


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(2.)
A PROPER
ANSWER
TO THE
BY-STANDER.

WHEREIN IS SHEWN

- I. That there is *no Necessity for, but infallible Ruin* in the Maintenance of a large regular (or mercenary) *Land Force* in this Island.
- II. That by keeping up a *Standing Army* for preventing an *Invasion*, we shall at last render it certain and successful.
- III. That *Publick Credit* is now upon a more stable Foundation than ever it was before the Year 1734, and can be ruined by nothing but bad Oeconomy, Temporary Expedients, and Loss of Trade.
- IV. That endeavouring to revive *Parties* or *Factions* long since extinguished, in order to divert the Attention of the People from *present Mischiefs* or *Dangers*, is a most wicked Attempt. And
- V. That the Weight of *Political Power* is now taken almost entirely from the *Popular* and thrown into the *Regal* Scale.

L O N D O N :

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[Price One Shilling.]

[1]

A PROPER

ANSWER

TO THE

BY-STANDER.

S I R,

THOUGH you have ushered your Letter into the World in the Character of a *By-stander*, People are very much mistaken, if you are not more properly to be called a *Behind-Stander*; because, though you do not appear upon the Stage, you direct all behind the Scenē. As the Letter is generally supposed to be wrote by you, or by your Direction, I shall address myself personally to you, though not by your *new Titles*, because I don't know if you deserve them. The World, 'tis true, may in this be mistaken, but your manner of arguing, your bold manner of asserting Falshoods, your sly manner of concealing Truths, your deceitful Manner of turning your Adversary's

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ry's Arguments, and your sophistical Way of stating your own, is so apparent throughout, if it is not *Sofia*, it is so like *Sofia*, that even *Sofia* himself may be in a Doubt; therefore, if I have mistaken the Author, I hope the World will excuse me, for as to you, I neither shall desire your Favour, nor ask your Excuse.

According to the Heads mentioned in my Title Page, I shall proceed regularly to establish what I have there asserted, and to make some Remarks upon what you have advanced with regard to each; but I must first observe, that in all Countries and Times there is a Sort of Fashion which prevails even in Religion and Politicks, as well as Dress and Modes of Conversation. When this Fashion relates only to Dress and Modes of Conversation, I shall generally comply with it, even though I do not altogether approve of it; but in Religion and Politicks, when it is erroneous, it is most pernicious, and therefore I shall always withstand it to the utmost of my Power.

This is now the Case in all the Countries of *Europe*, with regard to *Military Establishments*, except *Switzerland* alone. As the Government, in most of the Kingdoms and States now subsisting in *Europe*, was formed upon the Plan introduced by the *Germans*, *Goths*, *Vandals*, and other Northern and Eastern Nations, it was established upon what

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what we call *Military Tenures*. The Country conquered by the Invaders, was divided into several Seignories, and given to the principal Leaders of the Army; and all made dependent upon the grand or sovereign Seignory, or King of that People, whether Hereditary or Elective. Every one of these Leaders also divided the greatest Part of the Country allotted to his Share, into inferior Seignories, and gave them to the Officers under his Command, each of whom again divided the greatest Part of his Seignory amongst the Soldiers under him; and all without any Condition or Rent reserved, but that of being always ready, with proper Arms and Accoutrements, to follow their respective Lords in War, for which Reason they were all called Freeholders. In these Days, every Man from the greatest Lord to the meanest Freeholder was a Soldier, and obliged not only to be provided with Arms, but to be Master of Military Discipline; so that there was no occasion for what is now called a *Standing*, but more properly a *Mercenary Army*. Princes, both Sovereign and Subordinate, then vied with each other, not, as you say, in the Variety and Gaiety of their Diversions, but in the Number, Courage, and Military Skill of their Followers; and therefore it was their Business, and their Pleasure, to see their Followers brought up from their Infancy to all Sorts of

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Military Exercises, provided with proper Arms, and expert in all the Feats and Arts of War. Tilts and Tournaments, Hunting and Hawking, and other martial or man-like Diversions were their Delight; but sumptuous Feasts and Masquerades are the Production of latter Ages, and are never the Delight of any but *effeminate Princes* supported by *Mercenary Armies*.

While this Sort of *Military Establishment* lasted, it was impossible for the King to enslave his Subjects, or to render himself an absolute and arbitrary Sovereign: The Subjects had proper Rights and Privileges; the King had no Army wherewith to invade them; and if he had, his Subjects had Arms, Courage, and military Skill to defend them. For this Reason, Kings were obliged, in all their Measures, to study the Inclinations of the Majority of their People, and to do nothing that might alienate their Affections; but as this was always troublesome, and often dangerous to Ministers and Royal Favourites, such as you, Sir, they therefore have at all Times, and in all Countries, endeavoured to get this Sort of *Military Establishment* altered, and to prevail with the People to commit their Defence and Security to a *mercenary Army*, under the sole Command of their Sovereign. In this, the Indolence, Laziness, Covetousness, and Cowardice of the People, have in most Countries made

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made Ministers but too successful; for as Military Discipline cannot be learned without Application, nor Arms purchased without Expence; and as War must always be attended with Danger to those employed in carrying it on, the better Sort of People were willing to be free of the Trouble and Expence of qualifying themselves, as well as to avoid the Danger of being employed, to fight the Battles of their Country; and even the Lords of Manors began to neglect cultivating Military Exercises among their Tenants and Followers, and to be more fond of *pecuniary Rents* for supplying their *Luxuries*, than of *Military Services* for promoting their *Glory*.

The first *Military Establishment* that seems to have been substituted in the Place of that which depended upon Military Tenures, was what we now call the *Militia*; but this was far from being so proper for preserving the Liberties of the Country as the former, because it was in most Countries put under the sole Command of the Sovereign, and such Officers as he should please to appoint; and as it is always the Business of a Court to render the *Militia* useless and contemptible, in order to substitute in its Stead a Standing Army, this new Sort of *Military Establishment* has in all the Countries in *Europe*, except *Switzerland*, been entirely laid aside, or very much neglected, and numerous *Standing Armies* kept up in its stead. From hence

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hence it has, by the Art of Princes and Ministers, been made a fashionable way of Thinking in Politicks, that the *Militia* of a Country can never be made good for any thing; and that nothing but regular *Standing Armies* are fit for defending a Government against Insurrections at Home, or Invasions from abroad.

This way of Thinking first began in *France*, from whence it has spread itself into most Countries in *Europe*; and being favoured by our Court here, as most *French* Fashions are, it has at last, to our Misfortune, taken deep Root in this. You, Sir, being sensible of the Prevalence of this Opinion, have taken Advantage from thence to persuade us of the Necessity of keeping up a numerous *Mercenary* Army for our Defence against foreign Invasions; and I shall readily grant, that you and your Friends have of late Years taken all the Methods you or they could think of to make this necessary, not only by rendering the *Militia* contemptible and unacquainted with Arms or Military Discipline, but by rendering the People in general dissatisfied with your Administration. But still, I hope, if any *French* or Foreign Army should, by escaping our Fleet at Sea, have the good Fortune to land safe in any Part of this Island; I say, I hope, nay I am confident, that if the People were generally satisfied with the Administration

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ministration, and had proper Officers appointed to command them, they would resume their antient Spirit, and soon make their Invaders feel, they came not to conquer a Parcel of Slaves long accustomed to the Yoke, and cowed by *Standing Armies*, but a brave, a free, and a warlike People.

We are not, Sir, to judge of the Behaviour of our People against a foreign Invader, from the Behaviour of the *Westmorland Militia* in the Year 1715. It is well known, that the Minds of a great Part, perhaps the Majority, of the common People of *Westmorland* and the *West* of *England*, were then so poisoned by some of the Clergy in those Parts, that they looked upon the Party of *Highlanders* from *Scotland* not as Enemies coming to conquer them, but as Friends coming to relieve them from Oppression. It is well known, that several Noblemen and Gentlemen of great Estates, and popular Characters in the Northern and Western Parts of *England*, had joined that Party of *Highlanders* before they entered *England*, and therefore we are not to impute it to the Cowardice of the *Militia*, if by Flight they avoided being forced to engage in Battle against those they looked upon as their Friends and Countrymen.

It is therefore most unfair in you, Sir, to conceal these Circumstances, in order to form from thence an Argument for shewing, that

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our *Militia* is not to be depended on against a foreign Invasion. Our Men have still something of the ancient Spirit remaining; and if proper Arms were put into their Hands, they might in a few Days be taught Discipline enough to appear in *Battle Array* against the most formidable Infantry of *Europe*, tho' not perhaps enough for all the manual Exercises and dancing Steps of a *Review*; and if our *Militia* were put upon a right footing, if it were made honourable and necessary for our Noblemen and Gentlemen to be Officers of the *Militia*, and to make themselves Masters of all Sorts of military Discipline, a Regiment of *Militia* inured to Sobriety and hard Labour, might soon make as good a Figure at a *Review*, and a much better Figure upon a *long March*, or in a *Day of Battle*, than a Regiment of *Mercenaries* bred up in Idleness, and enfeebled by Debaucheries.

But if we continue much longer to keep up *Standing Armies*, and to trust to them alone for our Defence, I will venture to prophesy, that in a few Years our common Men will become like those in other Countries, where Standing Armies have been long kept up: There will be no Arms, Discipline, Courage, nor Spirit among them, and then, indeed, the *military* Strength of this Country, like that of our Neighbours, will be in Proportion only to the Number of regular Troops we keep continually in Pay.

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In all Countries where a *Standing Army* is kept up for the Support of the Government, the Ministers of course take all Methods they can think of, to render the rest of the People effeminate, defenceless and unacquainted with Arms or Military Discipline: Nay, under Pretence of preserving the Game, or preventing Insurrections, they generally make Laws for disarming the People; and the People of their Side begin to think, there is very little Difference between being oppressed by a Standing Army of *Natives*, or a Standing Army of *Foreigners*; from whence they look upon themselves as very little concerned in the Dispute, and consequently, when the regular Army is defeated, they make but a faint Resistance, or readily submit to the Conqueror.

In such Countries, even the Nobility and Gentry, who are not of the Army, begin to think, that they have no concern with the Art of War, or with any Sort of Military Exercise or Discipline, and such is the Prevalence of Fashion, they are not ashamed to own it. If they have learned a little how to manage the small Sword, which is fit for nothing but defending *their own Reputation*, they think themselves sufficiently qualified as Gentlemen, without so much as endeavouring to make themselves Masters of any of that Military Knowledge or Discipline which is necessary for enabling them to defend *their Country*. But as a good Swordsman may be a bad Soldier, and as none but good Soldiers are fit for defending the Country

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against a *foreign*, or the Liberties of the People against a *domestick* Invader, therefore, it is certainly the Duty of every Gentleman, and ought to be the Business of his whole Life, to render himself an expert Soldier as well as an expert Swordsman, that he may be fit for defending his *Country*, as well as his *own Reputation*. — This, Sir, I thought myself obliged to take particular Notice of, because you have been so successful, and the Fashion has of late Years so much prevailed in this Country, that I have heard both Noblemen and Gentlemen acknowledge without a Blush, in our most public Assemblies, their being totally ignorant of all the Arts of War. Nay so much has that Martial Spirit, for which our Ancestors were so famous, decayed of late Years amongst us, that even the Officers of our Army seem to think themselves sufficiently qualified, if they know how to make their Soldiers dance through the common Exercises of a Review. In all the Wars that have lately happened in *Europe*, few or none of them have gone to learn their Trade by serving as Volunteers in any foreign Army; whereas in former Times, and before we had any such Thing as a Standing Army, we read of many *English* Volunteers, and of their signaling themselves for Courage and Conduct, in most of the famous Battles that happened in *Europe*, when they had not an Opportunity to employ themselves in the Armies of their own Country.

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Such is the Difference, Sir, between those Soldiers who think of qualifying themselves for *Glory*, and those who think only of qualifying themselves for *Pay*. But there is another Difference which we now most sensibly feel, and that is a total Neglect of the Art of Engineering and Fortification. As the Theory of this Art might have been learned with little Expence, and great Safety, by making a Trip now and then over to *Holland* and *Flanders*, it is really surprising to find how generally ignorant our Officers are of this Art, especially when we consider how little they have had to do, and how heavily their Time must have hung upon their Hands, during the long Course of your Administration.

The keeping up of a Standing Army has always been, and must necessarily be attended with the Decay of a Martial Spirit among the rest of the People; and from what I have mentioned relating to our own Army, one would be apt to conclude, and, I believe, you are sensible, that by proper Management a true Martial Spirit may be destroyed even amongst those of the Standing Army itself; for when Honours and Preferments do not depend upon a Gentleman's Knowledge or Behaviour as a Soldier, but upon his voting, according to Orders, at Elections, or in Parliament; or upon his being a Relation or Friend to those that do, most of the Officers, even of the Standing Army, will neglect being at the Trouble or Expence of acquiring those Qualifications which are necessary

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to make a Man a Soldier, but can be of no Service to him with regard to his Preferment; and tho' such an Army may make a good enough Appearance at a Review, or may charge boldly an unarmed Mob or a Parcel of Smugglers, yet, I am afraid, our Liberties and Country would be in a precarious Situation, if they were to depend upon such an Army's defeating an equal Number of foreign *Veterans*.

It is not Pay, Sir, it is not the Knowledge or Practice of those Exercises necessary for a Review, that makes a bold and formidable Army; it is a Consciousness that no Glory, no Honours or Preferments in one's Country, are to be acquired but by a resolute Behaviour, and a thorough Knowledge of all the Arts of War.— This is what makes a brave and an expert Soldier: This may be made to operate upon a whole People, as well as upon a few mercenary Troops; and this with proper Arms and a very little Discipline will make the *Militia* of a Country as good, if not better, than any Standing Army that can be brought against them. In former Times, the Men of this Kingdom practised the long Bow and other warlike Exercises, every *Sunday*, instead of sitting at Alehouses and Taverns as they do at present; and if *Sundays* after Divine Service were set apart for exercising the *Militia* of each Parish, we should soon have nothing to fear from 20, or 30000 of the best Troops in *Europe*, even tho' they were all safely landed in some Part of this Island.

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You will say, Sir, I know, that till the *Militia* are disciplined, and made fit for immediate Service, a large regular *Land Force* must be kept up. This has been the Argument made use of by Ministers and their Tools in all Countries as well as here: They have first neglected the *Militia* so as to render them good for nothing, and then have made use of their own Neglect, as an Argument for keeping up a Standing Army; and in order to have this Argument to make use of, they will eternally neglect the *Militia*; therefore, if we have a Mind to make the *Militia* of this Kingdom good for any Thing, we must take the Regulation and Management of it entirely out of the Hands of Ministers, and consequently must put it upon a Footing very different from what it is at present.— Till this is done I shall admit, that we ought to keep a regular *Land Force* within the Island, but not near so large a one as we have at present: A Body of 12000 regular Troops kept within the Island, will always be more than sufficient for our Defence, either in Time of Peace, or in Time of War, because, notwithstanding the Phantoms raised by you, I will say, it is impossible, while we have a Superiority at Sea, to land above 5000 or 6000 Troops upon us. A larger Body of Men will always require such a Number of Transports, even from the nearest Coasts of *France*, that we shall hear of the Design, and have an Opportunity to lock up, perhaps burn their Transports in their Harbour; for unless *Dunkirk* be reformed,

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tified, I do not know a Port in *France* nearer than *Brest*, where a large Number of Transport Ships could be kept safe from a *British* Squadron, properly furnished with Bomb Vessels and Fire-ships.

Besides, Sir, it is very certain, that a Body of 12000 Troops, kept up in the Form we have kept them for many Years past, might be augmented in a few Days to 24000, without encreasing the Number of Commission Officers; and all the Recruits might in a very few Days be sufficiently disciplined for being incorporated into the old Regiments. But if in this there should appear any Difficulty, you, and such as you, are the only Persons to be blamed; for if you had allowed a Clause to be inserted in the Mutiny Bill, which has several Times been proposed in Parliament, for allowing a Privilege to Soldiers, in time of Peace, and when there are no real Apprehensions of an Invasion, after a certain Number of Years Service, to insist upon their being discharged, such a Number of them would before this Time have left the Service, and returned to their former Employments, that the whole Kingdom would have been full of disciplined Soldiers, and all of them would have been ready to serve their Country against a foreign Invasion; but this we may expect will always be opposed by Ministers, such as you, who desire nothing so much as that there should not be a Man in the Kingdom that understands any Thing of Martial Discipline, except such as are listed in the Standing Army,

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Army, and obliged to yield a blind Obedience to their Orders, by the severe Penalties of Mutiny Acts and Martial Law.

These Things considered, every impartial Man must conclude, that if we are now under a Necessity of keeping up a Standing Army even of 12000 Men in this Island, it is entirely owing to you, because you have prevented as much as lay in your Power our having any Soldiers or disciplined Men in the Kingdom, except those of the Standing Army; but as for a greater Number we can have no Occasion for it, either in Peace or War, I mean when there is no War nor Enemy within the Island: I say we can have no Occasion for a greater Number, until the People in general be cowed, and their Spirits quite broke, by a long Subjection to an arbitrary Government supported by a numerous Standing Army; and if this should ever happen to be the Case, I will affirm, that supposing we had a Standing Army of 200,000 Men on foot as they have now in *France*, the Nation would be far from being so powerful as it was in the Days of our great *Edwards* and *Henrys*; for in that Case, the Military Power of this Island could no more be computed from the Number of our Men fit to bear Arms, than the Military Power of *Jamaica* can be computed from the Number of their *Blacks*. Our Military Power could be computed from the Number of our Standing Army only, because they alone would be the *Whites* or the Freemen of this Island, and I must tell you, Sir, that whoever desires

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to reduce his Country to such a State, deserves not only the Resentment but the Execrations of every honest and brave Man in the Kingdom.

However fashionable the modern Opinion may be, that no Troops are fit to be sent against an invading Enemy, but such as are expert at all the Punctilios of a Review, which are seldom much minded in a Day of Battle; it is surprising, that any Man should give into this Opinion who has read the Accounts of the Battles fought here in King *Charles* the First's Reign. The Troops on both Sides were, 'tis true, but a Sort of *Militia*, and would, I believe, have made a bad Figure at a modern Review, but on both Sides they engaged with such Bravery, and fought with such Fury and Obstinacy as is scarce to be paralleled by any of the late Battles in *Europe*; and a few of the same Troops being afterwards sent to *Flanders*, engaged against and defeated the best and most regular Troops of *Spain*, and were thereby the chief Cause of the Victory at *Dunes*, which was followed by the Surrender of *Dunkirk*. The Punctilios of a Review are so far from being the chief Qualifications of a Soldier, that an improper Observance of them may sometimes be the Cause of a Defeat, of which we had a late Instance in a great General, who was known to be perfectly Master of all such Punctilios, and who having Occasion to send a Party of Men to attack a Castle which was to be taken by Scaling-Ladders, recommended chiefly to his Officers the right forming of their *Platoons*,

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when he should rather have recommended to them, or at least to such of them as were to employ themselves in the Attack, to have thrown their Pieces away from them, in order to mount the Scaling-Ladders Sword in Hand. The Event was answerable: The Castle remained untaken; and many brave Men lost their Lives without so much as a Chance of hurting the Enemy, by firing in Platoons, or by any other Sort of regular firing.

For this Reason, I must tell you, Sir, apply it as you will, that he must either have a cowardly or a corrupt Heart, who endeavours to persuade his Countrymen, that none of them are fit for defending their Country against a foreign Enemy, but such as have been for some Years in our Standing Army, as if the Trade of a Soldier, like that of a Shoemaker, were only to be learned by a seven Year's Apprenticeship. I shall grant, that Experience is useful in the Business of fighting, as well as in every other Sort of Employment; but this Experience is not to be got upon a Parade or at a Review, it can be got by nothing but by being in Action; and in this Light even our Standing Army can properly be called nothing but a well disciplined *Militia*; therefore if proper Care were taken to discipline our *Militia*, it would in all Respects be as fit for defending us against an Invasion, as our present Standing Army; and if Care were taken to cultivate a military Spirit among our landed Gentlemen, and to encourage them to go Volunteers in foreign Wars

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Wars as they did formerly; I am convinced, there would in a few Years be among them a much greater Number of experienced Officers, than are now to be found in our Standing Army.

The keeping up of a numerous Standing Army can never, therefore, be necessary for our Defence at Home; and as to our having Troops to send abroad to the Assistance of our Allies, or to attack our Enemies in their own Country, of all the Men in the World you should not argue for keeping up a Body of Standing Forces for either of these Purposes, because for the Assistance of our Allies, tho' you never gave them any, you have always put the Nation to the Expence of hiring foreign Troops, when there was the least Appearance of their being wanted; and in the present War, tho' you had a numerous Army, 30000 Men, all old Regiments, yet you chose to send new raised Regiments to attack the *Spaniards* in *America*. I shall grant, that our *Militia* neither can, nor ought to be sent abroad, because it ought to consist chiefly of Gentlemen and Masters of Families; but if our People in general were bred up to Arms and military Discipline, we could soon raise and form regular Regiments for these Purposes, and such Regiments, when formed, would be every bit as good as the Regiments we have now in Pay; because, as I have said, the latter can only be called a well disciplined *Militia*. Queen *Elizabeth* had no Standing Army, and yet she could immediately raise and send to the Assistance of the *Dutch*, a

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Body of Troops, who, notwithstanding their being new raised, engaged often with Advantage against the regular Veteran Troops of *Spain*, and made themselves remarkable both in *Holland* and *Flanders* for their Courage and Military Discipline.

Suppose we had kept up all our Troops after the Treaty of *Ryswick*: Suppose we had, in the Year 1700, had a Standing Army of 40000 Men, we could not have prevented the *Spaniards* from receiving for their King a Branch of the House of *Bourbon*, because the *French* could march their Troops into *Spain* much sooner, and with more ease, than we could transport Troops thither. Whatever you may insinuate, it was not our disbanding our Army, but our agreeing to the *Partition Treaty*, that made the Duke of *Anjou* King of *Spain*; and you know, it is not the first Time we have been drawn by *France* into very foolish Treaties. Though we had no Standing Army, at least a very small one, yet in 1702, when we resolved on War, we soon raised Troops, and those Troops gave signal Proofs of their Courage, the very first Campaign, which is a convincing Proof of our having no occasion to keep up a Standing Army, for enabling us to assist our Allies, or to attack our Enemies, whenever we may have occasion.

Thus, I hope, I have shewn, that the keeping up of a numerous Standing Army in this Island is far from being necessary, and that a numerous Standing Army under the sole Com-

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mand of a Minister, and all the Officers of it depending solely upon him, not only for their Preferment, but for their being continued in Commission and Pay: That such an Army, I say, is dangerous to Liberty, is incompatible with the Being of a Free Government, the History of our own Country, as well as most neighbouring Countries, must clearly evince. A Standing Army turned out of Doors the very Parliament that created it, and established the arbitrary Power of their General, *Cromwell*. A Standing Army supported King *James* the Second in arbitrary Power, against the Religion as well as Liberties of their Country, and would have supported him against the Prince of *Orange*, if he had not been seized with what I may call a *providential* Panick. Some of the Officers and Soldiers, 'tis true, went over to the Prince of *Orange*; but to speak of the Army in general, we ought rather to say, that the King deserted the Army, than that the Army deserted the King; for it is well known, that most of his general Officers advised him to march directly and give battle to the Prince. If he had taken this Advice, the Consequence might have been fatal to these Kingdoms. A Minister, with a Standing Army at his Back, may perhaps preserve the outward Forms of our Constitution: He may have a Parliament regularly assembled every Year, as long as the Parliament does nothing to disoblige him; but if they should, he will do as *Cromwell* did, he will employ his Army
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in purging the House, or perhaps in turning it out of Doors. The keeping up of a numerous Standing Army must certainly, therefore, at last overturn our Liberties; and as Trade never prospers long under an absolute Government, it must at last ruin our Trade, which will complete the Ruin of the Nation; and thus, I hope, I have proved the first Proposition laid down, *that there is no necessity for, but infallible ruin in the Maintenance of a large regular or mercenary Land Force in this Island.*

Let us therefore contrive and establish some new Regulations for putting the *Militia* upon a proper Footing: This is the only regular Land Force we can safely trust to, and as it may be made more numerous than any mercenary Army we can keep in constant Pay, the Dangers you are pleased to suggest, if they were real, would be strong Arguments for our going about this without delay. But you have formed such an imaginary Scheme of Dangers, as must certainly give Diversion rather than Fear to every judicious Reader. The *French*, you tell us, are to embark 20 or 30000 Men at *Bordeaux* for *Ireland*; another Body of 20 or 30000 at *Calais* and *Graveline* for *Scotland*; a third, equally numerous, to be ready to embark at *Brest* for *England*. The *Spaniards* are to join the *French* with a large Body of their Troops in *Ireland*; and another large Body of *Swedes* are to join them in *Scotland*: I wonder, you did not tell us, that *Koulikan* has lately bought up some Ships, and
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that he is to invade us with 100,000 Men from the Gulph of *Persia*. When an Author gives such excessive Scope to his Invention, he deserves to be laughed at rather than answered; and what you say of the *Spaniards* in Queen *Elizabeth's* Time, or of the *French* in King *William's* Time, is either false or nothing to the Purpose. The *Spaniards* never landed a large Body of Troops in *Ireland* in Queen *Elizabeth's* Time, and the safe landing of 5000 Men in *Ireland* by the *French* soon after the Revolution, did not proceed from our Squadron's not meeting with them, but from it's not being strong enough to destroy them. However, no one pretends but that either the *French* or *Spaniards* may land 5 or 6000 Men by Stealth upon us; but neither of them will ever do so, unless they are sure of being joined by great Numbers of our own People; and it will always be impossible for them to provide Transports for a greater Number, notwithstanding the late great Increase of Trade in *France*, either by your Indulgence or Misconduct, before we hear of their Preparations, and have time to stop or burn their Ships in their Harbours. Therefore, whilst we preserve our Superiority at Sea, and an Unanimity among our People, we can never be in Danger of an Invasion from any Part of the World; and the proper way to do this is, not to put ourselves to the Expence of, or oppress our People, by keeping up a numerous Standing Army.

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I shall admit that, whilst we keep almost all our Men of War at *Portsmouth*, and in the River *Thames*, or *Medway*, our Squadron may be blocked up by the same Winds that bring a Fleet from *Spain* or the Western Coasts of *France* to invade us; but this Danger may be easily prevented by having a new Dock at some Part on the Southern or Western Coasts of *Ireland*, with a proper Number of Men of War always stationed there, and ready to be fitted for Sea in a few Days Notice. To which I shall add, that tho' a Squadron incumbered with a great Number of Merchant Ships under it's Convoy, and still more incumbered with Ministerial Orders and a Ministerial Admiral may not, yet it is certain that a Squadron, without any of these Incumbrances, may turn down the Channel against the Wind, unless it blows very hard; and therefore it is highly improbable, that our Squadron should ever be so long blocked up as to give an Enemy time to sail from their own Coasts and land their Troops in either of these Islands. What happened at the Revolution is no proof of our being liable to any such Danger, because it is very much suspected, that the Admiral who commanded our Fleet at that Time had no Inclination to prevent the Prince of *Orange's* landing; and if King *James* had not oppressed his People by keeping up a numerous Standing Army, the Prince would never have embarked, nor would any such Attempt have ever been made against him.

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But suppose a Body of 10 or 12000 regular Troops should embark and sail from some Port of *France* or *Spain*, before we had heard any Thing of the Design, which is scarcely possible, can we suppose that such a Body of regular Troops would be able to conquer this Island, if the People were perfectly satisfied with the Administration, and generally united among themselves? The very Porters, Carmen and Chairmen of the City of *London* would overwhelm such a small Body of Men; and might in two Days be formed and regimented for that Purpose. If King *James* in the Year 1692 supposed, that upon his landing with 16 or 17000 Men, he could have marched immediately to our Metropolis, without any opposition, it was not because we had no Standing Army to oppose him, but because he expected a great Part of the City of *London*, especially those of the meaner Sort, would have joined him; and he had some ground for this Expectation, from the general Joy that appeared in the City, upon his Return from *Rocheſter*, after he had first endeavoured to make his Escape. Besides, it is very certain that King *William's* having been declared King had disgusted a great many who were his hearty Friends at his first landing; and moreover the *French* at that Time expected to have been more than a Match for us at Sea, which no Man will say they have now the least ground to expect.

It is therefore, Sir, a most unreasonable, nay a most ridiculous Apprehension, to be afraid of an

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an Invasion as long as we are united among ourselves and have a Naval Force superior to any Enemy that can invade us. Whilst we are in these Circumstances, no Enemy can invade us with a Force sufficient to conquer the Island, and no one will invade us with a less Force, because of their having no Retreat, which we shall always be able to prevent as long as we are Masters at Sea, especially when the Enemy are inclosed in any one Corner, or any one Sea Port of the Island. This, I say, we shall always be able to do by Means of our Fleet, notwithstanding your false Assertion, "That the *French* were at no great Difficulties in supplying their Troops in *Ireland*, with Ammunition and other Necessaries as far as they judged proper; and that at last, when the Affairs of King *James* became desperate there, they withdrew the same Troops again, with great Numbers of *Irish*, in Spight of all the Attempts of our Squadron, and tho' their Fleet before that Time had suffered so much at *la Hogue*."

These, Sir, are your Words, and this, I think, is a Bundle of the most impudent Falshoods I ever saw put in Print. Our glorious Naval Victory at *La Hogue* did not happen till the Year after, and after the Surrender of *Limerick*, and total Reduction of *Ireland*; and tho' the *French*, whilst they were in Possession of the greatest Part of *Ireland*, and had most of the Ports of that Island open to them, might perhaps by Stealth, but not without Difficulty

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and Danger, supply their Troops with some Ammunition and other Necessaries; yet after their Troops were inclosed in the City of *Limerick*, did they, or could they supply them with any Thing? Could their Troops have escaped from thence without our Consent? Were not they, and such of the *Irish* as pleased to go along with them, allowed by the Capitulation of *Limerick* to be transported to *France*? This Capitulation we then agreed to, in Order to finish the Reduction of *Ireland*, and prevent the Expence of another Campaign, but could a Body of foreign Troops, unsupported by any Party in the Kingdom, expect such a Capitulation?

The *French* are so sensible of the Danger of landing a few Troops in this Kingdom, without the Assurance of their being joined by a great Part of our own People, that in the Year 1691, after defeating our Fleet at *Beachy*, and thereby rendering themselves Masters of the Channel, they did not attempt to land any Troops in *England*, though we had then nothing but the *Militia* to defend us; for all our regular Troops were at that time employed either in *Flanders* or *Ireland*. But the People shewed so much Alacrity, and so much Readiness to fly to Arms for the Defence of their Country, that they not only frightened the *French* from landing, but prevented the *Jacobites* here, who were then very numerous, from assembling or making any Appearance. And this they will always do, unless they are oppressed at home by a voracious Minister and venal Parliament supported by a numerous Standing Army. Such

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Such a Minister, and such a Parliament must have a Standing Army for their Support; and a Standing Army will always very much contribute towards making a Parliament venal, and a Minister voracious. They are two Evils which naturally beget one another; and if this should ever be our Case, the People would be ready to join with any Invader against such an oppressive Government. A Body of two or three thousand regular Troops, with Arms and Ammunition for supplying such as should join them, would probably over-set such a Government, though supported by a Standing Army, even more numerous than that we have now on Foot; and as the *French*, or even the *Swedes* or *Danes*, may at an unawares throw in upon us such a small Body of Men, and such warlike Stores, I must therefore conclude, that the keeping up a numerous Standing Army in this Island will at last render an Invasion not only certain but successful.

Having thus established my second Proposition, I have no great Occasion to take Notice of what you say about *Publick Credit*, but your Argument upon this Subject, as upon every other, is so unfair, and so little to the Purpose, that I must take some Notice of it. Whilst the pernicious Practice of Stock-jobbing was allowed, or to talk in the Terms of *Change Alley*, whilst buying *Bulls*, and selling *Bears*, was allowed, it was easy for Brokers and Stock-jobbers to alter the nominal or imaginary Price of our Publick Funds as they pleased.

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pleased. I shall grant that imaginary Dangers, as well as imaginary *Hopes*, had then a great Effect upon the Price of our Stocks: We had then a most numerous Body of Men always employed to possess weak Minds with imaginary Fears, or imaginary Hopes; and the current Price of the Stocks was never according to the real Value, but according to the Expectation of what it might in a Day or two rise or fall to; but since an End was put to Stock-jobbing, by that most excellent Law passed in the Year 1734, the Prices of all our Publick Funds have in some measure remained fixed, and nothing but real Danger can produce a great Fall in our Stocks, or a long Run upon our Bank or Bankers. This we have had a strong Proof of, at and since the Beginning of the present War, and the other Confusions in *Europe*. Both the *Spaniards* and *French* have done all they could to frighten us with an Invasion: They did frighten you to that Degree, that some of your Measures cannot, I am sure, be justified any other way than by your having had certain Advice of an immediate Invasion intended; yet though these Menaces had a great Effect upon your Measures, they had no Effect upon our Stock-holders, or upon the Price of our Stocks. This shews, that our Publick Credit does not now depend upon imaginary Dangers; and surely, if it be so easy for *France*, *Spain*, and *Sweden*, to land great Bodies of regular Troops in this Island and in *Ireland*, as you have represented, our hav-

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having added *ten* or a *dozen thousand* Men to our Standing Army, could not make that Danger seem imaginary, which would otherwise have appeared real. The Truth is, I believe, our Stock-holders are so well acquainted with the Situation and natural Strength of these Kingdoms, that they are not so much afraid of Invasions as our Ministers pretend to be; and therefore our Publick Credit can never suffer much from any threatned Invasion, as long as our Sovereign is in Possession of a superior naval Force, and of the Hearts and Affections of his People.

But the keeping up of a numerous Standing Army must expose us to two Dangers that are in themselves real, and are dreaded by every Stockholder of common Sense in the Kingdom, which are, a general Disaffection among our People, and such a publick Expence and Profusion as must disable us from paying off, *in Time of Peace*, any considerable Part of the Debt we have contracted, or may contract, *in Time of War*. In case of a general Disaffection among our People, our Government will be in continual Danger of being overturned, either by an Invasion with a small and unexpected Army of Foreigners, or by a Mutiny among the Soldiers of our own Army. And surely no prudent Man will choose to have his Property, perhaps his All, depending upon such a Government.

In the other Case, if we go on contracting new Debts in every War we are engaged in, and

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and thus adding to the Load of Debt under which we now groan, our Publick Credit must break at last; for the strongest Cable may be broke by over-stretching, the largest Estate must at last be run out by every Year contracting. Our having paid off so little of our Publick Debts for these last twenty Years of Peace, has already, I believe, made many of our Stockholders, especially those of Quality or Distinction amongst us, withdraw their Money from the Publick Funds; and if *Foreigners, Jews, and low Persons* amongst ourselves, should ever come to be the sole Proprietors of our Publick Funds, a general Spunge would become much more easy than most People now dream of.

But for God's Sake, Sir, what do you mean by thus terrifying us with Invasions from *France*, and with the total Ruin of our Publick Credit, in case of a Rupture with that Nation? If you mean any thing, you must mean, that this Nation has been reduced to such a low Ebb, or the Power of *France* raised so high, by your weak or wicked Administration, that we must submit to any Hardships, to any Insults, the *French* please to put upon us. They have already told us with Impunity, *You shall not attack the Spanish Squadrons: Suppose they should tell us, You shall not attack the Spanish Galleons, because the French Merchants have Effects on board: Suppose they should tell us, You shall not attack the Spanish Privateers, because there are many French Sub-*

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jects on board. Must we submit to this Treatment, for fear of their invading us, or Threatning to invade us, and thereby distressing our Publick Credit? Should we submit to such Treatment, would it not put an End to our Trade? Should we then have any Publick or Private Credit left amongst us? Should we have a Navy to defend us against an Invasion? Should we be able to keep a numerous Standing Army on foot, for that or any other Purpose?

After having thus represented us in such a forlorn and helpless Condition, it is really pleasant to hear you boasting and pluming yourself in the good Condition of our Navy, and the flourishing State of our Trade and Publick Credit. As to our Navy, Sir, suppose it were much more powerful, and in a better Condition, than it is, you could from thence claim no other Merit than that of applying faithfully, the many extraordinary Grants made by Parliament, for the use of our Navy, since the beginning of your *sole Administration.* But have you done so? The World knows you have not: You are yourself conscious you have not, otherwise you would not have obstructed an Inquiry into the Application of those Grants. The World knows, that neither our Ships nor Naval Stores were in a good Condition at the beginning of this War, nor are yet in such a Condition as they might have been, had the large Sums of Money granted for that Purpose been faithfully applied: Nay your Friends, late of the Admiralty, have often pleaded this as their Excuse for our Trade's hav-

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having been so much neglected, during the Course of this War.

Then as to our Trade, it has certainly been, ever since the Beginning of your Administration, in a decaying Condition in every Branch except our *Plantation* Trade; and if in that Branch our Trade has increased, it is not owing to your Conduct, or to that of a Friend of yours, but to the Nature of new Colonies, which for many Years after their being first settled, must increase yearly in the Number of their Inhabitants and the Quantity of their Produce, consequently our Exports thither, as well as our Imports from thence, must necessarily increase, and would in such a long Tract of Peaceable Times have increased much more than they have done, if proper Encouragement had been given, and proper Care taken by the Administration to remove every Obstruction, and to prevent all Oppression; but with Regard to almost every other Branch, our Trade has been of late Years upon the Decay: And suppose it had been otherwise: Suppose our Trade had in every Branch encreased, could it honestly or truly be imputed to a Minister, who has encouraged the Trade of our Rivals the *French*, by conniving at the Exportation of our *Wool*, or at least by not putting the Laws strictly in Execution against those that did; who has for almost twenty Years allowed the *Spaniards* to interrupt our Trade and plunder our Merchants with Impunity, both in the *Mediterranean* and *American* Seas; who has often distressed our
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Trade by pressing our Seamen, in Order to fit out Squadrons which were never intended for any Thing but an Expedient to amuse our People and Parliament; who has incumbered our Trade with many new penal and insnaring Laws; who in almost twenty Years profound Peace has not taken off so much as one of those Taxes that lie heavy upon poor Labourers and Manufacturers; and finally who has, ever since the present War began, neglected in the most shameful and dishonourable Manner to protect our Trade either by Cruizers or Convoys?

With regard to our Publick Credit, the Interest payable upon our Publick Funds has, 'tis true, decreased, and the Price of Stocks has risen since the End of the late long War; but is not this the natural and necessary Effect of a long continued Peace? Can this be imputed to a Minister who has so much curtailed, and so often seized upon the whole Sinking Fund; who defeated one of the best Projects that was ever formed for the Discharge of all our Debts; and who has put the Nation to so much Expence by keeping up useless Armies, either of our own or of foreign Troops, by fitting out useless Squadrons, and by carrying on insignificant, perplexed, or pernicious Negotiations?

Publick Credit I shall grant is necessary, and may sometimes be of great Service to a Nation; but established Publick Funds, bearing an annual Interest, must always be prejudicial to a trading Nation; because they draw the Money out of Trade, by affording our moneyed Men

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an Opportunity to get a yearly Interest for their Money, without lending it to Merchants or Tradesmen; therefore these Funds should have been paid off as fast as possible; but you have all along seem'd to think, and, indeed, you have in a manner declared, that our Publick Funds ought never to be diminished, the Reason of which is very plain; for while these Funds continue, our Taxes must continue, and as long as our Taxes continue, many Posts and Places must be continued, which are all at the Minister's Disposal, and consequently must be of great Service in procuring a Majority at Elections as well as in Parliament.

I now come to the 4th Head I have propos'd, which is to shew the Wickedness or evil Tendency of endeavouring to revive Parties or Factions long since extinguished, in order to divert the Attention of the People from present Mischiefs or Dangers, by turning it to those that are pass'd. This appears evidently to be your Design, from the beginning of your Letter to the End; and to shew the Wickedness of this Design, I must observe, that in all Disputes of a Political Nature, every Man ought to judge and act according to that which, upon mature Deliberation, he thinks most for the Interest of his Country, and every Man ought to reason coolly with, and judge charitably of those that happen to differ from him in Opinion. Whilst Men do this, no Parties or Factions can arise in the Society. The People will not consider *Names* but *Things*, and the great-

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est Merit will always be the best Title to any Honour or Preferment in the Society; whether the same is to be conferred by Nomination or Election. But when Political Disputes begin to run very high, and the People of each Side grow warm, they judge uncharitably of one another, which occasions their inventing *Nick-names* for each other, to which every Man annexes such an Idea as he thinks fit. Thus the People of the Society come to divide themselves into two Parties, and then they begin to consider *Names* not *Things*, and all the Honours and Preferments of the Society are conferred, not according to Merit, but according to the Candidate's Zeal or Attachment for this or that Party. In such a Society *Publick Spirit* is swallowed up by the *Spirit of Party*, and the *Publick Good* is by each Party in it's turn sacrificed to the *Private Good* or *Success* of the Party.

This is the true Meaning of Party, but as to Faction it is something different; for Faction properly speaking is, when a small Number of Men, from private Views of their own, form themselves into a Cabal, for sacrificing the *Publick Good* of their Country to the *Ambition* or *Avarice* of the Members or Director of the Cabal.

From these Definitions or Descriptions, the Wickedness of endeavouring to divide our Countrymen into Parties or Factions must clearly appear; but to shew this Wickedness in a clearer and fuller Light, I shall give the following brief History of the Origin and fatal Effects of our

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late Party Divisions in this Kingdom; and in order to this, I must begin with observing, that the high Claims to Prerogative set up by King *James* the 1st, or rather mentioned by him in his long-winded Speeches to his Parliaments, first raised the Dispute in these Kingdoms, between the *Power of the Crown* and the *Liberties of the People*; and this Dispute being in the following Reign connected with another between the *Power of the Church* and the *Rights of the People*, it, at last, in the Year 1641 and 1642, grew to such a Height, that the Nation split into two Parties, under the *Nick-names* of *Round-head* and *Cavalier*. The latter affixed to the Name *Round-head*, an Idea of a Man who was for overturning our Government both in Church and State, by setting up the *Presbyterian* Religion, or some sort of *Puritanism*, as they called it, in the Church, and a Republican Form of Government in the State; and the *Round-heads* affixed to the Name *Cavalier*, an Idea of a Man who was for overturning the Liberties of the People, by rendering the King absolute and arbitrary.

That both these Ideas were unjust and improper, I believe, every Man is now convinced; for many of those that at first sided with the Parliament, had no Design to overturn our Government either in Church or State, but to rectify some Abuses that had crept into both; and many of those who sided with the King, were certainly very far from having any Design to give him an arbitrary and absolute Power. But

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But some of the Leaders on each Side, had really such Designs as they were charged with by the opposite Party, and they cunningly took care to get the People to annex those Ideas to those *Nicknames*, in order to inspire into the People of their Party such a furious Zeal for their own Party, and such a Hatred against the other, as might make them overlook, or not consider the Steps taken by the Leaders of each, to render their real Designs successful. From thenceforth the People never considered *Things* but *Names* only, nor did they seriously examine the Tendency and Consequences of any Proposition, but by whom it was made: If it was made by one of their own Party, it must be right; if by one of the other, it was on that account alone suspicious; and if opposed by the Leaders of their Party, they judged it to be wrong without further Examination. And with regard to the disposal of Honours and Preferments, whether by Nomination or Election, the Merit of the Candidate was thought of by none, but whether he was a *Round-head* or a *Cavalier* was the single Question. This will always be the Case, when the People split into Parties; and as this is a most unfortunate Case for a Country, and is never attempted but to conceal some hidden and wicked Designs, I shall leave it to you yourself, Sir, to give the Attempt its proper Epithet.

These two Parties were again revived in the Reign of King *Charles* the Second, under the different Names of *Whig* and *Tory*, but with the

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the same Ideas annexed; for the *Tories* annexed the same Idea to the Nickname, *Whig*, which the *Cavaliers* had before annexed to the Nickname, *Round-head*; and the *Whigs* annexed to the Nickname, *Tory*, the same Idea which the *Round-heads* had in the former Reign annexed to the Nickname, *Cavalier*; and at both times the Ideas were equally unjust and improper when thus generally applied. This Misapplication was fatal to our Constitution and Liberties in the Reign of *Charles the First*, and if it had not been for many peculiar Marks of Providence, it would have been as fatal to both in the Reigns of *Charles* and *James the Second*. But the fatal Catastrophe was then prevented by the *Happy Revolution* in 1688; and as many of those who had in the two former Reigns been reputed *Tories*, joined in calling the Prince of *Orange* over to our Deliverance, as most of them heartily wished him Success, it was a full Proof of the Injustice and Impropriety of the Idea, which the *Whigs* had been taught to annex to the Nickname, *Tory*, in general.

Though the Names *Whig* and *Tory* afterwards remained, and though the Faction on both Sides were every now and then endeavouring to revive these Parties, and to sow Dissentions between them; yet as neither King *William* nor Queen *Anne* shewed any particular Attachment to either Party, all those Endeavours proved abortive, till towards the latter End of her Reign, when this Party Division was again revived, and operated with great Fury. How this

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this fatal Effect was brought about, or by whom, is too recent for me to explain, and therefore I shall only observe what both sides will, I believe, admit, that about the End of that Reign, and Beginning of the following, they were both led by their Party Zeal to do or agree to what they now repent of.

From this short History of our late Parties, the People may see, how cautious they of every Denomination ought to be, of being led by the Heads of their Party into a bad Opinion of the other Party in general, or of approving what is proposed by their own Leaders, for no other Reason but because it is proposed by them, and opposed by the other. In all Cases, the People ought to judge of the Measure from the Reasons that are offered for and against it, and not from the Party Denomination of the Men that propose or oppose it; and whoever attempts to revive or set up Party Divisions by crying out, that it is a *Whig* or a *Tory* Measure, ought certainly to be looked on by every honest Man in the Kingdom, as one who designs to deceive them, and to lead them into, or prevent their opposing something that is inconsistent with, or dangerous to the Constitution and Liberties of their Country. If we examine with Candour the Behaviour of the *Round-heads* and *Cavaliers*, or of the *Whigs* and *Tories*, which were the same Parties under different Names, we must confess that both have been sometimes deceived by their Leaders, and led by their Party Zeal to approve of what was
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inconsistent with, or to oppose what was agreeable to the true Interest of their Country; and as both Parties have by Turns been in the Administration, we shall find, that whether the Administration be *Whig* or *Tory*, the People have Reason to be jealous of it; for *Ministers* have always been, and, I believe, always will be for extending the Power of the Crown farther than is consistent with the Liberties of the People; therefore, when any thing wrong has been done, under a *Tory* Administration, we not ought to say, it was done by the *Tories*, but that the *Ministers* got it done by fomenting the *Party Divisions* amongst us; and when any thing wrong has been done under a *Whig* Administration, we ought not to say it was done by the *Whigs*, but that the *Ministers* got it done by the like Means.

This should be the way of judging, this should be the way of talking with every candid and impartial Man in the Kingdom; for to your Sorrow, Sir, it will now, I believe, be generally admitted, that both *Tory* and *Whig Ministers* have attempted to establish an arbitrary Power in the Crown, tho' they have chosen very different Methods for effecting it. Our *Tory Ministers* have endeavoured to establish an absolute Power in the Crown, by means of that ridiculous Principle called *Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance*, which has always failed them, as soon as their own Party became sensible of their Designs. On the other Hand, our *Whig Ministers*, and you, Sir, in particular, have endeavoured

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endeavoured to establish an arbitrary Power in the Crown by means of Corruption, a Standing Army, and the Rooting out of all Principles either of Virtue or Religion. Our ambitious and ill designing *Tory Ministers* have endeavoured to conceal themselves under the *Mask of Loyalty*, and a true Regard for our Constitution in Church and State; but our ambitious and ill-designing *Whig Ministers*, especially you, Sir, have endeavoured to put on a much more dangerous *Mask*, even the *Mask of Liberty itself*. To the former the *Church's Danger* has been of great Service; to the latter, the danger of *Popery* and the *Pretender* has been of equal, if not superior Service: Nay some of your Tools have been so ridiculously foolish as to tell us, that nothing but a *corrupt Parliament*, and a *Standing Army*, can preserve us against *Popery* and the *Pretender*.

This, of itself, ought to be a sufficient Warning to every *true Briton*, to think of providing effectually for the future Security of our Constitution, whilst there is some Virtue and Principle among the People. The Crown, and consequently our *Ministers*, are now possessed of a most numerous *Standing Army*, and an infinite Fund for *Corruption*. These have been the chief Causes, these are the sole Supports of arbitrary Power in all Countries where it is established. If we do not wrench out of the Hands of our *Ministers* these Causes and Supports of arbitrary Power, before they have had time to root out from amongst our People every

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Principle of Virtue and Publick Spirit, it will then be too late to attempt it. There may even then arise a *Cato*, a *Brutus*, and a *Cassius* amongst us, but I may venture to prophesy, their Fate will be the same with that of these three glorious *Romans*. We ought not therefore to think of who are *Whigs*, or who are *Tories*, or of the Behaviour of any Man whilst these pernicious Parties subsisted amongst us: We ought now to think only of who are *Friends*, and who are *Enemies* to *Corruption*, and a *Standing Army*; and we may expect, that *Royal Favourites* and their *Tools* will secretly rank themselves among the former; for those who endeavour to rise to, or preserve Power, by the *sole Favour* of the *Prince*, will always be secret *Enemies* to the *Rights* and *Liberties* of the *People*.

I shall be far from endeavouring to vindicate the *Tories*, or from saying, they never did any thing amiss, but some of the Charges brought against them by you, Sir, are so ill grounded, that I cannot but take Notice of them, not for the Sake of vindicating the *Tories*, but in order to expose your Falseness and Imposture. Your first Attack is against those called the *Tory Ministers* at the End of *Queen Anne's* Reign, who, as you insinuate, P. 10. were generally supposed to have an Attachment to the *Pretender*; and that *Britain* was then in such a wretched Condition as to dread the Attacks of the *French*, and to tremble at every Motion of their Troops. Sir, if there

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was any such Supposition against the *Ministry* of that Time, you know how it was raised: You know it was the Effect of Party. You know it was far from being general, and that afterwards it appeared to be entirely groundless. You must remember, that in two or three Years after, there was a most *strict Inquiry* into the Conduct of *that Ministry*: An Inquiry carried on by a *secret Committee*, which consisted of Gentlemen who, as you know, could not be suspected of intending to screen the former *Ministers*, and who were sure of recommending themselves to their then Sovereign, by finding Materials to prove their Predecessors guilty; yet no such Materials could be found, nor the least Proof of their having had any Correspondence with, or Attachment to the *Pretender*. You, Sir, have been suspected, and more generally suspected of having had a worse Attachment, if any worse can be, an Attachment to the most inveterate foreign Enemies of your Country; and if you are innocent, you must pardon me when I say, I wish I could see you justified by a Committee, as little to be suspected of Partiality in favour of the Person accused.

As to what you say of *Britain's* dreading at that Time the Attacks of *France*, suppose a Knot of *knaveish* Stock-jobbers, with you very probably at their Head, got an idle Story inserted in the News Paper, and had Cunning enough to make the usual Advantage of that Story, by terrifying their Friends in order to pick their Pockets, which was for many Years

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a common Practice with you and your Associates, would any one but you take occasion from thence to say, that *Britain* at that Time dreaded the Attacks of *France*, or trembled at any of their Motions? Sir, you are the first *British* Subject, of any Figure, that ever dreaded the Attacks of *France*: You are the first *British* Minister that ever allowed the *French* insultingly to prescribe to our *British* Squadrons, and to tell a *British* Admiral, *Thou shalt not touch the declared Enemies of thy Country*.

Your next Objection against the *Tories*, is their having been the Cause of disbanding a great Part of our Army, and sending home the *Dutch Guards* after the Peace of *Ryswick*. Here, Sir, you seem to tread in *Buskins*, and to talk as pompously as any *Theatrical King* could do upon our Stage. You ascribe this to the Malice of *Tory Leaders*, whereas you cannot have forgot, that all the *Whigs* in *England* joined in this Measure, except such as were *Ministers* or *Tools of Ministers*. You must remember, that, upon this Occasion, or about this Time, Mr. *Trenchard*, who never was suspected of being a *Tory*, wrote his two excellent Treatises against *Standing Armies*. You was yourself, I believe, in Parliament at that Time, and if you was not in Place, I am convinced you was for sending home those *Dutch Guards* who had acted so bravely in the Cause of Liberty, and would have acted as bravely against it, if their Master had thought fit to employ them for that Purpose: I say, if you was

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was not in Place, I am persuaded, you voted for this Measure, because you have always taken Care, when out of Place, to affect the *Country Gentleman*, and to appear a zealous Assertor of the Liberties of your Country. This you have always done, because you know it would be of great Service to you, should you ever arrive at that height of Power which, unexpectedly to all those of your Acquaintance, whatever it might be to yourself, you have since arrived at; and it has been of such Service, that there are still many old *Fools* in this Kingdom, who will not believe you an Enemy to Liberty, notwithstanding the many convincing Proofs you have given of your being so, and notwithstanding this material Circumstance, that your personal Safety, and the Safety of publick Liberty are now become absolutely incompatible.

Your Reflection against the late Earl of *Nottingham* p. 22. as it is personal, I shall take no Notice of it, but leave it to be properly answered and refuted by those whose Duty it is to do so; and your Reflection in the following Page against the *Stuarts* I shall take as little Notice of, it not being my Province, nor shall I ever make it my Business, to vindicate any Sovereign Prince whatsoever; but I must observe, that some of our *English Clergy* are most to be blamed, who prompted the *Stuarts* to aim at Arbitrary Power, by which they embroiled themselves in such a Manner with their own People as prevented their being able to assist the *Protestants* of *France*; and to this I shall add, that

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that I wish the Nation may see *France* again brought as low under the present Royal Family, as it was under the last of the *Stuarts*, by the Conduct of the truly great and ever victorious Duke of *Marlborough*.

As to the Statutes you give us a List of p. 66, 67. if you had talked properly or justly, and without a Design to revive a *Party Spirit* amongst us, you would have told us, that all those Acts were passed by a *Pensionary Parliament*, and agreed to by a *Majority* who were all influenced by the *Spirit of Party*, or by downright *Bribery* and *Corruption*; but as these have been the only *Arts of Government* you have ever practised, you take care not to mention any such, lest it should put the Reader in Mind of what, you know, you are generally accused of. Ministers, whether *Tory* or *Whig*, will always be for laying Restraints upon Liberty, and for increasing the Power of the Crown. If I were inclined, I could make sufficient Reprisals upon *Whig Ministers* since the Revolution, but as I have no Occasion, I shall go no farther back than your own *Administration*, during which short Interval the following glorious *Laws* have been passed, viz.

1st. 1721, *An Act to enable the South-sea Company to ingraft Part of their Capital Stock and Fund into the Bank of England &c.* By which the *Bank* was freed from their famous *BANK CONTRACT* with the *South-Sea Company*, which had drawn in many hundreds to ruin themselves, by depending upon the Performance of that Contract.

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2d.—*An Act for the King's most gracious general and free Pardon.* By which all Ministerial Offences, especially those relating to the *South-Sea Scheme*, were pardoned, and almost all other Crimes or Offences excepted.

3d.—*An Act for making several Provisions for restoring Publick Credit, &c.* By which the Annuitants were obliged to take *South-Sea Stock* at the Rate of 400 l. for every 133 l. 6 s. 8 d. in Stock, in lieu of their Annuities; the *South-Sea Company* released of five Millions out of seven, due by them to the Publick, and several other most extraordinary Regulations made, which it would be too tedious here to explain.

4th. 1722, *An Act to enable his Majesty to secure and detain such Persons &c.* By which the *Habeas Corpus Act*, that Barrier of *British Liberty*, was suspended for above a Year.

5th.—*An Act for reviving and adding two Millions to the Capital Stock of the South-Sea Company &c.* By which that Company was released from the Payment of the remaining two Millions due to the Publick as above mentioned.

6th, 7th, and 8th.—*Three Acts for inflicting Pains and Penalties on John Plunket, George Kelly, and Francis Lord Bishop of Rochester.*

9th.—*An Act for the more effectual Punishing wicked and evil disposed Persons going armed in Disguise &c.* Commonly called the *Black-Act*.

10th.—*An Act to oblige all Persons being Papists in Scotland, and all Persons in Great Britain*

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tain neglecting to take the Oaths, to register their Names and real Estates. By which the whole English Nation were set a swearing, and great Sums raised upon the People, without any Benefit to the Publick; but for what Reason this Act was not made so general in Scotland as in England I shall leave for you to explain.

11th. 1723, *An Act for repealing certain Duties payable upon Coffee, &c. and for granting Inland Duties in lieu thereof &c.* By which the Laws of Excise, and the Power of the Commissioners of Excise, were vastly extended.

12th. — *An Act for explaining the Laws concerning the Trial and Admission of the Ordinary LORDS OF SESSION.* By which the King is impowered to appoint, if he pleases, a Person for one of the Chief Judges of Scotland, who is no way qualified for the same by the Laws of that Kingdom.

13th. 1724, *An Act for regulating Elections within the City of London, &c.* By which a Negative was given to the Court of Aldermen, and thereby a Power to the Minister, by means of Bribery and Corruption, to prevent the Citizens of London from asserting their own, or their Country's Rights, in any Sort of corporate Capacity.

14th. 1725, *An Act for granting an Aid to his Majesty, by laying a Duty upon all Victualers in London and Westminster, &c.* Commonly called the *Pot Act*.

15th. 1727, *An Act for the better Support of his Majesty's Household &c.* By which 200,000*l.* per

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per Ann. was added to the *Civil List* Revenue, with this remarkable Proviso, that if the Funds appropriated to that Revenue, should produce less than 800,000*l.* *per Annum*, the People should make it good; but if they should produce more, the People should have no Right to the *Overplus*, but the whole should belong to the *Crown*, and be at the arbitrary Disposal of the *Prime Minister*; which is a very great *Ministerial Advantage*, but an Advantage which cannot be understood by those who are not thoroughly acquainted with the Methods of issuing Money from the Exchequer.

16th. 1731, *An Act for reviving the Duties on Salt, for the Term therein mentioned.* By which these Duties, which formerly belonged to the Sinking Fund, have been ever since applied to the Current Service, in order to prevent the People's being sensible of the Expence they are put to by *Ministerial Projects*.

17th. 1735, *An Act for laying a Duty upon the Retailers of spirituous Liquors, &c.* By which a new Addition was made to the *Civil List*, the Powers of the Commissioners of Excise, and the *Vermin* called *Informers* vastly increased, and all the Keepers of publick Houses in the Kingdom made *Slaves* to the Minister.

18th. — *An Act for indemnifying Persons who have been guilty of Offences against the Laws made for securing the Revenues of Customs and Excise, and for enforcing those Laws for the future.* Under this specious Title is concealed, a Law of the most dangerous Nature to the

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Liberties of the Subject; by which the *best Nobleman* in the Kingdom may become liable to be transported as a *Felon*, if his Servant should, without his Knowledge, have above six Pound of *Tea*, or above the Value of 30 Pound's worth of *foreign Lace* in his Pocket.

19th. 1736, *An Act to explain and amend so much of an Act in Queen Anne's Reign, relating to Rogues, Vagabonds, &c. as relates to common Players of Interludes.* By which the Stage was laid under a *Licence*, as a Prelude to *licensing the Press*; which, 'tis generally thought, you would have done, if the present House of Commons had been as much under your Direction as the last seemed to be.

These, Sir, are some of the important Laws that have been passed during your Administration, and to these I should add your Bill for subjecting *Tobacco* to an *Excise*, and your Bill for *registering Seamen*, both which would have been passed into Laws, if you had succeeded in all your Attempts against the Liberties of your Country. As to the first of these two famous Bills, I hope I shall be pardoned the Expression, when I say, it was your Heaven, if you had got this Law, to it every thing would have been added your Heart could desire, and you would have now been triumphing over Virtue, Liberty, and publick Spirit, instead of their being in a fair Way to triumph over you. If to this List of Laws and Bills, I should add the many *unconstitutional* Votes you have got passed, and the many excellent Bills and reason-

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ble Motions you have got rejected, it would make such a *Black List* as no *Tory Administration* could parallel; yet you have always affected to have your *Administration* called a *Whig Administration*; but it would be the height of Injustice to charge those called *Whigs* in general, with what you have done. Every one knows, that many of them have appeared with a great and laudable Zeal against you; and that the *Majority*, by which you have so long triumphed over the *Constitution* and *Laws* of your Country, has all along consisted of those who were influenced by the Honours, Places, and Pensions which a *too indulgent Master* gave you the *sole Disposal* of, or of those who were influenced by a *Party Spirit*, which, for this very End, you have always most industriously endeavoured to keep alive.

Having thus made, I believe, sufficient Reprials upon you, Sir, the only other unjust Reflection thrown by you upon the *Tories* in general, which I think necessary here to take Notice of, is, That relating to the Impeachment of the Lords *Halifax* and *Orford*. Upon this Affair I shall observe, 1st, That the House of Commons seem to have been a little precipitate in their Proceedings, because they proceeded to *impeach*, before they had appointed a *secret Committee* to *inquire*, which in all such Cases is necessary, in order to find out and marshal the Proofs; for till this is done, the Articles of Impeachment cannot with any Certainty or Propriety be drawn up. And 2^{dly},
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That the impeached Lords were then in high Favour with the *King*, and had a great many Friends in the *House of Peers*. To these, or one of these Causes, may have been owing the bad Success of the Commons at that Time, and I wish you may not, by the same Means, escape the Justice of the Nation.

I must farther observe, that, I believe, no Man in *England* will pretend to justify the *Partition Treaty*, or that which followed it in 1699. The first was negotiated and concluded by King *William* when he was abroad, and far remote from his *English* Councils; and it had been happy for this Nation, if this had been the last Time of our Suffering by Treaties negotiated and concluded in the same manner. The *Partition* and *Dilaceration* of the *Spanish* Monarchy, which was made by these two *Treaties*, were certainly the Cause of the *King* of *Spain's* last Will in favour of the *House of Bourbon*, and of the *Spaniards* submitting themselves so readily to a Branch of that *House*, which has given occasion to most of the Misfortunes, this Nation in particular, or *Europe* in general has since met with; and therefore that *House of Commons*, however they may have been mistaken with regard to the Persons they attacked, were certainly in the right to endeavour to find out and punish the Advisers of these *Treaties*; especially the *Lord Chancellor*, without whom they could neither have been concluded nor ratified; for surely, the *King's* Order can be no Excuse for the *Lord Chancellor's*

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cellor's affixing the Seals to what is inconsistent with the Interest or Honour of his Country.

Whether the Majority of this *House of Commons* was *Whig* or *Tory*, I do not know; but if it was *Tory*, I am sure, it is a very unjust Charge to say, that all *Tories* are *Jacobites*; for it was this very *House of Commons* that first settled the Crown of these Kingdoms upon our present Royal Family; and the Limitations, many of which have since been repealed, are a Proof, that however much the *Tories* may be inclined to shew a decent and proper Regard for the Crown, they are not inclined to establish an arbitrary Power in the Crown, either by means of the Principle of *Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance*, or by the Method of *Corruption*, which you, Sir, have shewn to be more infallible, and consequently more dangerous to our Constitution; for, if you had shewn the least Dexterity in the Management of our Foreign Affairs, or the least Delicacy in your Management of Mankind, you might have riveted our Chains, before the Nation had become sensible of its Danger.

I come now, Sir, in the last Place, to prove, against what you have asserted, that the Weight of *Political Power* is now taken almost entirely from the *Popular*, and thrown into the *Regal Scale*. Upon this Subject, indeed, I cannot but admire your Ingenuity, in setting your Readers upon a *Wild Goose Chase*, after the present or past Proportion between the Property

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or Revenue of the Crown; and the Property or Revenue of the People; when the real Question is, whether the People are not now in Danger of having no Property or Revenue which they can with Certainty call their own; for I will say, that a *British* King, at the Head of a *corrupt* Parliament, and an abandoned *mercenary* Army, is as much Master of the Properties and Revenues of his People, as a *Turkish* Emperor at the Head of his *Divan* and *Janizaries*. Both may equally prescribe to their *Divan*, and if the People are unarmed, undisciplined, and dispirited, neither has any thing to fear but from a Mutiny of his *Janizaries*, who never mutiny on account of the *People's* being plundered, but on account of their not having what they reckon their *due* Share of the Plunder.

Now, Sir, to shew that the People are now in some Danger of having no Property or Revenue they can with Certainty call their own, I must describe what is, and ought to be meant by *Political Power*, which in a Government of any Sort of republican or limited Form, is either *Military* or *Civil*. *Political Military* Power consists in the Number, Discipline, and Arms of the Men, which any Senate or single Man has under his Command, and ready to obey his Orders. *Political Civil* Power consists in the Number of Votes which any single Man may influence or direct in a popular Assembly, either of Nobles or Commons. From hence we may see the Difference between *Political* and

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and *Personal* Power. One may be a Man of great Strength of Body, well armed, Master of all Sorts of Military Discipline and Exercise, firm Resolution and remarkable Courage: These Qualifications give him great *Personal* Military Power; but unless he has some other Men under his Command, and ready to obey his Orders, he has no *Political* Military Power. So a Man may be a Member of a popular Assembly, and may have good Sense and great Eloquence: This gives him *Personal* Civil Power, but unless by his good Sense and Eloquence, or some other Method, he can influence or direct the Votes of some of the other Members of that Society, he has no *Political* Civil Power.

Again, *Political Power*, both *Civil* and *Military*, is either *authoritative* or *mercenary*. The former depends upon the Opinion of those that obey, the latter upon the Rewards or Punishments which he that commands has to bestow. When any Number of Men think they are obliged to range themselves under the Command or Direction of one single Man, because of his being their King, Lord, Magistrate, or Father, or when a Number of Men choose to range themselves under the Command or Direction of one single Man, because of the Opinion they have of his Conduct or good Sense, or because of their being influenced by his Eloquence; this is *Political Authoritative* Power, *Military* or *Civil*. On the other Hand, when a Number of Men range themselves under the

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Command, or when a Number of the Members of any popular Assembly range themselves under the Direction of one single Man, because of the Punishments he may inflict, or because of the Rewards they have or expect from him, this is Political Mercenary Power, Military or Civil. Now as the Opinions of Men are wavering and very uncertain, therefore he who has Political *Mercenary* Power, has a Power he may more certainly depend on, and more absolutely command, than he who has only a Political *Authoritative* Power; and for this Reason all Men, but especially those who aim at arbitrary Power, seek as much of the former as they can possibly obtain. Even a wise Man will endeavour to have as much of this Sort of Power as he can, but a wise Man will not neglect and despise the other; because his Followers will certainly desert him, if an Opinion should generally prevail amongst them, that his Power of rewarding or making them suffer, will soon be transferred to another; and such an Opinion may be occasioned by their conceiving a bad Opinion of his Conduct or Prudence.

I know, Sir, you will in your usual way endeavour to put a Horse-Laugh upon these Distinctions, but as they are necessary for explaining what is meant by Political Power, and for making your Sophistry appear in its true Colours, I hope the Reader will excuse them. To begin with Political Military Power, I must observe, that in ancient Times, and before

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before the Reign of *Henry the VIIIth*, our great Barons, and Lords of great Manors had, by our Constitution, a Political Military Power of a *mercenary* Nature. They had Castles, Magazines of Arms, and great Numbers of Gentlemen and Servants in their Retinue who were bred to the use of Arms, and a great Number of Vassals or Tenants well-armed and disciplined, that were obliged by their Tenures to follow them when called on. When the People were generally discontented, two or three of these Barons joining together, were able to form an Army sufficient for protecting the People till they came to a Head; and by the Peoples flocking to them, they often formed an Army superior to any the King and his Ministers could bring against them. This made it necessary for the King and his Ministers to study the Inclinations and court the Affections of the People, and was often a Preservative for our Liberties against encroaching Ministers.

But since the turning of all Tenures into Soccage Tenure, I defy you to shew, that any but the King has, by our Constitution, any Political Military Power, or that the People in their collective Body has any such Power; for to talk of the Power of the People, without some Senate, or some Number of Men by their Appointment, to exercise it, is ridiculous. Whilst the People retain any Courage, Arms, or Military Discipline among them, I know, that a Man by his Character, or by his Riches, may
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acquire a Political Military Power, but this is Anti-constitutional; and as no Man, either by his Character or Riches can acquire such a Share of this Sort of Power, as may enable him to withstand a Minister with 20 or 30000 regular Troops at his back, therefore no Man will seek to acquire any such Power, because, he knows, he cannot exert it; and in exerting an Anti-constitutional Power, a great Number cannot easily join, because the very talking of such a Thing is High Treason; and therefore it is highly dangerous for one Man to propose it to another. This, Sir, you very well know, and this has made you despise the People, and shew your Contempt of them publickly upon many Occasions. To talk of the Riches or the Superfluities of the People, with regard to Political Military Power, is therefore ridiculous; and the more the People are disused to Arms, and cowed by regular Troops, the more ridiculous will it be, to talk of their having, or of any one among them being able to exercise, any such Power.

Now with regard to Political Civil Power, I know that by our Constitution there ought to be no such thing as Political Civil Power of a mercenary Nature, but you, Sir, must be sensible, that it is impossible to abolish or entirely prevent the Effects of this Sort of Political Civil Power. You know that Honours, Posts, Pensions, &c. will command the Votes of great Numbers of Men in any popular Assembly. I hope, you will not say, that the collective
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Body of the People can have any such Power, it is downright Nonsense to say so; and no single Man among them can now have any great Share of it. To evince this, I shall consider the Share a single private Man may now have, first, with regard to our Two Houses of Parliament, and next with regard to Elections. In ancient Times, some of our great Barons were a sort of Princes, and often had some of the lesser Barons in their Retinue, with good Salaries or other Appointments for their Attendance and Service, consequently those great Barons may be supposed to have had some Political Civil Power of a mercenary Nature, or a pecuniary Influence, as you call it, *even in our House of Peers*; but now no Man but the King has any such Power.

Then with regard to the *House of Commons*, as our great Barons of old had great Estates, as many of the Places under them were very profitable and honourable, and therefore possessed by some of the best Gentlemen in the Country, and as many of our Boroughs were within their Manors, over which they had a sort of supreme Command, we may suppose, that each of them had a great Political Power of a mercenary Nature, or a pecuniary Influence, *in the House of Commons*; but now no Man can have such a Power except the King alone. *Lastly*. With regard to *Elections*, as the Freeholders of our great Barons had all Votes at *Elections*, and many and great Dependencies upon their Lord; and as many of the Boroughs that sent Mem-
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bers to Parliament, were within their Manors, and in a great Measure their own, we must suppose, that they had a great Political Power, of the mercenary kind, over most Elections; and as they were *but few* in Number, and might therefore easily *unite and join* their Influence together, they were at *most Elections* an overbalance for the Political Mercenary Power, or *Pecuniary Influence* of the Crown.

But now let us see, Sir, how the Case stands. I shall grant that every rich Man in the Kingdom that spends, and does not hoard his Revenue, may have some sort of Political Power, of the *mercenary* Kind, over the Tradesmen and Shopkeepers he employs or deals with, or over the Freeholders that hold Farms of him, and consequently may have a Political Power, of this sort, at *some Elections*, if he applies his Riches to this Purpose; but this Power is not very certain or absolute, because few Tradesmen or Shopkeepers live by him alone, as they formerly did by some great Baron in their Neighbourhood; and when a Farmer has paid his Rent, he has now very little Dependence upon his Landlord, which was not the case of our Farmers or Freeholders of old. To this I must add, that many of our rich Men never think of applying their Riches to this Purpose, whereas Ministers will always think of applying the Riches of the Crown to this Purpose, when they can have the least Hopes of Success; because the Success of their Designs, and often their personal Safety depend upon it. No Man there-

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therefore can in this respect reckon upon the Riches or Revenue of the *People*, or upon its bearing any Proportion to the Riches and Revenue of the *Crown*. There are many rich Men who never think of Politicks, or trouble their Heads much who is, or who is not the *successful Candidate* at any *Election*; and even those that do, seldom or never join unanimously together, or exert this Power with that Vigour or Resolution which is necessary for balancing the Political Mercenary Power of the *Crown*, or for preventing the *poor Electors* from being influenced by the Posts or Bribes offered them by *Ministerial Agents*.

It is evident, that all the rich People of a Country never will, nor ever can join together in any Expedient for this Purpose. But to make this still more evident, I shall suppose the Shopkeepers and Tradesmen of a little Borough get 10000 *l.* a Year, neat Profit, by the Goods they sell, and the Work they do, for the Gentlemen in the Neighbourhood; suppose two of these Gentlemen, supported by the Interest of all the rest, set up to represent this Borough in Parliament, against two Court Candidates who come down with a *Brace of Thousands* in each of their Pockets, Treasury Money, or perhaps their own, which they are obliged to lay out once in *seven Years*, in order to preserve their Posts of 1000 *l.* a Year each. The *pecuniary Influence* of all the *Gentlemen* in the *Neighbourhood*, is certainly larger than that of the *two Court Candidates*; because, if the Gentlemen should all resolve

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resolve never to buy any thing from, or to employ any of the People of this Borough, the latter would be absolutely undone ; but it is impossible to get all the Gentlemen to unite in this Measure, or to stand to such a Resolution, should they all agree to it. The People of the Borough are sensible of this, therefore they take the ready Money offered them by the two *Court Candidates*, and send them up as their *Representatives*. Thus the *pecuniary Influence* of the *Crown* over *poor Electors* will prevail over the *pecuniary Influence* of *rich private Men*, tho' the latter be near twenty times as large as the former ; and that there are a great Number of *poor Electors* in this Kingdom, you, Sir, I believe, very well know.

But farther, Sir, to shew you how ridiculous it is to talk, upon this Subject, of the Proportion between the Riches or Revenue of the *Crown*, and the Riches or Revenue of the *People*, I must observe that the greater the Revenue of the *Crown* is, the more it will always have joined to it, of the Revenue of the *People* ; because among our *rich Men* there will always be many vain, many ambitious, many luxurious, many extravagant, and the Crown by giving them a Title or Ribbon, or a good Pension or Salary, will always have the Assistance of their *private Revenue*, towards increasing the Political *Mercenary* Power of the *Crown* at every *Election*, where they have any Concern ; so that if, upon this Subject, any Proportion is to be mentioned, we ought to talk of the Proportion between the

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Revenue of the Men of Honour, Riches and Spirit amongst us, and the Revenue of the Crown *plus* the Revenue of all the rich Rogues and Fools in the Kingdom. This, whatever you may pretend, you have been long sensible of, and therefore you have endeavoured as much as possible, to bring Virtue, Honour, and publick Spirit into a general Contempt.

I hope I have now demonstrated my fifth and last Proposition, *viz.* that the Weight of *Political Power* is now taken almost entirely from the *Popular*, and thrown into the *Regal Scale*. But lest your *sophistical* Arguments should still retain some Influence, I must make a few proper Remarks upon some of them. You begin with an elaborate Criticism upon *The Dissertation on Parties* ; but in every Instance you either mis-state, or willfully, I believe, mistake, his Argument. In your first Quotation from him, P. 29. does not every one see that he there talks of that sort of Prerogative which brings no Money ? Therefore your Criticism upon that Passage is a downright mis-stating of his Argument ; and the ancient *Prerogatives*, or rather Practices mentioned by you, were neither *Prerogatives* nor *legal Powers*, but downright Robberies, which those Princes committed by Means of the Military *Mercenary* Power they were possessed of ; for if their Soldiers or military Followers had not been *mercenary*, they would not have obeyed their Sovereign, in Breach of the Laws of their Country ; but such Soldiers are in all Countries ready

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to do the same, and I am afraid, would do it again in this, if there were any Occasion for it; for as long as a King gets from his Parliament whatever Sums he pleases to demand, he has no Occasion for having recourse to illegal Means.

You then fall foul of our Ministers in King Charles the II^d's Reign for *misapplying* the *Publick Money*, and from thence extol the Method of *Appropriation*, as if it were a very high and new Advantage we had got by the *Revolution*. Sir, do you think, the Parliaments before the *Revolution* did not know for what they granted the Aids desired by the Crown? Do you think the Ministers had a Right to *misapply* those Aids when granted? If they did, they deserved by the Law, even as it stood then, to be hanged; and if our Parliaments then did not do their Duty in that Respect, I cannot help it. Perhaps some late Parliaments have in that Respect been as deficient as they. This Method of *Appropriation* is therefore, like most of the other Advantages we gained by the *Revolution*, nothing but declaring what was Law before any such *Declaration* was made; and if our Parliaments do not do their Duty it will like other *verbal Declarations* be *Vox & præterea nihil*.

The other Criticisms you have made upon *The Dissertation on Parties*, and your Criticism on *The Inquiry into the Conduct of our domestick Affairs*, being all of the same Nature, and the *false Glosses* you put upon what that ingenious Author says, being easily seen through, I do not think it worth my while to take Notice

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tice of any more of them, and therefore shall proceed to consider the *Fallacy* of your Argument drawn from the supposed Improvement of a Manor. Suppose your Manor, as you say, to be possessed by a *Lord*, whose Revenue is 500 *l. per Annum*, and 1000 *Cottagers*, whose Revenue is 10 *l. a Year* each, and that this Manor is afterwards improved to ten Times the Value, so that the *Lord* has then 5000 *l. a Year*, and the remaining 100,000 *l. a Year* is divided among the 1000 *Cottagers*, it is not to be supposed, as you *fallaciously* do, that *all the Cottagers* will *equally* improve in their Fortunes; and to suppose a *Cottager* to become a *Farmer*, by the meer Improvement of the Manor, is ridiculous, because a *Cottager* has no Part of the Land belonging to him, and consequently cannot grow richer by its Improvement. But to suppose them *Freeholders*; and that the Power of the Lord is limited by the Laws they make in their *Court Baron*, they cannot all grow *equally* rich by the Improvement of the Manor: Some will sell off a Part, as fast as the Estate improves; and if many of them are poor, and the rest extravagantly rich in proportion, may not the Lord prevail with the Poor to *sell themselves and the Rich* together, by *out voting* the Rich in the *Court Baron*? Will not 5000 *l. a Year* be more effectual for this Purpose than 500 *l.* A poor Man that has no rich Man to envy may despise being bribed more than one of ten Times his Income, whose Ambition and Envy is raised by his Neighbour's being much richer and more luxurious than he. In this im-

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proved State of the Manor the Hearts of the poor Freeholders will be more corrupt than they were before, and the Lord will have ten Times the Temptation to throw in their way; would not the Liberties of the Freeholders therefore be in greater Danger than before?

You say, Sir, a Number of them may unite together to form a Purse: Can this be applied to the People of Britain? Can any Number of them that will unite, form a Purse equal to the present Revenue of the Crown? But what are they to do with *this Purse* when it is formed? Are they to appoint a Committee to purchase Arms and hire Soldiers, for opposing the Armies of the Crown? This would be high Treason, and the Conspirators would be hanged before they could make any use of their Purse. Besides, if the *Martial Spirit* of our Men in general should be once fully broke and destroyed, by being long oppressed by a *Standing Army*, the Committee could here at Home get no *Soldiers* to hire, and if they were to bring *Soldiers* from abroad, his Majesty's Navy would prevent them. What then are they to do with *their Purse*? Are they to bribe Members of Parliament, or Voters at Elections? This is against the Laws, and could not be publickly done; and if it were to be privately done, those they employed would cheat them: whereas the Crown may openly and publickly give Places, with good Salaries annexed, to those that vote as Ministers bid them.

You should therefore, Sir, have considered, whether the People, you must mean the *col-*
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lective Body of the People, had any Power, any Ability, any Advantage, before you gave us a pompous Shew of reasoning by saying, that the POWER OF THE CROWN and the POWER OF THE PEOPLE are to each other, in Proportion to their respective ABILITIES, and their DISPOSITION and ADVANTAGES for employing them against each other. For I insist upon it, and, I hope, I have fully proved, that against the Crown the People have no Power, no Ability, no Advantage of a forcible Nature, but what consists in a sudden Mob, or Insurrection; and, we know, how easily these are quelled by a Troop or two of Dragoons. Nor have the People, with Regard to voting in Parliament or at Elections, any Power, Ability, or Advantage against the Crown, but what consists in the Virtue of the Voters, and the small Influence honest rich Men may have at Elections, which is now dispersed into so many Hands, that it can never unite, and is not absolutely to be depended on, even in those Places where it does.

Thus, Sir, I believe, I have sufficiently evinced the Fallacy of your Argument, founded upon your supposed Manor; and another Fallacy that runs through your whole Argument relating to the Pecuniary Power or Influence of the Crown, is your supposing, that the Power of the Crown, with regard to a corrupt Influence at Elections and in Parliament, is to be measured by the Revenue of the Civil List only; whereas it is to be measured by the whole gross Produce of our Taxes, except that Part which is applied towards the Payment of our Debts, Bounties,
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and Draw-backs, I say the *gross Produce*, because the Difference between the *gross* and *neat Produce*, except what goes to Bounties and Draw-backs, is wholly applied to the Salaries &c. of the Officers employed in collecting, all of whom are nominated by the Crown; and if we consider, that the Difference between the *gross* and *neat Produce* of most of our Taxes, besides the *Land* and *Malt*, is near double the *neat Produce*, we may see, what a vast Power, of this Kind, accrues to the Crown, from the Nation's being kept groaning under *Debts* and *Taxes*.

The *Appropriations* now made yearly by Parliament are proper enough for preventing *Misapplication*, tho' they can be of no great Signification, unless *Ministers* are yearly called to a strict Account; and we know, Sir, who it was that lately opposed a Resolution of Parliament, for rendering them more effectual. But still, these *Appropriations* no way derogate from the Power the Crown acquires by having the Disposal of that Money. The appropriating of *two Millions* to the Uses of the Navy, no way derogates from the Power the Crown acquires by having the Disposal or Application of that Money; because as the Crown has not only the Command of all Seamen, Dock-yard-men &c. but also the appointing and preferring of all Officers, every Man concerned in the Navy must be under some sort of Court Influence, with Regard to his or his Friends voting at *Elections*. The same must be said of the *Million* appropriated to the Army. A Minister, 'tis true, cannot take this Money and apply it directly

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directly to the *bribing* of *Electors* or *Parliament-men*; but if he prefers none in the Army or Navy but such as have, or can command Votes at *Elections* or in *Parliament*, if all Seamen and Soldiers are oppressed by their Officers, as they may be, if they or their Friends do not vote at *Elections* for *Court Candidates*, the Money will work almost the same Effect as if it were directly applied, and will not give such an Alarm.

From what I have said, Sir, it will appear, that if we are to make a Comparison between the *Pecuniary Influence* or Power of the Crown, with regard to Votes at *Elections* or in *Parliament*, as it stands now, and as it stood at the *Restoration*, we must compare the *gross Produce* of our *present* Taxes, except what goes towards Payment of our Debts, Bounties, and Draw-backs, with the *gross Produce* of those Taxes that were imposed at the *Restoration*. For this Purpose I shall suppose, that the *gross Produce* of the Taxes appropriated towards Payment of the Interest and Principal of our Publick Debts, and to the Civil List amount to *six Millions Sterling* a Year, which will not be thought too high; if we consider, that the Taxes appropriated towards paying the *Interest* of our Publick Debts, and towards the Sinking Fund, which was originally appropriated to paying off the *Principal*, amount yearly to *three Millions neat Produce*, and that the Taxes appropriated to the *Civil List*, is generally supposed to bring in a *Million* yearly *neat Produce*, which is in the whole *four Millions neat Produce*; and as these Taxes chiefly consist in *Customs* and *Excises*,

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cises, the *gross Produce* of which is generally near double the *neat Produce*, it will not be reckoned extravagant to suppose the *gross Produce* of the whole, to amount to *six Millions a Year*, after deducting what is issued for *Bounties* and *Draw-backs*.

Now, Sir, as *three Millions* of this Money stands appropriated to the Payment of our Publick Debts, or the Interest growing due upon them, we can reckon but *three Millions* of the *six*, when the *Sinking Fund* is properly applied, as a Revenue of the Crown, by which it can procure, or augment it's *Pecuniary Influence* at *Elections* or in *Parliament*. To this, I must add the Money raised for the current Service of the Year, by Means of the *Malt* and *Land Tax*, and some other *Ministerial Projects* called in Aid, which has generally been, in time of Peace, about *two Millions a Year*, all of which must be allowed as a Revenue of the Crown, by which it may procure or augment it's *Pecuniary Influence* at *Elections* or in *Parliament*.

Thus it appears, that the Crown now stands possessed, even in Time of Peace, of a Revenue of *five Millions a Year*, by which it may gain a *Pecuniary Influence* upon *Votes* at *Elections* or in *Parliament*. And if to this we should add the Income of all the *Ecclesiastical Benefices* and *Preferments*, and of all the *Law Offices*, at the Disposal of the Crown, or of those appointed by the Crown, which is the same, what a vast yearly Revenue must the Crown now have at it's Disposal?

Now with regard to it's Revenue at the *Restoration*,

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Restoration, I shall take your own Account of it for the Years 1661, 1662, and 1663, without taking Notice of the Year 1660, because that Year was not complete, and because there were several extraordinary Services provided for, in that Year. According to your Account of the *neat Produce* of the Publick Revenue from *Christmas* 1660 to *Christmas* 1661, it amounted to 2,772,952 *neat Produce*, to which there is very little to be added on account of *gross Produce*, because the *Customs* and *Excise* were then under *Farm*, and the Officers employed in raising them were appointed by the *Farmers*, so that their Salaries could give no *Pecuniary Influence* to the Crown; and of all your other Articles, there are but the Third and Fourth, where there is any Addition to be made on account of *gross Produce*. The Third and Fourth Articles amount to 137,000 *l. neat Produce*, to which I shall add one Moiety, and suppose the *gross Produce* to be 205,500 *l.* therefore the whole Publick Revenue at the Disposal of the Crown, in the Year 1661, was 2,841,452 *l.* By the same Method it will appear, according to your own Account, that the *gross Produce* of the Publick Revenue from *Christmas* 1661 to *Christmas* 1662, amounted to 1,691,452 *l.* and that the *gross Produce* of the Publick Revenue from *Christmas* 1662 to *Christmas* 1663, amounted to 2,131,452 *l.* Therefore the whole *gross Produce* of the Publick Revenue for these *three* Years amounted, according to your Account, to 6,664,356 *l.* which is at the Rate of 2,221,452 *l. per annum*, one Year with another.

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Thus it appears from your own Accounts, when cleared of the *Fallacy* by which you have endeavoured, according to Custom, to impose upon the World, that the Revenue by which the Crown; that is to say, the *Ministers of the Crown*, may gain a *Political Civil Power* of a *Mercenary Kind*, or a *Pecuniary Influence* over the Votes of the People at *Elections* or in *Parliament*, is now more than *double* what it was at the *Restoration*, and, I believe, more than *treble* what it was at a *Medium* from the *Restoration* to the *Revolution*; for I must observe, that this Parliament, which was so generous to the Crown, after the *Restoration*, has ever since gone under the *infamous Name* of the *Pensionary Parliament*; and if the Crown could then gain a *corrupt Influence* over a *Majority* of the *Parliament*, what may it now do, when it has more than *double* the yearly Revenue it then had to dispose of?

Suppose the Number and Riches of the People to have increased to *double* what they were at the *Restoration*, which no Man, I believe, will suppose; yet we cannot suppose, that the *Pecuniary Power* of the Rich amongst us is *double* what it was at that Time; because this Power does not so much depend upon the *Quantity* of Riches possessed, as upon the *Unity* and *Spirit* that prevails amongst the Rich; and it is much more difficult to make *Unity* and *Spirit* to prevail among *forty* Persons than among *twenty*. You, indeed, by your late Conduct, have raised a very *general Union*, and a most *uncommon Spirit* against yourself; and
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your Success at the last general Elections, your being able to bring the *Contest* to so *doubtful* an Issue, notwithstanding your having the *Heir apparent to the Crown* openly declared against you, and most of the great and rich Men of *any Character* in the Kingdom acting not only with *Unanimity*, but with a *surprising Vigour* and *Spirit* against you: This, I say, must give the Alarm to every considering Man: This must convince him, that the *Pecuniary Influence* of the Crown, by means of the vast Revenues it has at its disposal, is now risen to a most dangerous Height.

The *Increase* of this *Danger* is by far greater in Proportion than the *Increase* of the *Revenue* at the Disposal of the Crown; because the *Danger* of the Crown's gaining, by means of its Revenue, a *Pecuniary Power* over most of our *Elections* increases according to the Probability there may be of making the Revenue effectual for that Purpose. Suppose, a Minister, with a Crown Revenue of *four Millions* a Year at his Disposal, could have no Hopes of thereby gaining a *Pecuniary Influence* over a *Majority* of our *Elections*, so as to have always a *Majority* of his *Creatures* in the *House of Commons*, he would never think of applying the Crown Revenue to such a Purpose. He would dispose of all Commissions and Preferments in the Army, Navy, &c. according to the *personal Merit* and *Qualifications* of the Candidates, and not according to the *Influence* they have at *Elections*. Add but *one Million* more yearly to the Crown Revenue, and you may give the
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Minister, not only Hopes, but a Certainty of being able, by means of that Revenue, to command a *Majority* of our *Elections*: no *personal Merit or Qualifications*, nothing but a *Candidate's Influence* at some of our *Elections*, will then be considered by the Minister in the Disposal of any Honour, Commission, Office, or Preferment, and by this Means he may gain such a *Pecuniary Influence* in the *House of Peers*, and such a *Pecuniary Influence* at most of our *Elections*, as will always secure him a *corrupt Majority* in both *Houses of Parliament*, which insensibly, and without any violent Means, puts an End to our *Constitution*. Thus by adding but *one Fourth* to the Publick Revenue, you make that Danger certain and unavoidable, which was not before so much as to be apprehended.

Though happily for the Nation you did not succeed so well at the *last general Election*, which was perhaps owing to your *too great Security*, and your *bad Opinion* of Mankind in general; yet your being able to render doubtful the important Contest between you and the Liberties of your Country is, considering all Circumstances, a most convincing Proof of our being at present very much exposed to this Danger. How it is to be avoided or guarded against, I shall not pretend to advise; but if our Publick Revenues were raised as well as granted by the *House of Commons*; if the Commissioners of the *Customs, Excise, &c.* were yearly appointed by *that House*, and *two* of each Board to walk out yearly, in order to make

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make room for two others, that in these Branches at least, there might be a *Rotation of Magistracy*, which is the *chief Preservative* of Liberty in all Free Countries, would this be erecting *Imperium in Imperio*? Would not the Treasury, and these Boards, be in this Case proper Checks upon one another, instead of being, as they may be at present, the *Protectors* and *Screens* of one another's *Neglects* or *fraudulent Practices*: Would this any way derogate from the *real Dignity* or *legal Authority* of the Crown? Does the appointing of *Excisemen, Custom-House Officers, or Clerks in the Stamp-Office*, add to the *Dignity* or *Authority* of the Crown? Could it injure or diminish your *favourite Civil List Revenue*? Can it serve for any thing but giving a *Minister* an *illegal Pecuniary Influence at Elections*?

From what I have already said, Sir, both you and the Reader must see, that it is quite unnecessary for me to grope in the *Dark*, as you have done, after the *annual Income* of the People at the *Restoration*, or at the *present Time*. You have put the Dispute upon this footing, in order to *bewilder* your *Readers*, because you know there is no certain *Track* to be found; and that therefore, you may upon this Footing wrangle for ever; but as I have shewn, that it is impossible for the People to apply their *annual Income* towards acquiring any *Political Power* of a *mercenary Kind*, either *Military* or *Civil*; that a great Part of their *Income* will always be at the Disposal of, and applied by

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the Crown, towards gaining a *Political Civil Power* of a *mercenary* Nature, and that this *Part* of the People's Income must always increase, in Proportion as the Revenue of the Crown is increased; it is evident that the annual Income of the People, *now*, or at any *former* Period, can be of no Signification in the present Dispute. However, Sir, I hope this will not disappoint the World of the Pleasure of seeing your *Second Part*; for as in this First Part, you have given us your *Ingenious Criticisms*, upon the Conduct of our Ministers *before* the *Revolution*, I should be glad to see your *ingenious Excuses* for the Conduct of our Ministers *since that Time*.

I shall now, Sir, conclude with some Remarks upon the Character you have been pleased to give, or cause to be given to yourself. When you say there has been no *harsh Exercise* of Power during your Administration, I suppose you mean, against the *Enemies* of your *Country*; for they, I shall grant, have had a most quiet Time of it, and have insulted and plundered us, not only with *Impunity* but with a sort of *Indulgence*; but with regard to ourselves, can you have any Right to boast of no *harsh Exercise* of Power, of no *violent Prosecutions* appearing, or of your *Mildness* and *Lenity*, when the People, from the Beginning of your Administration to the End, have bore all the *unnecessary Loads* you have laid upon their Backs, and the *more provoking Insults* you have put upon them, with a most surprising *Patience* and *Forbearance*? Can you say, Sir, we have been happy in the Enjoyment

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joyment of our most *ample Privileges*, when you must be conscious of your having endeavoured to rob us of the *Privilege* upon which *all our other Privileges* depend, a *free and independent Parliament*? As to your *Frankness*, it could never properly be called any thing but a *clownish Familiarity*: As to your *Benevolence*, it was never any thing but *Bribery*; because you never extended it but to those who sacrificed both *Honour* and *Conscience* to your *Commands*; and as to your *Moderation*, if you can shew me one Instance of it, except to your *own Tools*, when they were caught in *defrauding the Publick*, I shall be for shewing you more *Moderation* than you can *justly* expect.

But of all the Virtues you lay Claim to, I am surpris'd at your pretending to *Candour*. Have not you, from your first Appearance in Life, been noted for *asserting Facts* which were then known to be *false*, or afterwards appeared to be so? I could give you many Instances, but shall content myself with *Three*, which, *from their Dates*, will shew, that you have been *Semper Idem*. Upon your first Entrance into Power, in the Year 1715, did not you assert *confidently*, that the Earl of *Oxford* had been guilty of *Traiterous Practices*, and that there was *legal Evidence* to support the Charge; and yet in the Year 1717, when that Noble Earl came upon his Trial, you either could not, or would not give the least Account of that *legal Evidence*? Upon which I must observe, that in the Year 1715, you was a *Minister*; but in the Year 1717, a *Country Gentleman*.

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tleman. Again in the Year 1725, when you was at the *Zenith* of your Power, did not you assert in the *most solemn* Manner, that the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* had entered into a *Secret Treaty* for *ruining* our *Trade* and *restoring* the *Pretender*? Is not the whole World now convinced, there was no *just Ground* for your saying so. *Lastly*, in the Year 1739, when your Power began to decline, did not you publicly assert, that the Court of *Spain* had an *Inclination* to *repair* our *Losses*, and *secure* the *Freedom* of our *Navigation*? Has it not since appeared from the Conduct of that Court, and from the Papers laid before the Parliament, that you knew the contrary?

I therefore hope, Sir, your Attempt to revive *Party Divisions*, that you may have an Opportunity to *escape* in the *Scuffle*, will prove fruitless and vain. Both *Tories* and *Whigs*, or at least those who formerly went under such Denominations, have joined in *pulling you down*. If you deserve it, I hope, they will join in *hanging you up*; and, I hope, the World will excuse me for treating you with so much Freedom. If you had shewed the *least Sign* of *Contrition*, I should *with Pleasure* have been an *Advocate* for an Alleviation of your *Punishment*; but thus in your *last Struggles*, to aim at giving a *hidden, a treacherous Stab* to the *Liberties* of your *Country*, makes it impossible to *shew Mercy* without incurring the *Imputation* of *Cowardice*.

March the 26th,

1742.

F I N I S.