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SPEECH  
OF  
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON,  
UPON THE  
RELATIONS OF ENGLAND  
WITH  
PORTUGAL.

1s. 6d.

0458

**SPEECH**

OF

**VISCOUNT PALMERSTON,**

IN THE

**HOUSE OF COMMONS,**

ON

**MONDAY, THE FIRST OF JUNE, 1829,**

UPON THE

**MOTION OF SIR JAMES MACINTOSH,**

RESPECTING THE

**RELATIONS OF ENGLAND**

WITH

**PORTUGAL.**

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## S P E E C H

or

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

SIR,

I AM glad that the foreign relations of the Country have at last been brought under discussion in this House. It was, indeed, natural, that the all-engrossing matters of domestic policy, by which we have been occupied during the present Session, should for a time have withdrawn our attention from external affairs; but it would have been much to be regretted, if Parliament had separated, without affording the Government an opportunity of giving such explanations with respect to our foreign relations, as might be in their power, without violation of confidence, or prejudice to pending negotiations.

England, indeed, must naturally wish to have some knowledge of the spirit, in which her Government have been exercising those full powers, with which her confidence has invested them; and Europe has long been looking for some more authentic expression of the feelings of the British Cabinet, than can be collected from those vague surmises, to which

their silence has hitherto given such undisturbed existence.

It is just too, by the Government themselves, that they should be judged upon their own explanations, and not merely by the construction, which others may put upon their actions.

That some explanations are much required from the Government, if it were only for their own sakes, they cannot fail to be aware; for they cannot be ignorant, that impressions have gone forth, not in this country only, but throughout all Europe, that the foreign relations of England, for the last twelve months, have been conducted in a spirit far different from that, which, for some years previous, had animated our councils; and by no means such, as their declarations of May, 1828, had authorized us to expect.

If these observations apply more or less to every part of our foreign relations, they certainly bear with the greatest force upon our conduct with reference to Portugal; and there can be the less difficulty in calling for the fullest explanations on that matter, because that chapter seems unfortunately to be closed; there appears to be nothing on this subject to inquire into but past transactions; and little hope can be entertained of prospective arrangements, which such an inquiry could embarrass.

The course which the British Government has held with respect to the affairs of Portugal, has ex-

cited the astonishment of Europe; and has inspired every Englishman, who values the good name of his country, with deep mortification.

The civilized world rings with execrations upon Miguel; and yet this Destroyer of constitutional freedom, this Breaker of solemn oaths, this Faithless Usurper, this Enslaver of his country, this Trampler upon public law, this Violator of private rights, this Attempter of the life of helpless and defenceless woman, is in the opinion of Europe mainly indebted to the success which has hitherto attended him, to a belief industriously propagated by his partisans, and not sufficiently refuted by any acts of the British Government, that the Cabinet of England look upon his usurpation with no unfriendly eye.

In the opinion of many this impression is confirmed, by much which the Government have done, and by much which they have omitted to do. On the one hand it is said, that they have shewn a great alacrity to back up his measures of war by their recognitions; and on the other it is thought, that they have displayed a very patient forbearance under indignities offered to England, in the persons of British residents in Portugal; while their steady refusal to interfere in cases, in which their interference would have been prejudicial to Don Miguel, has been contrasted with their promptitude and vigour to interfere, when their interference was subservient to his projects.

All these things, it is said, seem to shew, that they

look upon his conduct and political existence with very different eyes from the rest of mankind; and appear to countenance the supposition that they have attempted by negotiation to give a legitimate sanction and permanent existence to his usurpation; and have even contemplated the project of delivering up to the keeping and custody of a man, who has attempted to embroil his hands in a sister's blood, that infant Queen, whose life is one barrier between him and the throne which he covets.

For these reasons it is fitting that these matters should be inquired into; that the truth should be known; that if the Government have deserved the censure of Parliament, that censure may be awarded; that if, on the contrary, they have been unjustly blamed, they and the country they govern, may at once be relieved from the odium under which we now labour.

The ground upon which my Right Honourable Friend, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, has defended the doing of all that has been done, and the not doing of all that has been omitted, is the principle of non-interference. That is to say, the principle that every nation has a right to manage its own internal affairs as it pleases, so long as it injures not its neighbours; and that one nation has no right to control by force of arms, the will of another nation, in the choice of its government or ruler.

To this principle I most cordially assent. It is

sound, it ought to be sacred; and I trust that England will never be found to set the example of its violation.

But in all discussions, it is of great importance, to come to a clear understanding of the precise meaning of terms used in debate; and let us therefore strip the word Interference of an ambiguity, which tends to perplex and confuse. If by interference is meant interference by force of arms, such interference the Government are right in saying, General principles and our own practice forbade us to exert. But if by interference is meant intermeddling, and intermeddling in every way, and to every extent, short of actual military force; then I must affirm, that there is nothing in such interference, which the laws of nations may not in certain cases permit; and that the whole history of the connexion between England and Portugal, has been almost one unbroken chain of such interference on our part; nay more, that the complaint to which the present Government is most justly exposed, is not that they have not interfered, but that they have interfered, only on the wrong side.

It has been the opinion of the ablest English statesmen, that it is important to the security of England, that the Tagus should be in the hands of a friendly power. It has been thought by the most competent judges, that with Gibraltar our own, and with an ally at Lisbon, we might face the combined hostility of France and Spain, should we ever be exposed to meet it, if not without effort, at least without alarm. This

opinion too has not been confined to our ablest statesmen, it was shared by our ablest enemy, I mean Napoleon Buonaparte.

It has also been the opinion of the wisest statesmen of Portugal, that the best security for Portuguese independence was to be found in the selfish interests of England; and that, as it was worth while for England, for her own sake, to make great efforts to prevent Portugal from being annexed to Spain, England therefore was sure to be, the most sincere and trusty ally, to whom, in the hour of need, Portugal could turn for assistance.

These reciprocal interests engendered connexion and alliance; mutual usefulness led to good offices on one side, and to confidence on the other; treaties imposed obligations, and conferred corresponding rights; and hence it is that Portugal has always solicited and received the advice of England, as that of a friend, whose interests were identified with her own; and hence it is also that England has been permitted to exercise an interference, and possess an influence in the councils of Portugal, which did not naturally belong to her, as regarding an independent state.

For proof of these assertions, I would refer the House to the treaties of Charles I., of Cromwell, and of Charles II.; to the war of succession; to the transactions of the eighteenth century; to the wars and treaties of the century in which we live: from all

which it will be seen, that it has been the practice and conceded privilege of England, to concern herself in a peculiar manner, in the affairs and destiny of Portugal.

But those who contend that it is the duty, and has been the practice of England, to withdraw herself entirely from all interference in the internal affairs of Portugal, and to stand aloof, a passive spectator of whatever there may happen, have they forgotten the transactions even of the last few years?

Have they forgotten our active and successful interference in 1807, to prevail upon the Royal Family of Portugal, to traverse the Atlantic, and transplant their royal stock to their South American dominions?

Have they forgotten the spirited interference, in 1824, of our then ambassador, Sir Edward Thornton, against the proceedings of the Portuguese Government towards its own subjects, an interference which was attended with complete success?

Have they forgotten that by the urgent advice of that same our ambassador, the seat of the Portuguese Government was transferred to a British line-of-battle ship in the Tagus? and that on the quarter-deck of an English man of war, with our hardy sailors as his pages in waiting, and our menacing guns as his guard of honour, the King of Portugal received the homage of his subjects on the celebration of his birth-day; and from that self-same palace of council, issued a proclamation to his people, and gave out his decrees

banishing the Queen from court, depriving Don Miguel of his command, and ordering him to absent himself from Portugal?—But all this, I suppose, was no interference in the internal affairs of Portugal! Invert the case, put London for Lisbon, the Thames for the Tagus, and then let me ask you if this is interference or not.

I pass by, the bringing over the Constitution of 1826 from Brazil to Lisbon, by an English ambassador, Sir Charles Stuart; because although that circumstance was considered by many of the Portuguese, unfortunately as it has since turned out, by them so considered, as an indication that the British Government had interfered, to procure for them the advantages of that Constitution; yet it is well known, as has just been stated by my Right Hon. Friend, the Member for Liverpool, that the selection of Sir Charles Stuart, to bring over that Charter, was the accidental choice of the Emperor Don Pedro himself; and that the Portuguese nation were indebted for that gift, so valuable, if they had known how to prize and preserve it, solely and entirely to the spontaneous liberality, and uncounselled wisdom, of that enlightened sovereign.

But have we forgot the active and successful interference of England, to bring about a separation of the Crowns of Portugal and Brazil, and to obtain the abdication of the Crown of Portugal in favour of Donna Maria; an interference founded upon a just regard to

the interests of England?—We should indeed do well if we could forget this interference, since we have been so backward to make any the slightest exertion to recover for Donna Maria that Crown, which, in accordance with our advice, her father had placed upon her head.

But if this interference on our part, may be thought by some, to impose upon us a kind of honourable obligation, towards Don Pedro or Donna Maria; on the other hand, there were circumstances of interference on our part, personal to Don Miguel himself, which give us, with respect to him individually, something like an absolute right, to require him to desist from that course of tyranny and usurpation, which he has pursued, since last he set foot in Portugal.

I allude to those conferences, to which the Hon. Member for Knaresborough has already adverted, and which took place at Vienna, in October 1827, between the ambassadors of England, France, Austria, Portugal, and Brazil. To the protocols of some of these conferences, the approving and confirming signature of Don Miguel, is said to have been affixed; But at all events it is well known that some of the Ministers then and there present, were fully authorized to speak and to contract for him. Out of these conferences arose a solemn engagement, on the part of Don Miguel, to obey the orders of his brother Don Pedro, as legitimate Sovereign of Portugal; in consequence of which engagement, Don Pedro, when he

learnt it, completed his abdication in favour of Donna Maria : out of these conferences arose also a letter of the 19th Oct. 1827, from Don Miguel at Vienna, to his sister Isabella, then Regent in Lisbon, informing her that he had accepted the lieutenancy of Portugal, under, and according to, the appointment of Don Pedro ; that he had sworn to maintain inviolable, the laws of Portugal, and the institutions granted by Don Pedro ; that he was determined to forget past transactions, and to repress future factions ; begging her to give to this, his solemn declaration, its due publicity ; and adding, that for the purpose of carrying into effect the intentions of his brother, he was proceeding to Portugal, through England.

This letter, according to his request, was officially published in the Royal Gazette at Lisbon.

Now let me ask, when the Portuguese saw officially published this letter, breathing nothing but allegiance to Don Pedro, obedience to the laws, sworn fidelity to the constitution, oblivion of past transactions, and repression of future factions ; when they knew that this letter was written, under the eye, if not at the dictation, of the English ambassador at Vienna ; when they saw Don Miguel, instead of taking the direct and natural road through Spain, come north about, and in the severest season of the year, take England, in his way from Vienna to Lisbon ; when they heard the honours, with which he was here received ; when they were told through every channel

of public report, that the period of his stay, had not been devoted merely to amusement and parade, but that the system of his future administration of Portugal, had received its full share of attention ; when they saw him enter the Tagus, escorted by an English squadron, and attended by an English ambassador ; and when they saw him march to his palace, surrounded by English troops ; was not all this, justly calculated, to excite in the minds of the Portuguese, who were favourable to the Constitution, that is to say in a large portion of the nation, expectations, the disappointment of which, must indeed be calamitous to them ? Was not all this calculated to induce those persons, to commit themselves openly in favour of the constitutional system, in a thousand ways, and to such a degree, as to mark them out for the devoted victims of vengeance, when the wolf cast off his borrowed clothing, and appeared in his own natural garb ?

But the fatal influence of the interference of England did not stop here. Don Miguel found, on his landing, a constitutional army, a constitutional ministry, a constitutional magistracy, and a constitutional legislature ; but he found also a British force : a British force, indeed, which had been sent to fulfil obligations of treaty, and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal. The object for which this force had been sent, had been fully accomplished, and its stay had latterly been prolonged, only at the request of Don Miguel himself, that it might do honour



to his arrival, and that its presence at Lisbon, on his landing, might testify to the world, the good understanding between him and the British Government. I am not blaming this arrangement; I was myself a party to it; and if blame attaches, of that blame I must take my share. But it turned out unfortunately, and it makes an ingredient, not unimportant, in the case of England against Don Miguel.

It was generally known at Lisbon, that the only event in which the British troops had orders to depart, from a strict abstinence from all interference in the internal affairs of Portugal, was that of protection being required, for the persons of the members of the Royal Family, and that this protection they were ordered to afford. This instruction, as has been already stated by my Right Hon. Friend, the Member for Liverpool, was not framed with any view to Don Miguel, but formed a part of the instructions originally given to the general officer commanding, when the troops first embarked for Portugal; and it had reference to persons more worthy than the individual, who in the end profited most by it.

It is obvious that no successful resistance could be made, to the steps taken by Don Miguel to accomplish his usurpation, without imposing some temporary restraint upon his personal liberty; and any such restraint, it was understood, the British troops would think it their duty to prevent. The consequence was, that so long as the British troops re-

mained, resistance would have been unavailing, and by the time they embarked, Don Miguel had made it impossible. Miguel thus contrived to make the British troops, who had been sent out for far different purposes, the protecting shelter, under cover of which he dismissed his constitutional Ministers, removed his constitutional Officers, changed his constitutional Magistrates, and prepared the dissolution of his constitutional Chambers; and thus, all those means of resistance were paralyzed, which, had our troops been out of the way, the existing institutions of Portugal, would infallibly have opposed to his projects.

Did not all these circumstances give us a right to insist, that Miguel should keep those oaths, and abide by those engagements, to which he had thus publicly, and in the face of Europe, made the King of England his witnessing sponsor?

Did not a due regard for the honour and dignity of the English crown, require that the Ministers of the King, should have used their best exertions to compel Don Miguel to do so?

If he had declined to enter into any engagements; if he had taken his stand upon alleged rights; if he had rejected our hospitality, and refused our money; if he had fought his way into Portugal by himself and on his own account; much as we might have condemned his after conduct, we at least should not have been implicated by any course, which he might have pursued.

But I say that the conduct of Don Miguel has been no less affronting to the King of England, than it has been disgraceful to Don Miguel himself.

Was it fitting that the King of England, should be made the stalking horse, under whose cover this royal poacher, should creep upon his unsuspecting prey? Was it becoming that the King of England, should be made use of, as the attesting witness, to engagements never meant to be fulfilled, and to oaths forsworn by the heart, ere yet they had found utterance from the lips?

I say, that if the insulted honour of a Sovereign, is a legitimate ground of national quarrel, we are intitled to demand, and to extort, reparation from Don Miguel. What that reparation ought to be, the voice of indignant Europe, has long since declared.

But in the absence of all documents, and judging only from known events, what, let me ask, have our Government done, to hold Miguel to those engagements, to which he thus studiously and publicly contrived to make us parties?

Why first, we took away from him his money; that is to say, our Ambassador, who accompanied him, seeing indications, not to be mistaken, of an intention on the part of Don Miguel, to depart from his engagements; our Ambassador acting upon his own responsibility, though the act was afterwards fully approved by the Government at home, sent back the money, which had gone out with Don Miguel, and

which luckily had not been landed.—Rather a strong measure this; and bordering somewhat upon interference in the affairs, pecuniary at least, of Don Miguel.

Secondly, as was stated by a Noble Friend of mine, the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in another place, towards the end of last session; secondly, remonstrance followed remonstrance, each couched in language stronger than that which preceded. Remonstrances indeed, and in language of progressively increasing indignation! Remonstrances, pray, against what? why, against the manner in which Don Miguel was proceeding, to administer the internal affairs of Portugal. And is remonstrance, strong and indignant remonstrance, upon such matters, no interference? and if all interference in the internal affairs of Portugal be interdicted, as is alleged by the Government, who and what, gave us the right, thus to remonstrate? Why my Noble Friend himself answered this question; for he stated, that we remonstrated against indications, that Miguel intended to depart from those professions, which he had made while in this country; and here the Government took the same view of this matter, which I am now taking, and assumed, that the engagements which Don Miguel had entered into with us, and through us, with others, did give us a right to interfere. Well, but ought the Government of a great nation to remonstrate strongly and repeatedly, and yet to remon-

strate in vain? ought they officially to complain of violated engagements, and yet to sit tamely down under a disregard of their complaint, and a determined continuance of the violation?

It does not appear that, at the time to which my Noble Friend alluded, such was the intention of the English Government; for when our remonstrances were disregarded, the functions of our Ambassador were suspended; and when those violations were continued, our Ambassador was actually withdrawn; and both these measures were in fulfilment of intimations, previously given by him to the Portuguese Government, that such would be consequences of a perseverance in the course, which they were pursuing.

Up to that period then, (about the end of May, 1828,) by which time a provisional order of recall had been sent to our Ambassador, which was to take effect upon the happening of certain things, which did actually occur a little while afterwards; up to that time, the Government seem to have remonstrated, threatened, and executed their threats. But when our Ambassador was withdrawn, the last bolt of the English Cabinet seems to have been shot away; their quiver was exhausted; and then began a cessation of hostilities, with the usurpation of Don Miguel.

The recall of our Ambassador, a measure, in the usual intercourse of nations, big with fearful import, and commonly understood as the immediate forerunner of rupture, or rather as the public declaration

of rupture already existing, the recall of our Ambassador seems, in this case, to have had no other consequences, than to deprive the British residents in Portugal, of the protection which the presence of our Ambassador, might have afforded them; and to relieve Don Miguel from the irksome necessity of listening twice a week, to the very disagreeable truths, which our Ambassador had, from time to time, been instructed to tell him.

All that since has followed, as far as the public are informed, has been entirely of a different complexion. Then came our acquiescence in every sort of blockade proclaimed by Don Miguel, against the subjects of our ally Don Pedro; then came his infliction of every sort of injury, upon the subjects of the King of England, residing in Portugal. Then came the arrival of an Ambassador from Don Miguel, who, though not formally acknowledged, is yet supposed to have been in frequent private communication, with the members of our Government; then came the mission of our Ambassador, Lord Strangford, to the Brazils, the objects of which, I trust, for the honour of the country, have been much misrepresented by public report; then came the conquest of Madeira; and then, would that it could be blotted out from the naval records of England, then came the British expedition against Terceira.

With respect to the blockade of Oporto, I must take leave to say, that we have been in a great hurry to proclaim our acquiescence in the Miguelite block-

ades. I well know that it is not for the interest of England, to break down the respect for blockades, when real and effective, and established by existing Governments; and that we are not to scrutinize too deeply, the legitimate origin of the blockading Government, but should take people in this respect pretty much as we find them, and for what they give themselves out to be; but at the time when Miguel declared Oporto blockaded, was he in truth the *de facto* Sovereign of Portugal? and if he was, did we take him for what he was, and for what he gave himself out to be? When that blockade was declared, civil war was raging in Portugal; the nation was divided; there were two Governments existing; an usurping one at Lisbon, another in the name of the lawful Sovereign at Oporto; why such breathless haste on our part, to decide that wrong must overpower right? and why, by thus publicly proclaiming our anticipation of the result, did we in some measure contribute to bring that result about?

Oporto marched troops against Lisbon; Lisbon launched a blockade against Oporto. The whole thing was a scramble. If the Oporto troops had been well led and commanded, they would infallibly have been in Lisbon, and have put down our *de facto* Lieutenant, just about the very time, when we were officially announcing his blockade; and it was owing to the merest accident that this did not actually happen. But suppose Oporto had had ships as well as troops, and had blockaded Lisbon; which

it had a much better right to do, than Lisbon to blockade Oporto; should we have been as ready to announce the blockade of Lisbon?

Now, Sir, a word or two about the conquest of Madeira; and I beg leave to ask, why the British Government permitted Miguel to make that conquest?

I respect as much as any man the principle of national independence; but it is precisely because I respect this principle; because I think that one country and one people have no right to impose upon another country and another people, by force of arms, any particular ruler or form of Government; it is precisely for this very reason, that I condemn the conduct of our Government, in permitting Miguel to go and conquer Madeira.

I deny that Miguel, by usurping the throne of Portugal, could acquire any rights over Madeira, which England, denying as she did, his right to the throne of Portugal itself, could be bound to acknowledge. Two wrongs cannot make a right; the wrongful usurpation of Portugal, could not render rightful, the subsequent conquest of Madeira; Miguel claimed to rule over Madeira, because it was a dependency of Portugal; but we, who denied his right to rule over Portugal, could not admit, that his unjust usurpation of the mother country, could constitute a legitimate title to the dependency. Those who deny premises cannot accede to conclusions.

He had no right to talk of the integrity of the dominions of the crown of Portugal; integrity indeed, and Miguel! The very words refuse companionship. Who had broken the integrity of the dominions of the crown of Portugal? who but he, who brandishing in one hand the sword of rebellion, uplifted in the other the sceptre of usurpation; he, who himself first began to dismember Portugal, he, least and last of all mankind, could urge the plea of the undivided entirety of the dominions of the crown of Portugal.

I ask then, was England bound by the obligations of any specific treaty, or by the general laws of nations, to stand by, and see Miguel conquer Madeira?

No treaty could oblige us, because treaties with Miguel, thank heaven, as yet, we have none. Treaties with Pedro indeed we have; obligations of honour towards him and his daughter, have we also. But the spirit of those treaties, and the tenor of those obligations, might have led to any other course rather than that, which has been pursued.

The laws of nations could not bind us down to connive at this conquest, because the conquest itself was a violation of those laws; and in like manner as in a particular community, any bystander is at liberty to interfere, to prevent a breach of the law of that community; so also, and upon the same principle, may any nation interpose, to prevent a flagrant violation, of the laws of the community of nations.

The usurpation of Miguel was an outrage upon

national law, whether at Lisbon, at Oporto, or at Madeira; and every one of the subjects of that Sovereign, whose crown he had placed upon his unworthy head, was not only at full liberty, but was bound by his allegiance, to resist that usurpation to the utmost.

If the people of Lisbon had a right to choose Miguel for their King, the people of Oporto and Madeira, had just as good a right to uphold the authority of Pedro or Maria. If the people of Lisbon had no right to choose Miguel for their King, still less could they have a right to impose him, upon their unwilling fellow-subjects. Upon no possible principle could the people of Lisbon have a right to impose by force of arms, upon Oporto or Madeira, that Miguel, whom Lisbon perhaps had chosen, but whom Oporto and Madeira rejected.

Well then, if England was not bound by treaty, nor by international law, to stand by, and see Miguel conquer Madeira; if England had, even by the laws of nations, a right to interfere, if she chose; what must have been the views and policy of that government, which could choose, not to interfere?

There could have been no difficulty in protecting Madeira. United to Portugal by diplomacy, it is widely divided from it by geography; we could have accomplished our purpose, without sending even a single keel to Madeira; by means no more hostile than words, by missiles no more deadly than a dispatch. We had only to declare to Miguel, that we took Ma-

deira under our protection, in trust for our ally Don Pedro or his daughter, so long, at least, as Madeira chose spontaneously to maintain its allegiance; and I think I may venture to affirm, that such a declaration from England to Miguel, would have met with an acquiescence no less prompt, than that of England, to his blockade of Madeira.

Did we want a precedent for such a proceeding? we need not have gone far back to look for it. The usurpation of Miguel, is not the first time in these our days, that the legitimate authority of the Sovereign of Portugal, has been forcibly suspended at Lisbon. In 1828, Miguel, if not backed and instigated by Spain, at least not disapproved by Spain, forcibly dethroned one Queen of Portugal; in 1807, another Queen of Portugal, was forcibly dethroned by the arms of France, combined with the influence of Spain. What did the British Government, then? They sent an expedition to take possession of Madeira, and to hold it in trust for the lawful Sovereign of Portugal. Aye, but I hear it said, those who dethroned the Queen of Portugal then, were at war with England. If those who have dethroned the Queen of Portugal now, are not at war with England, it is because England has put up with indignities from them, which she never before has brooked from any other people in the world. Perhaps it will be said, that it was France and Spain, who then dethroned the Queen of Portugal, and that it is Por-

tugal itself, that has done so now. A faction, indeed in Portugal, has done so now; and such has been the manner, in which our Government have managed these affairs, that if that faction shall triumph, its triumph will be the triumph of Spain; and if that faction shall be rooted out, we shall see planted in its place, the influence of liberal France. But if any man asks me, whether Miguel is the child of a faction, or the choice of a people, I refer him to the thousands and tens of thousands, of all that is distinguished or respectable in Portugal, who are now, either lurking in concealment, or wandering in exile, or languishing in crowded prisons.

In all the treaties between England and Portugal, most especial and particular stipulations have been made, for the security of the property and personal liberty of British subjects resident in Portugal. By these treaties it is provided, that a Judge Conservator shall be appointed, for all causes relating to British subjects, and from this Judge there is only a specified appeal; it is provided, that no British subject shall be arrested, (unless he is apprehended in the actual commission of a criminal offence), without an order in writing from this Judge Conservator; that British subjects may travel freely throughout Portugal, and carry arms for their security. That they shall not be liable to vexatious visits, and searches, of their houses, their books, or their papers; that if they offend against the laws, those laws shall indeed be enforced, but that

false and malicious accusations, shall not be made the pretext for vexatious visits and searches; and that none shall ever be made, except by the sanction of the competent Magistrate, and in presence of the British Consul. It is also provided, that even in case of rupture between the two countries, the existence of which is to be determined by the recall of our ambassador, British subjects shall have the privilege of continuing to reside and trade in Portugal, without any manner of interruption, so long as they behave peaceably, and commit no offence against the laws; and in case their conduct should render them suspected to the Portuguese Government, and should oblige it to order them to remove, the term of twelve months is to be allowed them for that purpose, in order that they may retire with their effects and property, whether intrusted to individuals, or to the state.

Now it is perfectly notorious, that in the cases of at least five British subjects, Mr. Young, Mr. Noble, Sir John Doyle, Mr. Ascoli, and Mr. O'Brien; every one of these stipulations, have been flagrantly and scandalously violated.

Their arrest; their long imprisonment without trial, sometimes in loathsome dungeons, sometimes in prisons crowded to suffocation; the seizure of their property; the visits, and searches, of their houses, books, and papers; the mode of their trial; their condemnation; their sentence; were, I believe, all violations, either of the treaties with England; or of the law of

Portugal itself. And how has our Government performed its duty, of protecting British subjects, of enforcing our treaty rights, and of asserting the national honour? Why, by their established method, of remonstrance. And how has Miguel treated their remonstrances? Why, judging from what he has done, and not knowing what he may have said, with perfect indifference.

Our naval commander in the Tagus, is supposed at one time, to have made, by order of his Government, a positive demand, for the immediate liberation of a British subject wrongfully imprisoned; and to have required a categorical answer in eight and forty hours. The time elapsed; the answer arrived; it was a positive and categorical refusal: What followed? any assertion of national dignity? was Fort St. Julien laid in ruins? was the Miguelite squadron burnt, sunk, and destroyed as per margin? or was Don Miguel even treated with a courteous retort of one of his own favourite blockades? Nothing of all this. Our naval commander puts his answer in his pocket, and in dignified silence proceeds to sail away. I am not criticizing the conduct of a brave and distinguished officer, I am only commenting upon the orders, under which I must presume he was acting; but I say, that if the accounts which I have heard are correct, Buonaparte in the plenitude and insolence of his power, never treated the humble representations of a petty German principality, with more con-

temptuous disregard, than that which our remonstrances have met with, at the hands of Don Miguel.

The wrongs of the individuals in question, are still, I believe, unredressed; their losses are still unrepaired; unless I am to except the sum of 56*l.* 17*s.* or something thereabouts, which I have been told the Portuguese Government, with the approbation of our own, has awarded to one of these persons, as a full compensation, for an illegal arrest, for a long and painful imprisonment, for an expensive trial, and for all the heavy losses, inevitably arising, from the sudden interruption of his business, and his abrupt expulsion from Portugal.

Thus then I say, that the personal honour of our Sovereign has been insulted; the rights of our fellow-subjects have been violated; treaties, ancient and modern, have been broken; and for all these injuries and affronts, which Europe has beheld with amazement, our Government have only had recourse, to a system of ineffectual remonstrance.

What is the inference to be drawn from all this? Is it that our ministers are wanting in spirit, and in a nice sense of honour? No human being, who ever heard that great and illustrious name, which stands foremost on the list; no human being who knows any thing of any one of our Ministers, could for a single instant entertain such an idea. Is it then that England is so weak and penniless, that she is reduced to the hard necessity, of crouching to Portugal? There may

be on the continent, those, who might wish it, there can be none, who believe it. Well then, what is the solution? Why in public opinion it is this; Miguel is looked upon, as a sort of pet of the English cabinet; and like as a fond and indulgent parent cannot bear to chastise, even the most irregular follies, of a spoiled and favourite child, so also it is thought, that the British Government have submitted to usage from Miguel, which coming from any other quarter, would have roused them, like a lion from his slumber.

Well, Sir, then comes the case of Terceira; and here indeed the lion has put forth his strength; when it were much to be wished, he had still continued to repose: or here rather we performed the functions of a less noble animal, and hunted down the prey; that another might step in, and devour.

Here, at last, we openly departed from our boasted principle of non-interference; but here, as I before said, our interference was on the wrong side. Here, no longer contented with bearing all the wayward contumelies of Don Miguel, we became his active and belligerent allies, and took his dependencies under our protection. His dependencies indeed! his mere expectations, his intended conquests, his projected plunder; we did like the confederates in the street, who surround the passenger, and keep off assistance; that the robber may follow his vocation.

It has been said by my Right Hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, that the



ports of England ought not to be made places of arms to organize attacks upon foreign and friendly powers: granted: and if we thought it due from us to Miguel, to say so, we might have said to the Portuguese at Plymouth, stay here if you like, quit England if you will; the world is before you, to choose your destination, with one, and one only exception; to Plymouth from Portugal you came, from Plymouth to Portugal you must not return. That road is barred; all else is open to your choice. Thus much, if we thought it due by us to Miguel, we might require; further than this we had no right to dictate.

In what character did these people come here, was it as prisoners of war, or as free agents? As prisoners certainly not; for with them and their Sovereign, war we had none. As free agents, perhaps not entirely; because our constitution, and our duties as a nation, might interpose some limits, to the fulness of their free agency. They were certainly to be considered more in the light of an organized military body, though unarmed, than as a chance assemblage of unconnected individuals; and we might therefore justly require them to depart, if we thought fit so to do. We did require them to depart; at least we gave them an alternative, of removal into the interior, and of separation of officers from men, which in fact, left them no choice, but to depart.

If this alternative was prescribed to them, in consequence of any fear of danger, which might arise, to

the peace of Plymouth, or to the safety of our arsenal, from the presence of these unarmed men; the Government of course acted upon good information, and they are entitled to our confidence in such a matter. But if this alternative was prescribed to them in consequence of representations and remonstrances from Spain, then I say, that such representations and remonstrances ought not to have been complied with. Spain was not entitled to say to England, this: In like manner as you England required us Spain, in 1826, to remove into our interior, and separate officers from men, the Portuguese deserters, who were then upon our frontier; so do we Spain, now require you England, to remove into your interior, and separate officers from men, the Portuguese refugees, who are now upon your coast. The cases were essentially different. Our right to demand that Spain, in 1826, should not collect, organize, arm, clothe, equip, and subsist, Portuguese deserters upon her frontier, for the avowed purpose of hostile invasion of Portugal, backed and supported by a Spanish army, close in their rear, our right to make this demand, was founded upon our patent treaties with Portugal, which obliged us, if Portugal should be thus invaded, to send troops to assist in her defence. Spain has no such treaties obliging her to defend Portugal. That one aggravation is indeed happily wanting, to the full measure of her injustice towards Portugal at that time. But Spain, exempt from our obligations, is therefore not invested

with our rights. Her very remonstrance, indeed, was a sort of interference in favour of the usurpation of Miguel, and we ought, on that account to have told her, courteously as we pleased, but firmly and decidedly, that to such representations from her, we could not listen.

It being, however, determined, rightly or wrongly, that these people should depart, whither should they go? From Portugal they were warned off, by the bayonets of Miguel and the Interdict of the British Government; Brazil, since the separation of the crowns, was to them a foreign land; but though exiled and proscribed, they still had a Sovereign and a country. Their Sovereign was at that very moment receiving at the hands of the King of England, a generous and a delicate recognition; a recognition in which the inborn nobleness of royal nature contrived to infuse into the dry forms of state ceremonial, something almost partaking of the charm and the spirit of chivalrous protection. Their country was Terceira, where the authority of their Queen was still maintained and obeyed. If there was any one spot on the face of the habitable globe, to which, when driven from England, they had a right to go, that spot was Terceira. But even to this, their last asylum, the jealousy of Spain, and the vengeance of Miguel pursued them; their very sanctuary was violated; the blood of unarmed and defenceless men, was shed in the only harbour of their Sovereign and under the very shadow of her flag; and the navy of Eng-

land, heretofore accounted, the protector of the oppressed, and the avenger of the injured, was made the subservient tool of tyranny and usurpation. Would that a veil could be drawn over a transaction, so uncongenial to British feelings, so inconsistent with British policy.

But it is said that there was civil war at that time in Terceira; there seems to be much doubt of this; when the documents are produced we shall see; but be this as it may, the government was carried on in the name of Donna Maria, and she was at that time *de facto*, as well as *de jure*, Queen of Terceira.

It is said too that these people were armed, if I may use the expression, *in posse*, if not *in esse*. That is to say, that arms had been previously sent thither, for their use, when landed, instead of those arms of which the Spanish authorities had deprived them. I hope and trust that this is true; I hope that these people being landed at Terceira, whether by American enterprise, or by French generosity, will there find arms to defend a cause, which heaven and earth pronounce to be just. But whether they were armed or unarmed, can make no difference whatever in their right to go to Terceira; though the fact that they really were unarmed, does give a painful character to the wrong, which we inflicted upon them there.

Well, but it will be said to me, what is it that you wished, what would you yourself have done? do you mean that England should have gone to war with

Portugal, on account of Don Miguel? Why the time has been, when the idea even of a war with Portugal, would not have been a very severe trial to the nerves of England; but to no such trial need we in the present case have been exposed. In the first place, to war against Miguel, would not be to war against the Portuguese nation; it would be to war in their aid, and to have them on our side as assisting allies. But no war would have been necessary at all; a strong demonstration of our feelings, a decided expression of our opinions, would probably have been enough: if we had countenanced and supported the government at Oporto, instead of helping to blockade it; if we had given succour to the Portuguese at Plymouth, instead of expelling and cannonading them; in short, if instead of throwing our sword into the scale of Miguel, we had cast even our empty scabbard into that of his opponents, we should probably have accomplished our purpose, and his destiny would have kicked the beam.

Such is the view which I take of the foreign policy of the Government, when looked at with reference to Portugal singly: is this impression altered, by even a cursory glance at their measures in other quarters? Has there been much more energy and promptitude in fulfilling our engagements to Greece, than in compelling Don Miguel to fulfil his engagements to us? July, 1829, is coming fast upon us, and the treaty of July, 1827, is still unexecuted; but out of the delay

in its execution, has arisen one of the main evils which that treaty was intended to prevent, I mean a war in the east of Europe.

The Morea indeed has been cleared of the Turks. Sir, I am conscious that I am not strictly confining myself to the particular subject in debate, but the House will remember that this is the first and will be the last opportunity in the present session, of touching at all upon our foreign relations; that during the last twelve months transactions of no common importance have occupied the attention of Europe, and that the seven or eight months that will probably pass away before Parliament again assembles, are pregnant with events, of which no man can foresee the issue, or foretell the consequences; and I trust, therefore, that I may experience for a few moments the indulgence of the House. The Morea, I say, has indeed been cleared; I wish the arms of England had had a more direct and prominent share in that honourable exploit. But why were the arms of France checked at the Isthmus of Corinth? Was it that France herself shrunk back with alarm at the consequences of a further advance? or was it that the narrow policy of England stepped in, and arrested her progress? Why did France go to Greece at all, unless it was to obtain by force what Turkey would not yield to persuasion, namely, the evacuation of that territory which is destined for liberated Greece? and if that was her purpose, why did she stop short, before that

purpose was fully accomplished? Shall I be told that this purpose is accomplished, that the Morea and the Cyclades are to be this liberated Greece, and that the Isthmus of Corinth is its northern boundary? I say that will not be, that cannot be, it is impossible that it should be; a larger and wider limit, extending at least to the line drawn from Volo to Arta, is indispensably necessary for Greece; it is indispensably necessary, for reasons, which I shall not now go into, but reasons, political, commercial, and military; every man who has any local knowledge of the country, and whose judgment is worth having, agrees now I believe about this; be he English, or French, or Russian, or Greek; be he naval, or military, or diplomatic; and even those, who were the greatest sticklers for the Morea simply, must now abandon the notion of establishing a Greece, which should contain neither Athens, nor Thebes, nor Marathon, nor Salamis, nor Plataea, nor Thermopylae, nor Misolunghi; which should exclude from its boundaries, all the most inspiring records of national achievements, whether in ancient or in modern times.

But in this, as in clearing the Morea, France will hold the first, and England the second place; the merit of giving this extended limit will in public opinion be ascribed to the enlightened liberality of France; France will have the credit of being supposed to have dragged England reluctantly after her; England will bear the odium, of having vainly at-

tempted to clog the progress of France. But why do not the allies deal with the country north of the Isthmus, as they have done with that to the south, and occupy at once, all that, which must be assigned to Greece? I have seen that it has been said elsewhere, that the allies are negotiating upon this subject with Turkey; I should have thought that the allies had had enough of negotiating with Turkey about Greece; and that they had by this time discovered, that even Turkey herself, would rather, that on this subject they should dictate; why then do they not at once occupy Livadia and Attica, why do they compel the unfortunate Greeks to go toiling on, recovering step by step that territory, which must be theirs; and thus force them to keep up that very state of hostility, which it was one of the first intentions of the treaty immediately to put an end to. The very first object of the treaty was armistice; that armistice the allies have enforced in the Morea, in the only manner in which it could be brought about; why do they not establish it in the same way, up to Volo and Arta.

What form of government the allies mean to propose for Greece I do not ask; it would be improper to do so; but I must express my hope that the form to be adopted will be such, that while it provides for its own stability, it will give free political development to the intellectual faculties of the people; it is indeed to be presumed that an alliance, in which two powers out of the three, are themselves striking ex-

amples of the advantages of popular institutions, will take care to secure to liberated Greece, the permanent enjoyment of similar blessings. In short, I hope the constitution will be of London and Paris manufacture, and not the production of any artist in a capital nearer to Greece.

I said that the delay in executing the treaty of July, 1827, had brought upon us that very evil of a war in the east of Europe, which that treaty was calculated to prevent. In that war, my opinion is, that the Turks were the aggressors. I am pronouncing no opinion whether Russia has or has not ambitious views upon Turkey; it might indeed be thought that the Russian empire is sufficiently extensive, to satisfy the most ambitious Sovereign, or to find employment for the most enlightened, but on that point I give no opinion; I will not decide either, on which side may be the balance of that general account of reciprocal grievances, which has so long been standing between the two parties; but in that particular transaction, Turkey was the aggressor; she seized Russian ships and cargoes, expelled Russian subjects from Turkey, and shut the Bosphorus against Russian commerce, all in violation of treaties; and declared her intention not to fulfil the treaty of Akerman; and all this upon no other pretence, than certain things which Russia had done in conjunction with her allies England and France, to prevail upon Turkey to accede to some arrangement about Greece.

Do I mean to infer from this, that England and France ought to have made common cause with Russia? far from it; but I do mean, that England and France ought to have used exertions to bring about an accommodation, which I very much doubt their having employed.

The opinion which I entertained upon this important matter, when I retired from the Government this time last year, an opinion which was known to my then colleagues, and which subsequent events in Europe have not changed, was shortly this:

That Turkey was the aggressor, and that Russia had therefore a right to compensation, for injury sustained.

That the interests of Europe, and the spirit of the treaty of July, 1827, required that this compensation should be in money, and not in territory.

That if the contest went on, it was obvious that it must either be waged between Russia and Turkey alone, or that other powers in Europe must be drawn in, to take a part.

That if other powers in Europe were drawn in to take a part, and the flame once spread to the west, no man could say where it would stop; and that it was impossible to contemplate, without the greatest uneasiness, the derangements of the present system, and settlement, and state of possession in Europe, to which such a war, in which England must inevitably be involved, might eventually lead.

That if the war was waged between Russia and Turkey alone, Turkey would infallibly have the worst of it; and that consequently a regard for the interests of Europe, and a regard for the interests of Turkey herself, ought equally to impel France and England to urge Turkey by all possible means, to make fair terms as soon as she could, since the sooner she made them, the easier they would be.

It was also my opinion, that Austria should be made clearly to understand, that the days of subsidies are gone by; and that it should have been distinctly explained to Turkey, that the people of England would be little disposed to pay, for the recovery of unpronounceable fortresses on the Danube, after they had been lost by the obstinate perverseness of Turkey.

If this system had been acted upon in the early part of last year, with vigour and decision, I do not say that it would, but it is just within the reach of possibility, that it might, have prevented the last campaign; and, that it was desirable to prevent it is obvious, because if that campaign had ended according to general expectations, its results might have infinitely augmented the difficulties of an arrangement satisfactory to Europe. Success, however, was so nearly balanced, although the scale inclined in favour of Russia, that great facilities for accommodation still remained, even after the close of that campaign. The precious interval of winter has, however, passed fruitlessly away, and a second campaign is already begun.

What its result may be, I will not be so presumptuous as to predict; but that which is the least likely, is, that it should replace Turkey in the state of territorial occupation in which she stood before the war commenced.

Have the Government employed to the best advantage the opportunities of negotiation which they have had; have they, while on the one hand they set their faces against territorial acquisitions by Russia, have they, on the other hand, combated stoutly and firmly the intrigues of other powers to stimulate the obstinacy of Turkey; have they, in short, laboured *bond fide*, and in good earnest, to bring about peace, in the only way in which peace can be accomplished?

If they have not, and if by any want of resolution and decision, they shall ultimately have endangered the tranquillity of all Europe; if balancing between a wish to assist Turkey, and an inability to find any pretence for doing so, they have, by the ambiguity and mixed character of their language to Turkey, allowed her to deceive herself, or to be deceived by others, as to what she is to expect from England; and if they have thereby been instrumental in encouraging her resistance to a just accommodation: then, indeed, they will have incurred a responsibility, which I should be sorry to share.

From what I have said, it will be seen, that I do not place implicit confidence in the foreign policy of the Government; my views of men and things differ

so much from those of persons who are supposed to have much influence with them, that it is impossible I should. There are two great parties in Europe; one which endeavours to bear sway by the force of public opinion; another which endeavours to bear sway by the force of physical control; and the judgment almost unanimous of Europe, assigns the latter as the present connexion of England.

The principle on which the system of this party is founded is, in my view, fundamentally erroneous. There is in nature no moving power but mind, all else is passive and inert; in human affairs this power is opinion; in political affairs it is public opinion; and he who can grasp this power, with it will subdue the fleshly arm of physical strength, and compel it to work out his purpose. Look at one of those floating fortresses, which bear to the farthest regions of the globe, the prowess and the glory of England; see a puny insect at the helm, commanding the winds of Heaven, and the waves of the ocean, and enslaving even the laws of nature, as if instead of being ordained to hold the universe together, they had only been established for his particular occasion. And yet the merest breath of those winds which he has yoked to his service, the merest drop of that fathomless abyss which he has made into his footstool, would, if ignorantly encountered, be more than enough for his destruction; but the powers of his mind have triumphed over the forces of things, and the subjugated

elements are become his obedient vassals. And so also is it, with the political affairs of empires; and those statesmen who know how to avail themselves of the passions, and the interests, and the opinions of mankind, are able to gain an ascendancy, and to exercise a sway over human affairs, far out of all proportion greater than belong to the power and resources of the state over which they preside; while those, on the other hand, who seek to check improvement, to cherish abuses, to crush opinions, and to prohibit the human race from thinking, whatever may be the apparent power which they wield, will find their weapon snap short in their hand, when most they need its protection.

In the first of these conditions stood England two years ago; when our political influence among the nations of the earth was infinitely greater, not than our means of defending our independence or asserting our honour, but infinitely greater than any power we possess of controlling the conduct of others.

In the second of these conditions, stands Austria now; who by the narrowness of her views, and the unfortunate prejudices of her policy, has almost reduced herself, in point of influence, to the level of a second rate power; notwithstanding her vast dominions, her ample resources, her warlike population, and her central position in Europe. Such England was; such Austria is: what England is now, Parlia-

ment has no means of knowing, except from vague and uncertain report. I trust that when the time shall come, that the lips of the Government shall be unsealed; we shall find that we have maintained our former dignity, and have not lost caste in Europe. But it is impossible for any man of late, to have set foot beyond the shores of these islands, without observing with deep mortification, a great and sudden change in the manner, in which England is spoken of abroad; without finding, that instead of being looked up to as the patron, no less than the model of constitutional freedom, as the refuge from persecution, and the shield against oppression, her name is coupled by every tongue, with every thing, on the continent, that is hostile to improvement, and friendly to despotism, from the banks of the Tagus to the shores of the Bosphorus; and that she is represented as the key-stone of that arch, of which Miguel, and Spain, and Austria, and Mahmood, are the component members. Time was, and that but lately, when England was regarded by Europe, as the friend of liberty and civilization, and therefore of happiness and prosperity, in every land; because it was thought that her rulers had the wisdom to discover, that the selfish interests and political influence of England, were best promoted, by the extension of liberty and civilization. Now, on the contrary, the prevailing opinion is, that England thinks her advantage to lie, in withholding from other countries that constitutional liberty, which she herself

enjoys. Not that they fancy, that the rulers of England can be insensible to the blessings and the energy, which spring from those popular institutions, which they themselves are daily administering. If any man were to say so, he would not be credited. But they think that because our Government know the full value of these advantages, therefore, from political jealousy, they seek to retain the monopoly for England. It is thus, that they imagine, that the atrocities of Miguel in Portugal are redeemed in our eyes, by his merit in destroying the constitution. It is thus, that they suppose we are making Austria our instrument, while she fancies us her tool; it is thus, that they see in the delay in executing the treaty of July, not so much, fear of Turkish resistance, as invincible repugnance to Grecian freedom.

I trust that when the time shall come, when the Government shall feel itself at liberty, to lay before Parliament, the whole course of its negotiations, and to explain the tone, and the spirit, and the objects of its communications with foreign powers, all these unfavourable impressions will be dispelled; and I rejoice, that by the present motion, such a developement will be afforded, at least, in the case of Portugal.

THE END.

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