

0404

122-21



THE LORDS PROTEST.

Die Veneris 2do Maii, 1746.

THE Order of the Day being read, for taking into Consideration the several Papers presented to this House the 28th of April last, pursuant to their Lordships Address to his Majesty of the 22d of the same Month.

The said Papers were also read.

Then,

It was mov'd to resolve, That an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, most humbly to represent to his Majesty, as the Opinion and Advice of this House, That carrying on the War in Flanders, at so vast a Disproportion of Expence to this Nation, while the States of the United Provinces, notwithstanding the unaccountable Loss of the greatest Part of their Barrier, and notwithstanding the very great Efforts which this Nation has made, have not only avoided declaring War against France, pursuant to Treaties, but are actually negotiating for themselves at the Court of France, is a Measure tending more to exhaust a Nation, long and grievously burthen'd with Debts and Taxes, and to destroy the publick Credit, than to weaken the Power of the common Enemy, which can best be effected, by this Nation, where itself is weaken'd least, by a vigorus Exertion of our Naval Strength,

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and by enabling (as far as the Circumstances of the Nation will permit) those Powers upon the Continent, who are more nearly interested in its Defence, to imitate the magnanimous Conduct of his Majesty's good Ally the King of *Sardinia*, in carrying on the War as Principals in Defence of their own nearest Concerns, and to maintain the Liberty and Independence of *Europe* against the ambitious Views and Attempts of *France*.

Which being objected to,

And long Debate thereupon,

The Question was put upon the said Motion?

And it was resolved in the Negative.

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Not Cont. 81 }

*Dissentient.*

*1<sup>st</sup>*, Because it appears to us, to be a Measure repugnant to the real and fundamental Interests of this Island to engage *Great Britain* as a Principal; and, in effect, as the only Principal in a Land War in the *Netherlands*; the Consequences of which are not only the Encrease of Taxes, and of Debts at home, but such immense Exportations of Specie abroad, as this Country cannot long, without Ruin, sustain.

*2<sup>dly</sup>*, Because we have experienced, and feel the Mischiefs arising to this Nation from the undue Influence of foreign Interests upon the Continent, whereby we have been unnecessarily embroiled in  
endless

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endless Jealousies and Contests, and engaged in impracticable Treaties and fruitless Subsidies, until after Intervals (hardly to be distinguished) of Peace without Oeconomy, and War without Effect, scarce any Trace remains of all the Efforts which this Nation has made upon the Continent, except that of a Debt of more than sixty Millions, exhausting the landed, distressing the trading Interest, creating new Powers and Influence dangerous to the Constitution, sapping the Credit, and preying upon the very Vitals of our Country.

*3<sup>dly</sup>*, Because the Means for carrying on the War have appeared, and still appear to us, not only burthenome and grievous to the Nation, but insufficient to the national End (which in our Opinion ought to be the Re-establishment of Peace) and the Conduct of the War throughout the several Changes of Administration at home, seems to us to have been unaccountable from the unavailing Victory of *Dettingen*, to the Slaughter of our gallant Countrymen at *Fon-tenoy*.

*4<sup>thly</sup>*, Because we have still less Reason for concurring in this Measure, when we reflect upon the Conduct of our Allies, *Italy* having been well nigh lost, by the Inattention of the Court of *Vienna*, and the Barrier in the *Netherlands* having been unaccountably given up by a Conduct of the *Dutch*, for which we want a Name, as we want Reasons for the ineffectual and contemptuous Succour which they sent in our domestick Distress; and Part of which (even such as it was) they withdrew when the Danger appear'd greatest.

*5<sup>thly</sup>*, Because after those Ministers, who first engaged us in this Measure, had declar'd the Concurrence of the *Dutch* essential to its Success; and after  
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a new form'd Administration had so explicitly declar'd that Concurrence to be the necessary Condition of continuing that Measure, after not only the Conduct, but the very Words of the *Dutch* (as contain'd in the Memorial which has been laid before us) manifest their Disability, or their Disinclination to any cordial or effectual Concurrence; and after it is become notorious, that at this very Time they are treating for themselves at the Court of *France*, (if we may not rather infer from their Conduct, that they have already secur'd to themselves that Protection which their Ancestors disdain'd.) After all these Considerations, we hold it inexcusable to concur in charging our poor and exhausted Country with new and immense Expences, which not only common Sense, but Experience has pointed out to be in this Conjunction ineffectual. A Conjunction, in which even they, who advise his Majesty, did not flatter us with much Hopes of Success.

6thly, Because the prodigious Expence which this Nation sustains in Support of this Measure for the Hire of foreign Mercenaries, bears no Proportion between us and our Allies, either with Regard to their and our Interests to Stipulations observed in former Wars, or to our present Abilities, and must inevitably be (as we apprehend) a growing Expence, if the present Measures are pursued.

7thly, Because we have sent Part of the *British* Forces left useless Abroad, at a Time when an additional military Strength was thought wanting for our domestick Defence; and that Want supply'd by foreign Mercenaries, which alarms us greatly, from the Reflections we cannot avoid making on the fatal Consequences which may be produced to this Country, if a Prerogative shall be ever established for

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for bringing over into this Country foreign Mercenaries in *British* Pay, even during the sitting of Parliament, and without previously consulting that Parliament in a Matter so new, and so essential to the Honour, and to the Safety of the Nation. This alarms us the more, when we see Troops of *Hanover*, which had been affectedly secreted from the last Year's Estimates (tho' paid by this Nation then) now taken avowedly again into *British* Pay; for which second Variation we are not able to assign any national Motive. Our Alarm, therefore, must increase, since that Patriot-Zeal seems alarm'd no longer, which adopted, at least, the Constitutional Jealousy, and which had given, at least, the Sanction of Ministerial and Parliamentary Acquiescence to the popular Discontent occasioned before by the Troops of *Hanover*; we, therefore, consider it as our bounden Duty to our Country, and to his Majesty's Royal Family, to warn Posterity to watch the Exertion of so dangerous a Prerogative, by which, upon the same Reasoning and Pretence, that a small Number of *Hanoverians* may be introduced into this Country, any greater Number may; and if that shall ever be the Case, the Rights and Liberties of this Country may be left at Mercy, or the Protestant Succession in his Majesty's Royal House be, at least, endanger'd by the Discontents which such a Measure might produce in the Hearts of the People.

8thly, Because we are discouraged still more from engaging in the further Burthens and Hazards of this Consuming Measure, by the sad View of the Situation of Affairs at home. The Peace of the Kingdom is not yet intirely restored; the whole Expence already incurr'd by the Rebellion is not yet ascertain'd; the further Expence, which may be incurred,

red, cannot be yet foreseen; the pressing Demands of the Navy-Debt weaken us most where we should endeavour to be strongest; and since to these we may add the Stagnation of Commerce, the Decay of our Inland Trade, the vast Increase of our military Establishment at home, made up of Hands wanted by the Manufacturer, and the Farmer; the Decrease of national Wealth, the Difficulty, and enhanced Expence of raising Supplies; when adding Debts to Debts, we have parted, in Effect, with the very Power of Redemption, by mortgaging the Sinking Fund; the Fluctuation and Delicacy of the Publick Credit; the Combination of all these Circumstances presents to our Minds a dark and dangerous Situation (such a one as we would not have thus pointed out, if it remained a Secret to any one within, or without this Island) a Situation, which, we apprehend, ought to fix our Attention, in the first Place, at home, and to warn us not to precipitate the too nearly impending Ruin of our Country. We should rather hope, by a proper Exertion of our own *British* Naval Strength, and by assisting the Powers more nearly concerned upon the Continent, with unsparing, but not with lavish Hands, to withstand the ambitious Designs of *France*; that we might regain to this Nation from foreign Powers that Respect grounded upon our Prudence, and upon our Strength rightly applied; which alone ought to be made the Foundation, and can alone be the Support of Peace. At least, that we might find some Leisure from our Cares for others, to effect, if possible; our own domestick Welfare, instead of promoting (as we apprehend the present Measures tend to promote) national Calamity, Bankruptcy, and Military Government.

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9thly, Because our Duty to God, and to our Country, excites us, in such a Situation, more particularly to exert ourselves in Discharge of that Office, for which we stand accountable to both, being established by the Constitution Guardians of the People, and Counsellors to the Crown, constituted to watch, to check, to avert, to retrieve, to support, or to withstand wherever our Duty suggests; in which no Desire of Opposition, no personal Dislike, no little Motive of Resentment, or of Ambition; no selfish, nor partial Consideration has animated, can relax, or shall disgrace our Conduct; affected deeply, but not depress'd with the impending Ruin of our Country; we are determin'd not to be remiss in our Endeavours to retrieve its Welfare, which can only be effected by the Re-establishment of Peace, and of Order, by wise Oeconomy, and temperate Reformation; by regaining Confidence, and Authority to Government; and reviving in the Nation a truly *British*, and a moral Spirit. With all who will concur in such a Conduct we will unite with Affection. All other Connections and Views we disclaim and abhor.

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| Beaufort,              | Montjoy,             |
| Suffolk and Berkshire, | Craven,              |
| Northampton,           | Shaftsbury,          |
| Westmorland,           | Litchfield,          |
| Ferrers,               | Stanhope,            |
| Oxford and Mortimer,   | St. John de Bleisoe, |
| Abingdon,              | Ward,                |
| Aylesford,             | Maynard,             |
| Hereford,              | Boyle,               |
| Foley,                 | Talbot,              |

F I N I S.

0408

Handwritten text on a page, likely bleed-through from the reverse side. The text is extremely faint and illegible due to the quality of the scan. It appears to be organized into several paragraphs or sections, with some lines possibly starting with capital letters or numbers. A dark ink smudge is visible near the top center of the page.