


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THE  
Case Re-stated;

OR AN  
EXAMINE of a late PAMPHLET,

INTITLED,  
*The State of the Nation for the  
Year 1747, &c.*

Wherein the Difingenuity, and secret Views  
of the AUTHOR are exposed, and the Con-  
duct of the present ADMINISTRATION  
explained and justified.

In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

---

*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*

---

L O N D O N:  
Printed for M. COOPER, at the *Globe*, in  
*Pater-noster-Row.*

(Price One Shilling.)

( 3 )



T H E  
Case Re-stated, &c.

December 31, 1747.

*My Dear Friend,*

**W**HEN Men of your Capacity and Experience alarm themselves about publick Affairs, on the Report of any puny Adept in Politicks, who, from his Garret, sets up for a Cenfor of publick Measures, and Reformer of the State, it becomes the Friend to offer the faithful Hand towards leading from the Path of Illusion. Nor does it less behove the true Patriot to step forth, on such Emergencies, and distinguish himself from those, who, under fair Pretences, work to undermine the Government, and ruin the State.

A 2

Nothing

( 4 )

Nothing can appear more evident, than that the Author of *The State of the Nation for the last Year*, the Work that has raised such gloomy Ideas in your Mind, has had a View to distressing the State, in order to bring on some signal Convulsion, as necessary towards producing a Change in the Constitution; or, in the Words of a late extraordinary \* Pamphlet, *of restoring the old Constitution*. Nothing is more certain than that this pretended Patriot, would bring upon us, in reality, all those big impendent Evils which he suggests, and seemingly writes, to avert; for cautious and covered as he is, we find him, on Occasions, exposing the cloven Hoof, and betraying the deep Secrets of his Scheme.

After he had wrote a Book, perhaps the most licentious and seditious that has appeared in our Age; after he had given the Ministry the highest Provocation, and furnished them with the most colourable Pretext for attempting a Restraint of the Press; after, I say, this masqued Patriot has done all in his Power to irritate and inflame, he puts his Readers in Mind that the Court is hatching a Scheme for subverting our Liberties.

\* \* I

\* Apology for the Conduct of a late celebrated second-rate Minister, &c.

( 5 )

\* I thought it proper to say so much, as it is part of the *State of the Nation* to understand our natural Rights, and to be guarded against a *Bill in Embryo*, projecting to destroy them: since it matters little that we have shewn what particular Affairs are transacting, when perhaps *one is in Agitation* of more Importance to our Welfare than all the rest put together.

A Man that apprehended an Intention to restrain the Press, and really wished to prevent it, would write with Decency and Calmness; and if he found Fault with the Ministerial Conduct, would speak of Ministers with Deference and good Manners. But he who would urge on every Measure for inflaming the Minds of the People, and ripening them for a Change, would use such Means as should appear more likely to hurry on the inflaming Measure he pretended to dread and explode. Thus are we told by the late Mr. *W——n* himself, or his Apologist, that in order to bring on, with the greater Certainty, a War with *Spain*, which would open a Way to that *old Constitution* he was so passionately fond of, he managed his Defence of the *Convention* so as to defeat, rather than promote the pacific Purposes of that Compact. 'And for this Reason,

\* Page 65.

( 6 )

Reason, says the Apologist, Page 45, tho' I was not at Liberty to oppose the *Convention* directly, I took care that my Justification of it should rather inflame, than abate, the Feuds and Heats both within Doors and without; insomuch that I may say, I had contributed as much to the *Spanish War*, by my Manner of opposing it, as those that had openly recommended it.'

This Legacy of Mr. *W——n's*, whether his own or another's, has opened the Eyes of the Publick in regard to the *Sempronius's* of the present Age; and it is to be hoped, for the future, they will be watched and guarded against, as being more dangerous than those whom we look upon as our hereditary Enemies. The *French* are at present our open Enemies, and as such, I am for pursuing them to Destruction, as far as is consistent with the real Interest of my Country; but I have no Notion of risking the Welfare of dear *England* out of Resentment to *France*, because I have been taught to hate *Frenchmen* as our hereditary Enemies.

This hereditary Animosity our Author builds upon for declaiming *Englishmen* to a disrelish for Peace, tho' there be no Prospect of Success by a Continuance of the War.

But

( 7 )

But this Writer, like that of *Faction detected*, knew the Excess of our Propensity to hate the *French*, and thinks to play the same Game, by Aid of that national Weakness, with equal Success.

The Author of *Faction detected*, lured us to provoke *France*, I may say wantonly and injudiciously, to declare War against these Kingdoms; and the Author of *the State of the Nation* attempts to lure us, in his Turn, to a Continuance of that War, against all the obvious Lights of Reason and Experience. Are not the Schemes of both these Writers founded on similar Plans? Does not the latter, who urges the Increase of our Debts and Taxes beyond our Strength, to prosecute an inauspicious War; does not the former, who wrote us into too good an Opinion of our own Force, and too mean a one of that of *France*; do not these Declaimers, I say, work upon similar Plans? And what other can this Plan be except that of Mr. *W——n's*, wherein he recommends the following passive Conduct to all such as wish well to his beloved *old Constitution*.

\* ' Let all who are fond of *War*, and  
' Parades on the *Continent*, be indulged.  
' Let all who would maintain a large stand-  
' ing Corps of *cherished foreign Mercenaries*,  
' have

\* Apology, Page 49.

( 8 )

‘ have their Way. Let those who would  
 ‘ increase our Debts, be pleased. And let  
 ‘ those who would prolong the War, to increase  
 ‘ these Pledges, and for a Pretext to continue  
 ‘ the aforesaid *Mercenaries* in our Pay, be  
 ‘ praised and supported. In short, let all  
 ‘ who would impoverish the People, in or-  
 ‘ der to humble them; and corrupt them,  
 ‘ in order to efface all generous Notions of  
 ‘ Posterity, and their Country, out of their  
 ‘ Breasts; let those, I say, have Rope  
 ‘ enough, and they will better answer our  
 ‘ Purpose than *France*, even if she were sin-  
 ‘ cere and inclined to serve us.’

Who, in his Senses, can argue against the  
 Rectitude of Mr. *W* ————’s Scheme?  
 ’Tis founded on Maxims self-evident and  
 uncontrovertible. If People are forced upon  
 an unhopeful Attempt, are obliged to pursue  
 ill Success, and have their Burden augmented  
 in order to continue such Pursuit, must not  
 the Consequences be Discontent, Sedition  
 and Disaffection, which generally grow up  
 to Convulsions, and often to an entire  
 Change of Government? And who, that  
 allows himself Time to reflect in the least,  
 can dis-believe that the Views of this Au-  
 thor, who has transformed himself into va-  
 rious Shapes, the better to impose and de-  
 ceive, are the same with those established  
 by the Apologist and his Brother *Proteus*,  
 the Author of *Faction detected*?

This

( 9 )

This latter, as the other two, cloathed  
 himself with *Whiggish* Principles, as most  
 likely to answer his Purpose of Deception,  
 though his whole Scheme was most noto-  
 riously built on Maxims diametrically re-  
 pugnant. And to gloss over his Deception,  
 he sets out with this pompous but dangerous  
 Proposition. ‘ The Criterion of a *Whig*  
 ‘ *Conduct* is to resist and reduce the Power of  
 ‘ *France*.’ On this Basis was the System of  
 that voluminous Writer built, and on the like  
 has the present Writer raised all his Engines  
 for unhinging our present happy Esta-  
 blishment.

*France*, with him, is to have no Peace,  
 let her sue never so humbly for it, till she is  
 conquered and undone.—‘ It was a Maxim  
 ‘ among the old *Romans*, says he, never to  
 ‘ leave an Enemy unconquered.’ But that  
 we may be the more animated to indulge to  
 the national Enmity to *France*, he sets before  
 us the Examples of our wisest Monarchs, as  
 he miscalls all those, who, to subdue the  
*French*, had well nigh ruined the *English*.  
 \* ‘ In the time of our *Edward III*. Unifor-  
 ‘ mity of Action appeared in its full Spirit  
 ‘ and Splendor, this at once animated our  
 ‘ Councils, and gave Vigour to our Arms.  
 ‘ The same Prince that headed the Army,  
 B ruled

\* Page 28.

( 10 )

‘ ruled in the Cabinet: *Nor has there been a*  
 ‘ *Sovereign, from the Time of this Edward to*  
 ‘ *that of Elizabeth of immortal Memory, but*  
 ‘ *what looked on the Court of France as their*  
 ‘ *ENEMY, and always so treated it.* After  
 ‘ which a long Interval furnishes us at  
 ‘ once with different Politicks, and less  
 ‘ glorious Monarchs, till *William III.* like  
 ‘ another good Angel, appeared to redeem  
 ‘ our past Follies, to recover our lost Com-  
 ‘ merce, and to inspire us with a just Sense  
 ‘ of the imminent Danger attending us, by  
 ‘ being in Friendship with *France.*’

You will necessarily observe a String of  
 tacit Reflection on our present Monarch for  
 not heading our Army, and Inaccuracies, or  
 rather Inconsistencies, pompously blended  
 together, and ornamented with the Sanction  
 of some of our most revered old Kings, pur-  
 posely to impose on the too good Nature of  
*Englishmen*, who are taught, from the Cra-  
 dle, to boast a Hatred to the *French*. Had  
 not this inaccurate Writer built too strongly  
 on our *Prejudice* to that Nation, he would  
 not have set such Examples before his Rea-  
 ders, as ought, in reality, to raise their  
 Indignation against him. Is there one ever  
 so little read in our Annals, that knows not  
 that the Ambition, or rather, the Enmity of  
 our *Edwards* and *Henries* to *France*, had  
 vainly cost this Nation an Ocean of Blood  
 and

( 11 )

and Treasure. And how much more of  
 both we spent in latter Days, to indulge to  
 our natural *Prejudices*, I leave this Author to  
 calculate.

But upon what Grounds do these masked  
*Whigs* raise their Proposition, *that the Cri-*  
*terion of a Whig Conduct is to resist and re-*  
*duce the Power of France?* Would *Whigs*  
 undertake the Reduction of *France* without  
 any Prospect of Success? Would they de-  
 stroy *England* in a fruitless Attempt of re-  
 ducing *France*? Such cannot be the Policy  
 of *Whigs*, unless of such *Whigs* as the *Apo-*  
*logist* paints out all our Statesmen since the  
 Revolution to have been. But that a Name  
 I venerate, as much as I do that of *Whig* in  
 its genuine, primitive Meaning, may no  
 longer suffer by Pretenders and *false Bre-*  
*thren*, I beg leave to deny this Propo-  
 sition to be true, for the following few  
 Reasons, among a thousand, that might be  
 instanced.

The *Whigs* in *Charles II.* Reign, perse-  
 cuted the Earl of *Danby*, afterwards Duke of  
*Leeds*, and principal Promoter of the Revo-  
 lution, and would have brought him to the  
 Block, tho' it was notorious that he was an  
 Enemy to *France*, and had obstructed all  
 her Machinations at our Court, while he  
 had any Influence there, as appeared by the

B 2

Measures

( 12 )

Measures pursued as soon as he was obliged to retire.

In King *William's* Reign, the *Whigs* indicated no innate Aversion to *France*, when they could advise and conduct the *Partition Treaties*, which, in their Consequences, gave *Spain* and the *Indies* to the House of *Bourbon*, and for which these *Whiggish* Counsellors and Negotiators were afterwards impeached by a rank *Tory* House of Commons, an amphibious Generation that brags of Principles and have none. There is no denying, that the obvious Meaning of the *Partition Treaty* was increasing the Power of *France*; and such were its direct Consequences; nor can it be less denied that it had been proposed, negociated, and concluded by *Whigs* Abroad; defended, maintained, and applauded in Parliament by *Whigs* at Home; so that *resisting* and *reducing* the Power of *France* was not always the *Criterion of a Whig Conduct*.

But to bring the Point Home to our present *Whigs*, who are not, it is to be hoped, less *Whigs* than their Ancestors, nor of the late Mr. *W————*'s Complexion, I shall appeal to the Conduct of the present Administration all the late Reign, and most of the present, and I assure myself that it will be admitted the Ministry all the while were of the

( 13 )

the true old *Whiggish* Standard. It is notorious, that an almost implicit Confidence was reposed by our Court in *France* ever since the Accession, till the Death of the Emperor *Charles VI.* a Period of near *thirty Years*. During all that long Period, this Doctrine now laid down as fundamental, was ridiculed and hooted at in our most August Assemblies, and a new *Credendum* substituted in its room, *viz.* Believe in *France*, and Suspect the House of *Austria*; pull down the latter, and aggrandize the former. And, Sir, should you have forgot that the long Opposition of the few grumbling *Tories* in Parliament, was founded on the Administration's constant Adherence to this Doctrine, I beg you will, to justify me and satisfy yourself, consult *Monf. Roussel's* Collections, so revered, and often appealed to, by the Author of *Faction detected*.

In order to justify this new-fangled Doctrine, of hunting down *France* at all Hazard and Expence, it is laid down as a *postulatum*, that the *French* are our natural and implacable Enemies, tho' this be a Principle which that Nation constantly and absolutely disavow and deny. And, indeed, one need not wonder at this so peremptory a Disavowal, if it be considered how extravagant, feroce, unnatural, impious a Principle that of an unrelenting Hatred is; how repugnant

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pugnant to the Law of Nature and Nations, not to name that of the Gospel, which I am sorry to see so little venerated of late.

Now whether the *French* do or do not merit the Character, I shall not take upon me to determine at present; but this I am very clear in, that they are extremely prudent in disclaiming it, and that this wise Conduct of theirs has been, in several critical Conjunctions, of mighty use to them. Why then, since it is not unlawful to learn even from Enemies, do we not follow the wise Conduct of the *French* in this respect, rather than justify that implacable Hatred with which we charge them, by avowing it to be the ruling Principle of our own Conduct? May not Foreigners justly retort upon us, whenever we call upon them to assist towards reducing and humbling *France*, 'Whatever comes from you of this Kind deserves to be suspected; you avow yourselves to be the constant, unalterable Enemies of that Power, and therefore we may doubt, that you mean rather the Gratification of your *Prejudice*, than the Security of our Freedom and Interests?' And I am not sure but the Weakness of the present Confederacy against *France*, is more owing to the Opinion which Foreigners entertain of our *false Prejudice* to that Crown, than to either the Gold, or superior Politicks

( 15 )

Politicks of the *French* Cabinet. Behold how calmly all the Powers of *Germany*, the House of *Austria* excepted, the *Dane*, the *Swede*, in short all the Powers of *Europe*, except *Russia*, which may be lured by the Charms of our *Guineas*, to move, or seem to move, to our Aid; see, I say, how composed and serene all *Europe* look on, while this hated Power pushes her Conquests almost to the Heart of *Holland*.

There can possibly be but three Reasons assigned for the general Inattention of the Powers on the Continent to the late Rapidity of *French* Conquests, viz. That they conceive the *Ballance of Power* to be in no Danger, that Phantom which turned so many Heads in *England* since the Revolution; or that they suppose the Interest of *H—r* more consulted, and more nearly concerned, than that of *England*, in the Commencement and Consequences of the present War; or, lastly, that these Powers, conscious of our avowed *Prejudice* to *France*, seem not in an Humour to indulge to our national Weakness.

May it not be supposed that these neutral Powers had observed this *Prejudice*, or the Interest of *H—r* strongly operating, when we wantonly plunged ourselves into the War, and industriously brought it Home to the *Dutch*?



( 16 )

*Dutch?* They might observe us transporting a large Body of Troops to the Continent, against the Opinion of those next exposed to the Power of *France*. They might likewise see us marching the same Troops beyond the Main, to draw the *French* out of *Austria*, *Bavaria*, and *Bobemia*, where they were *interring* the Flower of their Forces, and *sinking* their clearest and best Revenues. They might behold us, after the miraculous Escape at *Dettingen*, rejecting a Peace which would have restrained *France*, and prevented her ulterior Conquests, reconciled the Empire, secured the *Dutch* Barrier, and produced general Safety and Tranquillity. Such must have been the necessary Consequences of the Peace we rejected at *Hanau* in 1743; and so obvious were they to all *Europe*, that 'tis no Wonder none of the neighbouring Powers have ever since interfered either to join us, or compose the Quarrel.

All these capital Errors, Errors that have run us already *thirty Millions* in Debt, that have lost all the *Anstrian Netherlands*, and almost undone the *Dutch*, were owing either to a strong *Prejudice* to *France*, or in *favour* of *H—r*. Take it which way one will, it was unreasonable and unwarrantable; yet see how partially the masked *Scribe* I am considering, buries in Oblivion all

( 17 )

all the Errors of the *Minister* who presided in the Cabinet while those fatal Mistakes were committed, to traduce these Ministers who had no hand in those big Evils, and are supposed to be inclined to put the best and speediest End they can to an unsuccessful War.

\* 'The Reader will readily perceive that I am here talking in Metaphor, and that I mean by the Nation, those who take upon themselves to govern, in Consequences of a Kind of *Self-Creation*, which at once gave them being, and constituted them a M——y. These are the Men from whom I propose to sweat off all *Errors* and *Malignancy*, and by restoring them to a *right State of Judgment* give them *Honour*, and the Nation a well-considered Peace.—Just before this sweating Paragraph, the Author plumes himself on having observed in his *State of the Nation* for the preceding Year 1746, that the present Ministry found Affairs in a prosperous Condition.

† 'The Pretence of Ministers, who force themselves into Power, was next considered, who found Affairs in a fine Train of Success, but by their ill Conduct threw them into Confusion.'

C

But

\* Page 1. † Page 8, of the Introduction.

( 18 )

But it seems this shrewd Cenfor, not content to tells us that he would sweat and purge the present Ministry, who, he says, ruined our flourishing Affairs by their ill Conduct, he charges them in direct Terms, in his *Almanack* of last Year, with being *Enemies* to the Nation. \* ' I conceive those to be ' *Enemies* to the State who undertake Posts ' they are *incapable* of executing, that squander away the *publick Money*, or employ ' People in the Service who are only fit for ' Places as being their Friends.'

I should quite tire you with Quotations from this *Granvillian* Champion, if I had inserted a Tythe of his abusive Invectives against the present great Men in the Direction of our Affairs. With him, they are Fools, Madmen, and Enemies to their Country ; and for what ? for not reducing *France*, when they were forced to take up a losing Game, and for judging it more eligible to obtain the best Peace that can be had, than prosecute an unsuccessful War, against all the Lights of Reason and Experience, and the most stated Maxims of Prudence.

Yet, Sir, see what Sort of Peace this Monitor insists we shall obtain, against all those

\* Page 5. of *State of the Nation* for 1746.

( 19 )

those Lights of Reason and Prudence, which evidently point out to us a Discontinuance of the War when there are no Hopes of its becoming successful.

\* ' A Peace as firm and lasting as glorious ' and beneficial ; not productive of new ' War, nor making Peace and War equally ' expensive to us ; not keeping us always in ' Terror, and upon our Guard ; not fearing ' Invasions, nor dreading internal Enemies : ' But a Peace that must make the *French* ' perpetually *dependent upon us*, that will ' cure them for ever of setting the World in ' a Flame, and make them as much the ' Contempt, as they are now the Dread of ' their Neighbours.—Again, ' The Nation ' expects it done, (such a Peace as he Dictates above) they want not a Peace by ' Negotiation, but by Arms ; a Peace ' that will execute itself and be perpetual.'

If you had not known the past ill Success of our Arms, and the present Imminency of the Danger of our best and powerfulest Allies, would you not conclude, on the viewing so imperious a Mandate to our Ministry as the above, that our national Troops had taken up their Winter Quarters in the *Isle of France*, that *Paris* was already in our Hands, and *Versailles* the Head

C 2 Quarters

\* Page 31.

( 20 )

Quarters of our Royal Leader?—*A Peace that must make France perpetually dependent upon us.—Such a Peace the Nation expects.—But it must be obtained by the Sword, not by the Pen.*—Pray, Sir, what do you think now of an Author that had so dreadfully alarmed your Fears? Can you reflect on the gloomy Prospect of our Affairs, and consider this dictating Politician as a true Friend to the Cause and Royal Family he pretends to serve? Is not the Mask lifted up high enough here to expose to your View the Incendiary and concealed J——e? Need you a more pregnant Proof that this *clubb'd* Performance, and such I have Reasons for believing it to be, comes from a Partizan of *France* on one hand, and on the other, from a secret Friend to Mr. *W——n's* *old Constitution*?

You may possibly be able to guess, tho' I should be in an Error, who the *French* Partizan can be, by the pompous, but unmeaning Detail of the Election for the City of *L——n*, in which eight whole Pages (from Page 35 to 44) are employed to let the World know that a certain M——t was too hard for the *Aldermen*, whether by direct or *indirect* Means is another Question; and that \* 'The City of *London* has always been considered of distinguished

\* Page 43.

( 21 )

' Weight, and I hope will prove so in the  
' House by the Value of her Representatives,  
' which have never been equalled in my Time,  
' as being all Men of Sense, undevoted to  
' any Faction.'

I hope, that not only the City of *London*, but all our Cities and Boroughs are represented by Men of *Sense* and Integrity, free from all Prejudices in favour of any foreign Country, from whence they might be originally derived; but let the Supposition be never so strong in favour of their Parts and Probity, I cannot see why either the Election of *L——n*, or the Merit of the present Representatives, are hawled into this Work, unless it was, that one of our Authors, perhaps not in such Opulence as the other, had made this Push for opening the *Purse* of his *Chum*, by offering him the fulsome Incense of a *Pen*, which diurnally Plays the *Fool* for B——d.

And now, Sir, that I have laid my Thumb upon my *Men*, I hope you will be of Opinion that you had unnecessarily admitted of an Embarrassment of Mind, which I am endeavouring to remove. You may perceive by the Work, which is obviously swelled out to an *Eighteen Pennyworth* for the main Purpose of *Gain*, that the Authors are in no Secrets of State, and are of no  
Weight

( 22 )

Weight or Consequence. You may observe that *one* pushes to be taken Notice of by those he *rails* at, and the other to be taken Notice of by his *Colleague*.

Such are the *Duurrwiri* that assume prescribing to the Court and Ministry, and that put you in a Panick by insinuating, that our Governors were willing to make *Peace* without hazarding the Continuance of a successful War, in order to *beat France into an entire Dependance on this Nation*. The *first* in the high Commission, draws his own Portrait tacitly in the flattering Encomiums bestowed on the *French* for the *uniform and judicious Conduct of their PRINCES AND MINISTERS*, which are enforced by the Translation of part of a pompous Declaration spoken by M. *Pavillon*, on his being admitted a Member of the Academy of Sciences at *Paris*, in the Reign of *Lewis XIV.* I wish we *English* were as national as the *French*; but we too early and easily forget the Source we are sprung from, whereas others retain the *patrial Leven* for more Generations than one.

And could I suppose you, by this Time, at any Loss concerning the associate *Scribe*, I would direct you to the *Plain Reasoner* in 1745, the *State of the Nation* in 1746, and the *G—r*, six Days in the Week. But he shines so much *like himself* in this doughty Performance, that I should think it impossible  
for

( 23 )

for you to mistake him. In the first you may find him calling *the Nation Beetles* for not seeing that the *Revenues of France* are less than ours; for not looking on France at best but as a *Bugbear* that frightens weak *Spirits*; and for not believing that, to flounce deeper in the Mire is the Way to get out of it, or to increase one's Burden is the surest Way to get rid of it; or, to use the *Reasoner's* own immediate and more pertinent Expression, *That the Increase of our publick Debts, is the most probable, if not the only Means of lessening our Taxes.*

But I had unwarily like to have wronged our Author of the very Flower of all his wise Reflections, which is, \* that it is better for us to be *one hundred Millions* in Debt than *Fifty*. After this, I hope you will harbour a better Opinion of your own Judgment, than to take this Writer's frothy Declarations and Reveries for Oratory and Reasoning. You may perceive that the Conjuror is no better a Prophet than he is a Calculator, tho' he plumes himself, in the very first Page of his political Almanack of this Year, for the Rectitude of his Calculations; and having foretold the Year before, all that happened in the present.

Before the State of the Nation is entered upon for the current Year, it may be extremely necessary to form a brief Recapitulation

\* *Plain Reasoner*, Page 23.

( 24 )

‘ tulation of what we remarked under the  
 ‘ same Title the last Year, not only as it  
 ‘ will have a natural Connection with the  
 ‘ ensuing, but will at the same time *evince*  
 ‘ *the Impartiality of our Views, the Veracity*  
 ‘ *of our Assertions, and the Effect of our Con-*  
 ‘ *jectures.*’

After so pompous a Portraiture of his own  
 Sufficiency, one might expect he would  
 have produced some Tests of the Superiority  
 of his scientific Faculties; and to do the  
*modest Man* Justice, he attempts something  
 like it; but unhappily he mistakes for Proofs  
 in his favour, such as most obviously make  
 against him. On casting your Eye over his  
*State of the Nation* for last Year, you will  
 find infinite Proof of the Truth of this  
 Assertion, and particularly Page 50, 51, 52,  
 and 21, from whence I beg leave to borrow  
 a few Extracts for your present Satis-  
 faction.

‘ The Troops of our Allies are at least  
 ‘ equal to those of France, and at present  
 ‘ on the *gaining Side*. If any new Ally  
 ‘ starts up for France against the Court of  
 ‘ Vienna, the late Treaty with Russia will  
 ‘ fully ballance it; so that it does not any  
 ‘ where appear by what Means the French  
 ‘ Court can *extricate themselves out of their*  
 ‘ *present Difficulties*, by bringing into the  
 ‘ Field, in the South of France, an equal  
 ‘ Number of disciplin’d Troops, as are  
 ‘ already

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‘ already there of the Allies; nor find any  
 ‘ Ally capable of doing her any impor-  
 ‘ tant Service. *The Event in the Eye of*  
 ‘ *Common Sense, is very clear. France must*  
 ‘ *be soon ruined and exhausted, both by Sea*  
 ‘ *and Land*, except she can find Means to  
 ‘ conquer, which, at least, *is not very pro-*  
 ‘ *bable*, either in the *Low-Countries*, or in  
 ‘ South France.—Spain may be *lost to her*  
 ‘ *soon*, and then the very Basis of her Sup-  
 ‘ port falls of course.—As to the revolting  
 ‘ State of *Genoa*, tho’ it may require  
 ‘ some Time to clear up, has no very fa-  
 ‘ vourable Aspect towards the House of  
 ‘ Bourbon, but rather seems *on the Point of*  
 ‘ *eminent Destruction*.—The Soldiers on  
 ‘ our Part, and for ought I can see, *the Ge-*  
 ‘ *nerals too*, as full as good as the French;  
 ‘ our Success on the Side of *Provence*, pro-  
 ‘ bably a Ballance for the Loss of the *Low-*  
 ‘ *Countries*.—There is the best Appearance,  
 ‘ that our Army in the *Low-Countries*, this  
 ‘ Year, will be a *Match* for the French.—  
 ‘ And as the Affairs of *Europe* in general  
 ‘ are in a very *hopeful Way*, by the *happy*  
 ‘ *Progress* of the Arms of the Allies on the  
 ‘ Side of South France, I should not in the  
 ‘ least doubt, that when his *Royal Highness*  
 ‘ *the Duke*, shall be appointed to command  
 ‘ again in *Flanders*, but that we shall have  
 ‘ a *pleasant Prospect* on that Side.—Then  
 as for his Exactitude in Matter of Figures

D

and

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and national Expence, you shall find him mistaken in little more than a *single Million* in his Calculation of the Money granted for the Expence of the present Year.

You cannot hence, Sir, avoid perceiving the Unfitness of so loose a Calculator and Dabler in Politics, for the high Privilege he arrogates of alarming a Nation, dictating to a Court, and *sweating* a Ministry.—

\* ' The Way to give Health and Vigour to the State, is the same, as to cure malignant Disorders in the human Body, that is to say, by *Sudorifics* and *Perspiration*:—  
' In this Manner I propose to treat the Body politic *annually*, until all its gross Humours evaporate.—You see you are to be plagued annually with the Empirick's Prescriptions, unless he is taken down in Charity to the Public. For want of this Precaution the last Year, we are troubled with him at present. But as the late Sir *Richard Steele* had heretofore silenced *Partridge* by exposing his Impostor, so it is to be hoped his Brother Graduate may hereafter be struck dumb by being thus stript of those specious, patriot Trappings with which he covered himself the better to impose on the Credulity of the People for the Promotion of his Scheme, in favour of Mr. *W*———'s cherished *old Constitution*. Even in regard to this Scribe, we know by Experience that he

\* Page 1.

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he mends by Correction, or at least dares not offend, after Conviction, *in propria persona*. For being detected, about three Years ago, by an able Pen \*, he never after pretended to appear a *Reasoner*, chusing to cover himself under another Appellation.

'Tis probable, tho' we should beat him out of his present *Title*, this Author will assume another the next Year; for the Man wants not for a modest Assurance, as you may judge by his exulting in his Lucubration of this Year, for the Exactitude of his Calculations, Observations, and Predictions in his last.

There is something very peculiar in the Construction of this Writer's Mind, which one shall not often meet with among *Englishmen*, and which would incline me to suspect that some *Foreigner*, or *Spawn* of a Foreigner, may be not only his *Instigator*, but *Coadjutor* likewise, in his reiterated Attempts to impose upon the Public. He has gone on from Winter to Winter for three Years past, promising Wonders, and securing no Success; and yet tho' our Affairs grow every Day more desperate, or at least, are in as unthriving a Way as ever, this intrepid Scribe goes on prescribing the same Dose to us, which we experimentally found to be noxious and

D 2 unwholsome.

\* Plain Answer to the Plain Reasoner.

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unwholsome. *Faction detected*, from whence this Writer probably may have taken the Hint he annually pursues, assured us of beating *France* in a Campaign; next Year comes out the *Plain Reasoner*, who gives the like Assurances with as little Reality; then appears the *State of the Nation* of last Year, repeating the same Asseverations, and with as little Foundation; and yet in the present Year, we are still told we shall bang *France*, by a Continuance of the War, tho' full four Years Experience, one would think, ought to make us wiser than to take his Word, and him more modest than to offer it.

There is so great Petulancy, not to say Arrogancy, in thus persevering to impose upon the Publick, after being so often detected, and in the wrong, that one may very speciously be allowed to presume that some *pert* Foreigner or his *Offspring*, eggs on this Writer, and clubs with him in the Labour. The Politics of *France* are known to be too refined for the gross Understandings of the Majority of *Englishmen*. *Sempronius*, is represented, by Mr. *Addison*, bellowing most in favour of Liberty and the Commonwealth, when he was deepest in the Interest of *Cæsar*. And I don't find, if the late Mr. *W——n* may be credited, but part of our People may match even the *French* for Art and Dissimulation.

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But to have Recourse only to the Work before us for the Proof of the Depth of *English* Policy, see how furiously this Author mouths at *France*, proclaims her Inability, and promises her Reduction, when she is on the Verge of subjecting *Holland*, of kindling a third successful Flame in *Italy*, and of rendering ineffectual all our Efforts to strengthen ourselves, by a Corps of *Russian* Auxiliaries, and by engaging the *Germanic* Body in our Cause. Must we not deem an Author uncommonly adroit that can persuade us he is in earnest all the while that he is spiriting up the Nation to pursue an, unequal, unsuccessful Conflict? If, before *France* had won an Inch of the *Austrian Netherlands*, she was able to baffle and beat us, what View can we have of Success against her in the present flourishing Situation of her Affairs on the Continent?

But we are told by this adventurous Monitor, that her Successes in the *Netherlands* go for nothing, inasmuch as we shall be able to ruin her, in one Summer, by Sea, then get all her Trade, which he admits to be more lucrative than ours, and so make ourselves whole at once for all our Expences since the Revolution, by adding the profitable Trade of *France* to our own.

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As extraordinary as this Scheme for reducing *France* may appear to you, there is nothing plainer under the Sun than that such is the purport of all this Writer's present incoherent Lucubration, if a Work, which has neither Order, Connexion nor reasoning, may be said to have any Meaning at all. You will find the Work a whole, composed of Parts as little relative to each other, as they are altogether to the Design of the Performance, which may be supposed to have been the giving a general Idea of the State of our Affairs. But how is this attempted to be performed by the Author, by jumbling together several detached Subjects, most of them quite foreign to the main Design, in so disjointed a Manner, that the first Part of the Work may as well be the latter; and either, or both, the Middle.

The Writer had caught the Itch of dabling in Politicks, would write to get a Penny, to alarm the People, to answer the secret Purposes of his masked *Party*, to blacken and distress the present Ministry, and to restore a late fallen Minister. In such a Flow of different Ideas, what could a weak Brain do else but stuff into his Work all the good Things he had heard or read of, whether pertinent or otherwise?

Thus may we account for the Detail (Page 24.) of the Chancellor of the *Ex—r's* Method

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Method of ascertaining the *Quantum* of the current Supplies, and the manner of raising them. So likewise may be accounted for the whole tedious Progress of the late Election for *L—n*, and particularly his out-doing, Page 39, where he presents his Reader with the choice Nofegay of a Simile, which, for its Beauty and Pertinence, may be as well the Offspring of the Laureat as the *F—l*. 'If any one has seen a young Girl disappointed of her Husband the Moment the Priest was going to join their Hands, so now looked Courtier at Courtier, Corporation-Man at Corporation-Man.'—And what was it that had wrought this wonderful Surprize in Corporation-Men and Courtiers? *The sudden Appearance of two potent Adversaries that had been hid behind the Curtain*, as he tells in the same Page, which were *Sl—y B—ll* and *St—n Tb—e J—n*, Esqrs.—'Tis possible, that the Sight of two Gentlemen of so very great Importance may have scared timid Courtiers and Corporation-Men out of their Senses; but how a longing poor young Girl could be disappointed of HER Husband before she had one, is what some future *G—z—r* may clear up, if the learned Author be in an 'Humour to vindicate an intimate Acquaintance.

The Author himself best knows with what View he has spent so much of his Ink,



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Ink, and filled so many Pages of his Work, to shew us, that he had read the Treaty of *Munster* had been concluded in 1648, that of the *Pyrenees* in 1659, that of *Nimeguen* in 1679, and the Peace of *Ryswick* in 1697, and to give us a just Idea of his Accuracy, he descends to be so minute as to inform his illiterate Readers, that this last Treaty was concluded in the Month of *September*. He had finished the Portraiture of his *Exactitude*, if he had inserted the Day of the Month and *Hour* of the Day; but *Homer* himself nodded sometimes.

Nor are we to wonder if one so much more intent to frighten and deceive, than to set right and inform, should interlard his Work with such Scraps of History and Hearsay, as might set his Readers a staring, and in their Surprise, forget or overlook the main Drift of his Undertaking, which was to over-load and perplex the Nation by the Continuance of an unsuccessful War, the better to restore the late Mr. *W—————n's* *Old Constitution*.

Behold how judiciously, Page 34, he blends the *Dutch* with the *Ministry* in a strong Opposition to the *H——r A——t*, or, as he more elegantly phrases it, *that rising Genius of the Nation*. But being one of those accurate Scribes that never dishes up a *What* to their Readers without a *Wherefore*, he presently acquaints us what had principally

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principally occasioned this *Coalition*. ' It was, he says, Page 35, the *starting up an antiquated Right in the Duchy of Cornwall*. — But behold the Author's edifying Perspicuity in developing his Subject, and clearing it up gradually to the Understanding of the meanest Capacity. First, he *starts up a Right* which puzzles the Reader to find out; and then presently sets his Mind at Quiet by informing him that, ' There was at this time produced to light some *old Records* of the Duchy, which seemed to give a Right to the Prince of *Wales*, as *Duke of Cornwall*, of convening any where, within the Limits of the Duchy, a Parliament of *Tinners*, to be continued together as long as their Principal, or his Deputy, by his Directions, should think convenient.'

Here was Matter enough to alarm the Ministry and the *Dutch*, who might be overthrown, the latter by *Lewis XV.* and the former by the late Minister, should the lack-learning *Cornwall* Parliament be permitted to sit. ' This, to be sure, at so delicate a Crisis, alarmed the Ministry, and put them on using their best Endeavours to obviate so important an Opposition as such a Ballance against them must have created.'

But this *Ballance* so exceedingly dreaded, as you shall see by and by, was, however,

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in such impartial Hands, as that it was not likely to prove any *Ballance* at all. 'It happened very luckily for them, that these *Records* were not in the Hands or Power of any of the Duchy Officers; they were in the Hands of an eminent Lawyer, unbyassed to either Party, and to whom both made a very arduous Application.—It concerns not the Public, we will suppose, who the *unbyassed* Lawyer was, or how aptly the Epithet may be annexed to the Profession of the Law, how he came by the Custody of those important *Records*, what Right he had to detain them from him who could alone be intitled to the Possession of them; nothing of all this, without doubt, was thought necessary by the Author, or so accurate a Pen would have obliged the Reader, who must presently after wonder exceedingly why the *Dutch* and our Court were convulsed, since an *unbyassed* Gentleman had the Custody of the *Records*, which, by being in the *proper Hands*, could alone contribute to produce the Convulsion.

Yet, tho' these tremendous *Parchments* were in Hands not to be *corrupted* by Promises from L—r H—e, or *Gold* and Promises from A—n S—t, we shall find the *Dutch* and our Ministry driven to the very Verge of Despair, for fear the Lawyer should not love *Gold*, or should drop the  
*Substance*

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*Substance* to catch at the *Shadow*.—How little and weak do Men in the highest Stations appear, sometimes, when produced in their native Colours! behold how the *High and Mighty*, both at Home and Abroad, tremble at a Phantom.

While this was in Agitation, and both Sides in doubt which should succeed, both the *Dutch* and *British* M—y were at their *Wits Ends* for fear of the Event. They weighed every Circumstance, canvassed every Measure, and puzzled and perplexed themselves to no Purpose, *Reflexion worked on Reflexion, Thought on Thought*; they looked on one another like Men bewildered in a Storm (an Improvement of the late poignant *Simile* of the young Woman that had lost a *Husband* before she had one) expecting every Moment the finishing Gust, that must give them their *Quietus*.—Nay, Sir; do not despair for all this melancholy painting. You shall find our Author can as readily extricate his *Actors*, as confound and perplex them; and he shall do this in a manner, which no other Writer in the World but himself would have undertaken or thought of. While the despairing *Hollanders* and our Ministry were in this distracted Condition, not knowing whether to hang or drown, behold how a Dawn of  
 E 2 Day

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Day broke in upon them to direct their Steps to Safety of Body and Mind.

— ‘When suddenly a Glare of Light appeared from a Quarter they least expected, the Halcyon Day returned, and brightened all their Cares into Joy and Transport.’—How poetically expressed! *Brightened all their Cares!*—It would be a Pleasure to the Curious, certainly, if the learned Author had here condescended to explain himself a little more amply. He might have told us whether these *Cares so brightened*, were filed bright, varnished with shining Paint, or studded with small Brilliant Diamonds. But such small Slips being pardonable in great Wits, let us return to our Author, who himself *brightens*, as he proceeds in his Narrative, in proportion to the Rust he files off the *Cares* of his Agents.

He not only told us the *Halcyon Day* was returned, but obligingly tells that it was brought on by the *only Man in the Nation the least likely to contribute to the Quiet of the Ministry, or to set them right*. Let the World judge if I exaggerate in the Portraiture. ‘They had luckily intimated to the King the Necessity of learning the Sentiments of *the only Man* they feared would necessarily succeed on a Change, now seemingly approaching; they waited for some time with *Terrors* enough, when at length they

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‘they were told with a gracious Smile, that their Safety purely depended on the *Dissolution* of the Parliament.’

Some have supposed, I hope invidiously, that all this was of the Author’s own pure Invention; because, say they, ’tis unlikely the late *Minister*, who always was, and is still, cherished by the P—e, would give *Advice* that should put not only his royal Patron, but himself too, more in the Power of the Ministry than ever. He must be weaker and more self-denying than he is deemed to be, to act thus a Part, which *Machiavel* would decry, and his very Enemies laugh at him for. But what of that and much more, which might be urged against, not only the Infallibility, but Impropriety of this long-winded Digression. ’Tis enough that the learned Author had a Mind to put the *Dutch* and Ministry in a Fright, and to emblazon the Character of his Hero, the late Minister; and whose Business it is to find Fault with Men of Wit and Genius?

Therefore as he may think it to be none of mine, I shall take leave of him here, as to his *Pieces detachées, pour embellir & remplir*, to pursue him to the Main of his Subject, which appears to have been to *frighten the Ministry from all Thoughts of Peace for a Summer or two, that in the Interim, we may take the Chance of totally undoing the Dutch*

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Dutch and ourselves, or ruining France. Such is the sage Advice of this public Censor, such undoubtedly is the Scope and Purport of his Pamphlet, if it may be said to have any, except celebrating the very shining Merit of a certain young *Representative* of a very great City, and the *late Minister*, from both whom may be *Expectations* of different Complexions. But lest he should hold me inexcusably stupid for not perceiving the Profundity of his Conception, as to the Nature and Extent of Government, I beg leave to trouble you with a few of his *self-evident* Principles on the Subject. \* Every Minister in a free State either proceeds on a *new Plan*, or moves by *none at all*. If on a new one, *the Chain is broke that should hold the State together*, and if on *none at all*, then the *Spirit of the People governs*.—For my part, though I persuade myself there is something very new and shining in all this, I readily own it beyond the scanty Measure of my poor Comprehension; therefore humbly leave the Discussion of its Sublimity to the *Literati* at *Tom's* or *Child's*, as well as of the Super-Elegancy of the harmonious Author on the Stupidity of Ministerial Men. † 'It's a Pity that even the most desperate Necessities of the State won't turn the Minds of *Ministerial Men* to the reflecting on the impending Danger,

\* Page 65. † Page 24.

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'nor seek to shelter themselves under the *hospitable Cover of evident Rectitude*, &c.—But to the Author's principal Design.

To shew then his Drift at once in its strongest Light, I shall quote his own Words as being undoubtedly more apt than any I could substitute in their Place. \* 'I doubt not to see this War happily ended, with the entire Destruction of the *French Commerce*; which must be done, or as I have shewn before, all our Labour is in vain, our Debts are much too high to be paid by any other Means in Nature; and as they must be higher, there is no alternative left us, but *to have Peace on our own Terms*, or become the Slaves of *France*.—In a Word, *one of us must now fall*, which, next under Heaven, is in our own Power to determine,' &c.

You may observe here, Sir, that old *Roman* Spirit which glowed in the Breast of those renowned Republicans during the *Punick Wars*. *Delenda est Gallia*.—*Britain or France now must fall*; and we are here advised to run the Risk of that tremendous *Fall*, to obtain a *Peace on our own Terms*.

But you are not to suppose our Author so much a Visionary as to build upon Miracles only. I assure you he has his Pouch well stored

\* Page 63, 64.

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stored with *Hopes*, which you will find to be solidly grounded. \* 'Our *Hopes*, in the mean time, are centered in the Prince of *Orange's* getting the better of the *French* Party, and effectually rooting them out of the Army and Government; on the *Russian* Forces coming timely in to our Aid; on our Naval Affairs being pursued with Spirit; and of our bringing such an Army into the Field, as may be able to face the *French*.'

Here is the whole Chain of his political Strength for giving *France* the *Fall* he would persuade us to attempt; but should any of its Links give way, I apprehend it too obvious that we may receive the *Fall* instead of giving it?

It may be impracticable for the Prince of *Orange*, and perhaps not safe for him, to attempt so thorough and sudden a Change in the Army and Government, as the Author contends for, while a powerful, successful *French* Army is within the Territories, if not the Bowels, of the Republick. Here then may we be allowed to suppose that this first Link of his Chain may fail.--- Let us essay the next.

The *Russians* may be prevented by domestic or neighbouring Distractions, either real or pretended; may be impeded in their March, should they march in earnest, either by

\* Page 58.

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by *Prussia* or *France*; may come too late to obstruct such Conquests of the Enemy, as may reach even the Vitals of the Republic; or, should none of these Impediments intervene, *France* may still be an over match for the Confederates in the Field, by means of *Swedish*, *Prussian*, and other *German* Auxiliaries, or by a forced Augmentation of her native Troops, to make a dernier Effort. In either Case, what would become of *Holland*, should this Link likewise fail? and, to our very great Sorrow, the Appearance is but too strong, that it may.

The fourth Link of his Chain, I chuse to consider before the *third*, being naturally and more immediately connected with the *second*, which related to the *Russians*.--- If the *Russians* should not join us, there is no Appearance that we can bring such an Army into the Field, as may be able to face the Enemy; and even if they should, 'tis a doubt, a very great one, whether *France* might not outnumber, and over-match us after the Junction: Therefore at best, this *third* Link of the sanguine Author's Chain of *Hopes*, is but Conjectural. Would then a wise Man or a Friend to our present Establishment, risque the Fate of the Nation on a simple, I fear an untenable Conjecture? I appeal to your, and every Reader's Understanding, if the Author has not here evidently display'd the *Hoof*, and confirmed himself to be of the *Winningtonian* Sect.

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But as greatest Stress is laid throughout the whole Work, on the *third* Link of this imaginary Chain, that is, on our conquering and retaining all the *French Colonies*, before *France* overcame the *Dutch*, we will examine this Point separately and more minutely. This is the more necessary, that the Author himself tells us that both we and the *Dutch* are inevitably undone, unless we succeed in the Attempt. But is it not probable that we are declaimed into a Desire of making an Attempt of so sickly a Contexture, in order to a Recovery of the *old Constitution*.

This important Conquest, according to this dispatching Scribe, is to be made in one Summer, or our Ministry deserve to be hanged.\*  
 ' Our naval Power, while the *Dutch* cover the Seas with Privateers, may finish the Destruction of the *French Trade*, with great Facility; and this, with due Attention, may be effected in *one Summer*.— Again, if our Fleet cannot make such a Peace as we want in *one Summer*, I know what some *People* deserve.'

It were to be wished the Author had told us in what particular Manner he would advise the attacking the *French Settlements*, that we may be the better able to judge of his military Skill. But since he has not thought proper to let his Readers be as wise as himself, for I will suppose he had formed a Scheme of the Conquest he intended; since, I say, he has not informed the Public, how the Conquest

\* Page 30, 31.

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quest may be made, I shall endeavour to point out the Probability of our making none that can balance the Risk, should we make the Experiment, by continuing the War.

All *Queen Ann's War*, we were as much Masters as Sea as now, and we were Conquerors wherever the War was kindled on the Continent; yet we never attempted a Conquest of the *French Colonies*, but once of *Canada*, in which we failed, and not for Want of either Skill or Resolution, so much as through a natural Impracticability that attends the Attempt of such distant Conquests from a brave and the most experienced Nation in the World in the Art military. We took *Cape-Breton*; but had the *French Ministry* done their Duty, as they easily might, in sending early and necessary Supplies to *Louisbourg*, we might have had sufficient Reason to repent us of the Attempt. But are we presumptuously to expect that the Court of *France* will be always as remiss, and that we shall always have the like Success?

I don't know what might have been the happy Consequence, if the Blow had been immediately followed after the taking *Cape-Breton*; but if the most intelligent, in the Strength of both Nations, in that northern Part of *America*, may be credited, we have no chance of conquering *Quebeck*, without which all other Acquisitions there would turn to little Account. So that in north *America*, the Chance of our not succeeding to root out the

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the *French* there, is at best, precarious, perhaps impracticable. And were it otherwise, I fear the Conquests of *France* in the *Netherlands* would render us very tractable on a Peace, on which Occasion, I apprehend we shall be obliged to restore *Cape-Breton*, the only Conquest we have been able to make, since the War, with all our vast Superiority by Sea. — We are next to examine the Feazibility of subduing the *French* Sugar Colonies, the only they have in *America*, except their Settlement on the River *Mississipi*, which I suppose the Author himself would not advise attempting.

The Principal of the *French* Sugar Settlements, are *Martinico* and *St. Domingo*, or *Hispaniola* divided between them and the *Spaniards*. To begin with the latter, I will take upon me to assert that the *French* alone on that Island, are able to raise 20000 effective Men, willing and able to defend their Properties against a foreign Invader. And we may naturally suppose that the *Spaniards* on the Island, would rather aid their *Catholic* Neighbours, than us Protestants. Besides, it is no Secret, that the principal Harbours of that fine Island, particularly those in the *French* Possession, are regularly and strongly fortified.

In such a Situation then, can we suppose the Conquest of this *French* Sugar Colony to be so practicable and easy, as this adventurous Writer would persuade us it is? Is there not greater likelihood, that the *French*, from so populous a Colony, contiguous to *Jamaica*, may

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may invade that Island of ours, than that we should be able to subdue them?

The Probability of our succeeding against *Martinico* is still stronger against us, if it be true, as I take upon me to say it is, that the *French* are able to arm 40000 good Men, in Defence of that valuable Island. There is not one acquainted with the vast Superiority of the *French* in those Parts, that wonders not they had not invaded our *Leeward* Islands, since this War, and that scruples to own, they might, the two first Years of it, have ruin'd all those Islands in a Fortnight. There is no Disputing that they had Force enough at *Martinico* only, to do the Work; nor can they ever want it when inclined; or fear succeeding, if the Superiority of our naval Force, don't prove the Safety of our Fellow-Subjects in those Parts.

The *French*, 'tis true, have a few more small Sugar Islands, such as *Guardeloupe* and *Mariegalante*; but they, if conquered, would be but a poor Equivalent for the Continuance of an expensive and unsuccessful War. And I am not clear, that we could subdue even these small Colonies with all our Maritime Force, considering how populous and well fortified they are, the Weakness of our contiguous Colonies in Men capable of bearing Arms, and their Distance from this Center of our Force and Power.

Hence, Sir, you may perceive how very wide our Author shoots off the Mark, in supposing  
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we shall be able in *one Summer*, to ruin the *French Trade*, by the Conquest of their Colonies. We might indeed in a Course of many Years, if the *French* should sleep as they have of late Years, in regard to their Marine, reduce their Sugar Islands to great Distress, by obstructing the Intercourse between them and their Mother-Country. But would such a slow Reduction, or rather the *Hopes* of a Reduction, compensate for our ill Success on the Continent in the mean time? And are we sure that the *French* will always stand in their own Light and neglect their Marine, as they have done of late, to extend their Trade? Besides, were we able to beat them out of their whole Trade during the War, we should but raise so many more Enemies, so much more powerful Rivals, who might, by applying all their Attention to their Marine and employing all their Seamen to annoy us, become an Over-Match for a Nation that must necessarily employ the greater Number of our Seafaring Men, in the carrying on an extensive Commerce.

Our thoughtless *Monitor* insists that we beat the *French* out of all their Trade, or we are undone. I have endeavoured to shew above that the Odds are many against us, that we could not if we would, conquer the *French American Colonies*, and that if we did, we should be obliged on a Peace, to restore them all. How do you think the *Dutch* would relish the Detention of their Barrier, and even  
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of their conquer'd Territories, by *France*, because we should refuse restoring our Conquests upon her in *America*? Nor should we have the popular Cry less against us in behalf of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Turin*, should we pretend to retain such Conquests, which must necessarily be at the Expence of our Allies.

The only Trade we could have any Chance of getting out of the Hands of the *French* intirely, is that to the *East-Indies*; but even this fair Prospect may vanish, should our late great Armament to those Seas meet with bad Weather, Sickness, Shipwreck, or many other cross Accidents and Casualties, to which naval Expeditions are liable, particularly those at so vast a distance.

You see, Sir, that even this Conquest, the likeliest of all we can make on the *French*, is far from being so real as may be imagined by those who view only the fairer Side of the Picture. And it has this also in common with Conquests in *America*, could we make any, that we should be obliged to part from them, unless we could beat Count *Saxe* beyond the *Loire* and *Garrone*.

As for the general *European Trade* of *France*, which is the necessary Consequence of her Climate, Situation, Products, Oeconomy, Skill and Industry of her Inhabitants, the Author has not thought fit to explain himself, whether we shall continue the War till we beat her out of it, or indulge her with it, because it would be impossible to wrest it  
from



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from her, unless we should be adroit enough to persuade the *Turks, Spaniards, Italians, Danes, Swedes, Germans, Poles, Russians, &c.* neither to eat, drink, or wear any of the Products or Manufactures of that Country; or if these several Nations were not to be persuaded, that we should sag them into a Compliance.

To be serious, my dear Friend, how thoughtless must this sanguine Writer and his mercantile *Chum* be, if they were in earnest in their vehement Exhortations to continue the War, till we could beat *France* out of all her Commerce? How thoughtless should we be if we had swallowed the Bait on the Credit of Scribes that seek our Ruin to promote their secret Schemes? And how heedless and unjust would our Ministry be to continue the War, if any tolerable Peace can be obtained, in order to hunt after chimerical Conquests and Trades, which if possessed, we should most certainly be obliged to part from? But 'tis to be hoped the Nation are wiser than to be thus lured to their Undoing by Declaimers, that are no less Strangers to the Subject they pretend to treat of, than to that Truth and Candor which warm the Patriot's Breast.

It is obvious to a Demonstration, that the Performance under my present Consideration, was calculated for depreciating and perplexing the present Ministry, to make way for a new, at the Head of which, the Author would wish to see the *late Minister* placed. This being

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being the evident Purport of the Piece, it will be proper to consider it with some Attention. As for the *secret Views* of the Author or Authors, in favour of *W———n's old Constitution*, though they appear to me almost equally evident, from the Consequence of replacing the late adventurous *M——r* at the Head of Affairs, I will however chuse to leave you yourself to draw what Conclusion you think may be truly founded on the whole Performance taken collectively.

You must necessarily perceive the Scope and Tendency of the Author to be the plunging your Country into inextricable Difficulties, by the Continuance of a successful War, grown already much too burthensome for us: Nor is it less obvious that he would thrust out those whom he suspects to be pacifickly inclined as foreseeing the impendent Ruin, in order to make way for *Him* that had brought all our present Calamities upon us, and who is the most likely Man in the Nation to compleat our Destruction, by precipitating us from one ruinous Measure to another, till, on *Mr. W———n's* Plan, we shall be glad to do our *best Work*, as he calls treading back and ripping up the boasted glorious Work of our Fathers in 1688.

The Author himself scruples not to own that the *Dutch* are on the Verge of Destruction, and tacitly confesses, as he necessarily must, that our Ruin is blended with their Fall.— \* On their (*French*) being possessed

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\* Page 14, 15.

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‘ of *Holland*, the whole System of Affairs  
 ‘ will take quite a new Turn, either the  
 ‘ Lovers of Liberty will drown their Coun-  
 ‘ try, and retire hither; or, if the *French*  
 ‘ Party be more prevalent, the *French* will  
 ‘ come into Possession of that rich Maritime  
 ‘ Country, and therewith acquire an Addi-  
 ‘ tion to their Sugar Trade by having *Suri-*  
 ‘ *nam*, and it’s highly probable the whole  
 ‘ *East-Indies*.’—Again, ‘ I am verily per-  
 ‘ suaded, that something of this Nature is  
 ‘ nearly approaching, whether we *continue*  
 ‘ *the War*, or agree to a *shameful Peace*, &c.’

You see here, Sir, a tacit Avowal that the Continuance of the War may be attended with infinite Danger to our present Constitution, yet the Drift of the Author’s whole Book is to lure the Nation into a Relish for the successless Pursuit. Every Peace, with this Scribe, must be *shameful*, that does not render *France* dependant on *England*; therefore, as such a *Dependance* is morally impracticable, as Matters are now situated, ’tis manifest the Author must have some secret View in urging so unseasonably, and ardently the Continuance of the War; and what other can that deep-laid Design be but the throwing the Nation into so great Confusion and Despair, as that, to get rid of our Miseries, we shall be ripe for any Change that might give us a Chance for Relief.

Whom then, my dear Friend, would you chuse to trust with the Direction of  
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public Affairs, the *Man* that had wantonly plunged the Nation into all our present Difficulties, that had brought all their present Distresses on the *Dutch*, and who, if he had Influence, would perpetuate their and our Perplexities; or those, who would put the speediest and safest End possible to a War, which, if as successless as for the Time past, must, by its Continuance, inevitably ruin the *Dutch*, and probably bring on the Dissolution of our present cherished Constitution?

That the late M——r brought the present *French* War upon us, is beyond all Controversy; or, at least, that our Conduct during his Ministry had provoked *France* to declare against us. It will be as little controverted, that the same Conduct had brought the War into the *Netherlands* against the Opinion and Consent of the *Dutch*, who are now reduced to Despair by that precipitate Measure.

Again, ’tis notorious that the same *Man* presided over our Councils, when the Mediation of the King of *Prussia* was rejected at *Hanau* in 1743, by which Means, that Prince was cooled and weaned from any Attachment he might have had before that for our Court, and an honourable and permanent Tranquillity was prevented.

The same Minister likewise concluded the Treaty of *Worms* the same Year, the flagrant Injustice of which, forced the *Ge-*  
 G 2 *nese*

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noese into the Alliance of *France* and *Spain*, than which Junction with our Enemies, nothing could have contributed more to strengthen the *Bourbon*, and weaken the *Austrian* Interest in *Italy*. The fatal Consequences of that mistaken Treaty was nervously and prophetically pointed out by an accurate Pen \*, soon after its Conclusion; and time has since abundantly evinced the Rectitude of the judicious Author's Conjectures. Yet this is the very Measure, for which we see that *Minister* incensed by this partial Scribe, and by a daily Writer, no more the *Fool* than him.

Let the Scene now be changed to those at present in the Direction of our Affairs. There was no recalling immediately what had been done by the late M——r. He had shuffled and cut, and dealt out the Cards so, that his Successors had no Option left but that of playing the Game the best they could, in Hopes some Change, Death, or other lucky Accident Abroad, might intervene to accelerate the putting a safe and honourable End to the Contest. They have tried the Fortune of War with Courage; they have waited for fortunate Events with Steadiness; but neither having answered their Hopes, what ought they to do? How are they to act when involved in a burthensome, unpropitious War? Ought they to continue it at the Hazard of ruining their Allies and their own Country, or put a

\* Free Thoughts on the Treaty of *Worms*, &c.

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Period to it on the best Terms that can be obtained before the Enemy's Conquests reach the Vitals of the *Dutch*?

Surely, my Friend, the Eligibility of the alternative is too obvious to need Argument. If we continue the War, and it prove unsuccessful, the *Dutch* will be undone, and we must be buried in their Ruin. The Conquest of the *French* Colonies, and the Destruction of their whole Commerce, is a mere Chimera, as I have shewn before. Could the Conquest be made, our Allies would, and must be obliged to join so far with the Enemy, as to exact a Restitution of whatever might be wrested from the *French* in the new World. It would be impossible to make Peace without such Restitution, unless *France* be driven out of all her Conquests in the *Netherlands*, which may be rather wished for, than relied on. Yet see how differently this Writer pretends to judge of the Matter.

\* ' In this I see not any rational alternative, nor can conceive on what Terms it's possible to make Peace, but such as must be attended with inevitable Ruin.'—This inconsistent Author argued to the same Purport in his *State of the Nation* for last Year; and yet since his writing that incendiary Piece, we have had such Overtures of Peace made to us by *France*, as might be embraced even in a successful War. What could be wished for more, in the then State

of

\* Page 15.

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of the War, than for France to offer restoring all her Conquests, in Case a moderate Settlement should be agreed to for Don Philip in Italy, and that a small District in the Dutchy of Luxemburg, contiguous to the Territories of France on that Side, should be yielded to that Crown?

These are such Preliminaries as I presume to assert were offered by France, and repeated. And pray, why may not a Peace founded on such Preliminaries be made without being attended with inevitable Ruin, the Consequence, according to this Author, of making any Peace, till we shall have conquered the French Colonies, and possessed ourselves of all their Trade? But herein especially appears the Author's Secret Views. With him, our Ruin is inevitable if Peace be made; and why? but that he supposes, and very justly, that the Continuance of the War must so perplex us, that we shall plunge into any Measure that promises any Relief, or even a Change of Misery, which is some Alleviation in Pain.

But our Ministry, who have no View but to the Honour and Happiness of their Country and Prince, will, 'tis to be hoped, entertain other Notions concerning Peace and War, in a Conjunction the most critical and perilous that has ever been known. And if they are to blame for any Part of their past Conduct, 'tis, that they did not close with the Proposals of France, before she invaded the Territories of Holland; and that they

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they abetted an Attack on the Genoesse, a neutral Nation, which brought on the Invasion of France. For tho' she may have made, or listened, to Overtures since; nay, tho' she and Spain may have complimented us with the sending Emissaries Home to us to treat of Peace, yet I cannot persuade myself that the French are as tractable now, as before the Conquest of Bergen-op-zoom. And still, I am of Opinion, 'tis our Interest to listen to an Accommodation on the best Terms that can be obtained.

If I could suppose that the flipping so favourable, I may say, happy an Occasion of putting an End to the War, was owing to the Tenaciousness or Corruption of any Men in Power, I should as readily give them up, as I do the late M——r, for rejecting the Offers of the last Emperor, at Hanau. But I will hope the Error lies elsewhere, for the Sake of Englishmen; and that, for the Sake of England, no Interest will be more regarded or cherished than hers, in any Negotiation that may be now on the Anvil, or may hereafter be set on foot.

Before I take Leave of you, or quit this Writer, so extolled and supported by the Servants and Dependents of a Personage, as beloved as he is wise, good, and eminent, I cannot, in Gratitude to the Royal Youth who commanded for us and our Allies abroad, but animadvert on the Indecency of this Scribe in regard to that illustrious Hero, no less conspicuous for military Skill than personal

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personal Bravery. \* \* When the Duke of *Marlborough* commanded, the common Soldiers signalized themselves in a distinguished Manner, not only as they depended on the *Judgment* of their General, but as they knew he was always provided to carry any Point he determined on.

This needless Panegyric on the *Skill* and *Judgment* of the Duke of *Marlborough* needs no Comment. The scandalous Use designed to be made of it, and the Reflection intended to be fix'd by it, are too obvious to escape your Penetration. I shall therefore leave the Chastisement of a Writer, that thus dares tacitly reflect on the *Judgment* of the most promising military Genius of the Age, to your, and the Reader's Discretion, assuring myself you will still have a View to his *secret Byass*. to *W-----n's old Constitution*, in passing Sentence upon him.

If you should still doubt that he is not the Incendiary I would represent him, and for the dark Purpose I have hinted, I hope you will be convinced by reflecting on the following Portraiture of *England* lately drawn by the same *Pen*, wherein you will find us satyrized for a Conduct, which in his *State of the Nation*, he recommends with the utmost Ardour and Vehemence.

† *Great Britain*, I conceive, is in a Situation very particular and distinct from what either the Ancients knew, or the Moderns are well acquainted with. We are in the Character of Balance-Masters-General, to fight every Body's Battles, and arbitrate every Nation's Difference; no War ever lasts long but what we have a Hand in; nor any Peace made where we are not the principal contracting Parties; so that, like *Augustus Cæsar*, we either give the World Rest; or, like the *Roman Senate*, let all the Nations know what a happy Talent we have at Fighting. The House of *Austria* and *Sardinia*, the *Seven United Provinces*, and the *Empire*, (and more especially *H-----*, he might have said) are all under our express Care and Guardianship; and when we cannot defend them by our own natural Power, we fetch Succours from the remotest Regions; happy in that, we always carry our Point at last; but much happier in always having a Point to carry.

Could you imagine the same *Pen* drawing this Picture of his Country, and at the same time, declaiming her into a Continuance of an inauspicious, successless War? By this little Finger you may judge of the *Hercules*, who has brought this Address upon you, *From Yours, &c.*

\* Page 19. † *Fool*, No. 239.

F I N I S.