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THE
S T A T E
OF THE
N A T I O N
CONSIDERED,
IN A
L E T T E R
TO A
MEMBER of Parliament.

The THIRD EDITION.



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T H E
P R E F A C E.

I AM obliged to introduce the following little Performance by a short Preface, for various Reasons; one of which is, to explain why some Things are spoke of as to come, that are really past, owing to the Remarks thereon having been made some Time ago, but the Publication deferred until the Meeting of the Parliament, yet in no Sense necessary to be altered, as the Thoughts concerning them appear to be right, and connect properly with the Sequel.

One other is, that I did not chuse to interrupt too much the Course of the Reasoning, by the Intervention of Figures, which are apt to puzzle some Sort of Readers, and break the Thread of the Discourse. Intending at first to have given a compleat Table of the State of the Expences of the last and present Wars, but finding that already done, and in every Body's Hands who are supposed to read political Tracts, I have only illustrated the most important Part of the following Argument, by exhibiting to the Reader's View three Articles, which, I hope, will be sufficient to open their Eyes, both as to the Wisdom and Honesty of the present A——n, independent of their other Conduct.

The

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The Principles I have calculated upon, I conceive to be very fair ; the first seven Years of Queen Anne's War, set against an equal Number of the present, whereby our Frugality is sufficiently explained, and the Justice done the Nation happily illustrated. The Conclusion to be made therefrom is in every Man's own Breast, and, while they can condescend to think such Proceedings right, they are very welcome to glorify the present Ministry, and rejoice in their own Folly.

The Expence of seven Years	}	41,003,052
War 1740. to 1746. inclusive,		
The same of Queen Anne's	}	31,736,281
War 1702. to 1708. inclusive,		
Difference		9,266,771

The Reason of this will appear very evidently, when we come to see the different Sums allowed for the same Articles.

For 49,229 Men for the Land-Service	}	1,298,100
1746.		
For 50,000 Ditto for Ditto	}	1,063,734
1706.		

The

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The Difference besides 771 Men more, } 224,366

The Ordinary of the Navy 1746.	198,048
The same 1706.	120,000
Difference	
	78,048

To Ordnance for the Land-Service for the Year 1746. exclusive of an Allowance for extraordinary Charges of 246,542 L. the Sum of	}	175,777
To the same for 1706.		
Difference		55,777

I am ashamed to trouble the Reader with any more Articles, when the annual Difference on these three only, if the whole was thrown in, would amount to above 500,000 L. For the Truth on both Sides I refer to the Votes of the House of Commons, and believe the warmest Advocates of People in Power will own my Account very much in their Favour. This establishes the Point I am aiming at by the following Treatise, which is intended to shew, that a Peace cannot be in any Sense necessary, if the Military did their Duty on the one Part, and the Civil on the other ; besides the Destruction of the French Trade, and the commanding

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manding a Peace on our own Terms, I think it may be fairly concluded, that, notwithstanding the extraordinary Expences occasioned by the Rebellion, &c. we had been, at the Conclusion of the last Year, 8,000,000 L. less in Debt, which will still grow upon us surprisngly, when, for Want of having done what might justly be expected, little less is now to be raised extraordinary every Year; and if I was to shew this in its true Dress, fully calculated, and had remarked, that four of the last seven Years Expence was on account of a Spanish War only, it would still appear more astonishing what is become of all the Money. But as I hope that will be one Day considered in a proper Place, I don't chuse at present to give it the highest Colouring I am capable of, lest I should seem to prejudge those, who, I hope, will not be long unjudged, for their own Sakes, as well as that of the Nation's.

T H E

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T H E
State of the Nation, &c.

S I R,

THE Fate of England, as well as of all Europe, is now swiftly approaching towards its Crisis, and the Conjuncture so critically nice, as requires, in a very extraordinary Manner; not only yours, but the Care and Attention of every honest Man in your House. In a Word, something is to be done exquisitely bold and striking, something that will give the highest Eclat to our Arms, the greatest Glory to our Actions, or we are inevitably undone. This, Sir, is my Business to shew from indisputable Facts, such Facts as are as clear as Light to the Understanding of every Reader, that are known to be true, as soon as exhibited, and the Inferences therefrom just, natural and easy; such as every Men will make that reflects, and acknowledge the Instant he considers.

I presume that Nobody will dispute with me, that there is a wide Difference between begging and commanding a Peace, or that a
Peace

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Peace can be commanded where the War is not wisely conducted, both as to the Civil and Military. In the first, by throwing Money idly away on useless or worthless People; in the last, by employing Men without *Merit*, *Character* or *Honour*. In the first Case, Money will always be wanted for the Exigencies of the State; *Want* increases *Want*, *Necessity* heightens *Interest*; *Debts* improve upon *Debts*, and the Nation, from commanding Money at what Interest they please to give, must be reduced to take it on the Terms of those who are willing to lend, whose Views are to grow immensely rich on the common Ruin.

The employing of Men not judiciously suited to the End aimed at, must produce Disappointments; Disappointments useless Expence; a parallel Evil to that of giving Money away to worthless People in the civil Branch, and together be followed by such fatal Consequences as I tremble to recount.

I am the more concerned to mention this by Way of Introduction, as I find the Genius of the Nation well inclined to remedy such Disorders in a calm and gentle Manner, and to exert itself, at this tender Conjunction, for the universal Welfare. The natural *British* Spirit is ready to break its Bounds, and wants nothing but a Man of true Fire at the Head of Affairs to give it Vent, and to let it rush with all its genial Fury on the *House of Bourbon*.

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As Affairs are circumstanced, the Enemies of his Majesty, and of the Constitution, both at Home and Abroad, lay a great Stress on the Difficulties we must soon be driven to, if our Plan of Conduct be not immediately altered. They examine into, and see clearly this Course cannot hold long; and thereupon build their Hopes of our being presently in a State of Confusion. It is therefore not only necessary, but absolutely dishonest in any Man, who has it in his Power, not to shew the dangerous Situation we are in; that the same may be seriously considered by every honest *Briton*, laid close to his Heart, and the Means towards a Remedy pursued with Courage and Address.

There has been a Necessity, through the Course of this *War*, to advance some Millions annually above what was necessary in Times of *Peace*; had double the Sum been raised, so a suitable Spirit and Rectitude had attended it, we had certainly been Gainers. The Destruction of the *French Trade* and Shipping must have been followed with the Rise of our own, and had amply answered our Expences, as well as commanded a *Peace*. We for some Time acted very briskly, and then of a sudden, one can hardly tell how, or why, we fell into a Kind of Lethargy; and, instead of improving the forward Spirit of the People, as our Allies got Ground, the *Genius* of *Britain* drooped, and we sunk into an infamous Fawning on the

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French

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French for Peace; fearing, I suppose, that when Money was wanting, it would not be readily granted, until the Application of what had been given was fairly accompted for. Here is a judicious Inference drawn from a bad Principle, and dishonourable Means prosecuted to bury bad Conduct in Oblivion.

There is, Sir, a Kind of new Whim or ministerial Cant diffused among the People, with great Art and Industry. All the Consequences of their bad Management is thrown upon those who write in favour of the Publick, which they call *writing against them*, and their Conclusion is, that such Writers encourage Rebellion, and aid the Enemies of the State. If it be retorted upon them, that they are the only *Enemies* of the State, they would be very angry, yet, as we are coming to Facts, I am afraid it will be found too true.

I conceive those to be the Enemies to the State who undertake Posts they are incapable of executing, that squander away the *publick Money*, or employ People in the Service, who are only fit for Places as being their Friends.

They are Friends to the Administration who remark the Errors of the Administration, and aim to amend them, because such being amended makes the State securer.

The Money necessary for the Service of the Year 1746. was 7,063,352 L. 17 s. This appears

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 appears by the Votes of the House, and therefore needs no Proof.

The Money necessary for the Service of the Year 1747. I conceive, will be at least 10,500,000. Thus,

To the Service of 1747.	7,063,352
To keep down the Navy Debt } and Interest,	1,200,000
To make good the civil List,	700,000
The Expences of the Rebellion,	500,000
To <i>New-England</i> on account } of <i>Cape-Breton</i> ,	200,000
To the Expences of the Court- } Martial,	200,000
To a Vote of Credit	500,000

10,363,352

The Money for the necessary Service of the *War* must be rais'd, but if it is not well conducted, the Deficiencies will rise by Degrees to so enormous a Sum, that even *Seven Millions* won't answer the current Service in Time of *Peace*, nor perhaps double that Sum in a *future War*. If the Civil List requires 700,000 L. to make it good now, I need not tell Men accustomed to calculate what must inevitably follow. The Interest on that Sum will be large, there will be more Deficiencies every Year, and, if supplied, as must necessarily be the Case, more Interest upon that; this Increase of both Principal and Interest must lead us beyond

yond our Bearings, as the Seamen's Phrase is, and consequently sink us under the Burden; a Burden too that has nothing to do with either *War* or *Peace*. Not a Debt created by, or for the publick Service, but to ruin and distract our Affairs. A proper Application of the *Civil List* can never run us in Debt. Yet will this Debt, when created, be first made good, because those who created it, and those on whom the Money has been squandered, and who expect still to be farther supplied, will certainly interest themselves in the making of it good; the dangerous Consequences naturally resulting herefrom, I am afraid, have not been considered with that Concern for the publick Welfare as might, at this critical Conjunction, be expected from Men whose Hearts are rather warm than active in the publick Service. For there is nothing truer, than that the *Civil List*, subject to its proper Applications only, is very sufficiently supplied, and in consequence cannot be honestly in Debt, and if in Debt, it ought to be known why; then, if the Deficiency appears to have been squandered, surely those who have done it ought to supply it out of their own Estates; For what have the Publick to do therewith?

From hence we see the Necessity of accurately inspecting into the Deficiency of the *Civil List*, which we ought not to make good unless it evidently appears to have arisen merely from

from the *Funds* destined to support it: And even then, we hope, in these necessary expensive Times, that it will be shewn, that what has arisen has been only applied according to its *Destination*; for as otherways it may only be amassed to carry E——s, we may continue eternally in the idle Error, that the Sovereign needs such Assistance, though it may, and is true enough with regard to Ministers. And, to make them come to this Test, it is extremely necessary that those pecuniary Channels should be dammed up, which, when flowing freely, operate so much to the Prejudice of the Community. I would not be understood to mean by this, to stop any *necessary Supplies* for the carrying on of the *War*, badly conducted as it is, but such only as lead to mischievous Ends, that contribute to loosen and enfeeble the Bands of Government, and prevent proper Measures being taken for raising our Reputation once more to its pristine Lustre. This, Sir, you will readily conceive, is not to be effected while the Morals of Men are to be played Tricks with; and those in the Direction of Affairs want both Spirit and Judgment. A *War*, Sir, ought to be carried on like a *War*, not wavering between Earth and Heaven, not raised by vain Hopes, or cowed by idle Fears; Instability shews the Want of Judgment as well as Resolution, and we seem to be aiming at a *Peace* on any Terms our *determined Enemies* will give it

it us, and of becoming their Slaves by playing the Fool with the *War*. And however it may be pretended that we want good Officers, both by Sea and Land, there is nothing truer than that no Nation ever wanted them, and this perhaps less than any, when right Measures were taken to have them; when those that behave ill are *broke* without Ceremony, and those that behave well *honoured* and *encouraged*.

A *War*, rightly conducted, can never hurt this Nation, because we have in our own Hands the Power of ruining the *Trade* of our Adversaries, and thereby raising of our own, which, in any *War* with the *French*, will pay the Expences, and did so in this, 'till our *neutral Conduct* at Sea turned the Scale, lessened the Number of our Privateers, and, by the oddest Management in the World, gave the Balance to the Enemy, who have done more with a few Ships, than we with all our Grand Fleet; at a Time too when our Allies by Land are making large Strides towards reducing the exorbitant Power of the Enemy.

It is the common Pretence of Ministers, when they succeed such as had confused the publick Affairs, to say, that Matters so circumstanced are not readily set right again: But what Pretence have they who force themselves into Power, when Affairs are in a fine Train of Success, and then murder and confound every Thing they meddle with?

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By the *Treaty* of *Worms* the Foundation was laid of driving the *French* and *Spaniards* out of *Italy*, and, by the wise Conduct of our *magnanimous Ally*, it has had its Effect, in Despight of Opposition and Ignorance. But our Naval Glory, at the same Time, is sunk almost to nothing, the *French*, with three or four Men of War, commanding the Sea: Their Trade passes and repasses without Molestation; and one private Commander in the *French* Service, so poorly supported, could not only convoy his own Trade, in Opposition to a superior Force, but likewise disperse ours, and seize their Convoy. The *Privateers* are almost all laid up, and, for any Use we find them of, so might our *Men of War* be too. Thus Ignorance triumphs in this ill-fated Nation: And, while we have a Prince upon the Throne, as brave and as just as ever reigned, we don't find the Conduct of the War, on our Part, in any Sense adequate to, or connecting with the warm and vigorous Measures pursued by our Allies.

To render this more apparent, if Matters so clear and obvious need be made more so, let us consider the present State of our Navy, both civil and military, and what a fine Condition it is brought to in both Cases, what it has done, and what a terrible Debt it has created.

The

The Number of fighting Ships and Vessels, excluding Bomb-Vessels, Fire-Ships, and hired Ships, &c. are, if the printed List be right, 213.

Thus,

1st Rates	6
2d	12
3d	42
4th	65
5th	27
6th	36
Sloops	25
	213

Out of these we may presume there are about 150 employed, which, on an Average, have 300 Men each, the Sum total whereof is 45,000, whereout 5000 may be allowed for the Deficiencies in their Complements, and there remains only 40,000, the Number allotted to the current Service of the Year; perhaps less are employed. The Allowance by Parliament is four Pounds a Man *per* Month, which for 40,000 Men, including Wear, Tare, Victualling-Wages, and Ordinance-Stores, amounts, at thirteen Months to the Year, to 2,080,000 *L.* Upon Navy *Interest* and *non Interest* Bills, above 800,000 *L.* To the Officers and Men, on a random Calculation for 26 Months Pay only, about 1,200,000 *L.* more; together about 2,000,000 *L.*

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The *French* never employ above forty Men of War on the same Average, and if in them somewhat more Men, are not at more Expence than for a like Number of ours; their whole, at 300 Men a Ship, is 12,000. amounting, for 26 Months at four Pounds a Man *per* Month, to 1,248,000 *L.* So that their whole Expence in two Years is less by 752,000 *L.* than our Debt, besides 4,160,000 *L.* allowed for the said 26 Months by Parliament, the Difference therefore between their Expence and ours, in two Years, is 4,912,000 *L.*

But this is not all, the Navy Bills, after being due six Months, pay 5 *per Cent.* Interest, and in the Interval carry, on an Average, a Discompt of 8 *per Cent.* This 8 *per Cent.* seems no Charge on the Government, but that is a great Mistake; for, as all People know of this Discompt, they will make their Contracts accordingly, and therefore falls on the Government really, tho' not apparently; the Consequence whereof is a large accumulating Debt, obvious enough to the meanest Understanding.

I must observe, that there is a necessary Sum, besides all this, allowed annually for the Ordinary of the Navy, Repairs of Shipping, &c. independent of the above; so that we are, upon the Whole, running precipitately into a Debt that is morally impossible can ever be paid.

The Reason of comparing with the *French*, and setting out 150 Ships against their 40, is this;

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this ; they do more with their 40 than we do with our 150 ; convoy their Trade as safely, and take more of our Ships than we do of theirs, consequently have the better of us in Naval Affairs, by 2,456,000 Pounds *Sterling* a Year. And as I conceive we are, in one Shape or another, at as much Expence in the Land-Service as the *French*, it will follow, that we can either afford to spend 2,456,000 a Year more than they, besides the great accumulating Debt, or, by the Methods we pursue, be inevitably ruined.

I don't pretend here to be exact in my Calculation, but am on the favourable Side of the Question, having made great Allowances where less were sufficient. You will find, Sir, when the Accompts come before you, that, upon the Whole, they are but too true. And if you are, besides, called upon to make good the *civil List*, there will be such a Demand upon the Publick this Session, as I believe you will conceive is not readily to be made good ; and that will naturally lead you to consider how this happens ; whence it will evidently occur to you, that if our Naval Forces had done their Duty, been properly disposed by those who directed them, and those employed duly active in their Stations, that this Increase of the publick Debt had yet accrued, but then it had been balanced by the *Ruin* of the *French Trade*, and possibly of their *Navy*. This would have paid the growing Debt amply enough ; when,

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as it happens, the Case is quite contrary, and we have this Debt with the *Ruin* of our *own Trade*. So that the Fault must not here be laid on the War, which is right, and what every Body wishes to be vigorously continued, but on the Conduct of it, which is wrong, and which all hope will be duly considered.

Mr. *Conflans*, the *French Commodore*, as appears by his Journal in the *Utrecht Gazette* of the 22d of *November*, N. S. with the *Terrible* of 74 Guns, the *Neptune* of 74, the *Alcyon* of 50, and the *Glory* of 46, convoyed from the Road of *Aix* near *Rochelle*, the 29th of *April* last, 230 Merchant Ships for the *West-Indies*. We find, soon afterwards, that, from another Part of the same Coast, not far distant, the Duke *D'Arville* got off with the Fleet to *America*. Mr. *Conflans* convoyed his Fleet safe, and, returning with another Fleet in *July*, fell in with five of our Men of War under *Commodore Lee*, who never interrupted him. In *August*, with another Convoy, he fell in with *Admiral Davers's* Squadron, which we since learn were under the Command of *Commodore Mitchel*, and they also very complaisantly let him pass. In *September*, the same *French Officer* fell in with our homeward-bound *Leeward-Island Trade*, took one of their Convoy, the *Severn* Man of War, and some of the Merchant Ships. The first letting of him pass was owing to Negligence at Home, like as in the

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Case of *d'Anville's* Squadron. The Consequence was, that the *French* made good their Trade, and injured ours, with *four Ships*, which we could not, or rather did not do, on the other Side, with perhaps *four* and *Thirty*. This has essentially to do with the accumulating Expence, for, at this Rate, we are running in Debt without Sense or Meaning, though the Rectitude of the War as clear as ever; it is plainly, therefore, more necessary to change Hands than to make a *bad Peace*. The Spirit of the Nation is awake, and wants nothing but a suitable Genius, and real Skill to conduct it, in order to bring its Honour into some Kind of Repute. After what has been said, you cannot help seeing the Necessity of this, since, with good Management, one Campaign more by Land will put the *French* on the Defensive every where, and good Conduct at Sea intirely knock up the *French Trade* to the *West-Indies*, and render our Fleet truly formidable. The hanging half a Dozen *Sea-Officers* may possibly be a very meritorious Deed: And the obliging our *Land-Admirals* to retire to their Country-Seats, and direct the Navigation of their own Fish-Ponds, the most becoming Act in the World. This, Sir, pushed with Vigour, will make a *British* Parliament revered, give that just Lustre and Dignity to the Crown that the Majesty of the Wearer merits, who reigns in the Heart of every honest Man in the Kingdom, and

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and once more revive that Reputation and Fame which *Britain* has ever acquired when we were so happy as to have Men of Sense in the Direction of publick Affairs.

Our Situation will then be, that the Sovereign will, in Effect, be his own Minister, his gallant Spirit will unite, act, and operate with those he does the Honour; and the Nation the Justice to employ; and in that Light we cannot help thriving by the *War*, and commanding a *happy Peace*; a *Peace* as honourable as lasting; a successful Trade, and an abundant Flow of Wealth.

In our present State we are suspended between Hope and Fears, trifling with a *War*, and fooling with *Negotiations*; our Expences going on, and our Debts increasing; vainly labouring to acquire nothing, and fighting of Shadows.

But, to bring all this Reasoning into a narrow Compass, you will be pleased, Sir, to consider, that we have about three Millions to provide this Year more than the last; if we do not do it, we are only deceiving ourselves; if it were six we could bear it, nay, be Gainers with good Conduct; but there must be wise Measures pursued in the raising of it, and Prudence, Justice, and Honour, in the Disposition. Our Fleet must be better governed, and better officered, our Trade better convoyed, and Skill and Resolution appear through the Management of all our Affairs. I need not tell you,
Sir,

Sir, who they are whom the People wish to see at the Head of the Ministry, the Army, and the Navy: And, as the Affairs of *Europe* in general are in a vety hopeful Way, by the Progress of the Arms of our Allies on the Side of *South France*; I should not in the least doubt, that whenever his *Royal Highness the Duke* shall be appointed to command again in *Flanders*, but that we shall have as pleasant a Prospect on that Side. The Trade of *France* can subsist no longer than till our *Fleet* is properly disposed. I need not repeat again, that the Ruin of the *French Trade* will be the Improvement of our own; but may add, that the Advantage of improving our Commerce will not be the only Benefit resulting therefrom, since on the *French Trade*, in a great Measure, depends the Support of their Armies by Land; so that, in Reality, a right Judgment, in the Management of our Naval Affairs, is the Basis whereon is built our Hopes of ending this *War* happily, and of getting out of Debt. But, Sir, if we had an Angel at the Head of Naval Affairs, if we had not as bright a Being at the Head of the Ministry too, to co-operate with him, all must end in nothing. The whole State, Sir, must be uniform, and of a Piece, as it was in that Part of the late Queen's Reign when *Marlborough* triumphed. The Minister must be above either Corruption or corrupting; he must know how to distinguish and encourage

rage Men of Merit, and to have Virtue enough to despise those little Arts that keep tottering Ministers on their Legs; he must give Pensions to none, and Places only to such as can and will do their Duty in them: He must be in perfect Harmony with the chief Commanders both by Sea and Land, supply them well, and leave them to their own Judgment as to their Conduct in their respective Stations, giving them every Information, but no Directions; nothing being clearer than that either they are not fit to command, or ought to be absolutely confided in. A high Station is a Bond sufficient upon any wise Man, and it is the Minister's Fault if such be not employed; the rest ought to depend upon themselves; and where such are well chosen, and a strict Harmony between them and the Minister, in all human Probability Success will follow. This, Sir, with the having our Taxes rightly adjusted, and the publick Money wisely disposed to the Use of the Publick only, I can't help thinking must conduce to the happy Event we wish, his Majesty's Honour and Security, the Nation's Glory and Welfare, and the universal Happiness of us all. I need not say how much it is in the Power of you and your Colleagues to bring this Change about, that *Britain* may once more have the Direction of the Affairs of *Europe*, and shine again Queen of Isles and of the Ocean.

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There is no fairer Rule to judge of Men in Power, than by their Actions and Pursuits. If these are steady, equal and discerning, the Events flowing therefrom will be generally happy. I do not from hence conclude, that the wisest Men are always successful, though in the Conduct of the Affairs they undertake it will appear that they deserved Success. But it will not denote any Signs of Wisdom, to be in one continued Error from the Beginning to the End of an Administration.

Let us examine the Matter Point by Point. An Expedition is intended against *France*. For what? Why, to answer some eminent End; at least the taking of *Port L'Orient*, and destroying the *India Magazines*, &c. For this Purpose the Troops are marched down to *Portsmouth*, and divert themselves there all Summer. In the mean Time the *French* prosecute their Affairs in the *Low Countries*, and drive the *Allies* out of *Brabant*. The Expedition, then, was not to divert the *French* Forces from beating the *Allies*. They do their Business there, and put their Troops into *Winter Quarters*, which is no sooner known that they can be well spared to march any where, but instantly the *Fleet* sails. It is now the *Autumnal Equinox*, high Winds prevalent, more especially in the Western Quarter,—they reach the Enemy's Coast, and land in an open Road about 5000 Men, march them away to take a fortified Town without

without Artillery; return again to their Ships; and again, where there is nothing material to meddle with, plunder few a Farm-Houses and Churches, and then return Home.

Now, suppose this Expedition in Fact did not cost above 2 or 300,000 Pounds, for Transports, Provisions, &c. that Money, added to 2 or 300,000 more given away to Stock-Jobbers, would have gone a great Way towards discharging the Navy Debt, and so of saving much Interest; and the *Fleet* attending this Expedition, properly disposed, might have saved the *Leeward-Island Convoy*, might have met Mr. *Conflans's* Squadron returning Home, and picked up some of *D'Anville's* shattered Fleet. There was plainly no End answered by this Expedition, nor were they unfortunate in it; for I think, in Effect, no Body opposed them, nor, as good Luck would have it, the Winds neither. If it drew any Troops out of *Flanders*, it was insignificant at that Time; nor did it hinder others marching into *Provence*. So that what End it answered, or why it was sent, remains a Mystery, or rather had no Meaning at all. I believe we all agree it did no Good. It will follow then to examine, whether it did not do any Harm.

The Honour of a Nation is one of its choicest Jewels. This gives it Figure, Dignity and Influence abroad, and is the Means of saving much Wealth, since a People really revered

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are seldom quarrelled with willingly. But when Nations, whom all their Neighbours know enter into *Wars* without System, and undertake *Enterprises* without adjusting the Means to the End, they will not regard the entering into a *War* with them, as well apprised that no material Evil can result therefrom: The Consequence whereof is, that we must either be eternally in a *trifling War*, or, what is as bad, an uncertain and *unstable Peace*. A Nation's Honour is this, that Care be first taken in the making of *Treaties*, and then be as careful not to break them on any Considerations whatever. If necessitated to enter into a *War*, to calculate and adjust every Thing in such a Manner as to be morally sure of carrying the Point aimed at. In this Light the *Spanish War* ought to have been pushed with the utmost Vigour, or not entered into at all. Since the *War* has become more general, the *Enemy* should certainly have been pushed where weakest, instead of being played with where strongest. The whole *Coasts* of *France* and *Spain* have been hitherto unguarded, their *Troops* all drawn off into *Flanders* and *Italy*, and therefore obvious enough where they ought to have been attacked; but immature Attempts, to this Purpose, are full as idle, as dishonourable. To have taken *Port L'Orient* would have been carrying an important Point; but the seeming to design it without Force sufficient, is not only the worst Kind of Conduct,

Conduct, as it relates to the Act itself, but also as it relates to the future, for hence Care will be taken to prevent even the Possibility of any future Success, and thus have destroyed all after Views, as well as murdered the present. Surely, then, an *Expedition* so miserably managed had better been let alone, tho' a juster Design in general could never have been imagined. The conducting of right Designs wrongly, shews, in the strongest Light that can be, the Want of Genius and Ability in a Ministry. A Man cannot be questioned in his Understanding, when he makes *Traverses* in walking over an untrodden Grass-Field; but he must be blind indeed who cannot keep in a Path laid out for him. It is the same in State-Matters. There is a certain Course of Intricacies, which no Man can be sure of steering steddily through. In the *War* he cannot answer for the Skill, Conduct and Courage of every Officer employed, no more than he can for the Wisdom and Management of many of his civil Agents; but he can, when an important Point is to be carried, not only give a fair Judgment of whom he ought principally to employ, and likeways take Care that he is sufficiently furnished to succeed in his Enterprise; if these are not done, an *Enterprise* becomes ridiculous, the Nation is enfeebled and dishonoured, and the Minister shewn to be unfit for his Station. These are a Kind of self-evident Principles, which prove themselves as soon as in-

stanced,

franced, and are therefore the true Test whereby to try the Capacity of a Minister; and surely the late Attempt on Port L'Orient was an Experiment, with a Witness, as to the Manner wherein it was proposed to be executed, and may produce a severe Resentment from our Enemies, for what indeed we only ought to be laughed at.

It is very plain, from hence, that the present Ministers Capacity doth not shine in the Direction of *Enterprizes*. It is plain, from what occurs to every Man's Understanding, that it don't ly in the Management of the *Revenues*, either as to the improving, cherishing, or getting the Taxes properly in, it being but too notorious that one third Part, at least, is lost for Want of effectually destroying those Gangs of Robbers, that pursue their wicked Courses with Impunity, that make a Jest of the Law, and despise all Government; and, if there can be any Surplus raised at this critical Conjunction, we have some Reason to fear that it will be expended no Way to the Honour or Interest of the Nation. Now, as these are the two material Points, whereon the rest chiefly depend, and there appears not even the Face of Conduct in either, What are we not to expect in consequence, and this too at a Time when the finest Prospect imaginable presents, of making ourselves happy and easy for ever? If we cannot get in our old Taxes, new Ones naturally occur.

cur. Interest rises upon them, and consequently an unnecessary Increase of our Debts, which can only be remedied, as that merry Fellow who wrote the *Plain Reasoner* has paradoxically shewn, by putting a final Conclusion either to the wrong Means of raising them, as now, or of a general Bankruptcy.

The present Notion of reducing some Expences will be far from answering the great End of doing our Business as we ought, the saving of 20 or 30,000 L. a Year in one Article, while by one other we lose some Hundred thousand Pounds, and by a Third give as much away. The Specie carried out of the Kingdom by the Smuglers, and the Money given People who ought to be paid in another Coin, renders such Sums as are to be saved Trifles: Nor, were all the Whims and Inventions of Mankind, for raising new Taxes, executed, would they in any Sense answer a parallel Purpose, of raising what the Law previously intitles us to, and saving what is unlawfully given away. So that we are really, by every new Scheme, beginning at the wrong End, or rather going on from bad to worse, and while we are, as to foreign Affairs, in the finest Situation in the World, we are at Home feeding on our own Bowels, without Thought, Reflection, Compassion or Mercy; and this purely for Want of that common Care, which the plainest Understanding in the World, with the Help of an ingenuous Mind,

Mind, and an honest Heart, readily becomes Master of.

The Reason against it lies here. The private Interest of a few particular Men is to overbalance all Regards to the Honour, Welfare and Prosperity of the State; they must be supported in Power at all Hazards, and Smuglers permitted in a Course of Plunder and Rapine, because once in seven Years they can serve a particular Interest. But I hope they won't presume to call this governing a Nation; it is making a Jest of all Government, and laughing at every Thing that is just and sacred, and therefore ought to be considered, properly, by those whose more immediate Business it is to consider them, to rectify their Proceeding, and to give the Nation a fair Account of their Actions.

We may subsist now, To-morrow, and next Day, under such wild Conduct, but the Event must be evidently fatal. What Difficulties it has already put us under, and what Dangers brought us into, is but too obvious, not to intimate the certain Consequences of a Continuance; and we cannot be rightly in our Senses, and suffer such Acts to be perpetuated, when it is so easily remedied, by employing better Friends to the Royal Family and to the Constitution, with Abilities infinitely superior.

To you then, Sir, and to your Colleagues, I appeal. I may say, without Vanity, that the Nation appeals and demands your Aid, that
not

not only the publick but the private Enemies of the State, the Fools as well as the Knaves, may be properly disposed of, and Men of Skill, Penetration, Honour and Spirit, directing the Helm. Men lay up Estates for their Children, yet, at the same Time, by not considering this rightly, forget that they are really doing of nothing, and are only amassing Wealth in the Clouds. To what End is all their Pains and Labour, if they suffer, at the same Time, the common Rapine to swallow them up? He that gets much for his Children on this Plan, is not heaping Wealth, but Sorrow and Poverty on them. When a Nation is too deeply mortgaged, no Man has any Estate but in Imagination, and, while this is needlessly permitted, what must our Posterity say of either the Wisdom or Honesty of their Ancestors? This, Sir, will occur more sensibly to your Apprehension, when it shall appear that some People are contriving to make Peace with France, at a Time when the common Enemy is in Effect ruined. This does not, I confess, at first Sight, seem quite clear to every Body; but the Reason is, because they do not consider the true State of the Case in all its Parts, and without which it is impossible to give a right Judgment of our Situation. You will please, Sir, therefore, to reflect, that the French, on the first setting out of this War, had the following Aids, which are now entirely lost to them, viz.

By

By the Alliance of Prussia	100,000	Men
By the late Emperor	30,000	
By the Elector Palatine	6,000	
By the Prince of Hesse	6,000	
By the two Sicilies	20,000	
By the Republick of Genoa	12,000	
By Spain (more than now)	50,000	
Sum total	224,000	

I do not chuse to aggravate this Accompt, but as there are Eleven thousand Hessians and Bavarians, Part of the above Troops, now in our Service, which added to the Losses that the French have sustained in Italy, Germany, &c. I cannot think the Accompt heightened, if I say, upon the Whole, that the French are weaker now, than at the Beginning of the War, by at least 300,000 disciplined Men. This, Sir, makes a vast Alteration in the State of the War, and I dare say will strike you with Ideas very distant from Peace, at least unless begged of us. I know the Partisans of France, and of Power, will talk of Resources infinite which that Kingdom can afford. This, at first Sight, looks well, and would have some Truth in it too, were we attempting to conquer France, because then the whole Country fights at Home, without any significant Expence; but we are to see how they will be able to preserve their Conquests and their Trade, and keep their Armies

on

on Foot abroad. This must be effected on a different Principle than the domestick Resource common to all well-peopled Nations. A Flow of Wealth, arising from a free and extended Commerce, is essentially necessary towards the carrying on a Foreign War: For altho' there may be Money enough in France, as doubtless there is, yet, if that be drawn off by Force, and no Recruits to supply the common Circulation, it will be but a fatal Resource; besides that the French Subjects, in precarious Times, know how to secrete their Wealth as well as other People, which, for the present, is the same Thing as sending it abroad. But we must not wonder that this is not understood by some People, since they who do not know the State of their own Country, are hardly acquainted with that of France, as obviously enough appears by every Step they take, and will be still more apparent, by shewing you that the French have, in Effect, lost all their Trade, as well as are weakned in their Military Power, as above. This I likewise conceive few have considered comprehensively, though all see it in Fractures; I therefore, for your Satisfaction, throw it into such a Light as to make it appear at one View, viz.

- Lost to the French since the War,
- The East-India Trade — totally.
- Fishery — Ditto — if we please.
- Turkey — Ditto — at least for the present.

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Lyons — Ditto — the Course into the Empire stopt.

Bourdeaux—Ditto—by the War with us. Land-Trade by *South France* — by the Allies Army.

The Fur Trade — totally on *Canada Side*.

There remains to them at present, then, only their Trade to the *West-India Islands*, and *Mississippi*, which we must be guilty of the highest Negligence imaginable to suffer them to carry on another Summer; and then, from whence will spring their Resources, can any reasonable Man imagine? Thus, you see, Sir, how Men, who only consider Things in Parts, are apt to judge on publick Affairs, and brigue for a Peace, at a Time when the pursuing of a *brisk War* can only establish us in Power, Wealth, Peace, and Happiness. I need not set in Balance *ours* with the *French Trade*, as lost, because you cannot help knowing of its being really improved, though by the worst Conduct in the World we have lost a Multitude of Shipping. But, to avoid that for the future, as well as to destroy the *French Trade* intirely, I shall beg Leave to observe to you the Means I think right to effectuate both.

The first is, by Act of Parliament to make it Felony, either to carry *Provisions* from *Ireland*, or *Lumber* from the *Plantations*, to any Part of the Dominions of *France*. And, to prevent that common Trick of Ships running purposely

purposely in the Way of being taken, make it Felony to insure Lumber or Provision-Ships, both Parties liable, but one pardoned on discovering the other, and the Person insuring not liable to pay the Damage.—But Ships bound to our own Plantations to sail under strong Convoys, the Owners giving ample Security for the Masters obeying Orders, and not wilfully losing their Convoy.

It was observed, during the first Part of this War, that the Privateers took a vast Number of the Enemies *West-India* Ships, I think there were 240, worth, on an Average, 5000 L. a Ship, taken between our Men of War and Privateers; whereupon the *French* took new Measures, and put their Trade under the Direction of strong Convoys, making, at the same Time, the judicious Orders which I have annexed by Way of *Appendix*, which, altho' before published, may not have come to the Knowledge of many Readers. On this the Merchants and moneyed People left off privateering, and laid up their Ships. We never considered how to counterpoise the Enemies good Conduct; and the Consequence has been, that we have not only lost the Benefit of our Privateers, but have since lost three Ships to their one, and their *West-India* Trade has rose and flourished again. This is so important a Matter, as cannot upon this Occasion be passed over with any Kind of Decency, since the quick Ending

ding of the *War* mainly depended on it, and how to recover this false, or rather negligent Step, is now the Question. That the Merchants cannot fit out any Ships able to beat the *French Convoys*, is certain; and as they cannot get any significant Prizes without, it follows, that they must fit out none at all. But it is possible they might consent to do it, if right Proposals were made to them, and they might, at a small Expence to the Government, be rendered eminently useful, by only contracting with the Government to cruize on certain Stations with the Men of War, on being allowed Provisions at the Navy Expence, two or three 60 Gun Ships, with three or four Privateers, making at any Time a sufficient Squadron to destroy the *French Convoy*. This would answer the Owners Purpose very well, as their Hazard would be small, when they have neither Wages nor Provisions to load the Outset; and the Men's who serve, as they might have a greater Allowance of Prize-Money, and be morally sure of Success. Nor is there any Objection to this but what may be easily answered. As to the Notion, that the Privateers get the *Men of Wars* Men from them, it is an Error, they rather make Men for them; and I believe it would be found, that this, or some similar Encouragement, would be as much the Means of distressing the Enemy, or more, than the *Allied Army* in *Provence*, and consequently put the *State* of the *War* in the best Train

Train imaginable, and make a better *Peace* than all the *Negotiators* at *Breda* put together. I could deliver many Schemes to this Purpose, either of which I conceive would answer, but chuse not to digress so far from the main Intent of this Work; when I see the HELMSMEN of the STATE inclinable to do any Thing that is shining, it will be Time enough to give them my best Assistance; otherways the publishing my Thoughts may do Harm, but can do no Good.

When the Directors of *our* publick Affairs understand the Situation of the *Enemy's* thoroughly, they are so far in the fair Way to Success; they have next only to understand their own, and to have Wit enough to operate them to Effect. I think we have gone a good Way in considering of both, I hope we have made the *Enemy's* very clear, and it remains now only to adjust *our own*, form the Parallel, and conclude the Subject.

The Principles I would finish upon are these: That Taxes already settled be fully raised, and all Impediments thereto obviated; that new Ones, if necessary, be laid where least burdensom, least oppressive, least obstructive to *Trade*, and raised at the least Expence. That our *Naval* Affairs be judiciously attended to, and no Money squandered away on *Place-Men* or *Elections*. And that, to bring all this to bear, some Men of Spirit and Judgment rise up and put the whole in Execution; the Parts of themselves

felves being nothing, without a right Head to bring them together, and to make them act in due Order, with full Force and Efficacy.

As to the first Principle, it is as obvious as Light, that Taxes can never be duly levied, while Thieves and Vagabonds, holding little Freeholds, or being Voters in pitiful Boroughs, are tacitly permitted to obstruct them. That this is now the Case has been proved beyond all Contradiction, and, while it continues to be so, the endeavouring to raise the full Taxes vain. No well-governed Nation was ever *bulled* by *Smuglers* before, nor did ever any Men, who pretended to direct publick Affairs, or to have a Grain of Honesty, as we can find in History, dream of obliquely encouraging such illicit Practices; from whence I shall beg Leave to infer, that, until their Supporters are disempowered, this monstrous Superstructure of confessed Villainy must stand; we must be content with such Levies as we can make, and, as to the rest, like contented Cuckolds, put our Horns in our Pockets; not that this is the Way to beat *France*, but is the ready Road to a *ruinous* and *destructive Peace*. However, as we hope that this will be immediately amended, or perhaps so far obviated, as not to put us under the Necessity of new Taxes, while, at all Events, the Surplusage of those actually raised is a sufficient Fund for raising at least 20,000,000. which is what our Enemies cannot pretend to; but if
new

new Ones must be raised, as does not at all seem necessary, it is plain we can, by doubling the Window-Tax, and laying it equal, or by bringing the Land-Tax to an Equality only, make a Fund for twice 20,000,000. and therefore no Kind of Necessity to burden Trade, which trebles the Oppression on the landed Interest, and is perhaps the least expensive in raising of any we have.

Here I cannot help observing the Absurdity of allowing a Shilling in the Pound for receiving and issuing the Money raised and brought into the *Exchequer*, while we are endeavouring to save as little, by a Means that looks odd in our present Circumstances; for, as it is evident Money enough is to be had; the Notion of breaking his Majesty's Guards makes it seem as if we had no Money in the Nation; and must look a little particular to our Allies, and give Spirits to our Enemies; though on a false Foundation. The King of *Spain* is said to have done something like it, but it is presumed for Want of Money. I own I don't understand the true Reason, unless it be to raise more useful Men instead of them; but then, not only so many People will be injured, but there seems something dishonourable in the doing it. The Magnificence of the Crown, or, as others term it, the Embroidery of the State, is really more to be regarded in this Nation than Men generally dream of, if Popularity comes once to conceive
a mean

a mean Notion of kingly Power. Tho' I am as much a Commonwealth's Man as any reasoning Man in the Kingdom, yet, as it is evident to me, that kingly Power is the only Balance that keeps us from Confusion, I am persuaded that external Shew is in a great Measure the Basis of that Power, and, when removed, will be a great Means to make it totter, and should therefore conceive, that as much Money may be saved a much better Way, and without real Prejudice to any Body. For my Part, I see no Reason for suffering idle patent Places to run away with such a large Part of the publick Revenues, nor indeed the Sense of having any at all.

Our *Naval Affairs* are next in Place, the Care and judicious Management whereof importantly concerns us; this, with a right Manner of raising, and just Disposition of the publick Revenues, is the Foundation of all, and we are to be great or little, have a *ruinous War*, or a *destructive Peace*, as these happen to be conducted.

Our *Navy* now is near equal to that of all *Europe* besides, is at least four to one against *France*, and must increase as her's lessens. *Trade* is equally the Support of both, and next good Management. For this last Year or two, I think, the *French* have done much more for the *Protection* of *Trade* than ours; they have lost but few Ships, we a Number I am ashamed

ed to mention; where the Fault lies is next to be enquired into.

The good Conduct of the *French*, in giving the Orders beforementioned to be in the *Appendix*, put an End, in Effect, to our privateering, and consequently lessened our *Acting Naval Power*, by at least one Half, while those who directed our *Naval Affairs* pursued no counter Measures. The great Object before us was the preventing of the Duke *D'Arville's Fleet* getting off to *America*, which was in no Sense the Thing, since we at that Time either intended a Descent on *Brittain**, or we did not; if we did, the carrying of the Troops and disciplined Militia in that Fleet was the very Thing to be wished, and a very little Addition to our Naval Force at *Cape-Breton*, sufficient to obviate all Attempts of the Enemy there. If we did not intend a Descent on *Brittain*, surely it would have been best so to have divided our acting Squadrons, as have prevented at least 240 Sail of Merchant-Ships going out of the Bay of *Biscay*, in one Fleet, under the Convoy of four Men of War only. But, contrary to this, the Disposition of our Fleet was so very extraordinary, that out of the said Bay, and much

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* The Descent on *Brittain* seems only intended to avoid the Consequences of an Expedition to *North-America*, previously agreed upon and not executed; because, if that had been done, no Peace could have been made with *France* without delivering it up again, which the People would never agree

about the same Time, this Convoy and the Duke *D'Anville's* Fleet both failed, the one by the North, the other by the South Confines, while Admiral *Martin* was cruising with a very strong Squadron just in the Middle, as if his Business was only to see the Enemy well out. When the Enemy was gone, I don't remember that any Ships were sent after Mr. *Conflans*, or to strengthen the Squadron at *Cape-Breton*, our Fleet being kept together for the Descent on *Britainy*, which, detached from other Regards, was right enough, but, as it was conducted, impossible to operate significantly; so that the whole Year no one Thing was done either against the Enemy's Trade, or on the Coast. From whence I shall beg Leave to conclude, without any farther Remarks on our Naval Conduct, that, let us blunder as much as we will, and act by one eternal Solecism, yet, with a very little right Conduct henceforth, the Power, Wealth, and Commerce of *France* must cease for ever; and that we have and *France* has not those Resources in Store, which the World has been led blindly and implicitly to believe, from the hermaphroditical united Outcry of ministerial Agents and professed *Jacobites*; the one stimulated, I hope, by Fear only, the other on Principles too evident to need Illustration. To render the Folly of the one, and the Wickedness of the other, evident, it may not be improper, with the State of our own

own Nation abbreviated, to shew, at the same Time, that of all *Europe*.
 I shall not here engage in the common Dispute, which are greatest, the Revenues of the Crown of *France*, or of *England*, since an arbitrary Prince has all his Subjects Money he can find in his Power, while a free State only gives what is necessary. The Riches of Nations, as well as of private People, is best known by the Credit they have with others; it is plain, that whatever we find necessary is not wanted, on the contrary, is readily supplied, when wise Men engage in the Means; and it is extremely well known, that our sinking *Fund* only, without laying new Taxes, is amply sufficient to answer all the Emergencies of the State, for at least a seven Years War, so far as to pay the Interest of all Extraordinaries above the common Revenues; and how much they are capable of being farther improved, has been already mentioned. I believe Nobody will deny, but that our own Commerce is in a thriving Way, and the *French* on the Decline; nor that it is in our Power, with very moderate Care and Skill, to entirely ruin that of *France*; which Nation, not being in any Way of acquiring new Revenues by farther Dominion, must act on its own Bottom, and, by losing its Trade, sink under the Burden of the War, which there is not the least Appearance of on our Part. The Troops of our Allies are
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
at least equal to those of *France*, and at present on the gaining Side. If any new Ally starts up for *France* against the Court of *Vienna*, the late Treaty with *Russia* will fully balance it; so that it does not any Way appear by what Means the *French* Court can extricate themselves out of their present Difficulties, by bringing into the Field, in *South France*, an equal Number of disciplined Troops as are already there of the Allies, nor find an Ally capable of doing her any important Service. The Event, in the Eye of common Sense, is very clear. *France* must be soon ruined and exhausted, both by Sea and Land, except she can find Means to conquer, which, at least, is not very probable, either in the *Low Countries*, or in *South France*; and by Sea is quite out of the Question. *Spain* may be lost to her soon, and then the very Basis of her Support falls of Course. Besides that, *Spain*, if continuing to act on the old Plan, will not probably be able to do much; that Kingdom has not an Affluence of People, nor consequently can raise many Soldiers, without wounding her vital Part, the Labour of the Poor, which is the Support of all Nations. The Crown of *Spain*, notwithstanding the Wealth of the *West-Indies*, is always necessitous, and must be more so if just and regular Measures are pursued, on our Part, to prevent the Returns. The Affair of the Marriage with the House of *Saxony* cannot at present be expected

to answer any important Purpose, since any Motions from that House, in Favour of *France*, must hazard the Loss of the two *Sicilies*. And *Russia* seems sufficiently secured to balance the *Turks* in case they should attempt any Irruption into the Empress's hereditary Dominions. As to the revolting State of *Genoa*, tho' it may require some Time to clear up, it has no very favourable Aspect towards the House of *Bourbon*, but rather seems on the Point of imminent Destruction. On our Part, while in Alliance with the Court of *Vienna*, we certainly cannot want Men, if we have Money to pay them, and, I think, it is very clear we don't want that. The Soldiers, on our Part, and, for ought I can see, the Generals too, are full as good as the *French*; our Success on the Side of *Provence*, probably, a Balance for the Loss of the *Low Countries*. The King of *Sardinia* I conceive interested beyond the Hazard of losing him; and, as far as human Judgment can be supposed to extend, no Danger of *Italy's* being disturbed by the Power of the two *Sicilies*; and there is the best Appearance that our Army in the *Low Countries*, this Year, will be at least a Match for the *French*. It remains then that we only consider a little farther the State of naval Affairs, as to the military Part, where there seems no Appearance of any important Opposition, as we can calculate them to a greater Certainty than we

we can by Land, because we are better assured of our Interest. If *Holland* does not publickly declare against *France*, we are very sure of its not acting against us, and I believe are equally safe as to the Northern Powers in general; therefore have only to compute the Force of *Spain* and *France*. *Spain* not being a Nation in general Trade, raises no more Seamen than she can conveniently employ to her own Colonies; if she employs them in the naval Service, then the Trade must suffer, and consequently the Money Channels be dammed up. If in the Trade, then the Navy can't be supported; for it is not with *Spain* as with the maritime Powers, or, indeed, with *France*, that many Men may be draughted off, and yet the Trade carried on; *Spain* not having Seamen enough in its whole Trade to man a Navy, much less to do it, as we can, with a third or fourth Man. The Reason why *France* can't keep up a Navy of any Consideration for a long Time, differs essentially from the other. The great Expence the *French* Court is at in training and supporting a numerous Land Army, a multitude of Forts and Garisons, besides what is expended in common with us, renders it impracticable. Her Expences in the Land-Service in Peace being near equal to ours in War, notwithstanding the foreign Troops we support, and the Alliance we engage in; so that, if both *France* and *Spain* together could support fifty Ships,

Ships, from forty Guns and upwards, which I think is the utmost, they could not, one Time with another, have above thirty at Sea, which must either be kept together or distributed. If kept together, the Operations against them are the more easy, because only dependent on a single Point; if distributed, then some Judgment and Address is necessary in procuring of Intelligence and stationing of our own, which, as we can spare and support at least double the Number constantly, will only want Penetration to employ accordingly.

I must confess I see our Advantages in a much higher Light, if good Counsels be pursued; and, in Hopes that they will be so, shall beg Leave to conclude these my Remarks.



A P P E N D I X.

The French King's Regulation of Convoys for the Islands belonging to the French in America, dated May 14. 1745.

HIS Majesty, having resolved to fit out Men of War to convoy Merchantmen designed for the Trade of the Islands belonging to the *French* in *America*, and being desirous to secure the Success of the said Convoys, as well on the Part of the Captains of such Merchantmen, who shall

shall be ready to take the Advantage of them, as on that of the Officers to whom his Majesty shall trust the Command of the Convoy, hath, and hereby doth order as follows, viz.

Article I. The Captains and Masters of Merchantmen that shall be fitted out for the Islands belonging to the French in America, and for whom a Convoy shall be provided, shall be obliged to rendezvous in the Place appointed them by virtue of the Orders given by his Majesty, and at the Time prefixed them, for taking the Advantage of the said Convoys to the Places to which they are bound.

II. They shall also be obliged, before they leave the Islands, to rendezvous in the Ports and Roads prescribed, according to the Orders that shall be issued forth, for that Purpose, by the Governors, Lieutenants-General of his Majesty for the said Islands, in consequence of those which his Majesty shall give them; as well for the Rendezvous from whence the Convoys are to depart, as for the Cautions to be taken to secure the Passage of the Ships, from the Ports and Roads where they have been Trading, to the Port of Rendezvous.

III. His Majesty expressly prohibits and forbids the said Captains and Masters of Ships to depart without Convoy, whether it be from Ports in France, for which Convoys shall be appointed, or from Ports in the said Islands, under the Penalty of forfeiting 500 Livres, and to

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serve one Year in the Quality of a private Sailor, without Wages, on Board his Majesty's Ships. Nevertheless it is hereby understood, that such Ships which by some unavoidable Accident were prevented joining the Convoy before its Departure, or that, having departed with the Convoy, shall be obliged to put back, in such Case they may, within the Space of one Month after the Departure of the Convoy, proceed on their intended Voyage, without waiting for a succeeding Convoy; and for this Purpose they must obtain Certificates, justifying the lawful Reasons of their Stay, which must be procured in the following Manner; viz. The Captains of Ships, who desire thus to depart from Ports in France, must apply to the Directors of the Chambers of Commerce, or to the Chiefs of the Consular Jurisdiction, examined by the Commissaries of the Marine at the said Ports; and those Captains who shall depart from America, shall apply to the commanding Officer, and the Commissary of the Marine, or to the Officer appointed to execute that Function in the Port from whence he departs.

IV. It is also prohibited and forbid, that if any Captain or Master, voluntarily, or without being necessitated so to do, leave the Convoy, the Penalty shall be 1000 Livres, one Year's Imprisonment, and to be incapacitated ever to command a Ship at Sea. It shall be permitted to such who are accused of this Misdemeanour, to defend

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themselves by producing their Ship-Journal, verbal Procefs drawn up by the Help of their Officers, and the Declarations of their Ship's Crew, of the Cause of their Separation.

V. It is his Majesty's Pleasure, that in case the said Captains and Masters shall depart without Convoy, or willingly separate from the Fleet, by Order of the Owners of the Ships, such Owners shall be condemned, in their own and particular Name, to forfeit 10,000 Livres, besides the Penalties mentioned in the two foregoing Articles against the said Masters and Captains.

VI. His Majesty enjoins the commanding Officers of the said Convoys, to use their utmost Care for the Security of the Fleet, to accompany them, and keep them under their Flag. His Majesty expressly prohibits and forbids them to abandon the Ships under their Care, through any Pretence or Occasion whatsoever, under Pain of being broke, or more considerable Punishment, according to what the Exigence of the Case may require. Be it however understood, that in case of an unavoidable Separation, the said Officers shall do all that is in their Power to collect the Convoy again; and, when it shall so happen that they arrive in Port without the said Ships, they shall deliver an Abstract of their Journal to the Comptroller of the Port where they arrive, which shall be examined by the commanding Officers of the said Port, assisted by such Officers as his Majesty shall think fit to nominate for that Purpose;

pose; to the End that his Majesty may judge, by the Accounts delivered, of the Reason of their Separation, and give such Orders as he shall think fit; for which Reason the Officers shall be obliged to keep an exact Journal of their Navigation, or be liable to be called to Account.

VII. For the better Execution of the above Orders, the said Officers shall give to the said Captains and Masters Signals for the Voyage, to which Signals the said Captains and Masters shall be obliged to conform; those who do not shall undergo the Penalty of serving one Year as a private Sailor, without Wages, in his Majesty's Ships.

His Majesty orders and commands the Duke de Penthièvre Admiral of France, the Vice-Admiral, Lieutenants-General, Intendants, Commodores, Captains of Ships, Commissaries, and other Officers of the Marine; also Governors, his Lieutenants-General in the Colonies, Intendants, particular Governors, and other Officers to whom this may appertain, to see that these Orders be executed; and they shall be published and registered wherever needful, that none may pretend to be ignorant thereof.

Done at the Camp before Tournay, the 14th Day of May 1745.

Signed, LOUIS.
And underneath, PHILIPPEAUX.

The

The Duke de Penthièvre Admiral of France.

HAVING revised the King's Orders on the other Part, with Command to put the same in Execution, we order the Vice-Admirals, Lieutenants-General, Commodores, Captains of Ships, Commissaries, and other Officers to whom it may belong, likewise the Officers of the Admiralty, to put them in Execution according to their Form and Tenor; also to publish and inrol them wherever it may be necessary, and in the usual Form.

Done at the Camp before Tournay, the 14th Day of May 1745.

Signed, L. J. M. de Bourbon.
And lower, By his Serene Highness,
Signed, ROMIEU.

Collated with the Original by us,
For the King, } Ecuier Counseiller Secretary to
the King's Household, Crown of
France, and Treasury.

F I N I S

EXTRAORDINAIRE