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THE
 IMPORTANCE
 OF THE
 BRITISH DOMINION
 IN
 INDIA,
 COMPARED WITH THAT IN
 AMERICA.

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T H E
I M P O R T A N C E
O F T H E
BRITISH DOMINION IN INDIA,
STATED; AND COMPARED WITH
THAT IN AMERICA.

The domination of Britain is at this period extended over countries so very considerable and important, that it properly merits the name of empire: for, exclusive of her own domestic dominions, and of her many detached possessions in the different quarters of the globe, her territory on the continent of America is itself equal to a powerful state: but
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her late acquisitions in India are still more valuable ; being in truth inestimable and above compare.

Nevertheless Britain seems to hold this Indian branch of her empire in a very different esteem : for, by the little concern she bestows on it, we are led to imagine that she regards it rather like an adventitious excrescence, or as an encumbering burden unadvisedly taken up, from which she would willingly disengage herself. And, from this neglect, there is no little reason to apprehend, that it may be totally lost to her, before she becomes acquainted with the real worth of it.

But in order to arouse the attention of Britain to this most important object, before it is too late, we have set about this present undertaking : wherein we shall endeavour, in the first place, to set forth the true value

value of, that one branch of the British Indian dominion, Bengal : for as to the article of dominion in the other parts of India we shall not here build on it. And, by this representation, which shall be confined within the strictest bounds of truth, we doubt not to make it appear, that Bengal possesseth, in the highest degree, every advantage, either positive or negative, proper to a dependent dominion ; and that it is capable of yielding to Britain, in return for a small share of her attention, not only more rich, but also more durable benefit, than all her other foreign possessions.

In a second part, we shall enquire into the nature of that system of government which Britain hath established, or rather hath permitted to be established, in Bengal : we shall point out the defects of that system,
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together with the ruinous consequences that must unavoidably ensue therefrom. And we shall from thence evince the absolute necessity of applying a speedy remedy to those defects.

To the end that the value of Bengal may appear in a stronger point of view, we shall state a comparison betwixt it, and that other branch of the British empire, America. Not that we here propose drawing a complete parallel betwixt those two countries, upon the principles of intrinsic and inherent worth: that could only be necessary, in the case that Britain was possessed of an absolute and unlimited power over both, in the application of their resources and finances: and it is plain that Britain hath no such power over America. But the nature of our design in forming this comparison,

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son, betwixt Bengal a subject less understood and America a country better known and highly esteemed by Britain, being only to gain an occasion thereby of more clearly illustrating and inculcating the worth of this Indian dominion, requires, that we should ascertain in some measure what the value of each of those two countries is to Britain.

The value of a dependent dominion is to be measured, by the degree of benefit, which the sovereign country doth or may reap from this dominion, in matter of accession to its own proper stock of wealth, opulence, and power. This is the first and most immediate consideration: but, besides it, there are other two; which though they are of a secondary nature, are yet of very high import; such as, stability of dominion; and,

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and, charge or burden of maintaining possession.

These are the three principles, by which the merits of a dependent dominion are to be tried: and upon them we shall compare Bengal with America. First, with respect to the accession made, by either of those two countries, to the proper stock of the wealth and opulence of Britain.

The wealth and opulence of a sovereign country may receive augmentation from her dependent dominions either obliquely, by commerce; or directly, by tribute and revenue.

With regard to commerce, if we are to consider it on that general footing, of an intercourse commenced, by the free and unconstrained choice of two countries, upon the motive of mutual necessity and utility, which is the source of all commerce, and without which it cannot
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subsist; we must perceive, that the commerce of India will ever continue to be highly advantageous to Britain; and will also remain secure to her, so long as she can preserve the choice of the natives free from constraint: but that the commerce of America will, so soon as she is freed from restraint, not only cease to be useful, but will even prove detrimental to Britain.

For the natural necessity and utility of commerce, arises from the difference of production in the two trading countries. And, from this cause, the productions of India whether of nature or art being altogether different from those of Britain, it proceeds that the articles of commerce which India receives at present from Britain can never cease to be necessary to India: and, through the same cause, those articles which
Britain

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Britain receives from India will ever continue to be useful and necessary to Britain : of consequence, the commercial interests of this dependent dominion can never possibly clash with those of the sovereign; on the contrary, they must ever contribute highly to her benefit.

Whereas America differeth but little from Britain in either climate or soil : her natural productions are therefore nearly the same ; so that she possesseth the rough materials, of almost all the manufactures of Britain ; and her intimate connection with the mother country, affords her the opportunity of minutely acquainting herself with the art of manufacturing those materials. From whence it is evident, that almost all the articles of commerce which America hath hitherto received from Britain are no farther necessary to her,

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her, than as they are rendered so, by either the want of hands to carry on those manufactures, or by the laws of the sovereign restraining her from the free exercise of certain arts. But the population of America proceeds with a rapid speed : and that will of course remove the first impediment to her supplying herself; even the want of hands to manufacture. This population will at same time encrease the importance of America ; and in proportion as this importance advances, so will the free exercise of every art extend, through the diminution of the sovereign's restraining power. Here is then sufficient ground to apprehend, that the several articles of commerce which America receives at present from Britain, will not only soon cease to be necessary to America ; but that she will also have it in her power, and we cannot doubt her
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inclination, to rival the trade of her mother country with other nations, in those identical articles.

But if on the other hand it shall be said, that the commerce of Britain with India, if it is founded on mutual necessity and utility, cannot depend upon dominion, and that of consequence the benefit derived from this commerce, ought not, like that with America, to be placed to the account of dominion: we shall, in answer to this observe, that notwithstanding the commerce with India is not, like that with America, an absolute consequence of dominion, yet dominion is now become so very necessary to the existence of this Indian commerce, that Britain if she was to be despoiled of her dominion there, would along with it be deprived of all benefit arising from that commerce. For it is plain, that Britain can

can at present, by virtue of her dominion in India, restrain at pleasure any one or more of the European nations, from trading in those countries where she rules: for instance, it is by her permission, that France trades in Bengal, and on the coast of Cormondel, the two principal manufacturing countries; and immediately on a rupture with Britain, France will be deprived of this branch of commerce. And, by the same rule, if Britain shall be despoiled of her dominion in those countries by France, (and it is from this power that she hath most reason to apprehend), the commerce of Britain will be equally subjected to the discretion of France. But Britain indulges France with the liberty of trade in those countries, during peace; for this very sufficient reason, that the government of France, if she is not allowed

allowed a direct commerce thither, hath the power to totally debar her subjects from using those commodities; by which means Britain would be deprived of the benefit received from her commerce: and, for this very reason, it might possibly be for the interest of Britain to continue that indulgence to France, in even time of war. Whereas France, if she was possessed of the dominion of those countries, would most probably find it for her interest, to exclude Britain from a direct commerce thither, in even time of peace: because the government of Britain would, notwithstanding such exclusion, find it extremely difficult, to restrain her subjects from the use of those commodities to which they have been so long accustomed: and France would, by this exclusion, get possession of the re-export or carrying trade of Britain,

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in that merchandize; which is very considerable, and would make no small addition to her navigation and naval power. But at any rate, England would, in this case, be excluded from trading to India, during a war with France; in which space her carrying trade would be greatly weaned from her: so that, if we were to admit that she should be restored to this commerce on a peace with France, she would reap but little benefit from importing the commodities of India for only her own consumption.

In this sense therefore, the commerce of Britain with India, though founded on mutual utility, depends upon dominion. And the difference betwixt India and America, in this respect, is, that dominion will ever preserve to Britain her commerce with India; whereas the commerce with

America

America, not being the effect of free choice or of necessity, will most probably prove the cause, that Britain will, one day, lose her dominion over that country.

The commerce of America standing on a footing so extremely precarious, cannot, for this very reason, be brought, with propriety, into competition with that other, which is so much more permanent: nevertheless we shall, in pursuance of our purpose of illustration, carry on the comparison, so far as the nature of the case will admit, betwixt the degree of accession made to the wealth and opulence of Britain, by each of those two countries, through commerce, and otherwise.

The Indian branch of commerce is of a nature so complicated, that if we were to judge of it by the ordinary rule, of comparing the annual account

count of exports with that of imported merchandize, it would seem to be rather disadvantageous to Britain: for she is supposed to export to India about only 500,000 £. in merchandize; whereas her imports from thence (exclusive of China) exceed on the first cost 900,000 £. Str. besides the profit on sales of that exported merchandize which is uncertain, and this difference, betwixt her exported and imported merchandize, must necessarily be made good by her in specie. But then, a great part of this imported Indian merchandize is re-exported from Britain to other countries, in the self same state in which she received them; and the returns made to her therefrom, in specie, amount to almost the sum of her whole investment in India. So that, by means of this re-exportation, Britain receives payment, in specie, for 500,000 pounds

pounds worth of her manufactures disposed of in India; and is at same time reimbursed of nearly the amount of specie, which she originally sent to India, to complete her purchase there. Thus the clear balance arising annually to Britain, by her commerce with India, must exceed 300,000 £. and, over and above that, she is supplied with several articles, for her own consumpt; which are so indispensably necessary to her, that she must, otherwise purchase them with specie; such as salt-petre, rawsilk, black pepper, gums, Drugs, &c*.

* It must be observed that we have here stated this commerce on the ancient footing, as supposing that Britain remits to India so much specie as is requisite to make up the difference betwixt the sales and purchase of her merchandize there; though, in fact, she hath, since the time of her acquiring dominion there, sent little or no specie thither; having made good the sur-

But commerce is not now the only channel through which Britain deriveth wealth from India: that which she receives from Bengal alone, by virtue of dominion, is far more considerable. For Britain doth now possess the unlimited power of imposing, collecting, and applying the revenues of that country: and the amount of revenue received by her, doth greatly exceed the expence of government: as it appears that, in the Year 1766, there remained, after defraying every article of charge, both civil and military, a surplus of above 1,300,000 £. str. and this sur-

plus of her investment, out of the revenues received by her. But as the above commercial statement, will make no difference in the actual amount of ballance received by Britain from that quarter, we have, for the sake of perspicuity, reserved the account of revenue distinct and entire.

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plus she hath the power of appropriating to her own purposes. But, besides this, there have been immense sums accumulated, in Bengal alone, by individuals, since the time that Britain acquired *real* dominion in that country: and these sums, exceeding annually, by a moderate computation, 700,000 £. have been transmitted to Britain; and have thus become an addition to her stock of wealth. So that the whole amount of what is received annually by Britain, from Bengal alone, through these two channels of revenue and private fortunes, is near to 2,100,000 £. str. and if, to this sum, we add that which she acquires by her commerce in Indian merchandize, and which we have reckoned at 300,000 £. we shall find that her Indian dominion creates in the whole an augmenta-

mentation to her stock of wealth of about 2,400,000 £. str. annually.

It must indeed be acknowledged that the sums drawn at present from Bengal, by means of revenue and private fortunes, exceed what that country can afford to spare: and if continued, to the same amount, must produce impoverishment and ruin. But we shall hereafter show that, under a just and prudent administration, Bengal is capable of yielding perpetually to Britain from her resources, near to one million sterling per annum: which, with the commercial sum, will amount to one million three hundred thousand pounds sterling per annum*.

* It may be objected that the abovementioned surplus of revenue doth not come entire to Britain: but to this we answer, that there is so much surplus of revenue received by Britain from Bengal; and that whatever part of

As to America, we find that Britain, as both parent and sovereign of those Colonies, hath never received from them any accession to her stock of wealth, otherwise than through that exclusive privilege, of supplying them with such articles of merchandize as are necessary to them. We have lived to see this privilege, together with the benefit arising from it, almost annihilated; and we have but little reason to expect that it will ever be restored. Nevertheless, we shall state our comparison, against this privilege and benefit, as as if still existing; and we shall likewise allow for it, the utmost value that hath ever been assigned to it by the most sanguine compu-

it doth not arrive in Britain, is employed to defray such expence as must otherwise draw specie from Britain.

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tation, even one million sterling per annum.

But Britain is all this while subjected to the entire expence of defending and supporting those colonies. For it was not till of very late that Britain herself considered them as capable of defraying any part of the charge of their own defence: and then having, to this end, imposed on them a small revenue, which, had it been levied, would not have amounted to a third part of their necessary military establishment, America was so far from submitting to her authority, that she positively declared against admitting Britain to the most distant participation in the disposal of her finances: and expressed her indignation and resentment of the bare attempt, by, that only means in her power, breaking off so far as was possi-

possible all commercial correspondence with the mother country; by either denying herself the use of those commodities which she used to take off, or otherwise purchasing them from the rivals and enemies of Britain. So that the mother country is still necessitated to defend and maintain those colonies at her own proper cost: and her annual disbursements on this score exceed, in even time of peace, 400,000 £. str. in time of war it must be proportionably increased. Now the greatest part, almost the whole, of this expence centers in America; of consequence this sum, being paid by Britain and received by America, must be deducted from the above-mentioned ballance of trade, which we have allowed to be 1,000,000 sterling. And thus the utmost extent of benefit that Britain could possibly

possibly receive from America, in the most favourable circumstances that can be supposed, would fall short of 600,000 £. per annum*.

* It may possibly be alledged that we ought to join the British American, or West Indian Islands, to the account of her dominion on that continent; because this latter is so very necessary to the support of the former, that without it they could not well subsist. But this support doth not in any shape depend upon the connection of dominion: it arises from the mutual benefit accruing to each other by their intercourse of commerce; and for that reason would still continue, if Britain possessed no property in either of them. Nay, if it was not foreign to our purpose, we might demonstrate that, as the ballance of trade betwixt those two branches of dominion is altogether in favour of America, and as the property of the West Indian islands is not inherent in themselves but is entirely derived from and ever reverts to Britain, this ballance, which America draws from those Islands, is in fact derived from Britain: and therefore ought to stand as a ballance against America, in her account with Britain. And by the same rule it will follow, that

So that upon striking a ballance betwixt the value of those two countries to Britain, on the head of accession made by each to her proper stock of opulence and wealth, it appears, that the Indian dominion is at this present worth about four times as much as the American hath ever been in the very best times. And if we look forward, and suppose that the finances of, that one

that if it shall ever happen that Britain is not reimbursed, by her commerce with those colonies, of the whole and entire ballance which they draw from the West Indies, she then becomes a loser of such part of this ballance as shall prove deficient; whether that part rests and settles in America, or whether it is expended and laid out by her, for the commodities of other countries. However we shall not here dwell on this point, it being no farther necessary to our purpose, than as it may serve to prove, that if the value of the West Indian Islands is to be introduced into the present question, it must be in diminution of that of America.

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branch of dominion, Bengal, are reduced within equitable and permanent bounds, India will still be worth to Britain about 1,300,000 £. per annum: whilst America will, most probably, not indemnify Britain, for the charge of maintaining her dominion over it.

As to the accession made to the power of Britain, by either the one or the other of those two foreign dominions, it is far from being considerable. Her domestic strength or force, in opposition to that of her neighbouring enemies, can receive no direct or immediate augmentation from either of them: unless we admit the encrease of her wealth, which is termed the sinews of war, to be such augmentation; and that is shown to be highly in favour of India. Britain cannot employ the power of her foreign dominions to

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any other purpose, than that of aiding her to annoy or distress her enemies in such of their possessions as may lay contiguous to those dominions. For example she, in the case of a war with France, deriveth assistance from her American colonies, in her attempts on the West-Indian possessions of that rival. But this assistance can consist in nothing more than some small military aid; and in the convenient supply of provisions and necessaries to her armaments employed on these expeditions. The first of which is so very insignificant, that it is not worth mentioning: for Britain must, in such enterprizes, trust entirely to her own fleet, and almost entirely to her own troops. And as to the supplies which she receives on those occasions, they are greatly more than ballanced, by the support afforded,

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in time of war, by those colonies, to this very enemy, in these identical articles, which could not be procured by this enemy any how else; and but for which those foreign possessions must necessarily surrender themselves into the hands of Britain, without almost the application of force. On the other hand Britain, by virtue of her dominion in India, hath it in her power, on the first commencement of a rupture, to deprive her rival at one blow and without trouble or expence, of all her possessions and property in that quarter, together with her commerce.

The commerce of Britain with her American colonies may be said to contribute more than the Indian to the encrease of her navigation. But it must be observed, that we are not to confine the idea of Indian navigation,

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vigation, to only the carriage betwixt Britain and India: we must include in it the re-exportation of Indian merchandize; which constitutes, if not a bulky, yet a valuable part of her traffic, to those very colonies, as well as to other countries.

Thus far we have weighed the value of each of those two countries to Britain, in the scale of immediate benefit derived from either of them. It now remains to compare them upon the other two principles that have been mentioned, viz. The stability of dominion, and charge of maintaining possession. Two considerations of very great weight, which, it is imagined, have deterred Britain from embarking seriously in the business of Indian dominion. For the distance being so very great, the possession of this dominion is represented as extremely
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precarious: or otherwise, that, to properly secure it, would demand a greater share of attention and force than Britain could afford to spare. But we hope to make it appear, that these are the very circumstances, in which Bengal, considered as a dependent dominion of Britain, doth remarkably excel; we shall show that this country is, in a most particular manner, exempted from those dangers that render dominion precarious: and that of consequence, a degree of force and attention altogether trivial when compared with the importance of the object, would serve to more completely secure and more intimately connect this branch of dominion to Britain, than any other that she either hath or possibly can acquire.

For the possession of a foreign dominion stands in danger, from only
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one cause; namely, the attempt of other powers to wrest that dominion from the hands of the present proprietor: and this danger is greater or less in proportion to the abilities, opportunities, and disposition of those powers to execute such purpose. Now the powers that are to be here dreaded must necessarily be, either the native subjects themselves, or otherwise external enemies: and the first of these, even the native subjects of a considerable foreign dominion are, in reason, to be much more dreaded, than any foreign enemy: because, in the first place, the motive of their enmity is more immediate, active, and durable, even the desire of retrieving their liberty and independance. In the second place, a domestic foe hath greater opportunities, and therefore greater ability, of injuring the sovereign than

than a foreign enemy. And, in the third place, this natural passion for liberty, doth commonly stimulate the natives to call in a foreign power, to aid them in expelling their present masters; whereby both these sources of danger become united. But in the case of Bengal there is not perhaps on this globe a country so peculiarly exempted from this domestic danger as it is: the natives of which are so exceeding mild, pliant, and submissive, that this, which in a Northern clime affords the principal ground of apprehension is, here, not even reckoned upon. The inhabitants of Bengal have been more despotically governed than those of any other country, yet we do not find that they ever made any attempts to reduce or restrain the authority of their princes, or to redress their own grievances by force. For

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For we cannot admit the conspiracy of Meer Jaffeir to be an attempt of this nature: the treachery of two or three individuals, tending to promote their own ambitious views by the means of foreigners, cannot be termed a struggle made by the natives to recover their liberty. But the timid backwardness of those conspirators, on that occasion, discovers how little disposed these people are to dangerous attempts: and the ready, universal, and unreserved submission of the whole country to the small force of the English, indicates a most singular aptitude to be governed. Since that revolution, they have been subjected to a tyranny, such as was never till then heard of; and which is in its nature the most exquisitely oppressive, and completely destructive, that can be conceived; even a mercantile, joined
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to the political and military despotism, of foreigners and strangers: yet the evident prospect of ruin hath not hitherto served to rouse that people into resistance.

This extraordinary implicit submission of the industrious inhabitants of a wealthy, populous, and extensive country, is certainly the most valuable of all qualities proper to a dependant dominion. For to it the sovereign owes those mighty advantages arising, as hath been shown, from the the absolute disposal of the rich finances of this country; and by it he is not only secured from that first and greatest source of danger to his property, even the machinations of the native subjects; but he likewise derives therefrom a certain aid against the attempts of external enemies.

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But this valuable property of Bengal will appear more conspicuously by continuing the comparison, on this head, betwixt it and America: though in fact it will in this particular appear to be rather a contrast. For this latter country, which was originally discovered and planted by Britain, hath been by her nursed and cherished for above 200 years, at a mighty expence of her wealth and strength; so that the present inhabitants stand indebted to her for every thing they possess, for even their country, and their very being: yet no sooner have these inhabitants perceived their own strength so far formed through the indulgent care of this parent, as that her support hath become somewhat less necessary, than they have set about establishing a distinction of interest, refusing to the mother country the most

most distant participation in their finances and resources; and disputing the most solemn orders of her government: infomuch that the dominion of Britain over America, stands in much greater danger from the disposition of the inhabitants themselves, than from all her enemies.

The other source of danger to a foreign dominion arises from the attempts of external enemies: and these, with respect to Bengal, may be divided into two classes: namely, the native powers, adjoining to that country; and the European states trading to, and possessing force in India.

As to the first of these, the native powers, they are but little formidable to Britain, provided she conducts herself with any degree of prudence and moderation. The climate

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climate of India, rendering the inhabitants languid effeminate and soft, will ever prove an effectual bar to their becoming truly warlike. For, notwithstanding that they are not deficient in temporary courage, yet are they totally devoid of that vigour and activity, that firmness and persevering obstinacy, which is peculiar to the natives of a colder climate. Being altogether incapable of application, they can never, of themselves, attain to any degree of discipline; but must be led, or rather driven, into it, by others, of a more masculine disposition than themselves: and no sooner is this compelling force withdrawn, than they relapse into their primitive rudeness. Nay, even when they have acquired the exercise of arms, unless they are headed by a body of Europeans, whom they regard as a bulwark be-

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twixt them and danger, they will never be brought to act with steadiness in the field. For these reasons, the warlike ability of an Indian neighbour is not to be greatly dreaded: and the same cause that prevents their becoming warlike, doth also render them less forward to hazardous enterprize: they are impressed with an awe and dread of the military prowess of Europeans, it must therefore be a very urgent provocation, or otherwise a very glaring opportunity, that will induce a people thus indolent timid and impatient of fatigue to engage in war with them: and certainly it is in the power of Britain, to evade giving them such occasion: if she shall conduct herself by the rules of discretion and of equity she may not only escape the enmity, but conciliate the friendship of her Indian neigh-

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neighbours. It may not be improper however to observe, that, if we even suppose hostilities from this quarter, Bengal is wonderfully secured against the invasion of any of the neighbouring states: for in the north it is barricadoed by a chain of mountains, with a very few difficult passes; towards the east it is secured by impenetrable woods and many deep rivers, besides that there is no state of any consequence on that side; the south is bounded by the sea, the shore of which is every where inaccessible, except by the river of Bengal: so that the west is the only quarter open to the attack of an Indian enemy.

But the European nations trading to and possessing force in India are enemies far more formidable to the possessions of Britain in that quarter, than are the natives. However, of these

these, there is only Holland and France, from whom she hath any reason to apprehend danger. And as to the first of these, she is so much embarrassed with the charge and defence of what she hath already acquired, that there is no great probability of her molesting Britain, unless a very favourable occasion should tempt her to take advantage. But France, being the natural enemy of Britain in Europe, will be ever ready to attack her in India: and the power, activity, and opportunities of this adversary are such, that it will demand the utmost care and vigilance of Britain to guard herself against them.

The nature of this danger from France, and the measures that are proper to obviate it, form a subject of such consequence, as requires a distinct and full consideration; we shall

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shall therefore afford it a place by itself. Here it is sufficient to observe, that as France is an enemy common to all the possessions of Britain, we cannot consider her enmity as a danger particular to Bengal: therefore our present design only calls on us to prove that Bengal is, by the nature of its situation and other circumstances, less accessible to the attempts of France, than any other branch of the British empire; and that, of consequence, a smaller degree of the force and attention of Britain, will serve to secure it against her attack.

There is only one channel through which France, or any other European enemy, can enter Bengal: and that is by the river; which, from the sea, to the cultivated or clear part of the country, is above 150 miles in length; full of dangerous shoals

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shoals, and most intricate channels, with rapid tides: and the natural difficulties of this access to an invading enemy may be greatly increased by proper precautions. On the other hand, if this enemy should chuse to disembark their troops at Ballasore, in the mouth of the river, that long rout from thence to Calcutta, being through a country covered with wood, and intersected by creeks and gullies, must be extremely harrassing; and, as it is altogether impassable by artillery, must afford every imaginable advantage and opportunity to an active and vigilant defendant.

Another circumstance that contributes greatly to secure Bengal, as well as any other part of the British empire in India, against the attempts of France, or of other European nations, is the great
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distance of those countries from Europe. Now I am sensible that it will appear somewhat strange to assign, as a circumstance of security, that very distance, which is ever regarded as a certain source of danger to possession; and which, with respect to Bengal, is the very cause that hath diverted the attention of Britain from that quarter. But it must be observed that, in this particular case, distance of situation is an exception or rather a contradiction to the general rule: though this particularity is proper, not to the dependent dominion, but to Britain as sovereign; and to her alone. For the communication betwixt Europe and India is by sea: and it is evident that, in proportion to the distance which is to be navigated by both the belligerent powers to the intended scene of action, so will be the degree of opportunity

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afforded to that one of the two which exceeds in naval force and skill, of availing herself by this superiority; and so will be the degree of risk and danger to that other which is inferior in these points: now Britain is more powerful by sea, and also more skilful, than any other European nation; therefore this distance is a circumstance favourable to Britain, as sovereign of an Indian Dominion. As to the particular effects of this distance, with respect to France, considered as the power contending with Britain in India, it will more properly fall under consideration, when we come to treat of that subject distinctly. Here we have only hinted at it, for the sake of continuing the comparison, with the British possessions in America, on the head of stability and security of dominion.

Now it is well known that the whole

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sea-coast of British America, extending above twenty degrees in length, is open to attack. Such an extent of sea-coast, every where accessible, must present an easy occasion of enterprise, to an assailant of conduct and resolution: and reduces the defendant to trust, solely, to his superiority of force; which must indeed be exceeding great, to properly secure this mighty tract of country from the maritime invasion of an enemy, who will not neglect to inform herself of the disposition of that force, and who will direct her attempt to that quarter which is least guarded. And if we should admit, that the naval superiority of Britain may prevent France from retaining possession of conquest in America; yet cannot she prevent her from ravaging, destroying, or otherwise laying under contribution, the

the rich defenceless Towns and country on that continent.

We have next to consider the expence and charge of maintaining and defending each of those two foreign dominions. And here it is unnecessary to mention, that the defence of Bengal costs Britain no pecuniary charge; for we have already observed, that this dominion doth not only defray the whole expence of its own government both civil and military, but likewise affords to the Sovereign a large surplus of revenue. We have therefore only to consider what expence of her own native subjects, the maintenance of this foreign possession may be supposed to occasion to Britain, for the purpose of military defence, of civil government, or of commerce. As to the first of these, the military defence, we must here again repeat, that we have hitherto considered the circumstance

stance of dominion in India, and the benefit accruing from it, as confined to Bengal alone, we are therefore, in the account of charge, to allow for the defence of that country only: if Britain shall think proper to extend her views beyond that one object, it will no doubt encrease the charge of defence, but it is to be supposed that it will at same time encrease the degree of benefit arising from dominion; for we cannot imagine that she will act so absurdly, as to take up and sustain a dead and useless load upon her shoulders. The military defence of Bengal will not, on ordinary occasions, demand a standing force of above three thousand Europeans; for this, with the assistance of the native subjects or sepoy, is sufficient to maintain that dominion against any common attempt. But this force being once formed and completed, as it is supposed

posed to be at present, will not call for an annual recruit of more than seven hundred or at most eight hundred men. On extraordinary occasions, such as an attack made by or apprehended from France, that standing force must necessarily be augmented, though to no very considerable amount: besides this augmentation is altogether transitory; for it will hereafter appear that the dispute betwixt France and Britain in this country cannot be protracted, but will ever be decided in the space of at most one year after commencement: we are not therefore to guide ourselves, by that extraordinary addition of force which Britain may be necessitated to send out, to oppose the first onset of France; as this can happen but once in the course of each war with that power: we are only to respect the regular annual recruit, that will be necessary to keep up

up this force to its proper standard; which recruit will never exceed one thousand men. But the defence of this, or any other part of British dominion in India, against the attack of France, will principally depend upon the naval power of Great Britain; and that force, must ever be proportioned to the occasion: however it must be observed, that, provided the nation of Britain is possessed of the sovereignty and revenue of this dominion, she cannot with propriety charge to the account of Bengal, any part of her navy that may be detached by her thither, to oppose a part of the navy of France in that quarter: but if the sovereignty is vested otherwise than in the nation itself, the case is greatly altered. But exclusive of the military defence, Bengal cannot possibly drain Britain of any considerable number of her subjects; the purposes

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of civil government and of commerce are the only ones besides; and these can never call for above one hundred persons: and the greater part of that small number is now restored to her again; nay sometimes the whole is returned with increase. Therefore the total drain of subjects occasioned to Britain by Bengal, for every purpose of her dominion there, doth not exceed in ordinary years eight hundred men; and on extraordinary occasions it will not be more than one thousand.

Whereas Britain is obliged to keep up in America, at her own proper cost and charge in even time of peace, a force of eighteen regiments; which are recruited almost entirely from the mother country, and cannot require less for that purpose than two thousand men annually. She is likewise necessitated to maintain there, in this same time of

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peace, a considerable naval force; which is also recruited from the mother country. So that this article of military force, which Britain finds it necessary to keep up there in even time of peace, for the sole purpose of preserving the appearance of authority over the native subjects, must cost her above two thousand five hundred men: and what this expence of men may prove, in the case of a future war with France, is difficult to determine.

Yet this is but a small part of the waste that Britain suffers annually by this branch of her dominion; which is at same time a colony; and which, under this denomination hath been, and still continues to be an immoderate drain of her strength. It is not here material to determine, what the original or former emigration of British subjects to America, for the purpose of colonizing hath been;

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we are only to enquire into the present; which, by a very moderate computation, may be reckoned at four thousand men annually: and these too are not the scum or superfluites of her people; they are her most useful hands, being for the most part artificers, or husbandmen: and it must be observed, that few or none of these ever return to the mother country. Indeed this is now become a very serious matter to Britain, which loudly calls for her most speedy attention; as America is of late become the drain of not only her people, but of her wealth: for the numerous and heavy taxes of Britain enhancing the expence of individuals, they, by removing to America, a country where they find no difference in climate, language, laws, religion, or customs, shake off the burthen of those taxes; and this proves such a

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mighty inducement and encouragement to emigration, that we now find not only the labouring man, but the rich and wealthy removing themselves together with their property, to America: the more these remove the heavier will the burthen fall upon those who remain; and this will still encrease the cause of emigration. But not to dwell upon this, it appears that America creates to Britain, in even time of peace, an annual expence of above six thousand five hundred useful subjects: which is at least eight times as much as that of Bengal.

We have now finished the comparison betwixt Bengal and America, on the three principles of, first, immediate benefit derived from either of those countries, by Britain, in matter of accession to her own proper stock of wealth, opulence, and power: second, stability of domi-
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nion: and third, charge and burden of maintaining possession.

In the course of this comparison we have had occasion to show, that America is so far from yielding any aid to Britain from her finances or resources, that she hath absolutely refused to contribute towards supporting the charge of her own defence; and obliges the mother country to take that load intirely upon herself. Nor doth Britain derive the smallest benefit from America, otherwise than by commerce; which is now, through various causes, become not only uncertain, but in a great measure fruitless; it being difficult to determine whether it serves to reimburse Britain of what she expends in that country, on her military establishment there. The genius of the Americans is illiberally selfish, and sordidly attached to their own interest; therefore
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Britain, by promoting the grandeur of that country, diminishes her own importance, and rears up a rival to her commerce. The Americans are at the same time of a disposition haughty and insolent, impatient of rule, disdaining subjection, and by all means affecting independance: so that, without reckoning upon external enemies, we find that it demands a large share of the force, and almost the entire attention of Britain, to preserve even the appearance of dominion over the inhabitants themselves: but it is to be feared that, in a little time her whole force and attention will not suffice to render that country in any shape useful to her. In the mean time America hangs like a wasting disease on the strength of Britain.

On the other hand we have set forth the great advantages that Britain

tain derives from her commerce with India: and we have specified the mighty sums that she draws, at present, from that single branch of Indian dominion, Bengal. Though we must observe that, in this case, it is altogether unnecessary to specify a sum; because, the dominion of Britain over Bengal being absolute, unlimited, and implicit, the whole and entire resources of that fertile, populous, and extensive country, inhabited by an ingenious industrious and frugal people possessing the knowledge of arts and manufactures whereby they furnish an active commerce superior to that of most countries, become the property of Britain: Bengal plants and sows, she manufactures and trades, not for herself but for Britain: so that Bengal being as effectually and intimately annexed and united to Britain as if it was a part of herself, she dictates of

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of sound policy call upon Britain to attend as minutely to the interest and concerns of that country as to her own. We have likewise shown that the dominion of Britain over Bengal is secured, in a most singular manner, against the danger of either intestine commotion or foreign invasion, by the remarkably mild pliant and submissive disposition of the inhabitants, as well as by the particularly advantageous situation of the country itself: in-
somuch that the small annual expence of eight hundred or at most one thousand of her own native subjects may, *with proper conduct*, suffice to completely ascertain the dominion of Britain over Bengal; a country, in many respects, equal to herself.

F I N I S.