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**CURSORY REMARKS,**

&c. &c.

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# CURSORY REMARKS

ON THE

CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

**LORD MELVILLE**

AND

**MR. PERCEVAL.**

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## CURSORY REMARKS, &c.

MEN of sagacious and reflective minds, who have traced the rise, and watched the progress of the French revolution, have informed us, that the principle of resistance to despotism had but a small share in producing it. The dissolution of that great fabric, whose fall has shaken the world, cannot fail to become a lesson of eternal instruction. Its ruins furnish a mine of political science to the Statesman and the Philosopher.

Whoever is intrusted to lead in the administration of those governments that still are left, has much danger and many difficulties to overcome. His talents must be commensurate with his task, otherwise every step he takes will only bring him nearer to his fate.

But amidst all this danger, and these difficulties, he has many and great advantages. He is not left to strike at hazard, or to grapple in the dark. If the times are full of interest, they are likewise full of instruction. All that should warn, and all that should guide him, has passed under his eye. The principles, by which all the evil that is before him has been engendered, are of recent application. He is not left to pore over the pages of Roman and Athenian history, to assist him in deciding on their probable result, or their possible consequences. They read to him the lesson of their own precaution. Instead of abstract political theory, he has positive practical experiment. He, therefore, cannot be—he ought not to be, at least—imposed upon by plausibilities. The line of right and wrong are broadly chalked out before him. He may want ability to distinguish, or he may want resolution to decide; but, as for the rest,—it is furnished to him in abundance.

The Minister that would inspire confi-

dence into the *public* must have confidence *in himself*. A train of timid, fluttering, indecisive feelings, can never carry him through the difficulties that oppose him. He must be borne up by the consciousness that he is pursuing an honest and an honourable course; and so supported, he must act with promptitude, and proceed with firmness. Laying his standards on the altar of his country, he must face the worst without fear. If his fortitude fails him, his cause is lost.

But, with all this, he must possess that influence, arising out of power, and rank, and talent, which can alone enable him to wield the political strength of the nation, and to give a steady direction to the energy of the public will.

There are certain conflicting interests in every great and opulent state, which will always manifest their hostility in proportion—not to the justness of their pretensions,—but to the growth of their power. The one is between the body of rank and wealth, and

between that body of talent immediately under it; goaded by ambition, and struggling for authority. The other is engendered by a description of *Patriots*, courting the gaze and huzza of the populace, by inflaming their passions, and then playing off their feelings against their judgment. These latter neither seek power nor station—apparently they are quite disinterested;—perpetually busied in flattering and fomenting the prejudices of the unthinking crowd that flock round them, it is reward enough if they succeed in setting them at war with their rulers—their vanity is satisfied with being saluted as the *Champions of the people*. For reasons obvious to every man of reflection, this latter is the more dangerous faction of the two.

The great aim of a certain description of persons evidently is, and has long been—without openly forming themselves into a tribunal, to act as a controul on the Legislature—to usurp circuitously that controul, and to shelter it behind the ambiguous and

indefinite authority of *public opinion*. They reserve to themselves, among other things, the right to superintend the judicial prerogative of Parliament, and, virtually, to annul its judgment, whenever that judgment opposes *their will*, or interferes with *their views*.

The principles which they send forth, and the means by which they contrive to give effect to their sentence of condemnation against any one whom they are desirous to exclude from any share in the government, is a subject which has a strong and serious claim to our attention; and the more so, because, from the secrecy of its operation, it does not excite that alarm which it ought, and which is called for by the magnitude and importance of its consequences.

A better exposition of these principles cannot well be referred to than is contained in the following extract from Mr FINNERTY's speech on the Cintra convention, delivered

at the Westminster Meeting, on the 20th October 1808.

Reverting to his proposition for convening the Parliament, Mr Finnerty observed, that —“Many persons might not be very sanguine in their calculation of securing, through the medium of that body, the adequate punishment of any great public delinquent, who had the advantage of Parliamentary interest. Possibly he did not much differ from such persons; but although the punishment of guilt did not arise out of Parliamentary interposition, still an exposure of the guilty was to be looked for from Parliamentary discussion. When that exposure was made, the public would determine; and let it be remembered, that PUBLIC OPINION would have its due weight in this country, *whatever might be the decision of Parliament*. Public opinion, indeed, could never fail to be regarded in England. ALL MINISTERS MUST *attend to it*. Even Pitt himself, that worst of bad ministers, had never, in the plenitude of his arrogance, ven-

tured to treat public opinion with indifference. *Parliament might decide as they pleased upon any state delinquent*, but still the *public opinion* would *reserve its right of judgment*. Lord Wellesley had all the *formality* of acquittal by the House of Commons. Lord Melville had a *similar* acquittal by the House of Lords; and yet *no Minister had dared, notwithstanding notorious partialities and wishes, to introduce these persons into any public office*. This—added Mr Finnerty—“*is the triumph of public opinion*. It serves most signally to prove your influence and your strength—it should urge *you*, on this occasion, to *act vigorously*—let the case be referred to Parliament—let it be ascertained who are really guilty, and you, the Public, have it in your power to PUNISH, *however Parliament may choose to decide*.”—

If Mr Finnerty alone had broached this doctrine, the matter might be easily discussed. But it is a doctrine spread by the heroic reformers of his school, in all directions, and, unhappily, with such complete

success, that we find it absolutely recognized and acted upon in that quarter from which it ought to have met most resistance. Mr Perceval's letter will throw some light upon this principle,—but before we advert to that, we will look a little at the principle itself.

*Public opinion* is, by this class of persons, made synonymous with the opinion, whatever it may be, which *they* entertain, and which they are anxious to infuse into the public mind. According to the doctrine above laid down, what is termed public opinion, has nothing to do with the opinion of the public, as expressed by *the constituted authorities of the State*; on the contrary, it contains within it a principle of controul and counteraction. These Democratists, and their adherents, claim a right to reverse any decision from that quarter. The judgment pronounced by the CONSTITUTION must coincide with theirs, or it is in no instance final. The *voice of PARLIAMENT* must be the echo of *their voice*, or it must pass for

nothing. *They* must be the judges in the last resort, and their determination must be conclusive.

Amid the convulsion of opinion, it is impossible to ascertain that of the *majority* on any great complex political question. What can the great body of the lower orders,—which must ever constitute the people, considered as an aggregate of numbers,—what can they know, with truth, of the expediency of acts involving a variety of views, and embracing a wide extent of interests? How can they decide—for what means have they of deciding—on the real policy of public measures, or the real characters of public men? They must make up their judgment—if they pronounce judgment—upon report and hearsay. They are right, if their Informers are right; they are wrong, if their Informers are at pains to mislead them. In a word, their *opinion* is either just or unjust, according as they happen to fall into the hands of knaves or honest men. It is not to be imputed to them as a fault that they

often act upon false impressions. The guilt of the delusion—and of the sore consequences which sometimes arise out of it—is in those who misguide them.

“PARLIAMENT,” say these reformers, “may decide as they please, but still the *public opinion* will reserve its right of judgment.”—This language is calculated to repeal all the known and settled jurisdiction of the Legislature, in favour of the *magistracy of a party*. You cannot travel with these men but on the road of revolution. The democratic lawgivers of France held the same language to the ear of the crowd—while they were in secret creating and securing for *themselves* that very power which they were persuading the people *belonged to them*. It was through this medium that the spirit of resistance to all lawful authority was at first excited. Having succeeded this far, the reformers had the game in their hands.

But these patriots will ask triumphantly, Is not the *public will* SUPREME?—I answer, Yes. But, to all practical purposes, the

question is worth nothing. When we once begin with this topic, and with these phrases, we are lost in theory. Nothing intelligible, nothing useful, can come out of the discussion. The *public will* can create, and it can destroy a government; but it can make no *part* of the government. The constitution of England has made PARLIAMENT the depository, and the organ of that *will*. To represent it as the antagonist power before which Parliament must bend, and the Constitution bow down, is the essence of jacobinism. The teachers of this doctrine wait only for its application; the curtain would then draw up, and they would play over again the tragedy of Europe.

Under a constitution like our own, whose principles are sound, and in a kingdom whose PRESS is free, the *indirect* power of the people is great, and, if left fairly to itself, will always operate—as it ought to operate—to intercept bad measures, and to root out bad men. That it should act thus, is the security of our private rights, and of



public freedom. It is a bad government in which the voice of the people is not heard ; but where that voice *alone* is heard—government is overthrown.

It is always dangerous to infuse abstract general truths into unenlightened minds. Men of reflection and foresight know how far they may be carried, and with what qualifications they must be received ; but the annals of tyranny abound with the dreadful excesses that have grown out of the ignorant misapplication of abstract principles.

It is most true, as far as the meaning of the general principle can be appreciated, that the real security and strength of every government is in the sentiments and opinion entertained towards it by the mass of its subjects. Whenever the rulers of a state forfeit the esteem and confidence of the people, that state must be in real danger, because the energy of public wisdom can rarely restrain the excesses of popular irritation. But this being true, it is of the last

importance, that we do not suffer the traitorous patriotism of a faction to mislead us.

There is a generous lenity, and much shrewd discernment in the English character, and if *public opinion* were fairly left to take its own course, it would seldom fail to be well-founded. It would follow in the line of the disinterested and deliberate reason of the more reflective. It would decide upon the character of individual men by their conduct. It would distinguish, in the servants of government, between measures that were inconsiderate, and measures that were corrupt,—between a want of policy and a want of principle.

If the secret enemies of any man get possession of our ear, and besiege us perpetually with a black delineation of all his conduct, and a malignant interpretation of all his motives ;—if our opinion of that man is to be regulated by this representation, can it have any other effect than to rank us, most decidedly, among the number of his enemies? So likewise, if a faction hostile to

the existing authorities of government, contrive by an affected zeal for freedom, or by any other of the various arts which they know so well how to exert, if, I say, they contrive, by these arts, to win their way to the confidence of the multitude, what will be the sentiments with which the multitude will be impressed? Most clearly it will be with the same sentiments which they have been thus made to participate,—it will be with *the opinion* engendered by the harangues and misrepresentations of those to whom they have surrendered their judgment and their feelings. But, most clearly, it is not by canvassing the sentiments of this circle, however numerous, that we can ascertain the *public opinion* or the *public will*. What *opinion* and whose *will* is expressed, it requires no long line of sagacity to fathom.

But no part of this principle which we are considering, has in it more of deep iniquity than that which makes it competent for *public opinion* to set at nought the tribu-

nals of *public justice*. The prevalence of this conviction is calculated, beyond all others, to further the views, and foster the designs of Mr Finnerty, and that band of *active citizens* to which he belongs\*. This

\* It is worth while to remark, how this *patriotic* fraternity contrive to turn the very activity of government to frustrate their designs into some article of accusation against it. SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, in his speech on the address, at the opening of the present session,—a speech which went most grossly to insult *the people* of England, through the medium of their *representatives in Parliament*,—alleged, among other things, that “The Noble Lord (CASTLEREAGH) was most actively *intent upon preventing* a certain individual from accompanying the expedition to WALCHEREN, which individual (MR FINNERTY) might perhaps have given a true account of it. Amidst the important care of preventing that individual from going to Walcheren, the Noble Lord might have forgotten the purpose for which he sent the army there. Indeed the very transport in which that individual sailed, appeared to have been forgotten, although it contained articles of great necessity, (we believe that either Mr Congreve’s rockets, or the entrenching tools, were here alluded to) and it was said by some, that *the inaction of the army for sixteen days, was the consequence of this forgetfulness.*”

TIMES, Sat. Jan. 27.

While Sir Francis and his worthy colleagues were congratulating themselves on the impression which this, their joint *fabrication* would produce on the *public opinion*, the following letter unluckily appeared.

doctrine leaves every public man once accused,—as to the question of his guilt or innocence,—at the mercy of a party. Lord MELVILLE has been long since singled out by this faction as one upon whom their power was to be tried; and it has been tried, with an effect that must give them real cause for exultation.—As far as this instance goes,—and depend upon it, it will not be the last,—they have met with ample encouragement.

“ To the Editor of the Times.

“ Sir,—Having observed, in your report of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT's speech on Thursday night, that an allusion was made to Mr FINNERTY *having gone to Walcheren*, in one of the transports laden with my rockets, by which it would further appear, *that the vessel did not arrive until sixteen days after the rest of the armament*; I feel it incumbent on me to explain on both these points:—1st, That although Mr FINNERTY did make his passage on board one of the vessels under my direction, it was certainly NOT BY MY CONCURRENCE; and 2dly, That there was no delay in the arrival of any of these vessels. We all sailed from the Nore on the same day that the grand division left the Downs; and arrived on the Dutch coast at day-break the next morning. Your insertion of this statement will much oblige, Sir, your obedient servant,

“ 26th Jan. 1810.

WILLIAM CONGREVE.”

—“ Lord WELLESLEY,” say they, “ had the *formality* of an acquittal by the HOUSE OF COMMONS. Lord MELVILLE had a *similar* acquittal by the HOUSE OF LORDS, and yet *no Minister* HAD DARED, notwithstanding notorious partialities and wishes, to introduce these persons into any public office. This is the *triumph of public opinion*.”

In plain truth, it is neither more nor less, than the triumph of a Jacobin faction over the legitimate authority of the King and the Government.

Is the Great Charter of English justice to be void or valid, according as Mr FINNERTY and his party shall choose to confirm its authority, or to tear off its seal? Can it be the *public opinion*, that a Peer impeached before a British Parliament, shall be convicted without evidence, or against evidence? Can it be the *public opinion*, that the protective spirit of the British constitution, shall thus be withdrawn from all men in public stations? No. The great

body of the people of this kingdom, with one voice, will disclaim to be made parties to injustice and oppression.

Can any more be required to bring the supreme jurisdiction of the State under subjection to the Jacobin power, than the popular reception of a principle, by which that jurisdiction is wholly superseded? They will not suspend their decision till the final hearing,—they will not abide the judgment of Parliament,—but they will reverse the verdict of the Constitution; they will treat it merely as *a formality*; and no sentence but that which their interior Cabinet shall pronounce, shall be made effective.

They boast, that no Minister *had dared* to restore to power the persons whom parliament had acquitted. Unfortunately, it seems that this is not a mere flourish of rhetoric, but is matter of fact. It were to be wished, however, that any other person than the *Minister himself*, had taught them, that they were *Masters of the Minister*. The

apology of Mr PERCEVAL to Lord MELVILLE, for not *introducing him into office*, is but too striking a testimony to that truth which the Jacobin faction had so boldly uttered. Mr PERCEVAL, it seems, after bearing full testimony to his Lordship's great talents and integrity, and, after declaring his sincere assurance of his Lordship's unvaried zeal, as well as ability for the public service, yet expressed himself under the necessity of declining to recal his Lordship into any official station under the government, from the fear, that the prejudice, unjust as he knew it to be, which had been created against him, was not sufficiently subdued. He, at the same time, signified to his Lordship, that he had it in command from his Majesty, to offer him an Earldom, as an assurance of the high sense which his Majesty entertained of his services, and of his faithful attachment to the interests of his crown and government.—This offer, honourable as it was, his Lordship, with a dignified humility, declined, and made no

farther comment on the cause or the effect of Mr Perceval's fear to recal him to office, than by wishing it might be *the last* concession which he would be called upon to make to that description of persons to whose authority he had found it necessary to submit \*.

What does this language amount to? It amounts to this.—I am fully satisfied, that the articles of Impeachment preferred against you, were without foundation; but I must act as if I had formed an opposite conclusion.—I know that the accusations contained in those articles, were clearly disproved; but I must act towards you as if they had been clearly substantiated.—I do homage to that integrity, which, in spite of the influence of party, and the clamour of prejudice, pronounced your acquittal; but I must treat you as if you had been found guilty.—It is most true, that, by the most

\* Such was the substance of this correspondence, as it has appeared in the various public papers, and which has been admitted, by both parties, as authentic.

solemn form of trial known to the Constitution, you were proved to be innocent; but there is a certain faction that combine to represent you as criminal, and forbid your return to office, and to their will I must conform.

Is the government, then, so feeble, and the constitution so inert, that the minister must compromise with a faction, for the safety of his place? Would Mr PITT have thus acted? No. He would not have put his seal to the attainder of any British subject, who had proved himself a faithful servant of the state. He would not have violated the first principle of the Constitution, which treats every accused person as innocent till he is proved to be guilty; far less would he have so reversed that principle, as to treat as guilty, one, who,—after the most solemn and scrupulous trial,—stood acquitted of all guilt. Never would he have lent himself as the Accomplice of oppression. His high mind would have disdained to disarm the government of its strength,

from the dread of any prejudice that might weaken his power. He would have acted far differently. He would have strengthened that power by the example of his firmness, instead of betraying it by the evidence of his fear.

The Democratic Patriots have only to stun the public with clamour, and the legitimate authority of government must fall before them. A contemptuous treatment of juries, Englishmen never endure in silence; but this faction have made Englishmen feel, that they are able to despise as *formality*, and even, in effect, to negative the verdict of the highest tribunal to which a Jury can be summoned. They know, by experiment, and they will not fail to profit by their knowledge,—that they have the means to make their influence felt and feared. They have obtained a full recognition of their authority. They will, no doubt, plead Mr Perceval's concession to it, as a precedent to future ministers. It will operate as a sort of patronage, that will ani-

mate them to stronger confederacy. There was a something shrewdly prophetic in the hope, "that this concession might be *the last*."

The leading inquiry of a minister must hereafter be, not—how am I bound to act by a sense of public duty, or what line of conduct could be suggested by a sense of individual justice?—These are not the questions which he must put to himself. The grand question must be—*Will it give offence to certain persons?* This must be ascertained, and the government must be conducted accordingly. It is of some advantage to be aware of the mischievous maturity to which this power of *certain persons* has attained. The danger to be apprehended from it may well excite *fear*; but it is a fear of a very different kind from that which it appears to have inspired, a fear that should suggest precaution, and beget fortitude,—but that should never, for an instant, seek safety in submission.

What portion of the public power it may hereafter he found politic to abandon to this confederacy,—or how much of the legitimate judicial authority it may be found expedient to relinquish in favour of their right to *punish*, it is hard to say; but for the present, the deference manifested towards it is neither considerate nor safe. Every thinking man must enter his protest against that policy, which pays homage to such supremacy. No minister will make this faction less his enemy, by courting it as an ally. If he does this on the calculation of its strength, he is still more mistaken. They know too well when the affairs of the nation are in weak hands, to suffer any thing to be gained against them at such a crisis, by compromise or negotiation.—

If necessity had dictated the concession which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has avowedly made, that necessity would have carried its own apology along with it. But such necessity neither did, nor could

exist. He might not be able to subdue this cabal, but it does not follow, that he should be subdued by it. A General may despair of victory, but he must be insane to think of strengthening his *resources* by disarming himself.

If we could always be sure, that what is termed *public opinion*, were really so—and that it was dictated by clear and correct views—that it was, in fact, the united sentiment of the most reflective and enlightened; in this case, public affairs would always be well and wisely conducted under such an influence. Every king, and every minister, should conform to it, and should recognize it as the sovereign and supreme will. But the history of the world, in all ages, and not least in that age in which we live, has taught mankind, to their cost, that great deception may be practised on this head. It has taught them, that the determination of a few popular incendiaries may be made to pass for the *opinion of the public*.



and that the *majority of the people* may be confounded with the madness of the mob.

That a prejudice should be excited against a particular individual, considered in itself, is not a circumstance of great public concern. But that a faction should exist, capable of holding a Minister in awe, and of prohibiting the sovereign and the public to profit by the services of any British subject, whom it is their will shall be excluded from all political power—this is an affair that well deserves to arrest our attention, for it has consequences much below the surface.

LORD MELVILLE is accused, and he meets his accusers with that confidence which conscious integrity inspires. He demands a fair and impartial trial. He challenges the great and paramount inquest of Parliament to sit in judgment upon his guilt or innocence. He is impeached. All the evidence, which industry can furnish, is brought forward—it is applied with the whole stretch of effect of which it can be

made capable. All the influence which his opponents could call forth—for it is now no secret that very great and very high influence was exerted—is employed to procure a verdict of guilty. But after all endeavour is practised, and every effort tried, the charges could not be supported—no evidence could be brought to meet them, and the impeachment fell to the ground.

LORD MELVILLE, pursued with all this bitterness, suffered great and real injury,—it could not be otherwise.—But when he, that should have done him justice, shrinks, through the impulse of a selfish and shortsighted fear, into the rank of his persecutors—it is a lamentable littleness of mind that could dictate such a course of conduct.

It is not meant to be affirmed that every man that is acquitted is therefore innocent. We all know, that it may be otherwise; but we know, at the same time, from what causes this happens, when it does happen. An accused person may owe his acquittal to a defect in the indictment, or to a de-



violation from technical forms. He may escape from the witness being incompetent, on the score of interest, to give that evidence which, had it been received, would have gone to his conviction. When, through any occurrence of this kind, the accused escapes, the trial, in this event, is no better than a *formality*. But did LORD MELVILLE owe his acquittal to any cause of this kind? Did he owe it to any other cause than the absolute impossibility of at all substantiating a single article of the impeachment, which the zeal of party, and not the spirit of justice, had drawn up against him? Was not every testimony brought forward that could be brought forward? Was any rigour of inspection spared? Was there any want of exertion or ability in those appointed to manage the impeachment against him? Yet, after all, what was the result? The Peers of Great Britain\*, with all the evidence be-

\* I speak of the *great majority*, for there were several among them,—whom it would not be difficult to name,—that

fore them, in the unbiassed and upright discharge of that duty which they owed to their conscience, and to their country, pronounced him—NOT GUILTY.

And is this Statesman, perhaps, the first—certainly among the first—of modern times, whose character and actions could pass this ordeal, is he still to be visited with all the opprobrium of guilt? Is no reference to be made to this impeachment, but to assert the imbecility, or arraign the corruption, of Parliament? And this too, without urging a single argument to invalidate the justice of the acquittal! without proving—without even pretending to prove—that there was any shadow of evidence that could have led to, or supported an opposite judgment!

The mere injustice done to Lord Melville—great and glaring as it is—is the least evil. The question is not, whether the ma-

would never have pronounced him innocent, had it been in the power of evidence to have proved him guilty!

lignant activity of a party shall succeed in excluding *him*, as an individual, from acting officially in the public service. It presents to us something far beyond this. It presents to us the existence of a counter-authority, exercised by a faction opposing itself—and with success—to the verdict of the law and the constitution: a faction interposing between the Parliament and the people; and, at once, insulting the one, and imposing upon the other: that circulate their own *principles*, and enforce their *own will* as the expression of *public opinion*, and then urge that opinion as conclusive upon the executive government. Even the limited and local influence of such a faction is no light evil; but it is the broad consequences which grow out of the despotic principles which they disseminate, that the danger lies. What body of men were ever yet heard to claim a right to *punish* those on whom the law can fix no crime. It is impossible that any principle can be more aptly devised for

introducing, by degrees, the worst extremes of tyranny.

An individual, should his services meet with an ungrateful return, may be consoled under it by the consciousness of his own integrity, and by the hope that posterity will do him justice. But God forbid that the doctrines which this Jacobin fraternity disseminate, shall ever become the doctrines which Englishmen are to adopt and to act upon. I trust the period will never arrive when, what is called *public opinion*, shall overrule all public law, and defeat all public justice. If ever, hereafter, this sort of supremacy shall be attached to it, Heaven defend those that come within reach of its condemnation.

A minister must exalt himself in the public opinion, before he can carry that opinion with him, or can receive from it that stimulus which its sanction can never fail to inspire. Much of the legitimate strength of Government,—it is a truth which must be confessed;—much of the

legitimate strength of Government is gone, that must be recruited; much of the national energy is lost, that must be restored. How this is to be accomplished, is, indeed, an arduous question; but accomplished it must be before England can be at all equal to that struggle which she has to encounter with her enemies, both from within and from without. We have witnessed but too much of the reverse of all that should produce this effect,—a hesitating laxity of resolve,—a fearful fluctuating policy—has but too obviously pervaded the measures of his Majesty's Ministers. Either there has been no one that *could lead*, or there has been no one that *would be led*. Sacrifices have been made, and are daily making,—not to the public will, for then the policy would be both sound and wise;—but to an intriguing Cabal, which, under the disguise of a rigid patriotism, seeks to forward the purposes of its own ambition.

A minister, anxious for the public honour, and the public good, will pursue both, with a

firm and manly steadiness, not to be diverted by danger, nor turned aside by apprehension. He will pay to *public opinion*, fairly expressed, that deference which *ought* to be paid to it; that deference which it ever must command, and ever must deserve. But the instant he looks for the support of his popularity in his sacrifices to popular prejudice, or to popular clamour, the real interests of the state are no longer safe in his hands. Taking this principle for his guide, he will endanger all the legitimate power of government to secure *his own*. When concession can be obtained by *clamour*, few indeed will be the compliances that can be expected to the claims of *justice*. Such a policy is the last resource of weakness. The season of its triumph will be short; but severe and lasting will be the evils that will come in the train of it.

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