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A
DISCOURSE
Concerning
MILITIAS
AND
Standing Armies.

With relation to the Past and Present
Governments of EUROPE,
AND OF
ENGLAND in particular.

Res est periculi plena, summam Rei Publicæ hominibus Mercenariis, sine re, sine spe, quidvis ob pecuniam ausuris, committere; quorum profundam avaritiam incendat ad nova molienda occasio, & fortuna secum fidem circumagat. Thuan. Hist.

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DISCOURSE

Concerning
Militia's and Standing Armies.

THERE is not perhaps in humane Affairs any thing so unaccountable as the Indignity and Cruelty with which the far greater part of Mankind suffer themselves to be used under pretence of Government. For some Men fallly perswading themselves that bad Governments are advantageous to them, as most conducing to gratify their Ambition, Avarice and Luxury, set themselves with the utmost Art and Violence to procure their Establishment: and almost the whole World has been trampled under foot, and subjected to Tyranny, for want of understanding by what Methods they were brought into it. For tho Mankind take great Care and Pains to instruct themselves in other Arts and Sciences, yet very few apply themselves to consider the Nature of Government, an Enquiry so useful and necessary both

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to Magistrate and People. Nay, in most Countries the Arts of State being altogether directed either to enslave the People, or to keep them under Slavery, it is become almost every where a Crime to reason about Matters of Government. But if Men would bestow a small part of the Time and Application which they throw away upon curious but useless Studies, or endless Gaming, in perusing those excellent Rules of Government which the Antients have left us, they would be enabled to discover all such Abuses and Corruptions as tend to the Ruine of Publick Societies. 'Tis therefore very strange that they should think Study and Knowledg necessary in every thing they go about, except in the noblest and most useful of all Applications, The Art of Government.

Now if any Man in compassion to the Miseries of a People should endeavour to disabuse them in any thing relating to Government, he will certainly incur the Displeasure, and perhaps be pursued by the Rage of those, who think they find their Account in the Oppression of the World; but will hardly succeed in his Endeavours to undeceive the Multitude. For the Generality of all Ranks of Men are cheated by Words and Names; and provided the antient Terms and outward Forms of any Government be retained, let the Nature of it be never so much altered, they continue to dream that they shall still enjoy their former Liberty, and are not to be awakned till it prove too late. Of this there are many remarkable Examples in History; but that particular

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cular Instance which I have chosen to insist on, as most suitable to my purpose, is, the Alteration of Government which happened in most Countries of *Europe* about the Year 1500. And 'tis worth Observation, that tho this Change was fatal to their Liberty, yet it was not introduced by the Contrivance of ill-designing Men; nor were the mischievous Consequences perceived, unless by a few wise Men, who, if they saw it, wanted Power to prevent it.

Two hundred Years being already passed since this Alteration began, *Europe* has felt the Effects of it by sad Experience; and the true Causes of the Change are now become more visible.

To lay open this Matter in its full Extent, it will be necessary to look farther back, and examine the Original and Constitution of those Governments that were established in *Europe* about the Year 400, and continued till this Alteration.

When the Goths, Vandals, and other warlike Nations, had at different Times, and under different Leaders, over-run the Western Parts of the Roman Empire, they introduced the following Form of Government into all the Nations they subdued. The General of the Army became King of the Conquered Country; and the Conquest being absolute, he divided the Lands amongst the Great Officers of his Army, afterwards called *Barons*; who again parcelled out their several Territories in smaller Portions to the inferiour Souldiers that had followed them in the Wars, and who then became their Vassals, enjoy-

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enjoying those Lands for Military Service. The King reserved to himself some Demeafnes for the Maintenance of his Court and Attendance. When this was done, there was no longer any standing Army kept on foot, but every Man went to live upon his own Lands; and when the Defence of the Country required an Army, the King summoned the Barons to his Standard, who came attended with their Vassals. Thus were the Armies of *Europe*, composed for about eleven hundred Years; and this Constitution of Government put the Sword into the hands of the Subject, because the Vassals depended more immediately on the Barons, than on the King; which effectually secured the Freedom of those Governments. For the Barons could not make use of their Power to destroy those limited Monarchies, without destroying their own Grandeur; nor could the King invade their Privileges, having no other Force than the Vassals of his own Demeafnes to rely upon for his Support in such an Attempt.

I lay no great stress on any other Limitations of those Monarchies; nor do I think any so essential to the Liberties of the People, as that which placed the Sword in the hands of the Subject. But since in our time most Princes of *Europe* are in possession of the Sword, by standing Mercenary Forces kept up in time of Peace, and absolutely depending upon them, I say that all such Governments are changed from Monarchies to Tyrannies. Nor can the Power of granting or refusing Money, tho' vested in the Subject, be a sufficient Security for Liberty, where a standing Mercenary

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cenary Army is kept up in time of Peace: For he that is arm'd, is always Master of the Purse of him that is unarm'd. And not only that Government is Tyrannical, which is tyrannically exercised; but all Governments are Tyrannical, which have not in their Constitution a sufficient Security against the Arbitrary Power of the Prince.

I do not deny that these limited Monarchies during the greatness of the Barons, had some Defects: I know few Governments free from them. But after all, there was a Balance that kept those Governments steady, and an effectual Provision against the Encroachments of the Crown. I do not pretend that the present Governments can be restored to the Constitution before-mentioned. The following Discourse will show the impossibility of it. My Design is, first of all to explain the Nature of the past and present Governments of *Europe*, and to disabuse those who think them the same, because they are called by the same Names; and who ignorantly clamour against such as would preserve that Liberty which is yet left.

In order to this, and for a further and clearer Illustration of the Matter, I shall deduce from their Original the Causes, Occasions, and the Complication of those many unforeseen Accidents, which falling out much about the same time, produced so great a Change. And it will at first sight seem very strange, when I shall name the Restoration of Learning, the Invention of Printing, of the Needle and of Gunpowder, as the chief of them;

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them; things in themselves so excellent, and which, the last only excepted, might have proved of infinite Advantage to the World, if their remote Influence upon Government had been obviated by futable Remedies. Such odd Consequences, and of such a different Nature, accompany extraordinary Inventions of any kind.

Constantinople being taken by *Mahomet* the Second, in the Year 1453, many Learned Greeks fled over into *Italy*; where the favourable reception they found from the Popes, Princes, and Republics of that Country, soon introduced amongst the better sort of Men, the study of the Greek Tongue, and the Antient Authors in that Language. About the same time likewise some Learned Men began to restore the Purity of the Latin Tongue. But that which most contributed to the Advancement of all kind of Learning, and especially the study of the Antients, was the Art of Printing; which was brought to a great degree of Perfection a few Years after. By this means their Books became common, and their Arts generally understood and admired. But as Mankind from a natural propension to Pleasure, is always ready to chuse out of every thing what may most gratify their vicious Appetites; so the Arts which the Italians first applied themselves to improve, were principally those that had been subservient to the Luxury of the Antients in the most corrupt Ages, of which they had many Monuments still remaining. *Italy* was presently filled with Architects, Painters and Sculptors; and a prodigious Expence was made in Buildings,
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Pictures and Statues. Thus the Italians began to come off from their frugal and military way of living, and addicted themselves to the pursuit of refined and expensive Pleasures, as much as the Wars of those times would permit. This Infection spread it self by degrees into the Neighbouring Nations. But these things alone had not been sufficient to work so great a Change in Government, if a preceding Invention, brought into common use about that time, had not produced more new and extraordinary Effects than any had ever done before; which probably may have many Consequences yet unforeseen, and a farther Influence upon the Manners of Men, as long as the World lasts: I mean, the Invention of the Needle, by the help of which Navigation was greatly improved; a Passage opened by Sea to the *East-Indies*, and a new World discovered. By this means the Luxury of *Asia* and *America* was added to that of the Antients; and all Ages, and all Countries concurred to sink *Europe* into an Abyfs of Pleasures; which were rendered the more expensive by a perpetual Change of the Fashions in Clothes, Equipage and Furniture of Houses.

These things brought a total Alteration in the way of living, upon which all Government depends. 'Tis true, Knowledg being mightily increased, and a great Curiosity and Nicety in every thing introduced, Men imagined themselves to be gainers in all Points, by changing from their frugal and military way of living, which I must confess had some mixture of Rudeness and Ignorance in it, tho not inseparable from it. But at
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the same time they did not consider the unspeakable Evils that are altogether inseparable from an expensive way of living.

To touch upon all these, tho' slightly, would carry me too far from my Subject; I shall therefore content my self to apply what has been said, to the immediate Design of this Discourse.

The far greater share of all those Expences fell upon the Barons; for they were the Persons most able to make them, and their Dignity seemed to challenge whatever might distinguish them from other Men. This plunged them on a sudden into so great Debts, that if they did not sell, or otherwise alienate their Lands, they found themselves at least obliged to turn the military Service their Vassals owed them, into Money; partly by way of Rent, and partly by way of Lease, or Fine for payment of their Creditors. And by this means the Vassal having his Lands no longer at so easy a Rate as before, could no more be obliged to military Service, and so became a Tenant. Thus the Armies, which in preceding times had been always composed of such Men as these, ceased of course, and the Sword fell out of the hands of the Barons. But there being always a necessity to provide for the Defence of every Country, Princes were afterwards allowed to raise Armies of Volunteers and Mercenaries. And great Sums were given by Diets and Parliaments for their Maintenance, to be levied upon the People grown rich by Trade, and dispirited for want of Military Exercise.

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Such Forces were at first only raised for present Exigencies, and continued no longer on foot than the Occasions lasted. But Princes soon found Pretences to make them perpetual, the chief of which was the garisoning Frontier Towns and Fortresses, the Methods of War being altered to the tedious and chargeable way of Sieges, principally by the Invention of Gunpowder. The Officers and Souldiers of these Mercenary Armies depending for their Subsistence and Preferment, as immediately upon the Prince, as the former Militia's did upon the Barons, the Power of the Sword was transferred from the Subject to the King, and War grew a constant Trade to live by. Nay, many of the Barons themselves being reduced to Poverty by their expensive way of living, took Commands in those Mercenary Troops; and being still continued Hereditary Members of Diets, and other Assemblies of State, after the loss of their Vassals, whom they formerly represented, they were now the readiest of all others to load the People with heavy Taxes, which were employed to increase the Prince's Military Power, by Guards, Armies, and Citadels, beyond Bounds or Remedy.

I am not ignorant that before this Change, Subsidies were often given by Diets, States and Parliaments for maintaining Wars; but these were small, and no way sufficient to subsist such numerous Armies as those of the Barons Militia.

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What I have said hitherto has been always with regard to one or other, and often to most Countries in *Europe*. What follows will have a more particular regard to *England*; where, tho the Power of the Barons be ceased, yet no mercenary Troops are yet established. The Reason of which is, that *England* had before this great Alteration lost all her Conquests in *France*, the Town of *Calais* only excepted; and that also was taken by the French, before the Change was thorowly introduced. So that the Kings of *England* had no Pretence to keep up Standing Forces, either to defend Conquests abroad, or to garison a Frontier towards *France*, which was their formidable Enemy, since the Sea was now become the only Frontier between those two Countries.

Henry the Seventh seems to have perceived the Alteration before-mentioned more than any Prince of his time, and obtained several Laws to favour and facilitate it. But the succeeding Princes were altogether improper to second him: For *Henry* the Eighth was an unthinking Prince. The Reigns of *Edward* the Sixth, and *Queen Mary*, were short, and *Queen Elizabeth* loved her People too well to attempt it. King *James* the First was a Stranger, and of no Interest abroad. King *Charles* the First did indeed endeavour to make himself Absolute, tho somewhat preposterously; for he attempted to seize the Purse, before he was Master of the Sword. But very wise Men have been of Opinion, that if he had been possessed of as numerous Troops as those which were after-

afterwards raised, and constantly kept up by King *Charles* the Second, he might easily have succeeded in his Enterprize. For we see that in those Struggles which the Country Party had with King *Charles* the Second, and in those Endeavours they used to bring about that Revolution which was afterwards compassed by a Foreign Power, the chief and insuperable Difficulty they met with, was from those Forces. And tho King *James* the Second had provoked the Nation to the last degree, and made his own Game as hard as possible, not only by invading our Civil Liberties, but likewise by endeavouring to change the Established Religion for another which the People abhorred, whereby he lost their Affections, and even those of a great part of his Army; yet notwithstanding all this Mismanagement, *England* stood in need of a foreign Force to save it; and how dangerous a Remedy that is, the Histories of all Ages can witness. 'Tis true, this Circumstance was favourable to the Nation, that a Prince who had married the next Heir to the Crown, was at the Head of our Deliverance; yet did it engage us in a long and expensive War. And now that we are much impoverished, and by means of our former Riches and present Poverty, fallen into all the Corruptions which those great Enemies of Virtue want, and Excess of Riches can produce; that there are such Numbers of Mercenary Forces on foot at home and abroad; that the greatest part of the Officers have no other way to subsist; that they are commanded by a wise and

and active King, who has at his Disposal the formidable Land and Sea Forces of a Neighbouring Nation, the great Rival of our Trade: A King, who by Blood, Relation, other particular Ties, and common Interest, has the House of *Austria*, most of the Princes of *Germany*, and Potentates of the North, for his Friends and Allies; who can, whatever Interest he join with, do what he thinks fit in *Europe*: I say, if a Mercenary Standing Army be kept up, (the first of that kind, except those of the Usurper *Cromwel* and the late King *James*, that *England* has seen for thirteen hundred Years) I desire to know, where the Security of the Liberties of *England* lies, unless in the good Will and Pleasure of the King: I desire to know, what real Security can be had against a Standing Army of Mercenaries, backed by the Corruption of a Nation, the Tendency of the way of Living, the Genius of the Age, and the Example of the World.

Having shown the Difference between the past and present Government of *England*, how precarious our Liberties are, and how from having the best Security for them we are in hazard of having none at all; 'tis to be hoped that those who are for a Standing Army, and losing no occasion of advancing and extending the Prerogative, from a mistaken Opinion that they establish the antient Government of *England*, will see what sort of Patriots they are.

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But we are told, that only Standing Mercenary Forces can defend *England* from the perpetual Standing Armies of *France*. However frivolous this Assertion be, as indeed no good Argument can be brought to support it, either from Reason or Experience; yet allowing it to be good, what Security can the Nation have, that these Standing Forces shall not at some time or other be made use of to suppress the Liberties of the People, tho not in this King's time, to whom we owe their Preservation? For I hope there is no Man so weak to think, that keeping up the Army for a Year, or for any longer time than the Parliament shall have engaged the Publick Faith to make good all Deficiencies of Funds granted for their Maintenance, is not the keeping them up for ever. 'Tis a pitiful shift in the Undertakers for a Standing Army, to say, We are not for a Standing Army; We are only for an Army from Year to Year, or till the Militia be made useful. For *England* cannot be in any hazard from *France*; at least, till that Kingdom, so much exhausted by War and Persecution, shall have a breathing space to recover. Before that time our Militia will be in order; and in the mean time our Fleets. Besides, no Prince ever surrendered to great Countries, and so many strong Places, I shall not say, in order to make a new War; but, as these Men will have it, to continue the same. The French King is old and diseased, and was never willing to hazard much by any bold

bold Attempt. If he, or the Dauphin, upon his Decease, may be suspected of any farther Design, it must be upon the Spanish Monarchy, in case of the Death of that King. And if it be objected, that we shall stand in need of an Army, in such a Conjunction; I answer, that our Part in that, or in any other foreign War, will be best managed by Sea, as shall be shown hereafter.

Let us then see if Mercenary Armies be not exactly calculated to enslave a Nation. Which I think may be easily proved, if we consider that such Troops are generally composed of Men who make a Trade of War, and having little or no Patrimony, or spent what they once had, enter into that Employment in hopes of its Continuance during Life, not at all thinking how to make themselves capable of any other. By which means heavy and perpetual Taxes must be entail'd for ever upon the People for their Subsistence; and since all their Relations stand engaged to support their Interest, let all Men judg, if this will not prove a very united and formidable Party in a Nation. But the Undertakers for a Standing Army will say; Will you turn so many Gentlemen out to starve, who have faithfully served the Government? This Question I allow to be founded upon some Reason. For it ought to be acknowledged in Justice to our Army, that on all Occasions, and in all Actions, both Officers and Souldiers have done their part. And therefore I think it may be rea-

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sonable, that all Officers and Souldiers of above forty Years, in consideration of their Unfitness to apply themselves at that Age to any other Employment, should be recommended to the Bounty of the Parliament.

But the Undertakers must pardon me if I tell them, That no well-constituted Government ever suffered any such Men in it, whose Interest leads them to imbroil the State in War, and are an useless and insupportable Burden in time of Peace. *Carthage*, after the first Roman War, found how dangerous they were: And *Holland*, in the Year 1672, how useless to defend them. If ever any Government stood in need of such a sort of Men, 'twas that of antient *Rome*, because they were engaged in perpetual War. The Argument can never be so strong in any other Case. But the Romans well knowing such Men and Liberty to be incompatible, and yet, being under a necessity of having Armies constantly on foot, made frequent Changes of the Men that served in them; who, when they had been some time in the Army, were permitted to return to their Possessions, Trades, or other Employments. And to show how true a Judgment that wise State made of this Matter, it is sufficient to observe, that those who subverted that Government, the greatest that ever was amongst Men, found themselves obliged to continue the same Souldiers always in constant Pay and Service.

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There is another thing which I would not mention if it were not absolutely necessary to my present purpose; and that is, the usual Manners of those who are engaged in Mercenary Armies. I speak now of Officers in other Parts of *Europe*, and not of those in our Army, allowing them to be the best; and if they will have it so, quite different from all others. I will not apply to them any part of what I shall say concerning the rest. They themselves best know how far any thing of that Nature may be applicable to them. I say then, most Princes of *Europe* having put themselves upon the foot of keeping up Forces, rather numerous, than well entertain'd, can give but small Allowance to Officers, whom, notwithstanding, they permit to live in all that Extravagancy which mutual Example and Emulation prompts them to. By which means the Officers become insensibly engaged in numberless Oppressions and Cruelties, the Colonels against the Captains, and the Captains against the inferior Souldiers. So that there is hardly any sort of Men who are less Men of Honour than the Officers of Mercenary Forces: and indeed Honour has now no other Signification amongst them than Courage. Besides, most Men that enter into those Armies, whether Officers or Souldiers, as if they were obliged to show themselves new Creatures, and perfectly regenerate, if before they were modest or sober, immediately turn themselves to all manner of Debauchery and Wickedness,
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committing all kind of Injustice and Barbarity against poor and defenceless People. Now tho' the natural Temper of our Men be more just and honest than that of the French, or of any other People, yet may it not be feared, that such bad Manners may prove contagious? And if such Manners do not fit Men to enslave a Nation, Devils only must do it. On the other hand, if it should happen that the Officers of a Standing Army in *England* should live with greater Regularity and Modesty than was ever yet seen in that sort of Men, it might very probably fall out, that being quarter'd in all Parts of the Country, they might be returned Members of Parliament for most of the Electing Boroughs; and of what Consequence that would be, I leave all Men to judg. So that whatever be the Conduct of a Mercenary Army, we can never be secure as long as any such Force is kept up in *England*; and I confess I do not see by what Rules of good Policy any Mercenary Forces have been conniv'd at either in *England* or elsewhere. Sure, 'tis allowing the Dispensing Power in the most essential Point of the Constitution.

The Subjects formerly had a real Security for their Liberty, by having the Sword in their own hands. That Security, which is the greatest of all others, is lost; and not only so, but the Sword is put into the Hand of the King by his Power over the Militia. All this is not enough; but we must have a Standing Army of Mercenaries, who for the most part have no
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other way to subsist, and consequently are capable to execute any Commands. And yet every Man must think his Liberties as safe as ever, under pain of being thought disaffected to the Monarchy. But sure it must not be the antient Limited and Legal Monarchy of *England*, that these Gentlemen mean. It must be a French Fashion of Monarchy, where the King has Power to do what he pleases, and the People no Security for any thing they possess. We have quitted our antient Security, and put the Militia into the Power of the King. The only remaining Security we have is, That no Standing Army was ever yet allowed in time of Peace, the Parliament having so often and so expressly declared it to be contrary to Law. If a Standing Army be allow'd, what Difference will there be between the Government we shall then live under, and any kind of Government under a good Prince? Of which there have been some in the most despotick Tyrannies. If this be a Limited and not an Absolute Monarchy, then, as there are Conditions, so there ought to be Securities on both sides. The Barons never pretended that their Militia's should be constantly on foot, and together in Bodies, in times of Peace. 'Tis evident that would have subverted the Constitution, and made every one of them a Petty Tyrant. And 'tis as evident, that Standing Forces are the fittest Instruments to make a Tyrant, tho not of so gracious a Prince as we now live under, yet, to be sure,

sure, of some of his Successors. Whoever is for making the King's Power too great or too little, is an Enemy to the Monarchy. But to give him a Standing Army, puts his Power beyond Controul, and consequently makes him Absolute. If the People had any other real Security for their Liberty than that there be no Standing Army in time of Peace, there might be some colour to demand it. But if that only remaining Security be taken away from the People, we have destroyed the Monarchy.

'Tis pretended, we are in hazard of being invaded by a powerful Enemy; Shall we therefore destroy our Constitution? What is it then that we would defend? Is it our Persons, by the Ruine of our Constitution? In what then shall we be Gainers? In saving our Lives by the Loss of our Liberties? If our Pleasures and Luxury make us live like Brutes, it seems we must not pretend to reason any better than they. I would fain know, if there be any other way of making a Prince Absolute, than by allowing him a Standing Army: If by it all Princes have not been made Absolute; If without it, any. Whether our Enemies shall conquer us is uncertain. But whether a Standing Army will enslave us, neither Reason nor Experience will suffer us to doubt. 'Tis therefore evident, that no Pretence of Danger from abroad, can be an Argument to keep up a Standing Army, or any Mercenary Forces.

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Let us, now consider whether we may not be able to defend our selves by a well-regulated Militia against any Foreign Force, tho never so formidably: that the Nation may be free from the Fears of Invasion from abroad, as well as from the Danger of Slavery at home.

'Tis well known, that after the Barons had lost the Military Service of their Vassals, Militia's of some kind or other were established in most parts of *Europe*. But the Prince having the Power of naming and preferring the Officers of these Militia's, they could be no Balance in Government as the former were. And he that will consider what has been said in this Discourse, will easily perceive that the essential Quality requisite to such a Militia, as might fully answer the Ends of the former, must be that the Officers should be named and prefer'd, as well as they and the Souldiers paid, by the People that set them out. So that if Princes look upon the present Militia's as not capable of defending a Nation against Foreign Armies; the People have little reason to entrust them with the Defence of their Liberties.

'Tis as well known that after the dissolution of that Antient Militia under the Barons, which made this Nation so Great and Glorious, tho, by setting up Militia's generally through *Europe*, the Sword came not into the Hands of the Commons; which was the only thing could have continued

tinued the former Balance of Government, but was every where put into the Hands of the King: nevertheless ambitious Princes, who aimed at absolute Power, thinking they could never use it effectually to that end, unless it were wielded by Mercenaries, and Men that had no other Interest in the Common-wealth than their Pay, have still endeavoured by all means to discredit Militia's, and render them burdensome to the People, by never suffering them to be upon any Right, or so much as tolerable Foot, and all to perswade the Necessity of standing Forces. And indeed they have succeeded too well in this Design: For the greatest part of the World has been fool'd into an opinion, That a Militia cannot be made serviceable. I shall not say 'twas only Militia's could conquer the World; and that Princes to have succeeded fully in the Design before-mentioned, must have destroyed all the History and Memory of Antient Governments, where the Accounts of so many excellent Models of Militia are yet extant. I know the Prejudice and Ignorance of the World concerning the Art of War, as it was practis'd by the Antients; tho what remains of that Knowledge in their Writings be sufficient to give a mean Opinion of the Modern Discipline. For this Reason I shall examine, by what has pass'd of late Years in this Nation, whether Experience have convinc'd us, that Officers bred in Foreign Wars, be so far preferable to others who have been under no other Discipline than that of an ordinary

ordinary and ill-regulated Militia; and if the Commonalty of *England* at their first entrance upon Service, be not as capable of a resolute Military Action, as any standing Forces. The Battel of *Naseby* will fully resolve this Doubt, which is generally thought to have been the deciding Action of the late Civil War. The Number of Forces was equal on both sides; nor was there any Advantage in the Ground, or extraordinary Accident that happened during the Fight, which could be of considerable importance to either side. In the Army of the Parliament, nine only of the Officers had served abroad, and most of the Soldiers were Prentices drawn out of *London* but two months before. In the King's Army there was above a thousand Officers that had served in foreign Parts: Yet were they routed and broken by those new-raised Prentices; who were observed to be obedient to Command, and brave in Fight; not only in that Action, but on all Occasions during that active Campaign. The People of this Nation are not a dastardly Crew, like those born in Misery under Oppression and Slavery, who must have time to rub off that Fear, Cowardice and Stupidity which they bring from home. And tho Officers seem to stand in more need of Experience than private Soldiers, yet in that Battel it was seen, that the Sobriety, and Principle of the Officers on the one side, prevailed over the Experience of those on the other.

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'Tis well known that divers Regiments of our Army lately in *Flanders* have never been once in Action, and not one half of them above thrice, nor any of them five times during the whole War. O, but they have been under Discipline, and accustomed to obey! And so may Men in Militia's. We have had to do with an Enemy, who, tho abounding in Numbers of excellent Officers, yet durst never fight us without a visible Advantage. Is that Enemy like to invade us, when he must be unavoidably necessitated to put all to hazard in ten days, or starve, unless we will suppose we are to have no Fleet at all?

But to come to some of the Capital Errors committed by those that established the Modern Militia's, besides what has been already mentioned; One of the chief was, the discontinuing to exercise the whole People, for which there were many excellent and wholesome Laws in this Nation; and almost every where else. Another Error was, the taking Men without distinction, and, for the most part, the Scum of the People into that small number which they lifted and exercised. Whereas if a small number only was to be exercised, no Man of Quality or Riches ought to be excused from that Duty. Thus it was; that these Militia's fell into contempt; and Men of Quality and Estates having Power to send any wretched Seryant in their place, became themselves abject and timorous.

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morous, by being disused to handle Arms, 'Tis well observed by a Judicious Author, that 'tis easier to exercise a greater Number than a less; and consequently all that are able to bear Arms in a Nation, than a small Number pickt out of a wide Country; who must march far, and be from home several days at each Exercise. And perhaps it might be found an unnecessary trouble and burden, to have certain numbers of Men listd and formed into Bodies in time of Peace, if the whole People were exercised, and an easy Method laid down, by which such numbers of Men as shall be thought convenient, may always be drawn out, even upon the most sudden Occasion. For by this means the Choice will be greater, as it ought to be, that so Trade, Manufactures and Husbandry may be as little disturbed as possible, since the Impediments of the several Conditions of Men are so many and so various.

'Twill be said, That I insist much upon the Errors of the present Militia, and do not propose a new Model by which they may be amended. I answer, A Parliament only can do that. The People are to tell wherein they are agrieved, and what is amiss: It belongs only to that Wise Council to apply suitable Remedies: Which cannot be difficult when the Causes of the Disease are discovered. And there are many Models of Militia, both Antient and Modern, from which divers useful things may be taken.

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Of the Fleet I shall say little, having chiefly undertaken to speak of Militia's and standing Forces. But surely *England* cannot justly apprehend an Invasion, if the Fleet alone were in such order as it ought to be. And it can never be the Interest of this Nation to take any other share in preserving the Balance of *Europe*, than what may be performed by our Fleets. By which means our Money will be spent amongst our selves, our Trade preserved to support the Charge of our Navy; our Enemies totally driven out of the Sea, and great numbers of their Forces diverted from opposing the Armies of our Allies abroad, to the defence of their own Coasts.

If this Method had been taken in the late War, I presume it would have proved, not only more advantagious to us, but also more serviceable to our Allies than that which was followed. And 'tis in vain to say, that at this rate we shall have no Allies at all: For the weaker Party on the Continent must be contented to accept our Assistance in the manner we think fit to give it, or inevitably perish. But if we send Mercenary Forces beyond the Seas to join those of our Allies, then, at the end of every War, the present struggle will recur, and at one time or other the Nation will be betrayed, and a Standing

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Army

Army established: So that nothing can save us from following the Fate of all the other Kingdoms in *Europe*, but putting our Trust altogether in our Fleets and Militia's, and having no other Forces than these. The Sea is the only Empire which can naturally belong to us. Conquest is not our Interest, much less to consume our People and Treasure in conquering for others.

To conclude;

If we seriously consider the happy Condition of this Nation, who have lived for many Ages under the Blessings of Liberty, we cannot but be affected with the most tender Compassion to think that a Country, whose Fields are every where well cultivated and improved by the Industry of rich Husbandmen; Her Rivers and Harbours filled with Ships; Her Cities, Towns, and Villages, enrich'd with Manufactures; where Men possessing vast Estates, are not hated and abhorred as in other Countries, but deservedly blessed, by the poorer sort of People; whose Merchants live in as great Splendor as the Nobility of other Nations, and whose Commonalty not only surpasses all those of that degree which the World can now boast of, but also those of all former Ages, in Courage, Honesty, good Sense, Industry, and Generosity of Temper; in whose very Looks there are such visible
Marks

Marks of a free and liberal Education, which Advantages cannot be imputed to the Climate, or to any other Cause, but the Freedom of the Government under which they live. I say, it cannot but make the Hearts of all honest Men bleed to think, that in their days the Felicity of such a Country must come to a Period, if the Parliament do not prevent it, and his Majesty be not prevailed upon to lay aside the Thoughts of a Mercenary Army, which tho it may seem a Security in his time, yet by being continued; as will inevitably come to pass, must produce, under his Successors, those fatal Consequences that have always attended such Forces in the other Kingdoms of *Europe*; Violation of Property, Decay of Trade, Oppression of the Country by heavy Taxes and Quarters, the utmost Misery and Slavery of the poorer sort, the Ruine of the Nobility and Gentry by their Expences in Court and Army, Deceit and Treachery in all Ranks of Men, occasioned by Want and Necessity. Then shall we see our once happy Commonalty become base and abject, by being continually exposed to the brutal Insolence of the Souldiers, our Women debauch'd by their Lust, ugly and nasty through Poverty, and the want of things necessary to preserve their natural Beauty. Then shall we see that great City, the Pride and Glory not only of our Island, but of the World, subjected to the excessive Impositions
Paris

(30)

Paris now lies under, and reduced to a Pedling Trade, serving only to foment the Luxury of a Court. Then will *England* know what Obligations she has to those who are for Mercenary Armies.

FINIS.