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ADDRESS

TO THE

LANDOWNERS

OF THE

UNITED EMPIRE,

BY

C. C. WESTERN, Esq. M. P.

SECOND EDITION,

WITH

A SUPPLEMENTARY LETTER.

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ADDRESS, &c.

GENTLEMEN,

A thorough conviction of rapidly approaching ruin to all those who are dependent upon Agriculture, and a no less confident belief, that its further advance *might* be materially checked, if not altogether averted, lead me irresistibly to address you. Many persons who have not the means of knowing the real situation of the country, will think I exaggerate, when I say, that a great number of the Tenantry of the kingdom have already fallen a sacrifice; that multitudes are now on the verge of bankruptcy, struggling in their last efforts to save themselves and their families from absolute penury; that it is not merely that *they* will be ruined, that we must follow them, and our Lands, in many cases, pass into other hands; but that the soil will go to the new possessors reduced, impoverished, and comparatively waste and unproductive; and the present *Farming Capital* of the country, already most *cruelly* sunk, will be absolutely and entirely extinguished. Strong as these

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expressions are, and incredulous as I admit some persons may be of such a statement, facts nevertheless, will bear me out.

I say, indeed, we *may* yet avert this full measure of calamity; but we cannot do so if we remain in that state of torpid inactivity to which we have been so long addicted; our Tenantry have done more to save us, than we have done for ourselves. They have borne the brunt of the storm, they have been far more exposed to it than we yet have been, they have struggled manfully, and we have hitherto remained passive, with our hands before us, or reluctantly followed where they have led—thus reversing the more natural, and formerly the more usual order of things; we have much too long and too patiently seen the distress advancing upon us, from the year 1814 to the present moment; we have gone on hoping for better times, doubting the extent of pressure upon the Tenantry, or looking to better prospects annually held out to us, and as constantly fallacious. But the time is now come, when those hopes must change into despair, those doubts can no longer exist, and our expectations, we must acknowledge, have been completely disappointed.

My belief in the possibility of our extricating ourselves and the country from this perilous situation, arises from my conviction of our *immediate* and *overwhelming* difficulties having arisen from *recent measures* of the Legislature, which might be repealed, or materially altered, and a different policy pursued; and that the landed interest, if properly and fully exerted, has sufficient influence to accomplish this change of policy in the Government of the Country.

The *primary* source of our difficulties must, indeed, in a great measure, be traced to causes comparatively remote, viz. to the war, to the immense expenditure of that period, and more especially to the consequent stoppage of the Bank, in 1797, the vast accumulation of debt, and our enormous establishments; but all these we might have survived, such is the invincible spirit of the people of this country, such their energy, vigour, and industry, such the resources of the country in all ways, that we might not only have survived these difficulties, but now have been in a state of national prosperity, in which all classes of the community would necessarily have shared. In ascribing to the war and the conduct of it, the primary source of all our difficulties, I am far from desirous to invoke any discussion upon the policy or necessity of the measures pursued at that time; I was decidedly opposed to them, and have never seen any reason to reflect upon my own conduct in having so done, with any other feelings than those of satisfaction. At the same time I am quite ready to admit, that those who gave their full support to the Ministers at that period, may have been actua-

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ted by motives as purely patriotic as those I assume to myself, and give them in perfect good humour, full permission to ascribe to Ministers all our glory, and all we retain that is valuable in life. My sole object in this address is to establish in your minds the conviction I have brought my own to, of our present ability to mitigate, if not remove, the dreadful pressure under which we are fast sinking; not, indeed to repair the wrongs that have been suffered, or to revive those who have fallen victims, which is impossible, but I think, we might prevent further sacrifices, and rise again into a state of prosperity; I not only see no natural reason to cause our extreme distress and prevent our future prosperity, but I see great reason to calculate upon relief being within our probable achievement. There is in the country the greatest production of every thing that is valuable and useful to man; such supplies of the necessaries of life, that it is even said, there is a *redundance*, and that redundance, which, in all former times, would have been considered a blessing, is now, by some persons, said to be the cause of your misery. But to return to my argument, I say, that there is a profusion of every thing that is useful to man; that the industry, energy, skill, and enterprize that call forth those productions are unabated; that there remains a capital sufficient to keep them in full activity; that the state of Europe and the World open

to us new prospects, and new markets, the beneficial effects of which, are at this moment felt, and they counteract and retard our declension.

What is it then, that prevents peace from bringing with it all its attendant blessings? What is it, that prevents Agriculture, carried to unprecedented perfection, from yielding its happy fruits, and instead thereof gives to the Farmer the cup of bitter perdition? What is it, that prevents the Labourer from enjoying the rewards of his own industry—independence and a command of the plenty that surrounds him, and makes him a burthen instead of a treasure to his employer? What is it, that presses down all the industrious classes of the community, the little Tradesmen, the Mechanics of every description, who are sinking as fast as the Farmers? When such melancholy effects are attributable to *no natural existing causes*, nay, when we have a right to contemplate effects diametrically opposite, we are necessarily compelled to look out for some *artificial* cause, some fatally mistaken direction of the political machine, which can have produced these calamitous results. It is almost impossible to suppose any *one* measure that could bring us into such a state of distress; we should rather be inclined to think, we had pursued systematically a wrong policy for a number of years, the bitter fruits of which, we were now tasting. I certainly attribute much of our present distress, to the primary causes just mentioned,

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and consequent grievous and oppressive weight of taxation. I also think some degree of it is owing to the perverse determination of modern statesmen to give encouragement to the Agriculture of Foreign countries in preference to our own; but there is *one* measure, that is, in truth, the *millstone* under the *immediate* weight of which we are sinking. Ministers are not to blame for it, except in the degree of ignorance of the extent of its effects with which they adopted it; but for their excuse they were hurried forward by their opponents, and by the plausible theories of Economists. On the other hand, they had the advantage of some better and more sound advice from many good common-sense practical friends, but there was too much conceit to listen to them. The young Statesman, who was the introducer, though certainly not the author of the measure I allude to, might as well, for instance, have attended to the more sage counsel of his father, who most anxiously raised his warning voice to Ministers at the time, and deprecated the step they were taking.

It may appear singular to *some* persons that I should ascribe to the Act of 1819, by which the resumption of cash payments was decreed, the *blow* by which we have been so *severely* stricken: many there are however, who *long* have been so convinced, *none* deny our having sustained a *degree* of injury from it, and none that would be surprised at or doubt it, if they

took a little pains to investigate the case. It will be admitted of course that on the *supposition* of the *extreme* low price of all the products of Agriculture, being *wholly* attributable to that Act of Parliament, that to *it* our calamities are *now* owing; I do not mean to say that abundance of British and Foreign Growth, has not materially influenced the price, it must of course ever do so; but I do assert that the latter might have been kept away, and that benefit instead of misery would have followed from abundance of the former, and that the joint supply of British and Foreign will by no means account for the *extreme* low price of *all* commodities, the produce of land, industry, and labour, as well as labour itself, which has been occasioned by that Act entirely, and that unless it is repealed or by some means essentially altered, the country will ere long undergo some calamitous and fatal shock, from which it will not be easy to recover.

I contend that a *sudden revolution* in the whole property of the community has been made by that Act, that a positive transfer, a taking away of property from *one class* of men to give to *another* has been done by it, to such an extent as to accomplish in very many cases, the *utter ruin* of the party from whom the property is taken; that the industrious classes of all descriptions constitute the injured party; and that so much of their property has been by that

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Act, *suddenly, unjustly,* made over to the public creditors, the Government and private creditors of all descriptions, that these industrious classes are becoming bankrupts as fast as possible. It is not that the industrious Farmer alone, is injured, WITH WHOM WE SUFFER AS DEPENDING ULTIMATELY AND ENTIRELY ON HIS PROSPERITY; but all the industrious classes have equally been robbed, and have *almost equally* suffered.

It may immediately be said by any body who has not considered the question, that it is impossible such an unjust transaction could have been thought of, or effected, if it had been, by that Act. That it was neither maliciously or fraudulently intended, I not only admit, but also that the framers of it were governed by *a desire to do justice* in circumstances of difficulty; I only charge them with having made a *most unfortunately erroneous* and *unjust decree* between the parties, and which is likely in its consequences to be as *generally* fatal as it has been *partially* so already. Public and private creditors and all the Offices and Establishments of the Government, are at present paid and benefited in the proportion the industrious classes lose, but it should be considered, *that as all* are *paid out of the industry of the country,* if that industry continues to be absolutely overborne, as it is at present, *they* must *eventually* suffer as much as those who are the more immediate victims.

The question, *how* this has been effected, remains to be answered; I have considered the subject again and again with every disposition to check a first impression or hasty conclusion, and can form no other opinion than that which appears to me indeed very obvious—that the *alteration* of the *money* of the country by the resumption of cash payments as provided for by that Act, has effected all the injustice and misery we complain of. Nobody can doubt that injustice, robbery, and ruin *may* be accomplished to any extent by an alteration of the value of the money of the country; as for instance, if the Legislature should enact that twenty sovereigns made of silver should be taken and pass as legal money, in lieu of twenty golden sovereigns, and consequently that all debts contracted in golden sovereigns or pounds sterling in gold, might be paid in as many silver sovereigns, all *creditors* would be ruined of course; reverse the case, suppose the Legislature decreed that debts contracted in sovereigns made of silver should be paid in golden sovereigns, and in as many of the latter as were borrowed of the former, then the *debtors* would be ruined. A Farmer borrowing a thousand silver sovereigns to pay his labourers, and compelled to repay a thousand golden sovereigns, would be exactly in that predicament: this is an extreme case no doubt, merely to elucidate the *possible* effects of a change in the currency, and the

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fact itself I will now state. A Farmer ten years ago, occupying a hundred and fifty acres of land, borrowed a thousand pounds of his neighbour who had just received this money from his factor on the sale of *forty* loads of wheat, he was yesterday obliged to pay it, and for that purpose under the necessity of selling *eighty* loads of wheat. This is, I say, principally, if *not* entirely, brought about by altering the *money* of the country; the Act of 1819 has compelled him to pay in *gold*, or *paper convertible* into *gold*, all his debts and engagements which he contracted in *paper* not *convertible* into *gold*, and the difference of value between the one and the other, has produced these consequences. It is the same thing therefore exactly as being compelled to pay *sovereigns* for *shillings* borrowed, though not to the *same extent* of injustice, that is to say, the Farmer is obliged to pay *twice* as much only as he borrowed, instead of *twenty* times, which he would be, if he was called upon to pay golden sovereigns for silver; but the *doubling* of all his debts and demands, especially if any considerable portion of his capital is borrowed, is quite sufficient to work out his complete destruction; nor can any reduction of rent, &c. save him under such circumstances.

The reason this operation is not clearly and universally understood, is, that we have been in the constant habit of shutting our eyes to that which is nevertheless

as clear as the sun, namely that *money* or any thing that passes as money may be scarce or plentiful, dear or cheap, according to circumstances, as well as any other commodity; gold, for instance, may become scarce, and therefore dear, by a failure of the mines to produce it: corn may be scarce and therefore dear from a failure of the harvest: the mines are more regular in their supply than the harvests, it is true, and therefore we have never thought about gold being dearer or cheaper at one time than another, but when *paper* became the money of the country, I should have thought it would have soon been evident to every body, that the *quantity* might then be liable to *vary*, and therefore to be dearer or cheaper at the pleasure of the Government and the Bank, who had the exclusive power of making it; that is to say of making a paper money which was to all intents the lawful money of the kingdom. Country Bank notes passed also as money, but nobody was *obliged* to take them as such; whereas every body was virtually *obliged* to take Bank of England notes.—The total inattention to this variation of the *quantity* and consequent *value* of *money*, as well as corn, leads to incalculable mischief, in as much as it creates an entire misunderstanding of our real situation, and the causes of our distress: if *money* is very *abundant*, a *little* corn will of course purchase or exchange for a comparatively *large* sum of money. It is then said, corn is dear, whereas it is only that

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money is cheap. If money is scarce, either from the issue of paper being checked, or the mines unproductive, it will require a much *larger* quantity of corn to purchase the *same* quantity of *money*, and then *corn* will be called *cheap*, though in fact it is only that *money* is *dear*. I will suppose a case by no means improbable, which from want of a due understanding of this matter, shall not only lead to an *erroneous* conclusion, but to one diametrically opposite to the truth, let us suppose that when there is an ordinary supply of money and of corn, the exchange or purchase price shall be a quarter of corn for 80 shillings, now if the supply of money was reduced one *half*, and the harvests failed one *fourth* of its produce, the exchange price of a quarter of corn would be *sixty* shillings *only*, instead of eighty, and of course be called so much *cheaper*, when at the same time every man must of necessity be reduced to three parts out of four of the loaf he enjoyed the year before: this is a proposition, that appears to me, as *clear* and undeniable as that two and two make four. If *money* continue in the *same* quantity, and *corn* become *dear*, it is then a proof that it is also scarce. The supply of *money* may certainly *vary* as well as that of *corn*, and if increased must render corn apparently dear when it is not so in reality, it has indeed varied more than corn a great deal; it was the abundance of paper money that made corn apparently dear, and the want of it that now

makes it apparently so cheap, and that has caused all the variations of the last 30 years, I do not say FLUCTUATIONS, I am not putting aside the consequences of *defective* and *abundant harvests*, no, nor war and peace consequences; but the *permanent variations*, if I may so express myself, of the last thirty years, in the price of corn, are, I say, attributable to the *alteration* of the *value* of *money*, just as much as the price of corn now and other products of a farm, compared to what they were three centuries ago, is owing to the altered value of money.

To make out this position, I of course calculate upon *averages* of years; I begin with an *average* of *ten* years, ending in 1793, upon which I find that a quarter of corn would exchange for 45s.—that upon an *average* of *ten* years, ending in 1803, it would exchange for 72s.—and upon an *average* of *ten* years, ending in 1813, it would exchange for 91s.; then from that time to the present, there have been *fluctuations:* but upon the whole, the corn has exchanged for, or produced less and less money, till at length it will *hardly* exchange for more money than it would in 1793. I am aware, I say, of *incidental* causes operating powerfully, to produce fluctuations, at different times, and to which I shall advert presently; but the *chief* cause has been the *alterations* in the *value* of *money*.—Now let us see what has passed in all this time. In 1792, prior to the war, our total

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amount of the national debt redeemed and unredeemed, was, speaking in round numbers, *two hundred and thirty millions*, and the total of taxes levied upon the country annually, about *seventeen millions*. The *war* began in that year, and was carried on at a rate of expenditure beyond all former example; money was sent out of the country to subsidize Foreign Powers; the Bank was heavily drawn upon; the Directors remonstrated in vain to Mr. Pitt; and were obliged to stop payment; the shield of the Legislature was interposed, and the Act was passed in the year 1797, called the Bank Restriction Act, that was to restrain them from paying their notes in gold; and *then* began the PAPER MONEY. It soon multiplied in *quantity* prodigiously, and became proportionably cheaper, till in 1813, a quarter of corn would purchase 91s. in this paper money. No man in his senses can suppose that corn was *twice as scarce* on the *ten years average* ending in 1813, as in the ten ending 1793; it was the money, paper money, that was twice as plentiful as the gold.—At length in 1814, it was thought desirable to change back from *paper* money to *gold;* it was talked of continually, various times were fixed upon, and the Bank began and continued to make preparations for this event, by reducing the *quantity* of their paper money, seeing that the *Restriction* Act would be eventually repealed, and that they would again be liable to change their notes into gold or

demand: accordingly this *paper* money being so reduced in *quantity*, became *dearer*, and in 1814, a quarter of corn would exchange for and obtain only 74s. of it, instead of 91s. and in 1815, only 64s.—in 1816, there was an increased issue of paper money, and also a wet harvest; *money* therefore being again somewhat more *plentiful*, and *corn* more *scarce*, a quarter of corn would upon the average of the years 1816-17-18, exchange for 84s. of paper money. In 1819, the long expected measure took place, under certain regulations; the effect instantly followed; the *quantity* of *money* was reduced, became scarce, and a quarter of corn would only exchange in that year for 72s. In 1820, for 66s.—in May, 1821, for 51s. 8d.—at the present time for about the same money, and probably in May, 1822, we shall have got back to 45s. the price of 1793.—I know that in the last two or three years, corn has been plentiful, that the Legislature upon a most mistaken policy, encourages *Foreign* Agriculture and depresses our own, and that consequently the *low* price of corn may be *partly* attributable thereto. But I say, that the *excessive* low price is evidently from these changes, *owing* to the return to gold, instead of paper, and that if we do *ultimately* and *fully* re-establish the gold money, or currency, as it is termed, upon the standard of 1793, there is no reason to prevent the price of *corn* from

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settling itself down to what it was at that period. But what has happened, I repeat, in these thirty years? We have incurred a debt of a thousand millions, contracted in *cheap* and *abundant paper*, which we are called upon to pay in *sterling* and *dear gold;* that we have sixty millions annually to pay in taxes, for the interest of this debt, and charges of all kinds; that all the extensive transactions of private life have for a quarter of a century been carried on in the paper currency, and that this sudden recurrence will cause, as it is in truth now causing, a revolution in the state of property in the country, falling wholly upon Landholders and the *industrious classes,* and *debtors;* transferring in many cases, all their property to the public creditors, the Government, and the private creditors. It is a rapidly progressive state of national Bankruptcy of the industrious classes, of the Farmers, at least, I assert positively it is, and Tradesmen depending upon them. The manufacturing towns are kept up by Foreign demand, and such a country as this cannot be wholly ruined but by degrees. The revenue is, it is said, flourishing, and the public funds high, so they may be for a time, because they take *first* and as *much* as they did before this distress; but this state of things cannot remain. We have the means to do ourselves and our Tenantry and Tradesmen justice, and pre-

vent the ruin of the country, if we do but exert that proper constitutional influence, which we certainly never have yet exerted, but which we as certainly do possess, we shall accomplish it; let us lay aside all considerations of temporary party, of partialities and prejudices for particular men, and particular opinions, and for once unite for *our* preservation: I am ready for one to subdue mine as much as possible, and I am free to confess that as far as the *Currency and British Agriculture protection questions* go, I think the Ministers are more likely to attend to us, than those who are in *my* opinion, in other respects, their more able and enlightened opponents. I am satisfied the political machine cannot go on under present circumstances, I have said so repeatedly; I stated the same opinions in the Agricultural Committee of last year; I admitted that it might be very agreeable to the prejudices of the country to accomplish by such a change of the currency, a *money* price of corn at the rate of 1793, and which they choose to call a *natural* price, that it might do very well, if they would bring down the *unnatural* amount of the public debt and taxes in the same proportion. The term natural, I think an absurd one, for the prices of three centuries ago, might as well be called *natural* prices, but if they are brought down to what they were thirty years ago, the *debts* and *taxes* would absorb the

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whole revenue of the country, agricultural certainly, if not commercial also.—If we are to have the *money* of 1792, we must have the *debt* and *taxes* only of the same period. I will not say that the general wealth and ability of the country to bear taxes is not considerably increased since that period; but if we are to have the *money* of *that* time, we *must* cut down the *taxes, very nearly* to *that* extent.

In fact the experiment of a recurrence to *cash* payments, at the old standard, has *already been fully tried,* at the expense of multitudes who have fallen a sacrifice. To press it further, would be an excess of cruelty and injustice, such as the Legislature has never yet inflicted on any class of the people. I do not question the motive which induced the trial, though I think it was plain enough that the mighty fabric of debt, taxes &c. which had grown up during the *paper money* system, could not exist but under *its* continuance. We went on very well up to the year 1814, when the experiment began. If it is to be tried further, it can only be done, by cutting away the taxes to a greater extent than has yet been proposed, and at the same time taking especial care to prevent the grand staple products of British Agriculture from being extinguished by the growth of Foreign countries. *I* should like to try it upon *these terms,* rather than alter the standard of our currency or

resume the paper, if *it* could be made to appear at all *practicable;* but I have a thorough conviction that the resumption of the Cash Payment Act *must* be altered, that it is unavoidable, and a standard value taken somewhere near to that of the currency in which our vast debts were contracted. I know that such a measure would be only defensible, as the alternative in a case of such difficulty, as the laws cannot, contemplate. Can we suffer, I should say, the *industry* of the country *out* of which *all* are to be paid, and on which *all* depends, to be utterly overthrown? Will that class of the community submit to the annihilation of their property without a struggle? Will not public and private creditors, will not the public establishments, however they may thrive for the moment, must they not eventually and inevitably sink with our Tenantry and with us?

To avoid this impending national ruin, the Landed Interest with whom it has began, and amongst whose Tenantry such ravages have been made, must exert its just and legitimate influence; it is in their power to cause such measures to be adopted as shall rescue the country from its present unexampled and most deplorable situation. An immediate reduction of taxes to the *amount* of *ten* or *twelve millions,* a *steady determined* system of permanent protection to *every product* of Agriculture of the United Empire, a revision

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of the Gold Currency Act of 1819; I should urge this latter measure, in the *first* instance, as *I* think it would remove the principal cause of the extreme pressure of the moment, and that it MUST be ULTIMATELY unavoidable. I know it will be said, how can the Government do without the taxes, if you take away ten or twelve millions? my answer is, leave that to the Ministers; it is enough for us to know that we cannot do *with* them, and they will find the means, and the powers of the country will rise upon it immediately, aye and the revenue become more flourishing upon increased consumption. Let us only instruct our Representatives to move for the repeal of the most oppressive to *that extent*, and we shall soon have a cutting down of establishments, and a system of real and effectual economy: and in truth this is the only way to bring about economy—the *real old constitutional* method. The Ministers in the end will be *obliged* to you for *compelling* them to work out their country's salvation. The too great facility of raising money, and the alacrity, I was going to say eagerness, with which our Representatives vote away our money, and the complacency with which the people submit to it, have been our bane, and will be our complete destruction if it is not put a stop to. It is little more than two years, since additional Taxes, to the amount of three millions annually were imposed upon us. The

Table of the House was at that time, crowded with Petitions of the Farmers complaining of their distress, and instead of relief, 9s. per quarter Malt Duty was added, together with taxes upon British Spirits and other commodities of prime necessity used by our labourers; this would not have happened but for the known passive character of the Landed Interest, which is made the scape goat upon all occasions. We have submitted so long, they have so tried us to the quick, that I do hope we shall open our eyes ere it is too late. The prospect of our sinking Tenantry, and what is in human nature still more operative, that of *our own* certain consequent ruin therefrom, must surely urge us to exertion; time and circumstances will admit neither of longer delay or timid puny measures.

It is not my wish to charge all the blame upon the present Ministers, I do not think it would be justice so to do; they are only following up a system which the people encouraged: the necessity of abandoning which, they might certainly have sooner discovered. But it is not any reduction of Taxes, that can, in MY opinion, ALONE accomplish our relief, and enable us to pay the full amount of interest of the National Debt, the *money price* of the products of industry and labour continuing at their present rate or proportion. The gross payments of the Taxes last year, ending Jan.

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the 5th, 1821, amounted to £63,828,420, the actual repayments, and allowances, and drawbacks may reduce this total two or three millions. But I do really wish to know, whether any person can sincerely think, looking at the items of expenditure, and in contemplation of the utmost possible saving, that under a reduction of the *money* amount of *Rents* and *Receipts* of Agricultural Capital, *Industry*, and *Labour*, a similar reduction of the *money* receipts of Commercial and Manufacturing Capital, Industry, and Labour, (for such has or must take place,) such a burthen can be borne? This is a question I wish to put to Ministers, to opposition Statesmen, and political Economists.

It is undoubtedly true, that the public prejudice is in favour of *low* money prices, though, I think, indeed, they begin to see their error: they are just beginning to discover, that *Landlord*, *Farmer*, and *Labourer*, must each pay his share of the sixty millions of annual Taxes; that if the Landlord gets only 15s. per acre instead of 30s.—if the Farmer exchanges his quarter of Wheat into 45s. only instead of 90s. and the Labourer has only 9s. per week instead of 18s. that the difficulty of making good each his respective payment, is increased in the ratio of their diminished receipts, and, in truth, is beyond their power to sustain. Suppose out of the Labourer's earnings,

1s. only is set down for taxes, beer, leather, salt, soap, &c.; there is a vast deal of difference in taking 1s. out of 9s. and 1s. of 18s.—the one can be borne without material suffering, the other cannot. Thus is the Labourer injured as much as any body by money being again rendered so scarce, with such an accumulated weight of Taxes to pay. I believe 1s. may be hardly enough to put down for amount of the Taxes above-named; but allow them to be only one shilling, it is evident how much benefited, instead of injured, the man is, whose sole property is his labour, by having the more abundant and cheaper currency, than that which is scarce and dear. It is morally impossible he can purchase by his labour as much of the scarce article as he can of the plentiful. Suppose the total amount of money circulating in the country ten years ago, was one hundred millions, and that now there are only fifty, he can only purchase with his labour half as much as he could before—the Farmer can only have half as much for his corn—the Landlord for his rent, and yet they must all pay the SAME TAXES. This is, in truth, the exact state of the case at this moment, only that *rent*, *tythes*, and *labour*, have not actually, in all cases, come down ONE HALF—the *Farmer's receipts* HAVE; a painful struggle is going on between all these parties; and we may add in like manner with Tradesmen, Bakers, Butchers, Carpenters, Bricklayers, all

the industrious classes have been thrown together in conflict, each finding he could only receive half as much as he did before; it is impossible they should, there being only half as much in the country. I do not believe it is any exaggeration to say, that considering Country Bank Paper as well as Bank of England and other paper *securities* which formed the money of the country ten years ago, that there is only *half* as *much* now, as there was then; and yet we are to pay out of it the same amount of Taxes. As well might a warrant of possession be given to the Receivers of these Taxes, to enter in and upon our lands, tenements, &c. and put us out. Nothing short of this indeed has been done, I believe, by that famous Act, though it will take some time to carry it into full execution. The Sheriff's Officer is going on as fast as he can, beginning with the Farmers, amongst whom he is making rapid progress. The case is too serious to admit of any but the most painful reflection. I repeat that I do NOT exaggerate MY view of it, and I have not adopted that view *hastily*, and I think to exaggerate difficulties is wrong; on the other hand, is it not wrong to shut our eyes to an overwhelming evil, which if taken in time MIGHT have been averted, which even now may be mitigated, and *ruin* prevented? if some relief is not applied, and that speedily, a struggle between the Tax *payers*

and *receivers* is inevitable. The chief receiver is the public creditor. *Does any man believe that a struggle will not take place with* HIM *before we finally give up all we possess?* Shall *we not cling to our impoverished acres as long as we can?* And will *it not be such a struggle as shall nearly be fatal to both?*

In 1793, the public creditors received for the interest of the debt £8,319,995, in good money nearly twice as valuable, I say, as the paper money of 1797, because it would measure against twice as much corn as that paper money measured against for 10 years, ending in 1812; for I contend that corn taken upon an average of years, is a better proof of the depreciation of the currency, than any other, more especially accompanied as it was by a similar change in the *money* value of *other* commodities. The Legislature then decreed, that the owners of the £8,000,000 annual interest ought to be paid in the currency of 1793, that they could not be separated from the other creditors, and that therefore we should pay ALL other CREDITORS, likewise ALL other establishments of the country, &c. in the *old* currency of 1793, the contracts and payments made in the *new paper* currency of 1797; £8,000,000, is of course little more than an eighth of £62,000,000; seven-eighths, therefore have NO SUCH claim, and yet to do justice to one-eighth, the other seven are to take money out of our pockets, that to which

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they have no right or title whatever, and which is to so *immense* an *amount*, as to change the whole condition of property through the country, to *disjoint* as it were the whole *machinery* of property derived from every various source.

It is admitted by Ministers and other Statesmen, that the recurrence to Cash Payments by the Act of 1819, as it is sometimes called, or other metallic currency, gold, &c. will occasion a *severe* pressure upon the *Landed* Interest, and upon the *industrious* classes. It was so considered by the Agricultural Committee, of which I was a member.* I think I may say there was a pretty general admission, that in consequence of the alteration of the *money* of the country by that Act, that upon the supposition of the average price of corn having been at 80s. per quarter, it would by virtue thereof, settle down to 64s.; I mean *under circumstances* of an *average supply:* for I desire to *guard myself* especially *from any* possible charge of being so absurd as to suppose the quantity, or scarcity, or quality of money, has caused the FLUCTUATIONS in the price of corn. A scarcity from defective harvests or reduced cultivation, in spite of every thing we know will make corn dear; (and by the bye we are going the right way to induce such scarcity,) but I say on the supposition of an average supply, it was thought

* Vide—the Agricultural Report and Debates in Parliament, &c.

that the alteration of the currency alone would occasion a reduction of the money value of corn from 80s. to 64s. Upon that admission or supposition, though I do not believe it to be correct, thinking the fall will be very *much* greater, I framed a sketch of a Report for that Committee, which I printed and handed to the different members of it, and in which I have, I think, shown distinctly what the effect would be upon their statements, and which I shall here subjoin; the progressive amount of the Debt and Taxes will therein be seen, as well as the alterations in the value of money, *or*, advancing money price of corn. They advanced indeed in a different ratio of speed, the Taxes *quadrupling*, whilst the money price of corn was *doubling;* but so long as they proceeded together, the machine worked tolerably well; indeed there was certainly a *great* increase of solid, *not* fictitious wealth, created in that time; but the moment the increase in the money price of corn and Taxes ceased their conjoint motion, and actually went different ways, as they did in 1814; the distress began, and the difficulty if not impossibility of the parts of the machinery holding together became apparent: in spite of all our increased wealth and ability to pay Taxes, the most sanguine calculation of their amount, if realized, will not make us capable of sustaining the burthen.

In that sketch of a Report, I also have adverted to

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the subject of protection to British Agriculture against Foreign competition; of the necessity of which, in a most effectual manner, I am daily *more* and *more* convinced. My opinion is founded on *political practical* grounds; it may not be defensible upon the abstract theories of free trade. There are persons who are pressing their theories to a most dangerous extent. Their plan is to throw our poor lands out of cultivation altogether, to turn the Cultivators into Manufacturers of cotton and woollen goods, hardware, &c. send these to Foreign countries, and bring back corn from more productive soils. They *say* indeed that they wish to accomplish this by degrees. Now I never can bring my understanding to a comprehension of the wisdom of such a proceeding, nor can I do otherwise than contemplate the most fatal consequences from our becoming thus dependent upon Foreign countries, for a considerable portion of the food of the people with no other security for its arrival, than their desire to have our woollen and cotton goods, pots, and pans, &c. &c.; and with the strong temptations which hostile feelings might create, to exercise the power which they would then possess of effecting at any one moment our utter perdition. Are we really to trust ourselves to the good sense and good nature of Russia and the Northern Powers, France, and America, under all

possible circumstances of future hostility and our present jealousy? Are we to shut our eyes to the jealous feelings respecting our Manufactures, and the effects they are all making to encourage their own. I know it is said that our Manufactures will find their way in spite of all impediment, but it does not follow that their corn would find their way here in spite of all impediment. It is a bulky article of which the export would be impossible under a strict order of prohibition, the prejudices of their people enlisted in favour of such a measure, as making it in the first instance cheaper to them: and though they might feel the loss of the money it brought, this sacrifice would be ten-fold the cheapest and surest way of subduing us. Imagine what our apprehensions as to the annual arrival or not of the fleet of corn vessels would be, the freight of which, was to feed one third of our population; the speculations that would be formed therein, fluctuations of price, &c.

I will press the subject no farther. I wish to see our Manufactures carried to the utmost possible extent of our ability, to establish them upon the Agriculture of the country, but to extend them upon the plan of the Economists, would in my opinion be fatal to us in any point of view in which it can be contemplated.

Reverting again to the currency question, I repeat my conviction that nothing can afford effectual relief

to the country unaccompanied by a *more* ABUNDANT currency. The Resumption Act of 1819, might be justly termed an Act to DOUBLE the amount of the National Debt, Civil List, Salaries of all the Officers of Government, Sinecures, Pensions, &c. &c.—such is the effect to all intents and purposes. The Opposition Party, with some individual exceptions, certainly drove the Government into this measure; themselves ignorant as the Ministers were of the consequences, and forgetting that the resumption of the old standard of currency at the end of twenty-five years, and five, with the enormous accumulation of debt of the longer period, and the extensive credit dealings of this country was as different a proceeding as possible—the one being practicable perhaps, the other ruin. Thirty millions of Taxes taken off, would hardly *now* compensate the difference; as the *more abundant currency* is that alone which can effectuate a *general retrenchment*, and relieve the industrious classes as well as the Farmer, from their situation of *unmerited* and *unparalleled* distress.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient servant,

CHARLES C. WESTERN.

REPORT, &c.

THAT the allegations contained in the Petitions referred to this Committee, complaining of the excessive *distress* under which the Agricultural classes and others dependent upon them are at present suffering, *have been fully established* by the evidence that has been adduced.

That such distress arises from the *diminished money value* of the produce of their capital and industry, *unaccompanied by any adequate reduction of the burthens* with which they are charged.

That in contemplating these circumstances, the Committee have necessarily been led into a review of the great and important events, which have occurred in the last thirty years, and have remarked the *great alterations* that have taken place in the *price of grain*, the advanced *rent* of land that has accompanied this change, also the *greatly increased amount of the national burthens of all kinds* comprehending as well the Interest of the National Debt as the general Establishments of the country.

That it appears by the Gazette Returns of the prices of Grain, that the *average* price of Wheat of the *ten* years, ending in 1793, was 45s. per quarter.

Total gross receipt of Taxes, exclusive of Loans of the year 1793,	£17,674,395 0 0
Out of which was paid for Interest on the permanent Debt of the United Kingdom, &c. &c.	£8,176,336 0 0

Average price of Wheat of the ten years ending in 1803, 72s. per quarter.

Gross receipt of Taxes, 1803,	£39,584,827	19	6
Interest, &c. 1803,	20,428,488	0	0

Average price of Wheat of the ten years ending in 1813, 91s. per quarter.

Gross receipt of Taxes, 1813,	£81,644,212	5	2½
Interest, &c. 1813,	39,815,846	6	11¾

That the average price of Wheat since the year 1813 has *fluctuated*, but upon the whole materially fallen, whilst the Interest of the Debt and amount of the Taxes progressively increased till the termination of the war, and the Interest of the Debt even since that time.

Average price of Wheat of 1814, 74s. per quarter.

Gross receipt of Taxes, 1814,	£83,436,764	18	8½
Interest, &c. 1814,	40,776,530	12	0½

Average price of Wheat of 1815, 64s. per quarter.

Gross receipt of Taxes, 1815,	£87,722,037	0	2¾
Interest, &c. 1815	41,015,527	10	0¼

Average price of Wheat of 1816, 75s. per quarter.

Gross receipt of Taxes, 1816,	£75,376,885	9	9
Interest, &c. 1816	45,044,889	9	6

Average price of Wheat of 1817, 94s. per quarter.

Gross receipt of Taxes, 1817,	£64,107,097	4	6¾
Interest, &c. 1817,	44,108,233	8	7½

Average price of Wheat of 1818, 84s. per quarter.

Gross receipt of Taxes, 1818,	£77,095,679	12	7¾
Interest, &c. 1818,	44,648,738	18	10¼

Average price of Wheat of 1819, 72s. 5d. per quarter.

Gross receipt of Taxes, 1819,	£64,130,524	12	5¼
Interest, &c. ending Jan. 5, 1820,	46,467,999	17	10

Average price of Wheat of 1820, 66s. 3d. per quarter.

Gross receipt of Taxes, 1820,	£61,872,588	0	9
Interest, &c. ending Jan. 5, 1821,	47,247,991	0	0

The price of Wheat has, with very little variation, continued to decline in the course of the present year, and the average of the week ending May 12, was 51s. 8d.

Note—If the Sinking Fund is wholly withdrawn from its application, or the attempts to raise it abandoned, the annual charge upon the country will be of course proportionably lightened.—*Vide the Finance Account of the year ending Jan.* 1821, *in the Appendix.*

That upon this review of the *advancing price* of Agricultural produce and the *concurrent progressive advance* of our *national burthens*, the Committee could not do otherwise than turn their mind to a consideration of the situation of the country during that period. It appears indeed, that notwithstanding the *arduous* struggle in which the nation was involved, that up to the year 1813, the Agriculture of the United Empire made more rapid strides than at any former period of our history, improved in practice, and extended and increased its produce, that the vast number of Inclosure Bills, the formation of canals, roads, drainage, &c. and in general the whole appearance of the country indicated unequivocal marks of growing internal prosperity, and though the money price of Corn so much increased, the improvements introduced in the science and practice of Agriculture, by the introduction of greater skill and larger capital, must have had an influence in *counteracting* such *advance* of price by *increasing* the *produce*, and at the same time *reducing* the costs of production.

That in the year 1804, a temporary distress was felt by the sudden depression of the price of Grain, arising out of its then extended produce and an abundant harvest. The admission of Foreign Corn at the rate of the Act of 1791, was, under those circumstances, felt to be injurious to the Agriculture of the Empire, and a further advance of the import price of

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Foreign Wheat was accordingly enacted: the *import* price for Irish Corn was *not* then advanced, which in effect left it *free*; and in 1806 the *entire* freedom of the trade between Great Britain and Ireland was *finally settled.*

That from the year 1813, the Agricultural classes, up to the present time, excepting the years 1817 and 1818, have suffered under the effect of *declining* prices and *undiminished burthens,* and in 1814 began to communicate their complaints to Parliament, which, with the exception of those two years, they have continued to press upon the attention of the Legislature.

That the Committee are fully impressed with the effect of *such diminished* means of supplying such *undiminished* charges, so long as the same shall respectively continue their present disproportion; they trust and believe, that some of the causes producing such effects are in their nature only temporary, and others may be mitigated, and some perhaps removed altogether; that the energy of the country remains in all its former vigour, and the means of prosperity yet unimpaired, *if* the industry of the people and the influence of its capital are *not overpowered* in this moment of *unexampled* difficulty, by *too severe* and *insupportable* a pressure.

That in order to exemplify the pressure arising out of the present reduced value of Agricultural produce, and to show the necessity of some measure of temporary if not of permanent relief, the following calculation has been made of the value of the produce of a Farm, taking a mean reduction of value between the highest and lowest extreme, and supposing an *average* price of Wheat of 80s. per quarter, reduced to 64s. per quarter.

Land productive of Corn to the extent understated, will

produce when Wheat is at 80s. per quarter, and other Grain in proportion, the following amount in *money*, viz.

Three quarters of Wheat at 80s.	£12	0	0
Four and a half ditto of Barley at 40s.	9	0	0
Three and a half ditto of Peas and Beans at 40s. or Clover	7	0	0
Fallow nothing			
	£28	0	0

Turnips and Tares take no credit, but supposed only to cover accidental deficiencies.

The four course Husbandry.

This total of the four years gives therefore £7 per acre per annum.

Rent	£1	10	0
Labour, inclusive of harvest and beer	1	12	0
Rates	0	4	0
Tythes	0	8	0
Tradesmen's Bills	0	4	0
Interest of Capital	0	8	0
Assessed Taxes	0	3	0
Seed	0	18	0
Horse-keep, &c.	0	12	0
Residue to Farmers, and to cover buildings, wear and tear, &c.	1	1	0
	£7	0	0

That hence it appears, that should the price of Wheat be reduced from 80s. to 64s. that is to say one-fifth, and other Grain in proportion, the total reduction would be equal to the amount of the entire rent, all but two shillings, £1 8s. being exactly the fifth of £7.

That such reduction would not eventually fall upon either Landlord or Tenant, though one or the other might bear it at

first, according as the land is, or is not under lease, it is pretty certain that ere long a proportionate reduction would be made from other sources, which in another point of view may be termed costs, or charges, on production, viz. The money wages of the labourers in husbandry, the artificer of the implements of husbandry, such as blacksmith, wheelwright, collar-maker; the bricklayer, carpenter for buildings necessary to the occupation of land, of the furniture of houses, clothing, in short all articles, the produce of industry, which Landlord and Tenant consume; the money profits of the Farmer for his stock and labour, also tythes, taxes, and poor rates. Tythes may be considered as rent. Taxes, the revenue of the state and public creditor. Poor rates, according to their denomination, payments to the poor.

That the produce of the land, or the money for which it sells, is in fact divided between the above parties; and if each is diminished proportionably in the ratio between 80 and 64, no injury would necessarily result therefrom; but if *one* of the parties admits of *no reduction*, the others must be singly or collectively aggrieved, as it shall fall upon one or all of them.

That under either of the above stated cases, the *money* income of some or of all of the above parties, *which is the money income of the country* arising from its capital and industry, will be diminished in the ratio of difference between 80 and 64.

That on the supposition that the money income of the country is 200,000,000, when Wheat is at 80s. and other produce in the same ratio, it necessarily follows that the money income of the country will only be 160,000,000, when the price of Wheat is 64s.

And *no reduction* in the amount of *taxes* having taken place,

viz. the share of the state and public creditor, the other parties sustain at present a proportionate injury; and the reduced income of 160,000,000 is compelled to sustain the same burthen which before was borne by 200,000,000.

That this reduction of the *money* value of Agricultural produce is the result of a combination of causes in themselves wholly unconnected, but operating the same effect. The progressively contracted amount and increased value of the currency since 1813 appears to have *been the chief* cause, as the extended amount and depreciated value of the currency *advanced* the price of all Agricultural produce *subsequent* to the year 1797, when the Bank Restriction Act was passed, and *prior* to the year 1813. That the operation of this cause is further evinced by the *concurrent advance* and *fall* in all *other products* of industry and capital during the same periods, and may be fairly supposed from the influence of the extensive concerns of this country with all parts of the world, to have had some effect upon the depreciated money value of the chief products of Agriculture and general industry, which, according to the evidence, has also taken place in other nations of the Continent.

That the weight of the National Debt and burthens is *increased* to the extent of the *superior* value of the currency created by the Act of 1819, *compared* to the *value* of the currency *in which such debt was contracted and burthens imposed*, and on the supposition that the total annual sum now drawn from the resources of the country, is 60,000,000 of pounds sterling, and the *increased* value of the currency to the extent of twenty per cent. it follows that an *annual increased* burthen of twelve millions is effectively made thereby. All private debts charged upon the capital and industry of the country, acquire a similar increased pressure; and though the Act of 1819 was framed in that spirit of good faith which so

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eminently distinguishes this country, it may be fairly questioned whether *much greater* injustice has not been done to the *public* by compelling the payment of the *vast* amount of the National Debt, and private debts, which, in a country where credit is carried to such an extent, must be incalculable, in a currency of *so much higher* value than that in which they were contracted. It is true, the *gradual* declension of the value of the currency subsequent to 1797 and prior to 1813, was productive of injury to all annuitants and creditors, but the *sudden* resumption of the standard of value of a period so distant is obviously *more destructive* in its consequences to individuals, and operating *exclusively* upon *capital actively* employed, and upon the *industry* of the people, creates a strong apprehension of highly injurious consequences to the welfare and prosperity of the country, and therefore the Committee are of opinion, that the Act of 1819, providing for the resumption of Cash Payments, demands the *immediate consideration* and *revision* of Parliament. It appears that *some mitigation* of the effect and operation of that Act is necessary, and that the *aggregate amount* of *taxation* must be brought *nearer* to the level of the *reduced* powers of the country to sustain it.

The other causes affecting the value of Agricultural produce are, in the first place, the greatly extended and improved cultivation of every part of the United Empire, particularly Ireland; the vast importation of Foreign Corn in 1817 and 1818, probably a good deal exceeding the actual deficiency, and which being followed by two abundant harvests in 1819 and 1820, created a supply beyond the demand.

Secondly, The apprehension of a similar importation of Foreign Corn under similar circumstances; that is to say, the moment it makes the import price, which, under our present burthens, is barely equal to keep alive that spirited cultiva-

tion which is necessary to insure plenty and create an effective demand for labour.

Thirdly, The establishment of Warehouses of *Foreign* Corn, which prevents the application of capital, when the markets are very low, to take up any occasional surplus of *British* growth.

As to the first of these causes,—the extension of the Agriculture of the Empire, it is a subject only of congratulation and satisfaction; and must be considered as a proof of the substantial wealth and strength of the country; and of its ability, under wise and prudent direction, to overcome the difficulties with which it has to contend. The importation of Foreign Corn under the existing Laws has particularly engaged the attention of your Committee, and they have also turned their attention to circumstances indicative of the ability of the country to furnish sufficient food for its inhabitants. They are of opinion, that the produce of the United Empire is now, upon a fair average crop, equal to its consumption. That it is of the *first importance*, not only to *sustain* but further to *improve* and *extend* our Agriculture; and that the Foreign Trade in Corn should therefore be under such regulations as to insure the admission of such quantities as may be necessary to supply our *occasional* deficiency, but *not* to induce at one time a *superabundant* or *unlimited* quantity, *nor regularly* and *permanently*, so as to be *substituted in lieu of our own growth*, and thus to effect a consequent *diminution of our own Agriculture*, and the *loss* or even *removal* of the capital and labour employed thereon. As an exemplification of their views, they beg to observe, that in their opinion, the average importation of Foreign Corn of the last thirty years would not in its amount be *materially* injurious to British Agriculture, admitted *at the time* and on *the principles* above stated; but they conceive the existing Laws require some

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alteration to effect that object. The great difference of the British and Continental price of Grain probably is the cause which renders the provisions thereof ineffectual; but as the Session is far advanced, and the price of Grain so much below the importing regulation price, they think any alteration in that respect may be well delayed to a future period; strongly recommending at the same time, that any regulations hereafter to be adopted may be founded on the principles, and having in view the objects above stated.

They are further of opinion, that as it is necessary in order to maintain a growth of British Corn adequate, or nearly adequate, to its consumption, means must exist to take up its occasional surplus; and as the formation of *vast Granaries of Foreign* Corn must detract so much capital from such application, that the clause of the Act admitting Foreign Corn to be warehoused in this country when the ports are closed, should be *immediately repealed.*

That the contemplation of any *permanent reliance* upon the Grain of Foreign countries for the regular supply of any considerable portion of food to the population of this country, is a circumstance to which they look with the greatest apprehension, not only as rendering the aggregate supply of food *more precarious*, but as compromising thereby the *political independence*, and *substantial strength and wealth of this country*. They are of opinion, as above stated, that the actual produce of the United Empire is upon a fair average crop equal to its consumption: that under such circumstances, a regular importation of Foreign Corn would be productive of the following consequences. Suppose for instance, that such *annual* imports should amount to 3,000,000 quarters of Wheat, it would necessarily follow, (the demand not being increased,) that a similar quantity of British growth would be eventually extinguished.

That the *capital* belonging to the producers of the 3,000,000 of quarters of British growth must be turned into *other* channels, or their capital would also be *extinguished.*

That such portion of the farmer's capital as consisted of working stock, implements, buildings, &c. must be *actually lost*, or the *total* amount of such farming stock in the country *proportionally reduced* in value, by having a quantity *beyond* the demand.

That the *agricultural* labourers and artificers must become *manufacturing* labourers, or must depend on Poor-rates or bounty, or must emigrate, or must perish.

That they cannot become *manufacturing* labourers, *unless* a new and *additional* demand for manufactures is found, and which not *necessarily* arising out of this change of their occupation, they become liable to the above contingencies.

That these *British* capitalists and labourers, producers of 3,000,000 of quarters of *British* Corn, are *as good* customers to *British manufacturers* as the possessors or producers of 3,000,000 of quarters of *Foreign* Corn.

That in one *essential* particular they are evidently *better* customers, as they are *constant* and *certain*, whereas the Foreign must from *political* causes be *precarious* and *uncertain.*

That the *inevitable* consequence, therefore, of the *extinction* of a portion of our Agriculture, is the *loss* of a given number of *customers* for our *manufacturers*, without any *certainty* of acquiring *others* in their room, and also the conversion of such *customers* into additional *manufacturers*, without any means of *insuring* therefrom an *additional* demand for such *manufactures.*

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That if such *conversion* of labourers in husbandry into *manufacturers* should be productive of advantage by extending the sale of manufactures, and rendering Corn cheaper, it can only be by the operation of *incidental* and not *immediate* causes, and being connected with and *dependant* upon the policy of *Foreign* Countries, must be very *precarious.*

That admitting that *Foreign* Countries should supply Corn at a *cheaper* rate than *Home* Produce, and that the *general* price should be *kept down,* whilst the proportion of *Foreign* Corn was gaining upon the *reduction* of British; yet, as the quantity of Foreign must find a limit short of the *total* supply, *wherever* that limit is found, the price would rise again to the *British* price, that is to say, to such a price as should be commensurate with the *profits* of industry and capital devoted to *other* objects.

That such price would probably then be much *higher* as the proportion of Foreign supply was (from political causes) more *precarious.*

That suppose Corn was rendered *cheaper* by being drawn from *superior* soils and climates, as population increased therein, the *poorer* soils must be gradually *had recourse to.*

That *skill* and *industry* are often equivalent on soils *inferior* in quality to those which are *superior;* and advantage is always derivable from the exertions of human intellect and industry.

That the superior wealth of this country necessarily induces, independent of other circumstances, a higher price of Grain than in others comparatively less opulent and flourishing; and that a difference of price must necessarily continue so long as their situations in that respect continue different.

That in order therefore to prevent, under such circumstances, the *Grain of Foreign Countries superseding* the supply of *British* growth in the British Markets, protection must be given against such Foreign competition, upon the principle and to the extent above stated.

That so long as the superior wealth and consequent ability of this country to pay a higher price for Grain exists, it possesses the *more efficacious* means of guarding against the consequence of *scarcity,* by enjoying the *superior power* of extracting from *all parts* of the world an adequate supply for its *occasional* deficiency, and which of course would fail under such an alteration of their situation as should reduce their ordinary prices to a level with poorer Countries.

That the great consumption of Corn for other purposes than the food of man, furnishes other means which this Country eminently enjoys over others, as resources against scarcity; the vast consumption of oats by horses, the breweries, the distilleries, the application of grain to the maintenance and feeding animals for slaughter, each and all afford means applicable to relieve the pressure of *occasional* dearth, and equally become an object of national interest to maintain and promote. Upon the whole, the Committee are of opinion, that the *encouragement of the Agriculture of the Country* ought ever to be the *primary* object of the consideration of the Legislature, whether as it regards the comfort and happiness of the people, or as forming the substantial basis of permanent national wealth and prosperity, and of course comprehending therein the interests of all classes of society, whether Agricultural, Commercial, or Manufacturing, or the Public Creditors, or the lowest as well as the highest orders of the Community.

Public Income.

Taken from the Finance Account, ordered to be printed by the House of

	£	s.	d.
Customs	14,100,521	1	8¼
Excise	31,298,733	19	5¼
Stamps	7,027,837	3	6¾
Land and Assessed Taxes	8,182,819	11	6¾
Post Office	2,068,061	14	10
One Shilling in the Pound on Pensions and Salaries	18,346	15	4
Sixpence Ditto	8,684	2	6
Hackney Coaches	26,374	7	6
Hawkers and Pedlars	29,360	8	9
Poundage Fees (Ireland)	4,392	10	8½
Pell's Fees (Ditto)	878	10	0¼
Casualties (Ditto)	3,419	13	3
Treasury Fees and Hospital Fees (Ditto)	515	0	1½
Small Branches of the King's Hereditary Revenue	112,211	0	8¾
	62,882,156	0	0
Other Resources	946,264	3	0¾
	63,828,420	3	0¾
Loans Paid into the Exchequer	17,292,544	16	6
Gross Receipt of the Total Public Income, inclusive of Loans Paid into the Exchequer	81,120,964	19	6¾
Total Sum to be accounted for	82,892,115	6	3½
Total Payments out of the Gross Revenue	8,294,919	17	9¾
Net Produce applicable to National Objects, and to Payments into the Exchequer	74,597,195	8	5¾
Actual Payments into the Exchequer	71,826,806	17	3½

Public Expenditure.

Commons, the 23, 26, and 28 of March, for the year ending Jan. 5, 1821.

	£	s.	d.
Total Interest on Unredeemed Debts	29,126,972	15	11¾
Charges of Management	276,419	3	9½
Applied to Reduction of National Debt	17,667,535	16	9¼
	47,070,927	16	6
Interest on Exchequer Bills	1,849,219	13	0
Civil List	1,062,011	8	2½
Court of Justice	65,137	17	2¾
Mint	13,800	0	0
Royal Family, Pensions, &c.	327,066	8	9½
Salaries and Allowances	56,948	4	9
Bounties	2,849	0	0
Miscellaneous	224,896	16	0
Permanent charges in Ireland	381,503	19	5¾
Civil Government of Scotland	132,080	11	9¾
Payment in Anticipation of Exchequer Bills, Bounties, &c.	438,339	2	1½
Navy	6,387,799	5	8
Ordnance	1,401,585	5	11¾
Army	8,926,423	13	8¼
Advance to other Countries	1,229	12	0
Issues from the Funds for Local Purposes	49,128	18	0
Miscellaneous at Home and Abroad	2,616,700	9	3¼
	71,007,648	2	6
Deduct, Sinking Fund on Loan to the East India Company	156,906	18	6
	70,850,741	4	0

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