed that the Manner, in which he affirmed the Treaty of *Vinna* to have been signed before the Refusal of the *Mediation* was known there, did not refute *Raleigh*; on Account of some *possible Circumstances*, there mentioned. Now *this Author* has been forced to leave the Proof, drawn from those *possible Circumstances*, just as he found it. *There is no Proof*, says he, *but the bare Possibility here insisted on*. I say more. The Argument is as strong against *him*, as against *Publicola*; for even after the Advantages taken over *Publicola*, for not expressing himself clearly, *this Author* has, for Reasons easy to be guessed, expressed himself in a Manner liable to the same Objection. 'The Peace was signed, he says, before the Refusal of Britain could be known. What! before it could be known by *certain and direct Intelligence*; or before it could be known in *Form*, after the tedious Round, which this Resolution was to take? That is not explained; and yet that was the single Point, on which any Thing could be said to the Purpose. In short, we pursued, with great Steadiness, our wise Maxims of neglecting *Spain*, and of adhering closely to *France*; insomuch that those, who wished us no good, were perhaps heard, when they insinuated that, far from contributing to ward off a Blow so much apprehended by *Spain*, we privately abetted *France*, in her Design of breaking the *Match*, and imagined by that Measure to establish an irreconcilable Quarrel between the two Courts. The *Spaniards*, as well as the *Imperialists*, had Reason to believe, from our whole Conduct, that

that we should not accept the *sole Mediation*, which had been offered to us; and was it then strange that the *former*, neglected by *us*, provoked by *France*, should press the signing *this Treaty*, without waiting long for our Answer; or that the *Emperor*, who got so much by the Bargain, should consent to it?

Having been thus led to the Affair of the *sole Mediation*, which I had hitherto omitted to speak of, in order to avoid Confusion, I shall consider it here, as far as *this Author* has made it necessary for me. In my Letter to you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, I dwelt a good deal upon it. I placed it in every Light, and debated all the Merits of the Cause, as well as I was able. Now, if what I urged was absurd and nothing to the Purpose, *this Author* should have shewn, in general, that it did not deserve a more particular Answer. If what I urged was clear and strong, as some People imagine it was, *this Author*, who declares himself, in every Point, of a contrary Opinion, should have had the Goodness to examine and refute my Arguments. How it happens I know not; but this great Master of *polemical Writing* hath, in every Instance, upon this Occasion, avoided to enter into the Argument. He hath dwelt on the Outside of Things, and hath generally cavilled at Circumstances.

I have just now given a strong Instance of this; and I lay hold of the Opportunity to tell *this Gentleman*, that I am no Apologist for *Spain*, though he endeavours to fix that Character upon me by an *Innuendo*, so very fine, that I was for some Time at a Loss to find out his Meaning. I neither sounded to Arms against the *Spaniards*, two Years ago; nor am, at present, an Advocate for bearing their *Delays* and their *Insults*. I neither aggravated, two Years ago, the 'Depredations and Hostilities committed in the *West-Indies*, by the *Spaniards*; \* and those

\* Enquiry, p. 60.



‘ those Violences, by which the whole Commerce of *Jamaica* hath been well nigh destroyed, and the Trade of that Island reduced to a miserable Condition;’ nor do I now soften in their Favour, and call these Outrages and Losses by the gentle Name of \* ‘ Inconveniencies attending a State of Uncertainty.’

But to return. Having given an Instance of *this Author's* cavilling at Circumstances not material in the Dispute; I shall now give some Instances of his affirming over again, by way of Answer, what had been refuted before; and when I have done this, I shall have taken Notice of all that he says, upon the Subject of the *sole Mediation*.

*First* then he says, that ‘ the Knowledge of the Negotiations going on at *Vienna*’ was a just Reason to decline this Offer, which he supposes to have been a *mere Piece of Mockery*. But he does not so much as pretend to say a Word, in answer to what I insisted upon, as an Advantage in accepting this *Mediation*, even supposing it offered to us without any Design that we should concern ourselves in it. He does not pretend so much as to controvert what I urged, to prove that the worse Opinion we had of the Designs carried on at *Vienna*, the more Reason there was to catch at this Offer of the *Mediation*.

*Secondly*, he insists, that we could not accept this *Mediation*, with a due Regard to our *Alliance* with *France*; and he supposes, that this Reason will be thought just ‘ by all those, who do not think the Breach of Faith, and the Violation of Treaties, Matters of no Concern.’ Here again is another charitable *Innuendo*. But let it pass. It would be easy to strengthen all that was said, on this Subject, in my *Letter* to you, by shewing the Difference between such a Stipulation as this of a *joint Mediation*, and

\* Defence, p. 13.

and the Covenants, which Princes and States enter into with one another, about their mutual Interests. But there is no need of it; since *this Author*, who thinks fit to insist on this Point, hath not thought fit to answer any one of the Arguments, urged by me, to prove that *France* could not have complained of us, if we had accepted this *Mediation*; and yet there were some Dilemma's laid down, which seem'd to deserve a Solution.

*Lastly*, he pretends that I affirmed, ‘ against the most publick Facts, and the plainest Appearances,’ what I said to shew that our Acceptance of the *Mediation* must have been agreeable to *France*; and yet what I said was founded on *publick Facts, and the plainest Appearances*; which he has not touched, because he durst not deny them. It is really very strange, that so considerable an *Author* should continue to write, when he can neither find out *new Arguments*, nor answer the Objections made to *old ones*.

Having now dispatched the Point of the *sole Mediation*, it remains that I say something to those *probable Arguments*, (if they deserve that Name, which I have civilly given them) by which *this Gentleman* pretends to destroy what is, I think, established on the solid Foundation of *Fact* and *Reason*, concerning the Measure taken in *France*, after the Death of the late Duke of *Orleans*, to break the Match with the *Infanta*, and the Consequence of that Measure, the throwing *Spain* into the Hands of the *Emperor*.

Now the *first* of these Arguments is, that the Court of *Spain* did not mention this *Affront* from *France*, as any Inducement to the Transaction at *Vienna*; and that any such mention would have been inconsistent with other Declarations made to Mr. *Stanhope* at *Madrid*. Very well. It is then an established Rule, that we are not to believe a Court has

has *Motives* for their Conduct, which *Motives* they do not own, although we have the strongest Reasons imaginable to believe such *Motives true*. Another Rule, which *this Author* would do well to establish at the same Time, and which is founded on as much Reason as the former, is this; that we are to believe all the *Motives*, which a Court thinks fit to give out, to account for their Conduct; although we have the plainest Proofs imaginable that these *Motives are false*. Such Logick as this was never introduced into *Politicks*, I believe, before; and I am persuaded that you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, will excuse me, if I spend no Time in answering it. Let me desire you however, before I leave this Argument, to turn to the 13th and 14th Pages of the *Enquiry*, where you will find that the *Enquirer* says, the *Imperial Ministers* at *Cambray*, at *London* and at *Paris*, talked the very Language, which the *Defender* of the *Enquiry* says the *Spaniards* were always ashamed to make use of\*. Nay, the *Enquirer* adds, that, 'upon the first publick News of the *Vienna Treaty* at *Madrid*, the Discourses of many were taught to run that Way, and to dwell upon that same popular Topick.'

The *second* of these Arguments is this. If the News of sending back the *Infanta* from *France*, and of *Great Britain's* refusing the *sole Mediation*, had both come to *Madrid*, before *Ripperda* was sent from thence; even this could not have really been, and would not have been pretended to have been the *Motive* of what was afterwards done at *Vienna*. And why, pray? Because when the News of our refusing the *sole Mediation* did come, the Court of *Spain* acknowledged it to be a *reasonable Proceeding*. This, you see, is built on the Principles laid down in the last Article, and deserves no farther Notice. But on the News coming to *Madrid*, that the *Infanta* was sent home, he confesses that the *Court of Spain* might,

\* Page 19.

might, by such *Circumstances*, be induced to try what honourable Terms the *Emperor* would come to. This Concession goes farther than he is aware of; for I desire to know if it is reasonable to believe that *Spain* would have treated with the *Emperor*, when the Case had happen'd, why it is unreasonable to believe that *Spain* did begin to treat with him on almost a certain *Prospect* that the Case would happen; which is the great Point we have been contending about? Ay, but *Spain* would not have treated with the *Emperor* to hurt *Holland* and *Britain*, because *Spain* had been hurt by *France*; nor would the *Emperor* have enter'd into a *Treaty* to hurt them, who had no Part in the *Affront* to *Spain* and never injured the *Emperor*. Again; much less would the King of *Spain* send a Minister to *Vienna* to enter into and finish *Treaties*, which should hurt other Nations, upon a *Suspicion* that *France* would hereafter affront him. I could make several Reflections on some of the Expressions in this Place; and on the Turn, which the Author takes, of putting some very odd Arguments into my Mouth; and, what is still more, into the Mouths of the *Emperor* and the King of *Spain*. But I forbear; and content myself with saying two Things, which will effectually blunt the Point of all the Wit employed in this Paragraph, and fully answer the whole of what is said farther, upon this Subject, in the *Defence* of the *Enquiry*.

First then; as far as I am from being, or pretending to be, a *Master in Politicks*, (which Degree this Writer seems to have taken long ago) I never imagined that the *Affront*, consider'd merely as an *Affront*, precipitated *Spain* into all the Engagements she took with the *Emperor*; though, by the Way, he mistakes very much, if he thinks, as he says, that he may deny new fresh *Resentments* to determine the Conduct of Princes, exactly upon the same Grounds, as I have deny'd that old stale *Resentments* have this Effect

Effect. What I imagined, what I said, and what I proved was, that this *Affront*, considered as a necessary Breach with *France*, at least for a Time, would throw *Spain* into such Circumstances of Distress, as she was to prevent by all possible Means; and that therefore *Reason of State* determined in this Case; though no doubt the *Affront*, at the same Time, provoked the *Spaniards*. Thus I am consistent with myself; and the *Author* might have spared himself the Trouble of writing this *elaborate Paragraph*, if he had adverted to my Sense, instead of playing with my Words.

*Secondly*; as to the *Emperor*, our *Author* is guilty of begging the Question; for the *Emperor* will insist, as he has insisted, that his Engagements were not Engagements to injure any Body; that he entered into no *offensive Alliance*; and that, when he exacted from *Spain* the Guaranty of the *Ostend Trade*, and of his *Succession*, he exacted the Guaranty of nothing but of that, which he judges he has an independent Right to establish and secure. As to *Spain*, it will be likewise said, that when his *Catholick Majesty* treated with the *Emperor*, he never meant to hurt *other Nations*, but to secure his *own Interests*; that if his Guaranty of the *Ostend Trade* hurts the *Dutch* or *us*, he is sorry for it; but could no more avoid that Engagement than he could several others, extremely disadvantageous to himself, and into which he was however obliged to enter; because he was obliged to purchase the *Emperor's Alliance* at any Rate; that therefore we must not blame him, who opposed the Establishment of the *Ostend Company*, whilst he could do it, without any Support from us; who never gave his Guaranty to it, till he was forced to do so, by the *Necessity* of his Affairs; into which *Necessity* he was falling for above a Year together, without seeing the Hand of *Britain* once stretch'd forth to hinder it. Such Answers as these would

would certainly be given; and, in the Mouths of the *Imperialists* and the *Spaniards*, they would be just.

If, after all that has been said *this Gentleman* is unable, upon my Notions, to account for the King of *Spain's* resolute flying from the *Mediatorship* of *France*, I am sure it is not my Fault. A few *Sacrifices* did indeed help to pacify *Spain*, and to reconcile her to *France*; and a few *Sacrifices* might, for aught I know, have reconciled our Quarrels; or, which is better, have prevented them. But as no one can foresee now when such *Sacrifices* will be made here; so neither could *Spain*, at the Time when she sent to *Vienna* foresee when such *Sacrifices* would be made in *France*.

Upon the whole Matter, and to conclude this tedious Article; if the Way, in which I have endeavoured to account for the Resolution taken by *Spain* to abandon the *Mediation* of *Cambrai*, and to treat at *Vienna*, be not right; I should be glad to know what the right Way is. No other, which *this Gentleman*, or any reasonable Man will venture to support, has been yet pointed out. But I apprehend the Account I have given to be a just one; because it is built on *Fact* and *Reason*; because the *Event* hath, in every Respect, confirmed it; and because it shews not only why *Spain* broke with *France*, and apply'd to the *Emperor*; but why *Spain* enter'd into these new Measures, after the Death of the Duke of *Orleans*; which it cannot be pretended she ever thought of doing, while that Prince was alive. If now this Account be a just one, many melancholy but useful Truths result from it.

But I need not point out these Things. The World will discover them, without any Help of mine, and will judge how well the *Enquiry* hath been vindicated, by the *Author* and *Defender* of it, upon *this Head*.

The next Point, upon which my Reasonings and Imputations are to be try'd at his Tribunal, is that of Gibraltar; and here he sets out, by accusing me (not in Terms indeed; but in a Manner almost as plain) of Lying; of direct, premeditated Lying. I will keep my Temper, though a Field large enough is open'd to me; and though the Provocation is not a little agravated by the solemn Air, with which this Accusation is brought; by the Pretences to Patience, and Meekness and Candour; and by all the Appeals to God, with which my Accuser hath, in several Parts of this Treatise, endeavoured to captivate the good Opinion of Mankind, and to establish his own Reputation, that he might make sure of ruining that of others. He calls to my Mind the Character of Mopsus in Tasso's Aminta.

——— di quel Mopso  
 Ch' a ne la lingua melate parole,  
 E ne le labra un' amichevol ghigno,  
 ——— e il Rasolo  
 Tien sotto il manto.

I will have the Decency not to translate the Verses into English.

It is not necessary that I should say much about Jealousies, which this Author seems to complain arose at one Time, lest Gibraltar would be given up, or artfully betray'd into the Spaniards Hands; nor about the vigorous Defence of it, which was made afterwards. Thus much however I will say, that when Sir John Fennings was call'd home, with all the Troops embark'd on Board his Squadron, just before the Siege, and even from the Neighbourhood of Gibraltar; when the Spaniards were suffered, under Sir Charles Wager's Eyes, to transport by Sea many Things necessary for the Attack of the Place; and

and when it was known that the Town wanted almost every Thing necessary for the Defence of it, People stood a-gaze, and not without Reason. The Cries of the Nation precipitated at last the Supplies; and the Vigour of the Garrison made a glorious Use of them.

I come now to the Accusation, brought against me by this Writer. I said, in my Letter to you, that the Spaniards ground their present Claim to the Restitution of Gibraltar on a 'private Article in a Treaty, made with them in 1721, stipulating the Contents of a Letter to be written by the late King, and on the Letter, written in pursuance of this Article.' This is the Fact. The Accusation is, that there is no such Article in the Treaty; and many Words are employed to cut off all Pretences of Excuse, and to pin the Lye upon me. Now I desire it may be observed, in the first Place, how very exact and knowing a Critick this Gentleman is; who, after pronouncing with so much Emphasis, that 'he hath read the Treaty himself, and finds no one Article belonging to it, which hath the least Relation to this Subject,' proceeds to mention the Treaty, and quotes a wrong one. No Man would have imagined that such a Stipulation could have been supposed to be in the defensive Alliance between Great Britain, France and Spain, of the 13th of June, 1721, who had known that there was a distinct private Treaty, of the same Date, between Great Britain and Spain. But this it seems was a Secret to my Accuser; though the Treaty had appeared printed in the fourth Volume of ROUSSET's Collection, when he committed this Mistake. It was of this Treaty I meant to speak; and the Reason why I expressed myself in that Manner was this. I have had some Years by me an Extract of this very Treaty, which was long kept a great Secret, and for the keeping of which secret there is an ex-

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*press Provision* in the sixth Article of it. When the *Treaty* became publick, I found that my *Extract* of the several *Articles* was exact; and therefore I gave the more Credit to the *separate Article*, mentioned in the same *Extract*, as belonging to this *Treaty*, and stipulating the Contents of a *Letter* to be written by the *late King*. The *Letter* I never saw; but the Account I have had of it by those, who have read it, agrees with my *Extract*. All this induced me to think that there was such a *separate* and more *private Article*, belonging to this *private Treaty*; nor was I at all surprized to see the *Treaty* come abroad without this *Article*; knowing full well that *Treaties* often appear, when the *secret Articles* belonging to them do not.——This is a true State of the Case; and will, I believe, sufficiently justify me for what I writ. But I have not yet done with my *Accuser*. Let it be, that no such *private Article*, as I was led to suppose, does exist, or was ever executed. Will he venture to say that no such *Article* was drawn up, as he expresses himself about the *Treaty of Pacification*? Will he venture to deny that if our *Ministers* were afraid to sign such an *Article*, and therefore did not sign it, the Reason, on which the *Spaniards* were induced to recede from this Point, was that something equivalent should be done; and that this something was his late *Majesty's Letter* to the King of *Spain*? I appeal, in my Turn, to the lowest *Observer*, as well as the highest, who hath gone about to deceive Mankind; this *Author* or I; this *Author*, who conceals from the World what he knows, or might know, with all the Means of Information, which he has in his Power, and what sets the Matter in quite another Light than he hath represented it; or I, who, having not the same Means of Information, fell into an undesigned Mistake; which does not alter the *State of the Case*, in favour of my Argument; since if the *Spaniards* accepted this *Letter*,

*Letter*, which was written in lieu of the *Article*, which was not signed; their *Pretensions* (and nothing but their *Pretensions* are under Consideration here) will be still the same.

As to the *Letter* itself; what I affirm about it is, that the *Spaniards* pretend it is a *positive Engagement* to restore *Gibraltar* to them. That this should be allowed them, I am as far from agreeing as this *Author* can possibly be; but that the *Letter* is sufficient to keep up their *Pretensions*, I affirm; and that in Fact they do keep up their *Pretensions*, on this Foundation, is notorious. Was this *Gentleman* to dispute the Point with the *Spaniards*, he might comment as much, and distinguish as subtly as he pleased, on the Terms of the *Letter*; the others would insist, that it was given them as an *Engagement*; that if they had not received it as such, they would not have departed from the *Article*; and I doubt they would be apt to insinuate that we could not have found a more *proper Casuist* than himself, to distinguish us out of our Obligations, amongst their own *Schoolmen*, or amongst all the Sons of *Loyola*.

To speak seriously; it were to be wished extremely, that the *Spaniards* had not had this Colour for persisting in their Demand of *Gibraltar*; or that it had been by an express and clear Stipulation taken from them; since it is certgin that the *Right and Possession* of *Gibraltar* is nothing less than ascertained to Great Britain by the *Preliminaries*, as they stand; and consequently that all Claim of Spain to it again is not extinguished.

I contradict him in his own Words, though none of the *propereft*; and I will prove, in what I am going to say, either that he does not at all understand the Matter he talks so magisterially about; or that he attempts, in this Instance, to deceive the



World, by giving wrong Interpretations to some Things, and by concealing others.

If then, although the *Letter* of the late King hath given the *Spaniards* a Pretence to claim *Gibraltar*, this Claim is effectually bared, and even extinguished by the first general Words of the *second Article* of the *Preliminaries*; how comes it to pass that *Gibraltar* was not *specifically* mentioned, in order to prevent any future Chicane? It will be said, I know, that as the King of *Spain's* Accession to the *Quadruple Alliance* vacated any Promise, which my Lord *Stanhope* might have made; so the King of *Spain*, by consenting to these *Preliminaries*, has vacated any Engagement of this Kind, which the *Letter* may be supposed to contain; and I, perhaps, shall be quoted again as *one, who must necessarily see the Force of this Argument*. But *this Author* must not judge of my Eye-sight by his own; for I see a manifest Difference between the *two Cases*. My Lord *Stanhope's* Promise is said to have been *conditional*; all allow that it was *verbal*; and I think it is allowed likewise, that the *late King* never confirmed it. The simple Accession of the King of *Spain* to the *Quadruple Alliance*, might therefore be thought very justly sufficient to put the Matter, at that Time, out of all Dispute for the Reasons given by me, and quoted by *this Author*. But when the *Preliminaries* were to be settled, the King of *Spain's* Claim to the *Restitution* of *Gibraltar* rested on an *Engagement*, or what he took for an *Engagement*, entered into by the *late King*, and under his Majesty's *own Hand*. Besides, this *Engagement*, or Promise, whether valid or not valid, had been insisted upon as valid, in a *formal Treaty*, and had been made the Foundation of the *second Article* in the *defensive Alliance* between the *Emperor* and the King of *Spain*, which relates to *Gibraltar*. It required therefore something more to put an End to a Claim, founded in this Manner,

Manner, than to a Claim, founded on any Promise that my Lord *Stanhope* could make. These Considerations could never escape the Penetration of that most *able Minister*, who negotiated the *Preliminaries*; and therefore I conclude, *first*, that the *Spaniards* would not consent that *Gibraltar* should be mentioned *specifically* in the *second Article*; and, in the *next Place*, that they could refuse to consent to it on no Reason whatever, but this one, that their *Pretensions* to *Gibraltar* would be kept alive, if it was not mentioned *specifically*, notwithstanding the general Words, so much insisted upon by *this Writer*. He has not therefore *answered my Demand*; nor shewn 'in the *Preliminaries* an Article, which 'is indeed as express and effectual a Confirmation 'of our Right to *Gibraltar*, as if the *Word Gibraltar* 'had been put into it.' But he goes on, and observes, *that the latter Part of this second Article greatly strengthens the former*; because it is there stipulated, 'That if any Thing shall have been altered with respect to Rights and Possessions, or not 'have been put in Execution, the Alteration made, 'or the Thing not executed, is to be discussed in 'the Congress, and decided according to the Tenor of the said Treaties and Conventions;' that is, in his Sense, according to the Tenor of the *Treaty of Utrecht*, and of the *Quadruple Alliance*; for he mentions no other, except that of *Baden*, which hath nothing to do here. Now, says he, 'nothing, either as to the Right of *Great Britain* 'to *Gibraltar*, or to the Possession of it, hath been 'at all altered; nor hath there been any Non-execution, &c.' From whence he infers, that our Right to *Gibraltar* is not included in this Description of *Points left to be discussed in the Congress*. But how could he avoid seeing that he assumes for granted the very Thing disputed? No Alteration hath been made in *our Right to Gibraltar*, says he; therefore

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fore *this Right cannot be discussed*. An Alteration hath been made in *this Right*, say the *Spaniards*, by a *private Engagement* taken with us in 1721; therefore *this Alteration is to be discussed at the Congress*. Who doth not see, that whether this Right shall be found to have been altered, and what the Alteration imports, are by this Preliminary to be *discussed and decided at the Congress*?

I think, I have now shewn what I undertook, and what *this Gentleman* challenges me to shew; that is, I have shewn *those general Words in the Preliminaries*, upon which the *Spaniards* may found a Pretence for reviving their Demand of *Gibraltar*; or, to speak more properly, since they have never ceased to make it, for continuing this Demand. But I have undertaken something more; and therefore will proceed to shew what this Gentleman was ignorant of, or what he concealed very unfairly, because it is *decisive* against him.

I think he could hardly be ignorant that the *second Article* of the *Preliminaries* not only recalls the *Treaties of Utrecht and Baden*, and the *Quadruple Alliance*, as he quotes the *Article*, but likewise all *Treaties and Conventions*, preceded the Year 1725; which latter Words he does not quote. Perhaps, he judged them unnecessary. If he did so, he was much mistaken; for by the 5th *Article* of the Treaty of 1721, between *Great Britain and Spain*, it is declared, 'That all the Pretensions of both Sides, touching Affairs not exposed in the present Treaty, and which Pretensions are not comprehended in the second Article of it, shall be treated of in the future Congresses;' which was at that Time the *Congress at Cambray*. Now let it be observed, that the *Affair of Gibraltar* is not one of the *Affairs exposed in this Treaty*. Let it be observed also, that the *Pretension* of the *Spaniards to Gibraltar*, is not one of the *Pretensions* comprehended in the *second Article* of it; and then

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then let any Man deny, if he can, that, in the Intention of *Spain*, these Words were relative to the *Pretension*, which she acquired by the *private Engagement*, taken in the *Letter* so often quoted. If the *Letter* gave her a Right, as she insists, it gave her a *Pretension* certainly to claim that Right, and this *Pretension* is carefully preserved by the *Treaty of 1721*. I do not say among *other Pretensions*; for I think I may venture to say that all *other Pretensions* are specified in the *Treaty*; even that relating to the free Exercise of the *Roman Catholick Religion in Minorca*; and therefore these Words seem to have been singly applied to the *Pretensions of Spain on Gibraltar*. Will not the *Spaniards* now insist, upon these Foundations, that they enjoyed, in 1721, a Right to demand the Restitution of *Gibraltar*, by Virtue of *Conventions* then made; and that the *second Article* of the *Preliminaries* preserves entire, to all the *contracting Parties*, whatever *Rights*, as well as *Possessions*, they had by Virtue of any *Treaty or Conventions*, antecedent to the Year 1725; and that therefore the first general Words of the *second Preliminary* preserve to them the *Right* of demanding the Restitution of *Gibraltar*, as a *Right* acquired by *Conventions* made before the Year 1725; whilst the last general Words of the same *preliminary Article* preserve this *Right* as an Alteration made in the *Treaty of Utrecht* and in the *Quadruple Alliance*?

How little Weight soever the *Defender* of the *Enquiry* may allow to these Observations, which would I doubt have some in a *Congress*, yet he must allow that they ought not to have escaped him, or to have been concealed by him; since they do certainly affect the Merits of the Cause, on which he has so positively pronounced Judgment, without any Regard to them. But I am almost ready to ask your Pardon, Mr. *D'Anvers*, for saying so much on this Point, when there is another more clear, and more

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decisive still behind. Is it possible our *Author* should never have heard of a *certain publick Instrument*, containing a *Declaration* explanatory of the *Preliminaries*, made by the *French Minister* at the *Pardo*, on the 4th of *March*, 1728, and accepted and confirmed by himself, and by the *Imperial, British, Spanish, and Dutch Ministers* on the sixth of the same Month? If this *Instrument* hath ever fallen into his Hands, and it is in every Body's else, did he never read these Words in it, *that all Pretensions, on all Sides, shall be produced, debated, and decided in the same Congress?* The Disputes about *Contrabands*, and other Complaints made by the *Spaniards* concerning the Ship *Prince Frederick*, and the Disputes about the Restitution of *Prizes*, which Articles are taken Notice of in the Introduction to this *Instrument*, are, by particular Clauses in it, referred to the Discussion and Decision of the *Congress*. To what Purpose was it stipulated, that *all Pretensions whatsoever* (among which the *Pretension* of the *Spaniards* to the Restitution of *Gibraltar* must necessarily be included; since, whether ill or well founded, it is still a *Pretension* on their Side) shall likewise be referred to the *Congress*; and that his *Britannick Majesty* shall be obliged to stand to what shall be decided upon the whole? But I forbear to press this Matter any farther upon the *Gentleman*; since it would be, in some Sort, like stabbing him on the Ground.

I proceed to the Article of blocking up the *Galleons*; which is the *last*, upon which I am attacked in the *Defence of the Enquiry*. And here I must observe again that he is very far from entering into a Refutation of the Arguments advanced by me to prove, that *seizing the Galleons* was a Measure liable to no Objection, and in every Respect preferable to that of *blocking them up*. He observes indeed, upon Mr. *Hosier's* Letter, that the Treasure had been taken from on Board the *Galleons*, when our Squadron arrived

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arrived before *Porto Bello*. Now, without making any Reflections on the Intelligence brought from on Shore to the Admiral, and taking it for granted that all this Treasure was in Time removed out of his Reach; it will still be true that this Circumstance proves nothing in Defence of the Measure taken to *block up the Galleons*, and not to *seize them*; since whether they would have the Riches on Board them or not, when Mr. *Hosier* should arrive, could not be known, when his *Instructions* were drawn. If all these Riches had been actually at *Porto Bello*, when he came thither, he would have had, in Effect, nothing more to say to the *Spaniards*, than what the Orders they had received ten Days before from *old Spain* imported; which was, that they should secure the Money in the Country.

The single Point, insisted upon to justify this Measure, and which the *Writer* pronounces to be *sufficient*, is that the contrary Measure, that of *seizing the Galleons* in Port, with all their Treasure on Board, if it had been practicable, would have put Europe into a Flame, by putting all the *Proprietors* of those Riches, whether *French, Dutch, or Spanish*, into the greatest *Uneasiness*. At the same Time, he allows that taking these Ships, if they had attempted, by Force or Stealth, to come out, had been *reasonable*. Sure I am it is enough to say in reply to this, that as to the *Uneasiness*, which such a Seizure might have given the *Spanish Proprietors*, it deserved no Consideration; that the *French and Dutch Proprietors* would have believed, or ought to have believed, their Effects as secure in our Hands, as in the Hands of *Spain*; especially in a Point of Time, when they were, by Treaty at least, engaged on our Side in Opposition to *Spain*; and lastly, that the Distinction between *seizing the Galleons* at Sea, or *blocking them up in Port*, as if one was, and the other was not an Hostility, is very manifestly a Distinction without a

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Difference; to prove which, I dare appeal to every Man in *Britain*, whether he would not esteem the Hostility as great, and the Insult greater, if a *Spanish* Squadron should block up *Portsmouth*, than if it should cruize in the Channel and take our Ships at Sea. The Gentleman cuts the Dispute short, by referring us to the *Observations on the Conduct of Great-Britain*; and I shall readily join Issue with him, by referring, on my Side, to the *Craftsman extraordinary*; in which these *Observations* are fully answered, and treated as they deserved to be.

Having mentioned the *Galleons*, our *Author* could not avoid taking some Notice of a Question I asked, in answering *Publicola*, and which he allows to be very material. His Answers to it deserve a short Reflection or two. *Since the Galleons are coming home, hath Spain renounced those Designs, which our Fleet was sent to the West-Indies to prevent?* Thus he states the *Question*; and his Answer is, *truly I can't tell; nor can any one in the World, who is not in the Secrets of the Court of Spain.* A little afterwards he asks the same Question; *has the King of Spain renounced his Projects*; that is, those Designs which our Fleet was sent to the *West-Indies* to prevent? His Answer is, 'Yes undoubtedly, as far as Articles ratified by him can bind; and as far as any contracting Powers can be bound by Treaty to one another.' Let us see what is urged between the *first* and the *second* asking of the same *Question*, to produce such a wide Difference in the *Answers*. The King of *Spain* hath ratified the *Preliminaries*, in Consequence of which the Siege of *Gibraltar* is raised. Orders are sent to restore the *South-Sea Ship*; and he has promised, that the Effects of the *Galleons* shall be delivered. He hath therefore renounced his *Projects* by *Treaty*; but whether he hath renounced them in his Heart; *whether he will go on to act an open and honest Part*, that is more than any one

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one will desire, that *he* or *those*, for whom he is an Apologist, should pretend to tell, or be answerable for. But let us see what they are answerable for; what has been really done by *Treaty*; what we have obtained to make us some Amends for the rotting of our *Ships*; for the Loss of so many *thousand Lives*, and for the *Depredations* and *Hostilities*, which this *Author* sounded so high formerly; and which were carried on with redoubled Vigour, during the *pacifick Blockade* of the *Galleons*.—The Effects of the *Galleons* are to be delivered. I congratulate the *Dutch* and the *French* upon it; but especially the *latter*, who have such immense Wealth on board them. Our Share is, I fear, a small one; too small to bear any Proportion to the *Expence* we have been at, or the *Losses* we have sustained.—Orders are sent to restore the *South-Sea Ship*; but the Claims of the *Spaniards* either on that Ship, or on any Account, are preserved to them, and referred to a *Congress*, by whose Decision we must abide; and nothing is stipulated, which may secure to our Merchants a just Recompence for the numberless Seizures and Captures of their *Effects* and *Ships*.—The Siege of *Gibraltar* is raised; but the Right to the *Possession* of that Place hath not been effectually put beyond Dispute. The Obstinacy and the Chicanery of the *Spaniards* have prevailed so far, that they preserve, even by the *Preliminaries*, a Pretence for bringing this Right to be decided in the *Congress*; and I shall be glad to hear what *Ally* we have there, on whose good Offices we can depend for securing to us the Right of possessing, and the Possession of this important Place.—Upon the whole, I am extremely sorry to find, that I was so much in the Right, when I advanced that no Man could say, with Truth, that the *main Things*, in Dispute between *us* and *Spain*, were yielded to us before the Return of the *Galleons*; unless he reckoned our keeping

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keeping *Gibraltar*, and I might have added the procuring Satisfaction to our *Merchants*, not among the *main Things* in Dispute, but among those of *less Importance*.——I say very sincerely, that I had much rather have been refuted.

It appears, I think, from what hath been said, that the *Author* and *Defender* of the *Enquiry* has not only been *given up* by his *own Side*, but even by *himself*, in several *Particulars*; and several other *Points*, which were insisted upon, in the *Enquiry*, and have been disputed in *other Writings*, are either not mentioned at all in the *Defence*, or in such a slight Manner as plainly shews the *Author's* Conscience that he cannot support them, though he is very unwilling to *give them entirely up*; so that the *Author* gave a very *partial Title* to his *last Production*; which can be justly called, at best, a *Defence* only of *some Points* in the *Enquiry*; and is, more properly speaking, a *Recantation of it*, with a *few particular Exceptions*.

But now, Mr. *D'Anvers*, what shall I say to you in Excuse for so many and such *long Letters*? The best Thing I can say, is to assure you, and I do it very solemnly, that I will trouble you with no more of them. The *Gentleman*, to whom I have now replied, may *enquire* and *defend*, as much as he pleases, without any farther Molestation from *me*. When I began to write on this Subject, I meant nothing less than the silly Ambition of having the *last Word* in a Dispute. I saw, like every other Man, the publick Distress. I thought I discerned the true and original Cause of it. The Affectation, which I observed to turn us off from this Scent, fortified me in my Opinions, and determined me to examine what was alledged against them. I have done so; and if in doing it, I have contributed in any Degree to open the Eyes of my Countrymen, on their *true*, and on their *mistaken Interests*, I have obtained the sole End, which

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which I proposed to myself. I love and I hate; I esteem and I despise; but in a Case of this Moment, I should abhor myself, if any Regard to *Persons*, any Consideration, except that of *Truth*, had guided my Hand in Writing.

I began by asking Pardon of *this Author* for an Injustice, which I have done him thro' *Error*, not *Malice*; and I shall conclude with assuring him, that upon whatever Principle he may have treated me, as I think I did not deserve, I lay down my *Resentment* with my *Pen*, and remain in *Christian Charity* with him.

I return to the Business of my *low Profession* in Life; and if I was worthy to advise him, I would advise him to return to that of his *high Calling*; to feed the *Flock* committed to his Charge. That I may the more effectually persuade him to take a Resolution so much for his own Honour, and for the Advantage of the *Church*, I will exhort him to it, in the Words of the *Apostolical Constitution*, with some very little Variation, in order to render the Passage more applicable.

*Sit autem Episcopus turpis lucri non quæsitur, præsertim de Gentilibus; malitque detrimentum capere, quam inferre. Non sit avarus; non maledicus, non falsus Testis, non iracundus, non contentiosus, non negotiis, litibusque secularibus implicitus; non pro alio sponsor, aut in causis pecuniariis Advocatus. Non ambitiosus, non bilinguis; calumniæ & maledicentiæ*

“ Let a *Bishop* then  
“ not be fond of making  
“ his Court for *Gain*,  
“ and especially to the  
“ *Gentiles*. Let him rather receive than do an  
“ Injury. Let him not  
“ be given to *evil speaking*,  
“ nor to bear *false Witness*.  
“ Let him not be  
“ *wrathful* nor *contentious*. Let him not be  
“ engaged in the Business and Disputes of the  
“ *World*.



*non cupidus auditor; non Hypocrita, fallaciis vanis non utens. Quia hæc omnia Deo sunt inimica, Dæmonibus grata.*

Constit. Apostolic.  
Lib. II. Cap. 6.

“ *World.* Let him not  
“ be ready to answer for  
“ *others.* Let him not  
“ be the Advocate of *private Interest* in publick  
“ *Causes.* Let him not  
“ be *ambitious,* nor *double-*  
“ *tongued.* Let him use  
“ neither *Simulation* nor  
“ *Dissimulation* in his Con-  
“ duct; nor *vain and fal-*  
“ *lacious Sophisms* in his  
“ Discourse. For all  
“ these Things are hate-  
“ ful to *God,* and pleasing  
“ to the *Devil.*

I am,

Mr. D'ANVERS, &c.

JOHN TROT.

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## On good and bad Ministers.

**W**HILST a *wicked and corrupt Minister* is weighing out *Panegyrics* and *Dedications* against *just Satires* and *Invectives*; or, perhaps, is numbering his *Creatures* and teaching them their implicit *Monosyllables*; whilst he is drawing out his *Screen,* and providing for a *safe and decent Elopement*; or, it may be, comforts himself with the Hopes that the publick Joy, at his Removal, will drown all *future Enquiries*; or that he shall

shall *keep sweet* a good while longer, till the *Worm* seizes his *Carcass,* and *Posterity* preys upon his *Memory*; it may not be improper to turn your *Thoughts* upon the *Reverse* of his *Character,* and to enquire by what *Marks* a *good Minister* may be found out and distinguish'd; or, since he is only a *Creature,* by what *Arts,* and in what *Method,* he may be form'd and brought into *Being.* A *People,* who are running the *Hazard* of a *Death-Bed Repentance,* want nothing so much as a *good Minister*; and a *bad One* dreads nothing more than an *honest Successor,* who comes after him without treading in his *Steps*; takes his *Place* without giving into his *Secrets*; and will not be won by a *Share* of his *Rapine* to partake, at the same *Time,* of his *Crimes* and *Corruptions.*

We know the mighty *Hand,* that is to form this *Creature,* and that the *Breath of our Nostrils* is to give him *Being*; but it is no *Presumption,* no *Infringement* of the *Right of Election,* to trace out a general *Character* of many just and worthy *Candidates.* It is no *Nomination,* no *Designation* to a particular *Office,* to describe a good *Officer* at large, with all his *Qualifications* and *Endowments.* Neither the *honest Labourer,* who discovers the *Mine,* or digs out the *Ore*; nor the *skilful Artificer,* who purifies, refines, and weighs it, can in any *Sense* be said to *inroach* upon the *Authority* of *Those* above him, who are appointed to make the last *Essay*; to shape and mould it; and all *These* are *Friends* to *Cæsar,* who finishes the *Work,* and gives it his own *Image* and *Superscription.*

Let us then imagine a *Number* of *Men,* scatter'd up and down a great, wise, and discerning *Nation*; in their *Descent* noble and generous; full of the *Virtues* of their *Ancestors*; in their *Temper* affable and sweet-natured; educated in the *Knowledge* and *Study* of our *Constitution,* its *Laws,* *Settlements,* *Dependences* and *Interests*; always faithful to the  
Crown,

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Crown, when consistent with their Duty to their Country; fonder of the Substance, than the Outside of Religion; easy in their Fortunes; Lovers of Mankind; more careful to preserve, than to aggrandize a Family; making Virtue the Foundation of their Friendship, and Merit the Title to their Favour; Preservers of the Freedom of others, as well as of their own; delighting rather to be thought Good than Great; pleased with any Opportunity of making their Fellow Creatures happy; just in all their Dealings; moderate in their Pleasures; true to the several Trusts, which have been reposed in them; watchful over the Accounts of others, and ready to submit their own to a full and impartial Inspection; not servile when out of Power, nor imperious when in it; studying more the Propriety of *Oratory*, than its Ornaments and Garniture; and speaking rather to the good Sense of others, than to their Passions or Interests; not solicitous for a *Place*, because they want it, but because the Place wants them; so keen in their Resentments for the Publick, that they have no Room for those, which are personal; well acquainted with the most noted Characters and Transactions of late Years; indifferent in their Choice of publick or private Life, but careful to adorn both; and looking on the Revenue of an Office to be so far publick Money, as it is intended for the Support and Dignity of that Office, to which it is appropriated.——Men of this Character, Stars of this Lustre, are still stuck in good Plenty up and down our Hemisphere. The Changes of the Weather may sometimes hide, but cannot extinguish them. Their short-lived Obscurity is indeed their Advantage; for by This we know what it is to want them, and their Influence. Their Brightness is try'd, and distinguish'd from *Meteors* and *false Fires*. The Regularity of their Courses is  
more

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more observed; and their Glory, when it breaks out again, becomes doubly recommended.

Imagine now a Man, of this Order and Character, advanced to the *Ministry*. Suppose him not well acquainted with the Course and Dependence of many of the *Offices* and Branches of Trust under his Direction; and for that very Reason not over-forward to prescribe for *Abuses*, or admit of *Corruptions* upon the Plea of *Custom*; yet whilst it is natural for him to find out, or to place in these Offices such Men as most nearly resemble himself; he could never want good Intelligence both at Home and Abroad; clear and faithful Accounts. The *Eyes, Hands, and Feet*, which he borrow'd from others, would be so much like his own, that he could not fail to see clearly, act fairly, and walk uprightly. Such a *Minister* would with Pleasure meet a *Senate*, chosen as himself was, by the same Marks and Qualifications. He would encourage such a Choice as his best Security; and when the *boni & legales Viri de Vicineto* are return'd to *Parliament*, as well as upon *Juries*, the Electors do alike consult their own Honour and Interest. A *triennial*, or *septennial Bribe*, as ill-spent as it is ill-gotten, makes no Amends for the Loss of Credit and Reputation, which are the Support of Commerce; and it is as easy to prove, that the *Corruption* of some Boroughs is the Cause of their *Poverty*; as to prove, that their *Poverty* is the Cause of their *Corruption*. But to resume my former Subject——The *Marks* I have pointed out, and the Rules I have laid down, are of such Use to the Publick, in the Choice of a *good Minister*, that where only *one* of them (the Character of *common Honesty*) hath been attended to, and the rest have been barely guess'd at, or left to wild Chance; such a Choice has very often been more beneficial to a Country, than a Choice made upon the very Brink, or even from the Bottom of  
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that horrible and dreadful Gulph, commonly call'd *profound Policy*.——I shall illustrate this Truth by one remarkable Instance, which I hope is too remote and far-fetch'd, to be haul'd and wrench'd into *modern Application*. The *Grand Seignior* is said to walk abroad very often *incognito*, and to have his Out-lets and Conveniencies, both in the *Camp* and *Seraglio*, where he can oversee the Assemblies of his *Domesticks* and *Officers*, and be his own *Spy* upon their *Actions* and *Conversation*. Listening one Day to the *grand Minister of his Kitchen*, in a full Assembly of his own *culinary Subalterns*, closely debating the present *Juncture* and *Posture of Affairs*, (when *Discontents* ran high, and the general Voice laid the whole *Blame* upon the *Prime Vizier*) he heard the *grand Master*, then in the *Chair*, sometimes threatening *Justice*, and denouncing *Vengeance*; brandishing his *long Knife* at the *Close* of every *Period*; sometimes shaking his *Stew Pan* with——*Oh! He could toss up such a Dish of Politicks!*——And every *Menace*, every *Period* concluded with a *Wish*——*That he was Prime Vizier but for one Month only.*——The *Grand Seignior* took him at his *Word*; and, in a few *Days*, advanced him to that high *Post* next himself. Where all are *Slaves*, this *Advancement* was by no means surprizing. 'Twas a meer *despotick Humour* and *Frolick*; and perhaps done with a *Design* to punish his *Vassal's Presumption*, by setting his *own Knife* to his *Throat*, upon the first false *Step*, or *Mismanagement* in his *Conduct*. But the *Man* was honest, and the *Master* agreeably disappointed. No *Minister* ever fill'd that *Station*, for many *Years*, with greater *Honour* and *Reputation*; or was better beloved both by *Prince* and *People*. He fed the *Empire*, as he had done the *Emperor*, with *good, wholesome Diet*, well *cook'd* and *garnish'd*. He strew'd *Plenty* every where, and seem'd, by his *Conduct*, to understand perfectly well

well that fine *Maxim of Cæsar*, which deserves a whole *physical, moral, and political Essay*, fully to explain it——*Let me have Men about me that are fat.*

If *Chance* and *Incident*, or *Caprice* and *Humour*, can go thus far in the *Choice of a good Minister*, who, at first setting out only stumbled upon good *Sense* and *common Honesty*; what will not good *Sense* and *common Honesty* do, when join'd with those other *noble Qualifications*, of which I have given a *Detail*, and when mark'd out and distinguish'd by a regular and *judicious Choice*? They have made the *Reigns of Minors*, and of *Monarchs*, never out of their *Minority*, glorious and flourishing. They have transform'd *Queens* into *Amazons*, and confined the *Faults* of a soft and vicious *Prince* to a few *Apartments*; made them *Darlings* of their *People*, and their *People* happy under their *Government*. But where a *Prince*, truly wise and great, and good in himself, is surrounded by a *Multitude* of such *Counsellors*; to how amazing an *Height*, and to how many *Generations* may he extend his *Grandeur* and the *publick Felicity*?——*Such Ministers*, under a *Monarch*, the *Father* of his *Country*, will consequently consider all his *Subjects as Princes of the Blood*, (so a *merry Writer* of the last *Age* call'd them) or, in the inspired, royal *Style*, as *Flesh of his Flesh, and Bone of his Bone*; not in a *natural Sense*; for *Adoption* is better than *Nature*. *Such Ministers* will put out the *Revenues* of their *Master* to *Interest* in the *Pockets of his Subjects*; then, with a—*non rapui sed recepi*, recall them upon a real *Necessity*. *Such Ministers* will raise a *standing Force*, so very numerous, that it shall take in *all the landed Gentry and trading Commons of a Nation*; and perhaps 5 *d.* a *Day* is not so good *Encouragement*, as when *Men* fight for their *All*; for they fight for their *All*, when they fight for a *Prince*, with whom they have but one *common Safety* and *Interest*. *Such Ministers* will not suffer the *Law* to

to be made the *Back-Sword* of Justice, which cuts only on *one Side*. They will not score up a *War* to the Reckoning, when the *good Company* have not had it in; nor palm a *Truce* upon us, with all its Accidents, for the real Body of a *solid and lasting Peace*, by a new political *Trans-or-Consubstantiation*. In short, they will not, like some old *Roman* Minions and Favourites, make a *Statue* of their Master, and then fly to it for *Refuge*.

## ON THE

Policy of the *Athenians*.

*Hoc illud est præcipue in Cognitione Rerum salubre, ac frugiferum, omnis Te Exempli Documenta in illustrata Monumento intueri; inde Tibi, tuæque Reipublicæ quod imitere capias; inde fœdum Inceptu, fœdum Excitu quod vites.*

S I R,

IT is so common a Failing to think that every Thing, which particularly affects us in Reading, will equally please and entertain others, that I hope you will excuse the Fondness of a young Student for an old Story, which I have lately met with in the History of *Greece*; and I fancy it may prove as agreeable an Amusement to others as it hath been to myself; but if you think otherwise, the Use it will be

be of to you in lighting your Pipe will make you some Amends for the Trouble of reading it.

*Darius Hystaspis* is the first, I think, who is mentioned in History to have been possess'd with the wild Ambition of *universal Empire*; and in order to carry on this chimerical Design, he made several unsuccessful Expeditions into *Europe*; where he was informed that *Greece*, which then made a very considerable Figure in the World, would probably give him no small Opposition in his projected Conquests; particularly the *Athenians*, who with some of the Islanders, their Confederates, had given him a mortifying Instance of their Boldness and Resolution, by daring to assist their Colonies, in the lesser *Asia*, in their Endeavours to shake off the *Persian Yoke* and recover their antient Liberties. This was look'd upon as such an Affront to the Power of the *grand Monarch*, (as he is styled by the Historians of those Times) that nothing would satisfy him but the intire Conquest of *Greece*; to which he was likewise continually solicited by *Hippias*, Son of the famous Tyrant *Pisistratus*, who upon being expell'd by the *Athenians* for invading their Laws and Liberties, had fled to *Darius* for Protection and Assistance to recover his Tyranny.

The *Monarch*, however, to give some Colour to his Quarrel with the *Grecians*, sent to the several States to demand *Earth and Water* from them, as an Acknowledgement of their Homage and Subjection to him; requiring, at the same Time, that the *Athenians* should restore *Hippias*.

*Athens* and *Sparta*, the most considerable States in *Greece*, fired with a just Resentment at this haughty Demand from a free People, took his Messengers and threw them into deep Pits; telling them that there they might find *Earth and Water* for their King *Darius*; who, being enraged at this new Provocation, sent his Generals *Datis* and *Artaphernes*, with

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with an Army of above one hundred thousand Men, to revenge such an open Defyance and Contempt of his Power, with Orders to bring the *Athenians* Prisoners.

It is well known that *Miltiades* with a very small Number of Men, animated with the glorious Love of Liberty, routed these numerous Forces at the famous Battle of *Marathon*, and for some Time secured the Liberties of *Greece*.

*Darius*, being very desirous to recover this Disgrace, employ'd all his Endeavours, with the Power and Riches of the *Persian* Empire, to make Preparations for a second Attempt; but dying before they were compleated, he left the Prosecution of this Design to his Son *Xerxes*; who, having raised the greatest Army, that ever appear'd upon the Stage of the World, (being said to be some Millions) march'd with them into *Europe* over a Bridge made cross the *Hellepont*; but before he enter'd *Greece*, he again experienced the Courage and Bravery of the *Grecians*, by the Stop that was put to the Progress of this incredible Multitude, with a very inconsiderable Number of Men, under *Leonidas*, at the Pass of *Thermopylae*; which the *Persians* gain'd at last, by the Treachery of a fugitive *Greek*, who led them a private Way over the Mountains to surround the *Grecians*.

The unexpected Success of this small Body with the Victory, which the *Athenians* singly gain'd, soon after, over *Xerxes's* Fleet, would they hoped have been a sufficient Encouragement to the confederated *Grecians*, who had entered into a grand Alliance against the *Persian*, to have continued firm to them, in the Defence of their common Liberties; but when the *Athenians* propos'd to attack the *Persians*, in order to prevent their marching into *Attica*, the *Spartans* with their other Allies, either from Treachery or Cowardice, or a Mixture of both, in  
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a very shameful and infamous Manner refused to march, and deserted the *Athenians*, leaving them to struggle with those unequal Numbers, which it was impossible for them alone to resist; yet placing their Happiness in their Liberty, and their Liberty in their Valour, (as *Thucydides* expresses it) they did not even in this Extremity despair; but their Virtue and Courage taking new Force from their Distress, they abandon'd *Athens* to the Fury of the *Persians*, having first transported their Wives and Children to their Friends in the neighbouring Islands, and resolved with their Fleet, without any other Assistance, to conquer or dye, in Defence of their Liberties.

This glorious Resolution, with their Knowledge and Skill in naval Affairs, which they had very happily cultivated, enabled them to gain an intire Victory over the *Persian* Fleet. This so terrify'd the haughty *Xerxes*, that he fled with the utmost Precipitation and Confusion, to the *Hellepont*, and pass'd into *Asia* in a little Boat; and the Forces he left under his General *Mardonius*, to continue the War, being some Time afterwards intirely routed at *Platea*, *Greece* was absolutely freed from all farther Fears of the *Persians*, solely by the Virtue and Valour of the *Athenians*; who, forgetting the former ill Treatment of their Allies, had besides the additional Merit of leaving *Athens* a second Time expos'd to the Plunder of the Enemy, under *Mardonius*, rather than make a separate Peace with the *Persian*, who offer'd to render them full Satisfaction for all their Losses in the War; to pay them a vast Sum of Money; and make them Sovereigns of all *Greece*; but they generously refused to be instrumental in enslaving that Country, which they had so bravely defended, and preferred the glorious Title of the *Deliverers of Greece* to all other Considerations.

We may now look upon *Athens* in the Height of  
its



its Glory and Prosperity; and they would, in all Probability, have continued to be the last flourishing State in *Greece*, if they had been Masters of any Prudence, and improved the Advantages, which now lay open to them; but such is the Uncertainty of all human Felicity, that we soon find them, by their foolish Conduct, gradually losing all the Benefits of their amazing Successes in the War, till they, at last fell under the Power of *that State*, which owed its Being and Preservation to them. *Athens* therefore may be truly said to date its Ruin from the Day of its Triumph over the *Persian*; for presuming upon her great Merits and signal Services in defending and preserving the common Liberties of *Greece*, they grew haughty and insolent to all the neighbouring States; and wholly neglecting the Care of their own Affairs, they took all Occasions of intermeddling with those of their Neighbours; too often promoting Differences, in order to make themselves the sole Arbitrators and Umpires of them; by which Means they were generally so unfortunate as to increase the Number of their *Enemies*, instead of making *new Friends*.

But that, which raised the greatest Resentment against them, was their pretending to prescribe Laws to the Trade of all *Greece*, and endeavouring to exclude the *Megareans* from any Share in it. This was made the Ground of the War between Them and *Sparta*, which was not a little offended at the imperious Manner, in which *Athens* claim'd the Right of holding the *Balance of Power* in *Greece*, which they were certainly in Possession of, and might have long and easily kept, if they could have been content with the *Thing*, without affecting to make a vain Shew of it, and thereby shocking the other Powers of *Greece*, equally independent with themselves; for nothing would have more effectually secured the Superiority they aim'd at, than making

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Use of the great Reputation and Credit, which they had deservedly gain'd, by interposing their good Offices to reconcile the frequent Differences, which arose amongst the several States of *Greece*, ever jealous of their own Authorities; but whilst the *Athenians* kept within the Bounds of Moderation, the *other States* shew'd upon all Occasions the greatest Deference and Respect to their Mediation; and the whole of their Policy consisted in interposing their Force, in Cases of Necessity only, to prevent the *Weak* from being unjustly oppress'd by their *more powerful Neighbour*; and in avoiding, as much as possible, to make themselves *Parties*, much less *Principals* in their Quarrels.

Such a wise Conduct would have given them Leisure and Opportunity to enjoy the Fruits of *that Peace*, which they wanted to recover the Losses and ease the Burdens of a long and heavy War, supported chiefly by them, and carry'd on at a greater Expence of Blood and Treasure, than they had suffer'd, at any Time, since the Foundation of their State.

It is certain that they were under the happiest Circumstances to have effected this, soon after the War; for their great naval Power, which made them the undisputed Masters of the Sea, made them likewise equally esteemed and feared by their Neighbours. To this we may add the Advantages of their Situation, and Knowledge in all maritime Affairs, with their numerous Ships and the Benefits of their Colonies abroad; which might have enabled them to improve and extend their Trade, the only true Source of Riches, beyond any other Nation, and would have soon put them into such a flourishing Condition, as would have deterred the most powerful of their Neighbours from entertaining any Thoughts of disturbing their Tranquillity; and much more from entering into Projects of humbling, or subduing them.

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But they had the Misfortune, for several Years, to groan under the Government of a Set of *Ministers*, who were too intent upon their own Interest to have any serious Regard for the Welfare of the Publick; though that was the constant Subject of their own Praises; and the better to carry on their selfish and mischievous Designs, and divert the People of *Athens* from looking into their Conduct, they not only promoted continual Dissentions amongst them, under the different Distinctions of *Favourers or Opposers of the former Tyranny of PISISTRATUS*; but they likewise engaged them, on one Side or the other, in every Quarrel, that arose not only in *Greece*, but in *Asia* and Places at the greatest Distance, upon the smallest Pretences of antient Alliances, or Kindred with their Ancestors; by which Means they wasted their Strength and Riches in many fruitless and unnecessary *foreign Expeditions*, for no other Purpose than to make a Parade of their Power at Sea; and which had no other Effect than to increase the Envy and Jealousy of their Neighbours.

To support such extraordinary and extravagant Expences, they were obliged to raise almost as great and heavy Impositions, as they did in the Time of the *Persian War*, to the great Decay of Trade and Impoverishment of the People; and though this was coloured with the specious Pretences of extinguishing all Remains of the *former War*, and settling a *solid and lasting Peace*; yet it did not prevent the frequent Murmurs and Complaints of the Publick; nor were there wanting Persons, who vigorously and honestly opposed Measures, which were so visibly destructive of the true Interests and Safety of *Athens*; Measures, which it would have been impossible to have continued, if the *Heads of the Faction*, who got Possession of the Government, had not found Means to delude the People, from Time to Time, with the great Advantages they were every Day to receive

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ceive from an *universal, established Peace*, by which they were to be delivered from all Apprehensions of the Return of *Hippias*, or any of his Descendents; and the *Balance of Power* was for ever to be secured to the *Athenians*; a Notion which had been so successfully propagated in *Athens*, and so much intoxicated the Minds of the People, that there was no Imposition so gross, which their Leaders could not pass upon them, under this Pretence; and it was the never-failing Argument for silencing all Opposition, and removing all Objections to the most *chimerical Projects*, or *unreasonable Propositions* in their publick Assemblies.

*Athens* was daily languishing under this unhappy Management, which would have brought certain Ruin upon her in the End, without the Calamity of the *Peloponesian War*; for nothing prevented it but the continual Struggles of her *great Men* to supplant one another. This kept them in some Awe and restrained them from doing all the Mischief, which they had both in their Inclination and Power; so that the Preservation of *Athens*, for some Time, may be said to be owing in a great Measure, to the short Continuance of those in the Administration.

But *Cimon, Aristides* and *Tolmidas*, with several other considerable Men of real Merit and Abilities, who, notwithstanding some Failings, had done their Country very great and eminent Services; *these Men*, I say, happening to go off the Stage very near one another, left the Field open to *PERICLES*, who first subverted their Constitution, and then erected to himself an arbitrary Power, which ended in the Destruction of *Athens*.

He was a Gentleman of a private Fortune, but unmeasurable Ambition, which made him stick at nothing to advance himself in the State. For this Purpose he set out on the Foot of *Liberty*, and courted the Affections of the People, by pretending

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a Zeal for their Interest upon all Occasions; but when he had once made himself considerable by these Methods, he threw off the Mask, and treated them with the utmost Insolence; by Turns betraying all those, who trusted him, and knowing no Friendships, or Enmities, but such as favoured, or opposed his corrupt Purposes. He gave a very remarkable Instance of this, with Regard to *Cimon*, a noble *Athenian* of great Parts and Integrity, but one, whom *Pericles* hated and constantly opposed, for keeping him under that Subordination, which became his Station and Character. Yet *Cimon* afterwards falling under a Prosecution from the People, he screened him in the publick Assembly, and then made a Bargain with him, to share the Government between them; but took an Opportunity to revenge himself in the Ruin of his Son *Lacedæmonius*, after his Father's Death.

As he was Master of great Volubility of Tongue, with a Knack of speaking plausibly in publick, and had joined to this a very daring and consummate Assurance; so he knew perfectly well how to improve them to his own Advantage, in supporting any Proposition, right or wrong, as it best suited his present Purpose; for nothing was more common than to see him in *one Assembly* with great Zeal confuting his own Arguments in a *former one*; and he never scrupled to contradict the most certain Truths, or to assert the most notorious Falshoods, in order to carry his Point, though sure to be discovered a few Hours afterwards, having always an Evasion ready at Hand.

But notwithstanding the great Opinion, which he seemed to entertain of his own Eloquence and Cunning, he was convinced they would prove but a very feeble and short-lived Support to him, without some better Assistance. He therefore made Use of all his Art and Contrivance, to work himself into the

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the Administration of the *publick Revenues*; in which he had the good Luck to succeed, after the Death of *Aristides*; who, having been long Treasurer of *Greece*, did not leave Money enough behind him to defray the Expences of his Funeral.—Happy had it been for *Athens*, if *Pericles* had succeeded him in his noble Qualities, as well as Employment. But his Character was the Reverse of the *good Aristides*, and his Administration one continued Scene of Rapine and Profusion. Thus did he establish his Power on a much more lasting Foundation than his Predecessors, by applying himself to the Foibles and Vices of Mankind, which are too often the surest Hold upon them; for though it is not to be imagined but that many Corruptions had sprung up, during the former Disorders and Weakness of the Government; yet some Remains of the Modesty and Virtue of their Ancestors had hitherto restrained the *Athenians* from an open and avowed Prostitution of their Integrity; but *Pericles*, by the licentious Distribution of *Bribes* and *Bounties* amongst the People, soon extinguished all Sentiments of their former Honesty and Love of their Country, which he treated as the most ridiculous Fanaticism; and all the Endeavours of a few to oppose this Torrent of Iniquity were the publick and standing Jest of his Conversation.

This extravagant and unnatural Flow of the publick Money by Degrees introduced that Spirit of *Expence* and *Luxury* amongst all Ranks of Men, under the mistaken Notion of *Politeness*, which consumed the Estates of the best Families in *Athens*, and soon made them so necessitous, that forgetting their antient Honours and the Dignity of their Birth, they were not ashamed to become the known Pensioners of *Pericles*, living in as abject a Dependence upon him, as the meanest of People.

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Thus was *universal Corruption* spread over the whole State; and, to compleat their Misfortune, the *very Money*, which was reserved for the Necessities of War only, was spent in debauching the Minds of the People, and what was design'd for their Preservation, turn'd to their Destruction.

As *Pericles* was not qualify'd by his Rank to be of the Assembly of the *Areopagus*; (the great and supreme Judicature of *Athens*;) so to remove every Obstacle to his Ambition, he employ'd all his Art to undermine their Authority, and by Degrees drew all publick Business of Consequence to the *popular Assemblies*; where, by the Assistance of *Bribes, Pensions* and *Employments*, which were all at his Disposal, he was secure of carrying every Thing almost without Opposition.

This, together with the scandalous Disrespect, with which *Pericles* affected to treat them upon all Occasions, and their slavish Submission, at the same Time, to all his Orders, falling in with the general Depravation of the Times, soon brought them into the lowest Contempt with the People, and destroyed all Regard for that *antient and august Assembly*, which had for many Ages been the Bulwark and Defence of the Constitution.

After this fatal Blow to a *State*, which made the proudest Boast of its Liberties, and had ever shewed the greatest Jealousy of any Incroachments upon them, *Pericles* obtained almost as absolute and uncontrouled a Power as the Tyrant *Pyfistratus* himself; which gave Occasion to the calling him and his Creatures the *new Pyfistratides*; for though it is well known that the *Archons* had the Exercise of the regal Power, yet we scarce read of any Thing but their *Names*, during the whole Ministry of *Pericles*; to whom all Applications, both at home and abroad, were constantly made; and he scarce left them the Shadow of Sovereignty.

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But in the Height of this Prosperity, he was not a little disturbed with the Threats of a War from *Sparta*; the Seeds of which, as is before observed, were sown after the End of the *Persian War*, and ripened into Action by the monstrous Conduct of *Pericles*, who by Turns provoked their Resentment, and courted their Friendship in the most ignominious Manner.

It would be tedious and unnecessary to enlarge upon the particular Differences, which had from Time to Time, arisen between them, and increased the Animosities of the *two States*.

Many Endeavours had been used, to put an End to this uneasy Situation of Affairs; in which *both States* were under the Inconveniencies and Expences of an actual War, though no formal Declaration had been made of one, and the Interruptions the *Athenians* found in their Trade, with the Continuance of very severe Taxes, occasioned many loud Complaints amongst the People; to quiet which a sort of Cessation was agreed upon for five Years. This, however, lasted but a very short Time, the old Grudges breaking out again into new Hostilities; in the Pursuit of which both Parties being tired, a Peace was made between them for thirty Years, though it lasted between five and six Years only, which were chiefly employed in forming new Alliances, in order to be prepared for War; each Side being very sensible that the *Articles of the Treaty* were only patched up for the present, but were not a sufficient Foundation for a lasting Peace; and accordingly they were very negligently observed on both Sides; but it was the Misfortune of *Athens* always to lose Ground by these short Intervals of Truce; for their unhappy Behaviour had irritated many of their Neighbours against them; and their confederated Subjects took the first Opportunity to chuse *new Protectors*, and free themselves from the

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grievous Impositions, which the *Athenians* had laid upon them, under the Pretence of raising Supplies for the War.

*Pericles*, well foreseeing the fatal Consequences, which an open Rupture with *Sparta* would be to his Affairs, neglected no Endeavours to prevent it; and it is, not improperly, said that the Age of *Negotiation* then began in *Greece*. *Ministers* and *Ambassadors* were seen continually posting not only over all *Greece*, but even in the adjoining Kingdoms of *Macedon*, *Thessaly* and *Thrace*; both Sides endeavouring to engage them in *new Alliances* in their Favour; and *Pericles* was not ashamed to court the Friendship even of the *Persians*, to whom he had formerly profess'd so much Enmity and Hatred, by putting the *Ballance of Power* in their Hands.

He did not make a much better Bargain for his Country with some other of their *Allies*, who owed their Preservation to *Athens*, and pretended the greatest Friendship for them; yet being in Hopes of an Addition of Power and Wealth, by the Diminution of the Trade of *Athens*, and the Decrease of their naval Strength, in Consequence of it, they very faintly supported the Interests of the *Athenians*, and remissly discharged the Obligations of their Alliances.

*Pericles*, to remedy these growing Mischiefs, endeavour'd to gain over to his Interest some of the neighbouring Powers, by the Proposition of certain wild and impracticable Projects; such as joining the Forces of *Athens* to theirs, and making new Accessions to their Dominions, by altering the Dependencies of some of the lesser Principalities of *Greece*; but this Scheme gain'd him nothing but Shame and Contempt; so that after much Time and Labour had been spent in these fruitless Negotiations, he had Recourse to the same Methods, which he had found so very successful at home, and back'd all his  
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foreign Transactions with the Offers of a round Sum of Money; by which Means he engaged many of the lesser States of *Greece* to lend their Names, at least, to his *new Alliances*, and kept some of the favourite ones in constant Pay, under the Pretence of making good their Expences, in keeping Troops to assist *Athens* upon Occasion, though they never raised one Man more for this Service.

As he could not treat in the same Manner with the *greater Powers*, he made his Application to their *Ministers*, whom he judged by himself, and endeavour'd that Way to gain them to his Interest. Most of them took his Money; and, perhaps, excused themselves by their Intentions of neither doing him any Good, nor their Country any Harm; for they only amus'd him with Intelligences of pretended Secrets, many Falshoods, and Things of little, or no Consequence.

By this infamous Management, *Athens* was made the common Tributary of all *Greece* and the neighbouring Powers; not only to the great Waste of the publick Treasure; but, what was worse, these mean Condescensions from a *State*, which had for many Ages made so considerable a Figure in that Part of the World, lost them all their former Authority, and brought *Athens* into the utmost Contempt.

However *Pericles* endeavour'd, from Time to Time, to varnish over the present State of Affairs; continually amusing the People with Assurances of the Successes of his Negotiations abroad; and even the Perplexity of them was of Benefit to him; for it help'd to divert the Publick from looking into his Conduct; his Creatures, upon the least Offer at it, crying out that Divisions at home would give the greatest Encouragement to the common Enemy.

The present Uncertainties gave him likewise some Pretence for supplying his vast Expences, either to  
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carry on Engagements to prevent a War, or for making the necessary Preparations to begin one; and thus Arguments were never wanting to fleece the People, who in vain complain'd of the great Profusion of the publick Money, without any Account having been given of it by *One*, who had for so many Years the sole and absolute Disposition of their Revenues; whereas it had ever been usual before his Time for the *Prytanis*, who were a *Committee of the Senate*, annually to examine the publick Accounts, in the most solemn Manner, being sworn upon the Altar, before they enter'd upon that Office, to discharge their Duty with the utmost Impartiality, Fidelity and Justice to their Country.— So careful have all wise Governments ever been to preserve this Branch of the Administration from Corruption; well knowing that without it all other Precautions would be vain and ineffectual to support the Liberties of a *free People*.

As *Pericles* fell under the general Censure of the People, on this Account, so he did not escape being several Times charged in the *publick Assemblies* with the visible Corruption of his Management; which once went so far that *Dracontides*, as *Plutarch* informs us, carry'd a Resolution, or Decree, for impeaching him of embezzling the publick Treasure; but *Agnon*, one of his Creatures, by the Alteration of some Words, render'd it ineffectual; and by these little Arts and Shifts, which too many of his Dependents in the *Senate* were always ready to countenance and support, he baffled all Endeavours to obtain any Account of the immense Sums, which he had spent, during his Administration.

But it would have been impossible for him to have stood the general Clamour and Demand of the People for bringing him to Justice, if he had not had Recourse to a *new Artifice*, which no Minister before him had the Assurance to attempt. This was  
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a Proposal for allowing him *ten Talents* for *Secret-Service-Money*; which, though no very great Sum, yet as it was understood, and even acknowledged by himself, to be the *Wages of Iniquity*, it was giving a publick Sanction to *Corruption*, and was a Precedent, that at once quite overturn'd all the antient Checks and Controuls, by which their Ancestors had, in the strictest Manner, guarded against the Embezzlement of publick Money; the Disposal of which was, by this Stroke, put into the absolute Power of him, who was at the *Head of the Treasury*; for under this Cover he had the most unlimited Scope to supply any Expences, under Pretence of the publick Service.

One would think that nothing more could have been desired to gratify the most insatiable Thirst of Power and Dominion; but such were the extravagant Expences of *Pericles*, in unprofitable Negotiations abroad, and satisfying the craving Importunities of his Dependents at home, who always rose in their Demands in Proportion to the Difficulties, in which they saw him engaged, and the Want he had of their Service, that though he fear'd no Repulse to the most unreasonable Demand of *new Supplies*, yet being conscious himself of his exorbitant Expences, he began to be ashamed that the People should see what Money he consumed. He therefore resolv'd to make one bold Step more, to secure himself of a *Fund*, which would at once fully answer his Purposes and conceal his Profusions. This he put in Execution, by seizing upon the *sacred Treasure at DELOS*, which was deposited there by the common Consent of the States of *Greece*, to be kept inviolable, never to be touch'd but in Case of the utmost Extremity, and that not without their unanimous Advice and Consent.

Such an open Violation of the publick Faith rais'd the Clamours of all *Greece* upon *Pericles*; which he  
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endeavour'd to palliate at first with the Pretence of its being in greater Safety, and the Advantages, that might be made of it, by employing it for the Benefit of the Publick; but when he saw how few there were, who had the Virtue or Courage to oppose him, even in this extreme Act of Violence, he grew bolder, in a little Time, and being press'd upon this Article, openly desy'd them in the *publick Assemblies*, and with the most assuming Arrogance declared, *that the Money, when it was once granted, was no longer theirs, who gave it, but theirs, who received it.*

He soon after follow'd this with another Declaration; *that the Necessities of the State, of which he was to be the Judge himself, were above all Laws, and that nothing was so sacred but that even the Plate and Riches of the Temples might be seized, and Restitution made afterwards;* well knowing that it would not be in his Time, nor any Part of his Concern.

This *great Treasure* being now wholly in the Possession of *Pericles*, he had no farther Trouble than to give such Account of it to the Publick as he thought fit; for any Proposal of *appointing Persons* (as was the antient Custom) *to examine his Books, or count the Talents remaining,* was oppos'd with the old Cant of *dis trusting so virtuous an Administration,* as his Creatures had the Impudence to call it, and forwarding the Designs of the *Enemy,* by raising Divisions at home; the constant Artifice of those, who are engaged in Measures destructive to their Country, and are sensible that their Actions will not bear Examination; whereas, in Truth, no Enemy is so dangerous to a *free People* as these *domestick Spoilers;* for though Nations may, and often have been, laid waste by *foreign Invaders;* yet many of them have recovered their antient Freedom and Prosperity, as *Athens* itself had lately done, after all the Malice of the *Persian;* whereas History affords us no Example

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ple of any Nation, that ever regained their Liberties, when they had tamely consented to the Loss of them, or infamously sold them to their Governors for the present Supply of their *Luxury and Vices;* but their unhappy Posterity have for ever groaned under the Inheritance of Slavery, delivered down to them by their Fore-Fathers.——But to return to *Pericles.*

His Success, which even exceeded his own Expectations, struck every honest *Athenian* dumb with Astonishment at the continued, abject Compliances of their Fellow-Citizens. *Pericles* now flattered himself that his Authority and Power were so firmly established, as to be out of the Reach of all Accidents. This made him so haughty and insolent, that he became grievous to his *own Creatures,* and the Object of *universal Odium;* which was not a little heightened by the growing Necessities of the State, and the Poverty of the People; so that the former Clamours were again renewed with great Warmth and Violence for an Account of the Disposition of the Money, which had been dissipated during his long and expensive Administration. This roused his Apprehensions and threw him into great Perplexities; which his Relation *Alcibiades* taking Notice of one Day, when he was more melancholy than usual, he asked him the Reason of it. *Pericles* told him that he was considering *how to make up his Accounts with the Publick;* to which this *young Profligate* (who gave such an early Instance of the Mischiefs he was one Day to bring upon his Country) replied, that he had much better consider *how to avoid giving any Account.* Unhappily for *Athens,* he took his *Kinsman's* Advice, and seeing no other Way to escape and divert the impending Storm from bursting upon himself, he chose to turn it upon his Country, by plunging them into a War with *Sparta.*

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The *Spartans*, notwithstanding the Inclination they had shewn to begin the War, yet when Things came near to an Extremity, still expressed a Desire of continuing the Peace; and at last offered to desist from it, in Case the *Athenians* would consent to take off the Restraint from the Trade of the *Megaraeans*.

*Pericles*, in a long Speech, dissuaded them from accepting the Conditions offered, by telling them that though this was a Matter of no great Consequence, (as, in Truth, it was not) yet the Manner, in which it was asked, made it necessary for the Commonwealth to shew their Firmness on this Occasion, in order to support their Honour, and prevent the Attempts of future Impositions upon them, in Matters of greater Concern.

This determined the *venal Assembly* for War, which was soon after begun by the Siege of *Platea*, a strong Town of great Importance, and the only Acquisition of the *Athenians* by all their glorious Successes over the *Persian*; which however, in the Course of the War, was scandalously neglected by the *Athenians*, and fell a Sacrifice to *Sparta*.

Some Endeavours were used to terminate the War soon after it begun by a *Truce* made for a Year, in order to agree upon *preliminary Articles of Peace*; but they were never settled in such a Manner as to take Effect; and a *Peace*, that was afterwards concluded between them, had little better Success, the Articles being never put in Execution, or complied with on either Side; but the short Time it lasted was spent in breaking and renewing Alliances with their Neighbours in such a Manner, that it would require copying out the *fifth Book of Thucydides* to repeat the mutual Infidelities and Treacheries practised by *Athens* and *Sparta*, during this Cessation, which both Sides were more tired with than the War; and all *Greece*, with the neighbouring Powers, being

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ing now one Way or other engaged, it was soon renewed with the greatest Animosity, and at last ended in the entire Reduction of *Athens* to the Subjection of *Sparta*; a Fate, which they might in all Probability have escaped, if *Pericles* had either the Honesty to have preserved the *Peace*, by forbearing to intermeddle, where he had nothing to do, or the Spirit to have begun the *War* sooner, before *Athens* was quite exhausted, and had lost all Credit abroad by his wretched Management.

It ought however to be remembered, for the Honour of that learned State, that the most celebrated Wits and Poets of *Athens* endeavoured to open the Eyes of their Countrymen, and animate them against *Pericles*, by exposing his Conduct in satirical Poems and Invectives, but they were too far gone in Luxury and Corruption to recover their antient Spirit, being continually soothed in their Vices by a set of *profligate Writers*, whom *Pericles* had picked up and employed in his Service. These Fellows were so abandoned, that they not only made a Jest of *Liberty*, and justified all the Methods of arbitrary Government, but put their *Patron* in Competition with *Jupiter* himself, and flattered him with the Appellation of *Olympius*, at the same Time that he was precipitating the Destruction of their Country.

Thus we see that the over-grown Power, Ambition, and Corruption of ONE MAN brought Ruin upon the most flourishing State in the Universe; and there are not wanting Instances of the like Kind in History to convince us that the same Conduct will have the same Consequences in all Ages and all Nations.

I am, SIR, &amp;c.

PHIL-ATHENUS.

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O N T H E

Power of the PRINCE,

A N D T H E

Freedom of the PEOPLE.

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— *Furono veramente tutti i Rè principio Capi, e non Rè, di Republiche, e non di regni. Ma poi il lungo uso hà fatto che i Popoli si siano disposti et anuezzati all' habito dell' intiera ubbidienza, come apunto suole assuefarsi una pianta, & un corpo humano a viuere, in terreno, e sotto clime diuerso dal suo naturale.*—

Card. Bentivoglio Relatione delle Prov. unite de Fiandra. Lib. 3.

CARDINAL BENTIVOGLIO, from whose Writings I have taken the Motto to this Paper, was a Man on all Accounts little to be suspected of favouring the Cause of *Liberty*; much less of writing strongly and boldly for it. But the Love of it is innate in the Mind of every Man; and however we may be depraved by bad Education, however inflamed by Party, Interest, or the Spirit of Opposition,

sition, yet whenever we grow cool, and are not immediately agitated by our Passions, that Spirit breaks out, and shews itself even in those, who are the greatest Abettors of *arbitrary Power*.

Thus the *Cardinal*, borne down by the Force of Reason, and the Influence of this Principle of Nature, expresses in this Sentence not only his own Opinion, but that of all Mankind, though private Reasons may induce many to profess themselves of contrary Sentiments; nor is it impossible for some Men, weak in their Natures and warm in their Tempers, to be either so far seduced by the Arguments of designing Men, or so heated by political Contentions, as even to become in some Manner convinced, that they have no natural Right to *Liberty*; and that their Princes are born with a just Title to that *arbitrary Power*, which is always the Child of *Fraud*, or *Usurpation*.

It is our great Happiness that his present Majesty's Dominion is founded upon a better Title than either the *Jus divinum*, or *hereditary Right*. He owes it purely to the *Voice of the People in Parliament*. He got it by their Favour, and will keep it by their Affection; nor is it less for the Advantage of his Family, or for that of the Nation, that he came to the Throne upon these Terms. The Limitations and Conditions, by the due Observance of which he is entitled to it, will serve as a certain Rule to his Posterity, by which if they guide themselves, they may depend upon the Hearts and Purse of their Subjects to all Eternity. His Predecessors had not the same Advantages. They were bred up in a Notion that their *Prerogative* entitled them to do what they pleased; nor were the *Privileges of the People* so firmly ascertain'd. This occasioned perpetual Jealousies, gave Opportunities for *evil Ministers* to impose upon the *Prince*, and for *seditionous Persons* to inflame the *People*. It often gave  
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Rise to unwarrantable Acts of Power; and thus frequently exposed both the *Royal Family* and the *Nation* to the utmost Confusion.

*Machiavel*, in his political Discourses, lays down this Position; that no Government can long enjoy Liberty, unless it be frequently brought back to its first Principles. It is the Nature of all Government to degenerate. As it grows older, it gradually deviates and flies farther from its first Intention, which is singly the Advantage of Society; till at last it attains such a Degree of Corruption, that its Order becomes entirely inverted; and that Institution, by which the *Prince* was first only the *Servant of the Publick*, obliges the *Publick* to be *Slaves to the Prince*. For this Reason he recommends a frequent Renewal of the Constitution. The various Revolutions in this Kingdom have, in a great Measure, answered this End. They have purged off the Luxuriances of Power; and though few of them have gone so deep as to bring us back to the primitive Purity of our Constitution, yet they have still preserved us a *free People*, when *Liberty* is lost in almost every other Part of *Europe*.

The *last Revolution* has done more for us than any of the rest. I would not be understood to speak of that, which was brought about in Favour of our great Deliverer the *Prince of Orange*. I mean that, by which the *present Royal Family* were seated upon the Throne. This happy Change in our Government, though it is not marked out by any such Appellation, is the most important we have had. It has amounted within a few Degrees of that Reduction to the *first Principles of Government*, which *Machiavel* recommends. Our Constitution has received a new Spring from it; and had we taken Care to guard against a few Inconveniences, as we might have done, or used the same Caution to prevent *new Dangers*, as to redress *old Grievances*, our Liberties

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Liberties had been delivered down to our Posterity, after a thousand Years, more secure and with a greater Prospect of long Duration, than at the very Beginning of the Commonwealth.

The Sentence prefixed to this Paper contains an Account of the first Powers, with which Princes were invested. It alledges, 'That the present Power of unlimited Monarchs owes its Rise only to an Abuse of the first Trust reposed in Them; to which (though repugnant to human Nature) by gradual Steps and long Use, Men were insensibly habituated.' The original State of Monarchy is justly described very different from what it is now in all arbitrary Governments. *Kings were then no more than Chiefs, or principal Magistrates, in States Republican and free.*

It ought to give every *Englishman* the greatest Satisfaction to find the *Constitution* we now live under, since its last Renewal, bearing so near a Resemblance to *primitive Liberty*. Our Princes are now, in a great Measure, upon the same Foot with *these Chiefs, or principal Magistrates of old*. They have Authority given them to defend the *Laws of the Land*, but not to break them. They have too lately received their Crown from the Hands of the Nation to forget that it is to them only they owe it, and that consequently they can be entitled to no Powers but what are granted by them. The People must still remember that their own Hands adorn'd the Temples of their Kings, and can have Recourse to *known and positive Laws*, if *Privilege* and *Prerogative* should ever clash. They are no longer to be abused by the Sound of Words; nor will they suffer themselves any longer to be duped into an Opinion, because most of those, who have enjoyed the Title of *King*, have also an *arbitrary Sway*, that therefore *regal Authority* must inevitably import an *absolute Dominion*. They justly look upon this Word as one  
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of the many, which have different Meanings; and signifies with us no other than a *third Estate*, superior to every Individual, yet inferior to the collective Body of the People, whose Advantage and Prosperity were the only Causes of its Existence.

The *Act of Settlement* has obtained all these great Advantages for us. *That Compact between Prince and People*, which has been formerly treated by some Persons as a mere Chimæra, is now no longer to be disputed. In *that Act* are contained certain Stipulations and Conditions, under which the *Prince* has consented to accept, and by which Tenure only he holds his Crown. By these Means every Subject in the Nation may know the precise Extent of his *Prince's* Power, and the Measures of his *own Allegiance*; how far and how long he is bound to obey.

It would be tedious to enumerate the many wise and prudent Restrictions of this our second *Magna-Charta*. I shall only mention *two of the fundamental Points in this publick Act*, which sufficiently evince the Care and Zeal, with which the *Parliament*, on this Occasion, pursued the Interest of the Nation. They even seem, if we may judge from what has since happened, to have carried their Caution beyond the Bounds of absolute Necessity, or Prudence. Being apprized that the Dominions of the *present Royal Family* were very considerable abroad, and not knowing how far their Tenderness for their native Country might carry them to the Prejudice of this Kingdom, they made *these two Points* the principal Conditions of their Government; 'first, that the King should never leave his *British* Dominions without consent of Parliament; and secondly, that he should never engage *England* in any Broils relating to his *foreign* Territories.' I think I may venture to say, without any Reflection upon the Prudence of the Parliament, who insisted upon *these*

*Conditions,*

*Conditions*, that they were upon this Occasion, a little deficient in *good Manners*; but this Error may be forgiven, as it proceeded from their Zeal, and we have since corrected it, by abandoning *those two Points*, of which I have been speaking; the *first* soon after his late Majesty's Accession to the Throne; the *other* not long ago, in that just, honourable, and ever-memorable Resolution of the House of Commons, by which we engaged to support and maintain his Majesty's German Dominions, with the utmost Efforts of Great-Britain.

The remaining Articles of the *Act of Settlement* are of such a Nature, that we have no Reason to fear they will be dispensed with. I have already shewn how much it is the Interest of the *Prince*, as well as the *People*, to maintain them. I have mentioned many Advantages arising from a Settlement established on the Foot of *Liberty*. They are such, that I think any Man, who endeavours to raise the *Prerogative* one Step higher than it stands at present, or even argues in Favour of such Conduct, either with a View to seduce the *People*, or to ingratiate himself with his *Prince*, is the worst of Traitors, and deserves the Curse and Hatred of the whole Community.

Sir *William Temple*, in his Observations upon the *Dutch Republick*, made this judicious Remark.—  
 "That this stomachful People, who could not endure the least Exercise of arbitrary Power, or Impositions, under the *Spanish Government*, have been since inured to digest them in the highest Degree, under their own *popular Magistrates*; bridled with *hard Laws*; terrify'd with *severe Executions*; environ'd with *foreign Forces*; and oppressed with the most *cruel Hardships*, and *Variety of Taxes*, that was ever known under any Government."

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The Reason of this great and general Content, under the most severe Oppression, was only this; that they found every one subject to the *same Law*. The *Persons in the Administration* could make no Advantage from the publick Calamities. On the contrary, they felt the Weight of the publick Misfortunes more heavily than those, who had less Interest in the general Welfare. It was never observed in that Country, that the *principal Men in the Commonwealth* encreased in Riches, in Proportion as the Country grew poorer, or the Publick laboured under heavier Taxes. These Evils were well guarded against by their Constitution; and therefore they considered all their Misfortunes as a wise and just Regulation of Providence for some important Ends, which consequently they never repined at.

The *Hanover Succession* under the Limitations, which I have mentioned, and on which it is founded, has obtained in a great Measure, these Advantages for us. The *Prince* himself is now subject to the *Law*, and the *Act of Settlement* binds him equally with the *meanest Peasant*.

The Benefits of this excellent Establishment are not so easily discovered, 'till some Abuses happen. But if ever a *weak and corrupt Administration* should arise; if an *evil Minister* should embezzle the publick Treasure; if he should load the Nation, in Times of Peace, with Taxes greater than would be necessary to defray the Charge of an expensive War; if the Money thus raised should be expended, under the Pretence of *secret-Services*, to line his own Pockets; to stop the Mouths of his hungry Dependents; to bribe some future Parliament to approve his Measures; and to patch up an ill-digested, base, dishonourable Peace with foreign Powers, whom he shall have offended by a continued Series of Provocations and Blunders; if he should advise his Sovereign to make it a Maxim, that his Security consisted in the

Continuance,

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Continuance, or Increase of the *public Debts*, and that his Grandeur was founded on the *Poverty of his Subjects*; if he should hazard the Affections of the People, by procuring greater Revenues for the *Crown*, than they should be able to spend, or the People be well able to raise; and after this engage his Prince to demand still farther Sums as his Right, which all Men should be sensible were not his Due: I say, if the Nation should ever fall under these unhappy Circumstances, they will then find the Excellence of a *free Constitution*. The publick Discontent, which upon such Occasions has formerly burst forth in a Torrent of Blood, of universal Confusion and Desolation, will make itself known only in faint Murmurs, and dutiful general Complaints. The Nation will wait long, before they engage in any desperate Measures, that may endanger a Constitution, which they justly adore, and from which they confidently expect a sure, though perhaps a dilatory Justice, upon *such an enormous Offender*.

These are the inestimable Advantages of our *present, happy Settlement*. Let us prize it as we ought. Let us not have the worse Opinion of the Thing itself, because it may, in some Instances, be abused. But let us retain the highest Veneration for it. Let us remember how much it is our Right, and let us resolve to preserve it untainted and inviolate. Thus shall we truly serve our *King*; we shall do our Duty to our *Country*; and preserve ourselves in the Condition, for which all Men were originally designed; that is, of a *free People*.

Of

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## Of the CONSTITUTION of GREAT-BRITAIN.

**I**T is pleasant to observe a Set of Writers charging others with forming *Republican Schemes*, when they themselves are the Persons, who in Effect, and by the necessary Consequence of their Way of Reasoning, have been placing our *excellent Constitution* in a most ridiculous and contemptible Light. According to them, it is no better than a Jumble of incompatible Powers, which would separate and fall to Pieces of themselves, unless restrain'd and upheld by such honourable Methods as those of *Bribery* and *Corruption*; for how is it possible for any Man, under any other Notion, to plead for the Necessity, or for the Fitness of *Places*, and *Pensions*, or any *pecuniary Influence* among the Members of the *House of Commons*? If any *Dependence* or *Bias*, created by such *Motives*, were really necessary, it would prove that the *Form of our Government* itself was defective to a Degree of Ridiculousness; that it was a *Constitution*, having a *Representative of the People*, which must be engaged *not to represent them*; nor to vote and act, as they would vote and act, if uninfluenced by *private Interest*, or *corrupt Motives*. Now, if such an *Influence*, or *Dependence*, was universal and unlimited throughout the *whole House*, the Monarchy would be *absolute*, and whenever this *Influence* prevails in any Degree, it tends to *arbitrary Power*.

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For this Reason, the true Friends of *Liberty* must perpetually guard against such *Influences*; which is not setting up a *new Form of Government*, but preserving the *old*.

Our *Constitution* may, in some Sense, be said to be a fleeting Thing, which at different Times hath differ'd from itself, as Men differ from themselves in Age and Youth, or in Sickness and Health; but still it is the same, and it is our Duty to preserve it, as far as we are able, in its full Strength and Vigour. I don't know a more useful Turn of Mind, and what will contribute more to this End, than that, which disposeth us to observe the several *Changes* in our *Constitution*; the *Causes*, which have produced them; and the *Consequences* attending them. I don't pretend, for my Part, to enter far into this Subject; but will only offer some few Observations on what hath happen'd of that Kind, during the Reigns of King WILLIAM and Queen ANNE; and I leave it to other Pens to remark farther back, or to continue such Remarks farther on.

At the Time of the *Revolution*, our *Constitution* received a considerable Strength by that *Act*, which is call'd the *Declaration of Rights*; by which, we hope, an End is put to the dangerous Claims and Practices of some former Reigns; such as that of a Power in the Crown to *dispense with the Execution of the Laws*, as also that of keeping up a *standing Army in Time of Peace without Consent of Parliament*; and some other Particulars, which are contained in that *Act*. I don't reckon that we obtained any Thing new by it; any Thing, that was not our just Right before; nor does it provide such *Remedies* for us, or such *Penalties* for the Offenders against it, as might have been contrived; yet it is an Advantage to have that expressly declared and acknowledged to be our *Right*, which had once been brought, how unjustly soever, into Dispute.

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About five or six Years after this, we obtained the *Triennial Act*; which was an additional Security to our *Liberties*; for though it may seem, from the Reason of Things and antient Usage, that *Parliaments* ought to have been either *annual*, or to continue no longer than till the *particular Business*, for which they were summoned, was finished; yet, by the Precedents made of the *long Continuance of the same Parliament*, in the Reigns of *Charles the first* and *second*, it was become fit and requisite to enact, by an express Law, that there should be a *new one*, at least, once in *three Years*. It may, perhaps, be wondered that this was not taken Care of in the *Declaration of Rights*; for though it is declared that *Parliaments ought to be held frequently*; (by which might not improperly be understood *new Parliaments*) yet, in a Matter of such Importance, one might have expected more clear and positive Expressions. The only Reason I can assign for this is, that *that Declaration* was chiefly intended to assert and assure to us *those Rights*, which had been invaded by *King James*. Now, that of holding the *same Parliament for a long Term* was no Part of the Complaints against his Government; since during his short Reign he called but *one Parliament*, and that he dissolved abruptly at their *second Sessions*.

But I proceed to mention those *other Acts*, which *King William* passed, for securing to us *free Parliaments*, and consequently our *Constitution and Liberties*. There was one, to prevent *double and false Returns*; another to prevent *Bribery*; another to prohibit *Commissions of the Excise sitting in the House*; and by a Clause in an *Act* of the 12th of his Reign, which is the *Act of Settlement*, it was provided that after his Decease, and the Decease of the then Princess *Anne*, no Person, who had *any Office, or Place of Profit under the King, or received any Pension from the Crown*, should be capable of serving as a Member of the House

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*House of Commons*. The passing *those Laws* was certainly giving Strength and Security to our *Liberties*, in the most important and essential Article; for the Freedom and Independency of *this Assembly* is undeniably the Support of them all, and upon which the Fabrick of our whole Constitution depends. The *Members of this House* are the Trustees and Guardians of all we have, and of all our Posterity.

I will add one Instance more of the Advantage accruing to the Cause of *Liberty*, under the Reign of that *glorious Deliverer of our Country*. What I mean is, his complying with the Desire of his *People and Parliament*, in reducing the Number of the *standing Forces in England* to about 7000 Men. Thus we see that as, by the coming in of *King William*, our *Religion and Liberties* were preserved from the Designs and Projects then on Foot to destroy *both*; so, by his succeeding Reign, he farther strengthened and secured them to us by *good Laws*. I cannot help thinking, that whenever it shall be thought proper to set up an equestrian Statue to the Memory of *that Prince*, an Inscription ought to be engraven on the Pedestal in these, or such like Words.

— ‘ To the immortal Memory of King WILLIAM  
‘ the third, who by an hazardous and glorious En-  
‘ terprize preserved the *British Nation* from the  
‘ imminent Danger of *Popery and Slavery*; and af-  
‘ terwards with more Glory, as securing us for the  
‘ future is doing a far greater Good than only once  
‘ preventing a present Danger, he confirmed and  
‘ strengthened its Liberties by such excellent Laws  
‘ as the TRIENNIAL ACT, and that of the 12th  
‘ of his Reign, entitled an Act for the FARTHER  
‘ LIMITATION of the Crown, and better securing  
‘ THE RIGHTS and LIBERTIES of the Subject.’

It can be no Objection against setting up such a Memorial of *those Laws*, that the *first* of them is repealed, and that the *Clause abovementioned in the*

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other is repealed likewise; for though, in Deference to the Wisdom of the *Legislature*, we suppose that the *Repeal* was for *good Reasons*, with Regard to the Time, in which they were repealed; yet we may affirm that the *enacting of them*, at the Time they were enacted, was for *good Reasons* too, and such as arise from a Consideration of the Nature of *Government*, the Principles of *Liberty*, and Precedents in *free States*.

I was induced to mention these Things at present, because *some Persons* are often calling upon and defying People to instance any *one Article of Liberty*, or *Security for Liberty*, which we once had, and do not still hold and enjoy. I desire Leave to ask them, whether *long Parliaments* are the same Thing as having *frequent Elections*.—Is the Circumstance of having *almost two hundred Members of the House of Commons* vested with Offices or Places, under the Crown, the same Thing as having a *Law*, that would have *excluded all Persons, who hold Places, from sitting there*?—Is an Army of above 17,000 Men, at the Expence of 850,000 *l. per Ann.* for the Service of *Great-Britain*, the same Thing as an Army of 7000 Men, at the Expence of 350,000 *l. per Annum* for *England*; and I will suppose there might be about 3000 Men more for *Scotland*?—Is the *Riot-Act*, which establishes *Passive-Obedience* and *Non-Resistance* by a Law, even in Cases of the utmost Extremity, the same Thing as leaving the People at Liberty to redress themselves, when they are grievously oppressed, and thereby oblige the Prince, in some Measure, to depend on *their Affections*?

But to return from whence I have digress'd, and pass to the next Reign. In that of *Queen Anne* a very expensive War against *France* involved the Nation in a heavy Debt, (which I hope will be a Warning to us from engaging hastily in another) and occasion'd

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occasion'd the granting several *Duties and Taxes*, which are received by the *Crown*, and charged as Funds to pay Interest on several great Sums, that have been borrow'd. This Circumstance is certainly of no Advantage to the Cause of *Liberty*, as it makes the *Crown* the immediate Steward and Receiver of the annual Income of near *fifty Millions of the People's Property*; besides increasing its Influence and Weight by the vast Number of *Officers*, employ'd in collecting, overseeing and paying *these Funds and Revenues*. I must farther add, that there was a *Clause in an Act of Parliament* repeal'd in this Reign, which till then had been highly valued, as what would tend very much to the Security of our *Liberties*. I mean *that Clause of the 12th of King William* above-mention'd, by Virtue of which, after the Decease of the *Queen*, no Person having any *Place* could sit in the *House of Commons*. I mention this without any Design to cast the least Reflection on *that excellent Princess*, who pass'd many *good Laws* for the Security of *Liberty*, as will appear from what I am going to mention; for by the *same Act*, in which *that Clause* was repeal'd, there was *another* inserted, by which all Persons, holding the several *Offices* therein specify'd, were incapacitated from sitting in the *House of Commons*; as well as all Persons, holding any *new Places*, created since 1705. By the *same Act* all Persons, who, after their Election into Parliament, shall accept any *Office of Profit* whatsoever under the *Crown*, (except in the *Army or Navy*) are declared incapable of sitting in the House, unless *re-elected*.—In consenting to *these Clauses*, her Majesty gave us immediate Possession of the Benefit of them; whereas that of the 12th of *King William*, though it was more extensive, yet was not to take Place till a Time remote, and so was repeal'd before it came in Force. In the 5th Year of her Reign, she pass'd the *Qualification-*

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*Act,*



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*Act*, which requires that every Member for a Borough shall have 300 *l. per Annum*, and for a County 600 *l. per Annum*; a Law, which was intended to confine the Election to such Persons as are *independent in their Circumstances*; have a valuable Stake in the *Land*; and must therefore be the most strongly engaged to consult the *publick Good*, and least liable to *Corruption*. *This Law* has been of great Service to us, and is so still; tho' far from being effectual; but it would be in a great Measure needless, if we were once made secure against *Bribery at Elections* and *Corruption after Elections*; because the People, when left to themselves, would naturally chuse the chief and best Sort of the Gentry to represent them.

But I propose, as I said before, to pursue these Kind of Remarks no farther than *those two Reigns*. I will only add, that if any Part of these *good Laws*, which still subsist, and were form'd for the Preservation of the *Freedom of Parliaments*, have not their due Force, by Reason of *conceal'd Evasions*, which in Length of Time may have been found out; what can be more reasonable than to apply an effectual Remedy? Is it not of a hundred Times more Consequence to prevent *such Evasions* and any *little Frauds in the Customs*? If the Laws formerly contrived, for securing to us *free Parliaments* and *frequent Elections*, have been repeal'd; it is natural to desire that a proper Opportunity may offer itself for recovering what we once enjoy'd by *express Law*, as well as by the Nature of our *Constitution*. And farther, if the *publick Debts* are such an Incumbrance and Embarrassment to us, that we could not engage with Vigour in a War, even upon *our own Account*, and for *our own immediate Interests*, if Occasion required, or if they are so circumstanced, that they may render our *Liberties* less secure; what can be more fit and reasonable than to make Use of the Means we have in our Hands to lessen *these Debts*, by managing the national

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tional Expence with all possible Frugality, and shunning all Occasions of increasing them? Sure, no *good Ally* can expect that we should act for *his Interest*, with less Caution than we use for *our own*; or that we should be more quick in making Reprisals upon the Aggressors against *him*, than we are upon those against *ourselves*!

If the *ministerial Advocates* would be thought to have any Sense of *Liberty*, or *Revolution-Principles* left unextinguish'd in their Breasts, let them come fairly to *these Points*, without Sophistry, or Prevarication; but if, instead of this, they are resolved to drudge on in their old Road of calling *Jacobite* and *Republican*, they must expect to continue in the same Contempt they are at present, and only make their *Patron* ridiculous, as well as themselves.

I am, S I R, &c.

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## The Freeholder's POLITICAL CATECHISM.

I have lately read a little Piece, intituled, the *Freeholder's political Catechism*; and as the Duty to our Country is next to our Duty to God, I think it ought to be spread into as many Hands as possible, at this Juncture. I shall present my Country Readers with those Parts of it, which relate immediately to the *British Constitution* and the *Liberty of the Subject*.

*Extracts from the* FREEHOLDER'S POLITICAL  
CATECHISM.

QUESTION.

*WHO* are You?

*Answer.* I am *T. M.* a Freeholder of *Great-Britain*.

Q. *What*

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*Q. What Privilege enjoyest thou by being a Freeholder of Great-Britain?*

*A.* By being a Freeholder of *Great-Britain*, I am a greater Man in my civil Capacity than the greatest Subject of an arbitrary Prince; because I am governed by Laws, to which I give my Consent; and my Life, Liberty, and Goods cannot be taken from me, but according to those Laws. I am a Freeman.

*Q. Who gave thee this Liberty?*

*A.* No Man gave it me. *Liberty* is the natural Right of every human Creature. He is born to the Exercise of it, as soon as he has attained to that of his Reason; but that my *Liberty* is preserved to me, when lost to a great Part of Mankind, is owing under God to the Wisdom and Valour of my Ancestors, Freeholders of this Realm.

*Q. Wherein does this Liberty, which thou enjoyest, consist?*

*A.* In *Laws* made by the Consent of the People, and the due Execution of *those Laws*. I am free not from the *Law*, but by the *Law*.

*Q. Wilt thou stand fast in this Liberty, whereunto thou art born and entitled by the Laws of thy Country?*

*A.* Yes verily, by God's Grace, I will; and I thank his good Providence that I am born a Member of a Community governed by *Laws*, and not by arbitrary Power.

*Q. What dost thou think incumbent upon thee, to secure this Blessing to thyself and Posterity?*

*A.* As I am a *Freeholder*, I think it incumbent upon me to believe aright concerning the fundamental Articles of the Government, to which I am subject; to write, speak, and act on all Occasions conformably to this orthodox Faith; to oppose, with all the Powers of my Body and Mind, such as are Enemies of our good Constitution, together with all their secret and open Abettors, and to be obedient

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dient to the King, the supreme Magistrate of the Society.

*Q. Rehearse unto me the Articles of thy political Creed?*

*A.* I believe that the supreme, or legislative Power of this Realm, resides in the *King, Lords, and Commons*; that his Majesty King *George the second* is Sovereign, or supreme Executor of the Law; to whom, upon that Account, all Loyalty is due; that each of the three Members of the Legislature are endowed with their particular Rights, and Offices; that the *King*, by his royal Prerogative, has the Power of determining and appointing the Time and Place of the Meeting of Parliaments; that the Consent of *King, Lords, and Commons* is necessary to the Being of a Law, and all the three make but one Lawgiver; that as to the Freedom of Consent in making of Laws, those three Powers are independent; and that each and all the three are bound to observe the Laws that are made.

*Q. Why is the legislative Power supreme?*

*A.* Because what gives Law to all, must be supreme.

*Q. What meanest thou by Loyalty to the King?*

*A.* I have heard that *Loy* signifies Law; and *Loyalty Obedience*, according to *Law*; therefore he, who pays this Obedience, is a loyal Subject; and he, who executes the King's Commands, when contrary to *Law*, is disloyal and a Traytor.

*Q. Is it not in the Law, that the King can do no Wrong?*

*A.* It is; for since *Kings* do not act immediately by themselves, but mediately by their *Officers*, and *inferior Magistrates*; the Wisdom of the Law provides sufficiently against any undue Exercise of their Power, by charging all illegal Acts, and all Kinds of Male-Administration upon their *Ministers*; by the great Regard, which is paid to the *King* by this

Maxim, laying him under an indisputable Obligation not to screen his *Ministers* from publick Justice, or publick Enquiry.

Q. *What dost thou mean by the royal Prerogative?*

A. A discretionary Power in the *King* to act for the *Good of the People*, where the *Laws* are silent, never *contrary to Law*, and always subject to the *Limitations of the Law*.

Q. *Is not then the King above the Laws?*

A. By no Means; for the Intention of Government being the Security of the Lives, Liberties, and Properties of the Members of the Community, they never can be supposed, by the Law of Nature, to give an *arbitrary Power* over their Persons and Estates. *King* is a Title, which, translated into several Languages, signifies a Magistrate with as many different Degrees of Power, as there are Kingdoms in the World; and he can have no Power but what is given him by *Law*; yea, even the *supreme*, or *legislative Power* is bound, by the Rules of Equity, to govern by *Laws* enacted, and published in due Form; for what is not *legal* is *arbitrary*.

Q. *How comes it that those, who endeavour to destroy the Authority and Independence of any of the Branches of the Legislature, subvert the Constitution?*

A. By the fundamental Laws of the Constitution, the free and impartial Consent of *each of the three Members* is necessary to the Being of a Law; therefore if the Consent of any of the *three* is wilfully omitted, or obtained by *Terror* or *Corruption*, the Legislature is violated; and instead of *three* there may be really and effectually but *one Branch* of the Legislature.

Q. *Canst thou illustrate this by any Example?*

A. The royal Authority and that of the *House of Peers* were both destroyed by the *House of Commons*, and by a small Part of that, in the late civil War; so that the very Form of Government was annihilated.

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Q. *Can you give me an Instance, where the Form of Government may be kept, and yet the Constitution destroyed?*

A. Yes. The Forms of the free Government of *Rome* were preserved under the arbitrary Government of the *Emperors*. There was a *Senate*, *Consuls*, and *Tribunes of the People*; as one might say, *King*, *Lords*, and *Commons*; and yet the Government under the *Emperors* was always *despotick*, and often *tyrannical*; and indeed the worst of all Governments is *Tyranny* sanctified by the Appearance of *Law*.

Q. *By what Means fell that great People into this State of Slavery?*

A. I have read the *Roman History*, and by what I can judge, it was by *Faction*, *Corruption*, and *standing Armies*.

Q. *All these Things might happen to Romans; but did ever any Parliament of this Nation give up the Liberty of the People?*

A. Yes. A pack'd Parliament, in *Richard the second's* Time. established by a Law the *King's arbitrary Power*, and with Leave to name a *Commission with Parliamentary Authority*. Parliaments in *Henry the eighth's* Time, were Slaves to his Passions, and One gave the *King* a *legislative Authority*. And there are many Instances of *Parliaments* making dangerous Steps towards the Destruction of the Liberty of the People.

Q. *Who were the English Monarchs, who were the most indulgent to the Liberties of the People?*

A. The great *King Alfred*, who declared that the English Nation was as free as the Thoughts of Man; the glorious Monarchs, *Edward the first*, *Edward the third*, and *Henry the fifth*, who would not let his People swear to him till he had an Opportunity of swearing to them, at his Coronation; and the immortal *Queen Elizabeth*, who declared it by Law *High Treason*, during her Life, and a *Premunire* afterwards,

terwards, to deny the Power of Parliament in limiting and binding the Descent, or Inheritance of the Crown, or the Claim to it.

Q. When were those slavish Maxims of hereditary, indefeazable Right, and Prerogative, superior to Law, first introduced?

A. In the Time of James the first; who, by endeavouring to establish them, laid the Foundation of all the Miseries which have since happened to his Family; and it is the greatest Security to the present Branch of it, that such Doctrines, which sow the Seeds of Jealousy between the King and his People, are by the present Establishment quite exploded.

Q. What dost thou learn from those Histories?

A. That a King of this Realm, in the full Possession of the Affections of his People, is greater than any arbitrary Prince; and that the Nation can never be effectually undone but by a wicked Parliament; and lastly, to be thankful to God that, under our present most gracious King, our Constitution is preserved entire, though at the same Time there are many Circumstances, which call loudly for Vigilance.

Q. What are those?

A. Such as have been the Fore-runners and Causes of the Loss of Liberty in other Countries; Decay of Virtue and publick Spirit, Luxury, and Extravagance in Expence, Venality and Corruption, in private and publick Affairs.

Q. How comes there to be a Decay of publick Spirit, when there is more than usual a Desire to serve the Publick?

A. If a Desire to live upon the Publick be a publick Spirit, there is enough of it at this Time; when Extravagance makes People crave more, and the Administration of a publick Revenue (perhaps treble what it was before the Revolution) enables the Crown to give more than formerly.

Q. What dost thou fear from this?

A. That

A. That such as serve the Crown for Reward may in Time sacrifice the Interest of their Country to their Wants; that Greediness of publick Money may produce a slavish Complaisance, as long as the Crown can pay; and Mutiny, when it cannot; and, in general, that Motives of Self-Interest will prove an improper and weak Foundation for our Duty to our King and Country.

Q. What wouldst thou do for thy Country?

A. I would die to procure its Prosperity; and I would rather that my Posterity were cut off, than that they should be Slaves; but as Providence at present requires none of these Sacrifices, I content myself to discharge the ordinary Duties of my Station, and to exhort my Neighbours to do the same.

Q. What are the Duties of your Station?

A. To endeavour, as far as I am able, to preserve the publick Tranquility; and, as I am a Freeholder, to give my Vote for the Candidate, whom I judge most worthy to serve his Country; for if from any partial Motive I should give my Vote for one unworthy, I should think myself justly chargeable with his Guilt.

Q. Thou hast perhaps but one Vote of five hundred, and the Member perhaps one of five hundred more; then your Share of the Guilt is but small.

A. As he, who assists at a Murder, is guilty of Murder, so he, who acts the lowest Part in the enslaving his Country, is guilty of a much greater Crime than Murder.

Q. Is enslaving one's Country a greater Crime than Murder?

A. Yes; inasmuch as the Murder of human Nature is a greater Crime than the Murder of a human Creature; or as he, who debaseth and rendereth miserable the Race of Mankind, is more wicked than he, who cutteth off an Individual.

Q.

Q. Why is enslaving Mankind murdering human Nature?

A. Because Mankind in a State of Slavery and Freedom is a different Sort of Creature; for Proof of this I have read what the Greeks were of old, and what they are now in a State of Slavery.

Q. What is become of the Heroes, Philosophers, Orators, and free Citizens of Greece?

A. They are now Slaves to the great Turk.

Q. What is become of the Scipio's, and Cato's of Rome?

A. They sing now on the English Stage.

Q. Does not the Tranquility, occasion'd by absolute Monarchy make the Country thrive?

A. Peace and Plenty are not the genuine Fruits of absolute Monarchy; for absolute Monarchies are more subject to Convulsions than free Governments, and Slavery turneth the fruitful Plains into a Defart; whereas Liberty, like the Dew from Heaven, fructifieth the barren Mountains. This I have learn'd from Travellers, who have visited Countries in both Conditions; therefore, as I said before, I should reckon myself guilty of the greatest Crime human Nature is capable of, if I were any Ways accessary to the enslaving my Country. Though I have but one Vote, many Units make a Number; and if every Elector should Reason after the same Manner, that he has but one, what must become of the Whole? A Law of great Consequence, and the Election of the Member, who voteth for that Law, may be both carry'd by one Vote. Great and important Services for the Liberties of their Country have been done by ordinary Men. I have read that the Institution of the Tribunes of Rome, or the whole Power of the Commons, was owing to a Word spoke in Season by a common Man.

Q. Is it not lawful then to take a Bribe from a Person otherwise worthy to serve his Country?

A.

A. No more than for a Judge to take a Bribe for a righteous Sentence; nor is it any more lawful to corrupt, than to commit Evil that Good may come of it. Corruption converts a good Action into Wickedness. Bribery of all Sorts is contrary to the Law of God; it is a heinous Sin, often punish'd with the severest Judgments; it involves in it the Sin of Perjury, as the Law stands now; and is besides the greatest Folly and Madness.

Q. How is it contrary to the Law of God?

A. The Law of God saith expressly, Thou shalt not wrest Judgement; Thou shalt not take a Gift. If it is a Sin in a Judge, it is much more in a Law-giver, or an Elector; because the Mischiefs occasion'd by the first reach only to Individuals; That of the last may effect whole Nations, and even the Generations to come. The Psalmist, describing the Wicked, saith, his Right Hand is full of Bribes. The Prophet, describing the Righteous, tells us, he shaketh his Hands from holding a Bribe. Samuel, justifying his Innocence, appeals to the People, of whose Hands have I taken a Bribe? Then as to divine Vengeance, holy Job tells us, that God shall destroy the Tabernacle of Bribery. Achan's Avarice, who had appropriated to his own Use the Golden Wedge and the Babylonish Garment, brought the Judgment of God upon the whole People, so that they fled before their Enemies, till the Criminal was discover'd and stoned to Death. The Leprosy adhered to Gehazi (the Servant of Elisha) and his House for ever, for taking a Bribe from Naaman, a rich Minister of a great Prince. Therefore he, that taketh a Bribe, may justly expect what is threaten'd in holy Writ; He shall not prosper in his Way, neither shall his Substance continue; his Silver and Gold shall not be able to deliver him in the Day of the Wrath of the Lord.

Q.



*Q. Why is he, that taketh a Bribe, guilty of the Sin of Perjury?*

*A. Because he sweareth,*

**I** A. B. \* *do swear (or being one of the People called Quakers, I A. B. do solemnly affirm) I have not received, or had by myself, or any other Person whatsoever in Trust for me, or for my Use or Benefit, directly or indirectly, any Sum or Sums of Money, Office, Place or Employment, Gift or Reward, or any Promise or Security for any Money, Office, Employment or Gift, in order to give my Vote at this Election; and that I have not before been polled at this Election.*

*Q. What thinkest thou of those, who are bribed by Gluttony and Drunkenness.*

*A. That they are viler than Esau, who sold his Birth-right for a Mess of Porridge.*

*Q. Why is taking a Bribe Folly, or Madness?*

*A. Because I must refund Ten-fold in Taxes of what I take in Elections; and the Member, who bought me, has a fair Pretence to sell me; nor can I, in such a Case, have any just Cause of Complaint.*

*Q. What wilt thou say then to the Candidate, that offers thee a Bribe?*

*A. I will say, 'Thy Money perish with thee! As thou art now purchasing thy Seat in Parliament, I have just Reason to suspect thou resolvest to sell thy Vote. What thou offerest, and what thou promisest may be the Price of the Liberties of my Country. I will not only reject thy Bribe with Disdain, but will vote against thee.'*

*Q. Is not the Justice of a King sufficient Security for the Liberty of a People?*

*A. The*

\* *This Oath is enjoined by the late glorious Act for preventing Bribery and Corruption at Elections.*

*A. The People ought to have more Security for all that is valuable in the World, than the Will of a mortal and fallible Man. A King of Britain may make as many Peers, and such as he pleaseth; therefore the last and best Security for the Liberties of the People, is a House of Commons genuine and independent.*

*Q. What meanest thou by a genuine House of Commons?*

*A. One, that is the lawful Issue of the People, and no Bastard.*

*Q. How is a Bastard House of Commons produced?*

*A. When the People by Terror, Corruption, or other indirect Means, chuse such as they otherwise would not chuse; when such as are fairly chosen, are not returned; when such as are returned, are turned out by partial Votes in controverted Elections, and others not fairly chosen set in their Places.*

*Q. How may a House of Commons become dependent?*

*A. When the Freedom of voting is destroyed by Threatnings, Promises, Punishments, and Rewards; by the open Force of the Government, or the Insults of the Populace; but above all by private Influence; for they, who are armed with the Power of the Crown, have many Ways of gratifying such as are subservient to their Designs, and many Ways of oppressing such as oppose them, both within the Bounds of the Law.*

*Q. Can a King have a more faithful Council than a House of Commons, which speaketh the Sense of the People?*

*A. None; for they will not only give him impartial Council, but will powerfully and chearfully assist him to execute what they advise.*

*Q. What are the Marks of a Person, worthy to serve his Country in Parliament?*

*A. The*

*A.* The Marks of a good Ruler given in Scripture will serve for a Parliament-man; Such as rule over you shall be Men of Truth, hating Covetousness; they shall not take a Gift; they shall not be afraid of the Face of a Man, Deut. xvi. Therefore I conclude, that the Marks of a good Parliament-man are Riches with Frugality; Integrity; Courage; being well-affected to the Constitution; Knowledge of the State of the Country; being prudently frugal of the Money, careful of the Trade, and zealous for the Liberties of the People; having stuck to the Interest of his Country in perilous Times, and being assiduous in Attendance.

*Q.* Who is most likely to take a Bribe?

*A.* He, who offereth one.

*Q.* Who is likely to be frugal of the People's Money?

*A.* He, who puts none of it in his own Pocket.

*Q.* You seem by this to be averse from chusing such as accept Places and Gratuities from the Crown. What is your Reason for this Partiality?

*A.* I am far from thinking that a Man may not serve his King and his Country faithfully at the same Time. Nay, their Interests are inseparable. Mr. Such an one, my Lord's Steward, is a very honest Man; and yet if I had any Affairs to settle with my Lord, I would chuse my Neighbour for a Referee rather than my Lord's Steward.

*Q.* Why is Frugality of the People's Money so necessary at this Time?

*A.* Because they have run out much, and are still much in Debt. My Father and I have paid our Share of one hundred Millions, and I have heard there are near fifty more to pay. I grudge not this prodigious Expence, as far as it has been the necessary Price of Liberty; but as it would grieve me much to see this Blessing ravished from me, which has cost me so dear; so on the other Hand I think it expedient

to

to save, now the Affair is over, and the Government settled.

*Q.* Who are those, who are so careful of the Trade of the Nation?

*A.* Such as are willing to keep it from all vexatious Interruptions by Inspections, entering into Houses, Seizures, Suits; and the Oppression of Tax-gatherers, as much as possible; such as are willing to take off the burthensome Duties, which encrease the Expence of the Workman, and consequently the Price of the Manufacture.

*Q.* But as you have a Freehold, would you not be willing to be excused from paying two Shillings in the Pound, by laying Excises upon other Parts of our Consumption?

*A.* No doubt but every landed Man would be glad to be free from paying two Shillings in the Pound; but, at the same Time, I would not raise, by another Tax, two Shillings in the Pound, nor one Shilling in the Pound for a Perpetuity; for Parliaments, who have no more to give, may be disappointed for Redress of their Grievances. Besides, I would not be deluded by an Impossibility; for if my Tenant has any new Tax laid upon him, I am afraid he will not pay me so much Rent; so that the new Tax must still affect Land. Then it is utterly impossible to raise by Excises what shall be equivalent to two Shillings in the Pound, without the Ruin of Trade; for the Excises, which are settled already, generally speaking, raise double the Duty on the People, of what they bring in to the Government.

*Q.* How canst thou prove that?

*A.* By Experience of several Excises, as of Leather, Candles, Soap, &c. Whatever is brought into the Publick by those Excises is raised double upon the People; therefore if a Million of Money, or what is equivalent to two Shillings in the Pound, were levied

to

vied by *Excise*, it would be *two Millions* on the excised Commodities, which must destroy every Subject of Trade in *Britain*.

Q. *Why do'st thou insist that a Knowledge of the State of the Country is a necessary Qualification for a Parliament Man?*

A. Because this is a Qualification, of late, very much unheeded. I have heard that there are many Corporations, which never saw their Members.

Q. *Is then a Writ of Parliament only a Conge d'Elire for a Bishop; where the King nominates?*

A. God forbid! The *Crown* is never to meddle in an *Election*.

Q. *Why is assiduous Attendance so necessary?*

A. Because a *Parliament-man* is intrusted with the Lives, Liberties and Properties of the People, which have often been endangered by the Non-Attendance of many Members; because, if *Representatives* do not attend, I may have a Law imposed upon me, to which I had no Opportunity of giving my Assent.

Q. *Thou hast prudently and justly resolved to promote, to the utmost of thy Power, the publick Tranquility. What are the Advantages thou proposest from that?*

A. All the Advantages resulting from political Society depend upon the *publick Tranquility*. Besides, by publick Tranquility, *Armies*, which are a Mark of Distrust of the *Affections of the People*, may be disbanded.

Q. *Why do'st thou not love Armies, in Time of Peace?*

A. Because *Armies* have overturned the Liberties of most Countries; and all, who are well-affected to *Liberty*, ever hated them; because they are subject to an *implicit Obedience to their Officers*, and to a *Law of their own*; because they are so many lusty Men taken from *Work*, and maintained at an extravagant Expence upon the *Labour of the rest*; because

cause they are many Ways burthensome to the People in their *Quarters*, even under the best Discipline, especially in *dear Countries*; because there are so many Preferments in the Hands of *designing Ministers*; and lastly, because the *King* will never be denied an *Army* as great as he pleaseth, when it is *necessary*.

O N

## *Bribery and Corruption.*

CICERO, in the second Book of his *Offices*, highly commends a wise and handsome Rebuke, which *Philip of Macedon* gave his Son *Alexander*, for foolishly attempting to gain the Affections of the *Macedonians* by BRIBERY. He wrote his Son a Letter upon it in these Words. "Quæ te, malum! Ratio in istam spem induxit, ut eos tibi fideles putares fore, quos pecunia corrupisses? An tu id agis, ut *Macedones* non te *Regem suum*, sed *Ministrum & Præbitorem* sperent fore?"—*Tully* makes this Remark upon it.—"Bene *Ministrum & Præbitorem*; quia sordidum *Regi*. Melius etiam quod *Largitionem Corruptelam* esse dixit. Fit enim deterior, qui accipit, atque ad idem semper expectandum paratior."

*Philip* was undoubtedly the greatest Prince of his Time. He was wise, artful and fortunate. The Advice of such a King, while he was forming the Mind of a young Prince who afterwards gave Law to the World, deserves our Regard. This wise King

King had observed in his Son many noble Principles, the Seeds of Greatness, but ill conducted thro' Youth and Inexperience. *Alexander* was young, valiant and generous; but an Excess, or Misapplication of Valour and Generosity, often leads to the greatest Inconveniences. That his Generosity might take a good and useful Turn, he writes him this short, but important Epistle. "What Notion is this, says He, that you have got in your Head? Can you imagine the Fidelity and Affection of the Subject are to be acquired by *Bribery* and *Corruption*? Or is this your Motive, that the *Macedonians* may not consider you as one, who is to be their *Sovereign*, but a Minister to their *Extravagance* and *Corruption*."

*Tully's* Observation is equally fine. "'Tis fordid and mean, says he, below the Dignity of a great King, to court the Affection of his People with *base Bribes*." True Love and Esteem are built upon a quite different Foundation. "*Largesses*, or the giving of Money, as the same Author observes, is *Corruption* itself; for the Receiver becomes a worse Man, and is always apt to increase his Demands." This Maxim of *Philip* is certainly one of the wisest in the whole System of Politicks, and likewise consistent with the strictest Rules of Morality; that a King giving *Bribes* to his own Subjects renders himself mean and fordid; that he never gains the true Affection of one Person by it; that he subjects himself to the arbitrary Will and fantastical Government of such *Prostitutes*; and that his very Crown is at their Disposal to the  
\* *highest Bidder*.

The Immorality of it is likewise evident; for such Proceedings, when generally known, debauch the  
the

\* See *Wolfius* and *Grævius* upon this Passage of *Cicero*.

the Morals of a whole People. The same *Depravity* and *Corruption* soon find their Way from a Court to a Cottage; and, in Proportion to the Distance, is to be traced in a greater or less Degree through every private Family; so that in a short Time the very Name of *Virtue* may come to be lost in such a Kingdom. It is very probable that *Philip* might not regard this Maxim in the *moral View*; for, if we may credit the *Greek Historians* and *Orators*, he was not apt to guide his Actions by the Rules of a *nice Morality*. He is generally drawn by them as *cunning* and *designing*, and though a warlike Prince, no Man knew the Weight of *Money* more than he, as well as how and where to apply it. His usual Method of *Bribery* was to buy an *Enemy's General*, and sometimes a *convenient Town* or *Fortress*; by which Means he artfully avoided risking his own Glory, and the Lives of his Subjects. He carried it so far, that just before the decisive Victory at *Chæronea*, the very Priestess of *Apollo* at *Delphi* was strongly suspected to have been tampered with by that Prince; for the confederate Army, who were then going to engage, for the common Liberties of *Greece*, could get no Manner of Encouragement from her; so that *Demosthenes*, who well knew the Avarice of *Priests* and their juggling Tricks, might easily guess that *Philip* had secured the Oracle. At another Time, a grave-looking Demagogue of *Athens*, who had long bawl'd at the exorbitant Power of the King of *Macedon*, was at length prevailed upon, and took the Reward of his Treachery with great Complaisance.

These were the successful Arts, which he used abroad; and by such Intrigues he often defeated the strongest Confederacies of all *Greece*. His Administration was wise, dreaded abroad, and respected at home. What Occasion could he have to pension his own Subjects? Their Love and Esteem was founded upon the real Conviction of the Excellency of his Govern-

Government, and not upon that slippery Foundation of *Corruption*. He kept them honest, by not tempting them to be otherwise. Even in a *just Cause*, a *Gift* perverts the Mind; and, as *Tully* well observes upon this Place, "the *Receiver* immediately becomes a *bad Man*, and is always expecting "greater *Bribes*." The Plunder of a whole People is scarce sufficient. To this Honesty of the *Macedonians*, confirmed by their *King*, is to be attributed their true greatness of Mind and personal Courage. The Name of *Barbarians*, which the over-wise *Greeks* were too apt to bestow upon their Neighbours, now left them, even by the Confession of those very *Greeks*, who, in a general Assembly of their several confederate Republicks, soon after placed *Alexander* at the Head of that grand Alliance, which gave him and his *Macedonians* the Empire of the World.

From the whole it is clearly evident, that an *un-pensioned Subject* will give the wisest Counsel to his *Prince*, and will always continue the most faithful to him. It is the true Interest of the *Prince* to have such about him, as will not flatter him, and be Slaves to his *Passions*, for the sake of his *Money*. The greatest Danger, that can happen to a *Prince* will arise from such of his *own Servants*, as from their own *corrupt Principles* would sell him and his Counsels to the common Enemy. *Treason* is too often the fatal Attendant upon *Corruption*. A Government may be conducted with the greatest Security, without employing these *pecuniary Arts* at home; for a *wise Administration* will always stand upon its own Legs, and support itself without the Assistance of *Gold*. It can raise a whole People, almost from a State of *Barbarity*, to the Height of Greatness and heroic Virtue.

O N  
L I B E R T Y

And the ORIGINAL COMPACT between the

PRINCE and the PEOPLE.

*Salvâ Libertate fidus.*

I N all Governments there are, either expressly or tacitly, certain Conditions between the *People* and their *Rulers*, which in Conscience they are both bound to preserve. In the more arbitrary Kingdoms, the Traces of an *original Compact* are less discernible; and by Length of Time, Destruction of Records, or the Artifice of Princes, the Monuments of *antient Liberty* may be destroy'd; or, which is worse, the Minds of the People prepared to imagine that either they never had a Right to *Liberty*, or that it hath been cancell'd by Prescription. *These Doctrines* have been always inculcated, with great Art, by *designing Princes*; and, upon the Strength of the Invasion of their Predecessors, most Kings afterwards think themselves justly entitled to the same Powers, which those, who went before them, had notoriously usurp'd. In order to preserve their arbitrary Sway, they are reduced to maintain an Opinion, which draws after it great Danger, and is the strongest Invitation to the Attempts of their ambitious Subjects. This Opinion is, that Princes are in themselves SACRED, when

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once they mount the Throne, though the Means by which they rose to it, were ever so flagitious.

The Princes of Antiquity, particularly the heathen Emperors, used to *deify* themselves, with a View of obliging the People, from a religious Reverence, to submit patiently to their Extravagances. The *Jus divinum*, and *Sanctity of Person*, which some of our late Monarchs have ascribed to themselves, were but Copies of this Original, and calculated to the same Views; but the People have been wise enough, in these Kingdoms, to explode such dangerous and iniquitous Superstitions. It is, indeed, amazing that they could ever have prevail'd at all amongst us.

Nobody can be so weak, or so wicked, as to deny that the Prosperity of Mankind is one of the great Ends of Government. We are all obliged to promote it in our private Capacities; but it is a Duty more peculiarly incumbent on the *Governor of a People*. If he therefore should play the Tyrant, and pervert his Power to the Destruction or Misery of a whole Nation, his Crime is infinitely great, even much the greatest, that Man is capable of committing; and yet, according to this blasphemous Position, the worst of these is still *sacred and inviolable*.

In whatever Light we look upon *these absurd and dangerous Sentiments*, we may easily discover their weak Foundation, and monstrous Tendency. But it is very happy for us that there is not the same Occasion to explode them, at present, which there hath formerly been; though, at the same Time, they are not so totally eradicated, nor are the Attempts to revive them so inconsiderable, as not to deserve our Attention in some Degree. The *People* in general are grown too wise to entertain them any longer; but it is with Astonishment we observe that

Princes

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*Princes* have not likewise seen their Error in the Propagation of them.

We have already taken Notice of the Encouragement, which *such Doctrines* have given to the Ambition of private Men. *That Law*, which owed its Rise to the doubtful Title of *Henry the seventh*, is sufficient of itself to stimulate hot Spirits, without the additional Incentive of a *general Conscience* concurring in the *Opinion* there made legal. *This Law* declares in Effect a King *de Faëto* to be a King *de Jure*, and instantly annuls the Right of the *precedent Prince* by the Establishment of the *Person*, who obtains his Seat. Upon this was grounded the Advice, given to *Cromwel* by some of his Friends, that he should declare himself *King*; and upon this likewise is founded the Opinion of several Writers upon those Times, who imagine that he would have maintain'd the Crown in his Family to this Day, if he had follow'd that Advice.

But there is still a farther Mischief in it, not only to the *People*, (for that is evident enough) but to the *Prince* himself. If he attempts to ground *these Sentiments* in the Minds of his Subjects, he must either fail, or succeed in his Undertaking. If he fails, the Consequence must necessarily be the total Alienation of the Hearts of his People; for the very Cause of his Miscarriage must be a Discovery that, by giving Way to *such Opinions*, they make themselves his *Slaves*; and at the same Instant that they perceive the Consequence, they will discover the Cause to be an *arbitrary Intention* in him, which will always make them jealous of him.—But if he should succeed, it will only make him presume too much upon that Success, and lead him on, by the passive Principles of his Subjects, to push such Measures as will bring Ruin upon his own Head; for *Conscience*, when hardly pressed, will rebel against

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Principles

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*Principle*; of which we have had Instances enough in our own History.

It was the Dependence upon *these Principles*, strongly inculcated and artfully spread in the Reign of King *James the first*, and propagated with the same Affiduity by his Son, that brought King *Charles* to so tragical an End. It was a Presumption upon the *Patience of the People*, that engaged him in so violent an Exercise of the *Prerogative*. It was this, which induced him to govern so long without *Parliaments*; to raise Money upon the People, contrary to *Law*; and to support an *evil Administration*, however odious to the People, from a very wrong Persuasion that they were useful to himself. Thus, I say, he fell a Sacrifice to *that Principle*, which he had so large a Share in raising himself, and proved a memorable Example of this great Truth, that *Princes* generally find their Ruin in that, which they fondly think their strongest Security. We cannot but lament the cruel Destiny of *that unhappy Prince*, and we know how to acknowledge his private Virtues; but it must be confessed, at the same Time, that he owed his Misfortune to his Fault, and that he had never suffered, if he had never aspired to more than was agreeable to the *Constitution*, over which he presided. If he had expected the *Allegiance and Duty of his Subjects* from no other Motive than that, from which it is only due, a Return of *Protection* and a *just Administration*, he might have lived and died in Peace. Nay, he might even have gone some Lengths with Safety. But endeavouring to force their Consciences to Submission, he only ripened the *popular Discontents*. If these Discontents had been kept under by no other Force than that of Convenience, they would have shewn themselves sooner, and the Causes of them might have been early removed; but the long Forbearance of the People, upon *these Principles*, encouraged him to proceed

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proceed farther in the Steps, till he had soured the Minds of the whole Nation; and thus the Poison became universal, at the same Time that the Disease was intolerable.

King *James the second* had a better Fate, though his Conduct deserved a worse. The Calamities of his *Father* could not deter him from walking in the same dangerous Path. That desperate Example was too weak to bridle his Lust of Power.—May this be a Lesson to all succeeding Princes not to desire the Temptation!—May it be an everlasting Instruction to all People never to give it to their Prince!—This Temptation was the same that had undone his *Father*. It was an Adherence to the same *false Opinion*, which his *Brother* and *Himself* had laboured to encourage from the Restoration to that Time. They were carried higher, at that *Æra*, than they had ever run before. He relied so much upon them, that when those, who were Friends both to him and the Publick, advised him, in the Career of his arbitrary Measures, to act with more Caution; he told them *that he knew the Conscience of the People would keep them quiet*.—How far he was mistaken, and how fatal his Error hath proved to himself, if not to the Nation, the Experience of what hath since happened sufficiently demonstrates. It would be unnecessary to bring any other Examples of the Distresses occasioned to Princes themselves by a Thirst of *unlimited Power*. There cannot be a Truth more fully verified by a continued Series of Instances, in all Ages. I have here particularly mentioned but *one of the Means*, which are used to attain that unwholesome kind of Sovereignty; but the same Hazard attends *all other Methods*, by which the *same End* is to be pursued. The Danger lies not so much in the Manner of the Attempt, as in the Attempt itself. It lies in the Manifestation of a Design to invade the Liberties of the People; and if

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once

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once they discover such a Design, unless they are sunk into the lowest State of Corruption and Pusillanimity, they will endeavour to shake off an Authority, so plainly levelled at their antient Rights, and so contrary to its original Design.

Most Princes are inclined to imagine, and taught from the Cradle to believe that *those*, who argue in this Manner, are Abettors of *Faction* and Enemies to *them*. No; they are Enemies to the Growth of *Prerogative* and *arbitrary Power*; but, by being so, they prove themselves the best Friends to the *Constitution of their Country*, and consequently the soundest Subjects to a Prince, who hath no Designs against the Liberties of his People.

The whole Tendency of *these Discourses* is to inculcate a rational Idea of the Nature of our Government into the Minds of my Countrymen, and to prevent the fatal Consequence of those *slavish Principles*, which are industriously propagated through the Kingdom by *wicked and designing Men*. He, that labours to blind the People, and to keep them from all Instruction, may be justly suspected of bad Intentions; but he, who makes it his Business to open the Understandings of Mankind, cuts up all *Faction* by the Roots; for it is essential to Wisdom and Knowledge to support an *equal and good Government*.

Having justified our Endeavours in this Manner, we may venture to speak with Freedom upon that *original Compact between the PRINCE and the PEOPLE*, which we mentioned at the Beginning of this Paper; but to insist much upon that Head would be more necessary in Countries, where *Liberty* is totally lost, and its Footsteps erased, than in this, where *that Compact* hath been so lately renewed with the *present Royal Family*. Yet it is sometimes proper even here to touch upon *this original Right of the People*, that no Man may think the *late Contract* we have mentioned unjustly framed; but our principal

Business

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Business is to ground our Arguments upon the known Conditions of our *present Monarchy*.

Our *Constitution*, as now established, is founded on a most excellent Model. We have all the Advantages of a brisk Execution from the *monarchical Part*. From the *aristocratical* all the Conveniencies, which are to be found in *that Form of Government*; and the Mischiefs, which usually attend it, where it is absolute and unconfined, are in a great Measure blunted by the Power of the *Commons*. This is the *democratical Part of our Constitution*. Their Share in the Balance is vastly great, as it must be in all good Establishments; and thus we partake of all the Benefits and Securities to *Liberty*, which result from these different Kinds of Government.

It hath been observed, indeed, that our Work was, in some Measure, left imperfect upon the last great Change of Affairs; nor is it surprizing that in a Time of such Confusion, and from the Variety of Opinions upon these Points, some Errors, or Omissions, might have happened. Yet we may with Pleasure affirm that besides the Advantages, then procured, we likewise obtained the Power of redressing any *farther Grievances and Abuses*, which might be then overlooked, or might hereafter arise in the Administration of Government. Our Princes are now made sensible that they are exalted, not for their *own Convenience only*, but for the Advantage of the *People*, and therefore will never refuse their Consent to any Laws, which may be found necessary for the Happiness and Security of their Subjects. As they know that their *Prerogative* was settled only with that View, there can never again happen a Contest between us, upon that Foot; nor can they entertain the Thought of preserving any Branch of it, which may in future Ages, by various Accidents, be rendered repugnant to the End, for which it was created.

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The *Duty of the People* is also now settled upon so clear a Foundation, that no Man can hesitate how far he is to obey, or doubt on what Occasions to resist. *Conscience* can battle no longer with the *Understanding*. We know that we are to defend the *Crown* with our Lives and our Fortunes, as long as the *Crown* protects us, and keeps strictly to the Bounds, within which we have confined it. We likewise know that we are to do it no longer. The Part we have all to act, on every publick Occasion, is plainly laid down before us; and as the Blessings of Peace, Plenty, and Liberty will always secure to his Majesty the Allegiance of his Subjects; so, on the other Hand, the Dangers, which constantly attend all Advances to *arbitrary Power*, will I hope preserve us from any such Attempts for the future. — In short, as we have the Happiness to live under an *excellent Constitution*, so it is very much in our own Power, by a proper Conduct, to secure the Enjoyment of it to Ourselves, and to transmit it to the latest Posterity.

T H E  
Case of D U N K I R K  
C O N S I D E R ' D.

**I**T is of so great Importance to this Nation that *Dunkirk* should continue in that demolish'd, ruin'd Condition, to which it was reduced in Consequence of the *Treaty of Utrecht*, that we cannot be surprized at the great Uneasinesses and Complaints,

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plaints, since the Publick became acquainted with the Progress the *French* have been suffer'd to make towards restoring that *Port* and *Harbour*.

The Consideration of this Affair hath been brought into Parliament; where, tho' it has not met with Censure, it has not met with Approbation. The Wisdom of the Commons did not think fit, in a Conjunction, represented to be so critical, to speak in Form on what has pass'd. They contented themselves, for the present, with thanking his Majesty for the Instances he made to *France*. The Issue of this important Affair is still depending, and may probably occasion a farther Enquiry.

In the mean Time, it must be of Service to inform the Publick, more particularly than has been yet done, of the whole Transactions hitherto relating to it. My Intention therefore is, agreeably to the Title prefix'd to these Papers, to state, as exactly as I am able, the Sum of what has pass'd in the Disputes about the *Demolition of Dunkirk*, from the *Treaty of Utrecht* to the last Session of Parliament; and to make such Observations on the Conduct of *Great Britain* and of *France*, as seem to my best Judgment obviously and undeniably to result from the Series of Facts.

I do not sit down to write with a Design to flatter or to asperse any Person whatsoever. But I shall follow the Matter before me, and according as I am led by it, I shall commend or blame with all that Freedom, which the Subjects of this Kingdom are still in Possession of, and which I hope we shall never resign, as long as there remains a Tongue to speak and an Hand to act in *Great Britain*.

He, who attacks a Minister, or any other Man, without sufficient Foundation, is certainly guilty of a very great Crime. But he, who attacks with Fact and Reason on his Side, is so far an honest Man and a good Subject. His Writings are no  
L 5 Libels.

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Libels. That odious Term belongs to those, which are publish'd against him.

Who I am that undertake this Task may, perhaps, be the Object of some Peoples Curiosity. But that is a Matter of no Importance to the Merits of the Cause. Let them examine the Facts I advance, and weigh the Arguments I employ and the Observations I make. If the first are not founded in Truth, and the others in Reason, let them triumph in my Defeat, whoever I am. But if the first will bear the Touchstone, and if the others preponderate in the Scale, let them not submit to me, but let them submit to Truth and Reason, by whomsoever presented to them.

I do not apprehend that any of our *political Writers* will be in the Case of triumphing on this Occasion; and I am very sure that many of them will not submit even in the other Case. When Argument fails, they have recourse to their usual Topicks of Ribaldry and Adulation. I shall very probably be a *squat, fair Gentleman* in one Paper; a *petit Maître* of Fifty in another; and *Somebody* else in a Third; for each of these Authors supposes the Man he writes against to be the Person he has the most a Mind to rail at, or is best paid for railing at. Our Ministers will be *Heroes* in all; the *profoundest Statesmen*; the *most disinterested Patriots*; and our *flourishing Condition at Home*, as well as the *noble Figure* we make *Abroad*, will be the Subject of much Declamation.

Now all this will do little Hurt and little Good, either to the Persons scratched or to the Persons tickled. But it would do a great deal of Hurt to the Publick, if it should divert, in any Degree, that national Spirit, with which the Case of *Dunkirk* ought to be considered.

Among all the Artifices, which are employed to keep Mankind from seeing and embracing the Truth,

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Truth, no one is more gross, and there is but one more prevalent, than that of turning their Eyes from Things to Persons. If a false Heart, a foul Tongue, and a Front of Brass can create Prejudices against the most innocent Man alive, the bare Suspicion that such a Man is of an Opinion, shall be urged as an Argument against it, and on that solid Foundation it shall be established that Two and Three are not equal to Five. But this is not all; for as Prejudices are applied to this Purpose, so are Partialities. In Cases, where private Honour and publick Justice are both concerned, the Consequence of hurting a Man, in whose Favour we have been made to entertain an habitual, though groundless Partiality, is sometimes pressed as a Reason for complying with neither. These Mischiefs, like many others, are chiefly to be found where *Parties* have long prevailed; and it often happens that they continue to have some Effect, even when the Parties subsist no longer, and among those, who have all the same Views, because they have all the same Interests.

Whether any Attempts like these have been lately made to influence particular Men in the Case of *Dunkirk*, I shall not determine. But it cannot be amiss to warn against them at all Times, and especially when we see so much Pains taken to keep these Prejudices and these Partialities alive.

I have now done with my Preface, which may be thought perhaps too long. I wish it could be thought unnecessary.

Whether the *Demolition* of *Dunkirk* does, in a great Measure, secure exactly \* Seven-ninths of the Trade of *England* from the Power of *France* at Sea, as it has been asserted, I shall not trouble myself

\* Vide Sir *Richard Steele's* Writings about *Dunkirk* in the late Queen's Reign.



myself to calculate, neither shall I examine nicely how far this *Port* may justly be deemed our Rival in Time of Peace, by supporting some considerable Branches of the *French* Manufactures, and by carrying on a Trade to the *West-Indies*, which has been insisted upon likewise. In general it will not be denied, that the *French* have annoyed our Trade, and promoted their own extreamly, by the convenient Situation and other Advantages of the *Port* of *Dunkirk*.

To make therefore a true Judgment in the present Case, it is sufficient to lay a Foundation, which few Men will attempt to controvert, and which no Man can controvert without exposing himself to Ridicule, or to something worse than Ridicule, to the Abhorrence of every honest Heart.

The Foundation I mean to lay is contained in these Propositions.

*First*, The declared Sense of the *British* Nation, at the Time of making the last *Treaty of Peace* with *France*, was that *Dunkirk* should be no more either a fortified City, a fortified Port, or even an unfortified Harbour.

*Secondly*, *France* consented to the Demolition of *Dunkirk* in this Sense, and engaged never to restore it again in any one of these Respects.

These Propositions are fully proved by the 9th Article of the *Treaty of Utrecht*; by which *Great-Britain* required, and *France* consented, that all the Fortifications of the City of *Dunkirk* should be razed; those towards the Sea in two Months; those towards the Land in three Months. Thus far the Article stipulates the Demolition of *Dunkirk* as a fortified City and as a fortified Port, and if no more had been intended no more would have been said; but the Article says a great deal more; it says expressly that the Harbour shall be filled up, and that the Sluices or Moles, which serve to cleanse the Harbour, shall be levelled. The  
naked

naked Harbour itself was therefore to be destroyed as well as the Fortifications towards the Land and towards the Sea. After all these Stipulations follows this express Condition, That the said Fortifications, Harbour, Moles, or Sluices be never repaired again. So that *France* has never had, since the *Treaty of Utrecht*, nor can have, while the Treaty subsists, any more right to open, or by Reparations to help to open the Harbour of *Dunkirk*, than she has to rebuild the Fortifications of that City, and to render it in every Respect what it was before the Demolition.

The late Queen *Anne* was so solicitous to have this principal Part of the Article, for such it was then esteemed, effectually performed, that when she sent her Commissioners to *Dunkirk* to see the Demolition of that Place executed, she gave them the most particular Instructions imaginable on that Head. They were not only to see the Moles, and Jettees, and Keys, and Sluices demolished, but they were to see the Stones belonging to them, even the Stones of the Keys for shipping and unshipping Goods, thrown into the Canal or Harbour, the more effectually to spoil the same and render it impracticable for the future. They were to see the Channel of each Sluice filled up with Earth from the next Rampart, till it was made level with the Streets. Nay they were to see the Road, which lies before the Entrance of the Harbour, spoiled as much as possible, and the Reason for this particular Instruction is there given, to prevent as much as possible any Ships coming in for the future.

The late King of *France* had tried, by his Ministers at *Utrecht*, and even by a direct and strong Application from himself to the late Queen, while the Treaty was in Negotiation, to have the Rigour of the Ninth Article, in some Degree, softened. He did not desire that any Thing, which had been erected to fortify the Town, or make and preserve the Harbour, should be spared, but hoped and pres-  
sed

fed that the *Queen* would allow *one Sluice* to be left, which had been erected, as it was then pretended, by the People of the Country, before he fortified the Place, to carry off the Waters, and save the Low Lands from Inundations. Even this Application proved fruitless. The Article was insisted upon, and was accordingly passed without any Exception.

Not discouraged by this, the Inhabitants of *Dunkirk* sent over a Deputy, who was warmly supported by the Ambassador of *France*. Several fresh Instances were made, and all Endeavours were used to move the *Queen's* Compassion, by desiring, as a Grace, what they pretended no Right to by Treaty, *that the Sluice of Furnes at least might be preserved*, to carry the Waters off from Filth, Stench, and the Consequence thereof, Infection.

But the *Queen*, who was resolved that *Dunkirk* should have neither a *fortified Port*, nor even a *naked Harbour*, knew by the Reports of her Commissioners, that *Mr. Armstrong*, one of their Number, absolutely denied the Necessity of preserving those Sluices, in order to discharge the Waters of the Country. She was inform'd likewise, by the Report of the same Commissioners, that *if any of the Sluices remain'd, it would be impossible to prevent the Harbour from being kept open; whereas if they were all destroy'd, a small Space of Time would effectually fill up the Harbour*. She continued therefore inflexible, and besides several other Answers to the same Effect, given to the *French* Ambassador, and to the Deputy of *Dunkirk*, upon these Occasions, a Secretary of State was order'd, upon one of them, to write to the *British Minister* at *Paris*, to acquaint that Court, *that the Queen will insist that, by the Treaty, all Things are to be destroy'd, quæ eluendo Portui inserviunt, which serve to cleanse the Harbour.—That no Distinction is therein made of what contri-*  
butes

*butes accidentally and what directly to this Purpose.—That the French Ministers had insisted at Utrecht to have such an Exception inserted in the Treaty; that it was positively refused, and that they submitted—That under a charitable Pretence of saving the Country, the French would save the Harbour—In short, that he must let Monsieur de Torcy feel, and by him the King, that the Queen sees plainly the Correspondence between his Officers and the People of the Town, who are unwilling to lose their Harbour.*

I might descend into more Particulars; but these are, I think, sufficient to establish the two Propositions advanced above. The Intention of the late *Queen*, and of those who negotiated, by her Orders, the *Treaty of Utrecht*, was to destroy *Dunkirk* for ever, not only as a *Fortress* but as a *Sea-Port*. To this the *French* submitted, though with much Reluctancy; and in this at least the Ministers at that Time were seconded by the Voice of the whole Nation. Even those, who opposed that Administration, were ashamed of some weak Attempts made to depreciate this important Article of the *Utrecht* Treaty. They soon took the other Part. They sounded high the Consequence of it, and the Necessity of executing it with the utmost Rigour. They were so far from thinking the Demolition of the *Fortifications* to the Land and to the Sea sufficient, that the *Mole* and *Harbour* were call'd by them, and I think rightly, *the Terror of the British Nation*. In a Word, they asserted boldly, that nothing less than the total Destruction of the *Harbour*, as well as the Demolition of the *Fortifications* could answer the Expectations of the *British Nation*.

Such was the Issue of the first Disputes about *Dunkirk*, a little before the Death of the late *Queen*. The *French* were obliged to proceed to a total Destruction of it, after having in vain employ'd a  
Multitude

Multitude of Pretences to avoid the strict and full Execution of the *Treaty of Utrecht* in this Point.

They turn'd themselves therefore to another Method, and began to cleanse and widen the Canal of *Mardyke*. The Pretences for doing it were the same as had been urged in order to save the Port of *Dunkirk*, under Colour of saving the Country from Inundations. But the plain Design of this Work was to open a new Harbour at *Dunkirk*, and a new Communication with the Sea.

As the Work proceeded, this Design became every Day more evident, by the Breadth and Depth which were given to the Canal of *Mardyke*, and by the enormous Size of the new Sluice, larger than that at *Dunkirk*; and vastly beyond any Proportion that could be pretended necessary for carrying off the Waters, or even for receiving Fisher-Vessels, and other small Craft.

As the Design became more evident, the Representations against it became more frequent and strong. But the *French* drew the Affair into length, by the common Arts of Negotiation, and in the mean Time pursued their Enterprize with all the Vigour and Dispatch imaginable; till the late King, resolving not to suffer so manifest a Violation of the *Treaty of Utrecht*, sent the Earl of *Stair* to the Court of *France*, soon after his Accession to the Crown.

This Minister proceeded on the Principle established at first, and hitherto not once departed from. *The true Sense of the Treaty of Utrecht*, says he, in one of his Memorials, and the Intention of Great Britain is, that *Dunkirk shall never have a Port again*. From whence he argues, that since the Port of *Mardyke* is in its Use a Port to the City of *Dunkirk* as much as the old one was, the King of *Great Britain* would have liked as well to have had this subsist, and only the Name of it changed,  
as

as to see another Port, larger and more convenient, opened at a League to the Westward.

The Answers, which the Court of *France* made to all these Representations, were very far from giving Satisfaction, but the Firmness which the Earl of *Stair* shew'd, and perhaps the declining State of *Lewis* the XIVth, prevail'd on the *French* Councils to stop the carrying on these Works; probably with the same Views as they have acted since, to quiet the present Clamour, and to begin again upon the first Occasion.

Such was the Issue of the second Disputes about *Dunkirk*, when the late King of *France* died. The *French* neither departed from their Pretensions, groundless as they were, nor ruin'd the Works they had made at *Mardyke*. They kept one alive, and only suspended the other.

The late King, therefore, instead of dropping this Affair, continued to push it, and to shew that he was determin'd, at any Rate, to have another sort of Satisfaction than he had yet received.

This Satisfaction he obtained soon after, by a *Provisional Agreement* made with the Minister of *France* at *Hampton-Court*, in the Month of *September*, 1716, and inserted in the *Triple Defensive Alliance* concluded at the *Hague* between *Great-Britain*, *France*, and the *States-General* in *January*, 1717.

The Duke of *Orleans* was now Regent of *France*. His political Interests led him to desire the Friendship of the late King. This Disposition was cultivated and improved on our Parts, and the Union between the two Courts grew to be extremely intimate. But as *Great-Britain* and *France* acted in concert like *Friends*, so they acted together in those Days like *Equals*. If we used their Help, we lent them ours. The Dependence was at least mutual, and when our separate Interests came into Competition with theirs, far from fearing to assert our  
Right

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Right, lest we should disoblige our Friends, we treated with them like an *independent Nation*, who knew that it is, or may be always made the Interest of *France* to keep Measures with *Great Britain*, as much as it can become, at any time, the Interest of *Great Britain* to keep Measures with *France*.

This appeared very remarkably on the Occasion we were mentioning. The Regent was not, I suppose, more scrupulous than the late King of *France*, nor less desirous of regaining any Advantage, which had been lost, or given up; and yet he was forced to yield to all that we insisted upon, for the effectual Execution of the *Ninth Article* of the *Treaty of Utrecht*.

His late Majesty did indeed at this Time consent, that the Canal, opened at *Mardyke*, should subsist, for carrying off the Waters, and for the little Commerce necessary to supply that Part of the Country with Provisions. This was a Concession which had not been made before, and which the *French* had not strictly any Right to expect. But surely it was wise to make it in the Manner, and on the Conditions, on which it was made.

As long as a King of *France* had the plausible Pretence of saving his Subjects from drowning, or starving, to cover his Designs, it was obvious enough, by all that had pass'd, that the Design of restoring *Dunkirk*, under this Pretence, would never be laid aside. The late King, therefore, in order to defeat the Design once for all, resolved to take the Pretence entirely away.

By the fourth *Article* of the *Triple Alliance*, the great new Sluice made at *Mardyke*, and all the *Jettees* erected along the Strand, are to be destroyed, and not to be made use of 'for any Port, Haven or Sluice at *Dunkirk* or at *Mardyke*, or at any other Place within two Leagues Distance of either of these; the Intention of the contracting Parties, and

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' and the End, which they propose to themselves by this Treaty, being that no Port, Harbour, Fortification, Sluice, or Bason, shall be made or built at *Dunkirk*, at the Sluice of *Mardyke*, or at any other Place whatsoever upon the Coast, within the Distance before mentioned.'

By the same Article it was stipulated likewise that the *Digues* or *Jettees*, on both Sides of the old Canal or Port of *Dunkirk*, should be entirely demolished down to the Strand, and that some other Things should be farther done, which might be necessary to the more compleat Destruction of the Harbour.

This being consented to on the Part of *France*, his Majesty consented that the little Sluice, on the Canal of *Mardyke*, should remain, provided the Breadth of it was reduced to sixteen Foot.

All these Stipulations were made with the greatest Clearness possible; and the most exact Specifications of every thing necessary to render them effectual, are contained in the *Treaty*.

Such was the Issue of the Disputes about *Dunkirk*, in the Time of the late King; and surely there was good Reason to hope, after the Settlement then made, that we should hear of them no more. The *French* were gratify'd in two Points, for which alone they contended, at least avowedly; and *Dunkirk* was reduced to be no more a *fortified Town*, a *fortified Port*, or even an *unfortified Harbour*.

But to the great Detriment and Misfortune of our Nation, so it is, that we have greater Reason than ever to renew these Disputes. What the *French* were not suffered to attempt by that Administration, which Sir *Richard Steele* called the *French Administration*, they have been lately suffered to do. Instead of not executing *one Treaty* fully, they have publickly violated *Two*. They actually enjoy the Benefit of the Canal of *Mardyke*, which was indulged

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dulged to them, that there might remain no Colour for ever opening that of *Dunkirk*; and in the midst of this Enjoyment, they have opened, they have repaired that of *Dunkirk*, and contrived their Work so, that whenever they shall think proper to finish it, *Dunkirk* will be at once a better Harbour than it was, when it stood the Glory of *France* and the Terror of *Britain*.

I proceed to the particular Facts, which support these general Allegations.

Col. *Lascells*, one of the Commissaries appointed to see the fourth Article of the *Treaty* of 1717, fully and effectually executed, continued at *Dunkirk* till the Year 1725, that memorable Æra, when the *Treaty* of *Hanover*, was made, and from whence so many things, which will not be easily or soon forgot, are to be dated. How this Officer came to be recalled, just in that critical Point of Time, has not been explained. Perhaps we may begin to guess at the Reasons, when we have gone a little farther in the present Enquiry.

It is agreed on all hands, that whilst he continued at *Dunkirk*, the old Port and Harbour remained impracticable, as by *Treaty* they are to remain; and that the little peddling Trade, which the *French* had there, was carried on by very small Vessels, and through the Canal of *Mardyke* alone.

About two Years after he had been recalled, Rumours began to spread, that the Port of *Dunkirk* was opened again. These Rumours were confirmed by several Persons, who had pass'd that Way; and our *Ministers*, even without receiving any Intelligence from Abroad, could not be ignorant of the Truth of the Fact, since it appeared by the *Entries* at the *Custom-house*, that Ships were continually going and coming from the Port of *Dunkirk*.

As the Works for repairing this Port advanced, the Trade of the Place, and the Noise about it en-

creased.

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creased. Nay, these Works were carried forward in so publick a Manner at last, that it became impossible any longer to forbear concluding, either that our *Ministers* had not been able to prevail on those of *France* to stop this Violation of the *Treaty*, or else that they connived at it.

In this State of Things. and under such Apprehensions as these, some Members of the *House of Commons* resolved to lay this Matter before the *Committee of the whole House*, appointed to take into Consideration the *State of the Nation*. The Importance of it did, in their Opinions, deserve the most solemn Proceedings, and the Nature of it required that no more Time should be lost in stopping the Growth of an Evil, which became, by every Day's Delay, greater and harder to cure. They got therefore such Evidence of *particular Facts*, as they judged sufficient; and they concealed their Enquiries with all the Care they could, lest the Witnesses might be prevented, by *Power* or *Artifice*, from appearing; or when they did appear, from speaking as plainly and fully in *publick*, as they had done in *private*. This Precaution, which is, or ought always to be taken in Cases of this Kind, was surely as necessary as ever, on the Occasion we speak of; and the Complaints, which have been made of it, are indeed below Animadversion.

When, in Consequence of these Measures, it was moved in the *Committee of the whole House*, that some Persons, attending at the Door, should be call'd in, to give an Account of the Condition of the Port and Harbour of *Dunkirk*, \* \* \* \* \* attempted at first to hinder this Motion from passing; but the Sense and Inclination of the *Committee* running strongly against him, this Attempt failed of Success.

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The *Witnesses* were called in ; and they gave clear and distinct Accounts to the following Effect ;

That the Port and Harbour of *Dunkirk*, which had been demolished in pursuance of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, so that the smallest Fishing-Boat could not go into them a few Years ago, are now made capable of receiving great Numbers of Ships of considerable Burthen——That from *sixty to eighty Vessels* are frequently to be seen there at a Time ; and that the Port is capable of containing more than one Hundred and Fifty——That, in order to make it so, the Sluice of *Furnes* has been re-established, and the Piles of the *Damme*, raised at the Time of the Demolition across the Entrance of the Harbour, have been pulled up——That several Works, in which the Soldiers as well as other Persons were employed, have been carried on from Time to Time, for cleansing the Harbour ; for hindring the Mud and Sand from coming in to it ; for repairing the *Fettees* ; for preventing the Tides from flowing across the Channel, and thereby keeping it choaked up ; for making *Keys* where Goods are loaded and unloaded as commodiously as before the Demolition, and for procuring to this Port many other Conveniences of Trade and Navigation——That an *English-built Ship*, which trades from *Dunkirk* to *St. Domingo*, was actually in the Harbour lying at the *Keys*, besides several *Dutch* and other Ships, which trade to the *West-Indies*——That Ships of Force had been built and launched there lately, and one particularly in *January* last, which sailed out of the Harbour with *twenty-four Guns mounted*, and is able to carry *thirty-six*——In a Word, that some of the many Works, which have been made for restoring the Harbour of *Dunkirk*, are already put into as good a Condition as ever ; that the Trade of the Town is by these Means very much encreased within these two Years ;  
and

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and that the Pilots, who lie upon the Coast, refuse to carry Vessels any longer into the Canal of *Mardyke*, having Orders not to do it.——That the Canal of *Mardyke* is brought so near to the great Sluice, that by removing a small Quantity of Earth more, the whole Body of Water, which is at present carried into that Canal from those of *Berg* and the *Moere*, may be carried into the old Basin, and into that Part of the Harbour, where the Men of War formerly lay——upon the whole Matter, that the Port of *Dunkirk* may now very soon, and at no great farther Expence, be rendered as good, and perhaps better than it was before the Destruction of it, in all respects, except as to the *Fortifications*.——The *Witnesses* added that these Works, which had been carried on, at first, with some kind of Privacy, were afterwards continued without Disguise, and since last *August* with more Vigour than before ; nay, that they were actually carrying on, notwithstanding the Badness of the Season, in *January* and *February* last.

The *Witnesses*, who proved these Facts, were *Masters of Vessels* and *others*, who make frequent Voyages to *Dunkirk*, and who spoke to nothing but what they had had frequent Occasions of observing ; so that their Evidence was, upon a very *strict*, to use no harsher a Word, *Cross-Examination*, confirmed in every Part, and supported in the strongest Manner.

As clear as it was, and as unquestionable as the Truth of it appeared to be, Reasons were urged why no *Resolutions* should be, at that Time, taken upon it. The Chief of these Reasons were, that *Col. Armstrong* had been lately sent to *France* ; that his Presence would be necessary in a farther Examination of this Matter ; and that a Time ought therefore to be allowed, in which he might be able to return ; that several *Papers* would likewise be called for,  
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for, to shew what had been lately transacted and what Care the *Ministers* had taken about this Affair; and that the getting these *Papers* ready for the House would require Time also. These Reasons were acquiesced in, tho' it was not hard to foresee what might be effected by *Delay*.

The *Committee* was adjourned; *Papers* were called for; the *Committee* was again put off on the same Pretences for a Fortnight; several *Papers* were brought; and, the Day before it was to sit again, there were communicated to the House, by his Majesty's Command, Copies of a \* *Letter from the D. of N. to Mr. Pointz*; of an Answer from Mr. † *Pointz*; and of the following *Order* obtained from the *Court of France*.

By the KING.

“ THE *Sieur*—Capt. of his Majesty's Ships, is  
 “ ordered to repair immediately to the Port of  
 “ *Dunkirk*, there to draw up an exact State of the  
 “ present Condition of the Chenal and Port of the  
 “ said Town, and to make his Report thereof. His  
 “ Majesty enjoins the said *Sieur* to cause to be de-  
 “ molished all the Works that may have been erect-  
 “ ed in Contravention to the Treaty of *Utrecht* and  
 “ of the *Hague*, Copy whereof he will find here-  
 “ unto annexed. His Majesty commands and Or-  
 “ ders the Governor Commandant of the Place,  
 “ the Intendants, Engineers, and all other his  
 “ Officers and Subjects to give all the necessary As-  
 “ sistance in the Execution of the present Order, in  
 “ Case of Need. Done at *Versailles* the 27th of  
 “ February

\* The *Duke's* Letter to *Pointz Armstrong* was dated *February* the 12th, 1729-30.

† *Pointz* and *Armstrong's* Letter to the *Duke* was from *Paris* the 27th *February*, 1729-30.

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“ *February*, 1730. Signed *Lewis*, and underneath  
 “ *Phelypeaux*.”

Our *Ministers* seemed to applaud themselves very much on the Success of their last Application to the *French Court*; and it was talked of, in a triumphant Stile, as if there remained no Pretence for proceeding to any farther Examination of the present State of *Dunkirk*. But surely this was unreasonable on all Accounts; since if there was any Merit in obtaining this *Piece of Paper* from *France*, the Merit belonged to those worthy *Gentlemen*, who brought this Affair before the *House of Commons*, and in no sort to the *Ministers*. Besides which, even upon the Supposition that *France* had now given us full Satisfaction, and a full Security that *Dunkirk* should be once more demolished, according to the Terms of the *Treaties* of *Utrecht* and the *Hague*, it was still proper and necessary too that the *Committee* should proceed; because it was proper and necessary to discover how it had come to pass that the Harbour of *Dunkirk* had been, for so long a Time, repairing without any effectual Opposition on our Parts. No honest Man, who is acquainted with the Constitution of *Parliament*, and who knows what the Proceedings of the *House of Commons* have been in the best Times, will contradict me in this. Permit me to add, that the Facility and Expedition, with which the *French* consented, upon this Occasion, to their last Order, administered more than ordinary Cause to suspect that they had never been pers'd much upon this Head before.

When this House came again into the *Committee of the State of the Nation*, they had before them, besides the two Letters of our *Ministers* and the Answer just procured from *France*, several of the *Papers*, which had been call'd for, and the Evidence of some fresh *Witnesses* produced by those *Gentlemen* who had procured the former.

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I say *several of the Papers, which had been called for*; because, altho' the Papers called for by \* \* \* \* were all brought in; yet of those, which had been called for by *others, some* were kept back, under a Pretence that they could not be found in the Offices; and *others*, it was said, would require a great deal of Time to copy.

The Papers called for by \* \* \* \* and delivered in, were generally *Extracts of Letters*; so that, if one were to suppose an Intention to *conceal* any Circumstances from the Knowledge of the *House*, this Method would give a sufficient Opportunity of doing it; notwithstanding which, these very *Papers*, imperfect as they were, confirmed and strengthen'd all the Evidence given at the Bar.

In order to be more clear, and to state the whole Matter as fairly as I am able, I shall take Notice, in the first Place, of such Particulars as appeared in the *Papers*, or were proved by *fresh Witnesses*, in Addition to and Corroboration of what had appeared in the *preceding Examination*; for nothing contrary to it appeared any where. In the next Place, I shall give an Account of the Conduct of our *Ministers* through all these Transactions; for the Exactness of which, I shall appeal to their *own Papers*, as I shall appeal to the common Sense of Mankind for the Justness of the *Observations*, which I propose to make as I go along.

It appeared then by *these Papers*, that in *March 1727-8*, according to our Stile, the *old Harbour of Dunkirk* was so well repaired, that the Canal of *Mardyke* was no longer made use of; that the *Inhabitants* worked at these Reparations by *Moonlight*; that the Trade of *Dunkirk* had been carried on there as formerly for *eight Months*; and that a *Frigate* of 40 Guns was fitting in that Harbour, which is said to be in as good a Condition as formerly, except as to the Condition of the *Fortifications*.

Other

Other Advices, very little posterior to these, speak of a *Sluice* built in 1727, on the *Canal of Furnes*; of a new *Sluice* preparing for the *Canal of Berg*; of *Engineers*, who direct, and the *King of France's Troops*, who carry on these Works.

As this Account from the *Papers* agrees with the Accounts given by the *first Witnesses*; so the Evidence of the *second Witnesses* agrees perfectly with *both*; for they said that the *Sluice of Furnes* had been opened about *August 1727*; that is, about *eight Months* before the Month of *March; 1727-8*, Old Stile; that about *October 1727*, the Piles, which barr'd the Harbour, had been drawn, and that there was Water enough in it for a Ship of 400 Tons. They confirmed, that Numbers of Men, mostly *Soldiers*, were employed on these Works.

Mr. *Armstrong* was sent, in 1728, with Mr. *Cronstroom* to *Dunkirk*, and his Report is dated from thence in *September*. This Report is in nothing repugnant to the *other Accounts*. On the contrary, it enters minutely enough into the Particulars of Works, which the Report agrees to be *contrary to the express Terms of the Treaty*.

There are, among the *Papers*, other Advices of the Month of *May, 1729*, concerning *new Works* carried on at *Dunkirk*, and Accounts of what was done upon these Advices; but the *Papers* are, from *May and July 1729*, entirely silent as to this whole Affair; and yet it appeared plainly by the *Evidence* at the *Bar*, which was not contradicted, that from *July*, to the Time of bringing this Enquiry into the *House of Commons*, the *French* continued to repair and mend the Port of *Dunkirk* with more Application than ever. It is therefore no Wonder if the *Witnesses* spoke to some more Particulars than are to be found in the *Papers*.

Thus have I related the Substance of what appeared, concerning the *present State of Dunkirk*,  
M 2 as

as well as concerning the *Works* carried on by the *French* at that Place, since Mr. *Lasceles* was recalled from thence. Some Circumstances, which I may have omitted, to avoid Prolixity and Confusion, will occur more properly in the *Second Part*; where I propose to give an Account of the Conduct of our *Ministers*, through all these Transactions, out of their own *Papers*.

First, it appears, by their own *Papers*, that the very first Notice, which they took of what the *French* were doing at *Dunkirk*, proceeded from a Representation made by the *Pensionary* of *Holland*, on Advices he had received from *France*, and which were dated the 26th of *March* 1728, *N. S.* Now the *French* had been, at this Time, many Months working at the Harbour of *Dunkirk*, and the Trade of that Place had been, during this Time, carried on as formerly. Did our *Ministers* know of this, and do nothing against it till the *Minister* of the *States* called, in a Manner, upon them? This would be *Connivance* in the highest Degree. Did they not know it sooner? They took then no Care to be informed of what passed at *Dunkirk*, for two Years together, after they had recalled Mr. *Lasceles*, whose Presence had been a Check upon the *French*. This would be *Neglect* in the highest Degree. The *Dutch Minister* at *Paris* sent this Advice to the *Pensionary*. How came our *Minister*, at the same Court, not to have as good *Intelligence*, or having it, not to send it hither?

But there is another Consideration still behind; for if *publick Reports* did not deserve their Attention; yet they could not be ignorant that the *Port* of *Dunkirk* was opened, because they must know, at least one of them must know, and from him the rest might have known, by the Entries at our \* *Custom-house*,

\* *N. B.* The Entries of *Brandies* from thence were increased

*house*, that Ships went daily to it and came daily from it. *Neglect* might keep them ignorant of the particular Works, by Means whereof this Harbour had been restored. But even *Neglect* could not hinder them from knowing that it was, in some Degree, restored; and that, by Virtue of two solemn Treaties, over the Observation of which it was their Duty to watch, *Dunkirk* was never to be, in any Degree, an Harbour again.

Secondly, as the latter Part of the foregoing Observation bears particularly on the elder, so I apprehend that the Observation I am about to make will be found to bear as hard on the younger of that Pair of Brothers, who have had so long the Direction of the Affairs of this Kingdom; for the Advices, which the *Pensionary* had communicated to our Court, were sent to the *British Minister* at *Paris* by the *Secretary of State*, on the 4th of *April* 1728, with Orders that he should inform himself about them, and make the proper Representations to the *Cardinal*, if he found them true; though it was not possible for us to have any Doubt of the Truth of those Facts; concerning which, they might have had certain Information from so many Hands, if their Attention had not been wholly employed in the necessary Establishment of *Don Carlos*.

*Walpole's* Answer is dated the 29th of *April*, *N. S.* and it is a curious one indeed. He sends over an Information, which agrees, in the main, with the Advices received from the *Pensionary*; but adds, that the Inhabitants of *Dunkirk* had seen, 'some Time

creased from 600 Tons, in the Year 1727, to above 1600 in the Year 1729; and the Entries of *Cambricks* from 18,500 half Pieces to above 31,000 half Pieces; and 160 Sail of Ships, from 30 to 60 Tons, were entered at the Custom-House from this Port in the three Years from 1727 to 1729.

Time ago, with equal Surprise and Pleasure, that in one Night their Port was opened at once, by the Force of an *extraordinary Tide*, which they looked upon as a kind of *MIRACLE*. In this *French Miracle* his Excellency seems to believe; and therefore most cautiously proposes to the *Secretary of State*, that a Person may be sent to *Dunkirk* to see whether what has been done there be any thing more than the pure Consequence of the *Tides*, before he speaks to the *Cardinal* in pursuance of the Orders sent by the *D. of N.* to him.

On the 30th of *April*, the *Secretary* writes to the *Ambassador* again, and sends him an Account, which his Majesty has received, says the *Letter*, of the Works which have been carrying on at *Dunkirk* for the Establishment of the Port and Harbour there, from a Person of undoubted Credit and Skill in those Affairs. The Advices of the *Pensionary* are owned to be true; and every Step, which has been taken at *Dunkirk*, is declared to be a direct Breach of the *Treaty of Utrecht* and of the *Triple Alliance*. *Walpole* is directed therefore to insist with the *Cardinal*, that immediate Orders be sent to stop these Works, and a Confidence is expressed that the *Cardinal* will take effectual Care that every Thing be rectified according to the *Treaties* abovementioned. All this is enforced by some Reasonings, which would incline one to imagine, that our *Ministers* at home might think it necessary, at that Time, to insist upon the Observation of the *Treaties*.

But our *Minister abroad* did not appear much convinced of any such Necessity; for his *Excellency's Answer* to this Dispatch is more extraordinary than the last, and even than the *miraculous Tide*, which, it is pretended, opened the Harbour of *Dunkirk*. He writes on the 30th of *May*; that is, a Month afterwards to the *D. of N.* sends him some *Papers*,  
received

received from the *Cardinal*, relating to our Complaints about *Dunkirk*; takes no Notice of any *Representations* made by him, in obedience to the Orders sent him; but says very coolly and very tenderly, that 'he is no competent Judge of this Affair and can say nothing to it.'

His *Excellency's Temper* would almost make any honest Man lose his Temper; but let us examine these Passages with all the Indifference possible.

*Walpole's* Information, which he sent the *D. of N.* agreed with that of the *Pensionary*, which the *D. of N.* had sent him. He knew then, by repeated Advices, that it was not the *Tides*, but the incessant Labour of the *French*, which had opened the Port and restored the Trade of *Dunkirk*, with all the Circumstances already mentioned. He knew, or he might have known, that this *miraculous Tide* had happened eight Years before, long before Mr. *Lascel* was recalled from *Dunkirk*, and neither had been, nor could be, of itself, effectual to the opening that Port. This being the Case (and it is so most exactly) on what Principle shall we account for *Walpole's* Doubts, Delays, and the Weight he seems to lay on that impertinent Story of the *Tide*?

But this is not the worst. He holds much the same Conduct, after he has received a *third Information*, confirming the *two former*, coming from a Person of undoubted Credit and Skill, believed by the King, and made the Foundation of *positive Orders* to him to insist on having an immediate stop given to these Works. He was no Judge in this Affair. His Orders were not conditional in this Case, as in the former. Nothing but the greatest Certainty, that the Advices, which the King had received, were untrue, and that his Majesty had been deceived in them, could justify him for delaying one Moment the Execution of his Orders. Now, instead of this Certainty, what had he? Why he had a Paper,  
M 4 drawn



drawn up by the *Intendant of the Marine at Dunkirk*; for which, by the way, he had stayed about a *Month*; and it happens very unluckily that this Paper, as inconsistent, as shuffling, as evasive, and as impertinent as it is, owns not only the Truth of some Particulars, contained in the *Advices*, which were the Grounds of Complaint, but acknowledges expressly that some Works had been made to prevent the Sands from choaking up the Harbour. Need I go about to prove that, in Consequence of the *Treaties*, the Harbour is to remain choak'd up for ever; and that every thing done to prevent that is an Infraction of these *Treaties*?

I proceed, in the third Place, to take Notice of Mr. *Armstrong's Report*. This Report is dated at *Dunkirk* the 23d of *September*, 1728, near four Months after the Transactions last mentioned, and confirms sufficiently the Truth of the *Advices* received.—It takes Notice of an *Extraordinary Tide*, which had demolished, in the Month of *December*, 1720, the great *Batardeau* or *Digue*; but it observes that the breaking of this *Digue* was far from opening the Harbour, since the Sand and Earth of it, being spread by the Flux and Reflux, had filled the Port, Basin, and Channel, so that a *Boat* could not get in from the Seaward.—It attributes very justly the opening the Harbour to the rebuilding the *Sluice of Furnes*, and augmenting it with a *second Flood-Gate*.—It then proceeds to particularize the several other Works, which had been made, and asserts that 'they are all contrary to the express Terms of the ninth Article of the *Treaty of Utrecht*, and also to the fourth Article of the *Treaty of Alliance* made at the *Hague* the fourth of *January* 1717.'—It afterwards proposed different Methods for restoring Things to the State they were in, before the *French* had opened and repaired the Harbour.—Thus far all is well; but then

then these *Engineers* (for *Cronstroom* joins in the Report with *Armstrong*) turn Politicians; and having offer'd what they judged necessary for an effectual Compliance with the *Treaties*. they take on them to offer what they judge may be expedient, and not repugnant to the *Intention* of the *Treaties*; and that is, that the little *Rigolle* or *Gut* (so they are pleased to call it, and such it might be then, in Comparison of what it is now) should be left to the *French*; and in order to preserve it to them, that the *Sluice*, which they had built on the *Canal of Furnes*, in Violation of their *Treaties*, should be left to them likewise.

This must appear a very odd Opinion; especially when it comes from Mr. *Armstrong*, who was so positive in the late *Queen's Time*, that the *Sluices* at *Dunkirk* were not necessary to be preserved, in order to discharge the Waters of the Country; and that if any of these *Sluices* remain'd, it would be impossible to prevent the Harbour from being kept open; whereas if they were all destroy'd, a small Space of Time would effectually fill up the Harbour. But since that Time, he seems to have been enlighten'd by *Ricouart*, the *Intendant of the Marine at Dunkirk*; who, in the Paper abovemention'd, to which this Report refers, had undertaken to do, in three Month's Time, in War or Peace, at the Expence of ten thousand *Livres*, and with one hundred Workmen, more than he own'd had been done at *Dunkirk* in four Years.

It was right, perhaps, in *Ricouart* to advance this extravagant Proposition; because it was his Business to furnish the *Cardinal* with Arguments to oppose to our Complaints; but surely it was not our Business to build, on this Foundation, such *Maxims*, as are establish'd in Mr. *Armstrong's Report*, and as have had too much Prevalency since.

*France*, it is argued, may, in Case of a Rupture with us, rebuild *Sluices*, and open thereby the Harbour

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*bour of Dunkirk* and the *Channel*, as deep and as wide as formerly. But this *Harbour* will be of no Advantage to them, till the *Fortifications* to the Sea are rebuilt; because all Ships of War or Burthen were ever obliged, when this Place was in the best Condition, to go out into the *Road*, where they may be attack'd, as long as the *Strand* remains *unfortified*, and there take in their Guns, Provisions, &c. Therefore let us permit them to *open* their *Harbour* now; that is, because *France* will probably, in Case of a *War*, restore and fortify the *Port of Dunkirk* again, let us allow them to do *part of their Work before*; because they will not observe the *Treaties*, when they are *no longer bound by them*, let us connive at their breaking these *Treaties*, whilst they are *bound by them*.

But I must not dismiss this Point ludicrously.

Mr. *Armstrong's* reasoning, which was very *bad*, when he first made Use of it, and which is grown *much worse* by what has happen'd since (though there are Men who still insist upon it) is entirely built on *supposing* what is in *Dispute*, or rather what is *fully disproved*.

For *first*, it is taken for granted that, in Case of a *Rupture*, the *French* will be able, in a short Time, to restore *this Harbour*, notwithstanding all that has been done, or can be done to *destroy* it. Now this is absolutely denied by several very *knowing Men*; and was so, in a particular Manner, by *one*, whose *Knowledge* can be no more disputed, than his *Valour*, or his *Integrity*; and who said in the *House* that he would undertake the *Digue* or *Damme* might be so made, as not to be destroy'd, in *two Years Time*, with all the Expence *France* could bestow upon it.

But besides, how could it escape Mr. *Armstrong*, when he took his Hint from the *French Intendant*, or those who have been Mr. *Armstrong's* *Ecchoes*, that their own reasoning turns, in this Case, *against them*? Let it be allow'd them, for Argument's Sake,

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Sake, that no Ship can take its Departure from *Dunkirk* without stopping sometime in the *Road*; let it be allow'd that we can attack and destroy them there, as long as the *Strand* is not *fortified*; may let it be allow'd that, in Case of a *War*, we should be able from the *Road* to hinder the *French* from *fortifying* the *Strand*. From all which they conclude that a *naked Harbour* cannot be of much Advantage to *France*, at the same Time that they assert that it is not worth while to hinder that from being done now, which *France* can and certainly will do in a *few Months*, whenever a *War* shall happen.

But surely 'tis very plain, upon this Foundation, and in Contradiction to what is asserted, that nothing can be more worth our while, than to *hinder the French from restoring this Port and Harbour in Time of Peace*; since they cannot possibly restore it in Time of *War*. The same Force, which it has been allow'd would destroy their Ships in the *Road*, and even hinder them from *fortifying* the *Strand* again, would equally hinder them from restoring their *Channel* to the Sea, by making *Jettees* down to the low-water Mark, to prevent the Flux and Reflux of the Tides, which set across the *Channel*; from choaking it up with Mud and Sand as fast as the Sluices by their Effect can clear it. Now it is undeniable, that if we can, in Time of *War*, command the *Road* and even hinder the *Strand* from being *fortified*; we can likewise, by the same Means, hinder the *Jettees* from being carried to *low-water Mark*. From whence it follows, on the reasoning of these Gentlemen, that if we do not suffer the *French* to do this Work, by Stratagems in Time of *Peace*, they never can do it by Force in Time of *War*; and by Consequence, if ever it is done, it must be owing to the Folly, Neglect, or Treachery of the Ministers of *Great Britain*.

◦ *Secondly,*

*Secondly*, it is asserted to be publickly known that all Ships, whether of *War* or *Burthen*, were ever obliged, when the Haven was at its best, to go out into the *Road*, and there take in their Guns, &c. Now it is publickly known, that all Ships of *War* or *Burthen* were not formerly, and are not even now under any such Necessity. There is at present Water enough in the *Harbour* for a Ship of 400 Tons, and the *Witnesses* had seen a Ship sail out of it with 24 Guns mounted. The largest Men of War, which we kept formerly on that Station, might be obliged to go light into the *Road*, and there take in their Guns, &c. but it is evident that Ships of Force sufficient to annoy the Trade of *Great Britain* and to carry on that of *France*, did formerly and may now sail out and in, without being obliged to stop in the *Road*.

*Thirdly*, the opening this Port, in the Manner it has been done, and the erecting a *Sluice* on the Canal of *Furnes*, tho' allow'd to be contrary to the express Terms, is supposed not to be repugnant to the *Intention* of the *Treaties*, and to the *Ends* proposed by them. Now surely the direct contrary is demonstratively plain; so plain, by the *Terms of the Treaty*; by the Principles over and over laid down; by the Arguments over and over employ'd in the Disputes and Negotiations about this Affair, and finally by *Mr. Armstrong's own Opinion* formerly deliver'd, and follow'd, that it is inconceivable he should report in Contradiction to all this; unless a Report was to be made, on this Occasion, in Consequence of a Measure resolved, instead of determining the Measure, in Consequence of the Report; which I apprehend has been the Case, on many Occasions.

When the *French* made the Canal of *Mardyke*, they cover'd themselves under the Letter of the *Treaty*; and because they did not rebuild the same individual Moles, *Fettees* or *Fortifications*, as had been demolish'd,

demolish'd, they would have had it understood that they did not act against the Words of the *Ninth Article* of the *Treaty of Utrecht*; which are, *ne dicta Munimenta, Moles, aut ageres denuo unquam reficiantur*. Now when they have rebuilt one of the same *Sluices*; are repairing the very same *Fettees*; and are, in a Word, restoring the same individual Port, *Harbour, Basin and Channel*; we argue, in their Favour, that they do not act against the Spirit or *Intention* of the *Treaties*, provided they do not renew the *Fortifications on the Strand*. *Mr. Armstrong*, in his Report, does not indeed allow the repairing the *Fettees*; on the contrary, he insists strongly on the Necessity of destroying them, even to the Level of the *Strand*; but we shall see that he does little less than allow it in a subsequent Report; and the same Argument, drawn from the supposed *Intention of the Treaties*, has been equally insisted upon, since the *Fettees* have been in part repair'd and other Works done, which answer the same Ends.

But to conclude this Observation; if there could have been, before the *Treaty of 1717*, any Doubt concerning the *Intention of the Treaty of Utrecht*, as there certainly could not; and as his late Majesty insisted very justly and very successfully that there could not; yet to urge this, after the *Treaty of 1717*, is to chicaner about the Spirit of *Treaties*, in Favour of the *French*, more grossly than they did themselves in their own Favour, when they accepted the Will of the late King of *Spain*, notwithstanding all the Engagements they had taken by the *Treaty of Partition*. The *fourth Article* of the *Treaty of 1717*, is a Commentary on the *ninth Article* of that of *Utrecht*. If, after that, we are still at Liberty to talk of the Spirit or *Intention of the first Treaty*, nothing can be ever determined by any *Treaty*. The *Treaty of 1717* leaves the Canal of *Mardyke* in such a State as might suffice for carrying off the Waters, and admitting  
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of *small Vessels*, that there might be no Excuse left for opening, in any Degree, the *old Channel*, which by the *same Treaty* is to be more effectually demolish'd than ever, in order to the intire choaking of it up; How can it be said, after this, that the *Intent* and *End* of this *Treaty*, as well as of the former, is not disappointed by opening this *same old Channel* and the *Harbour* anew? I grow ashamed of insisting so long on a Point so very clear, and shall finish it by saying, that nothing could surprize or afflict me more than to hear *some Persons*, from whom better Things might have been expected, argue for *keeping open the Harbour of Dunkirk* upon any Principles and especially on such as these; that it is not against the *Treaties*, nor against the *Interest of Great Britain*. To excuse *Ministers*, who have committed *Faults*, may be allow'd to *Friendship*, and to *particular Obligations*; but there can hardly be a more melancholly Symptom in a *free Government*, than that of *excusing* and even *justifying* the Conduct of *Ministers*, by explaining away the most *important, national Advantages*.

Having made these Observations on Mr. *Armstrong's Report*, I proceed, in the *fourth Place*, to take Notice of what our *Ministers* did, in Consequence of it.

What they did was in short This. They followed his Advice, as far as it went in Favour of *France*; and there do not appear any Footsteps, that they followed it in taking *effectual Care* of those few *Things*, which he recommends in Favour of *Great Britain*.

They approved his *Report* in all its Parts. They directed the *Minister at Paris* to insist that Things might be rectified according to it; and the *Secretary of State* writes that *this will give entire Satisfaction*. Nay they would not so much as try whether *France* would be contented with less than Mr. *Armstrong* propos'd;

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propos'd; for *Walpole* having given the Hint, by asking whether he should communicate the *whole Report* to the *French*, or only such Parts of it as related to the *Infractions of the Treaties*, he is ordered to communicate the *whole Report to the Cardinal*. That is, he is ordered to shew the *French* at once, that we are willing to give up to them what had never been given up from the *Treaty of Utrecht* to this Time; and leave them a *Harbour*, under the *sham Pretences*, under which they had so long press'd for it in vain.

What is the Return made to this noble Frankness and Generosity of ours? Why, the *Cardinal*, says he, has put the *Report* into the Hands of the *Secretary for Maritime Affairs*; and that, in order to hinder an *Eclat*, Direction will be given for complying with it by Degrees.

Who does not see the Meaning of this Answer? The *Eclat*, that is the Noise, was already made in *Great Britain*, and in *Holland* too. It was publickly known in *both*, and publickly complain'd of, that the *French* had, in great Measure, *restored the Port and Harbour of Dunkirk*. Surely there could have been no Hurt in letting it be as publickly known, that they were *destroying*, at least, a Part of what they had done in *Violation of the Treaties*. This must have helped to *hinder*, instead of making any farther *Eclat*. This must have done Honour to *that Court*, and have given some Colour, if any Thing can give Colour to so improbable a Story, to what has been so often said, and is said even now, that the *French Ministers* knew nothing of the Works carried on by the Inhabitants of *Dunkirk*.

But the Meaning of *this Answer* was plainly to gain Time. We had shewn too much Haste in giving up, at once, a great Part of what they wanted to gain upon us; and they were willing to try if they

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they could, by Delay, evade performing the small Part of what we required of them.

I pass to my *fifth* Observation, which will prove that this is no unreasonable Refinement, or rash Judgment. What I have just related passed in Nov. 1728. From that Time it does not appear that the *French* demolished, according to Mr. *Armstrong's Report*, any of the *Works* they had made, or that our *Ministers* pressed them once to it. But though they did not *demolish*, it appears that they *built*; for in the Month of *May* following, a new Alarm comes, and our *Ministers* are once more called upon by the *Pensionary*, who sends them Accounts of *farther Works* carrying on at *Dunkirk*, for the Improvement of the *Harbour*. These Accounts were such, that my Lord *Chesterfield* says, in his Letter, the *Pensionary* gave great Attention to them. Let us see what Attention *We* gave to them.

They are sent to the *Minister* at *Paris*. He communicates them to the *Cardinal*. The *Cardinal* knows nothing of the Matter; but gives *general Assurances* that nothing, contrary to the *Treaties*, shall be done. Our Complaints are transmitted from Court to *Dunkirk*, and from thence an *Answer* is returned by the *Intendant*, acknowledging in the main the Facts complained of, but giving Turns to them, which one would hardly imagine could pass even with those, who have so much Faith in their *Miracles*. Such, for Instance, as this; that a *certain Floodgate* had indeed been repaired, but that it was *one*, which had not been demolished at the Demolition of *Dunkirk*; which is true for this Reason, that it was not *in being* at the Time of that Demolition, but hath been *built since*; so that the *French Argument* stands thus. We do not break the *Treaties* by *repairing this Work*, though we broke them by *building it*.

This

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This Answer was referred to Mr. *Armstrong*, who (without any Examination, whether the *French Intendant* had not palliated and disguised Matters) makes as implicit and favourable a *Report*, as the other could have desired.

A few Months ago, it was, in his own Opinion, necessary to destroy the *Jetties*, newly erected, and the Heads of the *old Ones*, which had been left, and that even down to the *Level of the Strand*. Now, the *Piles*, driven at the Head of the *old Channel*, and pretended to be designed only for *Beacons* and *Moorings*, may be allowed; provided Care be taken that they do not serve for the Foundations of *Batteries*. The *new Magazines* and the *new Key* are not thought of any Inconveniency. All that *France* is doing, and which the *Pensionary* laid so much Weight upon, is allowed. The *Minister* at *Paris* hath Orders to say so; but he is to hint, at the same Time, that Care be taken that no farther Works are carried on. He may speak out in making these Concessions to *France*; but he must measure his Words, and not speak plain, when he mentions what we required in Return; though what we required, in Return, was nothing more than a *verbal Assurance* that *Batteries* should not be made on the Heads of the *Jetties*, which we allowed them to erect at the Entrance of the *old Channel*.

My sixth Observation is this. Though we were now brought, Step by Step, to see and own a manifest Danger, that the *French* might not only repair, but fortify the *Port of Dunkirk*; yet from the Month of *July* last the Works were carried forward there till the *Enquiry* begun in Parliament, without the *Knowledge*, or with the *Connivance* of our most *knowing Ministers*.

It appeared by the concurring Evidence of the Witnesses, that they were carried forward, during this Time, with greater Application and less Reserve than



than ever; that the *Soldiers of the King's Troops* worked at them; and that Ships were pressed, by the *King's Orders*, to carry Stones for this Service.

After this, it is impossible to read, without some Surprize, that when Mr. *Pointz* and Mr. *Armstrong* made the Representations, which they were ordered to make, to the *French Ministers*, both the *Cardinal* and the *Keeper of the Seals* assured them, that if any Thing had been done towards restoring the *Harbour of Dunkirk* to its former State, or in Contravention to the *Treaties of Utrecht* and the *Hague*, it had been done *without their Knowledge* and *contrary to the French King's express Commands*. They seem, by this Protestation, as ignorant as our *Ministers* were, of Things done in their own Country, and with all the *Eclat* possible; but even Ignorance, in this Case, is not very excuseable in either; for,

*First*, as to the *French Ministers*. Taking what they say, in their own Behalf, for granted, that the *Inhabitants of Dunkirk* have been principally active in what hath been lately done there, contrary to *Treaties*; yet can it be supposed, with the least Appearance of Probability, that Works of such Importance could be carried on, for above two Years together, without any Authority, or Connivance, or even the Knowledge of the *French Court*?—Is it, in any Degree, credible that the Subjects of an arbitrary *Prince* would dare to make Use of his Troops, or to press Ships into that Service, by pretended Orders and without any real Licence—Can we imagine that This could be done under the very Nose, and yet without the Privity of the *Gouverneur Commandant*, the *Intendants* and divers other Officers of the *Marine*, who are obliged to hold a constant Correspondence with the *Ministers at Paris*?—or, lastly, can it be pretended, without putting the greatest Violence on common Sense and common Reason, that even *Curiosity itself*, the lowest Principle  
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of all our Enquiries, would not have prevailed on the *Ministers of France* to examine into this Affair and gain the best Informations about it, after it had made so great an *Eclat* in *England* and *Holland*?

I am at a Loss to find, in this Conduct, any Proof that *they carry their Fidelity even to a Nicety*; for it was certainly incumbent on them to be so informed; since it was from the *French Court*, and not from the *Inhabitants of Dunkirk* that we were to expect and require the strict Observance of the *Treaties*. When the *French Ministers* therefore would impose on us another Assurance of this Kind, so void of all Probability, and at the same Time give us another Assurance of their doing every Thing agreeably to *Treaties*; will not the notorious Improbability of the *one* justify our strongest Suspicions about the Performance of the *other*? When there are such convincing Reasons to question their *Veracity*, can we, without exposing ourselves to the Contempt of the whole World, depend intirely on their *Sincerity*?

*Secondly*, As to the *inactive* Conduct of our *Ministers* from *July* to *February* last; and in order to set this Matter in a full Light, let us recal very shortly and place their whole Proceeding in one View.

If we look no farther back than the Year 1727, when the *new Sluice*, on the Canal of *Furnes*, was built, it is now about 3 Years since the *French* have worked at the Restoration of *Dunkirk*. In this Time, our *Ministers* have made *three Complaints*, and not *one* of these Complaints hath been made originally on their own Motion, and upon *Advices of their own*. The *two first Times*, they were called on by the *Pensionary*, and the *last Time*, they were pushed on by the *Parliament*. The Proceedings on the *first Complaint* ended by allowing to the *French* some Infractions of the *Treaties*, and by desiring that others might be rectified. This is *promised*; but the Promise  
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mise is *not kept*. Instead of *rectifying* what had been done, *new Works* are carried on. The Proceedings on the *second Complaint* end in our acquiescing to these *new Works*, provided they are *extended no farther*. All Mankind know it, and complain loudly of it for seven Months together. An *Enquiry* begins in Parliament. Our *Ministers* are surprized and know nothing of the Matter. Although they had been disappointed a *first Time*, they took no Care not to be so a *second*.

I think that I need not explain or enforce this any farther; and therefore I shall observe, *7thly*, that as there may be some Reason, arising from *their past Conduct*, to apprehend that the *French Court* may not be quite so exact, nor so expeditious, as we are made to hope, in fulfilling even the *last Promise*, which they have given us, to *demolish all the Works erected contrary to the Treaties*; so there is great Reason likewise, arising from *our past Conduct*, to apprehend that *they* do not understand, on that Side of the Water, by *Works contrary to the Treaties*, what *we* do and always must understand, on this Side of the Water, by those Words; from whence it will follow that, by *dextrous Management*, we have brought the clearest Point in Nature to be the most intricate; and that whereas there never could have been Room for the least Dispute, if the *Treaty of 1717* had been observed, in Explanation and Moderation of that of *Utrecht*, our departing from it may and must open a Source of inexhaustible Chicane.

I have already shewn how the *Treaty of 1717* explains the *Intention* and moderates the *Conditions* of the *Treaty of Utrecht*, so as to leave the *French* no Colour, either from the *Letter* or *Intention* of the *Treaties*, for doing or acting any Thing more than what is there *specifically express'd*; no, not even on Account of discharging the *Canals*; draining the  
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*flat Country*; or carrying on their *Fishing* or any other *Trade*.

Upon this Foot, therefore, the Sense of these Words (*Works contrary to the Treaties*; or *Works done in Contravention to the Treaties*;) is exactly and invariably determined. But the *French* have been artful enough to improve our Complaisance for them, so as to set the Case of *Dunkirk* on quite another Foot; with our *Ministers* I mean; for with the *Nation* I hope and believe that impossible to be done.

On the former Foot, every Thing, which hath been done at *Dunkirk*, is directly against the *Letter* of both *Treaties*, and against the *Intention* of that of *Utrecht*, explained by that of 1717. The *Rigolle* or *Gut*, which Mr. *Armstrong* and our *Ministers* allow the *French*, by virtue of their *dispensing Power*, and the *Sluice* on the Canal of *Furnes*, to keep this *Rigolle* or *Gut* open, are as directly and as plainly against the *Intention* of the *Treaties*, as even fortifying the *Town*, the *Harbour* and the *Strand* would be.

But, on the other Foot, there is Room for *Chicane*. The *French* may say (and, no Doubt, they will say) that the *Intention* of *Treaties* ought to be determined by the *Sense*, in which the *contracting Parties* have, by mutual Agreement, executed them; that as the late *King* allowed them to have a Communication from *Dunkirk* to the *Sea*, by the Canal of *Mardyke*; so they have been allowed, *at present*, to have the same Communication by the *old Channel*; that we did indeed once insist on demolishing their Reparations of the *old Jettees*; but that, since that Time, and on Occasion of Complaints about *other Works*, made for improving this *Harbour*, we have not only expressly *approved* their making these *latter Works*, but have tacitly consented to their repairing and supplying the *old Jettees*, by taking no Notice of their not destroying them, nor of their making other Works to hinder as effectually the  
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the Flux and Reflux of the Tides from choaking up the *Channel*, as the *Fettees* are designed to do; that all this, together with our Approbation of the *new Key* they have made, and the new Magazines they have built, shew it very evidently to have been our Sense, as well as theirs, that the *Intention* of the *Treaties* is not to deprive them of a *naked Harbour* at *Dunkirk*, but only to hinder them from having a *fortified Harbour* there; that they are far from entertaining any such Thoughts; that *they carry their Fidelity even to a Nicety* and have not yet raised *one, single Battery* on the *Strand*; till they attempt which, we have not the least Reason to affirm that they act in *Contravention to the Treaties*.

This and much more, to the same Effect, may the *French* say, whenever they are pressed in good earnest to fulfil their *last Promise*, agreeably to the just Expectations of the *British Nation*. Nay, they certainly will insist in this Manner, if they were so pressed; because whatever Reasons they may have to desire that *our present Ministers should continue in Power*, I can hardly persuade myself that they will, for the Sake of the *two illustrious Brothers*, undo intirely what they have done at *Dunkirk* and fairly lay aside the Hopes of restoring *that Port*, by *Degrees* and *without Eclat*, to its former Greatness and Splendor.

That there is Reason to apprehend such a Conduct from them, we may judge by what we have lately heard from *Dunkirk*; for it is said that *Mr. Lasceles*, with some *French Officers*, had been to *sound the Water* in the *Harbour* and *Channel*. Now, to what Purpose can this be? If we are to stand to the *Treaties*, we must insist that there be *no Water*; at least, no *navigable Water* at all in the *Harbour* and *Channel*. If we depart from the *Treaties*, to what Purpose do we dispute about a *Foot or two of Water*, more or less?

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The Question does not turn on such Circumstances as these; whether the Port be capable of receiving 50 or 100 Ships; whether Ships of 50 or 500 Tons go into it, or out of it; whether the Depth of Water be 14 or 18 or 20 Foot, and the like; but singly on this, whether it be made a *Port to any Purpose, or in any Degree whatsoever*.

Perhaps, we may hear of *some Fettees, or other Works* destroyed, and a few Appearances of a *Demolition*; but let it be remembered that nothing can be a just Satisfaction and real Security to us, but the reducing *Dunkirk* once more to that Condition, into which it was put by Virtue of the *Treaties*, and following them as the stated Rule between *us*, and *France*, on this Head. Let it be remembered likewise that whatever *Satisfaction* we may obtain, be it more or less, will be owing to the *Parliamentary Enquiry*, and not to the Care, Vigilance and Spirit of *those*, who are employed in the Administration.

After having made so many Observations on the Conduct of our *Ministers* in this Affair of *Dunkirk*, I am obliged, in Justice, to take some Notice of the chief Argument, by which their Creatures endeavour to excuse them; for though many concur to screen them from *Censure*, few there are, I think, even amongst *these*, who presume entirely to justify their *Conduct*.

It hath been said then that *different Times* and *different Situations of Affairs* require *different Ways of acting*; which is a most undeniable Truth. But as *Common-place Wit* diverts nobody, who hath any *Wit*, so *Common-place Maxims* impose on nobody, who hath *Sense* and *Knowledge*.

It is true that *different Times* and *Situations* require that Ministers of State should both speak and act in *different Manners*; but they are never to lose their *Object*, although they change, in some Measure, the *Manner* of pursuing it. This *Object* is, or ought always

always to be, the *greatest national Good*. To *wise and honest* Servants of the Publick *all Countries* will be absolutely indifferent, except *their own*; and by Consequence they will neither lean to nor from any *foreign Interest*, but as *that Interest* is brought nearer to the Interest of their *own Country*, or placed in a *greater Opposition to it*, by the Course of *Accidents*.

Now, let us apply the *Maxim*, thus explain'd, to the Conduct of our *Ministers* in the Case of *Dunkirk*.

That we have seen and do still see *Times and Situations*, with respect to *Great-Britain* and *France*, very different from those, which our *Fathers* or we beheld, during forty Years, is true. It is true therefore, that since this Alteration of *Times and Situations*, a different Manner of *speaking and acting* towards *France* hath been requisite on our Part. But our *general Interest*, with Respect to *France*, is only thus far changed. *Formerly*, it was our Interest to *oppose all her Measures*, and to *defy her most exorbitant Power*. It is now become our Interest to have a *Communication of friendly Measures* and *Inter-course of friendly Offices* with her; and, instead of *defying her reduced Power*, to be only jealous of its *growing again*.

In cultivating therefore the *Friendship of France*, and even in avoiding all Appearances of *distrusting her*, or being jealous of her, our *Ministers* have acted according to the *Rules of good Policy*. The *French* have held the same Conduct toward us; and this mutual Confidence and Amity might certainly have been productive of much *publick Good*, without any particular Inconveniency or Mischief. It hath been so to *France*; but it hath not been so to *Great Britain*; and the Reason of this Difference is plain. The *French* have follow'd the *Maxim* above-mention'd, but without once losing Sight of the *national Interest*. Whenever *this* hath come into Question, they

they have insisted *amicably*, but they have insisted *as strongly as ever*; witness the Case of *Santa Lucia*, that of the \* *Honours at Sea*, and many others. Nay, whenever they could acquire such a Pretence, as seem'd consistent with the Terms of *Friendship*, they have artfully enough endeavour'd to *diminish our Power*, and to wrest from us *those Advantages*, which they know may some Time or other, in *our Hands*, be of Detriment to *them*; witness the Part, which our intimate Friend, the late Duke of *Orleans*, acted in supporting the Claim of *Spain* to the Restitution of *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*.

But I am afraid it will be found that our *Ministers* have suffer'd the Transports of *Friendship* to carry them too far in Favour of *France*; particularly, in the Case now before us; for which they must be confess'd inexcusable, notwithstanding the *wise Apothegm* quoted in their Behalf; unless they can shew that, by departing from a strict Observation of the *Treaties*, with respect to *Dunkirk*, they have avoided a *greater Evil*, than the Danger of seeing *this Port restored* is and must be reputed; or else that they have procured to their Country a *greater Good* than that of keeping *Dunkirk* in the *State*, to which it was *reduced*, and in which it was to *continue*, according to the *Treaties*.

If this *sole Excuse*, which can be made for our *Ministers*, will avail them little, when it comes to be tried by the *Rules of Reason*; it will be quite exploded, when we have Recourse to *Experience*, and compare the Conduct, which was held by our

N Ministers,

\* Above a Year ago a Lieutenant of an *English* Man of War was broke, as it was said, upon the Instance of *France*, for obliging a *French* Ship to *Strike*, according to his Instructions, as she was going out of one of our *own Harbours*.

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*Ministers*, in the Years 1716 and 1717, with that which has been held for these *three* or *four* last Years, as well as the Situation of Affairs, at *that* Time, with the Situation of Affairs, during the latter Period.

The Purport of the *Provisional Agreement* made in 1716, which was inserted in the fourth Article of the *Alliance* made in 1717, hath been already mention'd. The *French* were far from consenting easily to make this Step; and nothing less than the Firmness, which we then shew'd, could have forced them to it. I doubt not but they would gladly have destroy'd entirely the Canal of *Mardyke*, if they might have been permitted to have had that *Rigolle*, or *Gut* (for there appears an Affectation in calling it any Thing but what it is, a *Channel*) which hath been allow'd them since. The Harbour of *Dunkirk* is a *Tide-Harbour*, and therefore liable to much Inconveniency; but this Inconveniency was, in great Measure, remedied by the Situation of the *old Channel*, now *restored*, which runs strait down to the *Sea* from the *Harbour*, and hath the *Road* before it, in which Ships may, at all Times get into the *Port*.

The Canal of *Mardyke* runs a great Way about and makes an Elbow, before it can descend to the *Sea*; and when it comes there hath no *Road* across the Entrance of it; for which Reason, *Dunkirk* can never be of that Advantage to *France*, and of that Danger to *us*, with *this* opening to the *Sea*, as with the *other*.

The *late King* therefore consented, as is observed above, to leave the Canal of *Mardyke*, reduced according to the Terms of the *Provisional Agreement*; but he was so far from giving the least Way to any Thing, which might tend to open the *old Channel*, that he expressly stipulated the doing of every Thing necessary

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necessary for the *farther* and *more compleat Destruction* of it. Thus we see the Difference between our *former* and our *late Conduct*. Let us consider how we stood, at that Time, with *France*, and what was the *general Situation of our Affairs*.

We were *then* as closely united with *France* as we are *now*; and the Maxim of cultivating this *Union* prevailed as strongly in our Councils. A Storm from the *North* was *then* much more to be feared than *now*. The late *Czar's Grandfather* was then alive likewise. How we stood with *those Princes*, and what we had to apprehend from their *Arms*, I need not explain. At Home there were some Remains of a *Rebellion* not totally extinguished; and a *Jacobite Party* still in being. The *Swedish Plot* against the Government was carrying on at that Time. *Alberoni* was ripening his formidable Schemes, which he began to execute in 1717, and we were, in Concert with *France*, taking Measures to oppose them.

Let me ask now any Man, of common Ingenuity, whether an Argument, drawn from the *Situation of Affairs*, to excuse some Compliances with *France*, might not have been urged with a better Grace at *that Time*, than it could be urged, for the *same Purpose now*? He will certainly answer that it might; and yet it is urged *now*, not to excuse some little Compliances, but to excuse what hath been done, in *direct Contradiction to the Treaties*, and for giving up to *France* a great Part of the *Advantage* and *Security*, which we were in Possession of by *them*.

This *Difference of Conduct* is therefore not to be accounted for by the Difference of *Times and Situations*. It is to be accounted for by nothing, but by the *Difference of Men*. We had then *other Ministers at Home* to give Instructions, and *another Minister at*

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*Paris* to execute them. The *Times* and *our Situation* in the Years 1716 and 1717, were not more favourable to us, than the *Times* and *our Situation* in the Years 1727, 1728 and 1729; and our *national Interest*, with Respect to *Dunkirk*, hath been exactly the same in *both*; but our *Ministers* had not then negotiated themselves into an absolute Dependance on *France*, nor learned perhaps a Lesson, that it is much more easy and profitable to evade or defeat a *Parliamentary Enquiry*, than to *govern well at Home*, and to support the *Interests*, the *Honour*, and the *Dignity* of the Nation *Abroad*.

A FINAL

## A N S W E R

To the REMARKS on the CRAFTSMAN'S VINDICATION; and to all the Libels, which have come, or may come from the same Quarter against the PERSON, last mentioned in the Craftsman of the 22d of May 1731.

IT is impossible to have read the Papers, which have been published against the Writings of the *Craftsman*, and not have observed that one principal Point hath been laboured with constant Application, and sometimes with a little Art. The Point I mean hath been This; to make all the Disputes about national Affairs, and our most important Interests, to pass for nothing more than *Cavils*, which have been raised by the Pique and Resentment

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ment of *one Man*, and by the Iniquity and dangerous Designs of *another*. Nothing, which could be said or done to inculcate this Belief, hath been neglected. The same Charges have been repeated almost every Week, and the Publick hath been modestly desired to pay no Regard to undeniable Facts, to unanswer'd and unanswerable Arguments, because these Facts and these Arguments were supposed, by the *ministerial Writers*, to come from Men, to whom *these Hirelings* ascribed, against all Probability, the worst Motives, and whose Characters they endeavoured to blacken without Proof. Surely this Proceeding rendered it necessary, at least not improper, at the Conclusion of those Remarks, which were to conclude the Collection of the *Craftsman*, to say something concerning the *Persons*, who had been so particularly attacked on Account of the Part, which they, who railed at them, were pleased to suppose that *these Gentlemen* had in the Writings, contained in that Collection. This, I say, was necessary; at least proper; not in order to *raise a Spirit*, as it is impertinently suggested in the *Libel*, which lies before me; but to refute *Calumnys* and remove at least some of those Prejudices, which had been raised, or renewed, on the Occasion of *these Writings*, and which were employed to weaken the Effect of them; an Effect, which may be said with Truth to have been aim'd at the \* *noble Pair of Brothers*; since it keeps up a national Spirit of Enquiry and Watchfulness, which it is the Interest of *these Persons*, as it hath been their Endeavour, to stifle; and which it is the Interest of every *other Man* in *Britain* to preserve in himself, and to nourish in others; an Effect, which cannot be said, without the greatest Untruth, to have been aim'd

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\* *Par nobile Fratrum*. See the Motto prefixed to the Remarks.

against the *present Settlement*; since the highest Insolence, which can be offered to his Majesty, is to attempt to blend his Interest and his Cause with those of his *unworthy Servants*, as the Tools of these *unworthy Servants* are every Day employed to do, and probably at his Majesty's Expence.

Something was said therefore by the *Craftsman*, in his Journal of the 22d of \* *May*, to the Purpose I have mentioned. If he went out of his Way, (for he ought most certainly to confine himself to *Things*, and meddle with *Persons* as little as possible) he went out of it on great Provocation. He carry'd Truth and Reason along with him; and he used a Moderation and a Decency, to which his *Adversaries* are Strangers.

To set this Matter in a full Light, let us consider how he hath been answered; and, by fairly comparing both, let us put the whole Merits of this Cause upon one short but decisive Issue. It will be Time afterwards to make a few Observations on the Clamour raised; on the Reasons and Designs of it; in a Word, to detect the mean Artifice and silly Expedients, to which the *two honourable Patrons of the Remarker* are reduced. In doing this, I shall neither affect to declaim, nor to inveigh, though I have before me an inexhaustible Fund of Matter for both, and the Law of Retaliation to bear me out. As I am persuaded the *Men*, I have to do with, can raise no Passion in the *Person* concern'd, so have I no Need of endeavouring to raise the Passions of others.—But to proceed.

The *Craftsman* took Notice of those Accusations, which are brought against the *Gentleman* he mentions in the *second Place*.—I meddle not with the Defence of the *other*, which hath been undertaken by an

\* See Letter xxiv. in Oldcastle's Remarks on the History of England.

an abler Pen.—Some of these he answered in general only; and yet he answered them as particularly as he ought to have done for Reasons of *Honour*, which are touched upon by him, and which shall be a little more opened by me.

But there were other Points, not at all affected by these Reasons, on which no Explanation was necessary to be given by the *Accused*, and on which the *Craftsman* had a Right to demand Proofs from the *Accusers*. They were Points of a more determined Nature; such as admitted of no different Constructions; such as could not be altered by Circumstances. They were of a more publick Nature; such as the *Men*, who brought the Accusations, must have it in their Power to prove, if they were true; and such therefore as must be false, if the *Men*, who brought the Accusations, were not able and ready to prove them.

On these the *Craftsman* insisted. He affirmed Propositions directly contrary to the Accusations brought. He appealed to unquestionable Authority for the Truth of what he affirmed; and to *one* in particular, which should have been treated with more Respect by the *Remarker*, since it will outweigh, at home and abroad, a thousand such Authorities as those of *his Patrons*. He challenged all Mankind to produce one single Proof, in Contradiction of any one of the general Affirmations.

Was there any Thing unfair, or indecent in this Proceeding? Was there any Thing in it, which could provoke the Choler of those, who are Friends to Truth and Justice? If they, who brought these Accusations, had been such, an Opportunity was presented to them of convicting the guilty Man at the very Tribunal, before which his Cause had been pleaded. By producing Proof on these Heads, they had it in their Power to condemn him upon all the Rest; and if *this Part* of the Charge was

made good, the Opinion of Mankind would have been fairly enough decided as to the *other*.

Issue being joined therefore in this Manner, the *accused Person* must be found guilty of all the Crimes laid to his Charge; or his *Accusers* must be found guilty of Slander, of Calumny, and of the worst Sort of Assassination.

Thus the *Craftsman* left the Matter.——Let us see what hath been said in Answer to him.

I pass over the many scurrilous Productions of those *weekly ministerial Scolds*, who are hired to call Names, and are capable of little more. The elaborate Libel, intitled *Remarks on the Craftsman's Vindication*, seems to be the utmost Effort of *their* and *their Patron's* collected Strength; and though I have waited several Days to see if they had any more Scandal to throw out; yet I never doubted an Instant from what Quarter this Remarkable Piece came into the World.

The whole Pamphlet is one continued Invective, and deserves no more to be called *Remarks on the Craftsman*, or *an Answer to him*, than the Railing and Raving and throwing of Filth by a *Madman* deserve to be called an *Answer* to those, who unwarily pass too near his Cell. All, that *Malice* could ever invent, or the Credulity of *Parties*, inflamed by Opposition, receive, is assembled. Truth is disguised by Misrepresentation, and even many Things, which the *noble Pair* know to be false, are affirmed as true.

But you will ask, perhaps, whether the Challenge is not accepted, and whether Proofs are not brought to contradict the plain and positive Affirmations made by the *Craftsman*? I answer, the Challenge is accepted, and the *Remarker* assures us that he hath brought Proof in *numerous Instances* against these Affirmations; which is the more generous, because the

the *Craftsman* exacted but one single Proof in Contradiction of any of them.

The first of these Affirmations was, that the *Gentleman concerned* never entered into *Engagements, or any Commerce with the Pretender, till he had been attainted and cut off from the Body of his Majesty's Subjects*.——Let us examine the Facts, which we find scattered up and down in the *Remarks*, which may be applied to prove, in Opposition to this Affirmation, what hath been so often asserted, that *this Gentleman was a zealous Jacobite, and an Agent of the Pretender, even in the Reign of the late Queen*.

The first Fact of this Kind is this. *He left the Kingdom. His High Treason, among other Crimes, was confessed by his shameful Flight*.

Had the *Libeller* proved this *High Treason*, I might agree that the *Gentleman's leaving his Country* was a Consequence; but I can never admit that it is a Proof of his *Guilt*. Could no *other Reason* for leaving his Country be given, except his *Guilt*, his *leaving his Country* would be a strong Presumption against him. But many other Reasons will soon occur to those, who remember the Passages of that Time; and Reasons there are of a more private Nature still, which would be very far, to say no more, from reflecting Dishonour on a Step, which is called, by *these foul-mouthed Advocates of Power*, *shameful* and *ignominious*. One Thing it may be proper to assure them of, that they may pretend to mistake the *Craftsman*, and to misapply his Words no more. It is this. The *Gentleman* never declined a Contest with the *two honourable Patrons of this Libel*. One of them was, in those Days, below his Notice; and he never found, upon Trial, that he had Reason to apprehend being foild by the *other*. But we must not yet dismiss this Article.

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If the Proof we are examining proved any thing, it would prove too much. If to decline, in certain Circumstances, a Trial; if to go into voluntary Exile, either before a Trial, or even after Condemnation, were absolute Proofs of *Guilt*, the Conduct of many greater and better Men than the *Person now accused* would deserve our Censure, and that of Calumniators, as vile as *these Libellers*, would merit our Approbation. *Metellus* and *Rutilius* must be condemned. *Apuleius* and *Apicius* must be justified.

This sort of Proof therefore not appearing sufficient to make good the Charge, that *this Gentleman* was engaged with the *Pretender* before his *Attainder*, great Pains are taken, and much Rhetorick is employed to shew, what we shall not presume to contradict, that he ought not to have engaged in that Cause after his *Attainder*. Neither did the *Craftsman* insist on this Circumstance as a Defence of the *Person accused*. He fixed this Date of the Engagements mentioned, in Contradiction to *Those*, who had falsely affirmed that these Engagements were much more antient. But he neither urged it as a *Defence*, nor pleaded it as an *Excuse*; and yet I am persuaded that this very Circumstance had some Weight with his *late Majesty*, when that excellent \* Prince, the Mildness of whose Temper, and the Clemency of whose Nature, would have rendered him amiable in the most private Station, and made him almost adorable in that great Elevation, to which the Providence of God had raised him; when that excellent Prince, I say, was pleased on his own Motion, and without any Application from the *Person* here spoken of, to extend his present, and promise his future Favour to him.

Though the *Craftsman* did neither say nor intend what has been objected by the *Remarker* to him,

yet

\* King George I.

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yet he might perhaps mean something more than hath been observed; and if he did mean it, he meant to inculcate, upon this Occasion, a very useful, general Truth. Let us grant that the Man, who engages against his Country, even when he has been oppressed in it, or driven out of it by Violence, is not to be defended; that these are Occasions, wherein we ought to kiss the Rod, which scourges us, and reverence that Authority, which we think has been unjustly exercised against us. But then let it be granted likewise, that *human Passions* are so strong, and *human Reason* so weak, that Men, who suffer Persecution, or who imagine they suffer it, are seldom able to keep within these Bounds of *heroical Moderation*. They will be apt to seize the Opportunities, which may be offered, of resisting, or of attempting to repair the Injuries done them. They will flatter themselves, that they do not *vow their Revenge against the People, the innocent and collective Body of their Countrymen*, nor go about to subvert the *Constitution of the Government*. They will persuade others, nay they will persuade themselves, that they do not seek *Revenge*, but *Redress*; nor aim to destroy the *Law*, which punishes, but to prevent the *Abuse* of it, which persecutes. Thus will Men, who actually suffer, be apt to reason; and if the Case be common to Numbers, they will be apt to proceed from reasoning on such Principles, to act upon them. Wise Governments therefore have been careful to distinguish between *Punishment* and *Persecution*; have never suffered the *former*, however just, necessary, or severe, to carry the least Appearance of the *latter*. *Ludlow* was justly punished. My *Lord Clarendon*, whom the *Remarker* hath so strongly yoked with the *Regicide*, was unjustly, ungratefully and cruelly persecuted. We may pronounce, without Uncharitableness, that the *former* would have taken any Opportunity of sub-

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verting a second Time the Constitution of his Country; not from *Resentment* alone, but from *Principle*. The *latter* would have been moved by no *Resentments* to disturb that Frame of Government, which he had contributed so much to restore. The *former Example* therefore hath nothing to do in this Place; and if I admit the *latter*, it will only serve to shew us how Men *should act*, not how they *do act*. It will be one Example of *Virtue*, opposed to innumerable Instances of *Frailty*. Innumerable, indeed, are the Instances of Men in all Ages, who, having been driven out of their Country by Violence, have endeavoured, even by Violence, to return to it. This is the general and known Course of Nature; *depraved* indeed, but *human*; and since it is so; if we allow that *they*, who disturb a Government, because they think themselves persecuted, deserve no Excuse, we must allow that *those*, who give Occasion to this Disturbance by Persecution, deserve very little.

I hope I may deserve some for this Digression, into which the *Remarker* led me; and I return to my Subject, by saying that neither the *Craftsman* hath pretended, nor do I here pretend, to excuse the Engagements, which *this Gentleman* took, after his *Attainder*, and which his *late Majesty* so graciously pardoned; but that his taking these Engagements, *after his Attainder*, is no Proof that he was under them *before*; and that his going out of the Kingdom, in the late King's Reign, is no Proof that he was a *zealous Jacobite*, and an *Agent of the Pretender* in the late Queen's Reign.

The *Libeller*, finding himself unable to make this Charge good, lessens the Charge that he may suit his Proof to it. If he cannot prove that the *Gentleman* was in the Interests of the *Pretender*, before his *Attainder*, he will prove at least that he had a *strong Propension to those Interests*; and how does he prove even this? He asserts that *in the Year 1702*, this Gentle-

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Gentleman was one of the *virtuous 117*, who gave their Votes to throw out the Bill for settling the Protestant Succession, &c. False and impudent Assertion! A few Pages before he pretends to have the *Journal Book of the House of Commons* before him. Had he it before him now? If he had, how can he affirm, in direct Contradiction to it? If he had not, how could he venture to affirm any thing, concerning this Matter? The 'Bill for settling the Protestant Succession, in the present Royal Family passed the House of Commons in the Month of May 1701, not in 1702; and it passed nemine contradicente, to bring in a Bill for the farther Security of his Majesty's Person, and the Succession of the Crown in the Protestant Line, and extinguishing the Hopes of the pretended Prince of Wales, and all other Pretenders, and their open and secret Abettors.' This Bill was accordingly brought in, and the Persons who, by Order of the House, prepared and brought it in, were *Sir Charles Hedges* and one *Mr. St. JOHN*. In the Progress of *this Bill* thro' the House, it appears that there were some Debates and Divisions about *particular Clauses* and *Amendments*; but the Bill was passed without any *Division*; so infamously false is the Assertion made by *this Libeller*, that there was no Division of 117, or of any other Number, for throwing out either 'the Bill which settled the Succession; or the Bill, which was made for the farther Security of it.' There was a Division indeed, of 117 against 118, upon a Clause added by the Lords to a *Bill for enlarging the Time for taking the Oath of Abjuration, &c.* and this happened in the Year 1702; but what Relation hath *this Fact* to the Fact asserted? Whether the *Gentleman* voted against *this Clause*, or not, I am unable to say; and it is to no Purpose to enquire; for the Clause regarded only 'such Persons as had neglected to take the Abjuration Oath in Time, and provided that if such Persons had forfeited any Office,



Office, Benefice, &c. to which any other Persons had been preferred, the former should not be restored by taking the Advantage of this Act.' If this pretended Proof is not another Instance of the vilest Calumny, the Libeller himself confesses that the 'Craftsman's Challenge was properly made; and that there is not one Proof in the World against his general Affirmations.'

Another Fact, which is advanced and most pathetically declaimed upon, for Reasons not hard to be discovered, is likewise applied to maintain the same Charge. This Gentleman, says the Libeller, had the Impudence to oppose his present most sacred Majesty, when he demanded a Writ of Right—The Writ of Summons to Parliament. He afterwards caused the Elector of Hanover's Minister to be forbid the Court, for no other Crime than having demanded that Writ. And did this Gentleman oppose this Writ? Nay, did any other Servant of the late Queen oppose it? False and impudent is the Assertion. It was ordered to be made out the very Day \* it was demanded. If the Minister, who demanded the Writ, was forbid the Court, was this Gentleman the Cause of it? Is every disagreeable Circumstance to be ascribed to him in an Affair, which was too important not to be laid by the proper Minister, that is by the Chancellor, not the Secretary, before her late Majesty and her Council; and in which it may be supposed that her Majesty's Resentments were alone sufficient to determine such a Resolution? Besides, if the Minister received the Affront mentioned, was it singly and abstractedly for demanding the Writ; or was it founded on the Manner of demanding, and on many other Circumstances, some expressed and some hinted at in the Letters, written soon afterwards by the late Queen to her late Electoral

\* Vide Annals of the Reign of Queen Anne.

ral Highness the Princess Sophia and to his present Majesty, which lie before me in the printed Annals of Queen Anne's Reign? Was the Reception, given by his late Majesty, then Elector, to the Minister, who made this Demand, at his Return home, such a one as shewed his Majesty's Approbation of this Measure, and his Disapprobation of what had happened here upon it?—I say no more.

We have now gone through all I can find in this Libel, which seems not so much as to aim at making good the first Head of Accusation, on which the Craftsman made his Challenge.

On the second Head, the Craftsman affirmed that the same Gentleman never had any Commerce either direct or indirect, inconsistent with the Engagements he took after his Attainder, whilst he continued in them. Now, this Affirmation, instead of being disproved, is evaded. It is foreign to me, says the Remarker—Is it so?—Have not all his scribbling Associates charged this Gentleman over and over for being treacherous to the Pretender; for being engaged with him; and at the same Time a Spy and a Partisan, such is the Language they use, of the late King? Is not the flat Contradiction given to this Lye a Part of the Challenge made by the Craftsman? Hath not this Libeller accepted the Challenge? Hath he not called it a weak, a foolish, and a slavish Defence? May he evade it after all his boasting? Is he not bound to make it good in every Part, or to own the Charge of Calumny, which I make on him, on the whole scribbling Crew, and on those, who pay them? What he, or they will own, I neither know nor care. What the Publick will determine is evident.

On a third Head of Accusation against this Gentleman, the Craftsman affirmed, that since he was out of the Engagements last mentioned, he hath had no Commerce, either direct or indirect, in favour of that Cause. Now,

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Now, upon *this Head*, though the Accusation be not given up in Terms, yet is it as little maintained, or supported by Proof as the *last*. The *Libeller*, indeed, calls the *Gentleman* a *Leviathan* of *Treason*; displays the terrible Dangers, which would have attended the reinstating him; presumes to call it a *Libel on the late King's Memory* to say that he had such Intentions; and yet dares not deny that his Majesty signified his having such Intentions. In short, with much Bombast, he makes the Panegyrick of his *Patron*, for defeating these Intentions. I shall not condescend to make one single Remark on this Rapsody of Scurrility and Adulation. Such Poyson carries its Antidote along with it into the World; and no Man will be at a loss to judge whether *publick* or *private Motives* determined the *Servant*, in this Case, to defeat the Intentions of the *Master*. Which ever they were, he, who can believe, that the *Gentleman* so often mentioned has upon him any of that *Obligation*, which the *Craftsman* disclaims for him, deserves to be pity'd; and he, who can bring himself up to affirm it, deserves to be despised. But before I leave *this Article*, it may not be improper, nor unseasonable to enquire, by what Criterion *good Subjects to his Majesty* and *faithful Friends to the present Establishment* are to be distinguished and known. Are all those to be reputed such, who assumed the greatest Zeal for the *protestant Succession* formerly?—This cannot be; for many of the *Tories* have this *Title*; and all, who ever wore that Name, are proscribed by the *System* we have advanced.—Are all these to be reputed such, who were alike zealous for the *Protestant Succession*, and who have besides made constant Profession of the Principles of *Whiggism*?—This cannot be neither; since many such as these are daily stigmatized with the reproachful Names of *Malecontents* and *Incendiaries*; and since Endeavours are used, by false De-

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Deductions and by arbitrary Interpretations, to prove them *Enemies to the Government*, and in Effect *arrant Traitors*.—What is *this Criterion* then? I am able to discover but one, and it is this; being for, or being against the *noble Pair of Brothers*, the *two honourable Patrons of the Remarker*. Without the Merit of approving their *Conduet*, no Man is to be reputed a *faithful Subject*, or a *Friend to his Country*. With this Merit, and with that of a blind Submission, even *they*, who have been the *most obnoxious*, may be received; and *they*, who have been call'd *Enemies to the Government*, as loudly as any others, may be inrolled among its *Friends*. This Practice of endeavouring to confine the Interest of the Government to as narrow a Bottom as that of *two Ministers*, has been of late most audaciously pursued. It has been said in direct Terms \* that *if his late Majesty had put the Administration into any other Hands, he would have been unjust to those brave Men, who had done and suffered much to serve him; and that he would not have deserved to wear the Crown, if he had not employed the Men, whom he did employ*.—Here, again, there might be room for some particular Reflections, if I was disposed to make them. But I avoid this invidious Part as much as my Subject will allow me to do; and shall therefore content my self with desiring these *bold Writers*, their *Inspectors* and *Patrons*, to consider what the necessary Consequences of such Positions are. If they dare to assert that his *late Majesty would have been unjust; that he would not have deserved to wear the Crown, if he had not employ'd the Men he did employ*; what might they not assert if his *present Majesty* should, at any Time, think fit, in his great Wisdom and Goodness to his People, to remove some of *those very Men*, whom his royal Father did employ? The Assertion is not even extended to *Party*.

\* *London Journal* May 15, 1731.

*Party.* It would have been still indecent if it had. But it is confined to a certain Number of *particular Men*; as if the Zeal for the *Protestant Succession in the present Royal Family* had not been directed, as it most certainly was, to the *national Advantage*, but had been intended, as to be sure it was not, for the Advantage of *particular Men*, and to perpetuate the Administration in a *private Family*. This is such Language, as I believe was never held before, and as no Man would presume to hold now, if the Encouragement to it did not proceed from *those*, by whom it should be discountenanced and punished.

There is *another Fact*, which I must not omit to take Notice of in this Place; because though it is not one of those, on which the *Craftsman* made his Challenge, yet it hath been positively asserted by him, and half of it at least as positively denied by the *Remarker*.

The *Craftsman* said that the *Mercy of the late King* was extended to the *Gentleman*, we speak of, *unask'd and unearn'd*. That it was *unearn'd* the *Remarker* thinks probable; and in thinking so he gives the Lye to all his *Fellow-Scribblers*, who have so often affirmed the contrary. That it was *unask'd*, he says, is a downright Falshood. He hath the *Journal-Book of the House of Commons* before him, and there he finds that the *House* was acquainted by his late Majesty's Command, in April 1725, that this *Gentleman* had, about seven Years before, made his humble Application and Submission, &c. which his Majesty so far accepted as to give Encouragement to hope for some future Mark of his Majesty's Favour and Goodness.

In this he exults; but here again the *Effrontery* and *Falshood*, which he charges on others, will recoil on himself. Who drew this *ministerial Message* I know not; nor how far the Style of it may be necessary, according to the Forms usual on such Occasions; but the *Remarker* might have known, if he had

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consulted even his *Patrons*, that his Majesty's Mercy had been extended to *this Gentleman* two Years before the *seven* there mentioned; and that this Mercy did not consist in *Encouragement to hope for some future Mark of his Majesty's Favour and Goodness*, but in a gracious and absolute Promise of his Favour in the full Extent, which the *Circumstances of that Gentleman* required. I may be the more bold in affirming this Fact, because the *noble Lord*, who delivered the Message I quote, is still alive, as some other Persons are, to whom his late Majesty was pleased to own that *this Message* had been delivered by his Order, and to express his gracious Intentions conformably to it.——But to proceed.

It appears most undeniably that of the *three Heads* on which the *Craftsman* gave, and the *Remarker* accepted, the Challenge, the *Remarker* hath shewn himself unable to prove the *first* by any *true Facts*, and hath scandalously attempted to do it by *false ones*; that he hath given up the *second*; and that he hath not so much as attempted to prove the *third*.

Let us ask now, shall Men, thus plainly convicted of Calumny on Accusations brought so often and charged so peremptorily by them, expect Belief, when they endeavour to defame in any other Case? Shall they, who are convicted of accusing falsely in Cases, which are plain in their Nature, where no Proof can be wanting, and where no Pretence can be alleged for not producing it, expect that the Publick should condemn any Man, and especially a Man, who is under so many Circumstances of Disadvantage, peculiar to his singular and unexampled Situation, because they affirm him guilty in Cases, which are intricate in their Nature, and where Reasons of Honour, of Prudence and of Decency may all concur to impose Silence? How often have the *noble Pair* defended themselves, and been defended by others, on this Principle; that no Man ought  
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to charge another, unless he is able and ready to prove the Charge? How often have they called for Proof on this Principle, and triumphed that it was not immediately brought? Now, although this Defence may not be sufficient in every Case, where Matters of *present Transaction* are concerned and where the *Persons attack'd* are in actual Possession of the greatest Power; yet surely it may be thought, with Reason, to be a sufficient Defence, when Matters *long ago transacted*, and long ago censured too, are concerned; when the *Persons*, who *attack*, are in actual Possession of the greatest Power; and the *Person*, who is *attack'd*, hath none of those offensive, or defensive Weapons at his Command, which Power furnishes in so abundant a Manner.

The *Remarker* thinks that no *Reasons of Honour, Prudence, or Decency* ought to shut the Mouth of Innocence; that *Shame and Guilt alone* are silent in the Day of Enquiry.——When this *Day of Enquiry* is to come, and *who* is to be the Subject of it, I know not; but let him learn that there are many Cases, wherein it is not *honest*, and many others may occur wherein it is not *prudent*, to say all that might be said either in Defence or in Excuse; that is, when the Defence or Excuse of *ourselves* must affect *others*, not concerned in the Debate. In such Cases the most Innocent will rather bear the Imputation of imaginary Crimes, by keeping Silence, than be guilty of a real Crime, by breaking it; and to carry this as far as it can be carried, Instances might be produced of Men, who have died, rather than accuse others, whose Blood was thirsted after more than theirs.

Much hath been said, and great Complaints have been made, of the *Torture*, as it is called in *this Libel*, given to *another Gentleman's* Actions. If, by this, be meant ransacking into all the private and publick Passages of his Life, and wresting every one into

into a Crime; far be it from me to approve in *his Case*, what I abhor *this Libeller* for doing in the Case of *another*. But is it really so? Have we seen Accusations of *Treachery* and *Ingratitude* towards several, who are dead, and towards any, who are living, insisted upon, in the former Case? Has it been reproached to the *Patrons of the Remarker*, that they worm'd out of Power, a *Person*, to whom they were nearly ally'd and ought to have been firmly attached by Gratitude and Friendship? and yet is that a Subject, which affords nothing to be said? Are there no Circumstances, which might be aggravated at least? Are there no strong Colours, which might be laid? Even I should not be at a Loss to do it, if I thought it fair to do it; if I thought it honest to push any Man to a Silence, of which I might take a seeming Advantage, or to a Necessity of justifying or excusing himself by saying what, supposing him innocent, he ought not to say. Are there no Facts relating to *former Transactions* of great Importance not commonly known, and yet not absolutely Secrets, which remain still unmentioned?——In short is it not apparent that there are Men, who accuse, indeed, *when the immediate Subject of Debate leads, and provokes them necessarily and unwillingly to it*, whilst there are others, who wait for no such Necessity, but accuse meerly to *defame*.

It would be tedious, not difficult, to go through this whole *Invective*; to deny with Truth many Things, which are falsely affirmed; and, by giving a just Turn to others, to set them in a very different Light from that, wherein the *Author* exposes them to publick View; to explain what he perplexes; to distinguish what he confounds. But I shall not take this Task upon me, for the Reasons I have given and for others, which I am going to give.

As to the Conduct, which the *Person*, against whom

whom such Torrents of Ribaldry are pour'd forth, held towards *those*, who were at the Head of Affairs, whilst he was in Business, I shall only add to what hath been said already, what no Man of Candour will deny; that the Heat and Animosity, which perpetual Contests and frequent Turns of Party raise, have carry'd many (perhaps, the *Person*, who is blamed; perhaps, the *Persons*, who blame him) to do, what in any other Situation, or Temper of Mind, they would carefully avoid; in a Word, that the just Man hath been, on such Occasions, sometimes unjust; the good-natured Man ill-natured; and the friendly Man unfriendly. Few there are, I fear, who could with a safe Conscience take up the first Stone upon such a Trial. Few there are, who are blameless. But here is the Difference. The just, the good-natured, the friendly Man returns to the Character, out of which he started. The unjust, the ill-natured, the unfriendly Man persists. The *first* reflects with Sorrow on what the *last* reflects with Triumph; and whilst *one* wishes undone what the Heat of *Party* carry'd him to do, the *other* is glad of the Excuse of *Party*, such as it is, to indulge the Viciousness of his own Nature, and to repeat unjust, ill-natur'd and unfriendly Actions to the *Living* and even to the *Dead*.

There is an Example before us, which may serve to illustrate what I have said.—Great Advantage is taken of a *Memorial* sent to the late Queen, by the late Earl of *Oxford*, wherein many hard Reflections are made on *others*; but the hardest of all on the *Person* here referred to. He is painted in the worst Colours, and accused to the *Queen* of the greatest Faults. Should I descend into the Particulars, I might shew that the Accusations were groundless, and point out, perhaps, the unjust Causes of Suspicions, which were taken, as well as the Motives to  
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the writing *that Memorial*, which I wish had never been written for a Reason very different from that, which the *Remarker* would be ready to assign. But I shall not descend into any such Particulars, nor give a double Advantage to the *Malicious*, who would be just as well pleased to have any Handle given them by the *Living* of inveighing against the *Dead*, as they are ready to seize, on every Occasion, that which was given them, so many Years ago, by *one*, who is now *dead*, of inveighing against the *Living*.

The *Persons*, who had the Honour to serve the late *Queen*, in the last Period of her Life, have been these twenty Years the Subjects of great Clamour. If the Differences, which happened amongst them so long ago, gave in some Measure, as I apprehend that they did, both Occasion and Force to this Clamour, it would be strange Conduct, indeed, in those of them, who remain *alive*, and in the *Relations* and *Friends* of those of them, who are *dead*, to preserve the Spirit of *Difference*, and to assist in reviving *this Clamour*.

The Day will come, when *authentick History* will relate the Passages of those Times, without Regard to the partial Views of any *Party*, or the particular Defence of *any Man*. 'Till this Day does come, every one must decide, or suspend his Judgment, as he sees Reason to do, and they, who may suffer by these Judgments, must bear it with that Temper and Respect, which is due from every private Man to publick Censures; nay, even to publick Prejudices.

But what hath all this to do with the Characters and Conduct of the *noble Pair*? Suppose the *Men in Power*, two Reigns ago, to have been *Angels of Darkness*; will it follow that the *two honourable Patrons of the Remarker* are *Angels of Light*? What then is the Meaning of so great a Clamour, affect-  
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edly raised on so slender an Occasion as the *Craftsman* of the 22d of *May* gave; wherein little was said, and that little with much Moderation, after much Provocation? Why are so many Pens employ'd, and so great Pains taken, to divert the Attention of the Publick from *present* to *past Transactions*; from *national Considerations* to *personal Altercations*?—The Reason is obvious; and no other Reason in Nature can be assigned. The *noble Pair* have been hard push'd, on their Management of *publick Affairs*, both at home and abroad. Not only their *Errors* have been pointed out; gross, palpable *Errors*; but a long Series of Error; a whole System of cool, deliberate, conducted, defended, expensive Error hath been laid open to publick View. What I believe never to have happen'd before, hath happen'd on these Occasions. The *noble Pair* have been admonished in Time, and shewn the Precipice, into which, whoever led, they were both falling. The Consequences of their Measures have been foretold as early as possible, and even whilst the Causes were laying. Surely this Conduct, on the Part of their *Adversaries*, favours more of *publick Spirit* than of *private Resentment*; and yet, when they have taken Advantage of it, they have stopt short and triumphed in their Escape as they did in the Case of the *Irish Recruits*. These very Admonitions, which gave them Time and Opportunity to do so, have been modestly attributed to *private Resentment* alone; though nothing can be more manifest than this; that *private Resentment* would have found its Account better in Silence; would have preferred *Accusations* to *Admonitions*, and would have waited longer to have struck more home.

Sometimes, instead of stopping short, they have gone on, answering for and being answered for, 'till the *Events* have justify'd the *Predictions*; till the Inconveniencies, Disadvantages and Difficulties, against

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against which the *noble Pair* had been warn'd in vain, have followed and increased upon them; till even their *Apologists* have been forced to allow some Errors, and till they themselves have confessed their *boasted System* to be wrong, by *changing* it, and by boasting of the *Change*. Even after all this, they have complained of *Clamour*; and they still complain, as if there had never been the least Occasion for it given by them.—How their *new Schemes* are plann'd, and how they will be pursued; whether these *able Men* have failed hitherto, because they set out on *mistaken Principles of Policy*, or whether they have fail'd for want of Skill to conduct the *rightest*, we shall soon see.

But these are not the only Circumstances, which have borne, and still bear hard upon them.—In the Course of these and other Disputes, it seems to have been plainly and fully proved that *such Principles* have been established, and *such Doctrines* have been taught by the *ministerial Writers*, as tend manifestly to destroy the *Freedom of the British Government*. Such are, the *Dependency*, (I mean the *corrupt Dependency*) of *Parliaments on the Crown*; the *Necessity of standing Armies*, notwithstanding the Danger of them to *Liberty*; and some *other Points*, which I need not recapitulate. It is sufficiently known how much, and with how much Reason, the far greater Part of Mankind have been alarmed at these Attempts; which, if they succeed, must hurt not only the inferior and temporary Interests, but the greatest and most permanent, political Interest, which a *Briton* can have at Heart; that of the *Constitution of this Government*.

As these Things have been objected strongly on *one Side*, so Endeavours have been used on the *other*, to disguise and to palliate them, or to evade the Consequences drawn from them. But these Endeavours have not succeeded. How, indeed, should they succeed

ceed? As well might *those*, who make them, expect to persuade Mankind that *Slavery* and *Beggary* are preferable to *Liberty* and *Wealth*, as to make the World believe that these Blessings can be preserved to *Britain* by the very Means, by which they have been lost in so many other free Countries.

Since this therefore cannot be imposed; since the Minds of Men cannot be convinced of such Absurdities, they must be diverted, if possible, from the Subject. A new Cry is therefore raised, or an old one rather is revived. Disputes, which inflamed the Minds of Men, whilst the Affairs they relate to were transacting, and the Conflict of *Parties* was the most fierce, are renewed at a Time, when they can be of no Benefit to the Publick, and when the same Motives of *Party* subsist no longer. *One Man*, in particular, is made the Subject of new Invective. Nothing, which Malice can suggest, and ill Nature and ill Manners utter, is omitted to render his *Person* odious, and to represent his *Designs* as dangerous. In the same Breath, we are told that this odious, this dangerous Man is endeavouring to come into Power once more. He stands again a *Candidate for Grace and Trust*. *He would again administer the Publick, abandon its Allies, and sacrifice its Honour. Nothing will satisfy him but the Power, which he once abused and would again abuse; the Trusts, which he once betrayed and would again betray.* These are represented, with equal Modesty and Fairness, to be his *Requests*; and the *Hero of the Remarker*, that is the *Remarker's Paymaster*, who administers the Publick so righteously; who never abandoned its *Allies*; neither the *Emperor* nor *France*; who never sacrificed its Honour to *one*, nor its Interest to *both*; who never abused his Power, nor betrayed his Trust, through Ambition, through Pride, through private Interest, or private Pique; *this Person,*

*son* is applauded for his Opposition to such Requests for his *just and fatal Resentment*.

What *Fatality* there may be in his *Discernment*, I know not; but surely there is a *Fatality*, which attends *those*, who indulge themselves in speaking and writing, without any Regard to *Truth*. How could it happen else that the *Remarker* should so egregiously contradict himself, and destroy in his 40th Page the whole Drift of his 39th? This *bold and rash Scribbler* takes upon him to marshal and to characterize insolently the *Friends of the Man* he rails at. If I was not of that Number myself, I should probably say more on the Subject. This however I am under an Obligation to say; that the *Friends of this Gentleman* must be such to his *Person*. They cannot be so to his *Power*. That he takes it as the greatest Compliment, which can be made to him, to have a *Sympathy of Nature and a Conformity of Principles and Designs* with them attributed to him; that he thinks their Friendship an Honour to him; such an Honour as the warmest of his *Enemies* have Cause to envy, and do envy; such an Honour as the highest of his *Enemies* would be heartily proud to obtain, and have not been able to obtain.

The *Friends* now of *this Gentleman*, whom he is sometimes said to *lead*, and who are sometimes said to *employ him as their Tool*, just as it suits the present Purpose of Scandal to say; these very *Friends*, it seems, the very Men, who defend him, *would never raise him above his present low Condition, nor make him the Partner of their success.*—However they may employ him, the *Remarker* and his *Patrons* know how they mean to reward him.—Since this is the Case, since they know it to be so; for what Reason, in the Name of Wonder, is all this Bustle made about so insignificant a *Tool*?—Why so many Endeavours to raise a Jealousy, and give an Alarm

as if *this Man* was aiming again at Power?—Why so much Merit ascribed to the *noble Pair*, for keeping him out of it?—His *own Friends* would not raise him to it.—How ridiculous then is the Affectation of his *Enemies*, who value themselves on their Opposition to him;

Let the *noble Pair* stand or fall by their own Merits, or Demerits. I dare answer to them and to the World, upon better Foundations than those of the *Remarker's* laying, that their Continuance in Power will never break the Spirit of *this Man*, nor their Fall from it excite his Ambition. His Ambition, whatever may have been said or thought about it, hath been long since dead. A Man must be dead himself, who is utterly insensible of all that happens, either to the *Publick* or to *himself*; but he who seeks nothing but *Retreat*, and that Stability of Situation, which is essential to the Quiet of it, hath surely no Ambition. Now that this is the Case, and hath been long the Case of the *Gentleman*, concerning whom I speak, I know to be true, and I affirm boldly. He never had the least, I say more, he never would have the greatest Obligations to any Country, except his own; and yet so desirous was *this Man* of Rest and Quiet, that he was contented to enjoy them where Fortune had presented them to him. A little Frankness might have kept him *abroad* all his Life without Complaint. Much Art has been employed to confine him *at home*, and to teaze him there. If forgetting all former Persecutions, he resented the *last*, would he be much to blame?

I am not conscious of having said, in this Paper, a Word against the Truth; and I am sure that I have the same Truth on my Side, when I assert that *this Man*, whom the *Libeller* represents to be so *turbulent*, so *outrageous*, and of such pertinacious Ambition, however he might have been willing for-

formerly to have had the Obligation to the *noble Pair* of enjoying, by their Assistance, the full Measure of his late Majesty's intended Goodness, would decline with Scorn, after all that has pass'd, to be reinstated in his former Situation, at the intolerable Expence of having the least Appearance of an Obligation to *them*. Neither *they*, nor their *Advocates*, can be half so sollicitous to keep him out of *Power*, and even out of a State of aspiring after *Power*, as he is determined against the *first*, and indifferent about the *last*.

I am sensible that all this may appear a little improbable to the *Persons* I oppose. It will be hard for *them* to conceive that the Man, who has once tasted *Power*, can ever renounce it in earnest. No wonder *they* should think in this Manner. *Those*, who find nothing in themselves to rest upon with Satisfaction, must lean on *Power*, on *Riches*, or *both*, and on other external Objects. Nay, *those*, who have of the two Vices, *Ambition* and *Avarice*, the *meanest* in the most eminent Degree; and who would be glad to quit their *Power*, and to retire with their *Gains*, may be afraid to quit it, because they have abused it. They may be so miserable as to see no Security out of *Power*, nor any other in it, except that precarious, that temporary Security, which is the last and useful Refuge of *desperate Men*; the continuing the same Violences to maintain, by which they acquired their *Power*; the keeping up of *Dissentions*, and the *embroiling of Affairs*; those noble Arts, by which they rose.

But there are Men in the World, who know that there is something in Life better than *Power* and *Riches*; and such Men may prefer the *low Condition*, as it is called by the *Remarker*, of *one Man*, to the *high Condition* of *another*. There are Men, who see that *Dignity* may be disgraced, and who feel that *Disgrace* may be dignified. Of this Number is

the *Gentleman*, whom I have undertaken to defend; who possesses his Soul without Hopes or Fears, and enjoys his *Retreat* without any Desires beyond it. In that *Retreat*, he is obedient to the Laws, dutiful to his *Prince* and true to his *Oaths*. If he fails in these Respects, let him be publickly attacked; let publick Vengeance pursue and overtake him; let the noble *Pair* indulge for once their Passions in a *just Cause*. If they have no Complaints, of this Nature, to make against him, from whence does this particular Animosity proceed? Have they Complaints of any other Kind to make, and of a private Nature? If they have, why is the Publick troubled on this Account?—I hope the *Remarker's Mask is now taken off*; that the true Drift of all this *personal Railing* is enough exposed; and that the Attention of Mankind will be brought back to those more important Subjects, which have been already started, and to those, which every Day may furnish.

After what has been here said, the *Gentleman*, in whose Defence I have appeared, can have no Reason of Honour to enter by *himself*, or his *Friends*, into these Altercations, and if my Opinion can prevail, should these *Libellers* continue to scold and to call Names, they should be left to do it, without Reproof, or Notice. The Answer now given should stand as a *Final Answer to all they have said, and to all they may think fit to say hereafter*.

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