CONSIDERATIONS

On the Revival of the

Royal-British-Assiento;

BETWEEN

His CATHOLICK-MAJESTY,

And the Honourable

The *South-Sea Company.*

With an Humble Attempt

To unite the *African-Trade* to That of the *South-Sea Company*, by *Act of Parliament.*

By *MALACHY POSTLETHWAYT*, Esq;

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ERRATA.

PAGE 8, line 23, for *for*, read *from*; p. 9, l. 27, for *Supenſion*, read *Suſpenſion*; p. 11, l. 12, dele *a*; p. 22, l. 1, for *thay* read *they*; p. 30, l. 17, for *without* read *with*.

TO

PETER BURREL, Eſq;

Sub-Governor,

JOHN BRISTOW, Eſq;

Deputy-Governor,

And the other

DIRECTORS of the Honourable the

SOUTH-SEA COMPANY.

GENTLEMEN,

IN Conſequence of the happy Reſtoration of Peace between *Great-Britain* and *Spain*, we may ſoon ex-

pect the *Royal-Assiento* between *His Catholick Majesty*, and the *Honourable Company* over which you preside, will be again re-established, and carried into Execution.

The Difficulties experienc'd in supplying the *Spanish West-Indies* with *Negroes*, have heretofore been great enough; and attended with no little Disadvantage to the *Royal Assientists*.

But as our Part of the *African Trade* has so many Years been in a most lingering Condition; and is, at present, reduced to a very low Ebb, by the intolerable Encroachments and Usurpations of our Rivals therein, who are daily stripping our Parts of the Coast of the choicest *Negroes*; the Difficulties the *Assientists* will meet with are greatly increased: and

and those, perhaps, to so great a Degree, that it may be found impracticable to supply above one *Quarter Part* of the *Assiento*; which will prove no little Detriment to the Trade of the *South-Sea Company*.

These Considerations have induced me to do myself the Honour to suggest such Measures, in the following Papers, as are humbly apprehended, will enable the *Assientists* to carry their Contract with the *King* of *Spain* effectually into Execution; and that to the best Advantage.

The Measures submitted for that Purpose are uniting the Trade to *Africa* with that of the *Assientists*: And to the End that the Publick as well as the *South-Sea Corporation* may

may reap all the Benefits and Advantages the *African-Trade* will admit of, I have taken the Liberty, with all humble Submiſſion, to ſuggeſt the Neceſſity of the *excluſive Privilege*, in that Trade, being granted to the *South-Sea Company*, by *Act of Parliament*, for a Term of Years certain.

In Conſequence hereof, certain Terms and Conditions on the Side of that *Honourable Company*, are propoſed to be acquieſced in, for the peculiar Intereſt and Proſperity of the *Britiſh Plantations* in general. To countervail which, in ſome Degree, further *Parliamentary* Encouragement will certainly be neceſſary. Whether the Shape wherein ſuch Encouragement to the *South-Sea Company*, may be given, is properly adapted; and what elſe is therein

therein exhibited to anſwer the Preſervation of our Trade to *Africa* and *America*, as alſo the Proſperity of the *South-Sea Company*, is moſt humbly ſubmitted to your candid Conſideration, by

GENTLEMEN,

Your moſt devoted,

moſt Obedient,

humble Servant,

MALACHY POSTLETHWAYT.

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

REVIVAL of the ROYAL BRITISH ASSIENTO, between the Court of SPAIN and the SOUTH-SEA COMPANY, &c.

ALL Nations have a natural Right to regulate the Trade and Navigation of their diſtant Colonies, by enacting ſuch Laws within themſelves, and by making ſuch Treaties with foreign Nations, as they ſhall judge the moſt conducive to the general Intereſt of their Mother-Countries.

'Twas from the Violation of thoſe Laws that the late calamitous War took it's Riſe: The *Spaniards*, by their Depredations, interrupted the *Britiſh* Rights of Navigation to and from *our* Colonies; and the *Engliſh* carryed on an illicit Trade with the *Spaniſh* Colonies.

But as the Subjects of no foreign Nation whatever have a Right to trade to the *Britiſh* Colonies,

but under the peculiar Restriction and Limitation of *British* Laws; so neither have the Subjects of any foreign Nation a Right to trade to the *Spanish* Colonies, but under the peculiar Restriction and Limitation of *Spanish* Laws, national Treaties, or Connivance. To do otherwise is violating those Laws, or Treaties; carrying on contraband Commerce, and breaking Friendship with that Nation.

The *Spaniards* standing in Need of a constant Supply of *Negroe*-Labourers to work their *Gold* and *Silver* Mines in *Peru* and *Mexico*, *&c.* have been under the Necessity, from time to time, of contracting with such Nation who could supply their Wants. Yet neither the *Genoese*, *Portuguese*, or *French*, who had that Contract, were ever able fully to supply them: and at length the *Assiento*, for this purpose, fell into the hands of the *English*. By virtue whereof the *Assientists* are authorized, under certain Conditions therein stipulated, to furnish the *Spanish West-Indies* with *Negroes*. But, by this Contract, all other the *British* Subjects, and all other the Subjects of any other Nation * whatever, are absolutely excluded from carrying *Negroes* to *New Spain*, or any other Merchandize, but in a way consistent with Treaties, subsisting between *Spain* and *other* Nations, for that purpose. For any other Nation therefore to interfere with the present Right of *British-Assientists*, is carrying on contraband Trade, as much as the *French* would be thought by the *English* to do, if they should presume to supply the *British* Colonies with what they are obliged, by

* Vide *Contract de l'Assiento en faveur de la Grande Bretagne, signé à Madrid en* 1713. *Art.* 18. *Rousset Tom.* 3.

by our Laws, to take from *England* their Mother-Kingdom.

From this State of the Case, we cannot be at a Loss to judge of the Nature of the *British Assiento*; it being a peculiar Contract between *Spain* and the *South-Sea Company*, as *Assientists*, to furnish the *Spanish* Colonies with *Negroes*, under certain Terms and Conditions; and, at the same time, to exclude all others whatsoever, either *English*, or *Foreigners*, from taking any Share therein.

'Tis a little extraordinary, methinks, that some *Gentlemen*, and those too of no mean Abilities, should, on particular Occasions, treat this *Contract* in the Light of an injurious, and therefore odious *Monopoly*; when, if dispassionately consider'd, it must certainly appear quite otherwise.

A *Monopoly* of Trade, in the common Sense and Acceptation of the *Trading Interest* in *general*, carries a frightful Idea with it; it implying nothing less than that the *general* Interests of Trade are thereby sacrificed to the *particular* Interest of a few. But how can this be the Case of the *British Assiento*; when the Trading Interest of *England* in *general* never did, nor ever will legally enjoy the sole Privilege of supplying the *Spanish West-Indies* with *Negroes?* How then can it be said, that the Trading Interest in *general* can lose what they never had, or ever will have? Nor will it always be the Interest of *Spain* to exclude the Trading Interest of England in *general* only, but the Trading Interest in *general* of all other Nations whatsoever, who may hereafter enjoy this Contract; for we can never suppose *Spain* weak enough to sacrifice the greatest part of her Royal Revenues in Compliment to any Nation whatever. And this, they well know, would certainly be the Case;

 for

for a free and open Trade to ſuch extended Coaſts as thoſe of the *Spaniſh Indies*, would give ſuch an handle for clandeſtine Trade, as to ruin that of the *Galleons* and *Flota*, from which the Royal Revenues of the whole *Spaniſh* Empire principally ariſe.

Altho' then this *Excluſive Privilege* lodged in the *S. S. Company*, cannot, with any colour of Reaſon, be ſaid to be the leaſt injurious to the Trading Subjects of *England* in *general*; yet it is certainly highly ſo to the Trading Subjects of *France*, our Predeceſſors in the *Aſſiento*: becauſe it is taking ſuch a Proportion of Trade out of their Scale, and throwing the ſame into our own.

That the *Aſſiento* is a *Monopoly* in this Senſe is true: but a *Britiſh Monopoly* that *excludes* foreign Nations from Trade, can never be thought detrimental to *Britiſh* Subjects in *general*. Was our whole *National Debt*, inſtead of being a *dead* Weight upon us, converted into a *Live-Trading-Stock*, and employ'd as the *South-Sea-Trading-Stock*, in ſuch *Monopolies* as excluded our foreign Rivals from Trade, ſhould we have Reaſon to repent it? On the contrary, would not ſuch maſterly Policy be the means of converting our national Incumbrances into national Benefits; and in time of gradually *realiſing* our *Paper-Debt* into *Solid-Caſh*, by augmenting the general Ballance of Trade highly in our Favour? However impetuous therefore has been the Cry againſt *Trading-Monopolies* in general; yet to condemn every *Kind* of *Monopoly* in the groſs indiſcriminatly, is moſt certainly a popular miſtake, however faſhionable it may have been.

As at firſt view we do not all ſee Things in the ſame Light, it may not be amiſs to give this matter

matter further Conſideration for Illuſtration's Sake. The *Dutch* enjoy a very lucrative *Monopoly* of the *Spice Trade* of the *Indies*; a *Monopoly* that *excludes* all other Nations, as well as *Dutchmen* in *general*, from this valuable Branch of Trade. Let it be ſuppos'd this Trade was to change hands, and to fall into thoſe of the *Engliſh*, on Condition of being united to the Trade of our *Eaſt-India Company*, with their excluſive Privileges and Immunities: Was this the Caſe, I would aſk, whether ſuch *Britiſh Monopoly* would be detrimental to the *Britiſh* Trading Intereſt in *general*, by reaſon that a *particular Britiſh* Company only poſſeſs'd that Trade? Would not this be a new Acquiſition of Trade to the Kingdom, by taking ſuch a Proportion out of the Hands of the *Dutch* and throwing it into our own? Could the Trading Intereſt of *England* in *general* complain of the *India Company*, as being any way detrimental to their common Intereſt, in depriving them of what they never before enjoyed? This could never be thought, or believed: And ſuch a Kind of *Monopoly* is the *Aſſiento*; a *Monopoly* that does no manner of Injury to our Traders in *general*, but engroſſes ſo much Trade out of the Hands of our Competitors, to their Prejudice and our Advantage.

But to make this Point ſtill more unexceptionably apparent. Our *American-Plantations* depend upon the Labour of *Negroes* for their various Productions: Should ever *Great-Britain*, by the ſubtil Wiles and Machinations of her Rivals, be render'd incapable of ſupplying her *own* Plantations with thoſe valuable People; ſhould we not be under the Neceſſity of contracting with ſome other Nation, who could ſupply them? Or, muſt not our Plantations be abſolutely undone? Suppoſe then a *Contract*,

tract, for this purpoſe, was made either with the *French* or *Dutch*, who having Dominion in *Africa*, might be capable of it; would not this be throwing ſuch an additional Proportion of Trade into the Scale of the *Dutch* or the *French*, and taking the ſame out of our own, we having hitherto ſupply'd ourſelves with *Negroes?*

Be our Neceſſity for *Negroes* ever ſo great; was our whole Dependance for them upon ſome Rival Nation, which I dread the very Apprehenſion of, ſhould we not avoid, if poſſible, the granting ſuch Contract to the Subjects in *general* of ſuch Nation? If ſo, ſome *foreign Negroe-Company* muſt enjoy it, *excluſive* of all other the Subjects of that Nation. Now, was this the Caſe, can we ſuppoſe that ſuch Nation would be ſo wrong-headed as not to know and ſenſibly feel this to be quite a new Acquiſition of Trade and Navigation to their Country, and leſſening that of *Great-Britain* in the like Proportion? Would the Trading Subjects in *general* of ſuch Nation be ſo infatuated as to grudge, or endeavour to deprive their Country of, ſo valuable an addition of Trade, becauſe ſuch were the peculiar Circumſtances thereof, that they could not in *general* reap the Benefits of it? Or could they in *general* complain of an injurious and odious *Monopoly*, that deprived them of what they never before did, nor their Country ever could enjoy at all, but in the Shape of a *limitted excluſive* Company. *England*'s giving ſuch a Power to any other Nation would be as ruinous and deſtructive of her *Trade*, *Navigation*, and *Revenues* ariſing from her Plantations, as it would to the *Spaniſh*, was that Nation to leave the *Negroe* Contract free and open to the Subjects in *general* of any Nation who ſupplied it; becauſe it would give ſuch an

an handle for clandeſtine Trade to our Colonies in *general*, as muſt prove extremely detrimental to their Mother-Kingdom. How weak then does it appear for *Gentlemen* to treat the *Aſſiento*, as has too often been the Caſe, in the Light of a *Monopoly*; deſtructive of our *general* Intereſt of Trade, when it appears diametrically otherwiſe?

Well then; we have ſeen that the *Aſſiento* in the *Negroe-Part* of it is no frightful *Monopoly* in the vulgar Acceptation: but it is ſaid, that the granting of the Licence of an *annual Ship*, is; foraſmuch as it impowers the *Aſſientiſts* to import ſo many hundred Tons of *Britiſh* Manufactures into the *Spaniſh Indies*, beſides *Negroes*. But in what Senſe is this a *Monopoly?* Do the *Aſſientiſts*, by having this Liberty, exclude the reſt of the *Britiſh* Subjects from trading to the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, in a manner agreeably to the general Treaties ſubſiſting between *Great-Britain* and *Spain* for that Purpoſe? This will not be ſaid. Well then; it is not a *Monopoly* in the common Senſe of the Trading Intereſt. What ſort of a *Monopoly* is it then? Why, by ſending ſo many hundred Tons of *Britiſh* Merchandize, the *Aſſientiſts* engroſs ſuch a Proportion of Trade from our *Spaniſh Merchants* in *general*. But how does this appear either? Why may it not be as reaſonably ſaid, and believ'd too, that if our *Aſſientiſts* did not ſupply this Quantity of *Britiſh* Merchandzie, that ſome other particular Nation that trades to the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies* as well as we, would; or, if no *one* in particular did ſupply the whole; yet *all together* they might. And what Proof is there to the contrary? Who will undertake to demonſtrate, that if the *Aſſientiſts* had not this Share of the Trade, that the ſame would

would fall into the Hands of our ſeparate *Spaniſh Merchants?* And unleſs this is made appear, how can the *Aſſientiſts* be ſaid, with any degree of Certainty, to engroſs this Share of the *Britiſh* Trade from our *ſeparate Merchants?* Suppoſing however, but not granting, the *Aſſientiſts* do interfere with them in a ſmall proportion, an *Eighth* or a *Tenth* ſuppoſe, is it not more for the Advantage of *Britiſh* Manufacturers in general, that an *hundred thouſand Pounds* worth of our Merchandize ſhould be ſent to the *Spaniſh Indies* by the *Aſſientiſts*, than about *ten thouſand Pounds* worth by our own *Spaniſh Merchants* only? In that caſe the Addition of the other nine *Tenths* or ſeven *Eighths*, if you pleaſe, is taken out of the Scales of *other* Nations together, and thrown into our *own*. That this is the true State of the matter we have no Reaſon to doubt; for the *French* in particular having the Advantage of moſt Nations in this Trade, by Reaſon of their *Linnen*, *Silk*, and *Gold* and *Silver* Manufactures, which come cheaper than ours, the *Aſſientiſts* have been able to cope with them, by Reaſon of their Merchandize being exempt for thoſe heavy Duties in *Old Spain* on the Outſett and the Return on all European Goods: So that by means of the *Aſſiento*, we not only prevent the *French* and other Nations from ſupplanting the *Engliſh*, as they would do, but keep up the *Spaniſh* Spirit and Taſte for the *Britiſh* Manufactures in thoſe very Articles, wherein the *French* and others have done us the moſt Miſchief. In this Senſe neither then is the *Aſſiento* a *Monopoly*; unleſs it is more for the Intereſt of the Nation in *general*, rather to take to the value of *Twenty* or *Thirty Thouſand Pounds Sterling per Annum* only of *Spain*, than *Two*, or *Three Hundred Thouſand Pounds per Annum*.

Nor

Nor does it follow from this Capacity in the *Aſſientiſts* to be upon a level in their Sales with our Rivals, that they are any way prejudicial to our own ſeparate Traders in that Reſpect; for 'tis well known to be their Practice, as it is their Intereſt, to keep up the Price of *Britiſh* Manufactures in *general* in *New Spain:* and altho' in ſome *Particulars* they may be able to ſell as low as other Nations; yet what Detriment is that to their *Countrymen*, who cannot take the Advantage of it?

It has been ſaid likewiſe, but with as little Foundation as any thing elſe, that the *Aſſiento*, by ſupplying the *Spaniards* with *Negroes*, hath render'd them *dearer* to *Britiſh Planters* in general; and thereby prov'd prejudicial to our *Sugar* and other Colonies. To which I reply:

Before *Britiſh Aſſientiſts* ſupply'd *Spain* with *Negroes*, the *French* did, as has been obſerved: And did not they ſupply them from the Coaſt of *Africa*? Have not the *Aſſientiſts* done the ſame? How has *England* then, by ſupplying this *Contract*, and that from the ſame Place, increas'd the Demand, and thereby the Price of *Negroes?* Has ſhifting Hands only produced that Effect? Or, is it not owing to ſome other apparent Cauſes, which we ſhall ſee preſently?

On the Supenſion of the *Aſſiento* at any Point of Time, have *Negroes* been *cheaper* to our Planters than when the *Aſſientiſts* carry'd on their Trade from *Jamaica?* Are they cheaper now? On the contrary, are they not exorbitantly dear? This will not be laid at the Door of the *Aſſientiſts*. Well: But ſince *Negroes* are ſo dear at preſent; upon the *Revival* of the *Aſſiento*, will not this render them ſtill *dearer*, by increaſing the Demand? Paſt Experience has ſhown, that the Exerciſe of the

 Britiſh

British Assiento never did render them *dearer* to our *Planters*; but the Suspension of it certainly has; particularly to the *Planters* of *Jamaica*; who, as when the *Assientists* imported large Quantities for the Supply of their *Contract*, have never had them so cheap ever since. Supposing however, that the *Revival* of the *Assiento*, should not again be instrumental to the lowering the Price; which indeed is not now to be expected, for Reasons that will soon be given. What's to be done in this Case? Are we to throw it up to *France* again, who would, doubtless, chearfully accept it, should we be wise enough to do otherwise?

The *Spaniards*, we know, must and will have *Negroes*, because they must and will have *Gold* and *Silver* from the *Spanish Indies*: And if *England* does not think it her Interest to employ *Thirty* or *Forty* Sail of Shiping in transporting *Negroes* to them, as also to export large Quantities of our *British* Manufactures to *Africa* in Barter for those *Negroes*, some other Nation greedily will snap at those Advantages. Should this come to pass; who will undertake to shew, that our *British Planters* will purchase *Negroes* cheaper in consequence of such a Change of Hands of the *Assiento*?

Under such an Alteration in the Circumstances of that Trade, is it not rather to be feared, that our Plantations would not obtain a Supply at any Rate; instead of having them cheaper? For, as the *Spanish Assiento* must be given to a *French* or a *Dutch exclusive Company*, such *Company* would certainly use their utmost Efforts to engross as great a Share in the *Negroe*-Trade as possible; in order to carry their *Contract* into Execution. Whatever Nation had it, is it not reasonable to believe

believe that *Spain* would stipulate for a much larger number of *Negroes* than is done by the *British Assiento*?

That they would do so we have no little Reason to believe. For the Expences of *Spain* have been very extraordinary during the late War; their Debts in Consequence thereof very heavy; and their Finances in general but in very indifferent Plight. To recover themselves they have no Resource but to their *American-Indies*; nor need they a better. But altho' they abound with immense Treasures; yet these Treasures happen to be under ground; and the *Spaniards*, we know, are not mighty fond of Labour. They must and will have *Negroes* whom they can compel to work to bring their subterranean Treasures above Ground: And the more *Money* they want, the more *Negroes* they will purchase for that purpose. On a new *Assiento* therefore taking place with a another Nation, may not we naturally imagine the Number of *Negroes* will be increased, perhaps doubled; and how will it fare with our *British Planters* then?

While the *Assiento* continues in *British* Hands, we shall always be able to judge what Number of *Blacks* we can furnish, consistent with the Prosperity of our own Plantations; and beyond this Standard we shall never go to our own Prejudice: we shall always manage the Terms and controul the Exercise of a *British Assiento*, in due Subserviency to the Well-being of our *British* Colonies. But who will undertake the Guarantee, that *foreign Assientists* shall consult the Interest of *English Planters*, as the *British* may be always over-rul'd to do, by the occasional Interposition of a *British* Parliament, or a wise Administration?

 Upon

Upon the whole therefore, I am inclin'd to flatter myſelf, that, by this time, it appears rather more eligible to preſerve the *Aſſiento* as long as we can, than to reſign it to a foreign Competitor in Trade: And I am well perſwaded, was this matter ſet in a true Light before them, that our moſt judicious and eminent *Planters* would be of the ſame Sentiment.

If then keeping is a more conſolable Conſideration than parting with this *Contract*, it nearly and eſſentially concerns the Intereſt of the Kingdom in general, as well as our Plantations in particular, that the *Aſſientiſts* ſhould be enabled to carry their Treaty into Execution, the moſt to the Advantage of both, as well as themſelves.

The Importance of the Plantation-Trade to this Kingdom is now ſo well underſtood; and ſo generally allow'd, that it is needleſs to ſay any thing on that head: but it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that we are not the only People thoroughly ſenſible of the invaluable Benefits of this Branch of Commerce and Navigation. The late War hath afforded us experimental Knowledge, that ſomebody is following us cloſe at the Heels in this Trade; but if they overtake us herein, I am certain the Fault muſt be laid at our own door; we having the effectual means of Prevention in our own Hands. Were we even deſtitute of the means of Preſervation, 'tis beneath the Dignity of the *Britiſh* Empire to betray a ſervile Tamenefs and Paſſivity; but is it not an unpardonable Supineneſs and Inactivity, to have the means in our Power, and make no uſe of them at all: and this, I muſt beg leave to ſay, is the Caſe. For,

How can any Rival ruin our Plantation-Trade, while we are capable of ſupplying it cheaply and plentifully with *Negroes*? And while alſo we have it in

in our Power to prevent any Rival from ſupplying their Plantations near ſo cheaply and plentifully as we are able to do our own? And theſe things we moſt certainly have in our Power: and, what is peculiarly happy, we may eaſily exert this Power, without violating any National Treaty, or Compact; or indeed giving the leaſt *real* Cauſe of Offence to any Nation whatever.

That this is matter of Fact, is well known to all who are thoroughly acquainted with the *Britiſh* Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of Trade in *Africa*. Our Settlements there are more commodiouſly ſituated, than thoſe of any other Nation to carry on the *Negroe*-Trade to the beſt Advantage; they are not only more numerous likewiſe, than thoſe of any *particular* Nation, but are near equal to them all: and, at a few Thouſand Pounds Expence, may be render'd ſuperior in Strength to thoſe of all Nations, conſider'd together. What hinders then, but from the Weight of the *Britiſh* Intereſt in *Africa*, the *Britiſh* Plantations, and the *Britiſh Aſſiento* may be more cheaply and more plentifully ſupplyed than thoſe of any other Nation? Nothing can hinder this but our own ſhameful and ſcandalous Diſſenſions among ourſelves, who ſhall profit the moſt by the *African* Trade, for the Time preſent; though Poſterity ſhould be undone by their Contentions, and Animoſities.

Tho' our Mercantile Part of the Nation were pretty well apprized of the extraordinary Increaſe of the *French* Plantation-Trade in *America* before the late War; yet even the moſt knowing and experienc'd never thought it ſo very extraordinary, as it lately appear'd to be. The Heat of Action being now over, and Peace happily reſtor'd, does it

it not well become the Wiſdom of the Nation to ſcrutinize effectually into the Cauſe of ſo unexpected a Riſe of Trade and Navigation in the Hands of our Rivals? And more eſpecially ſo, ſince we are at preſent convinced, that it has been at the Expence of our own Plantation-Trade in general?

Tho' the apparent and glaring Cauſe of all this lays before our Eyes; yet we are hindered from ſeeing it. But does it not moſt nearly concern the Trading Intereſt of theſe Kingdoms, to enquire, by whom thoſe Clouds of Darkneſs are raiſed to eclipſe their View; and for what peculiar Ends and Purpoſes?

That we may take a pretty full View of the Meaſures of *France*, with Reſpect to the Support of their Trade to *Africa*, it may be neceſſary to deſcend to Particulars; of which, as I gave ſome Account in the Year 1746, † I ſhall only tranſcribe the Account then given.

An Account of the *Bounties*, *Exemptions*, *Privileges*, and *Encouragements*, given by the *French* to their *African Company*; taken from a Memorial of the *Deputies of the Council of Trade* in *France*, to the *Royal Council* of Commerce there.

I. An Exemption from all local and provincial Duties of any Kind, upon their Goods and Merchandize in *France*, as

† Vide *The National and Private Advantages of the* African Trade *conſider'd, &c. Addreſſed to the* Right Hon. Henry Pelham, Eſq; *Firſt Lord Commiſſioner of the Treaſury, &c. printed for Meſſ.* Knapton.

as alſo from all Duties for Merchandize exported to *Africa*, wherewith to purchaſe *Negroes*, *&c.* which conſidering the number of Ships they employ in this Trade, cannot be computed at near ſo ſmall a ſum as £ 150,000 Sterling *per Ann:* nor the whole Exemption at ſo ſmall a Rate as 3 *per Cent.* thereon: ſay only. ——— ——— £ 3000

II. An Exemption from half the Cuſtoms on all *Sugars*, and other Merchandize imported from the *French Iſlands* and *Colonies* in *America*, being the Produce of the Sale of *Negroes* there: the Amount of which will appear by the following moderate Computation, *viz.*

Suppoſe 15000 *Negroes* only (whereas good Judges reckon them not leſs than double that number) are imported into the *French Sugar Iſlands* annually; and that 10000 of that number only ſhould be ſold for *Sugar* to be returned to *France* at the Rate of 40 hundred Weight of Sugar only per Head,

The Duty on Importation of *Sugar* into *France* is 3 *per*———

Carried over £ 3000

Brought

Brought over ——		£3000
Cent. on about Two-thirds of the Value; which is at the Rate of 2 *per Cent.* There is alſo an *Inland Duty* of Three Livres, or 2*s.* 9*d.* Sterling *per* hundred Weight.		
Suppoſe the Price of ſuch *Sugars* is computed at no more than 25*s.* *per* hundred; which upon 10000 *Negroes* makes 400,000 Weight of *Sugar*: and this at one *per Cent.* being one half of the *Duty* upon Importation, amounts to ——	£5000	
400,000 hundred Weight of *Sugar* at 1*s.* 4*d.* ½ *per* hundred, being half of the above *Inland Duty* of Three Livres, or 2*s.* 9*d.* Sterling *per* hundred Weight, is ——	£27,500	
		£32,500
III. A *Bounty* of 10 Livres, or 9*s.* 2*d.* Sterling, to be paid out of the King's Revenue, for every *Negroe* carried to the *French Sugar Iſlands* and *Colonies* in *America*; which upon the ſaid 15000 *Negroes* only, amounts to ——		£6875
IV. A *Bounty* of 9*s.* 2*d.* for every Ounce of *Gold Duſt* that ſhall be imported from *Africa* into *France*. Suppoſe only 5000 Ounces of *Gold*		
Carried over		£42,375

Brought

Brought over ——	£42,375.
imported from *Africa* into *France*, which is quite trifling and inconſiderable, when we recollect how rich their Ships in the *Guinea*-Trade are in *Gold*, as appear'd by ſome Captures made in the late War, is —— ——	2296.
The Total is *per Ann.* in Sterling Money	£44,671.

N. B. The *Exemption* of Duties on what the other 5000 *Negroes* produce in *Coffee*, *Indigo*, *Cotton*, *Cocoa*, *&c.* is left out in this Account, leſt any Exaggeration ſhould be made: and in every other Article, things are extremely underrated, which every one at all acquainted with the Extent of the *French* Trade to *Africa*, and *America* need not be apprized of.

Nothing can be a more modeſt Computation than this is. But if to thoſe extraordinary Encouragements we tack that of *excluſive Powers* and *Immunities* beſides, it muſt certainly give the *French* a great weight of Influence and Authority in their *Negroe*-Trade in *Africa*.

Yet their Encouragements do not terminate here only: there is one ſingle Article alone, which ſeems to be ſo well calculated to make the moſt of

 the

the Labour of *Negroes*, and encourage their Planters, that it may not, perhaps, be esteemed inferior in it's good Consequences to all the rest, consider'd together: And that is, the Maxim of giving their most industrious Planters Credit out of the Publick-Stock, or the King's Treasury, for *Negroes*, and other Planting Materials. The Management of this part of their Encouragement, it seems, lies between the *Comptroller General of the Finances* and the *Company*: They are indeed, as Prudence directs, cautious of their *Planters*, to whom they give such Credit; but if they are Persons of known Probity and Industry, and make proper Application, they need want no Credit for *Negroes*, or any other Planting Materials. §

Measures of this Nature, it may be worth Observation, have been the constant Practice of *France*, when they have aim'd at carrying any capital Point in Trade. 'Twas by thus giving Credit to Traders out of the Royal Treasury, that the celebrated *Monsieur Colbert* first enabled *France* to rival *England* in the *Woollen Manufactury*; for after he had brought the *French* to furnish their own People, and clothe their own Nobility and Gentry, and even the King himself, with their own *Woollen Manufactures*, and exclude the *English* Manufactures from *France* by a *Law*, they turn'd their Thoughts upon supplanting us at *foreign* Markets. To which End that great Statesman caused Credit to be given to Exporters, even till the

§ *The* French *King also grants Lands in his Plantations*, gratis, *to poor industrious People, sent thither from* France, *and gives them other Encouragements to go over and settle there; and moreover, lends Money to his* American *Subjects, in Case of Hurricanes, which destroy their Plantations, and other unavoidable Misfortunes.*

the *Returns* of their *Woollen Goods* came from abroad. This was done particularly to the *Turkey* Merchants at *Marseilles*, who had Credit for the *Woollen Manufactures* of *Nismes*, 'till the *Return* of their Ships from *Smyrna* and *Scanderoon*: by which wise Encouragement the *Marseillians* first supplanted the *English* in the *Levant* Trade; in which, we are too sensible, they have greatly increased ever since.

It is not unlikely, that the *French* might take this Maxim from the wise *Prince*, *Ferdinand* the First, *Great Duke of Tuscany*, who raised the Trade of his Subjects to an incredible height by the like Policy. That Prince, not content with having his Royal Coffers full for his private use only, was ambitious that his Treasures should be subservient to fill those of his Subjects also. Mr *Mun*, * a very skillful, and eminent *English* Merchant, tells us, he himself experienc'd the *Duke*'s Liberality; who lent him no less than *Forty Thousand Crowns*, *gratis*, altho' he knew that he should send the whole away, and that in *Specie* too, to *Turkey*, to purchase Merchandize; the *Duke* being well assur'd, says he, that in the Course of that Trade, the same would return again, according to the Italian Proverb, with a *Duck in the Mouth*. The judicious old *Gentleman* further tells us, that, by this Policy, the *Duke* incourag'd Trade to such a Degree, that of his own Knowledge, *Leghorne*, which was only a poor little Town, became, even in his Time, a fair and strong City; being one of the most famous Places of Trade in all Christendom. How it has improved since, from that Foundation, need not be said.

 Now,

* Vide England's *Benefit and Advantage by Foreign Trade by Mr* Mun.

Now, if we well weigh thoſe Meaſures taken by our Competitors, and compare them with our own, we cannot but diſcern how the one are judiciouſly adapted to the peculiar Nature and Circumſtances of thoſe Trades, and to render them as proſperous as poſſible to *France*; while our Meaſures, I am ſorry to ſay, can have no other Tendency than to the gradual Ruin of the *Britiſh Negroe*, and *Plantation*-Trades in general.

The *Excluſive* Privilege alone of the *French Negroe-Company*, gives them a great Advantage over us in that Trade; becauſe upon their Parts of the *African* Coaſt, they have none of the ſeparate Traders of *France* to bid for *Negroes* againſt the Company, and againſt each other; which raiſes the Price: On the contrary, the Company being the *ſole Purchaſers*, they keep the Price as low as they pleaſe: Whereas what is the Caſe of the *Engliſh*? The Trade being open to all the Subjects of *Great-Britain*, the Company have bid againſt private Traders, private Traders againſt them, as alſo againſt each other; and the *French* againſt 'em all. How can we expect therefore but the *Negroe Princes* and *Chiefs* will take Advantage of our Folly, and raiſe their Price to what Heighth they pleaſe? In the one Caſe, the *French* make their own Price with *Negroe-Sellers*; in the other, the *Negroe-Sellers* make *their own Price* with the *Engliſh*. Can it be any great marvel therefore, that the *French* ſhould ſtock their Plantations very *cheaply* and *plentifully* with thoſe Labourers, while our Planters, paying a moſt exorbitant Price for 'em, cannot have that Plenty; and conſequently cannot afford their Plantation-Produce ſo cheap as the *French*; nor can they maintain the *Negroes* they have

have ſo cheap as they do, from their greater Plenty of Labour.

Nor does the Influence of the *French*-Company end here. Obſerving the Effects of *Engliſh* Meaſures, occaſion'd by the Diſſenſions and Animoſities between *our* Company, and the *ſeparate* Traders, they were reſolv'd to take Advantage of *both*, as the *Negroe-Chiefs*, and *Princes* have likewiſe done. Accordingly the firſt Step they took was to try how we ſhould reliſh their Purchaſe of *Negroes* upon the *Britiſh* Parts of the Coaſt; where they have no Right to Trade at all: And finding they met with no manner of Obſtruction, either from the *Engliſh*-Company, or the *Engliſh* ſeparate Traders, they have long ſince uſurped a Power of Trading quite uncontrouled to our Parts of the Coaſt, and ſweeping away numberleſs of the choiceſt *Negroes*; while, at the ſame Time, the *Engliſh* have never dared to approach the *French* Coaſts. With ſo high an Hand have the *French* carry'd their unwarrantable Encroachments upon the *Britiſh* Rights of Trade in *Africa*, that they have abſolutely engroſs'd the whole Trade of the extended *Gum-Coaſt* out of our Hands; and have the Confidence to take and confiſcate *Britiſh* Ships, when trading only within the *Britiſh* Rights and Privileges; and where the *French* have no more Right to trade than they have to our Settlements in the *Eaſt-Indies*, or to the *Spice-Iſlands* of the *Dutch*. Theſe are Facts too notorious to be gainſaid.

And here it may be neceſſary to obſerve, that altho' upon *our* Parts of the Coaſt, the *French* are obliged to give a much greater Price for *Negroes* than upon their *own*; yet this little affects the Company, or their Plantations; for the public Encouragements,

Encouragements, we have ſeen, thay enjoy, enable them to let their Planters have *Negroes* at one half the Price the *Britiſh* have; and notwithſtanding their *African* Trade in general is a very profitable Branch to the Company.

Are not theſe extraordinary Advantages the *French* have in the *Negroe*-Trade beyond what we have, ſufficient to account for the Proſperity of *their* Colonies and the Declenſion of *ours?* If then *this Cauſe*, and this only, is ſufficient to account for the *French* producing, in their *Weſt-India-Iſlands*, more than double the value in *Sugars*, *Indigo*, *Cotton*, *Coffee*, *Ginger*, *&c. &c.* than what is at preſent produced by the *Engliſh*, who before this Time abundantly exceeded the *French* in thoſe Branches: If this Cauſe, and this only, is ſufficient to account for the *French* cutting us out of the *Sugar* and *Indigo* Trades at all *foreign* Markets, and amply ſupplying themſelves with *Sugars*, which they before took from *England:* If this Cauſe and this only is ſufficient to account for *France* drawing from *Two* to *Three Millions Sterling per Ann.* from foreign Countries, in Return for *Sugars*, *Indigo*, *Coffee*, *Ginger*, and other their Plantation-Productions, the Bulk of which *England* uſed to ſupply: If the *French* ſtocking their Plantations ſo *cheaply* and *plentifully* with thoſe valuable Labourers, ſufficiently points out the *true Cauſe* of their ſurprizing Increaſe of *Trade*, *Shipping*, *Seamen*, and *Naval Power*; does it not moſt nearly concern the Trading-Intereſts of this Kingdom, if we have it in our Power, to check them in their *Negroe* and Plantations-Trades; which have prov'd the grand and principal Cauſe of all this? And that we have this in our Power, I am inclin'd to believe, will appear before we have done with them.

Our

Our *African-Company* charge their preſent reduc'd State, to the Account of the ſeparate Traders; and the latter ſay the Nation muſt have loſt the Trade, and the Plantations been undone, if the Company had been, or ever ſhall be ſuffer'd to proſper. But what has the Nation to do with their Contentions and Animoſities? Is our *Negro*-Trade to be ſacrific'd, becauſe the Parties intereſted in it can't agree?

If the ſeparate Traders, by their *diſjointed* Endeavours could be the Guardians and Protectors of the *African-Trade*, how comes it to paſs that ſince it has been under their peculiar Care and Patronage, as it were, that they themſelves have loſt the whole Trade of the *Gum-Coaſt?* Why alſo have they not, and why do they not, at this Time, prevent the *French* from Trading for the choiceſt *Negroes*, within their own Rights and Privileges? If they'll be ingenuous, the Anſwer is plain enough: It is becauſe, they have not been able: For, how is it poſſible for a *diſunited* Body of private Traders, to be able to contend with the *united French-India* and *Guinea-Companies*, who want no Encouragement *France* can give, and our Company wants every *Thing?*

If we don't battle our Enemies in Trade as well as in War, with Weapons equally powerful, is it not in vain; is it not ſuperlatively weak, and ridiculous to expect equal Succeſs in either? It would be happy for Mankind, if the Intereſt of Nations in *general* could always coincide with that of *Individuals:* Since it cannot be ſo, the Intereſt of *Particulars* always has, as it always muſt, in wiſe States, give way to that of the *Whole.*

Many Branches of our Foreign-Trade were firſt ſtruck out by *Joint-Stock* Companies; private

vate Adventurers being intimidated from hazarding their Fortunes in unbeaten-Tracts of Commerce. When Companies have effectually eſtabliſh'd *new* Branches, the public Good may as much require their Diſſolution, as it did at firſt their Eſtabliſhment: But to do this before this great End is anſwer'd, does not diſcover any extraordinary Wiſdom, methinks.

Such is the State of our *African*-Trade at preſent, that there ſeems as much Reaſon for vigorous Meaſures to ſupport it againſt our dangerous Competitors, as did firſt to eſtabliſh it. The *Negroes*, by our Management, have grown wilely and artful as our Rivals are formidable. There will be as much Difficulty perhaps, to reduce the Price of Slaves, as to reduce the *French* within their own Boundaries of Trade, and retrieve what we have loſt. But if both theſe are not done, our *Planters* muſt be undone; for ſuch is the Career of the *French* in thoſe Trades, that it will ſoon be out of our Power to regain them, without a freſh War for that Purpoſe; whereas, in my humble Opinion, it may be now done by Meaſures ſimilar only to thoſe of our Rivals, and without Umbrage. The ſhort Queſtion therefore is, What's to be done? And the Anſwer, I think, is equally ſhort: Follow *French Meaſures*!

Are we then to have an *Excluſive African-Company* again? Why not? Has not Experience verify'd the Soundneſs of *French* Policy in that Reſpect; and ſhall we reject it only becauſe it is *French*? Or, are ideal Whims and impracticable Schemes to take Place of rational, practicable and ſucceſsful Policy? If not, why ſhall not *Great-Britain* have a powerful *Guinea-Company*, as well as *France*, and that ſtrengthen'd and fortify'd, with as mighty

mighty Privileges, Immunities, and Encouragements? Tho' we may not chuſe, perhaps, to adopt the identical Meaſures of Encouragement that Nation has; yet if in the Aggregate Total they are but amply equivalent to Theirs, we ſhall be able to maintain a Ballance of Power, and conſequently of Trade againſt them: and how can we expect to do ſo before? By means of a Company, ſo circumſtanc'd, we ſhall not only be able to ſtand our preſent Ground, but effectually to regain that we have loſt: And will not this be making the Nation full Compenſation for it's Encouragements? When the deſirable Ends of it's Inſtitution are effectually anſwer'd, can't we lay the Company aſide with as much Eaſe as it may be eſtabliſh'd?

We have already ſeen that a *Company* is not hurtful that engroſſes Trade out of the Hands of our Rivals, and puts the ſame into our own. If another *temporary excluſive Company* ſhall be found the moſt proper Expedient to eſtabliſh our *Negro*-Trade upon a good Baſis, and regain the Plantation-Trade we have loſt, there is no Reaſon why it ſhould be rejected, becauſe it may happen to diſoblige ſome of the Merchants of *Briſtol* and *Liverpole*; which I could heartily wiſh was not the Caſe.

Various Sorts of Companies, and Projects of various Kinds have been ſuggeſted to anſwer the Purpoſe, of reviving, ſecuring, and extending our *African*-Trade, but all that have come to my Knowledge are ſo exceptionable, that, I am perſuaded, the Intereſts of the Nation will ne'er be bottom'd upon any of them.

One of thoſe Schemes that has fell in my way, is that of a Company, with ſome Kind of Parliamentary

mentary Aid, from Year to Year, for Support of Forts and Caſtles, but without a *Joint-Stock*; ſuch a one as leaves the Trade open in general in the Manner of our *Ruſſia*, or *Turkey* Companies. But if *Gentlemen* would pleaſe to conſider, that as the Circumſtances of thoſe Trades, and that of *Africa* are no way parallel, Meaſures that well ſuit the one, may prove deſtructive of the other. Trade carry'd on among civilized Countries, regulated by Treaties, by the fixt Laws of Nations, and by wiſe Cuſtoms immemorial, may be long preſerv'd, by the Means of *Ambaſſadors* and *Conſuls*, without Forts and Caſtles; and therefore without the Weight of a *Joint-Stock*.

But where Forts and Caſtles are indiſpenſably neceſſary to carry on Trade in barbarous Countries, a *Joint-Stock* is not leſs ſo; while Competitors in the ſame Trade do the like. I ſhould be glad to know how gracious the Parliament is expected to be to this Rope-of-Sand Company; to empower 'em to cope with our Rivals: They would do well to conſider the greater their own Weakneſs is, the more Strength they will require from the Publick. The Power of the *French*, they ſhould not forget, is not lodged in a *looſe*, *vague*, *ſtraggling* Body of Traders, whoſe Schemes and Intereſts are as various as their Numbers: On the contrary Theirs is a well-diſciplin'd *Corps*, a Power moſt politically regulated, and well fortify'd with weighty Privileges and Immunities, that require a round *Fund* of *Money* to combat: Their excluſive Power too, is back'd with pecuniary Encouragements of no leſs Value than £ 50,000 *per annum*.

To ballance all this, our disjointed Company could not demand leſs of Parliament than an *Hundred Thouſand Pounds per annum*: For without

out ſufficient Strength, I hope thoſe Champions would not preſume to enter the Liſts with ſuch Antagoniſts. But it can hardly enter into any Man's Head, that a *Britiſh* Parliament will grant an Allowance of that Size, for ſuch Service, when there can be no Security that the Money ſhall anſwer the End pretended. If a Truſt of this Nature was repos'd in ſuch Hands, can we reaſonably expect wiſe concerted Meaſures from a diſconcerted disjointed Body? Separate Traders have their *ſeparate* Schemes of Traffick, and if they can ſupplant each other therein, they don't think the worſe of their Sagacity or Probity: The *Briſtol* Traders would ſtruggle hard to appropriate greater Part of the Allowance for ſupport of their Schemes againſt thoſe of *Liverpole*; and thoſe of *London*, perhaps, would oppoſe 'em both: And what is ſtill worſe, we ſhould not only have City againſt City, but one private Trader againſt another. Would not ſuch wiſe Meaſures rather multiply than leſſen our Diviſions; ſtill keep up the high Price of *Negroes*, and give our Rivals ſtill greater and greater Advantages over us?

French Meaſures, we have ſeen, are conducted by one Head, one Hand, and one Purſe, to anſwer one united *particular* Intereſt, made moſt wiſely ſubſervient to the Intereſt of the *whole*. Theſe are the happy Effects of a *Joint-Stock Intereſt* in this Trade; it is actuated by one invariable *Primum Mobile*: To do otherwiſe is ſomething like an ill-contrived Piece of Mechaniſm, that derives an elaſtick Motion from one Point, whoſe Velocity is deſtroy'd by an oppoſite.

Could it be expected that the Factors and Agents of ſuch a Company, reſident at the Settlements, would give Satisfaction to ſuch a diſunited Intereſt? Would they not rather follow the Ex-

 ample

ample of their *Maſters*, and purſue private Advantage in Oppoſition to that of them all? Rather than not Trade at all for private Account, tho' e'er ſo much reſtrain'd by the Company, would they ſcruple to do ſo with a public or a ſecret Enemy; and prove as regardleſs of the Intereſt of the Nation, as that of their Employers?

That I would not be prolix, I ſhall only mention one more Difficulty that may attend this Regulation, or rather Confuſion of our *African-Trade*. If it be not thought convenient, as I reckon it hardly will, to quit our Forts and Caſtles, I ſhould be glad to be informed, who muſt purchaſe them of the preſent Company, upon their Diſſolution? Will a Capital be raiſed for that Purpoſe by the ſeparate Traders? And in what Proportion ſhall each Adventurer be rated towards it? And who ſhall rate and liquidate theſe Proportions?

Another Scheme that has been broach'd for the Security of this Trade, is that of a Parliamentary Allowance from Year to Year, to be veſted in the Hands of the *Lords Commiſſioners of Trade and Plantations*, for Maintenance of Forts and Caſtles. I could wiſh that this Scheme was leſs exceptionable than the other. But as the Trade, under this Regulation would be left open as in the other, will not every inſurmountable Difficulty occur in *This*, as does in *That?* Indeed there ſeems rather more Difficulties attending this latter than the former.

There muſt, doubtleſs, be ſomething of a *Military Power* to ſupport Forts and Caſtles. As Trade, however, is our great Point in View, the Controul of this Power, methinks, ſhould not be out of the Hands of a trading Intereſt: I mean a *Mercantile*

Mercantile trading Intereſt; becauſe our Rivals controul their *Military*, by the ſame Head: But, with all humble Submiſſion, the practical Intereſt of Trade, ſeems to require Knowledge of another Kind, and Management of a different Nature from what can be preſum'd to fall under the Cognizance of that *Honourable* Board.

Thoſe *noble Lords* may wiſely hold the Helm, and guide the great Machine of Trade for the publick Intereſt, by the moſt profound Theory, grounded on the beſt Intelligence their *Lordſhips* can obtain: but the *practical* part of Trade; the Cuſtoms and Uſages, the peculiar Schemes and Projects of Traders among the *Mercantile* World, we may humbly preſume, do not fall directly within the Province of their *Lordſhips*; nor indeed the Direction of a *Military* or *Naval Power*; both which might, perhaps, be requiſite, under ſuch a Regulation.

Such a governing Power, independent of the controul of Merchants intereſted in this Trade, might indeed be exerciſed to drive the *French*, or the *Dutch* from our Coaſts; or, otherwiſe give 'em a Broad-ſide, or a Volley from the Forts, if they approach'd near 'em: Such a Power might alſo erect a Gallows to deter the *Negroes* from trading with our Rivals, as the Preſident of *Panama* did at *Portobel* to prevent illicit Trade: All this may be done, but what End will it anſwer? Raſh Meaſures, with our Rivals, might be productive of a freſh National War; (for we have had one before now on account of this very Trade) and rigorous Meaſures with the *Negroes* would alienate their Attachment from our Intereſts. To beat, or equal, our Rivals in Trade muſt be done by a Trading Intereſt only; a Trading Intereſt

tereſt every way equal to that of our Rivals in Dignity and Authority; and with a *united Purſe* no way inferior to theirs. As theſe Meaſures can give no Reaſon for nationals Quarrels, ſo they are the moſt naturally adapted to our Proſperity in this Commerce. For Trade, we know, is a coy, and a delicate Miſtreſs; ſhe muſt be tenderly courted and careſs'd: and altho' the People we trade with, in this Part of the World, are Savages themſelves, and treat each other as ſuch; yet they are not inſenſible of other Treatment from *Europeans:* among them, whoſe Conduct is the moſt engaging, will certainly obtain the greateſt Share of their Trade. The Exerciſe of all Power therefore for Support of this Trade, muſt be done with all Delicacy, leſt it ſhould drive the *Negroes* from our Settlements, or promote a War without our Competitors: And it will never be the Intereſt of any united Company to do either; but yet may ſupport ſuch an Awe and Dominion, as may anſwer all our deſirable Purpoſes:

Which brings us to the Conſideration of a *Joint-Stock Company*, and how far ſuch an one, with a Parliamentary Allowance to ſupport the Forts and Caſtles, may be preſum'd duely to ſupport this Trade, while the whole is left free and open to all His Majeſty's Subjects.

And before I enter into this Point, I muſt acknowledge, that I was once of Opinion, that ſuch a Company, with an ample public Allowance, ſecur'd for a Term of Years certain, upon Parliamentary Authority, for the Support of the Forts and Caſtles, might have anſwer'd our moſt ſanguine Hope and Expectation.

The Reaſon whereupon I founded my Judgment, was the Poſſibility that the Trade might have

have been ſo happily regulated between the Company and the ſeparate Traders as to have produc'd an indiſſoluble Harmony and Union between 'em for their reciprocal Intereſts: And 'tis well enough known, that I took no ſmall Pains to promote ſuch Union, when I had a Share in the Direction of the *African* Company. But I am very ſorry to ſay, that Time and Experience have afforded ſufficent Reaſon to change Sentiment; there not appearing any more likelihood, at preſent, of any ſuch Union, than there was above Forty Years ago.

Whether the Fault has lain on the ſide of the Company, or on that of the ſeparate Traders, may be worth the public Attention; becauſe the due Eſtabliſhment and Regulation of this Trade can be poſtpon'd no longer, without endangering the abſolute Ruin of our Plantation-Trade in general; for 'tis too notorious, that our Competitors in *Africa* are at this Time, exerting their full Stretch of Power and Policy, to raiſe *their* Colonies to the higheſt Degree of Splendor upon the Deſtruction of *ours*.

That the *African* Company have acted with all Cordiality and Condeſcention towards the *ſeparate* Traders, in order to induce them to ſuch a Union as would ſupport the *Britiſh* Rights of Trade againſt *our* Rivals, and reduce the Price of *Negroes*, will appear from what I did myſelf the Honour to propoſe, upon that Head, ſome time ago; and which received the Approbation of the *Gentlemen* in the Direction of the Company †. The Subſtance of which is as follows, *viz.*

' I.

† Vide *The aforementioned Tract addreſs'd to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in* 1746.

I. ‘ By ſtrengthning the Hands of the Company ‘ they will be render'd capable of reſtraining the ‘ *French* within the Limits of their own Charter; ‘ whereby we ſhall retrieve the Trade of the *Gold* ‘ Coaſt, and drive them away from *Anamaboe*, ‘ from whence they have ſupplied their Colonies ‘ with *Ten Thouſand* of the choiceſt, and moſt ‘ robuſt *Negroes* on all the Coaſt, to *One Thouſand* ‘ that have been carry'd by all the *ſeparate Britiſh* ‘ Traders to our own Plantations. We ſhall alſo ‘ be capable of rooting them out of the Trade at ‘ *Whydah*, which they have alſo uſurped; and ‘ from whence likewiſe they have carry'd very ‘ conſiderable numbers of *Negroes* no way inferior ‘ to thoſe of *Anamaboe*; and regain the Trade of ‘ that part of the *North* Coaſt, extending about ‘ four or five hundred Miles from *Cape Blanco* to ‘ the *North* of the *River Gambia*; from which the ‘ *French* have within theſe nine Years abſolutely ‘ excluded the *Engliſh*.

II. ‘ The Trade on the Coaſt of *Africa* being ‘ thus reſtored, under the Power and Authority ‘ of the Company, *ſeparate Britiſh* Traders would ‘ no longer be under the Neceſſity of ſkulking in ‘ ſuch comparatively obſcure Holes or Corners, ‘ as the *Pight* and *Callabar* for their Lading, and ‘ contenting themſelves with leſs ſerviceable *Ne-* ‘ *groes*, while our Rivals engroſs the Bulk of ‘ the *beſt*.

III. ‘ By thus excluding the *French* from ‘ trading within the Limits of our Royal Com- ‘ pany's Charter, there will of Courſe be a greater ‘ Plenty of the choiceſt *Negroes* left for *Britiſh-* ‘ Traders; and the Number of Purchaſers being ‘ leſſened upon the Coaſt, the Company and ſe- ‘ parate Traders will purchaſe the *beſt* Negroes *cheaper*,

‘ *cheaper*, as the Demand is leſſened; for as no- ‘ thing has ſo much contributed to raiſe their ‘ Price to the great Height it, at preſent, is, as ‘ the Encroachments of the *French*; ſo nothing ‘ can help more to it's Abatement, than extirpat- ‘ ing them from our parts of the Coaſts, and re- ‘ ducing them within their own Boundaries.

IV. ‘ What will ſtill further contribute, and ‘ that I am apt to think effectually, to reduce the ‘ exorbitant Price of *Negroes*, is *the Promotion of* ‘ *a laſting Harmony, and good Underſtanding be-* ‘ *tween the Company and ſeparate Traders; for,* ‘ *from the Excluſion of the* French, *the whole Trade* ‘ *will again revert into their Hands; and if, by* ‘ *the* Conſent and Choice of ſeparate Traders, ‘ *the* Company *became the ſole Purchaſers of Ne-* ‘ *groes upon the Coaſt, and the former purchaſed of* ‘ *them only, the Price would ſoon be reduced to as* ‘ *low a Degree as could be deſir'd.*

V. ‘ By ſuch an Agreement between the Com- ‘ pany and private Traders, quick Diſpatch alſo ‘ would be given them; they would obtain their ‘ Complement of *Negroes* in a Fortnight or three ‘ Weeks, which they now do not in three or four ‘ Months; and conſequently the great Charge of ‘ Demurrage, and Loſs by Mortality of *Negroes*, ‘ by too long Confinement on Ship-board, would ‘ be prevented.

VI. ‘ That the Price of *Negroes* has been ſo ‘ greatly raiſed, and ſtill continues to be kept up ‘ from an Encreaſe in the *Number* of Buyers, will ‘ be quite out of Diſpute from the following ‘ *Fact*. Before the *African* Trade was laid open, ‘ and the *French* in Conſequence thereof, permit- ‘ ted to encroach upon the Trade at *Whydah*, the ‘ the Price of *Negroes* there was not above

'FIFTY SHILLINGS and THREE POUNDS *per Head*, first Cost; *but upon the Encrease of* separate Purchasers, *and the Encroachments of the* French, *they soon advanced to* TWENTY POUNDS *per Head, first Cost.*

'But should not *separate Traders* find their Advantage, by thus carrying on the Trade, by Means of the Company, they will of Course naturally return to their old Method of Traffick, after having found the Experiment ineffectual.

'However, that it might not prove so, I would humbly propose; that while such an Agreement subsisted between the Company and separate Traders, *the Company should not carry a single Negroe to our* American Plantations; *in Consideration, that all separate Traders purchased Negroes of the Company; for then the Company would by Consent, be constituted, as it were Factors, to separate Traders; and if they did not raise their Commission too high, the Trade would continue to be carried on through their Hands; but if the Company grew exorbitant, separate Traders would become their own Factors again, and the Trade return to it's old Course, which would be Check sufficient upon the Company: And all this may be easily concerted between the Company, and separate Traders, without Application* for Parliamentary Restrictions *on either Side.*

'That the *British-Planters* also will find their Account, by this happy Establishment of the Company, is not less certain; for the *French* being totally excluded from the Purchase of the *best Negroes*, they will be left for the *British* Plantations; and from Reduction of their Price in general, by the Measures proposed, the Planters, doubtless, will obtain them cheap in Proportion.

'Thus will our *British* Colonies become cheaply and plentifully stocked with the *choicest Negroes*, the Culture of more Land naturally take Place, more Plantation-Commodities be produced, and cheaper, by the Price of all necessaries of Life, both for Blacks and Whites, abating in Proportion to the greater Plenty. And will not the Interest of Money fall, and the general Prosperity of all the *British* Plantations naturally follow? These Measures depriving *France* of the Supply they at present have of the choicest *Negroes* from the *British-Coast* of *Africa*, their Sugar-Colonies will soon be reduced to the State of supplying themselves only, while our Planters happily retrieve the lost Trade of supplying foreign Markets with that Commodity; and prevent the future Advances of *France* in her Trade and Navigation in *America*.'

So very extraordinary, we see, have the Concessions of the Company been, that they have made Overtures of throwing the *whole Negroe-Trade* into the separate Trader's Hands, and spontaneously excluding themselves from that whole Branch of Trade: Yet what other Effect has this produc'd, than *Petitions* to Parliament, from those very Traders, to obstruct every Measure taken for the Prosperity of the Company; tho' their Ability to support the *British* Rights of Trade, would have prov'd more to the Interest of those Traders, than of the Corporation itself.

What can be the real Motives of those *Gentlemen* to reject such a condescending and equitable Regulation of the Trade proposed? However implacable might be their Enmity towards the Company, have they no Tenderness towards the *Planters*; whose Hardships and Distresses, they well

 know

know, are insuperable, from the extravagant Price of *Negroes?* If they had any Regard to the Prosperity of our *Planters*, why were not those Measures to reduce the Price of *Negroes* embraced? For had the Company been constituted, by mutual Consent, the only Purchasers, as propos'd, they must, and very naturally would, have reduc'd the Price as low perhaps as it was before the Trade was laid open.

The Truth is those *Gentlemen* apprehend, as they always have done, and ever will, that the Company's enjoying the least Degree of Prosperity is inconsistent with their own: And therefore it is, that they have either openly or covertly always opposed the Company's obtaining any Security from Parliament for the due support of their Forts: And why? Because truly they dread the Apprehension of any *Joint-Stock* Company whatsoever: but if Parliamentary Security for the Forts had been once obtain'd, they imagin'd a *Joint-Stock* would soon have been raised; and therefore they have, and always will oppose the one, in order to defeat the other.

But I must confess I don't see why those *Gentlemen* need be in any Pannick about that matter; for if the Parliament had secured *Twenty Thousand* a Year to the Company for a Term *certain*, it would have been so granted, as not only to have oblig'd the due Application, but to have prevented the Mortgaging or Anticipation of the *Annuity*: And if so, this would not have raised the Company a *Joint-Stock*, however sanguine some People may be in their Expectation; for, while it continues the Interest of the *separate* Traders to ruin the Company, who will be so infatuated as to hazard their Money in so precarious a *Joint-Stock* Trade? When

When this Competition of Interest among ourselves has ruin'd the Company already, how can it be suppos'd to prosper, while the same subsists? I am at a loss too to comprehend by what Sort of Magick, *Twenty Thousand* a Year on our side, can be made to go as far as *Fifty Thousand* a Year on the Side of *France*; or how a Company without *exclusive* Powers and Immunities, can possibly ballance the Weight of one with such Privileges. This, I think, must pass every Man's Comprehension, as well as that of one of my narrow Conception: and if so, how can this prove the effectual Means of restoring the Trade, preventing *French* Encroachments, and tending to the Prosperity of our Plantations in particular; the grand Point we should never lose sight of in the Regulation of this Trade?

The Company grant they have expended above £17000, a Year, for many Years together, upon Support of the Forts; and yet they have not been able to support them but in a very pitiful manner; nor to make the least Head against our Rivals. Now, how the Addition of £3000 *per Ann.* more only, will empower the Company to maintain the Forts in a *formidable* manner; and so to support the Dignity and Dominion of the *British* Nation as to prevent the Usurpations of our *foreign* Rivals, is also beyond the Tether of my poor Understanding.

Under the Circumstances of being liable to the daily Insults and Encroachments of *foreign* Competitors, and also to the eternal Opposition of our *own* separate Traders, how can the Publick be ever expected to venture their Money in such a Corporation? In short; while any Opposition of Interests among ourselves continues, as it has done, was

was the Parliament to grant *twice Twenty Thousand* a Year for the *African Service*, I cannot believe the Publick could be brought to raise a *Joint-Stock*; because there is the greatest Danger of Annihilation, but little Proability of successful Trade.

Many more Reasons might be urged in Favour of this opinion, which I shall wave at present. Upon the whole therefore it does not appear to me, upon the most deliberate and impartial Consideration, either that the Company, or the Plantations can possibly prosper upon the System of a *Joint-Stock* Company, with a free and open Trade, as we have at present.

Having taken the Liberty to give my frank and undisguised Opinion upon the several Methods, that have come to my Knowledge, proposed for the Revival and Security of this important Branch of Trade; it may be expected, that I should point out such Measures as will answer the national Interests; since I disapprove of all that have been hitherto offered. This may naturally enough be expected, but not easily comply'd with. To effectuate that, which has been so many Years accomplishing, is scarce to be expected from any private Person; nor am I presumptuous enough to think myself equal to so arduous a Task.

As it has fell in my way however, to consider a little of this Matter, I shall contribute what occurs to me, at present, to forward so laudable a Design; as it is likely to come before the Consideration of Parliament in a few Days: but I am too sensible it is far less difficult to censure than to amend the Propositions of others.

I could have wish'd to have had more Time allow'd me on this Occasion, that I might have been

been better prepar'd to have given my humble Opinion, on a matter of this Importance, than for my Pen to keep Pace with a *Printing-Press*.

But all that I shall most humbly submit to public Consideration is very plain and simple; the *Out-lines* whereof may be sketch'd under the few following Propositions: *viz.*

PROPOSALS for the *Revival*, *Security*, and *Extension*, of the *British Trade* to *Africa*.

I. That the *British-Trade* to *Africa* be given, by Act of Parliament for ———— Years to the Honourable the SOUTH-SEA-COMPANY, under the Title of the ROYAL AFRICAN ASSIENTO COMPANY; or such other as shall be approv'd by *Parliament*: And that all other His Majesty's Subjects shall be absolutely *excluded* from the said *African-Trade*.

II. That in Consideration thereof, the said ROYAL AFRICAN ASSIENTO COMPANY shall be obliged, by the said Act of Parliament, to import all *Negroes* into the *British* Colonies in *America*, and sell them there at a *certain Price*, limited by the said Act of Parliament: that is to say, in Times of *Peace* at the Rate of *one half the Price* they are at present sold for in the *respective Colonies*, belonging to the Crown of *Great-Britain*: And in Times of *War*, at the Rate of *Two Thirds* of the Price *Negroes* are at present sold for, in the said *respective British Colonies*.

III. That the said ROYAL AFRICAN ASSIENTO COMPANY shall be obliged to support and maintain, in a defencible Condition, the *British Forts* and *Castles* in *Africa*, at their own sole Expence.

IV That

IV. That the ſaid ROYAL AFRICAN ASSIENTO COMPANY ſhall make the preſent *Royal African Company* of *England* ſuch a Compenſation for their Forts and Caſtles, and all their Property in *Africa*, as the ſaid two Companies ſhall agree upon: Or, as ſhall be ſettled by Parliament.

V. That as an Encouragement to the ſaid ROYAL AFRICAN ASSIENTO COMPANY to ſupply the *Britiſh Colonies* plentifully with *Negroes* at the Prices aforeſaid, a BOUNTY ſhall be allowed them of ——— *Sterling Money per Head*, for each *Negroe*, ſo imported into the *reſpective Britiſh Colonies*, and ſold at the Prices ſo limited by Act of Parliament as aforeſaid.

Whether theſe Propoſitions bid fair to anſwer all that can be hoped for, and expected from the Regulation of the Trade to *Africa*, is what ſhall be next conſidered.

A Company thus poſſeſs'd of *excluſive* Powers and Immunities will certainly be a Match for our *Competitors* in the ſame Trade; and be capable of *excluding* them from encroaching upon any of the *Britiſh* Rights and Privileges of Trade. As this will be dealing with our Rivals in their own Way, it will certainly give the leaſt Umbrage; and is the leaſt likely to be productive of *national* Quarrels upon this Occaſion.

On the contrary, when *France* and *other* Nations are ſenſible that out *African-Company* is eſtabliſh'd, by *Act of Parliament*, they will be convinced, that it is the determin'd Reſolution of the *Britiſh* Nation, to maintain their Rights in *Africa*, with the whole Weight of *Britiſh* Power: And therefore from the Diſpoſition of our Rivals, at preſent towards Peace, they may be preſum'd, without

without any great Difficulty, to diſavow, and deſiſt from the Encroachments they have made.

But if the Reſumption of our Rights of Trade in *Africa* be longer deferr'd, we may very probably not find our *Rivals* under ſuch Neceſſity for preſerving the publick Tranquillity as a preſent; nor the Affairs of *Europe* ſo circumſtanced as to prevent a War on this very Account.

That the *excluſive Right* in the *African-Trade* ſhould be rather given to the *Aſſiento* than to any *other Company*, is no way unnatural; becauſe one part of their Trade already lying in *Negroes*, it is a Commerce they are thoroughly experienc'd in.

It will be the Intereſt of the *Aſſientiſts* to ſupport this Trade in the moſt vigorous Manner; to the End they may be able the more effectually to comply with their *Contract* with *His Catholick Majeſty*; the Profits whereof, upon the *Reduction* of the *Price* of *Negroes*, if they can accompliſh it, may make ſome Amends for their ſupplying the *Britiſh Colonies* upon ſuch diſadvantageous Terms, as propos'd.

The *Aſſientiſts* can better afford to undertake this Trade upon the aforeſaid Conditions, than any *new* excluſive Company could do, without the Benefits of the *Aſſiento*.

How highly advantagious ſuch a Regulation muſt, and moſt certainly will, prove to the *Britiſh Plantations* in general, when the *Planters* ſhall be able to purchaſe *two Negroes* for the Price of *one* at preſent, need not be expatiated on. If any Meaſures can ever enable them to reſtore our loſt Plantation Trade, *Theſe* ſeem to bid fairer for it than any I have ſeen; and therefore, 'tis to be hoped, will be carryed into Execution; unleſs ſomething

 ſtill

ſtill more beneficial to the Plantations ſhall be thought of.

And altho' the *Separate Merchants* may think themſelves highly aggriev'd by ſuch a Regulation; yet as the publick Intereſts ſo manifeſtly require it, Thoſe *Gentlemen* certainly muſt, with a very ill Grace, oppoſite what is calculated ſo much for the Benefit of the Plantations; for if this Regulation, or ſome other equally beneficial to our *Planters*, does not take place, I am well perſuaded, their Grievances will ſoon be inſupportable.

But this cannot be the Caſe of the *ſeparate Traders*; for altho' the *Company* will have the ſupplying our *Colonies* with *Negroes*; the *Planters* will be the greateſt *Gainers* by it, not the *Company*: and the *ſeparate Traders*, as at preſent, will continue to be the *Carriers* of *Negroes*; they will find the *Shipping*, and take their back Freights as they at preſent do,

And as the *Plantations* flouriſh, thoſe *Gentlemen* will not only ſend more of our *Plantation-Productions* to *Foreign* Markets, but more *Britiſh Manufactures* to the *Plantations* in general; for the *more* they proſper the *more Trade* will they have with their *Mother-Kingdom*: So that it does not appear, that the Caſe of thoſe *Gentlemen* can be much worſted by this Regulation; while that of our *Planters* muſt be deplorable, if ſomething of this Kind be not directly done for their Relief.

Altho' theſe Conſequences ſhould not immediately follow; yet they moſt certainly muſt and will follow gradually; and there is no extraordinary Difficulty for ſkillful and experienc'd Merchants to make an eaſy Tranſition from one Branch of Trade to another; whereby they'll ſoon make themſelves Amends for what little *temporary* Diſ-

advantages,

advantages, the Neceſſities of the Nation, ſhall thus oblige them to labour under.

Did the Profits and Advantages of the ſeparate Traders go out of the Nation, their Oppoſition to ſuch Regulation might be well founded; but they will only change hands, and be thrown into thoſe of the *Britiſh Planters*; whoſe Proſperity too, in the End, muſt be theirs, as well as that of the Nation in general.

And altho' the Company will reap the ſole Benefits of the other Branches of the *African-Trade*; yet it is to be hoped the ſeparate Traders will not grudge them That, when they pay ſo dearly for it to the Plantations; and alſo are at the ſole Expence of maintaining the Forts and Caſtles in a defenſible Condition. Nor indeed could it, by any Means, be worth the *South-Sea-Company*'s While to accept the *excluſive* Trade to *Africa*, upon the hard and unequal Terms propos'd; provided the Parliament ſhall not allow Them an encouraging *Bounty* to accept the ſame, upon their Importation of *Negroes* into the *Colonies*.

The greateſt Difficulty indeed that I am apprehenſive of, is, that that *Honourable* Company will not ſo eaſily be brought to accept the Propoſals humbly ſubmitted. For, as it is certain the beſt Branch of the *African*-Trade is that of *Negroes*; and the new Company being not only depriv'd of all Advantages ariſing thereby from our own Plantations, but, I fear, running ſome Hazard of Loſs by ſuch *Plantation-Aſſiento*, I muſt readily acknowledge, the Conditions ſuggeſted are not very engaging.

That this part of the *African*-Trade however might not prove ſo very diſcouraging to *Britiſh-Aſſientiſts*, I would beg leave to obſerve, that by

 the

the wise and prudent Management of the *Negroe-Chiefs*, they may very probably be gradually brought to reduce their extravagant Price: and altho' not so low, perhaps, as before the Trade was laid open; yet so low, possibly, as to prevent the Company's being Losers by their *New Assiento*: And if that only could be done, the Profits of the *Negroe* Part of the *Spanish Assiento* may, in a great Measure, compensate for the Disadvantage of the other.

The Prospect the *new* Company may have also in extending the *Inland Trade* of *Africa*, by means of a large *Joint-Capital*, employ'd on parliamentary Authority, will also contribute to countervail some of the Disadvantages of the Terms proposed: And as all Improvements of the *African*-Trade this way, will prove an entire new Acquisition of Commerce to the Nation; and, in Proportion, increase the *Exports* of *British* Manufactures in general, who can reasonable envy the Company in this Respect? Will they not be very justly entitled to the Advantages of their own Acquisition, without Injury to any body whatsoever? Which Advantages too the Nation could never reap at all, but by means of so powerful and opulent a Company?

Upon the whole therefore, it is to be hoped by every true Friend to his Country, that for the Interest of the *British* Plantations in general, the Parliament will be graciously pleased to give the *South-Sea-Company* such reasonable Encouragements as may induce them chearfully to undertake the Guardianship and Protection of this invaluable Commerce; a Commerce the grand and fundamental Support, I will presume to say, of the greatest

greatest Part of the whole Trade and Navigation of the *British Empire*.

And that this happy Establishment of our *African-Trade* will prove agreeable to the Nation in general, we have no little Reason to expect. For at length the separate Traders themselves have been brought to acknowledge, that this Trade cannot be duly supported without *Forts* and *Castles*. —— And that it cannot be effectually establish'd, and preserv'd, without a *Joint-Stock Company*, I am apt to believe, will no longer remain a matter of Dispute. But that a *Joint-Stock Company*, with a *free and open Trade* cannot possibly flourish, or be capable of protecting the Trade against our Rivals, must appear evident and indisputable to every Man of plain Understanding. Even tho' the Parliament should be pleased to give the present *African Company double* the Annuity they have so modestly requested for the Support of their Forts, and that for 20 Years *certain*, I am thoroughly persuaded that the Company could never thrive, while the present Competition subsists between them and the separate Traders. In Support of which my humble Opinion, there are more Reasons to be given, perhaps, than some People may be aware of; tho' I shall urge the Matter no further at present.

I am not insensible how highly distasteful the very Idea of a *Monopoly* of any Kind is to some People; and indeed not without Reason, when the Necessities of the State do not stand in absolute need of them,

But that the pressing Necessities of the State do at present stand in need of such a limited and restrained trading *Monopoly*, as I have taken the Liberty to point out, as the most effectual Expedient

pedient on the present Occasion, appears to me most manifestly evident and apparent. And if I happen to be mistaken in Point of Judgment, I shall be glad to be set right, by those who will condescend to do me that Honour: not that my private Opinion is worthy of the least publick Attention; but as the Interests of the Nation seem to be so essentially concern'd, it will be doing a most national, and therefore a most acceptable, Service to the Kingdom in general.

Before I conclude, I would beg leave just to remind the Reader, that as the present *British Assiento* appears to be a *Monopoly* that only takes so much Trade out of the Scale of our Rivals, and throws the same into our own; so the annexing of a *Plantation-Assiento* thereunto, will be the means of taking so much *further* Trade out of the Scale of *France*, and throwing *that* also into our own. That a *Temporary* Monopoly therefore of this Kind can be any ways injurious to the Trading Interests in *general*, when it is so likely to promote the Interests of Trade in *general*, is quite beyond my Comprehension at present.

If the Parliament of *Great-Britain* is never to take any Measures for the Benefit of the Kingdom in general, till the Interests of the several Parties who may be concern'd in any public Affair, are perfectly reconcil'd; I am afraid the Representatives of the Nation may as well continue at their Country Seats, as to assemble at St *Stephen's-Chapel*. The several Parties concerned in this Debate have been many Years left to themselves, to unite and harmonize in Measures for the due Revival, and Security of this Trade; yet they remain as distant from Unanimity as they ever were: and therefore it is full Time to pay little Regard to their further inconsistent

inconsistent Remonstrances or Exclamations on either side.

Was the Case so, that *England* had no Plantations of her own to support, by Virtue of the *African*-Trade; yet as the supplying other Nations with *Negroes*, and the other Branches of that Trade, would prove highly beneficial to the Kingdom, it would not be at all unreasonable to take the like Measures that our Rivals do, and to carry the same on by a *Joint-Stock Exclusive*-Company: But as we have Plantations of our own to support, by the Labour of *Negroes*; and such too as are of the last Importance to the Nation, does it not still render the Necessity of such Measures more highly eligible?

The general Principle of making *Treaties of Commerce* with foreign Countries, is to aim always at being upon a Level therein with the *most favoured* Nations: If then it be a good Maxim of Policy to be upon equal Terms with Rivals amongst civilized Nations; why ought we not to be desirous of the same in *Mercantile* Power and Dominion amongst uncivilized and barbarous Ones?

March 14*th*, 1748.

F I N I S.