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A N
A D D R E S S S

TO THE
COMMITTEE of ASSOCIATION

OF THE
C O U N T Y of Y O R K,

ON THE STATE OF
P U B L I C A F F A I R S.

By DAVID HARTLEY, Esq.

JANUARY 3, 1781.

Y O R K:

Printed by A. WARD, and sold by J. ALMON, Piccadilly;
G. KEARSLY, Fleet-Street; and R. FAULDER, in New-
Bond-Street, London; R. CRUTWELL, Bath; and by all the
Bookfellers in York.

EXTRACTS of the RESOLUTIONS of the COMMITTEE of ASSOCIATION of the County of YORK, at their Meetings held on the 3d and 4th of January, 1781.

YORK TAVERN, January 3, 1781.

The Rev. Mr. WYVILL in the Chair,

RESOLVED, That the Thanks of this Committee be given to David Hartley, Esq; for his unwearied and disinterested Services in the public Cause; and also their particular Acknowledgments for his Address to this Committee, dated this Day.

YORK TAVERN, January 4, 1781.

At the adjourned Meeting of the COMMITTEE of ASSOCIATION,

The Rev. Mr. WYVILL in the Chair,

RESOLVED, That David Hartley, Esq; be requested to permit this Committee to publish his excellent Address to them, dated January 3, 1781.

RESOLVED, That, if Mr. Hartley shall give his Permission to this Committee to publish his Address, Copies thereof be immediately transmitted, with their Recommendation, to the other petitioning and associated Bodies throughout the Kingdom.

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A D D R E S S , &c.

HAVING, upon some former occasions, taken the liberty of addressing you upon public matters, whilst I had the honor of serving in Parliament for a most respectable Borough in the County of York, I hope you will not think it any unbecoming degree of presumption in me, if I still wish to continue in communication of public sentiments with you, though I have no longer the claim of any parliamentary employment to entitle me, in a public capacity, to that honor. But if any industry of mine, in a private situation, can be acceptable to you, or in the least degree instrumental, in your hands, to promote the objects of those laudable exertions for the public good, which derive additional authority from your name and national importance, I shall think myself highly honored, if I may be permitted to throw in the sincere, though feeble, aid of a private individual towards the common cause under your protection. Those principles which have been adopted by you, as the foundation of all your public proceedings, and which, through your means, have found their way to the hearts and feelings of the people of this kingdom, contain a full and complete summary of all points, both in doctrine and practice, which can in any way contribute to secure the national safety, honor, and welfare; with respect, therefore, to principles and fundamentals, nothing can possibly be superadded. However, as it may be convenient for the information of Gentlemen resident in the country, who have not had access to authentic parliamentary documents, to give some state of the national expenditure, of our enormous debts and taxes, and of those boundless parliamentary supplies which are annually granted, and wasted in parliamentary influence, and in support of a ruinous war in America, I will endeavour shortly to state some plain and undeniable facts on the foregoing topics, leaving the result to the collective sentiment of the several Counties in their public

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public capacities, that they may form a national judgment upon the case, and that they may proceed accordingly to take such steps as may be necessary to prevent the consummation of public ruin.

I consider it as a great misfortune, that arguments upon the subject of public finances are commonly looked upon as too abstruse for general comprehension and popular judgment; for the natural tendency of this opinion is to produce an implicit and passive surrender of the public property and purse, to the unrestrained discretion of the Minister for the time being. It thus happens that the country is kept in a state of profound and unsuspecting ignorance, in consequence of the palliations and deceptions which are put upon them by the Minister, until defeat, disgrace, despair, and all the convulsive pangs of public ruin strike to the heart. How near we are to this state now I tremble to think; but still there remains this one consolation, that to be apprized of danger, is the road to safety. The watch-word is at length gone forth throughout this kingdom, that *all is not well*. I hope the public vigilance will never be relaxed till we have to say *all is well*.

As I wish to avoid all the confusion and embarrassment, which generally attend the explanation of financial estimates, to those who are not more immediately conversant with them, than merely from the respective shares which they are to sustain of the common profusion, I will endeavour, before I come to any argumentative application of facts, to state, in a preliminary way, such necessary rudiments as will, when once explained, facilitate the whole course of the subsequent arguments.

The general system of national expences falls under three heads, viz. The Navy, the Army, and the Ordnance. There is an ordinary computation upon these three heads in the times of peace, which constitutes what is called the Peace Establishment. In the time of war the whole expence of that war is incurred upon the excess of these three articles above the ordinary Peace Establishment. By comparing the totals of these expences in different years of war and peace, we get a clear and indisputable

indisputable information of the expence of the war. I will now proceed to state the ordinary Peace Establishment of this country, and after that I will draw out the expences of the war, and the present rate of expence in which we are proceeding.

Ordinary PEACE ESTABLISHMENT.

N A V Y.		£.
16,000 Seamen	— — — — —	832,000
Ordinary of the Navy	— — — — —	410,000
Building and Repairs of Ships	— — — — —	284,000
Extra Naval Expences annually incurred, but not provided for by specific estimate	} — — — — —	111,000
		————— 1,637,000

A R M Y.		£.
Estimate for Guards, Garrisons, and Plantations	— — — — —	1,000,000
Chelsea Hospital and Half-Pay	— — — — —	230,000
Staff Officers, Widows, &c.	— — — — —	15,000
Extra Expences of the Army annually incurred, but not provided for by specific estimate	} — — — — —	269,000
		————— 1,514,000

O R D N A N C E.		£.
Ordinary Estimate of the Ordnance	— — — — —	170,000
Extra Expences of ditto	— — — — —	50,000
		————— 220,000

<i>Recapitulation of the Peace Establishment.</i>		£.
Navy	— — — — —	1,637,000
Army	— — — — —	1,514,000
Ordnance	— — — — —	220,000
Total ordinary Peace Establishment		3,371,000

Having thus got a computation of the ordinary Peace Establishment, I proceed to state the expences incurred in each year since the commencement of the American war, each in totals, under the three foregoing heads, viz.

	1775.	1776.	1777.	1778.	1779.	1780.
Navy	2,496,000	—4,153,000	—4,590,000	—6,173,000	—7,774,000	—8,688,000
Army	2,206,000	—4,799,000	—4,797,000	—6,466,000	—7,405,000	—7,796,000
Ordnance	451,000	—522,000	—620,000	—904,000	—986,000	—1,049,000
	5,153,000	9,474,000	10,007,000	13,543,000	16,165,000	17,533,000

The expences of the first five years, in this account, are taken accurately from the Journals of Parliament; but as the precise total of the year 1780 cannot as yet be ascertained, on account of the latitude of those expences which are annually incurred under the title of *Extraordinaries*, and which are not yet made up for the year 1780; for the purpose, therefore, of giving the fairest estimate, I have drawn out the expences upon the establishment for the year 1780, from the parliamentary votes, and have taken, by presumption, the *Extraordinaries* at the same amount that was incurred in the year 1779 under that head. As all Military Expences in war usually run on at encreasing rates, this method of computing the expences of the year 1780 cannot be accused of exaggeration. The total Military Expences will therefore be in the respective years as follows, viz.

	£.
Total MILITARY EXPENCES of the Years	1775— 5,153,000
	1776— 9,474,000
	1777—10,007,000
	1778—13,543,000
	1779—16,165,000
	1780—17,533,000
	£. 71,875,000

I stop this account, for the present view, at the termination of the year 1780, not because there is any hope of seeing the conclusion of the American war without another and another campaign; but merely to draw into one total the Military Expences which have been incurred and wasted by the late Parliament. Still, however, the above-mentioned sum of 71,875,000*l.* will not contain the total of Military Expences incurred to the end of the year 1780; for even if we were to have no farther campaigns, yet the general arrears of the war which would remain to come in within the course of a year or two, would amount to an immense sum, probably not less than eight or ten millions. For the sake of bringing the total financial operations of the late Parliament to round numbers, I shall state this article of general arrears

rears at the sum of 8,125,000*l.* and then the account will stand as follows:

	£.
Military Expences incurred and wasted during the six Sessions of the last Parliament	} 71,875,000
General Arrears supposed outstanding	— — — 8,125,000
	Total £. 80,000,000

This sum of 80,000,000*l.* is only the total hitherto incurred, not that the business is by any means finished; on the contrary, we are a great deal farther from our original objects than when we set out. Those who advised the rejection of the petitions from America have so much to answer for *on account* to their country already. Let so much be observed for the present: But my principal motive in drawing out the account to this precise period, is to bring into close contrast the promises and performances of the Minister and his late Parliament.

In the first Session of the late Parliament, when the object of Administration was to lead the public insensibly into the adoption of the American war, every fallacious pretext was thrown out to represent it as an undertaking of the most trivial amount, in point of expence. We were given to understand that the lowest Peace Establishment was fully equal to the undertaking. A three shilling Land-Tax was voted before Christmas in the first Session, to take off the alarms of the landed Gentlemen. The number of seamen was reduced to a lower establishment than they had been at for the four preceding years; they were reduced, at the beginning of that first Session, to 16,000 men, which is the lowest establishment for profound peace. Nay, still farther, to carry the deception to the extreme point of insult, the public was amused, in that Session, with paying off a million of the national debt, though an additional debt of double that amount was contracted in the very same year.—These were the promises of the Minister and his late Parliament. I have already stated to you their performances. They have wasted fourscore millions of the public money,

money, for which they have repaid to the public less than nothing.

It may, perhaps, be said, that the expence of the war should only be estimated at the difference between the War Establishment and the Peace Establishment; which is undoubtedly true, if we were merely speaking of the additional expence incurred by the war: But the Minister undertook, at the outset, to carry on the war upon the Peace Establishment; and this was at that time a principal ground of argument for the original adoption of the war. His own pretext now argues with double force against himself, when the argument turns upon the general profusion of the public treasure. The Peace Establishment, by his own argument, became applicable for the purposes of the war, and therefore, the whole of this Ministerial war having failed in every part, the total amount is imputable, as wasted by those who advised and who undertook the conduct of the war. However, to make the fullest allowance on this point, I will abate as much as the amount of the Peace Establishment would have been for the term of the six years in question. Would to God they had been years of peace.—The sum to be abated on this head will be 20,226,000 l. which being deducted from the 80,000,000 l. above stated, the amount of the public treasure confessedly wasted, according to the most candid computation, would only be 59,774,000 l. Take it in round numbers 60,000,000 l. wasted in the course of six years by a Minister and his Parliament, who combined together to lead their country into this fatal war, making themselves responsible, at the outset, not only that no additional taxes or expences should be incurred, but likewise that the annual reduction of the National Debt should not be interrupted.

In return for this concession, I think I am now entitled to some allowance on the other side of the argument. We are not yet got to the end of the war, or of the expences entailed upon us: Many and many millions, I fear, stand between this country and that long-wished-for period; and our only consolation is, that we are invited still to repose confidence in the same system of measures,

measures, supported by a new Parliamentary List, vainly hoping, by such means, to extricate this country from all its surrounding evils.

With respect to this first article of the charge, viz. The waste of the Public Treasure, I fear that, before we shall see the end of this fatal American war and of all its consequences, the bill will not amount to less than 100,000,000 l. that is to say one hundred millions given, granted, and wasted to purchase the loss of all those objects which, at the outset of the war, we were solicited, by the unanimous petitions of America, to accept without contest.

Public Money wasted — — — — £. 100,000,000

But is this the whole of the account? I wish it were. But it is very far short of it.—Look at the Proprietors in the Public Funds, and consider the state of their property. Since the commencement of this most ruinous war, there has been a destruction and annihilation of at least forty millions of their capital. The public stocks have been reduced from 88 l. to 60 l. per cent. a fall of near 30 per cent. upon the whole capital of the National Funds, which, upon a total of more than 150 millions, amounts to more than 40 millions annihilated. So much for the lot of taxation distinctly and separately imposed upon the creditors in the Public Funds, over and above their respective share of general taxes upon articles of necessity and of daily consumption. This is no exaggeration, but a very serious and searching truth to those who are involved in this kind of property.

I know, when we talk of millions in the discussion of public arguments, the effect of such arguments, either as warnings or conviction to the public, is partly lost from the magnitude of the object, which goes beyond the reach of private and individual experience. But in this case, the conviction may be brought down to the feeling of each individual. Let the truth be tried by that test. Take the case of any private person having purchased 1000 l. of stock at 88 l. the price paid being 880 l. Suppose this moderate

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rate pittance to have been the intended marriage portion of an Orphan, what would it yield now? About 600l. There is a tax upon the Orphan's property nearly to a third part of the total. Let every Stockholder, in the same manner, take his pen and compute his particular loss, the same fate awaits them all. The remorseless stewards of the public say to each man in his turn, For each 100l. which has been committed to our care, take thy pen and set down 60l. So much for the Stockholder, who can have no chance of recovering any part of his property but by the restoration of peace.

We are now to set down for the destruction
of the capital of the Proprietors in the Pub- } £. 40,000,000
lic Funds, at least

Let us next go to the Landholder, and make an estimate of his separate loss, over and above his proportion of all other common burthens. In the first place, I should not omit to mention the additional shilling in the pound, which has been laid on in consequence of this war, (notwithstanding the fallacious promises of the Minister at the commencement of it) and which will probably remain upon his shoulder from henceforward for ever. But (which is of infinitely greater importance) let us next consider what proportion of the Landed Man's capital property is annihilated and destroyed. The rent of the land itself is fallen, and is still falling every day: The number of years purchase is less by seven years than it was, and the price is still so rapidly declining, that it is difficult to catch any precise point at which to fix it. These are melancholy truths, of which country Gentlemen have but too feeling a conviction.—It has always been a difficult question how to ascertain the National Landed Rental. Different calculations have been made from 20 to near 30 millions per annum, I shall, therefore, take a medium, and suppose, that the Landed Rental, before the war, was about 24,000,000l. per annum. The capital value of this Landed Rental, at thirty years purchase, (which is a moderate computation for the then current price of land) would amount to 720,000,000l. This was the Landed Man's capital. What is it now, after the loss of seven years

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years purchase in the price of his land, viz. from 30 years to 23 years, and the rent itself fallen perhaps to 20,000,000l? According to these premises, 20,000,000l. per annum, at 23 years purchase, will amount to 460,000,000l. the Landed Man's reduced capital now. The difference, being 260,000,000l. is the Landed Man's defalcation; whilst, upon his reduced remainder, an additional shilling in the pound is saddled for ever.

As there must of course be some uncertainty in the specifications of such large masses of property, therefore, to avoid all suspicion of exaggeration, I will strike off the odd 60,000,000l. from this account, and I will only set to account, as the defalcation of the Landed Man's property, 200,000,000l. over and above the additional tax of one shilling in the pound.

But it may be said of this article, as I stated before in respect to the annihilation of millions of funded property, that the magnitude of the object astonishes and confounds the imagination. Then let us likewise, in this case, reduce the scale of this argument, and bring it down to the practical test of feeling conviction. Let the appeal be made to the disconsolate sensations of the Landed Man himself. Is not every private estate of 2 or 3000l. a year, at this present time worth less to the owner by 15,000l. or 20,000l. than it was? The Landed Man is left to lament his hopeless fate in all its variety of aggravations: His lands are fallen, his tenants are in arrears and breaking, his farms are thrown upon his hands, his debts are called in, his mortgages are foreclosed, and his lands are sold. The fallacious delusion of American taxation recoils upon his own head with new-fangled taxes upon taxes, even to the fatal stamp which seals his ruin.

If one of these unfortunate men should by chance repine at his fate, or if, in the keenness of his anguish, he should happen to curse the Minister; the Minister replies, "Have I deceived you? No! you have deceived yourselves in trusting me; you have been too lavish and unsuspecting in your confidence; thus have you deceived yourselves."—The retort is bitter, and the distinction is accurate; but not more so than it is insulting.—So much for the share of

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taxation

taxation and defalcation, which is thus fallen to the lot of the Landed Man. His hour-glass is running out apace; two or three hundred millions-worth of his property destroyed requires no aggravation. Insult added to injury may drive patience itself to madness; but as it is past remedy there let it rest, viz.

Reduction of the capital of the Landed Proprietors, more than } £. 200,000,000

Upon the same line of argument I might proceed to state the loss upon the capital of the Proprietors of House Rents. Supposing a reduction upon all the property of Householders from 7,000,000 l. a year, at 14 years purchase, to 6,000,000 l. at 12 years purchase;

Here is another defalcation upon this class of } £. 26,000,000 men to the loss of

But having given the great line of the argument, I shall not descend farther into the detail. I have only to observe upon this article of the House Rent, that this defalcation likewise is over and above all other taxations. Householders have a feeling proof of this truth from the severe tax which has been recently imposed upon their specific property.—The fundamental maxim of the modern system of finance is, first to destroy, and then to tax.

I will just enumerate the preceding Articles. £.

Waste of Public Treasure — — — —	100,000,000
Offensive war with the House of Bourbon — —	<i>Nothing done!</i>
Destruction of the capital of the Proprietors of the } Public Funds, more than	40,000,000
Destruction of the capital property of the Landed } Man, more than	200,000,000
Destruction of the capital property of House } Rents, about	26,000,000

Summation of these articles of Public Loss £. 366,000,000

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These are but outlines to suggest prudent thoughts. I have not yet said any thing of the Manufactures and Commerce of this country. What proportion of their capitals will be annihilated, or rather what will be left, if the ravages of this destructive war shall be suffered to continue? You may already see whole pyramids of English cloth heaped up in the public halls unfold; a drug upon the market without a purchaser. When the Foreign vent for our Manufactures is stopt, and the domestic price will not yield a living profit, the honest Tradesman can no longer hold up his head; or if he should endeavour to struggle against his fate, then comes a merciless list of taxes to complete his ruin. The working Manufacturer is dragged, as a recruit, into the bloody ranks of war, from his desolated labours, and the deserted loom. He is carried to his grave in that America, which in his, and in his country's better days, gave riches, prosperity, industry, and vigour to all.

Look next at the state of Commerce, not only as generally dependent upon the national marine of force, but more especially upon the supply of mercantile bottoms. Your merchant ships, which used formerly to distribute the manufactures of this country to the North and to the South, to the Eastern and to the Western worlds, are now converted into armed transports, loaded with every instrument of death; guns, and balls, and powder, and swords, and bayonets, and (shame to the British arms) even with tomahawks and scalping-knives. And what remains of the Commerce of a great country, once the mistress of the ocean, is now reduced to take shelter in neutral bottoms, or to pay the disgraceful tax of a tenfold insurance. America was once the source of the British marine. Three ships out of four, upon which the British Commerce, during its prosperity, was navigated, were of American building. There is an annihilation of three ships out of four in the Commercial Capital of this country.

Above all other things the Merchant's grand resource consists in Credit: Without Credit, Commerce would be reduced to simple barter. If the facility of Credit be destroyed, it is not a part annihilated, but the whole. In this situation every private Merchant

chant is now involved. The utmost stretch of private Credit is now drawn off from the service and supply of National Commerce, to gamble with Government in the Stocks, and to supply the sanguinary profusion of a ministerial American war. Every Public Loan that is now made, is a premium set upon the private Merchant's head, for his destruction; not only by cutting off from him the sources of supply, but by establishing in those Loans an usurious rate of interest of 6 or 7 per cent. at which rate, even if the private Merchant could afford to borrow at all, yet the bargain itself and the parties would become obnoxious to the penalties of the laws against usury. The Credit of the private Merchant is in the first place stretched upon the rack, by the enhancement of the rate of interest from 3 to 5 per cent. then comes the Minister, monopolizing the market by his usurious bargains, and gives him the finishing blow, by making it impossible for him to procure a supply upon private Credit at any rate.

If any one should suspect that he spies a flaw in this argument, as knowing, perhaps, of some cases in which private Merchants do procure money upon their private Credit within the legal rate of interest, and below the scale of Ministerial Extravagance; I am sorry to say that I think the testimony of such facts affords but little consolation; they only prove that, in the opinion of some men, the security of private industry is thought preferable to all those lavish offers of a thriftless public profusion, which, in its consequence, inevitably tends to National Bankruptcy and Ruin.

But to enlarge upon all such topics would be an endless task. My only view is to suggest some thoughts of prudence to the Landholder, the Householder, the Stockholder, the Manufacturer, and the Merchant, that they may all unite in one common interest, and join hands together to put an end to all the fatal waste and ravages which are thus committed in consequence of the present destructive system of public measures.

Having thus shewn, in a few striking instances, the destruction and devastation of public property, which have been brought upon

upon us by the Ministers of this fatal war, I shall now proceed to state the List of perpetual Taxes, and their respective computed produce, which have been laid on, in the course of five years, by those very Ministers who led their country into this war, under the false pretences of acquiring revenues, reducing taxes, and discharging debts.

PERPETUAL TAXES.

	1776.	Computed produce per ann.	£.
Stamps on Deeds	— — — — —	— — — — —	30,000
— on News Papers	— — — — —	— — — — —	18,000
— on Cards	— — — — —	— — — — —	6,000
Additional duty on Coaches, &c.	— — — — —	— — — — —	19,000
			<u>73,000</u>
	1777.		
Tax on Servants	— — — — —	— — — — —	105,000
Stamps	— — — — —	— — — — —	45,000
Stamps	— — — — —	— — — — —	10,000
Additional duty on Glafs	— — — — —	— — — — —	45,000
Duty on Sales by Auction	— — — — —	— — — — —	37,000
			<u>242,000</u>
	1778.		
Tax upon House Rents	— — — — —	— — — — —	264,000
Additional duty on Wines	— — — — —	— — — — —	72,000
			<u>336,000</u>
	1779.		
A TAX upon TAXES, viz. An additional sur-charge of 5 per cent. upon the Customs and Excise	— — — — —	— — — — —	314,000
A tax upon Post-Horses	— — — — —	— — — — —	164,000
			<u>478,000</u>
	1780.		
An additional tax upon Malt	— — — — —	— — — — —	310,000
Additional duty on British low Wines	— — — — —	— — — — —	20,617
— on British Spirits	— — — — —	— — — — —	34,557
— on Brandy	— — — — —	— — — — —	35,310
— on Rum	— — — — —	— — — — —	70,958
Second additional duty on Wines	— — — — —	— — — — —	72,000
Additional duty on Coals exported	— — — — —	— — — — —	12,899
Additional 5 per cent. on all the above-laid Taxes	— — — — —	— — — — —	46,193
Additional tax upon Salt	— — — — —	— — — — —	69,000
Additional Stamp Duties	— — — — —	— — — — —	21,000
Duty on Licences to sell Tea, &c.	— — — — —	— — — — —	9,082
			<u>701,616</u>

Computed amount of taxes laid in five years £. 1,830,000

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I know that such representations as these are irksome and ungrateful. Impatience says,—“The money is gone and past recalling, let care and vexation go after it. Let us look forward.”—I say too, “Let us look forward, for we are not yet got half way through the list of taxations.” Another campaign, that is to say, another year's waste of millions (not to be employed against France and Spain) is already announced. Let us be aware, therefore, that the expences of but one more additional campaign, added to the present outstanding debt, will make a total of more than 40 millions, which will require a much longer list of taxes than all the foregoing. The foregoing list, which was computed to produce about 1,800,000 l. per annum, has not been found productive beyond 1,500,000 l. Three hundred thousand pounds, therefore, of that work is still to do over again by some supplemental tortures of taxation; and after this we must find another list of taxes to provide for the interest of 40 millions more at 5 per cent. viz. about 2,000,000 l. more per annum for ever.

Surely the time is come to pause a little, and to consider where we are, and what we are doing. The Minister declared, by his public acts, at the outset of the war, that so far from apprehending fresh debts or taxes, he was superabundantly provided. He suspended the imposition of the 4th shilling Land-Tax, and still boasted that he had a surplus to discharge a million of the National Debt. Who could, at that time, have expected what we have since seen, and what we now feel? Who could have conceived that, by the end of the year 1781, an hundred millions would have been wasted, and an annual rent-charge of taxes required from this country, to the amount of 3,800,000 l. per annum for ever? As yet we are only got so far upon the road of taxation, as in the proportion of 1,500,000 l. to 3,800,000 l. which is considerably less than half way; and this supposing the war to be brought to a termination in one more campaign.

I shall now produce the documents upon which I have undertaken to state the sum of 40 millions, as still requiring to be provided for by future taxations. But to prevent any confusion which may happen in the use of technical terms, I will just explain

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plain what is meant by the term of the Outstanding Debt, as distinguished from the National Debt. The National Debt, properly so called, amounts, at present, to the capital sum of 156,000,000 l. To pay the interest of this debt, specific taxes have been laid from time to time, as the respective loans were made; and this interest, as it becomes due half yearly, is paid at the public offices to the respective proprietors. This is the National Funded Debt. The Outstanding Debt consists of an immense number of promiscuous debts, contracted upon loose and indefinite accounts according to the Minister's discretion, without any parliamentary estimate, and without any specific funds provided for the payment. The custom of voting supplies in Parliament upon estimate becomes a mere fiction, as the Minister no longer thinks of confining himself to that estimate. He runs into an immense arrear of many millions unknown to the public, which are kept secret and out of sight, till the amount becomes too enormous to be concealed any longer. This mass of enormous and unrestrained profusion in Navy Bills, Victualling Bills, Ordnance Bills, &c. &c. &c. constitute what is called the Outstanding Debt; and sooner or later the public must be severely taxed for the payment of it. It amounts at present to many millions.

The point which I am now going to lay before you is this, That the taxes which it will be necessary to lay on for the future provision of the outstanding expences of this war, supposing it to continue only one campaign more, will exceed the list of taxes already imposed during the war. Malt, and Beer, and Wine, and Houses, and Servants, and Salt, and Land, &c. &c. must be taxed again and again, or some other substantial equivalent taxes must be provided.

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The following is an estimate of the Outstanding Debt, and of the expence of one additional campaign.

Navy Debt remaining from 1779	— —	£. 6,857,000
Computed encrease in 1780, being taken at the same rate of encrease as in 1779	}	3,182,000
Army Extras for the year 1780, taken nearly as in 1779	}	2,500,000
Vote of Credit due for 1780	— — —	1,000,000
Ordnance Extras, 1780	— — —	450,000
Exchequer Bills outstanding	— — —	3,400,000
Deficiency of Grants and of several Funds and several Anticipations	}	1,200,000
Computed Expence of another campaign	—	15,000,000
General Arrears at the supposed conclusion of the war	}	8,125,000

Total £. 41,714,000

This is the real state of the matter without aggravation. Taxes and funds must be provided for all these millions, which amount to a greater sum than all the millions which have been funded since the commencement of the American war. Here follows the proof. The amount of the money which has hitherto been funded upon the list of taxes above recited, is only 32,000,000l. viz.

		£.
In	{ 1776 —	2,000,000
	{ 1777 —	5,000,000
	{ 1778 —	6,000,000
	{ 1779 —	7,000,000
	{ 1780 —	12,000,000
Loans funded in five years	— — — —	32,000,000
Remaining henceforward to be provided for, as above	}	41,714,000

I think I am now justified in having said that we have not yet run half through the gauntlet of taxation. However, to set all

all possible cavil at defiance, in the application of this argument, (as unfortunately there is no occasion to strain it) I will even cut off 10,000,000 l. the remainder will then be in round numbers 32,000,000 l. That sum would precisely require a double list of all the preceding taxes of the war, to bring us to the conclusion of one year more, as far as relates to the financial part of the war. Whatever farther annihilations may befall the capital properties of the Landholder, the Stockholder, the Householder, the Manufacturer, and the Merchant, are not included in this or in any of the preceding statements. Let them seriously reflect on these things. The tide of ebb is rapidly running out, and all that they can still call their own, and all their future hopes and fortunes, are bound in shallows and in misery.

I will now give you a specimen of the mode in which the accounts of the expenditure of Public Money are presented to Parliament, passed and voted, especially upon the article of Extraordinaries. The following is a copy of

An account of the distribution of the sum of 1,000,000l. granted to his Majesty to defray any extraordinary expences incurred, or to be incurred, on account of Military Services for the year 1779.

		£.	s.	d.
Dates of Warrants.	To Henry Theophilus Clement, Esq; Deputy Vice-Treasurer of Ireland, to be by him, from time to time, applied for defraying the charges and expences of encampments and other military services in Ireland	50,000	0	0
1779. August 3d.				
February 3d.	To Thomas Harley and Henry Drummond, Esqrs. to be by them applied and invested in the purchasing Spanish and Portugal Coins for the use and service of his Majesty's forces in North-America	74,834	4	4
March 12th.	To ditto for ditto service	11,977	15	7
— 22d.	To ditto for ditto service	49,050	9	2
	To ditto for ditto	200,000	0	0
	To ditto for ditto	30,000	0	0
	To ditto for ditto	20,000	0	0
	To ditto for ditto	31,489	7	3
	To ditto for ditto	62,778	19	9
	E			T.

		£. s. d.					
Dates of Warrants.	To ditto for ditto	—	—	—	4200	0	0
1779.	To ditto for ditto	—	—	—	82,115	16	11
March 22d.	To ditto for ditto	—	—	—	27,264	15	3
	To ditto for ditto	—	—	—	43,383	9	3
	To ditto for ditto	—	—	—	76,002	12	6
	To ditto for ditto	—	—	—	20,000	0	0
	To ditto for ditto	—	—	—	93,550	2	11
	To ditto for ditto	—	—	—	43,483	18	3
	To ditto for ditto	—	—	—	35,748	13	10
	To ditto for ditto, in part of 352,705l. 12s. 7d.	—	—	—	44,119	15	0

War-Office, Feb. 29, 1780, 1,000,000 0 0

C. JENKINSON.

If such an account as this had been produced as a specimen of the method of regulating the Public Expenditure in any foreign nation of the world, I think it would not have been credited. There is no comment in words which can possibly aggravate the absurdity, or the insult to common sense, which appears upon the first sight of this extraordinary document. The first article is a gross and lumping article of 50,000 l. for encampments, &c. in Ireland. It does not pretend to be an explanatory voucher, however it styles itself at least to be an expenditure. But the remaining 950,000 l. pretends to be nothing else but money laid out to purchase money. What then! we do not get forward by that piece of information; for the question again recurs, What is become of the Spanish and Portugal money so purchased by British money? The money still remains unaccounted for. No other account, however, has been laid before Parliament; but upon that very document, without any pretence of explanation whatsoever, they voted the total sum to be paid, in contempt of the petitions of the people of England, who, "*appealing to the justice of Parliament, did most earnestly request, that before any new burthens were laid upon this country, effectual measures might be taken by the House to enquire into, and to correct, the gross abuses in the expenditure of Public Money.*" Is it possible to conceive a grosser abuse in the Public Expenditure? Of what use to the nation

tion is the institution of Parliament, if such sort of accounts are suffered to pass without the least enquiry?

Another account of a similar kind, entitled *Extraordinaries of the Army for the year 1779*, was presented in the last session, in which there was a farther sum of 638,000 l. with no other description or explanation, but merely *To ditto for ditto service.*

In a like manner the Extraordinaries of the Navy are laid before Parliament, in gross unexplained totals. As a specimen, I have extracted two articles out of the state of the Navy Debt presented in the last session, to shew you the undistinguishing manner in which the Naval Expences are presented and discharged in Parliament, viz.

		£.	
Navy Bills	— — — —	3,674,852	
Victualling Bills	— — — —	2,320,216	
		5,995,068	

Here are near six millions in two lines, which Parliament gives and grants to the Minister, without any farther enquiry into the matter.

It is not to be wondered at that so good an intelligence should subsist between the Minister and his Parliament, when it is considered that the Minister, who has the disposal of public contracts, distributes immense proportions of the public expenditure, through the hands of members of Parliament. Can it be expected that such persons should be among the foremost to insist upon the most rigid frugality, or to restrain the squandering of Public Money, or to reduce all Exorbitant Emoluments? Can it reasonably be expected that a Minister, and his Associates in Parliament, should be strenuous to put an end to the war, on account of any national expences, when the one is to enjoy, in proportion to those very expences, the patronage of bestowing 10 or 15 millions a year in beneficial contracts and emoluments; and the others have no consent but their own to consult, for dividing any share that they chuse of the public spoils?

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I have extracted out of the Army Extraordinaries, which were presented in the last session, amounting to about 3,500,000 l. the specific proportion of that sum which passed through the hands of members of Parliament. In the first place it appears by the several names in the accounts, that the contracts for 2,016,000 l. out of that sum stand clear under the titles of members of Parliament, unconnected with any others; and that a farther sum of 370,000 l. consists of mixt contracts jointly to members of Parliament, and other merchants not in Parliament. Upon the whole, three parts in five of all these contracts go through the hands of members of Parliament. From this specimen it is no more than fair reasoning to suppose, that in other branches of the Public Expenditure a similar proportion of the public waste and profusion passes through the same channel.

The amount of this influence, upon a Public Expenditure of 15 or 20 millions a year, is enormous. We see it in its effects every day. What would the nation say to a proposition for settling the moderate sum of 4 or 5 millions a year, to be disposed of by the Minister without account, in gratifications to members of Parliament voting in his train? The effect, as influential on the representative body of the people, would be the same as in the other case, but with this material difference to the advantage of the people at large, that they would save the useless expenditure of many millions which they are now involved in, only to serve as a cover for the Minister's parliamentary patronage. For instance, in the last session a sum of 12,000,000 l. was borrowed on the public account, and the terms of the loan were so constructed as to carry a premium of 5, or 6, or 7 per cent. I think the last loan stood at 7 per cent. which, upon the sum of 12 millions, would amount to above 800,000 l. This is the amount of the Minister's patronage as far as the loan goes. Now would it not be a good bargain for the public, prudently to lay half a million at the Minister's feet, or even to pay the full forfeit of 7 per cent. upon the whole sum, rather than to be put to the additional expence of 12 millions only for a pretext?

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The whole system of public measures is carried on with no other view but to establish parliamentary influence, and to secure a constant majority attached to the Minister for the time being, and detached from the interest of their country. This is no secret, you may see a court list of the late Parliament, consisting of Placemen, Pensioners, and Contractors, sufficient to ruin any nation in the world. It is well known that the property of many rotten boroughs is vested in the Minister for the time being, under the titles of Treasury-Boroughs, Admiralty-Boroughs, &c. &c. while for others, the bargain and sale is made out of his fund of public corruption, which is the Public Purse. Thus Parliament becomes the representative of the Minister, and not of the people. Permit me on this subject to quote to you a passage in that most excellent Address of your worthy representative Sir George Savile, to his Constituents at the late general election. His abilities and public virtue give additional weight to every argument which falls from him.

“ While the Electors sell their voices to the Member, and the Member distresses his fortune to buy them, *Parliament will be the purchase of the Minister.* Parliament-Men will find ways of *partaking other advantages than merely their share in common with you, of those good measures which they shall promote, and of those good laws which they shall enact for your government and their own:* And the modern-improved arts of corruption, by contracts, subscriptions, and jobs, is attended with this perverse and vexatious consequence; that their benefit is not only unconnected with your's, but it grows upon your distress. They *feed on the expence, they fatten on every extravagance that art and ill conduct can engraft on the natural disadvantages of a remote, rash, ill-fated, impolitic, and unsuccessful war.* The Minister's direct interest, (nay his safety) meanwhile, requiring him to push the desperate game, and even in self-defence to increase that very expence which is his crime; to intrench himself still deeper in corruption, and by headlong and unmeasured extravagance to have the means of justifying to the faithful Commons his former mismanagements and misdeeds.—
“ See where this ends, but forget not where it begins.”

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That ministerial influence *has* prevailed in Parliament, and that, by the means of such influence, the nation *has been* fatally deceived and betrayed into this *rash, ill-fated, impolitic, and unsuccessful* war, are truths too notorious to be denied. We have, therefore, reasonable ground to apprehend that similar means may at least be attempted for the purpose of again deceiving the nation, and leading the present Parliament into the adoption of the same fatal system of measures. In such circumstances it is the duty of Constituents to watch over their Representatives with a circumspect and jealous eye. We have lately seen two Parliaments dissolved before the ordinary term of their expiration. In the first instance, viz. in 1774, the motive avowed for that measure was, the introduction of the American war. What has been the motive in the year 1780? The answer is obvious, A renewal of the lease of that war for another term of six or seven years. A war which I can call by no other name than a war of Ministers against the sentiment and real interests of their country.

It is the undoubted right of the people of England, in their own concerns, to think and to speak for themselves, as well as through the intervention of their representatives. This right they will and ought to exert whenever they see reason to suspect, that secret or corrupt means may be used to pervert the counsels of their Parliament to purposes adverse to the public good. This is a constitutional mode of bringing measures to a national test unconnected with any private views, or any possible biases of party. This right they have exerted; let us, therefore, take the voice of the people for our guide. What then is their opinion respecting the American war? The County of York have brought that opinion to a public test, and have met with the support and concurrence of subsequent meetings of other counties, in the following unanimous declaration of their own sentiments on that head.

At

At the GENERAL MEETING of the COUNTY of YORK,
held at YORK the 28th of March, 1780,

“RESOLVED unanimously, That it is the opinion of this meeting, that the prosecution of an offensive war in America, is most evidently a measure which, by employing our great and enormously expensive military operations against the inhabitants of that country, prevents *this* from exerting its united vigorous and firm efforts against the powers of France and Spain, and has no other effect upon America than to continue, and thereby to increase, the enmity which has so long and so fatally subsisted betwixt the arms of both, can be productive of no good whatever; but, by preventing conciliation, threatens the accomplishment of the final ruin of the British Empire.”

Another unanimous resolution, of the same import, was superadded at the General Meeting of the County of CAMBRIDGE, on the 10th of April, 1780, and adopted by subsequent meetings of other counties, viz.

“RESOLVED unanimously, That the thanks of this meeting be given to those Members of both Houses of Parliament, who, foreseeing and forewarning their country of the consequences, have uniformly opposed the coercion of America; and that they be entreated to use their wisdom in accomplishing, and not even yet to despair of effecting, a re-union with that country on beneficial, just, and honorable terms.”

These are the declared sentiments of many counties, containing, in numbers, some millions of our countrymen. And it is undoubtedly the united wish of the whole kingdom to see peace restored with America.

I will now state to you *authentic* evidence of the sentiments of Ministers upon this head. On the 27th of June last, your worthy member, Sir George Savile, made a motion in the House of Commons, (which I had the honor to second) in the very terms of the unanimous resolution of his Constituents.

IT PASSED IN THE NEGATIVE.

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By this contrast you may form a certain judgment of the principles which guide the measures of Administration, and from principles argue to their intended system. The negative given to the first part of your resolution relative to France and Spain, amounts to an explicit declaration, either that the employment of all our powers upon the continent of America, does not prevent the application of those same powers against the House of Bourbon (which is too absurd even to be asserted); or, that Ministry are systematically determined to sacrifice every interest of this country to the House of Bourbon, rather than to relinquish the American war: And by contradicting the latter proposition it asserts in effect, That the continuation of hostilities does not contribute to the encrease of animosity, nor an irreconcilable breach with America tend to the ruin or even the diminution of the British Empire: that it is, therefore, the plan of Ministers to widen the destructive breach, and to render it irreparable, is incontrovertibly the only inference that can be drawn from the sanguinary and venal negative, which has thus been put upon the declared sense of a very large and most respectable portion of the people of England.

We have thus brought the Ministry and their country face to face upon this ground; the one for a just and honorable peace; the other for war at all events. But Ministry contend that they are sincere for peace: What steps have they taken to demonstrate their sincerity? Is the refusal of your proposition of the 28th of March, 1780, when moved in Parliament by your worthy Representative, a proof of their sincerity? Is the refusal of every proposition or bill of conciliation offered in Parliament, by the friends of peace, without offering any others of their own, to be accepted as a proof of their sincerity? Have they offered any specific conditions of accommodation to the Colony of Georgia, which has been in their possession for near two years? Have they drawn out any line of accommodation with South-Carolina since the capture of Charles-Town, or the victory at Camden? Yet such steps as these would be the surest way of inviting the confidence of the Colonies towards this country, while the omission of them, by creating only alienation and distrust, demonstrates to a certainty that their disposition is for war.

Ministers

Ministers are now professedly carrying on the war for unconditional submission: They will not declare either to this country, or to America, upon what terms peace may be practicable. A bill was offered in the last session by General Conway, to invite them to some specification of conditions. That bill was drawn up upon the closest terms of dependence; yet even that was refused, and, by a parliamentary manœuvre, (of moving for the order of the day) not even the title was suffered to appear in the votes. On the same day that Sir George Savile moved the Yorkshire Resolution, I did likewise propose a bill of conciliation, which might have been modified to any terms that Ministry would have consented to. It was offered upon that ground, and still rejected: And to render every thing uncertain to the utmost, the American Minister has frequently declared in his place in Parliament, that the proposed concessions of the commission in the year 1778, are not now to be considered as binding this country to any similar propositions in future. Every thing, therefore, is loose and unconditional.

Ministers profess peace in general terms, but whenever they descend to particulars, their arguments tend only to war. To certain persons, who still retain some old scruples as to the original justice of the war, and who would not consent to the continuance of an *offensive* war, if they were not instructed to believe that America is now become an implacable enemy, and even the aggressor, they affirm that the Americans are a nation malignant and hostile to Great Britain, actively engaged in a confederacy with our enemies, sworn to our destruction, and so powerful in conjunction with France, that if we were not to keep an immense fleet to watch their coasts, and fifty or sixty thousand troops upon the continent to *keep them at bay*, they would seize all our remaining islands in the West-Indies which are not yet taken from us by France. Upon this state of the argument, "the prosecution of an offensive war in America," appears quite in a different light from that in which it appeared to the County of York; for it is now become a *defensive* war on our part for the protection of the British West-Indies.

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But when they are to cast their nets for another set of men, who, having no scruples at all, enquire no farther than simply this,—“Can we beat them?”—To these persons they reply that—America abhors France; most bitterly regrets her alliance, and would do any thing to shake it off. That the people there are destitute of food and raiment; distracted in their counsels; feeble in their efforts; undisciplined in their ranks; exhausted in their resources; harrassed under military oppressions; and groaning under the tyrannous anarchy of Congress; and, what is most to be depended upon in our favor, universally attached to the parent state, and earnestly longing to return to their antient constitutional connexion and dependence.—Strange as it may seem, that such contradictory arguments should be applied to the same point, yet so it is, every man who has sat in Parliament has heard each of them urged, according to the argument of the day, to instigate the relentless fury of war.

Another argument for war is, That we cannot make peace till we have reduced the power of France and Spain. “Then why are not the military operations of this country exerted with united vigor and firm efforts against France and Spain,” instead of supporting “an offensive war in America?” This would be the sense of the people of England. But the Minister will have it otherwise. His plan for reducing the power, and particularly the naval power, of the House of Bourbon, is by a war of millions upon millions upon the continent of America. Such arguments as these may pass current with a ministerial majority in Parliament; but they are insults to a nation.

What are you to think when such arguments are imposed upon you? Every suspicion becomes justifiable. This country may become a sacrifice to France in the event, for a temporary forbearance, whilst our Ministers are wasting the strength, and destroying the resources of their country in an American crusade. *Fears and scruples shake us.* What are we to think? We know for a certain truth, that, during three campaigns, since the commencement of hostilities with France, our Ministers have not directed
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our military force against that antient enemy and rival of our greatness. We have no reason to believe that they mean to exert the force of this country against the House of Bourbon in the next campaign, for which Parliament has already voted immense sums both for land and sea service. It is, therefore, too plain that the honor and interests of this country are to be sacrificed, or at least but slackly supported in competition with the House of Bourbon.

But, perhaps, if Ministers do not speak to France out of the cannon's mouth, they may whisper; and that they have whispered has been asserted upon no mean authority; for it is asserted in a manifesto bearing date July, 1779, from the court of Spain, *that they* (the English Ministry) *were insinuating themselves at the court of France, by means of secret emissaries, and making great offers to her.* Is this the way in which British Ministers assert the honor of their country against the House of Bourbon? They have been forewarned for many years of the insidious designs of France; their Minister at Paris informed them, from time to time, of many specific arts of interference in the American concerns, long before the French declaration in March, 1778. Yet, after more than twelve months of open hostilities, instead of “exerting the united, vigorous, and firm efforts of this country against the House of Bourbon,” they are found prostrate at a French Minister's feet, *insinuating themselves with great offers* to procure forbearance and peace. For three campaigns together they have wasted the force and treasure of these kingdoms in a mad and ruinous war in America, knowing that they have left behind us the whole power of the House of Bourbon, lying in wait, with permissive forbearance, to watch the maturity of our errors, and then to strike the blow.

Whether such Ministers may even now be *insinuating themselves with great offers* at the court of Spain, cannot be known; but thus much is clear at least, that the unaccountable state of inaction, which has hitherto subsisted in that part of the war which concerns Great Britain and the House of Bourbon, carries a deceitful

and treacherous aspect. I fear this temporary calm forebodes some heavy storm behind.

The situation of this country is truly alarming, and more so upon deeper consideration of it. Ministers tell us, and I fear too truly, that it is not possible *now* to make peace with America without the consent of France. But what is their conclusion? That we must pursue an offensive war in America. Yet this is the very cause of the embarrassment: For it is not by virtue of any of the articles of the alliance between France and America, that France can obtain any controul over the acts or views of Great Britain. Give us back the forces and treasure which our Ministers have wasted, and which they are continuing to waste, in a war upon the continent of America, and we need not ask the permission of France in the arrangement of any conditions with America. Then strike at the root; direct "the united, vigorous, and firm efforts of this country against France and Spain." It is vain to prolong our undecided fate; if you can, by force of arms, carry compulsion to the House of Bourbon, we are yet a great people, and the first of nations. The road will then be open once more to any arrangement with America, free from the controul of France, and Britain may be herself again. But Ministers are obstinately and inflexibly bent upon their own madness, and will not exert the united efforts of their country against the inveterate and watchful rivals of its greatness. Yet what do they expect to obtain by cringing and *insinuating themselves with great offers*? Perhaps that which the House of Bourbon would think it a good bargain to concede without any offers at all, viz. An infidious and temporary forbearance, while British Ministers are exhausting the Public Treasure, wasting the blood of their countrymen in vain, and thus preparing to deliver over their country itself, weak and defenceless, to its natural enemies. What compact could the House of Bourbon wish tacitly to establish but this, viz. Forbearance on their part, as the condition of perseverance in the present exhausting system of measures upon ours.

But, perhaps, it may be said, that one successful campaign in America may decide the contest, and extricate us out of all our difficulties.

difficulties.—So far from it, in my opinion, that if such an event could happen, it would only be the commencement of our difficulties. The whole force of this country would then be bound down in America for ever. To maintain the conquest of such a country in reluctant subjection, 3000 miles distant, and 1500 miles in its own extent, would require, I believe I might venture to say, the whole force of Europe; but would certainly exceed the extremest powers of Great Britain. In such a case the House of Bourbon would have completely gained their end; at present they are to conceive it as a possible event at least, that this country may relinquish the American war, and that consideration may suspend their designs; but if they could once see the whole force of Great Britain bound down and fixt to the continent of America, they would then speak out, their inaction would then turn to activity. A new war would emerge upon us even out of our supposed victories; a war active and offensive against us on the part of the House of Bourbon, and perhaps brought home with terror and dismay to our own defenceless gates.

That wise men "have foreseen and forewarned their country of such consequences," take upon recorded attestation; hear then the Protest in the House of Lords, March 5, 1776. "If the flames of war should be kindled in Europe, which we fear is too probable, we reflect with horror upon the condition of this country, under circumstances in which she may be called upon to resist the formidable attack of our powerful enemies, which may require the exertion of our whole force, at a time when the strength and flower of our nation are employed in fruitless expeditions on the other side of the world."

Thus much I state upon the supposed case of a total and absolute conquest of America; and, after all, the argument of conquest is but a dream. But for the sake of argument I will go yet farther, and even put the case of a general surrender and voluntary submission on the part of America, in order to shew you that, in every possible case, the present system of measures is absurd and ruinous, for, on this supposition, the House of Bourbon still remains to be talked with. In short, the great contest of rival power between Great Britain and the House of Bourbon must,

fooner or later, be brought to a decision: That is now the core of the war. The House of Bourbon have been lying in wait for many years to seize the advantage of our folly. By favour of our Ministers they have at length obtained it, and completely hemmed us in. We can neither make war with America, nor peace with America; nor send troops to America, nor withdraw our troops from America, without their consent. Ministers know this; they proclaim it; and, because it affords a pretext for procuring another 20 millions for waste and speculation, they even exult in it; and still, instead of exerting the national force against the allied Crowns of France and Spain, they persist in their plan of reducing the strength of this country by diverting it to other objects; thereby giving every advantage to the comparative force of our enemies.

But supposing this voluntary submission complete on the part of America; Can any one conceive that we can ever again possess the dependence of America without the consent of the House of Bourbon; or can any one think that France and Spain will give their consent without the extremity of war first tried between them and Great Britain? I think no man can be so weak as to flatter himself with either of these expectations. Consider the circumstances. What could be the motives of France for entering into the American Alliance? To separate America from Great Britain. Their whole conduct declares that they considered the independence of America as the ground-work: For immediately after the declaration of independence, they received the American Ministers at Paris, and entered into the negotiation of a treaty of alliance, in which treaty the independence of America was recited as the basis; nay, still farther, the independence of America is publicly avowed in the French Manifesto of March, 1778, to Great Britain herself, and to all the world, as the basis of the connexion between France and America. Therefore the independence of America, was the condition upon which alone France would give them their assistance; that is to say, her own independence was the valuable consideration pledged by America to France as the purchase of that assistance. And the reason is obvious, for the independence of America must necessarily become a matter of deep and serious interest to France, when by the separation

tion the limits of the British Empire are contracted, and by the infringement of our monopoly in the American Trade, a division of the spoils is not only poured into her harbours for the present, but permanently assured to her by commercial treaties, which, for their validity, must altogether depend upon the free agency, and absolute independence of the contracting party; and therefore, in any of the foregoing cases, either of conquering America by arms, or of their voluntary submission, the core of the contest still remains with the House of Bourbon; and the more we exhaust ourselves in a preliminary war with America, the farther we shall be from the final power of maintaining and realizing the objects of our pursuit, even if we could by any means acquire a transitory possession of them in the first instance.

If the dependence of America is at any time to be recovered by force, (a case which I put in compliance with the argument, not as approving or deeming it practicable) there are two parties to be subdued. If we begin with the House of Bourbon, and should succeed against them, we should be so far upon the road; but if we should fail against them, we had better fail in the first instance, than fall into their hands, when exhausted to the last gasp by the continuance of the American war. America would equally be gone in either case; but the consequences to ourselves, as a nation, would be widely different; for if we exhaust ourselves in the preliminary contest with America, and should then fall into the hands of France and Spain, we may become, I know not what, even a province to the House of Bourbon! But if we bring the contest to an issue, in the first place, with the House of Bourbon, while our force remains equal to the trial; even, if we should fail, yet the disparity cannot be so great, but that we should bring our European rivals down with us, without any fear in that case of becoming a province to America.

There are many persons who, not entering into the intricacies of the war, take the question only in the gross, and who think that, in every case of actual war, they cannot do better than to give general support to the Administration. To such persons I recommend that, as a criterion and pledge of fidelity to their country, they shall require of those Ministers whose measures they

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have hitherto supported too indiscriminately, to "direct all the united, vigorous, and firm efforts of Great Britain against her invidious and inveterate enemies the House of Bourbon." I call it a pledge of fidelity from Ministers, because however other persons, who are at a distance from opportunities of accurate observation, may be unapprized of the real state of public danger; yet Ministers themselves must know that it is by their own sufferance that the antient and avowed enemies of this country are collusively permitted to lie in wait for its destruction.

If Ministers will obstinately plunge their country into a preconcerted system of destructive measures of which they are competent to see the fallacy; if all their measures are miscalculated to their pretended objects, and bear no other marks but those of being the creatures of pride, revenge, and speculation; if it then be notorious that they have secreted all means of enquiry and information from the public, and uniformly imposed upon their country by every delusive misrepresentation of the case, I shall leave the conclusion to this applicable maxim of the Law, *Omnia præsumuntur contra spoliatores*. Constructive presumption is unquestionably good against them.

It must be confessed upon the foregoing state of the argument, that if neither the conquest nor the submission of America can be productive of any good, the case seems desperate. What then remains to be done? Can it be still possible, in the present state of the contest, aggravated and embarrassed as it is now become, to look forward to any practicable terms of conciliation with America? That some kind of conciliation must take place at some period or other is most certain, because war cannot be eternal. But for the terms, I fear, we cannot expect them now to be such, as those which have been formerly offered to this country by the unanimous petitions of America, and which Ministers, *in the hour of insolence*, have rejected with disdain. The only rule which we have hitherto seemed to follow, has been to refuse the terms which might have been had at each particular time till it became too late, and then to contemplate the effects of our folly and passion with regret. For what remains, at least, let us be wiser now. We can

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can no longer hope to restore the state of our affairs to the condition in which they were when the unanimous petitions of America were rejected. We should not, however, despair, they may yet admit of some alleviation, if conducted with prudence, moderation, and sincerity.

I have already sufficiently explained that the dependence or independence of America upon this country, remains no longer a question to be settled solely between the original parties to the dispute. France is now become a principal; it was France that first called America forth to independence; it is the House of Bourbon which now asserts and maintains that independence with a strong hand, and America herself, in the cause of her own independence, is now become but a remote and secondary party, as far as the decision of that cause relates to Great Britain. If Ministers tell us that we must fight to the last man, and to the last shilling, to recover that dependence of America which they themselves have thrown away, then why do they not "direct the united, firm, and vigorous efforts of this country against the House of Bourbon?" From their not doing this, the proof becomes conclusive against them, That they are deceiving their country by false pretences, and that *their* war is nothing else but a war of pride, revenge, and speculation, at the peril and cost of their country.

But the pretext of continuing the war to recover the dependence of America, is now, I think, almost worn out, and Ministers have accordingly changed their ground, and tell us that France and America are at present so closely connected together, that we must carry on the war in America until we have effected a separation between them. But is the continuation of an offensive war against America the way to effect this separation? So far from it, that its only possible operation must be to drive the connected parties into a more intimate connection; and perhaps, by urging America for the purpose of present preservation to the necessity of mortgaging to France all her future faculties and resources, to cement a union beyond the power of Great Britain hereafter to dissolve. The fallacy is hardly specious.—If they truly and sincerely fought to

effect a separation, they must necessarily have adopted that fundamental maxim established in the resolution of the County of York; and in the first instance, have "directed all our united, firm, and vigorous efforts against the House of Bourbon."

I believe that the wish to see America released from their engagements with France, and to re-unite that country in friendship and affection with ourselves, is much closer to the heart of the people of Great Britain, than the desire of recovering any reluctant dependence from them hereafter. But can the treaty of alliance, now subsisting between France and America, be superseded in its operation by any steps of relaxation, which could be taken on the part of Great Britain? I think it might, if that stumbling-block of independence could but be removed, or even *tacitly* dispensed with. I will state those articles of the treaty, which seem to me to warrant that opinion: In the first place, If Great Britain should think proper, *formally*, to declare the independence of America, the whole treaty of alliance drops to the ground at once; the essential and direct end of it being accomplished, there is no farther object for the treaty to attach upon, and therefore, as a treaty of alliance, it ceases to exist. This argument is founded upon the 2d article of the treaty, which declares that "The essential and direct end of the present defensive alliance is to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence absolute and unlimited of the said United States, as well in matters of government as of commerce." So much for the first supposed case of the independence of America, *formally* assured by Great Britain.—To the second case, viz. The *tacit* cession of independence, I adduce the 8th article, in which "they mutually engage not to lay down their arms, until the independence of the United States shall have been *formally* or *tacitly* assured by the treaty or treaties which shall terminate the war." When these two articles are compared together, it appears that in either of these cases, viz. of the independence of America *formally assured* or *tacitly assured*, the basis of the treaty is taken away, and therefore, that the treaty itself, upon this contingency, becomes a non-existence; because the treaty in question is not a general treaty

treaty of alliance, but a specific treaty for the accomplishment of one, and only one declared end.

I have hitherto only spoke of the independence of America as patronized by France against Great Britain, upon the general view of hostile and rival politics between them; but in the present case it bears a more specific reference to the treaty of alliance of which we are now speaking. It may appear singular at first sight, that a treaty, *the essential and direct end* of which is declared to be the establishment of American independence, should be entitled a *defensive alliance* between France and America. But the reasoning upon which this title is founded will appear upon a deduction of the case. I have already stated to you that America was dragged into a premature declaration of independence, as a qualification necessary to be complied with, before they could expect to receive such support from a foreign independent power, as might enable them to resist the foreign mercenaries which had been hired by the British Ministry for their destruction. But this point of procuring assistance from France was not to be obtained by a simple declaration of independence only; for when actual support was to be sent to them, they were called upon to deposit some valuable consideration as repayment for that actual support so sent. That valuable consideration was a treaty of open and free commerce with America. Accordingly a treaty of commerce was previously signed between America and France on the same day, but before the treaty of alliance; in consequence of which this concomitant treaty of alliance is expressly declared to be entered into, for the purpose of strengthening and supporting the treaty of commerce. For there was evidently a defect of title on the part of America to enter into a treaty of commerce, unless as maintaining the rank of an independent state; therefore the essential and direct end of the treaty of alliance was to *defend* the treaty of American commerce, by establishing that independence which, alone, could give validity to the contract. And France and America are thus joined together to *defend* the title, upon which the one conceded and the other received the treaty of American commerce, as a subsidiary compensation for the assistance afforded by France to America. But the moment the independence

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dence of America is recognized by the only party having any claim against it, the validity of the treaty of commerce being established, France is paid off for her mercenary support, and under that treaty cannot have any further claim upon America.

Besides, the whole constitution of this treaty of alliance between America and France is *defensive*, special in its matter, and solely directed in the construction of its parts, towards the accomplishment of one essential and direct end, and to no other. Therefore I am astonished how it can possibly be conceived to carry, in the least degree, the appearance of being a general and perpetual alliance.

As to the subordinate articles of this or any other treaty, they are always to be considered as being merely instrumental in their operations, and finally referable to the fundamental object of the treaty. All the subordinate provisions, such as *making common cause*, or *not concluding truce or peace without mutual consent*, &c. which are of course component parts of every treaty of alliance, are to be taken as dependent upon the essential and declared end of the alliance, being merely instrumental means to accomplish that end, and having no originality in themselves, they drop of course, upon the effectual accomplishment of that end towards which they were only intended to serve as the efficient and instrumental means. Upon the whole matter I do conceive, that upon the *formal* or *tacit* admission of the independence of America by Great Britain, the contracting parties on both sides become free, and that the alliance itself is, *ipso facto*, dissolved.

I am aware that this concession may appear to establish an alienation of the American trade to France. I grant that it recognizes the infringement of our former monopoly, but do not, for that reason, conceive that we enter into a losing bargain. America, if conquered by the sword, will scarcely be an acquisition; her wasted territories will be but ill able to send money for the manufactures of Great Britain. The mode of govern-

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ment, which tyranny, nay perhaps policy herself, upon such a state of circumstances, must establish, for the purpose of controuling the reluctant remnant of her vanquished inhabitants, will continue the depopulation, and is but ill calculated to foster the second infancy of American commerce. What then do we alienate by lenient concessions? A portion of that trade, the whole of which we must otherwise annihilate, while we still reserve a portion to ourselves; for, if America encrease, as on terms of tranquillity and independence she naturally must do, she has not yet, by her treaty with France, precluded a treaty of commerce with Great Britain; and a moiety of her custom, in the day of her uncontrouled prosperity, may possibly, nay must necessarily, exceed in profit the utmost that Great Britain has ever heretofore received upon the whole.

The independence of America, and the treaty of alliance with France, are now become the great objects of the public attention and anxiety: They must speedily be brought to a national decision.—The summary state of the whole matter is simply this, If it should be determined to pursue the dependence of America by force of arms, it must be done by beginning with the House of Bourbon. If, on the other hand, it could be thought proper to relax upon the point of dependence, the treaty of alliance between America and France becomes, *ipso facto*, dissolved.

Perhaps the simple concession of independence to America, as an act of generosity and free grace, at the period of their approaching maturity, and flowing from ourselves, might not have met with much reluctance in a wise, a liberal, and a magnanimous people; it might, at least, have rescued the honor of this country in the present fatal contest. But our Ministers have cut off this retreat from us, and that concession, which might have been an act of choice, their conduct has rendered an act of compulsion. There are many people who now say: "If it were only to America, we would readily concede an amicable independence to the descendants of British blood, and to the heirs of British freedom; but to France we cannot make concessions—there is the rub."—The answer is,—“Conciliate with America, and direct the

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“united efforts of this country against France and Spain.” That is the voice of the people of England; but Ministers will not hearken to that voice, they will neither act with vigour nor open their hearts to conciliation.

If the public sentiment and wish of this country could but once prevail so far as to procure a change of system, from the sanguinary hostilities of an offensive war, to conciliatory measures with America, we should, in the pursuit of that conciliation, meet with some incidental advantages from the conduct of France towards America. If the court of France have taken some advantage of our folly, they have likewise, on their part, given us every favorable opportunity of retaliating upon them, and of recovering our own false steps, if we are so disposed to do; for it is evident, that their original interference in the dispute between Great Britain and America did not proceed from any principles of generosity or affection towards America, but from various selfish considerations of their own national interests and ambition. The establishment of civil liberty in America could not be an interesting object to the arbitrary court of France: But under the mask of magnanimity and pretended zeal for America, to urge on the contest, and just to feed the hopes of the weaker party, from time to time, with languid and undecisive support, so as to keep that contest alive, until both parties should have mutually exhausted each other, was a plan calculated to gratify every view of pride, of resentment, of jealousy, and of ambition. This is the plan which they have uniformly and steadily pursued. The whole system of their conduct towards America, during three years of their actual interference in the war, has evinced it. In every stage they have most evidently seemed to prolong the continuance of the war, even in its most oppressive shape to America, and, as if in concert with the Ministers of Great Britain, have made the continent of America the seat of war. If, therefore, America is to judge of motives from the uniformity of actions, (than which there cannot be a fairer test) the conduct of France cannot appear in any other light to them, than as proceeding from motives of resentment towards the ancient rivals of the House of Bourbon, in Europe; and, perhaps,

haps, of jealousy towards the rising power of their future rivals in America. This was not the way to conciliate the affections of America to France, neither can it be supposed to have produced any such effect. There never have been any natural ties of affection between them, for as the alliance, on the part of France, proceeded only from considerations of politic prudence, so on the part of America it was merely the effect of reluctant necessity, to which they were driven by the sanguinary and vindictive measures of a British Administration.

These are the principles upon which the alliance between America and France was at first entered into by the respective parties, and the whole progress of it, in all its operations, has been conformable to its original foundation. America and France have very well understood each other on that head. It has been a temporary coalition of independent views and interests between parties mutually jealous of each other; nor, either according to the letter of the treaty, or to the spirit of the alliance, does it extend to any points beyond the precise and limited objects of that occasional coalition. Whatever incidental obligations America may have incurred to France, they are undoubtedly of a limited nature; and as such, they may be satisfied and discharged whenever Great Britain shall hold out an affectionate and conciliatory hand to America. The only way, therefore, to defeat the effect of the French alliance with America, and “to accomplish a re-union with that country upon just, honorable, and beneficial terms,” is to proceed henceforward with sincerity and conciliatory measures towards America, and no longer to permit a sanguinary administration to continue in the farther pursuit of their revengeful purposes. Moderation and forbearance are the harbingers of peace, but conciliation never comes by the sword.

It is impossible to enforce the generous sentiments of humanity and peace in terms more expressive, or more adapted to the case, than by the repetition of your own words, which carry the highest authority, as coming from you, and having been adopted by the general voice of the people of England; with these words,

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therefore, I shall sum up this argument of peace, and conclude the whole of this address to you, viz. "That the prosecution of
 "an offensive war in America can have no other effect upon
 "America herself, than to continue, and thereby to encrease,
 "the enmity which has so long and so fatally subsisted betwixt
 "the arms of both, and that it can be productive of no good
 "whatever, but, by preventing conciliation, threatens the accom-
 "plishment of the ruin of the British Empire."

I hope you will excuse the liberty that I have taken in addressing to you the foregoing thoughts on public affairs. It has proceeded from the highest respect which I entertain for you, and my fullest conviction of the wisdom of those sentiments which have received the sanction of your authority. I consider it as the duty of every private man, in times of public danger, to take his turn in standing to the watch. Having now no longer any public Parliamentary employment, I am solicitous to acquire some additional weight to the services of a private individual by the protection of your name. I presume no farther than argumentatively to state a few important facts, in order to support and to enforce your sentiments; but the ultimate adoption and influence of those sentiments upon the public counsels and conduct, must be derived from your own importance and authority. It has been declared in Parliament, April 6, 1780, "That it is the
 "duty of this House (*viz. as being the representatives of the*
 "*people*) to provide, as far as may be, an immediate and ef-
 "fectual redress of the abuses complained of in the petitions pre-
 "sented to this house from the different counties, cities, and
 "boroughs of this kingdom." By this formal and parliamentary recognition of your rights you know them; it is, therefore, to your own disinterested vigilance that you must finally look for safety. You have already stated your complaints of such public abuses as require redress. If, after the recognition of your rights to that redress, it should still be withheld, you have the authority of parliament itself to declare such a dereliction of duty to be a breach of public trust. To prevent public affairs from coming to such extremities, some effectual and fundamental provisions should be made, by stopping the torrent of public corruption, to maintain
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and to secure the fidelity of the representative body to their constituents. It remains with the public wisdom to search for such securities as shall be adequate to the accomplishment of these objects. This great work is already begun by an associated band of virtuous men who can have no other interest but the public good, and every honest man will lend his heart and his hand to it.

But, believe me, the greatest of all evils *now*, and that which requires instant remedy, is the American war: A war which has had its rise in pride, and now derives its nourishment from corruption: A war which, from contracts, perquisites, and exorbitant emoluments, may, perhaps, find advocates both in parliament and out of it; but which, I trust, will receive every constitutional opposition from the justice and disinterested wisdom of the county of York and other associated counties. If some stop be not put to the American war, according to the unanimous resolution of the county of York, all your views of public reformation will come too late; you will, alas! have no country to save. The American war is not only in its immediate operations destructive, but it is the grand source from which administration has supplied those torrents of corruption which have long deluged the land: But this is not the whole, the very existence of your country is at the hazard; and unless a speedy effect follow your benevolent and patriot determinations, you will have deliberated in vain.

It could hardly be conceived that any aggravations of what has already been stated upon this subject, were yet remaining; but even now, while I am yet writing, I hear the denunciation of other wars; and the declaration of hostilities against Holland, in the British Manifesto of December 20, 1780, bears tenfold testimony to the truth of every present calamity, and the probability of every future calamity, that I have stated in the foregoing pages of this Address: Nay, I dread that it may prove an omen of farther evils; for Holland alone stands not in the adverse predicament stated in the Manifesto. She formed but an individual member of an alliance entered into by every maritime power in Europe.—The inference is obvious.

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We have not a single ally in the whole world, and every man's hand is lifted up against us. If you have a sincere and effectual wish to serve your country; if you feel for your own personal safety; or if you have any regard to your posterity, exert yourselves to avert those long-foreboded evils which are now encroaching upon us with hasty and tremendous strides. A little cloud arose in the West, at the first no bigger than a man's hand, it has already cast its gloom over the horizon of our glory, it is now spreading over our heads with darkness and dismay, and is preparing to shed a torrent over us, which will overwhelm our name and nation.

Hear the voice of wisdom and justice, O People of England! Lay your Hands with self-conviction upon your hearts! Will you say that Ministers, through prerogative, have effected *this* measure; or that Parliament, through corruption, have carried *another*? No! you have been yourselves the efficient agents. You have connived, you have suffered the base and malignant instruments of pride and revenge to stalk abroad in pursuit of their tyrannous and sanguinary purposes, without resistance and without controul. They have purchased your acquiescence by a proffered participation of the intended spoils of America, and rendered you the instruments of enforcing every fatal measure. To step forth now to vindicate your country and the rights of mankind, is, therefore, become your more incumbent duty. Sad would it be indeed, if a day of wisdom should be accounted a day of national humiliation. Then strive no more against the dictates of wisdom, of justice, and of humanity!

“ A greater power than we can contradict
 “ Hath thwarted our intents !”

York, Jan. 3, 1781.



A P P E N D I X.

N^o I.

VOTES of the HOUSE of COMMONS.

Martis die 27 Junii, 1780.

A motion was made, and the question being put, That leave be given to bring in a bill to invest the Crown with sufficient powers to treat, consult, and finally to agree upon the means of restoring peace with the Provinces of North-America.

C O P Y

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B I L L.

To invest the Crown with sufficient Powers to treat, consult, and finally to agree upon the Means of restoring Peace with the Provinces of North America.

WHEREAS many unfortunate subjects of contest, have of late years subsisted between *Great Britain*, and the several Provinces of *North America*, herein after recited, viz. *New Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-Island, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, the Three lower Counties on Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia*, which have brought on the calamities of war between *Great Britain* and the aforesaid Provinces: To the end therefore that the farther effusion of blood may be prevented, and that peace may be restored, may it please your Majesty, that it be enacted, and be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That it shall and may be lawful for his Majesty, by letters patent, under the Great Seal of *Great Britain*, to authorise and empower any person or persons, to treat, consult, and finally to agree with any person or persons, properly authorised on the part of the aforesaid Provinces of *North America*, upon the means of restoring peace between *Great Britain* and the aforesaid Provinces, according to the powers in this act contained.

And be it further enacted, That in order to facilitate the good purposes of this act, his Majesty may lawfully enable any such person or persons, so appointed by his Majesty's letters patent, as aforesaid, to order and proclaim a Cessation of Hostilities,
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on the part of his Majesty's forces by sea and land, for any time, and under any conditions or restrictions.

And be it further enacted, That in order to lay a good foundation for a cordial reconciliation and lasting peace, between *Great Britain* and the aforesaid Provinces of *North America*, by restoring an amicable intercourse between the same, as soon as possible, his Majesty may lawfully enable any such person or persons, so appointed by his Majesty's letters patent, as aforesaid, to enter into, and to ratify from time to time, any *Article* or *Articles* of *Intercourse* and *Pacification*, which *Article* or *Articles*, so entered into and ratified from time to time, shall remain in full force and effect for the certain term of ten years, from the passing of this act.

Provided also, and be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, That in order to remove any obstructions which may arise to the full and effectual execution of any *Article* or *Articles* of *Intercourse* and *Pacification*, as before-mentioned: That it shall and may be lawful for his Majesty, by any instrument under his sign manual, countersigned by one or more of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, to authorize and empower any such person or persons, so appointed by his Majesty's Letters Patent as aforesaid, to suspend for the term of ten years, from the passing of this act, the operation and effect of any act or acts of parliament, which are now in force, respecting the aforesaid Provinces of *North America*, or any clause or clauses, proviso or provisos, in any such act or acts of parliament contained; in as much as they, or any of them, may obstruct the full effect and execution of any such *Article* or *Articles* of *Intercourse* and *Pacification*, which may be entered into and ratified as before-mentioned, between *Great Britain* and the aforesaid Provinces of *North America*.

And be it further enacted, That in order to establish perpetual reconciliation and peace, between *Great Britain* and the aforesaid Provinces of *North America*, it is hereby required, and be it enacted, That all or any *Article* or *Articles* of *Intercourse* and *Pacification*, which shall be entered into, and ratified, for the certain term of ten years as before-mentioned, shall, from time to time, be laid before the two houses of parliament for their consideration, as the perpetual basis of reconciliation and peace between *Great Britain* and the aforesaid Provinces of *North America*; and that any such *Article* or *Articles* of *Intercourse* and *Pacification* as before-mentioned, when the same shall have been confirmed in parliament, shall remain in full force and effect for ever.

And be it further enacted, That this act shall continue in force until _____

IT PASSED IN THE NEGATIVE.

C O P Y

Of the TREATY of ALLIANCE, *Eventual and Defensive*, between his Most Christian Majesty LOUIS the Sixteenth, King of France and Navarre, and the Thirteen United States of America, concluded at Paris, Feb. 6, 1778.

THE Most Christian King, and the United States of North-America, to wit, New-Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-Island, Connecticut, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, having this day concluded a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, for the reciprocal advantage of their subjects and citizens, have thought it necessary to take into consideration the means of strengthening those engagements, and rendering them useful to the safety and tranquillity of the two Parties; particularly in case Great Britain, in resentment of that connection, and of the good correspondence which is the object of the said treaty, should break the peace with France, either by direct hostilities, or by hindering her commerce and navigation, in a manner contrary to the rights of nations, and the peace subsisting between the two crowns—And his Majesty and the said United States having resolved in that case to join their councils and efforts against the enterprizes of their common enemy.

The respective plenipotentiaries, impowered to concert the clauses and conditions proper to fulfil the said intentions, have, after the most mature deliberation, concluded and determined on the following articles:

ART. I. If war should break out between France and Great Britain during the continuance of the present war between the United States and England, his Majesty and the said United States shall make it a common cause, and aid each other mutually with their good offices, their councils, and their forces, according to the exigency of conjunctures, as becomes good and faithful allies.

II. The essential and direct end of the present defensive alliance is, to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, of the said United States, as well in matters of government as of commerce.

III. The two contracting parties shall each on its own part, and in the manner it may judge most proper, make all the efforts in its power against their common enemy, in order to attain the end proposed.

IV. The contracting parties agree, that in case either of them should form any particular enterprize in which the concurrence of the other may be desired, the party whose concurrence is desired shall readily, and with good faith, join to act in concert for that purpose, as far as circumstances and its own particular situation will permit; and in that case they shall regulate, by a particular convention, the quantity and kind of succour to be furnished, and the time and manner of its being brought into action, as well as the advantages which are to be its compensation.

V. If the United States should think fit to attempt the reduction of the British power remaining in the Northern parts of America, or the islands of Bermudas, those countries or islands, in case of success, shall be confederated with, or dependent upon, the said United States.

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VI. The Most Christian King renounces for ever the possession of the islands of Bermudas, as well as of any part of the continent of North America, which, before the treaty of Paris in 1763, or in virtue of that treaty, were acknowledged to belong to the Crown of Great Britain, or to the United States, heretofore called British Colonies, or which are at this time, or have lately been, under the power of the King and Crown of Great Britain.

VII. If his Most Christian Majesty shall think proper to attack any of the islands situated in the Gulf of Mexico, or near that Gulf, which are, at present, under the power of Great Britain, all the said isles, in case of success, shall appertain to the Crown of France.

VIII. Neither of the two parties shall conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain, without the formal consent of the other first obtained; and they mutually engage not to lay down their arms, until the independence of the United States shall have been formally or tacitly assured by the treaty or treaties that shall terminate the war.

IX. The contracting parties declare that, being resolved to fulfil, each on its own part, the clauses and conditions of the present treaty of alliance, according to its own power and circumstances, there shall be no after-claims of compensation, on one side or the other, whatever may be the event of the war.

X. The Most Christian King and the United States agree, to invite or admit other powers, who may have received injuries from England, to make a common cause with them, and to accede to the present alliance, under such conditions as shall be freely agreed to, and settled between all the parties.

XI. The two parties guarantee mutually from the present time, and for ever, against all other powers, to wit—The United States to his Most Christian Majesty the present possessions of the crown of France in America, as well as those which it may acquire by the future treaty of peace; and his Most Christian Majesty guarantees, on his part to the United States, their liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as commerce, and also their possessions, and the additions or conquests that their confederation may obtain during the War, from any of the Dominions, now or heretofore possessed by Great Britain in North-America, conformable to the fifth and sixth articles above-written, the whole as their possessions shall be fixed and assured to the said States at the moment of the cessation of their present war with England.

XII. In order to fix more precisely the sense and application of the preceeding article, the contracting parties declare, that, in case of a rupture between France and England, the reciprocal guarantee declared in the said article shall have its full force and effect the moment such war shall break out; and if such rupture shall not take place, the mutual obligations of the said guarantees shall not commence until the moment of the cessation of the present war between the United States and England shall have ascertained their possessions.

XIII. The present treaty shall be ratified on both sides, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the space of six months, or sooner if possible. In faith whereof, &c.

F I N I S.