AN

ANSWER

TO THE

Strictures of the Quarterly Review

(No. 4),

UPON THE LETTERS

OF

THE RIGHT HON. G. CANNING

TO

EARL CAMDEN,

LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

Discat aliquando populus Romanus quantum cuique tribuat, quibus se committeret a quibus caveret.

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THE publication of the fourth number of the Quarterly Review has been detained three weeks beyond its proper period, and the reason of this detention is now apparent. The publisher of this Review was the publisher of the Anti-Jacobin, and is a close and intimate friend of Mr. Canning. He naturally wished to take the earliest opportunity for presenting some defence and vindication of his friend before the meeting of Parliament, which might in a degree do away or counteract the effect of Mr. Canning's own publications. He has, accordingly, in what he calls a Review of those publications, taken most especial care not to enter, in the slightest degree, into a production or discussion of their contents: these he sedulously keeps out of view; and, with great dex-

terity and artifice, gives a history of the transaction which Mr. Canning has disclosed, according to his own real or partial conception, with the apparent design of fixing the entire blame of what has passed, first on Lord Castlereagh, then upon other members of the Cabinet, and of entirely liberating Mr. Canning from any censure whatsoever.

We may consider this as a well-intended conduct of the Reviewer: but we cannot assert that it is either modest or prudent. Surely Mr. Canning is the best judge of what he can truly allege in vindication of his own conduct; and the Reviewer seems hardly to have a right to wrest Mr. Canning's defence from his own hands, to proclaim it as defective and inadequate, and to substitute an apology for Mr. Canning, or an accusation against his colleague, which Mr. Canning does not venture to bring forward himself.

We perfectly agree with the Reviewer, that the paragraphs and statements which had appeared, and particularly Mr. Canning's own statement, may be fairly considered as grounds for a new vindication of Mr. Canning's character; but we can never agree, that they were grounds for extorting *such* a vindication as his letters to Lord Camden.

We lament with the Reviewer, the necessary notoriety of such a transaction as took place between Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh, in all

its views, tendencies, and consequences, but as to the utter condemnation of that notoriety, we entertain our doubts.—In the first place, we consider that the honour of a Cabinet Minister ought, at least, to be as highly regarded as that of the meanest individual; and, secondly, that the exposure of the conduct of any government, which by its duplicity, or intrigue, or imbecility, shews itself inadequate for the situation it fills, is a public benefit, not a public misfortune.

But, says the Reviewer, *the circumstances of Lord Castlereagh's challenge are attended with every imaginable circumstance of aggravation. The situation of the persons concerned, bound as they were by their characters as legislators and magistrates, and as confidential servants of a sovereign conspicuous for morality and piety, to afford an example of strict obedience to the law, and to avoid any occasion of public scandal, necessarily exposes their conduct to peculiar blame, and requires more than ordinary justification. It is also a further aggravation, that such justification could be produced but by the disclosure of circumstances which are most unfit for public scrutiny and discussion. Such was the letter from Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Canning, which has unfortunately and unaccountably been made public, and such of necessity must be, in a great measure, the character of any document, by which the allegations in the letter are refuted.*

The whole of this paragraph is perfectly true; but it is only true under this proviso, that the service of his Majesty is not a service of integrity, uprightness, virtue, and honour. If the Reviewer contends that statesmen, when joining together to conduct the affairs of the empire, as the confidential servants and advisers of the Crown, have a privilege to divest themselves of the common principles of gentlemen, and to break asunder all the bands of good faith and honour which unite men in society; if they have a right to practise every species of concealment, intrigue, manœuvre, and cabal, to supplant and overthrow each other, for the purposes either of private pique or private aggrandisement;—if these are avowed Cabinet principles, if these are the acknowledged political creed, and constitute the Cabala of government, I readily coincide with the Reviewer, and with the whole strain of his observations, and join in his condemnation of Lord Castlereagh for a proceeding which could not fail to draw up the veil, and unfold a mystery, which ought to be for ever secret.

But if, on the contrary, the nation has a right to expect that the virtue, the disinterestedness, the candour, the fairness, the good faith, and honour of private men should be rectified and exalted in proportion to the lead they assume, and the station they occupy; if these qualities are to be expected and presumed to exist in more than ordinary purity, among those who associate as the

confidential advisers of the Sovereign; then must I ever contend against Mr. Canning, his Reviewer, and his friends, that they alone are guilty in the eyes of the world, who set aside and repudiate these principles; who practise, or suffer to be practised, against their colleagues, any unfair and secret intrigue for removing or degrading them; and that the colleague, on whom such practices are employed, deserves well of his country, who, at whatever personal risque, and at the hazard of whatever consequences, takes the strongest and most decisive measures for marking his indignation at such proceedings, and for vindicating himself from every possible suspicion of conniving at or submitting to so disgraceful a system.

Let the Reviewer endeavour to stigmatise Lord Castlereagh as he may, let him try to sacrifice him to the manes of Mr. Canning's fame,—this at least will be his lordship's defence to the public; that there was not a single member of the Cabinet, but thought too highly of his honour, to venture the slightest insinuation of the degradation to which he was in ignorance consigned: and that when he was informed of the indignity with which he had been treated, and of the wound which had been inflicted on the honour of the Government by that treatment, he hesitated not to assert what was necessary for his own character, and in doing so, to point out what was necessary for the character of the country.

We may lament, I say, we may possibly condemn, under certain considerations, the challenge contained in Lord Castlereagh's letter: but what honest man in the nation regrets the publicity of the transactions which led to it?—The transactions themselves we must ever most severely reprobate: on their publicity we congratulate the public. Since we believe that such a disgraceful course of proceeding never before took place, we feel confident, from the general reprobation which has attended its disclosure, no such proceeding will again stain the annals of the country.

I have no doubt there are those who wish that Lord Castlereagh had been kept in perpetual ignorance of the dishonorable treatment he received—Mr. Canning himself cannot refrain from a sarcastic complaint at ultimate disclosure: I believe from my soul, that there is nothing he would not have given to have kept his whole conduct in eternal secrecy. It might have been gratifying to many, if Lord Castlereagh, being acquainted with the insult and deceit which had been practised upon him, and the ignominy to which he was destined, had been rendered sensible to the expediency of sacrificing himself to prevent disclosure, and of subjecting his character to perpetual insinuation and whisper, and ultimately to the most merited and public obloquy, by a submissive and disgraceful silence at the present moment. The indignation of the Reviewer against Lord Castlereagh, is not that he has acted wrong, but that he has acted right: that, under a degrading and ignominious treatment, he was not passive and pusillanimous, but that he scorned to compromise his honour, or to pander to his own indignity.

Let it be recollected, that if circumstances have appeared *unfit for public scrutiny and discussion*, if a *particular scandal has been brought upon this government in the eyes of Europe*, it is the fault of those, who adopted a course of conduct which could not stand exposure, and not of the Minister, who, to assert his own character, was obliged to expose it. Surely the Reviewer does not mean to establish this detestable doctrine, that there is no cabal or intrigue, no fraud or treachery which Ministers may not employ, and employ with safety, against their colleagues, because a betrayed and injured colleague will be more censurable in his opinion for disclosing the intrigues of a cabinet, than the Cabinet for concerting them.

It is rather a matter of surprise that the Reviewer should impute to Lord Castlereagh the notoriety which has taken place in consequence of the publication of Lord Castlereagh's and Mr. Canning's letters, when it is known that copies were early circulated by Mr. Canning among his friends without reserve: and he who gives out many copies on such a subject, cannot but presume, if he does not directly intend a complete publication.

The most marked censure is pointed against Lord Castlereagh for the *time* at which he addressed a challenge to Mr. Canning, and as marked an apology for Mr. Canning's acceptance of it. Both had resigned their offices, though both were nominally ministers; and in such a case, we are of opinion, that the seeming attention to decorum which would have been gained by postponing the meeting, would not have made up for the imputations which might have attached to delay. The Reviewer has at present the candour to consider Lord Castlereagh's conduct *as a mere gratification of revenge*: what would have been the aggravation of this charge, had Lord Castlereagh not taken the earliest moments in his power to vindicate his honour, but had employed six additional weeks for pause and consideration? We should have heard enough of the odia in longum jaciens, &c.

But if the time selected by Lord Castlereagh was improper, the *tone* of the challenge was more so. *A demand*, says the Reviewer, *so peremptory and unconditional as Lord Castlereagh's, would not be justifiable even in a case where the provocation had been so notorious, and of a nature so little doubtful, that the challenger could not by possibility have been liable to mistake, either as to the degree of offence, or the person responsible for it.*

Was then the provocation not notorious? Was it of a doubtful nature? was the degree of offence,

or the person responsible for it, liable to mistake? If any one point of these questions admit of the slightest doubt, we must admit that the nature of Lord Castlereagh's letter may be liable to objections; but this must be proved, and must not rest on assertion. Mr. Canning himself never once ventures to call into question the propriety of Lord Castlereagh's challenge, either by distinctly stating its terms, or by expressly denying or fairly answering its allegations. In both his vindications he utterly avoids the true statement of the subject, as much as the Reviewer does, and merely touches the edges of the question, without venturing to attack the centre. Let us bring before the viewer the challenge as it stands.

It is in this form, "*that Mr. Canning having procured a positive promise from the Duke of Portland (the execution of which he afterwards considered himself entitled to enforce) that Lord Castlereagh should be removed from the War Department, he, notwithstanding this promise, by which Lord Castlereagh considers he pronounced it unfit that he should be charged with the conduct of the war, and by which his situation as a minister of the Crown was made dependent upon Mr. Canning's will and pleasure, continued to sit in the same Cabinet, and to leave him not only in the persuasion that he possessed his confidence and support as a colleague, but allowed him, though thus virtually superceded in breach of every prin-*

ciple of good faith both public and private, to originate and proceed in the execution of a new enterprize of the most arduous and important nature, with his apparent concurrence and ostensible approbation.

That Mr. Canning was fully aware, that if his Lordship's situation in the Government had been disclosed to him, he could not have submitted to remain one moment in office without the entire abondonment of his private honour and public duty.

That Mr. Canning knew he was deceived, and had continued to deceive him.

Now what is the fair import of these words? Is it not that Mr. Canning could not pretend to believe, without a direct insult and a personal affront to Lord Castlereagh, that he would remain in office one moment after he was acquainted that a decision had been given for his removal on Mr. Canning's demand? That it was every moment in Mr. Canning's power to give him this information? That he accordingly held his office at Mr. Canning's will and pleasure? That it was always in Mr. Canning's power to select the moment he chose for the communication; and that every hour he withheld it or suffered others to withhold it, he deceived and continued to deceive him? That he appeared to act with him as an honourable colleague, when he was directly the reverse; and thus made him a dupe for five months, with a determination to make him a victim at the end of them?

This was the real situation in which Lord Castlereagh was placed by Mr. Canning, and these charges he precisely objects to him in his challenge, and to which there is no reply, nor can be a reply.

Now the questions which arise are these; as a private or a public man, was it Lord Castlereagh's duty to submit to such a predicament in passive silence? was he to have resorted to candid explanation? or was he at once to vindicate his insulted feelings by the last appeal?

It is more than probable, as I have before stated, that it is the wish of those, who have a regard for Mr. Canning's character, that Lord Castlereagh should have pocketed his wrongs in silent acquiescence and affected ignorance; and that he should have left himself a butt to the sneers and whispers of Mr. Canning's friends: but I do not think there is any man, who is not in that class, who does not conceive that Lord Castlereagh would have been eternally dishonoured by a conduct so contemptible and pusillanimous. There are some passages in the Reviewer's strictures that pretty plainly demonstrate that in any other case he would never have counselled such a debasing humiliation.

Now then, as to the second possible line of proceeding, the *line of explanation*: how was it possible for Lord Castlereagh to demand a mere explanation, without admitting that Mr. Canning had neither deceived, nor duped, nor affronted, nor in-

sulted him. I submit to every candid man, what would have been the insinuations against Lord Castlereagh, as a man of common honour and common courage, if he had waved every consideration of the indignity with which he had been treated, and entered into a mere formal complaint of the injuries he had received, and confined himself to an argumentative appeal to Mr. Canning's candour. No man will feel for another, who does not feel for himself;—who will interest himself in the wrongs and indignities put upon a man that has not sense to feel or spirit to resent them? How would Lord Castlereagh expect to engage or interest either affection, or friendship, or public feeling in his cause, when he did not think his injuries and provocations of sufficient consequence for personal rebuke and resentment? Who would not have believed, if Lord Castlereagh had assumed a lower tone on the occasion and made a disclosure of less extent, that, whatever he pretended, he had been all the while in the secret, and been carrying on a shabby system of manœuvre and subterfuge to evade and disappoint Mr. Canning's attacks? Who would not have believed, that if he had adopted a line of moderation towards Mr. Canning, his lordship was aware of the necessity of such a course; and that if he had dared to adopt that, which the nature of the offence demanded, certain proofs would have been produced to demonstrate his privity and connivance?

The case then being not a case of mere injury, but of the most express personal indignity and personal affront, Lord Castlereagh was left without resource, if he did not consider it in all its aggravated form, and act accordingly, however he was obliged to vindicate his honour at the expence of his duty.

We must recollect that Lord Castlereagh, from the moment of the decision for a change in his department, was at Mr. Canning's mercy; that he existed in Cabinet on his forbearance; that he was liable to be the perpetual object of his sport and sarcasm, and sneer, for five months; that all Mr. Canning's conduct, as far as Lord Castlereagh was concerned, was insincere and hollow; that Lord Castlereagh was employed in the greatest undertakings, as a mere tool, to be used and thrown away; that he was urged to measures of the greatest responsibility, with a view to disappoint, to disgrace, to sacrifice him; in short, that he was treated as a tool, a dupe, a convenience, with unheard-of indignity and insult. Is such treatment to be passed over or resented? and if resented, is it not to be obviously resented, in the first intance, against the person who first proposed the measure of his removal to further his own views, and then permitted his colleague to be thus contemptuously deluded, in order to effect them?

Another complaint against Lord Castlereagh is, that if *any thing fatal had happened to Mr. Can-*

ning, Mr. Canning's posthumous reputation would have been left without defence against the recorded charges of his antagonist.

Here we can by no means agree with the Reviewer; for though nothing would have shocked us more than a fatal termination to the duel, yet we cannot but conceive, that it would have been more fortunate to Mr. Canning's fame, had the *supposed posthumous defence* never appeared.—Why should the Reviewer desert Mr. Canning's own production, and fabricate a vindication for him himself, if Mr. Canning's two defences had not been found inadequate?

But, what is singular, the Reviewer adds, that if Lord Castlereagh's letter *had remained uncontradicted, not only Mr. Canning's name, but that of the Cabinet in general, would have been equally injured:* now what we assert is, that Lord Castlereagh's letter does remain *uncontradicted,* and I do not see how any accident, which might have befallen Mr. Canning, could possibly deprive the members of the Cabinet from explaining their conduct, if they had chosen to do so.

After all the complaints which the Reviewer has made against Lord Castlereagh for the unaccountable publication of his letter, he now changes his note, and considers *the publication to be most fortunate, as it affords Mr. Canning and the Ministers an opportunity for explaining the real nature of the transactions which have*

taken place. We have already Mr. Canning's statements before us; we wait with impatience for the vindication of the other Ministers, but they seem to be a little more wary and cautious than Mr. Canning.

The Reviewer now at last proceeds to Mr. Canning's letters, of which he gives such an abridgement and gloss, as he conceives will tend to put Lord C. most in the wrong, and Mr. Canning most in the right. This is undoubtedly fair and natural, and we shall let it pass till we shall have placed before our readers our conception of the case.

It appears then, from the publications, which are in every one's hands, that about or before Easter, when Lord Castlereagh was under a public charge*, in which Mr. Canning had promised to support him, the latter considered himself obliged in duty to make a statement in writing, to the Duke of

* Without drawing inferences, we may state a few dates and facts.—In the middle of February last, the affair of the writership first appeared before a committee of the House of Commons; on the mention and explanation of it by Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Canning, he treated the subject in the most liberal and friendly manner. As no act had taken place, it was uncertain whether the committee would report the evidence; but, upon the 23rd of March, the committee did report it, and the report was ordered to be printed; upon the 2d of April, Mr. Canning admits he made a statement (quere his first statement) to the Duke of Portland, on the insufficient state of the government, which led to the proposal of a change in Lord Castlereagh's department.

Portland, as the head of the Cabinet, in which he represented, "*that he considered the Administration, as then constituted, insufficient to carry on the affairs of the country under all the difficulties of the times, and requested, unless some change was effected in it, he might be permitted to resign his office.*"

We conceive that Mr. Canning, by this statement, has imposed upon himself the gravest possible responsibility for his seriousness and sincerity. What is the case?—In the midst of a session of Parliament, a session attended with much extraordinary embarrassment, in a most critical situation of the country, his colleague being in an unpopular predicament, Mr. Canning is so struck with the state of the country, with the exigency of the times, with the inadequacy of the Administration, that unless immediate measures are taken to correct that inadequacy, and to give the government new and additional vigour, he feels himself obliged, by every principle of public duty, to hazard the entire dissolution of that government, by secession from office.

It is not possible to conceive that a stronger measure could be taken by a minister: and my feeling is, that the minister who takes such a measure, subjects himself to the deepest responsibility; for after having stated his opinion thus forcibly, and having confirmed it by such an

alarming menace, he makes himself responsible for every failure which subsequently takes place, unless he carries his menace, or his plan for improving the Government, into immediate execution.

If then Mr. Canning was sincere in his statement and his menaces, what is his apology to the country for not acting upon them? Why did he not bring the whole to issue at once, if he thus thought the interests of the nation imperiously required it?—why not demand that his whole views on the subject of the Administration, and the national safety, should be submitted to the Cabinet for immediate discussion? why not unfold the plans which were to make the Administration efficient, and the country safe and successful? When Mr. Canning had made up his mind to take such a step, he ought to have been firm and inexorable, knowing that nothing is so respectable, as a strong, well-considered, decisive act in times of emergency; and nothing so contemptible as an insincere and empty threat. There is no excuse for Mr. Canning's complaint or threat, since he did not act on them: all his pretences to sublime and vigorous patriotism evaporated in submission to disgraceful concealment, to contemptible arrangements, to the repetition of ineffectual menace, and at length in accepting a promise for his colleague's removal, upon terms that reflect eternal disgrace on all who were privy to them.

Surely it must have been soon evident to the Duke of Portland, and to all the colleagues he consulted, that Mr. Canning was playing a mere personal game, and not a public one. When Mr. Canning once suffered the consideration of his menaced resignation to be postponed to the end of June, from the second of April; when he had in the mean time been indulged with the accession of Lord Grenville Levison to the Cabinet; how could any one member imagine that Mr. Canning was serious as to the public point? It was perfectly natural for them to try to manage his restless temper by every possible expedient; and I doubt not, that when they put off the removal of Lord Castlereagh till the termination of the expedition, they hoped that its success would induce Mr. Canning to relent from his designs, or give them strength to resist him. The fact seems to be, that they never thought Mr. Canning serious upon any public grounds: if he was so, they knew it was impossible for him to admit of any delay or postponement: it was not credible to them, that he would leave the whole campaign to be carried on by a Minister he had deemed inadequate, and with an Administration he considered insufficient. They must of course have believed all his views to be personal: nor is his conduct upon any other supposition reconcileable to common sense. Honesty would not suffer delay; patriotism would

not brook postponement; virtue would scorn all compromise in the case stated by Mr. Canning, supposing him conscientiously sincere. When he therefore admitted every kind of delay, when he suffered month after month to elapse in visionary plans and fruitless protests, how was it possible for any person who was witness of his conduct to attribute it to any thing but personal motives?

What then must have been the natural feeling of Lord Castlereagh, when he came to be at length informed of the whole course of Mr. Canning's proceedings? If he considered Mr. Canning to have been originally actuated by views of patriotism, he must have felt that no postponement could have taken place, and that Mr. Canning would, in the spirit of those views, have acquainted him of his designs, as soon as they were formed. Lord Castlereagh, therefore, could merely on the principles of common sense ascribe Mr. Canning's plans for his removal to private and personal motives; and he felt that he had a distinct right to resent his being made a tool, and dupe, and convenience, by Mr. Canning, till, one while by yielding, one while by menacing, he could manage his dismissal without breaking up the Cabinet. Is it not obvious to every man who reads Mr. Canning's two statements, that he was endeavouring to effect Lord Castlereagh's resignation, without its being followed by other resignations? His object was plainly not to break up

the Government, but to increase his own power in that Government. The Duke of Portland's health was visibly declining: he had introduced, to strengthen *himself*, certainly not to strengthen Administration, Lord Grenville Levison into the Cabinet;—he meant to drive Lord Castlereagh out of the Ministry, or into the House of Lords, and to place Lord Wellesley in his department. All this is very consistent for a scheme of personal aggrandisement. He would have shewn his power by naming two Cabinet Ministers, and removing one: as long as Lord Castlereagh remained in his office, he was a casting voice in any differences between Mr. Canning and Mr. Perceval, as to modes of proceeding in the House of Commons. On Lord Castlereagh's removal, Mr. Canning and Lord G. Levison formed a sure majority against Mr. Perceval; and his authority, as leading the House, was cut up by the roots; for on every cabinet question, or parliamentary proceeding, there were two to one against him. — We see then plainly that Lord Castlereagh was not made the object of attack on account of Mr. Canning's patriotism, but was merely made the victim of his ambition: Lord Castlereagh was to be kept in the dark till his colleagues could be managed to decide against him; he was to be gulled till a complete cabinet arrangement could be made, of which he was to be the sacrifice. Mr. Canning was of course always against concealment, always for disclosure;

for he wished Lord Castlereagh out, and Lord Wellesley in, as soon as possible; but if (as he was bound to do) he made the disclosure himself, he at once took the game into his own hands, and endangered the success of the whole manœuvre. If he stated his designs to Lord Castlereagh, it would have been impossible to manage his colleagues: they might have taken offence; they might have taken part with Lord Castlereagh; the Cabinet would have been divided and gone to pieces: but by leaving the disclosure to the Duke of Portland and others, and giving them the management of the *time*, they became gradually pledged to the arrangement Mr. Canning wanted.

This statement I have been induced to make, to meet the misrepresentations of the Reviewer; and I think it places the whole subject in a clear point of view, which cannot be misunderstood, and I shortly restate it.

I say then, that when Mr. Canning represented the insufficiency of Government to meet the public exigencies, and desired to resign unless adequate changes were made, he was bound, *supposing him sincere and honest*, to enforce an immediate decision or to have seceded.

If, after having represented the insufficiency of Government, and desired to resign unless adequate changes were made, he suffered five months to elapse, and the whole campaign to pass without

any change at all, how can it be argued that his views *were sincere and honest*, or directed to the public good.

If his views had been patriotic, and if he considered Lord Castlereagh's partial or total removal indispensable, he would not, as a candid honest patriot, have failed to have acquainted Lord Castlereagh, as well as the whole Cabinet, with his designs.

If his views were private and personal, he would disclose nothing to Lord Castlereagh, and would contrive that his designs should be managed by others more than by himself, so as to make others as responsible as possible, and to procure their support.

We shall give the reader a trait of the Reviewer's ingenuity. Lord Castlereagh had stated it was perfectly allowable for Mr. Canning, if he pleased, to demand his removal, but that he had a *distinct right to expect that a proposition, justifiable in itself, should not be executed in an unjustifiable manner, and at the expence of his honour and reputation.* Upon this the Reviewer rests the following argument. It appears Lord Castlereagh acknowledges Mr. Canning had a right to propose his removal, and Mr. Canning did no more; for he left the execution of his proposition to the Duke of Portland and Lord Castlereagh's friends. Yet Lord Castlereagh challenges Mr. Canning for what he allows to be justifiable, and

finds no fault with his friends for what he says is alone unjustifiable.

This is a true example of the *hæret in cortice*, or of an argument upon the words, not upon the sense.

Whereas, Lord Castlereagh's obvious meaning is, that, when Mr. Canning proposed his dismissal, it was his duty to acquaint him, or to take care that he was acquainted with that proposition; because, as long as he was permitted to be in ignorance, and to act as a minister in a state of ignorance, his honour and reputation were put at hazard; he was placed in a state of DELUSION, which he was bound to resent as soon as he was informed of it, and unless he resented the delusion his honour and reputation were compromised.

The Reviewer says, that *Lord Castlereagh admits Mr. Canning pressed for disclosure, and then he asks what motive Mr. Canning could possibly have for wishing concealment?* I have above solved this enigma. Mr. Canning had two objects: one, to get rid of Lord Castlereagh as soon as possible; the other, to accomplish that object without breaking up the Administration. The various members of the Cabinet were to be reconciled to the degrading of Lord Castlereagh, but there seems to have been great opposition to it, much manœuvre to counteract it, much hope to evade it, and some determination to resist it. Mr. Canning therefore acted cautiously for his purpose,

by leaving the whole management to others, and by repeating from time to time his threats of resignation, which he was sure would not be accepted; but does this prudence or caution on the part of Mr. Canning alter the state of the question with respect to his conduct to Lord Castlereagh? By no means. It was this yielding to proposals of delay, to suggestions of compromise, of which Lord Castlereagh complains; and that Mr. Canning, being master of his fate, continued his apparent supporter, till the moment should arrive when he could secure the agreement of his colleagues for his removal.

The Reviewer states, with an air of complacency, that Lord Castlereagh *no where suggests that which has since been so vehemently contended for by his Lordship's advocates—that Mr. Canning was himself the proper person to make the disclosure; and that among all the charges to which this controversy has given birth, this has uniformly appeared to him to be the most* SENSELESS. What does this Reviewer mean? Is he so *senseless* as not to understand the whole drift of Lord Castlereagh's letter, than which nothing can be more plain and intelligible? After stating to Mr. Canning the long and disingenuous concealment which had been practised against him, contrary to ev ry principle of good faith both public and private, his Lordship closes with these words, *You knew I was deceived, and you continued to deceive me.*

What is this but to declare, as explicitly as words can declare, that Mr. Canning was *bound to undeceive him*; and how could he undeceive Lord Castlereagh without making him a communication? The rest of Lord Castlereagh's letter is an anticipation of all the pretexts and apologies which he supposes Mr. Canning might resort to, and which he precludes the use of; thus charging the duty of disclosure on Mr. Canning, and Mr. Canning alone, as a duty to which he had made himself liable, by preferring a complaint against him. What is the difference between an accuser and a calumniator? the latter is the odious, the former the honourable character; because the one gives notice to his adversary and puts him on his guard and his defence; the other, by whispering in secret and defaming an adversary behind his back, cuts off from him the power of meeting and repelling the charge. Who ever heard of demanding judgement against a party without serving the defendant with notice? Who is made answerable for serving notice, but the person who commences the suit?—So much for the *senselessness* of Mr. Canning being himself obliged to prevent Lord Castlereagh from being deceived and continued in a state of deception.

But what we have all along insisted upon, is, that if Mr. Canning's views were sincerely patriotic and disinterested, there never could have been any deceit at all. When, on account of the

alleged inadequacy of the Government, he determined to resign, unless new strength and vigor were infused into Administration, the discussion of his views and intentions ought to have been submitted to the Cabinet. Lord Castlereagh, with the rest of the Cabinet, must have discussed them, and a general result have been laid before the King, for his decision. All the concealment, all the deception, which have been practised, are merely attributable to the private and personal views which pervade every part of the transaction. In the first case there never could have been any personal difference; in the latter, discovery and detection made it unavoidable.

It was urged against the Papists, that their councils had declared, "no faith was to be kept with heretics;" is it to be a Cabinet Minister's creed, that no faith is to be kept among the King's confidential advisers? The Papists were persecuted for two centuries, and driven out of the pale of the constitution, for their alleged persuasion: what will be the fate of our Cabinet Ministers, and Ex-Cabinet Ministers, I do not venture to predict.

Is it not something remarkable, that towards the close of the six-thousandth year of the world, and in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, a controversy should arise, whether a man may not conscientiously intrigue against his colleague, without giving him notice? that he may put his colleague upon new and arduous enterprizes, after

he has obtained a promise of his removal on their termination? and that fairness, openness, and real ingenuous plain-dealing, may be dispensed with in the concerns of Ministers between one another?

But this Reviewer, as we have seen, goes still further: he not only does not require that a Minister should be open and candid, and fairly acquaint his colleague with his intentions; but broadly asserts, that the doing so, or the believing that any man ought to do so, is the most SENSELESS thing imaginable.

It will be acknowledged that there were great difficulties, that the removal of Lord Castlereagh might be attended with other resignations, and the whole Administration be threatened with division: —but it will be urged at the same time, that Mr. Canning, when he brought forward his complaints against the insufficiency of the Administration, was bound to have foreseen and estimated these difficulties, and have boldly determined to meet or overleap them, or he ought not to have stirred at all. The putting a pistol to the Minister's breast, the threatening to resign in the midst of a difficult session, in an hour of great embarrassment, is not to be justified on light grounds or by personal motives. A man, who considers himself warranted to take such a step, without being serious in his object, and without an object adequate to such a proceeding, shews himself to be of such a precipitate and impatient temper, or of such desperate

ambition, as to be utterly unfit for any Cabinet whatever.

The Reviewer admits, *that he is perfectly convinced Lord Castlereagh never did authorize, nor directly nor indirectly countenance any of the different arrangements, proposed with whatever motive by his friends : and he admits, that acting as he did under the impression that he had been dishonoured by the apparent implication that he had assented to them, it was perfectly natural and justifiable that he should express deep resentment, and seek reparation (he does not mean in the technical terms of the word) at the hands of those who had dishonoured him :—but this crime was not transferable. It was the crime of Lord Castlereagh's friends.*—Excellent! bravo! Reviewer.—It seems at last, that the impression of the conduct practised on Lord Castlereagh is so glaring and irresistible, that the warmest defender, the most zealous advocate of Mr. Canning, is driven to confess that Lord Castlereagh has been *dishonoured;* that, on every *principle of human nature,* that on every *principle of justifiable indignation,* he could not avoid expressing deep resentment, and *seeking reparation* at the hands of those who had *dishonoured* him.—I congratulate Lord Castlereagh, that at length, after every effort to discountenance and reprobate his conduct, to censure and condemn his appeal, the most ingenious and sturdy advocate of his opponent is flushed with conviction; and,

confessing that he has been *dishonoured,* proclaims a compunctious acknowledgement, that on every principle of human nature and general justice, he was authorized to avenge that dishonour. But forsooth, the poor Duke of Portland and Lord Camden, they are the wolves he ought to attack; Mr. Canning is the innocent lamb—nihil ille nec ausus nec potuit, cœlum hoc et conscia sydera testor.

As for myself (whatever may be the case of the Reviewer), I can easily distinguish between the well-intentioned errors of a friend, however he may commit my feelings and my character, and the regular concerted attacks of an opponent, who wishes to supplant me. I can easily distinguish between the man, who brings forward a charge against my conduct, with a design to remove or degrade me, and the colleague or the friend, who wishes to parry or to soften the attack, though he does it in a manner I must censure and condemn. I can pardon concealment in those who permit concealment to be practised against me, with a hope, though with but a fruitless and censurable hope of ultimately protecting my situation; when I cannot pardon the man, who, having originally suggested my degradation, permits that concealment to continue, with a view to make my degradation certain and effectual, and at the same time compatible with his own interest and ambition.

If I were attacked by a desperado in the dark,

and my friend, in endeavouring to succour, and to parry the attack, plunged his own sword into my bosom by mistake, should I wish to revenge myself on my mistaken friend or upon the desperado?

One word upon the Duke of Portland. I could have wished Mr. Canning had been as just to the memory of the Duke of Portland in his second letter to Lord Camden, as in his first; and that he had not exhibited his conduct as a contrast to the character he had pourtrayed.

When Mr. Canning's threatening letter was opened by his Grace in the midst of all the difficulties and extraordinary events of the last session, I can easily picture to myself the conflicting embarrassment which must have agitated his Grace's mind. His Grace was naturally and necessarily impressed with the weight of all those duties and obligations under which, at his advanced period of life, and in his state of bodily infirmity, he had accepted the leading situation in his Majesty's councils: he, possibly, from the goodness of his mind, believed and hoped that all his colleagues were actuated with sentiments similar to his own. He thought, that they were all associated with him upon one and the same principle, not to pursue paltry and personal objects, but to exert their individual abilities to the utmost in furthering the interests of their sovereign and the state; he probably knew, that there was not any existing cause which could raise any real difference

among his colleagues; he felt perhaps that they were all employed to the utmost of their ability in promoting the public service; what then must have been his distress to learn that the Secretary of State for foreign affairs, who had recently much distinguished himself in the House of Commons, considered the Administration as totally *inadequate and inefficient*, and that, *without some new arrangement, he was resolved to resign?* It seems that, struck with so mortifying a conduct, he could not bring himself to take any part on the subject at all for some time; that when pressed, he thought it right to examine and sift the real drift and views of the menace he had received, and to try, by means of proposing delays, to ascertain Mr. Canning's objects. It soon became apparent, that these objects were personal, not public; that Mr. Canning was to a degree capable of management, and that it was his duty to keep by management the Administration from falling to pieces. He naturally conceived, that as Mr. Canning did not insist upon any peremptory and immediate decision, he might be gradually tempered and softened in the course of events to relax from his demands, and that as Mr. Canning's objects were apparently personal, he might be satisfied by some flattering arrangement. I do not state this as the conduct of a strong and vigorous mind; but it was natural, in the Duke of Portland's situation, when the declining state of his health did not

admit of his resorting to personal remonstrances, and to such a line of determined vigour, as would have been expected from him in the earlier part of life. This explanation will, I think, in some degree extenuate the fault of concealment, and the system of modification, which the Duke of Portland employed or adopted; though I do not think it will excuse the line adopted by Mr. Canning to a connection, to a patron, to a friend, whom he seems to have cultivated with such unremitting observance, and honoured with never-ending correspondence, and whose memory he consecrates with such multiplied panegyric.

I must own for myself, that if I felt for the Duke of Portland what Mr. Canning professes to feel, it must have been a severe struggle indeed between my private feelings and my sense of public duty, before I could have brought myself to such a determination as appears to have dictated Mr. Canning's letter to his Grace of the 2d of April; but if I had once written the letter, upon due reflexion, if I had once got over every private feeling of affection, friendship, and respect, from a superior sense of regard to the interests and safety of the empire, nothing on earth should have shaken or delayed my resolved and determined purpose;

> I love that bold uncompromising mind,
> Whose views are fix'd and principles defin'd.

Had Mr. Canning acted with the sentiments he

has so well expressed, had he risqued all in one bold appeal to produce a government, which he thought would save his country, throwing all views of himself in the back ground, and without favour and affection insisted upon that arrangement, which he conscientiously thought best for the country, and exacted a decision on his demand, who would not have applauded or pardoned his prudent or mistaken zeal? and cherished the character of the man who had cast aside every feeling of private friendship, regard, veneration, connexion, and party, for the cause of his country? But when he once yielded to postponement, and suffered all his sublime patriotic principles to dwindle and die away in petty schemes of personal aggrandizement, who can forgive him, that for such paltry motives, he should disturb the councils of his Sovereign, and embitter the last days of a patron whom he now embalms in panegyric, for which no one gives him credit? I ask whether there is a friend of the Duke of Portland, who would not wish his panegyric in his first letter to be buried in oblivion, if he could at the same time consign to the same fate the exposure contained in the second.

His Grace however, at last, did justice to himself. He felt himself entangled in arrangements, in order to appease Mr. Canning's personal importunities, which he found it inconsistent with his feelings to fulfil; and rather than execute a dis-

creditable plan, into which he had been unwarily led, he at length honourably resigned. Requescat in pace!

It is a very singular and notable circumstance, in the transactions relating to Lord Castlereagh, that the complexion of them, when brought to the point of accomplishment, struck those concerned in them with such distress and compunction, that, in order to avoid the disgrace of fulfilling them, the Administration was dissolved.

The line of explanation I have taken, is so diametrically opposite to that of the Reviewer, that it is unnecessary to remark on all the minute points he enters upon in conducting Mr. Canning's defence. My object has been to examine Mr. Canning's *possible* motives for his original conduct, which I conceive to have been either *public* or *personal;* if the former, his concealment of his views from Lord Castlereagh is inexplicable, and contradictory to his motives; if the latter it is perfectly consistent. The Reviewer *cautiously*, as he says, *abstains from giving any opinion upon the original and fundamental cause of the whole proceedings.*

With these observations we leave the Reviewer in the enjoyment of the satisfaction he feels in perusing Mr. Canning's last publication—*from the singular and striking instance which it has exhibited of the dissipation of accumulated calumnies and errors, by the influence of simple truth.*

We shall now advert to the Reviewer's remark on Mr. Canning's extraordinary introduction of the authority of his Sovereign.—"*That such a permission should have been asked, and have been obtained, is a circumstance which of itself establishes the character of the narrative, and evinces at the same time the clear and conscious integrity, which must have dictated both the request and the concession!*"—Thus writes the Reviewer: against which doctrine we beg leave to enter our unequivocal protest.

In the first place, I decidedly object to the introduction of the Sovereign's name and authority, as utterly, essentially incompatible with the fundamental principles of the British government. The Sovereign's name can never be used as an authority to screen, to vindicate, or support a Minister: an attempt to introduce his sacred person for such a purpose, is a direct attack on the vitals of the Constitution.

Secondly. The Minister who makes the attempt, not only violates the Constitution, but treats his Sovereign with the utmost unkindness and disrespect—for he knows, that when he applies to his Sovereign for such a permission, his Sovereign cannot refuse his application: for, supposing a refusal, the Minister would be enabled to plead that he is prevented from making his justification by the secrecy enjoined by his Sovereign, and the King would be thus exposed to obloquy for suffer-

ing the ruin of a Minister's character, rather than allow the production of such circumstances as he thinks may justify him to the public.

Thirdly. It is not constitutional to discuss the King's personal conduct; since that discussion might lead to false insinuations, and to misrepresentations, whilst it is impossible that the Sovereign, like an individual, could be brought to explain or defend himself from the attack of individuals.

Fourthly. All production of the King's authority must be partial and contain a part, and not the whole of the case; it cannot enter into and explain all the circumstances which may have been laid before the King by his Ministers, in order to produce his decision, or all the causes, views, limitations, and intentions of that decision, whilst the Ministers alone are answerable for the information they give, the advice they recommend, and the decision they carry into execution.

Mr. Canning must have been aware of all these points and circumstances, and therefore we cannot but express our astonishment, that he should have recurred to so unconstitutional a measure, as the introduction of his Sovereign's name, even if it had been of service to his cause; and still more so, when its introduction is of no use to him at all, but, as I shall shew hereafter, is of actual disservice to him.

What Mr. Canning or the Duke of Portland

may have represented, or may have recommended to his Majesty we are not informed; but, until we are fully and adequately acquainted with the whole of their representations and suggestions, I am confident it is utterly incompetent for us to pass any decision upon what his Majesty may have wished or determined, and if we could obtain this knowledge, it is utterly unconstitutional for us to do so at all. We have a complete right and complete duty to enquire into all the conduct of Mr. Canning and the Duke of Portland: as Ministers of the Crown, they are responsible for what they have done; and are neither more nor less censurable or commendable, because they have, by some means or other, obtained the King's sanction, if indeed they obtained it.

The Reviewer now proceeds to discuss the propriety of Mr. Canning's tendering his resignation so often, and at last resigning when he understood the Duke of Portland had retired. Upon the whole of this part of the subject, my sentiments and those of the Reviewer are diametrically opposite.

When once any public man has undertaken an important office in the state, and become a leading member in a Cabinet, so far from being at liberty to resign at his pleasure; so far from it being honourable for him to resign, except under circumstances which make it a duty for him to risque the dissolution of Administration, he is absolutely preclud-

ed from such a measure. I can hardly conceive a more unjustifiable, or more censurable act in any leading member of a Cabinet, than either an actual resignation, or the tender of a resignation, except in the most extreme case possible. It is incompatible with the implied sense of duty which a Minister stipulates to his Sovereign, on entering the Cabinet; it is inconsistent with that principle of mutual support which is virtually given by Ministers to each other, when they commence a Ministry; it is contrary to the just expectations of those members of the two houses of parliament, who, in consequence of the formation of the Cabinet, have agreed in general to support its measures. When, therefore, a leading member of a Cabinet resigns, it ought to be upon some vital and fundamental point, for some great and capital object, which, if not acceded to, the Minister, on resigning, should explain to the country, demonstrate its importance, and press its attainment as indispensable.

We ought, on the first blush, to believe that it was a cause or an object of this fundamental consequence, that induced Mr. Canning to offer his resignation at a crisis so important as the middle of the last session; and yet, when we turn to his letters, we are obliged to believe the contrary. In order to pacify his discontent and gratify his importunity, an offer is made to him that he should have the conduct of the war, so far as it was con-

cerned with political correspondence; and that Lord Castlereagh should in compensation have an additional office, and carry on the Scheldt expedition: to this arrangement Mr. Canning states that *he signified his acquiescence, so far as he was concerned.* Thus we see, from Mr. Canning's own confession, that his object, so far from being actuated by any public principle, was confined to the paltry view of some accession of political importance. If he believed in his soul, as he stated to the Duke of Portland in April, that the frame of the Government was inadequate to meet the difficulties of the times, and if he thought it his real duty to resign, unless an adequate change were effected, is it possible he could conscientiously think the mere division of the war department, and making two war ministers instead of one, would remedy all the insufficiency he had complained of in the Government, and make it adequate to the difficulties of the times? The supposition is too absurd and preposterous:—if any thing can be matter of demonstration, it is demonstrable by Mr. Canning's acceptance of this absurd arrangement, as a receipt in full for all his sublime remonstrance on the insufficiency of Administration, that it was personal aggrandisement he was aiming at, *and that alone;* that there was no measure so ridiculous or preposterous in itself, which he was not ready to embrace, provided it

invested him with additional importance and power.

So much as to Mr. Canning's tenders of resignation, in order to make an efficient Administration. As to his resignation when the Duke of Portland resigned, *that* was a measure of another complexion. By his Grace's resignation, a new head of the Cabinet was to be selected by his Majesty. And it soon appeared that Mr. Canning, with perfect consistency, designed himself to be this head: we soon hear of his laying down his political code, first, that it is essential that there should be an efficient head to the Administration; secondly, that this head should be in the House of Commons; thirdly, that the only two persons whom his Majesty could possibly fix on, were Mr. Perceval or himself, and that it was impossible for him to serve under Mr. Perceval. This conduct of Mr. Canning's was stated in all the government newspapers, circulated through all political companies, avowed and defended by Mr. Canning's friends, who were prepared before-hand to support it, and never denied, but even admitted by the Reviewer.

So much then as to Mr. Canning's resignation at the time the Duke of Portland retired:—and we now take leave of the Reviewer by cordially uniting with him in the *same* expressions, though with an *opposite* meaning.

"*As at none of the periods of Mr. Canning's former resignations, a doubt could be raised as to the motives which actuated his conduct, we should think it most unfair to suppose the exclusive operation of a new motive at the period when his resignation actually took place.*" We most sincerely believe that the motives of personal ambition and aggrandisement actuated him throughout; but as to the principles of disinterestedness, which the Reviewer supposes, we cannot trace a vestige of them through the whole proceedings.

Having taken leave of the Reviewer, we may now be at liberty to make a few remarks upon Mr. Canning's vindications, sometimes adverting to his statement, sometimes to his letter.

The great and main object of Mr. Canning's letter to Lord Camden, is to prove the justifiableness of those means which may be used for imposing upon a colleague without compromising your *private honour*.

The first principle is, that you are never bound to undeceive your colleague yourself.

2nd.—That you do enough to save your character, if you merely state your designs against your colleague to the chief Minister, and urge him to make a disclosure; and if he, wishing to counteract your designs, declines it, you are clear from all blame, and the crime of deception is shifted from your shoulders to that of the Minister's.

3rd.—That you do more than enough, if you

know your intentions have been mentioned to your colleague's friend, although that mention may be accompanied, for what you know, by injunctions of secrecy, and though that friend may be practising secrecy in order to counteract your designs.

4th.—That you have a right *never to entertain a doubt* with regard to disclosure being made to your colleague, although there is every human reason to make you believe the contrary, and although your colleague sits every day with you for five months in Cabinet, without discovering the slightest symptom of being acquainted with your intrigue against him.

Now as to the first proposition, I never can agree with Mr. Canning, because I never can agree to shut honesty out of the world. And, for the soul of me, I cannot bring myself to believe, that I have a right to keep my colleague in a state of delusion when it is every moment in my power to take him out of it. And whenever my own integrity, fair dealing, manliness, and honour, are concerned, I will never commit their preservation to the discretion or policy of another, so long as I can preserve them myself. But I would seriously advise Mr. Canning not to urge this doctrine any longer; for it is highly casuistical, and the idea of it disgusts and revolts every honourable mind.

As to the sufficiency of his second principle, he completely confutes it by his own conduct: for, having laid down as an axiom, that the *regular,*

efficient, and straitforward course, is to state your designs against your colleague to the prime Minister, to be by him laid before the King, he then considers this course so *irregular,* so *inefficient,* and so *little straitforward,* that he, on the 31st of May, *believing it possible that his intention might not have been fully explained to his Majesty, and thinking it his duty to leave no doubt upon it,* passes by the chief Minister entirely, discards his authority, and in defiance of his own axiom, and in contempt of the Duke of Portland, *repeats to his Majesty all the representations he had laid before his Grace.*

If thus Mr. Canning could doubt with regard to the Duke of Portland being a safe channel of communication to his Majesty, why might he not suppose that he was not a very certain channel to Lord Castlereagh? If he could overleap authority and supercede etiquette to remove his doubt in one case, why could not he take as decisive a proceeding in the other? Are Mr. Canning's maxims to be considered as waste paper, when operating against himself? and are they to be considered as immutable verities, when applied against Lord Castlereagh?—Thus Mr. Canning has merely introduced his Sovereign's name in order to refute his own argument, and has at the same time violated decorum and common sense.

Thirdly.—I never could understand on what principle Mr. Canning contends that he had a

right to believe that Lord Camden was bound to mention to Lord Castlereagh the plans for a change in his department. The Duke of Portland was the only official channel, according to Mr. Canning; for, when a suggestion was mentioned to Mr. Canning, as coming from Lord Camden, he refuses to discuss it, and desires that Lord Camden should be requested to state his suggestions to the Duke of Portland, as *the only official channel.*

As to the last point, the right which Mr. Canning asserts of *entertaining no doubt* on the disclosure being made to Lord Castlereagh, when every thing presumed the contrary—we can only say, that if this was really the state of Mr. Canning's mind, we must conceive that his mind is of a distinct nature from that of other men, and cast in a separate mould, which induces him to believe, what no man else believes, and to entertain *no* doubt at all where there are the best reasons for entertaining the *strongest.*

Surely, as long as Lord Castlereagh acted with Mr. Canning, as if he was in ignorance of the intrigue around him, as long as neither the Duke of Portland nor Lord Camden, nor any other member of the Cabinet gave him reason to know that his Lordship was apprised of his fate, Mr. Canning could not have been in a state of *certainty* that disclosure had taken place; and if he was not in state of certainty, he must have been in a state of *some doubt:* and surely his nine tenders of resig-

nation, and his various protests, pretty clearly prove, that the fact of disclosure having been made, was not quite so clear as is pretended.

How extremely farcical is it in Mr. Canning, to assert his perpetual belief, that Lord Castlereagh was at all times apprised of his fate, when, in his letter of July to the Duke of Portland, he desires *it should be remembered, that when concealment shall be alleged against him as an act of injustice to Lord Castlereagh, that it did not originate in his suggestion.* Undoubtedly, if he was serious on the subject, if he had not winked at concealment, he would, upon finding that it had been practised against his intention, have taken immediate steps to put an end to it. But what does he do? he lets the concealment continue, and *washes his hands* of the responsibility—I know there is scripture authority for such a conduct, and no less than the authority of that respectable magistrate and minister, Pontius Pilate; who, when he gave up our Saviour to the Jews, took water and *washed his hands,* saying, "I am innocent of the blood of this just person." Pilate put the death of our Saviour on the Jews, and Mr. Canning puts the deceit practised on Lord Castlereagh, on the Duke of Portland.

Mr. Canning states only a part of the Duke of Portland's answer to his letter. Now, possibly, if we had the whole of this letter, we might fairly see how the whole subject stood: It appears, however,

that there is no intention expressed in it by the Duke to make any communication to Lord Castlereagh, and consequently from this period Mr. Canning could never believe his Grace would make it.

I wish here to observe, that it was never intended to make *a perfect disclosure* at all to Lord Castlereagh; the utmost which was held out and agreed upon, seems to be, that Lord Castlereagh should be *prepared by his friends* to consent to a change in his situation at the issue of the expedition. I perfectly admit, that making a full disclosure to Lord Castlereagh, with the slightest hope of retaining him in office, was a silly measure, which would have defeated its object. If Lord Castlereagh had been honestly informed of the whole of the intrigue against him; if it had been fully stated to him that it had been brought forward by Mr. Canning at the very time he had promised cordially to support him in the affair of the writership; that his partial or total removal had been agreed to for several months; that he had been urged to undertake the whole campaign on an understood agreement that he should be sacrificed at the end of it, even if successful; that his degradation and disgrace had been bargained for, and stipulated to Mr. Canning as the price of his continuance in office; if, I say, the whole broad, naked truth had been disclosed to Lord Castlereagh, was it possible for an opponent to hope, or a friend to wish, that he should continue in office one instant

after so disgusting a narrative? The supposition is, I say, utterly irreconcilable to any kind of probability. What was then the design? Clearly to *deceive* Lord Castlereagh by a false representation of what had passed, and by prudential concealment and dextrous address to induce him to submit under a false impression to an arrangement which he must have rejected with scorn, were he in complete possession of the whole of his situation.

Thus it clearly appears, by *both* Mr. Canning's statements, that from first to last, there was a design to deceive Lord Castlereagh, and that a broad, open, and honourable confidence and disclosure, formed no part of the policy employed against him.

There are many variations and inconsistencies between Mr. Canning's two vindications, which might be amusing to point out. One, however, is of great consequence. Mr. Canning contends in his letter (which does not appear in his statement) that he never demanded Lord Castlereagh's removal; that he never thought him unfit for his situation; that he was ready to be contented with a partial change in his department, such as would leave his Lordship *the direction and superintendance of the expedition to the Scheldt*: and he seems to make this statement, in order to elude a charge, that he had been guilty of a high crime and misdemeanour in committing the direction of the greatest expedition that ever sailed from the ports

of England, to a Minister discredited, and sentenced to removal for unfitness. Against this charge Mr. Canning seems to argue that he never thought Lord Castlereagh unfit to conduct the greatest expedition that was ever undertaken by a Minister; on the contrary, he specifically agreed to a plan which was to leave him the conduct of it. What then? Mr. Canning having retained Lord Castlereagh in his office as the fittest person to conduct the greatest expedition that the country was ever engaged in, the most numerous, the most complicated, the most important; how does he reconcile it to his feelings as a man of honour, to insist, as a preliminary to the sailing of this expedition, that even in case of its complete success, this very Minister, whom on account of his fitness he had as it were chosen to conduct it, should, in reward for his services, be removed and degraded, and that removal be the price of his own continuance in the Government? Was there ever a proposition more monstrous, more directly offensive to every principle and notion of honour? more repugnant to every generous feeling of the human heart? more directly hostile to the interests and character of the country? Yet this is a proposition that, from some unaccountable confusion of understanding, Mr. Canning brings forward with affected accuracy, as forming a necessary part of the defence of his *private* honour and *public* conduct. What? to assert your colleague to be fit to

conduct the most arduous and extensive enterprize which human power can plan or execute, to exhort him to its undertaking, to support him in its progress, and during that very progress, to obtain a sentence for his disgrace even in case of his success, and thus to place a rope upon his neck and employ him, not as an able colleague, whom you mean honourably to support, in whose triumphs you wish to share, to whose honours you wish to contribute, but as a condemned and respited criminal, reserved for the most insulting torture which can be imposed on man—disgrace for great services performed, degradation for success, dismissal and dishonour for victory!!!

When Mr. Canning can bring himself deliberately to make this statement, and to exhibit his conduct in such a light, and rest his continuance in office upon the performance of such a compact, he may write defences on defences, vindications upon vindications, and employ Reviewers after Reviewers, but he will never satisfy a high-minded nation, or retrieve himself before an honourable people.

FINIS.

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