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FACTS
RELATIVE TO THE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR
IN THE
WEST INDIES;
COLLECTED FROM THE
SPEECH
OF THE
RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS,
IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS,
ON THE 28th OF APRIL, 1796,
AND FROM THE
DOCUMENTS LAID BEFORE THE HOUSE UPON THAT
SUBJECT.

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1796.

F A C T S, &c.

FEW Subjects of Public Discussion have excited so much Interest, and given rise to a greater variety and difference of Opinion than the Conduct of the War, and the Events which have happened in the West Indies since the commencement of the year 1793.

With respect indeed to the first Campaign, there was, and can be, but one sentiment of great and general satisfaction at the important benefits which accrued to the Nation by our rapid and brilliant Conquests in that quarter. But the public mind, elated by these successes, certainly became, by that very circumstance, more open and liable to receive every impression unfavourable to Government, and to join in every acrimonious censure which the subsequent reverses have drawn upon Administration.

Opposition, for two years, have tried every means to increase and improve this disposition, and whilst they were actively employed in irritating the forebodings of disappointment, in sowing the

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seeds of mistrust and discontent, in imputing to error and remissness every unfavourable result which no human sagacity could foresee, and no human power avert, Ministers were under the painful necessity of suffering their calumnies and misrepresentations to go forth into the World.—It is true they did not pass unnoticed, but Ministers, instead of repelling the Charges brought against them, by a defence founded on unanswerable and official documents, were confined to oppose assertions to assertions, and, in general Terms, to contradict unwarranted statements, by other statements certainly more correct, but not supported, as they might have been, by positive and unequivocal proofs. Their assurances obtained credit in Parliament, because their character and responsibility were at stake, and also because the reasons which entitled them to expect a proper degree of confidence, and compelled them to withhold the particulars of the information they possessed, were explained and understood. Out of Parliament the motives of this conduct have not, perhaps, been so generally known; and it is fair to assume that many persons, dispassionate and unprejudiced, have formed their opinions of the West India Expeditions from unfair representations; and that others, judging of events by their issue, without any discussion or enquiry, are ready to attach blame wherever a plan, however extensive and complicated, however subject in its operations to the influence of physical and uncontrollable obstacles and accidents, has not, in every particular, answered their expectation.

The period is now arrived when Ministers have found it possible, without inconvenience or prejudice to the Public, to give particular Answers to most of the Heads of Accusation brought against them;

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them; and Mr. Sheridan's late Motion, by affording them an opportunity, has given them the means of appealing to Parliament, and to the Nation to decide between him and them on every principal question relative to the conduct of the War in the West Indies. To those who, prior to this explanation, supported Government, it must be a satisfaction to find that their confidence was not misplaced; and the Public will now be convinced, that with the present Ministers every personal consideration is subservient to the public interest, and that the gratification of every private feeling is scrupulously sacrificed to a sense of public duty. What other motive could have induced them to resist the repeated provocations of their accusers, and their own natural anxiety to communicate to the House and the Nation the Proofs they have had for months and years in their possession? I cannot believe that their long reserve can be seriously imputed to any other motive, even by those who have hitherto affected to construe it into a consciousness of guilt or incapacity, and an apprehension of blame. All those who are not governed by party, and are open to conviction, will certainly do Ministers this justice; to them, (and they form, I trust, by far the greatest part of the Nation,) it will be a sincere satisfaction to find that at no period of the War have the real interests of the Country been neglected in any quarter of the World, and that, in particular, it has been the object of the constant attention of Government to provide, by every possible means, for the security of our own, and the reduction of the Enemy's Possessions in the West Indies. It is with a view of fixing the public opinion upon those positions that the following Facts have been collected from the very able speech of Mr. Dundas on the 28th of April, and from the Documents moved for on that day, neither of which, owing perhaps to the very great

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great variety of subjects which they embrace, have been given with tolerable accuracy in any of the news-papers, or other periodical prints.

The nature of the Military Peace Establishment of this Country being so generally known, it can hardly be necessary to remark, that, from the moment we are involved in Hostilities, it requires the utmost diligence, care, activity and judgment to establish a system of defence tolerably secure for all our distant foreign possessions, against an enterprising and powerful Enemy; and that any immediate attempt to carry on offensive operations, unless peculiarly pointed out by some favourable circumstances, would be preposterous and impracticable.

It will, I presume, be admitted on all sides, that the above observation was truly applicable to the state of our forces in almost every quarter of the World, when France declared War against this Country and the United Provinces in February, 1793.

At that most critical period, nevertheless, Government was suddenly called upon to detach to the Continent a valuable proportion of the very small army then at home, on a service of the most pressing importance. The first Invasion of *Holland* by Dumourier, the fall of *Breda* and *Gertruydenberg*, the consequent consternation and despondency that prevailed, and the inadequate means of resistance, then existing in that country, are circumstances too recent not to be impressed on the mind of every man, who has attended to the events of the War. The very spirited determination of sending, at that conjuncture, a Body of the Guards to the assistance of the Dutch Government, and the expedition with which it was executed, were, in all human probability,

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probability, decisive of the fate of *Holland* at that time, and of the Campaign of 1793; for any further progress of the French must necessarily have defeated the well-concerted plans, and checked the brilliant operations of the Austrians then upon the *Roer*.

It would be foreign to my purpose to enquire into the probable effect of the loss of *Holland* in 1793, or to shew that it would inevitably have been attended with results far more serious and alarming to Europe, and to this Kingdom in particular, than have followed from its fall in 1795. It is sufficient to have established, on the present occasion, that, in the first moment of Hostilities, the most vigorous, important and successful exertions were made in Europe: nor were Ministers less vigilant and attentive to the interests of the Empire abroad. It is well known that intelligence was received of the French being driven from all their Factories and Settlements on the Continent of *Asia*, almost as soon as any answer could possibly be expected to orders dispatched from hence for that purpose, at the first moment after the Declaration of War.

To the West Indies, more particularly the object of the late Discussions, Ministers, justly upon their guard against the hostile dispositions of France, had ordered, previous to the rupture, such small reinforcements as could be spared from other Possessions less exposed, or less liable to attract the attention of the Enemy. On the 2d of January, 1793, Brigadier-General *Cuyler*, the Commanding Officer in the Leeward Islands, was informed that a regiment would be sent from *Ireland*, another from *Gibraltar*, and a third from *Nova Scotia*. The actual commencement,

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mencement of hostilities soon afterwards rendered it necessary to change the destination of the first, and it was employed on board the fleet. On the 8th of February (three days after the French Declaration of War had reached this Country) General Cuyler was further informed that he would be reinforced by two more regiments from *Nova Scotia* and *New Brunswick**; and on the 10th instructions were sent to him to attempt the reduction of *Tobago*, provided it could be undertaken, consistently with a due attention to the Safety and Defence of the British Islands. Ministers had good reason to believe that the landing of an English Force at *Tobago* would be favoured by the greatest part of the inhabitants, who had manifested a wish to return under His Majesty's government; and the event justified their expectation; the Island surrendered the on 17th of April.

Several strong indications of a disposition to resist the Decrees of the Convention, destructive of all property and security in the Colonies, appeared about the same time in *Martinique* and *Guadeloupe*; and a disposition having been manifested by a large proportion of the most respectable Planters to place themselves under His Majesty's Protection, instructions were sent, on the 28th of February, to Major-General Bruce to concert measures with these persons for taking possession of those Islands, and to collect, for this purpose, such force as could be spared from other services, and the different garrisons then under his command. The British Forces appeared off *Martinique* on the 11th of June. This expedition could only be undertaken with a view of giving effectual countenance and support to those who had

* At the same moment, in order to replace this Force, a Regiment of 600 Men was ordered to be raised in each of these Provinces, a measure which has been attended with the happiest effects.

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had invited the British Forces to their assistance. At that period we most certainly had not the means of attempting to wrest those valuable islands from the Power of France in any other manner. The efforts made by the British to meet the wishes of the inhabitants prove the active vigilance of Ministers in that quarter, whilst the want of success can by no means be attributed to any want of exertion on their part. It was certainly proper in them to furnish every possible succour to the persons who had engaged to co-operate with them; but if from any unforeseen failure in such expected co-operation, the execution of the design in which they were jointly concerned became impracticable, it cannot certainly be made an object of censure either on those who authorized the expedition, or on those who were charged with it's execution.

In the Spring of 1793 the French were also dispossessed of *St. Pierre* and *Miquelon*, on the banks of Newfoundland, in pursuance of orders sent from England to Brigadier General Ogilvie, the commanding officer in *Nova Scotia*.

With this cursory view of events in the West Indies during the short period which remained for active operations after the intelligence of the rupture could have reached that quarter, combined with the variety and importance of other services which were then to be provided for, and comparing the whole with the inadequate means by which Ministers were enabled to meet so many pressing exigencies, I think it will be allowed that, from the outset of the War until the close of the first Campaign in the West Indies, they are entitled to considerable credit for the judgement and activity manifested in the choice and direction of the measures, by which the general interests of

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Europe, and the particular interests of this Kingdom, were so materially improved and promoted. On what grounds can a different conclusion be supported? Were any of the British possessions insulted? Were not the internal security and tranquillity of the Empire maintained against the machinations of its avowed and secret enemies? and in the present instance, was this no addition to the difficulties and embarrassments, inseparable from the commencement of a War?

During the Summer of 1793, the greatest exertions were made to prepare an armament for the reduction of the French Leeward Islands. An army of 10,000 men, in addition to the forces then in the Islands, was deemed necessary for this Service; but it having been judged expedient, from particular circumstances, to retain in England eight of the Regiments belonging to this Army, it was reduced to about 6000 men. I shall not lose sight of my object by a particular attempt to ascertain and discuss the motives by which Ministers were governed in withdrawing this force. However much the march of the Royalist Army to the Coast of *Brittany* contiguous to the Channel, and the expectation of giving them effectual support and assistance, might be supposed to be the more immediate objects Ministers had at that moment in contemplation, it is, nevertheless, to be presumed that their determination was taken also upon the more general principle of having collected at home a certain number of disciplined Troops, as a Corps de Reserve, constantly ready to avail itself of any favourable occurrence, or, under a contrary emergency, to reinforce the Quarter where the pressure was most to be apprehended. On the one hand, the relief of *Ostend* and *Nieuport*, from which the very Troops withdrawn from the West India

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India Expedition were just returned, and on the other, the attack made on *Granville* by the Royalists, were equally in favour of their Detention, and, whether it was adopted on these or other considerations, the necessity of re-dispatching the same Regiments to *Ostend*, in the spring of 1794, shews that it was founded on a principle which ought not to be lost sight of by a prudent Administration.

It would appear from Mr. DUNDAS's Statement, that, in signifying to *Sir Charles Grey* the necessity of this reduction in the Expedition under his Command, he intimated, at the same time, that it was not expected of him to accomplish all the objects to which the more extensive Armament had been judged adequate; and that, to the immortal honour of that gallant Officer, he, nevertheless, did compleat all the Conquests which were in contemplation before any diminution of the Force had taken place.

A narrative of the brilliant enterprizes by which they were effected could add nothing to the high professional characters of the respective commanders, nor to the well-earned reputation of the officers and men employed under them. As no one presumed, during the late discussion, to dispute their titles in this respect—titles justly stamped with the satisfaction and approbation of their Sovereign, with the thanks of Parliament, with the grateful applause of their Country, and the warm acknowledgment of Ministers, I shall only remark that, on all occasions, they have been strenuously asserted and supported by Mr. DUNDAS. His open and candid declaration on this head, and the whole tenor of his political life ought certainly to have

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exempted him from the injurious imputation of harbouring a wish to load Sir C. Grey with any responsibility, which might attach on him as Minister, with respect to the misfortunes which have since deprived us of a part of the General's Conquests.

How far the indiscreet and unwarrantable assertions, made by Opposition, on some former occasions, impelled them, in the last debate, to bring forward this unjustifiable imputation, will appear from the manner in which the Minister answered their observations, on the causes of the unfortunate events which have occurred in the Leeward Islands since the month of June 1794.

The great object of all the strictures on the Conduct of the Campaign of 1794, appears to have been to establish the two following positions:

1st. That Sir Charles Grey during that Campaign made several Requisitions for Supplies of Troops, and that Ministers promised him Reinforcements which were never sent.

2dly. That it is to the neglect of Ministers, in not complying with the General's Requisitions, and in not fulfilling the promises they had made, that the re-capture of a part of the Island of Guadaloupe, and all the subsequent disasters in the Leeward Islands, are to be attributed.

If the first proposition could have been established, the second unquestionably would have acquired a degree of probability sufficient to have induced the House of Commons to have entered upon a particular enquiry into that part of the conduct of Administration.

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In answer to these propositions Mr. Dundas asserted, that Sir Charles Grey had made no specific requisition for reinforcements for the defence and security either of the British or conquered Leeward Islands, till after the landing of the Enemy at Guadaloupe:—that until that period he had conceived the force, then in that quarter, and at his disposal, adequate to those objects, as circumstances then stood:—that it was with this impression upon his mind that he left Guadaloupe on his return to England. That in his correspondence, after the reduction of Martinique, St. Lucia, and Guadaloupe, whenever he had occasion to mention a further supply of troops, it was either expressly stated, or evidently implied, that the service for which such supply would be necessary, was to enable him to improve our advantages in St. Domingo, without too much diminishing the force in the Leeward Islands. And, lastly, that all the reinforcements promised to Sir Charles Grey, or which he could have reason to expect in that campaign, were actually sent to, and had arrived in the West Indies before the 1st of June 1794. Mr. Dundas pledged himself to prove all these positions in the most unequivocal manner; and I have no scruple to say, that no man, after reading with attention the Correspondence between Sir Charles Grey and the Secretary of State, can conscientiously maintain that he has not fulfilled this engagement. It was by the assistance of these official Documents that he was principally enabled to reply to the different specific charges brought forward by Opposition, with a view of establishing the two positions abovementioned.

The first charge was—*That no reinforcements whatever were sent to Sir C. Grey during the Campaign of 1794.* The answer to this was positive and direct. Four Regiments, consisting of
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more than 2000 men, had sailed from Cork on the 22d of March, and arrived at Barbados on the 5th of May *.

This answer, in refuting the first charge, furnished materials for another. *That with these Regiments Ministers had sent to Sir C. Grey positive orders, or, at least a recommendation tantamount to an order, to send this whole reinforcement to St. Domingo:* and, in order that no doubt might be entertained of the serious light in which this charge was considered, and of the certain grounds on which it was formed, the Member, who has taken the lead on this occasion, gave to the House an opinion, (which however, I am far from supposing, he would now, after better information, persist in) that if *Sir Charles Grey* had made any detachments to *St. Domingo* without such orders or recommendation, he should be made to answer for it with his head. The question at issue, being a plain matter of fact, was easily decided by a reference to the correspondence on the subject.

The reinforcement in question, it appears, consisted of the 22d, 41st, 23d, and 35th Regiments. The two former embarked so early as the 10th of December, 1793, for Jamaica, and on the 18th, Sir C. Grey was informed of their destination; and *that one, and possibly two more Regiments*, might be sent, in the course of the season, to reinforce him in the Leeward Islands. In conformity to the expectation, thus held out, the 23d and 35th were embarked, in the beginning of 1794, for Barbados; and

* A small Detachment of Dragoons, required by Sir C. Grey, was also sent, and some Recruits for the Regiments then on Service with him, as will appear from the annexed Return of the whole Force sent to the West Indies between the 1st of January, 1793, and the 1st of April, 1796.

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and the two first, having been detained by various causes at *Cork*, the whole sailed together on the 22d of March following.

The letter from Mr. *King* to Sir Adam Williamson, of the 3d of April, is a positive proof that their destinations were, as I have now stated, and, by a reference to the Secretary of State's letters on the same subject, it will be manifest, not only that no expectation whatever was held out to Sir Adam Williamson of more than two Regiments, but that not even a recommendation was transmitted from hence to Sir C. Grey, to send any addition to that Force prior to Mr. Dundas's letter, dated the 24th of May, when accounts of the compleat reduction of *Guadaloupe* and *St. Lucia* had reached *England*. But this letter, which still leaves Sir C. Grey a full discretion, could not, in the smallest degree, have influenced him to make any addition to the two Regiments, for he had detached the whole Force sent to *St. Domingo*, viz. three compleat Regiments and the Flank Companies of the fourth, from *Barbados*, two months before the letter could be received, and eighteen days before it was even written in *London*. The manner in which this Force was sent is also highly worthy of attention, and is fully explained in Sir C. Grey's letters to Mr. Dundas and Sir Adam Williamson, of the 6th and 10th of May, and 11th and 13th of June.

Three Regiments were sent down in the first instance to *St. Domingo*, without their Flank Companies, which were detained to assist in an Expedition on which Sir C. Grey intended to proceed against *Cayenne*; but soon after having relinquished, from the reasons stated in his letter, his proposed attack

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attack on *Cayenne*, the Flank Companies, with those of the 35th, followed the three Regiments to St. Domingo. The reason assigned by *Sir C. Grey* for retaining the remaining Companies of the 35th is, that "He cannot reconcile the idea of leaving the Leeward Islands *weakly garrisoned* at the time that some apprehensions of a War with North America prevail." Are not this statement, and the correspondence from which it is taken, the most satisfactory proofs, that, in sending the Reinforcements to St. Domingo, *Sir C. Grey* was governed entirely by his own discretion? Can any doubt remain that, after making these Detachments, he conceived himself possessed of a Force adequate to the Security and Defence of the Leeward Islands? It has been observed, that the promise he had received from Ministers of a further Reinforcement, had perhaps induced him to send this first Division to St. Domingo. Here again we must appeal to the Correspondence. Has the General intimated, in any of his letters, that he was the more readily inclined to spare the first reinforcement, because he had been taught to expect the speedy arrival of a second? Has the Minister, in any part of his Correspondence, held out such an Expectation to the General? On the contrary his letter of the 28th of April distinctly states that the next reinforcement will be sent, so as to arrive in November. A loose and general demand for reinforcements, I admit, appears in several of *Sir C. Grey's* letters, but the object for which he thought they would be necessary is more specifically stated; *towards enabling him, as he says, in his letter of the 16th of March, after garrisoning the Captured Islands to proceed to St. Domingo with a Force somewhat respectable.*

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I think I have now established that the measure of detaching the Force to St. Domingo was discretionary on the part of *Sir C. Grey*; but let it not be supposed that it is thereby intended to attach any blame on Him, as Commander in Chief. Ministers would have deserved censure, if they had not left to him the discretionary power of distributing the Forces, entrusted to his Command, according to his Judgement, guided by circumstances, and the Intelligence he might procure on the spot.

In the exercise of this discretionary power, the Commander in Chief most certainly yielded to no other motives than a sincere zeal for His Majesty's Service, and his knowledge, on the one hand, of the immense importance of preserving and improving the footing we had obtained in St. Domingo, and, on the other, his firm persuasion, that the force detached was not requisite for the immediate Safety and Defence of the Leeward Islands. I know it has been said, that this opinion was, in a manner, conditional, in as much as it rested only on the assurance that an Enemy's Force from France would not be allowed to make their appearance in that Quarter. It is true that, during the siege of *Fort Bourbon*, on the 18th of March, *Sir Charles Grey* expressed his expectation of forcing it to surrender, and in time to attempt the Capture of the other Islands, on the supposition however, he adds, *that effectual care will be taken at home to prevent their receiving any reinforcements from France.* Certainly a trifling Force, such as afterwards landed at *Guadaloupe*, if it had reached that Island sooner, might have produced a resistance materially different from that which was experienced by *Sir C. Grey* in its reduction. But when the three Islands were completely conquered, and, according to the General's own expression,

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tion, *not weakly garrisoned*; and when, under this persuasion, he had left them, to return to Europe, is it a fair inference that the expectation on which the General had acted, subsequent to his Conquests, had been disappointed and deceived by the negligence of Ministers; because an Armament of less than 1500 Men, with three or four small Ships, in all probability destined by the Government of France solely for the relief of the French Islands, on arriving too late for that purpose, had not only been fortunate enough to escape, unobserved, through twenty-five British Ships of War, who were then employed on that station, but also to effect a landing at Guadaloupe, in the presence of a British Garrison, and to wrest from it some of the most important Posts in the Island? Besides, how does it appear, or can it be believed, that Ministers were rash enough to give any assurance that no Force, Naval or Military, however insignificant, should be detached from France to the West Indies? Could any man in his senses bind himself to such a condition? Ministers, I allow, would have been deficient in their duty, if any great Expedition, and particularly any Naval Armament, capable of meeting or overpowering our Squadrons in those Seas, had been detached by the Enemy, unknown to them, and without their having taken every possible step to prevent it; but this appears to me the full extent of their responsibility in this respect, and full as much as they could in prudence promise, or Sir C. Grey in reason expect.

The landing and success of the French at Guadaloupe were favoured by several accidental circumstances peculiarly unfortunate. Among others, the absence of the General and Admiral, then at St. Christopher's on their return to England, and by

by a contagious and almost pestilential fever, which, making its first appearance about this time, soon spread through the Army and the Islands. The gallant Troops, worn and harrassed by a Campaign as unexampled for its fatigues as for its success, were seized by it in great numbers. Very few, either officers or men, recovered, and even those few were no longer efficient for any service. One of its first victims was Major-General Thomas Dundas, Governor and Commander in Chief at *Guadaloupe*. The success of the Enemy is perhaps due to the fortuitous coincidence of their attempt with his death; at least such is the opinion of the persons best informed on the subject, and the manner in which he is mentioned by Sir C. Grey gives no reason to doubt their opinion.*

On receiving intelligence of this unfortunate event, and of the landing of the Enemy, Sir C. Grey and the Admiral immediately returned to *Guadaloupe*. Forces were collected from the other Islands, and a plan formed for driving the Enemy from the positions they had taken. The failure of the attempt, and the loss sustained on this unfortunate occasion, are fully explained in Sir C. Grey's letter on the subject. The only material question arising from it, with respect to the Minister's responsibility, relates to the requisitions made by the General for reinforcements in consequence of these events, and to the steps taken at home for complying with his demands.

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* It is not on these grounds alone that we shall long have to regret this most valuable Officer. The Army has lost in him an example of exact discipline, ardent exertion, judicious arrangement, and spirited enterprise, so successfully displayed in the Campaign of 1794. It is by this brilliant earnest of what might have been expected from his superior talents, his indefatigable zeal, and his unaffected attachment to his profession, that the Nation must measure its loss, no less than by the extent of the calamities, with which it was immediately followed at *Guadaloupe*.

It is evident from the correspondence, that, until the unfortunate issue of the attack made on the 1st of July, Sir C. Grey entertained a sanguine expectation of driving the Enemy from *Grand Terre*, the Part of *Guadeloupe* occupied by them. After this failure, all idea of recovering it until the hurricane months were over was abandoned, as appears by Sir C. Grey's letters of the 8th of July, received by *Colonel Coote* on the 18th of August. In one of these letters he says, "Should we receive reinforcements earlier than the French, there will not be any difficulty in regaining *Grand Terre*, immediately after the hurricane months shall be over." In the other, "I can only say, that about 6000 men should be sent to the West Indies as soon as possible, but as it may be difficult to collect so great a number in a short time, I recommend that from 1200 to 2000 men be sent to reinforce these Islands with all possible expedition."

On the 19th of August, the day after these dispatches were received, *Colonel Dundas* arrived with Sir C. Grey's letter of the 17th of July, stating the reasons which induced him to defer for some time his return to Europe, and requesting that two or three Regiments might be sent immediately, in Frigates and line of Battle Ships. His anxiety, however, for their speedy arrival was entirely founded on his wish to recover *Grand Terre* before the Enemy could be joined by any further reinforcements from France, and not on any apprehension of danger from their Force as it then stood; otherwise he never could have employed the following expressions. "From the steps I shall take, I may venture to assure you of the safety of *Martinico*, *St. Lucia*, and *Basse Terre*, (the latter being that part of the Island of *Guadeloupe*,"

daloupe, which remains in our possession) and I may add, that I deem them to be in perfect security, unless the *Enemy should receive large reinforcements before we receive any.*"

Sir C. Grey's determination to remain for some time longer in the West Indies was consistent with the uniform Zeal and Public Spirit he had shewn during his command.

When Sir C. Grey's requisition was received, the numerous and indispensable Services on which the Navy was employed, put it out of the power of Ministers to apply any part of it to the conveyance of Troops. In the distribution of this essential part of our defence, on which our Security, our Commerce, and our Prosperity more immediately depend, it was the duty of Ministers to allot a due Proportion for every important Station, and for the protection of our Trade in every quarter of the World. The events of the War, considered either with respect to the safety of our Convoys, the annoyance and destruction of the Trade of the Enemy, or with respect to our splendid Naval advantages and decided superiority in every part of the World, are the most satisfactory proofs of the judicious arrangements which have uniformly prevailed in this branch of the Administration.

The commanding Naval Officer on the Leeward Island Station, had required no addition to the Forces then under his Command—At home it was justly considered, that he was possessed of means amply adequate to all the Services entrusted to his care, and certainly, upon a comparison with other Services, fully proportionate to the provision made for those, which are most closely

closely connected with the dearest Interests of the Empire. Under these circumstances, would it have been proper to have distressed or entirely neglected some other important Service, by detaching a powerful Squadron of Ships of War to convey Troops to a station, where those Ships were in no respect wanted? Or, in order to provide for such a Service, to have weakened the Channel Fleet in such a manner, as to have obliged its gallant Commander to have shunned the Enemy on the 1st of June, or to have engaged them with an inequality of numbers, which might have baffled and defeated even the superiour Skill and Gallantry of British Seamen. It was therefore necessary to have recourse to Transports, which were immediately provided for the reception of the 17th Regiment in England, and of three Regiments from *Gibraltar*. The 17th was the only old Regiment at that period remaining in England, and formed with the three old Regiments at *Gibraltar*, a Force of near 3000 disciplined seasoned Troops, instead of 2000, which the General had required. Exclusive of the 17th Regiment and the Guards, the whole regular Force then in England did not exceed 7500 Men, consisting of new raised Regiments; and of this Force, (certainly not the best for West India Service) near 1500 were under orders for *St. Domingo*, and at least an equal number destined to relieve the three Regiments at *Gibraltar*. It must therefore appear evident that the four Regiments selected for the Leeward Islands were not only the best, but, in fact, the only Regiments that could be immediately sent to that quarter. The Transports ordered to *Gibraltar*, had a long and tedious passage, which prevented their reaching that place before the beginning of November, when the Troops were embarked, and they arrived at

at *Barbadoes*, to the amount of 2219 Men, on the 22d of December.

By the arrival of this Division of seasoned Troops, the first part of the General's requisition was more than complied with, and though they did not reach *Barbadoes*, so soon as might have happened, if the weather had been more favourable, they were certainly there before the Enemy had received any Reinforcements whatever from *France*. With respect to the 17th Regiment, it was embarked at *Southampton*, in the latter end of August, but having been detained by contrary Winds until the end of September, it was then joined by the 31st and 34th Regiments withdrawn from the Continent. These two Regiments, and a third not sent*, formed the second Division of upwards of 2000 Men, promised to Sir C. Grey by Mr. Dundas's Letter of the 25th of August. The Orders for the Embarkation of this second Division, were sent to *Flushing* on the 4th of September. The Convoy, having on board the three Regiments collected at *Portsmouth*, it appears, by Mr. Dundas's Letter to Sir C. Grey of the 28th of September, was expected to sail on that day. Contrary winds however, prevented it's clearing the Channel, and baffled several subsequent attempts made for getting away between that period and the 16th of December, when it had reached no further than *Plymouth*. The Wind then became fair, but intelligence being received of the *Brest* Fleet being at Sea, in great Force, orders were given to detain the Convoy.

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* The third Regiment ordered was the 79th, but by some mistake of the orders sent to *Flushing*, it was directed to join the Duke of York's Army, instead of embarking at that Port for the West Indies.

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It will appear scarcely credible, after reading Mr. Dundas's Letter of the 28th of September, that the detention of this Convoy, from the end of September to the middle of December, should have been imputed to Ministers. What diabolical caprice could be supposed to actuate their Conduct? What species of gratification were they likely to find in the Failure and Disappointment of their own Measures? What plausible argument can be assigned in support of this charge? A more ridiculous one was never brought forward by the intemperate Rage of Party.

The conduct of Ministers has also been reprobated in the strongest terms, and from the same quarter, for not having the Channel Fleet in immediate readiness to meet that of the French when it put to Sea in December. When the Gentleman who made this candid observation was told, in reply, that our Fleet was just returned from a long Cruise, in the course of which it had secured the safe arrival and departure of our Homeward and Outward-bound Convoys, intercepted the Trade of the Enemy, blocked them up in their Port, where they had remained skulking the whole summer, and that most of our Ships would require to be refitted and repaired before they could again be sent to Sea; these arguments appeared to him nugatory, and the difficulties such as ought to have been foreseen and guarded against. The Gentleman in question, intimated that it was a disgrace not to have had a second and even a third Squadron, if necessary, in immediate readiness to proceed on the return of the first, and to protect the Convoy. As it is well known that the Best Fleet consisted of about 35 Sail of the Line, let me ask this Gentleman if he seriously expects that the Channel Fleet should consist of two or three Divisions of between 30 and 40 Sail each? Or if he

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he seriously thinks that, as Ministers were not possessed of such extraordinary means, they are to be censured for having obtained early Intelligence of the Movements and Design of the Enemy, and for having thereby prevented a most valuable Convoy from falling into their hands? The hope of surprising and capturing that Convoy was certainly the only object of their Cruise, undertaken at a season of the year, when a Fleet of that magnitude could not be at Sea without being exposed to great danger. I believe it is well ascertained, that several of their Line of Battle Ships were lost, and the remainder very much damaged by the violence of the Weather. The temptation which brought them to Sea was great, the risk was great also, and the only question is, whether Ministers deserve praise or censure for having kept the former out of their reach, and left them to experience the full effects of the latter, whilst the British Fleet was refitting and preparing to return to Sea.

During these Delays, occasioned by contrary Winds, and the appearance of the French Fleet, the Minister had not lost sight of the full extent of Sir C. Grey's Requisition for 6000 Men: every exertion was made for completing that Force at home, for it was become impossible, from the position of the Enemy, and the state of the season, to expect that any part of it could be withdrawn from Holland. In the course of December, by drafting Independent Companies, and by great exertions in collecting the Recruits of some new raised Corps, six more Regiments were completed at Plymouth to 600 Rank and File each, and embarked to proceed with the three already mentioned to the Leeward Islands. These Recruits were the best that could be obtained, tho' certainly not such as Ministers would have wished

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to have employed in a West India Campaign, if the state of the Army at home, and the situation of Affairs on the Continent, had left them any other alternative. By their detention on board Transports, by the extreme severity of the Weather, and partly perhaps by their own inattention to cleanliness, the 17th and three of the last mentioned Regiments became so sickly, as to induce Ministers to reland them, previous to the departure of the Convoy. The remaining Force for the Leeward Islands, amounting to 3818 Men, sailed on the 15th of February, and reached Barbadoes on the 30th of March, having scarcely a sick Man on board. I mention this circumstance, with singular satisfaction, because the extraordinary sickness, which prevailed at Plymouth, has been ascribed to the infected state of the Transports, previous to the Embarkation of the Troops, to the want of the usual allowance of Tonnage, and to the deficiency of Medicines and Medical Assistance. If these or any other similar grounds of complaint could have been established, the Departments of Government, to which the neglect could be traced, would have been in the highest degree reprehensible. The instructions given to Sir *Jeremiah Fitzpatrick*, several months before the Embarkation of these Regiments at Plymouth, shew with what anxiety the Secretary of State had endeavoured to provide for the Health, Accommodation and Comfort of Troops embarked for Foreign Service, and this Gentleman's presence at Plymouth, during the embarkation and detention of the Troops, and the Report of the Commissioners of Transports of the 23d of January 1795, leave no room to doubt, that all the established regulations of the Service had been observed with the utmost care and precision. I lament that they were all to a certain degree ineffectual, and that a considerable loss of Men was sustained

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tained at Plymouth by a violent and infectious disorder, which made it's first appearance among the Regiments embarked for the West Indies. I admit also that some difference of opinion prevailed between Sir *Jeremiah Fitzpatrick* and the Medical Staff at Plymouth, respecting the mode of treatment, the situation best adapted for the reception of the Sick, and other professional points, and that these differences gave rise to a considerable correspondence with the War Office, the Medical Board, and some other Departments of Government, in the course of which Lord *George Lennox*, as Governor of Plymouth, was induced to take a part, from his wish to convince Government of the necessity of erecting a building to serve as a permanent General Hospital in that Garrison. From what I have now said of this correspondence, it is evident that it could not be produced without injury to the public, whilst, on the other hand, it is sufficiently proved, by the letters above referred to, that the Sickness which prevailed cannot be attributed to any neglect of Government.

The conclusion to be drawn from the above statement is obvious. The requisitions from Sir C. Grey for 2000 Men immediately, and 6000 in the whole, were received at a period when all the preceding accounts from the West Indies had afforded no ground to apprehend that they would be so soon wanted; and precisely at a moment when the greatest exertions had been made to resist the increasing pressure of the Enemy in Holland. The first difficulties were great, but by great exertions they were overcome. The first Division of 2000 Men was not to be procured, except from *Gibraltar*. Orders were dispatched to hold them in readiness to embark, an effort was made to relieve them with fresh Troops from England, and notwithstanding

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standing some untoward delays of wind and weather, they were relieved, and reached *Barbados* in December, certainly not so early as the exertions of Ministers entitled them to expect, but before the only contingency which Sir C. Grey appeared to apprehend had occurred, namely, *the Arrival of a French Reinforcement at Guadeloupe*. The second Reinforcement to complete the 6000 Men remained to be provided. For this purpose some Regiments were withdrawn from the Continent, and others, by great exertions, were completed at home by materials rather hastily procured perhaps, but the best Government had then at its disposal. Instead of 4000, near 6000 Men were embarked. This Expedition, after encountering all the severe calamities we have had occasion to notice, and though a part of the Force was re-landed, still conveyed to the West Indies a reinforcement of 3818 Men, making, with the 2219, from *Gibraltar* a total of 6037 Men.

We have stated undeniable Facts, and drawn plain Inferences. It would be in vain to oppose them by specious arguments, and superfluous in us to notice all those which ingenuity and sophistry may have adduced on the occasion. One general objection however has been made, to which some answer may be expected.

Mr. Dundas observed to the House that Sir C. Grey did much more than was required from him, under the diminution of his Force, and though he was not specific in his statement on the subject, it is not improbable that nothing less than the reduction of *Martinique* was the unexpected and important Conquest alluded to, as due to that Officer's superior Skill and Gallantry.

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This observation furnished Mr. *Sheridan* with the following argument. If Sir C. Grey, with his diminished Force, completed all the Conquests expected from him before the eight Regiments were withdrawn, Ministers, on receiving the intelligence, ought to have taken immediate measures to garrison those more extensive acquisitions. The little Army, entrusted to Sir C. Grey, might have been sufficient to preserve what it was expected to conquer, but having done more than was expected, it became obvious that more ample means of preservation were required. This is the argument I believe in all its force, and I do not hesitate to say, that the very reverse of it is much nearer the truth. By the reduction of the three Islands and their Dependencies, the Enemy had no place of dépôt where they could collect their Forces, no port to refit Fleets in those Seas. The Islands of *Martinique* and *St. Lucia* are and have always been considered as having a complete command and check over all the other islands between *St. Kitt's* and *Barbados*. This arises from two points—First, their Situation, *St. Lucia* lying immediately to windward of *Martinique*, and commanding *St. Vincent's* and *Grenada*, and *Martinique* lying to the windward of and commanding all the other Islands, which we call our Leeward Islands:—Secondly, from their Harbours, viz. *Fort Royal in Martinique* and *the Great and Little Careenage in St. Lucia*; which being able to contain and protect Ships of War in all Seasons, gives those Islands of course the power of taking advantage of their Situation. As they together command the other Islands, so it is evident, from their Situations, that they are the only two that can be checks on each other. *St. Lucia*, if equal in strength, would probably have the preference

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preference, as being immediately to windward of Martinique; being therefore, when taken together, the keys and guards of the other Islands, and, when in separate hands, checks upon each other, it has always been the chief aim of the same power to keep possession of both. Hence it may be fairly concluded that moderate Garrisons, in each Island, to preserve internal security and prevent surprize, with a superior Naval Force, would have been amply sufficient, if the views of the Enemy in that quarter had been directed to the recovery of their Possessions, according to the ordinary practice of War, or to useful Conquests, instead of attempting the general Destruction and Devastation of the Colonies.

The effects of this diabolical system could not be foreseen or guarded against; Sir C. Grey was guided by his own judgment and observations on the spot; Ministers were to be guided by experience, by his reports, and the opinions of other well-informed professional men. Will any of them assert, that having driven the Enemy from *Martinique*, *Guadaloupe*, and *St. Lucia*, the three Islands were not infinitely more secure and more competently garrisoned, with any given limited number of men, than the two last would have been with the same number, if the former had remained in the possession of the Enemy? Will any one assert, in direct contradiction to Sir C. Grey's reports, that the Islands were not in a state of security? and, even if he had not reported it home, would he have asked for leave to return to Europe with this apprehension on his mind? Will any one assert that Sir C. Grey or Ministers ought to have foreseen the unprecedented sickness and mortality which raged during the whole Summer of 1794, the death of *Major-General Dundas*,

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Dundas, it's coincidence with the desperate landing of the Enemy at Guadaloupe, the system of revolt and devastation on which they immediately proceeded, and their success in spreading the same spirit of warfare and rebellion through *St. Lucia*, *St. Vincent's*, *Grenada*, and *Dominica*? Both he and they, each in their respective capacities, and according to the best of their judgment, had taken every precaution, within the reach of human foresight, to make the whole of our Leeward Island Possessions, and particularly those newly conquered, secure against the ordinary events and chances of War.

The employment of the 6000 men sent to the West Indies, and the losses sustained in that quarter during the Spring and Summer of 1795, appear to have been very little noticed in the late discussion. We shall therefore only state that, whatever observations may be made on these heads, cannot affect the character or responsibility of Ministers. They sent the whole of the Reinforcements required, and they increased considerably the Naval Force on the station. Whether the distribution of our Forces in the respective Islands was in all respects judicious, whether an anxiety to meet the pressure of rebellion and resistance in too many quarters at once, was not the cause of our failure in all, and many other questions of this nature, are so immediately connected with the discretion and military responsibility of the respective Commanders in Chief, that they cannot be said to have any reference to the general conduct of the War in that quarter, for which Ministers can be made responsible. Besides, the death of the gallant Officer, who commanded during the greatest part of this period, is an additional reason for being silent on the subject, as far as it relates to him: And
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with respect to those who acted under him at *St. Lucia*, *St. Vincent's*, or on any occasions, where a strong presumption of misconduct has gone forth against them, they may, for any thing I know to the contrary, be called upon to account for their behaviour before the regular Military Tribunals, if, upon enquiry, any charges can be substantiated against them.

The Expeditions prepared and fitted out in the Summer and Autumn of 1795, and placed under the command of Sir *Ralph Abercromby*, with a view to re-establish tranquillity in our Possessions, to recover our losses, and to extend our Conquests in the West Indies, are the next objects of our attention.

For these services two separate Armaments were requisite. The one to consist of not less than 15,000, and the other of at least 12,000 effective Rank and File, with Ordnance, Stores of every description, Camp Equipage, and every other requisite of active Service, in due proportion.

Ministers have been very properly silent on the precise nature of the operations for which each of these Armaments was destined, according to the original plan of the Campaign; but from what has been stated, every man, possessed of a general knowledge of Politics, will be satisfied that their measures were taken upon a full and mature consideration of the situation of affairs on the Continent of Europe and in the Colonies, of the period of the War, of the conduct of the Enemy in the West Indies, of the immediate interests of this Country with regard to their Possessions, and the security of our own in that quarter, and of the prospective advantages to be derived from a vigorous and

and decisive Campaign, either for the continuance of the War, or for the restoration of Peace. Proceeding upon these grounds, compared with the best intelligence they could procure, and the opinions of the most experienced officers, both Naval and Military, the first object for Government was, to examine how far the Force then in Great Britain, not absolutely required for the internal Defence and Security of the Kingdom, or under actual orders for other indispensable Services, was competent to supply a demand to this extent.

If we revert, on the one hand, to the state in which the Army returned from the Continent after the Winter Campaign in Holland, and to the unparalleled hardships it endured in its retreat from the United Provinces; and if we consider, on the other, the situation of the Public Mind at that critical period, agitated by the discussion, and deeply impressed with the idea of the possible danger to which this Country might be exposed from the conquest of Holland, looking forward with considerable anxiety, but at the same time with a manly spirit, to the means of averting it, and resting a proper confidence, for this purpose, in the plans and exertions of Government, we shall find that great and serious difficulties were to be overcome; that an Army was to be refreshed, refitted, and prepared for distant service; that other Services more cogent than distant Expeditions and Foreign Conquests pressed first upon the care and attention of Ministers, when the remains of the British Infantry, harassed and fatigued, returned to England.

In the late discussion an attempt was made to deprive Ministers of the benefit of this argument; and the apprehensions they

and the Nation entertained were described as chimerical and ridiculous by the same gentlemen, who, in the arduous posture of affairs now alluded to, mistook the sense of danger manifested by the Nation, for irrecoverable despondency; and, proceeding upon this error, mistook still more the character of the Nation, when they advised an immediate negotiation, as our only resource at a moment of all others the most exceptionable, as any proposals to this effect must have necessarily led to degrading submission. Instead of this shameful conduct, Ministers consulted the true feelings of their Country, no less than its real dignity and interest, by placing a considerable proportion of the Troops in different Camps in the East and North districts of the kingdom; providing, at the same time, as far as the military duties required from them would allow, for their rest and refreshment; whilst other measures were carrying on for completing and refitting the Battalions for Foreign Service, for relieving them by Troops raised for Home Defence, and for rapidly and effectually increasing our Naval Establishment, at all times our best security against Foreign Insult. It was by these united efforts that Government gradually prepared and brought to maturity the West India Expeditions. I wish it was in my power to do justice to their incessant and complicated labours, and to display, in their true light, the progress and effect of their operations in all their successive stages. Whoever will take the trouble to consider the imperfect sketch I am enabled to give, will think I am not assuming too much for the Executive Government, when I assert, that it required great penetration and method to form and digest the plan; and, above all, a mind superior to difficulties however complicated, accustomed to subdue obstacles, secure of its own energy, and of the activity and steady co-operation

co-operation of every concurring department, to resolve upon its execution.—It required a mind which nothing could divert from a sense of duty, incapable of a moment's hesitation between what appeared of the greatest advantage to the nation, and the responsibility however great, due to his Sovereign and his Country; resting no less than a character acquired by long and eminent public Services on the issue of his exertions.—No Man, not actuated by these motives, not possessed of these qualities, would have embarked in the attempt, unless he had been, at the same time, grossly ignorant of business, unacquainted with the nature and extent of the Service, or totally regardless of his own credit and responsibility, and criminally indifferent to the dearest interests of his country.

The Troops which had been employed upon the Continent did not reach England until the beginning of June. It was these Battalions, reduced and harrassed as they were, that afterwards became the foundation of the West India Armament. Without their assistance it would have been physically impossible to have collected a Force in any degree adequate, either in numbers or quality, to the Services then in contemplation.

Including these Troops which, for reasons already explained, Ministers had been obliged to station in different districts, almost from one extremity of the kingdom to the other, the whole Army in Great Britain, Ireland, Jersey, and Guernsey, consisted at that period of

32 old Regiments.	—	11,346 Men.
47 new Do.	—	19,808
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79 Regiments.	—	31,154 Men.
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Supposing the returns, from which this statement was taken, to have included none but Men really efficient for Service, they would have exceeded, by a few thousands only, the number requisite for the two Expeditions; and certainly the excess is not more than the proportion which, even on this favourable assumption, should always be allowed for sickness, and other inevitable causes of deficiency, in the best appointed Armies.

So far from answering this description, it appeared obvious from a complete examination and minute inspection of the 79 Battalions, that there was scarcely one that could, in its actual state, be reckoned fit for Foreign Service. It was not to be expected from the old ones, and such of the new ones as had been with them on the Continent, after the hardships from which they were recently returned, destitute of every requisite for active Service, worn out and enfeebled by the excessive fatigue and sickness they had experienced, during a season of unparalleled severity, and most of them, by their successive losses, reduced in number below the proportion at which Regiments are deemed efficient for any Service.

With respect to the new Battalions that had never seen Service, several of them had not even been embodied or inspected; all of them were deficient in their proportion of Officers, and the greatest part of those few they had, as well as their non-commissioned Officers, were raw and inexperienced. The Men were not sufficiently advanced in their discipline, and many of them were afterwards reported unfit to encounter the fatigues of a West India Campaign.

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With respect to this last circumstance, it cannot be denied that the proportion of Men rejected in some of the new Battalions, on a second and near inspection, was a matter of serious distress and concern to Government; but it must be recollected that this second inspection was made expressly with a view to West India Service, and principally by the Officers under whose command the Troops for that very Service were to be placed. Some of the Men they rejected ought certainly never to have been enlisted, and all such were totally dismissed; but by far the greatest number, I believe, were admitted, by these Officers themselves, to be fully adequate to duties of a less arduous nature than those for which they were making their selection.

It must also be observed, that their choice was liable to no other restriction than the necessity of finding in the whole 79 Battalions, the requisite numbers specified for the two Expeditions, and that they proceeded in it with a solicitude proportioned to their anxiety and zeal for the success and glory of the British Arms under their command. Most of the Men set aside by these Officers were either too young or too old for the West Indies. The former were incorporated into Regiments recruiting at home, and not likely to be sent for some time on Foreign Service. Some of the latter were turned over to the Invalids, and the remainder were formed into a Garrison Battalion, now at Gibraltar, where it enabled Government to relieve a Regiment of Infantry, appropriated to the West India Service.

Whilst the Officers charged to examine the particular state of each Regiment were proceeding in their inspection, Government,

vernment, acting upon the general knowledge previously procured, was occupied in digesting and maturing a plan for remodelling the whole; as it was evident from the circumstances already stated, that it was only by some general operation that so many weak and scattered Battalions could be formed into an efficient Army. The two great principles of the new arrangement were—To complete the old Battalions by drafting into them all the Men of the new Levies, then fit for Foreign Service, and—To reduce, as much as the circumstances of the War would immediately admit of, the expence of the Army, by a very considerable reduction of the number of Regiments then on the Establishment. It is to the execution of this arrangement, for which the orders were issued on the 14th of August, that we are indebted for every prospect of success we have enjoyed, or are likely to enjoy; but a considerable time was necessary for carrying it into effect.

For this purpose, it became indispensably necessary, in the first place, to bring the whole Army of Great Britain, except a few Regiments that were to embark at *Cork*, to one rendezvous.

It was then dispersed in Garrisons, Camps, or employed on interior Service, in every part of the three kingdoms, and in *Jersey* and *Guernsey*. A great proportion of the Troops could not be withdrawn until they were relieved by Fencible Regiments, of which several were not then completed and inspected. Nearly the whole of these movements were to be made by water, and, from the situation of the respective places, required various winds:—for example, the wind, which brought the Troops from
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Ireland to *Southampton*, detained those expected from Scotland and the East and North East Coasts of this kingdom for near a month in the ports of their embarkation, and thereby, prevented their joining the rendezvous before the 12th of October. A minute detail of the measures taken for collecting and completing the Army at *Southampton*, cannot be necessary to convince every impartial Man, that, in an operation so complicated, some delays were inevitable. By a full review of the other preparations for the Expedition, it will however be satisfactorily established, that these delays led to no real disappointment, and that, from various concurring circumstances in every department, (circumstances over which Ministers could have no controul) it was impossible, upon a fair consideration of the whole, and after making a reasonable allowance for detention by Wind and Weather, to expect that the Expedition under Rear-Admiral *Christian* should have proceeded to Sea sooner than it really did.

The difficulties experienced in forming, collecting, and completing the Army for the West India Expeditions, were in some measure increased by the steps Government had taken for the reduction of the Cape of *Good Hope*. Three thousand of the best Troops had been sent on this Service: A Detachment to this extent could not be made without materially retarding the completion of the efficient Force for other arrangements.

Most fortunately, however, the issue of this Expedition has placed the propriety of undertaking it beyond the possibility of doubt. Another more serious and embarrassing interruption was occasioned by the unexpected loss of *St. Lucia*. The advantageous
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tageous position of that Island, for giving assistance to the Rebels in *Grenada* and *St. Vincent's*, and the steps taken by the Enemy for availing themselves of this facility, rendered it necessary to detach, in the month of August, four of the most efficient Regiments, then collected at Southampton, to reinforce the two last mentioned Colonies. Independently of these demands, Ministers very properly thought it their duty to have a certain disposable Force, in constant readiness for any Emergency that might arise nearer home.

In stating the difficulties Government had to contend with in the formation of the West India Expedition, inasmuch as they arose from the necessity of a new and general arrangement of the Army, it is impossible not to mention the exertions, and gratefully to acknowledge the assistance of the Illustrious Personage placed by His Majesty at the head of His Forces; the Country has derived the most essential advantages from his judicious suggestions, his indefatigable zeal, his cordial and active co-operation in every useful measure, and his persevering energy in the execution. In the distribution of Military favors He has been uniformly governed by a strict sense of justice, and an earnest desire to promote the public Service. Regulating his conduct upon this principle, considering with impartiality every claim, listening with patience and affability to every grievance, he continues to proceed, with a firm and steady hand, to enforce such reforms, and to execute such regulations, as have been deemed requisite in the different branches of the Command entrusted to his care. The double object of these bene-
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ficial exertions will soon be attained by an improvement, on the one hand, of the discipline, public spirit, interior order and oeconomy of the Army; and on the other, by a diminution of the expence incurred by the Nation for its maintenance and support.

Notwithstanding so many impediments, an Army, consisting of Sixteen Thousand effective Rank and File was collected at Southampton, and ready to embark by the 15th of October. At this same period, the Troops which were to embark from Ireland, were assembled, and in the same state of readiness, to the amount of Five Thousand Five Hundred Rank and File.

Before mention is made of the measures taken for embarking these Forces it is necessary to observe, that it was intended to add a Corps of 1000 Riflemen, from Germany, to the Army at Southampton; and that the Irish Infantry, collected at Cork, was to have been joined by seven Regiments of dismounted light Dragoons, embarked at Portsmouth, to proceed with them to the West Indies; by its proportion of Ordnance and Stores of every description, from Woolwich; by at least 6000 foreign Troops from the Elbe; and, lastly, that two Old Regiments at Gibraltar were ordered to be completed to 1000 Rank and File each, by drafting into them several new-raised Levies, then doing duty in that Garrison, and to proceed to the same destination as the Force from Cork.—It will appear from this statement that the Force prepared for each of the Expeditions exceeded the numbers required, so as to make a proper allowance for Casualties on the Passage, Sickness on their Arrival,
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and to provide for any unforeseen requisitions, without breaking in upon the Force destined for offensive operations.

In the promiscuous obloquy certain persons have endeavoured to throw on the whole management of the Expedition, it was not to be supposed that the Ordnance and Engineer Departments would escape their share of censure. It was impossible to do justice to their conduct, without adverting, in the first instance, to the Nature and local Situation of the Establishments, on which the Supplies of those Departments depend in this Kingdom.

Except the Tower, which is rather a Depôt than an Establishment, the only Laboratory for the Preparation, Assortment and Embarkation of Ordnance and Stores of every Description, is Woolwich. It is certainly upon a Scale inadequate to the expeditious execution of the very extensive demands to which it has been rendered liable by the modern practice of War, of which one of the greatest changes consists in the use of a much larger proportion and variety of Artillery and other Articles required from the Ordnance. They are not only employed in greater numbers, but on more occasions than formerly.

From these circumstances it would have been rather a matter of praise than of censure, if, at the end of the third Year of a War, during which such immense requisitions have been supplied, the exertions of this Department, without any proportionate augmentation of means, had been able readily to furnish

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furnish the articles necessary for an Expedition of ordinary magnitude, without interruption or prejudice to any other Service.

If this be a fair Statement, if no instance can be adduced of any of our efforts, Military or Naval, in any quarter, (increased as they are beyond all former example,) having been retarded by the Board of Ordnance, although it was principally engaged at the same time in making preparations fully adequate to the unparalleled extent of the Expeditions in contemplation for the West India Campaign; and if it can further be shewn that the difficulties and delays which were experienced, did not arise from the slow progress of those preparations, but were the inevitable consequences of local inconveniences, and of wind and weather, the Board of Ordnance, I trust, will appear highly deserving of commendation, instead of censure, for its exertions in completing the West India Arrangements.

The local inconveniences of Woolwich are two-fold: First, as a point of Embarkation, it is not sufficiently extensive to allow a large number of Ships to take in their Cargoes at the same time. This inconvenience may not be felt in the preparations of ordinary Expeditions; but it was found to be a most serious obstacle when it became necessary to load no less than twenty-four Ships for the same Service. It had been in some degree foreseen and allowed for; but it was only by experience that its full effects could be known: they were rendered more distressing by the frequent interruptions of the Weather, and increasing shortness of the days.—The latest Ships, however, appear to have been completed in their Cargoes from the 16th to the 20th of October, and the delays which, from this period,

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prevented their reaching Portsmouth, must be traced to the Second cause, which renders Woolwich an inconvenient Situation, and which can only be prevented, on future occasions, by establishing another Dépôt at some place within the Channel.

In order to make known the full extent of this Second inconvenience, and how much it operated to delay the arrival at Spithead of the Ordnance Transports in the present Expedition, it must be observed that two different winds are necessary to carry a Ship from Woolwich to Portsmouth; so that a Vessel proceeding from the River to the Downes must remain there until the wind shall have shifted to some point nearly opposite to that which carried it so far. It must further be observed, that the Downes, however safe for Ships of War, is not, in very hard weather, a secure Anchorage for Transports, and particularly for Transports, stowed with very heavy Cargoes, under a small Bulk, as were the Ordnance Ships. In the present case about one half of these Ships, viz. those destined to join the Cork Expedition, appear to have left Woolwich on the 18th of October, and to have reached the Downes on the 23d, and the other half to have sailed from Woolwich on the 25th and 26th, and to have reached the Downes on the 2d of November; where the first Division was still detained by contrary winds. The whole remained there from the 2d to the 8th.

The Weather having been uncommonly tempestuous, from the 23d of October to the 2d of November, several were driven from their Anchors, and otherwise damaged, by some very severe gales. On the 9th they sailed, and reached Portsmouth on the 10th. The Wind, it is true, was favourable during the

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the whole of the 2d, and a part of the 3d of November, for a Convoy from the Downes to Portsmouth; but the Ordnance Ships had suffered so much by preceding Gales that they were not in a condition to avail themselves of it, being then in Margate Roads repairing their damages.—Admitting however, (which I really believe was the case) that the Expedition was, in other respects, ready to sail from Portsmouth on the 3d or 4th of November, the accident which detained the Ordnance Ships till the 9th did not occasion any real delay, as the wind continued adverse during the whole of that interval.

In admitting that the Expedition was not ready until the beginning of November, I am fully sensible how desirable it would have been that it should have sailed at least a month sooner, and I know that invincible obstacles alone could have induced Ministers to relinquish their wish in this respect; but it is a positive fact, and which ought not to escape notice, that, supposing it to have been ready, there was no wind in the month of October which would have carried it to sea. As a proof of this assertion, it is only necessary to remark, that four Regiments of the Army were embarked, and ready to sail, on the 2d of October; that they remained at Spithead under sailing orders until the 14th*; and that from the 14th to the 31st the wind blew invariably from some point between the West and South, with hard gales. It was in fact a very fortunate circumstance that the means of embarkation could not be collected at Portsmouth by the 1st of October, for Ministers, yielding to their natural anxiety, would have immediately ordered the Troops to embark, and certainly they

* The knowledge of Richery's Squadron being at Sea, induced Government to recall those orders on that day.

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they would have remained in Port until the middle of November. The consequence would have been, a degree of Sickness more or less alarming, and Ministers, who are now accused of delays which they could not prevent, would, in that case, have been reproached with sending the Army to perish on board Transports, at a time when the very unsettled and boisterous state of the weather afforded no reasonable prospect of its speedy departure.

This statement is not only a satisfactory proof that the Troops could not have sailed before the 12th of November, even if they had been embarked a month sooner, and consequently that no time was really lost, but also that the same wind which would have detained them during six weeks at Spithead, retarded the arrival of every thing belonging to the Expedition that was then to the eastward of that port, which it will be seen in the course of these observations, necessarily included, not only all the Ordnance ships, which could only be loaded in the river, but also the greatest proportion of the ships for Troops, which could not be drawn from any other quarter.

The truth of this last assertion may easily be established by a short investigation of the requisitions made on the Transport Service for the West India Expeditions, and of the other Services for which they had then to provide, comparing them with the resources at their disposal, or which could be procured for supplying these demands.

As soon as the outlines of the plan of Campaign for the West Indies had been formed, the means of conveying the proposed
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reinforcements, with every requisite for active operations, to that quarter, became, of course, a subject of immediate attention and consideration. Proceeding upon the allowance established for distance service, of two tons for each man to be embarked, it was evident that all the regularly hired Transports, then in the service of Government, would have been insufficient for these Expeditions; and the points therefore to be ascertained were, 1st. What proportion of the requisite tonnage could be supplied by the regular Transports then at home, and certainly to be depended upon, without interrupting other indispensable services; and, 2d, the best method of procuring the shipping necessary to complete the Expedition. The calculation of tonnage then in the Transport Service, or likely to be procured, so as to be brought forward for the West India Expedition, did not exceed Forty Thousand Tons, whilst the lowest estimate of the whole quantity necessary, including Victuallers, Ordnance, and other requisites, was, at least, One Hundred Thousand Tons. Every man must be sensible that, with a Commerce rather increased than diminished by the War, it would have been impossible to hire Transports sufficient to provide for this deficiency, without submitting to the most extravagant terms, exposing our trade and navigation to the greatest pressure and stagnation, interfering with the manning of the Navy, and consequently exposing to the greatest risk all mercantile speculations, and hazarding all the leading interests of the Empire.

It may even be doubted, whether they could have been procured on any terms for the West Indies, as a general disposition to object to the employment of their ships in that quarter appeared

peared to prevail among the ship Owners, who were otherwise desirous to meet the wishes of Government.

It must also be observed, that a great proportion of Tonnage was taken up at the same time for other services of a more temporary nature, but of which the necessary effect was to put it out of the power of Government to encrease the number of Transports for the West India Expedition. Near 12,000 Tons of this description were employed to bring the draftable regiments from their different stations to Southampton, and in other collateral services of the Expedition: and upwards of 25,000 Tons more to bring home the British Cavalry from the Continent. Other means were therefore had recourse to for supplying the deficiency, in a manner the least expensive to the Public, the least inconvenient to the Trade, and most likely to fulfil the views of Administration. About 10,000 Tons of shipping were procured by allotting ships of war for the reception of Troops; measures were taken for procuring upwards of 12,000 Tons of neutral shipping in the ports of the Elbe and Weser, for the foreign corps. The fortunate arrival of the first East India fleet, on the 26th of July, presented the next great resource; and sixteen of the Company's ships, amounting to 12,894 Tons, were immediately engaged to carry Troops on freight to the Leeward Islands. This assistance, it was supposed, could be given by the Company without the least inconvenience to their trade, as the ships were then likely to be returned to England sufficiently early in the ensuing season to proceed on their voyage to India. In chartering these ships Government was fully aware that their cargoes from India were to be unloaded in the river; and that, with every exertion of the Company, and every facility and assistance that Government could

could possibly afford them in this operation, it could not be completed before the end of September.

Ministers, from their earnest desire that these ships should reach Portsmouth as soon as possible, stipulated with the owners that those which might be first cleared should sail from Gravesend on the 15th of September, and the remainder on the 1st of October. Both of these Divisions were detained by the weather until the 5th, reached the Downes on the 12th, and, availing themselves of a few hours of moderate weather, with a southerly wind on the 19th, got to Portsmouth on the 20th. These ships had made several previous attempts to reach Portsmouth, but were as often driven back, except three, which appear to have effectuated their passage through the Downes on the 9th, without stopping, and to have arrived at Spithead the same day.

Upwards of 20,000 tons of shipping were still wanting to complete the Transport arrangement; fortunately the outward-bound West India Trade was competent to supply the whole; but the arrival of this Trade at Portsmouth depended also on the clearing in the River of the cargoes, with which it returned on the 19th of July from the West Indies. This the owners agreed to effectuate by the end of August; but, notwithstanding their utmost exertions, by far the greatest part of these ships did not leave the River till the end of September, and were afterwards detained in the Downes until the 19th of October. The parties concerned in the East India ships had certainly a great interest in the early departure of the Expedition, in order that they might be returned in time to refit for their other destination; and no motive could counteract this interest; for,

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by their contract, they were to receive so much a head for carrying out the Troops, and demurrage was not to commence until a certain number of days after their arrival at Portsmouth. It can hardly be necessary to observe, that the Parties concerned in the West India Trade had likewise the strongest interest in expediting the departure of the Expedition, consequently Government had every reason to feel confident that all the tonnage, over which they could not have the same immediate controul as over their own Transports, would be brought forward in time, and certainly the delay experienced cannot be imputed to any want of exertion in the owners of these ships.

It appears to me incontrovertibly established, that it would have been absolutely impossible, under all the difficulties already stated, to have completed the tonnage required for the Expedition without the assistance of the East and West India Ships. The evidence of their charter parties sufficiently proves that they could not be expected to leave the River before the beginning of October, and the causes of wind and weather, which farther retarded their arrival at Spithead, until the 20th of that month, have been so obviously explained in the case of the Ordnance ships, as to render any repetition useless. Thus, without adverting to the Foreign Corps detained in the Weser and Elbe, we find, in addition to the whole of the Ordnance, and the greatest proportion of the provisions, which could not be loaded but in the River, that near 40,000 tons of Troop Ships were necessary to be drawn from the same quarter.

The Embarkation at Portsmouth and Southampton could not take place until their arrival, for all the regular Transports and
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Ships of War appropriated to the reception of Troops, were either destined to proceed to Cork or Gibraltar, to receive Troops at those places, or had already on board the four Regiments embarked in the beginning of October.

Before we proceed to state the particulars of the Embarkation at Portsmouth, and the circumstances which intervened between the 20th of October and the departure of the Convoy, it may be necessary to revert to the Expedition collected at Cork.

The seven Regiments of dismounted Cavalry, destined to join it from this Kingdom, and the Division of Transports for the reception of the seven Regiments of Infantry in Ireland, were ready to sail from Spithead on the 27th of September; but notwithstanding several attempts to sail, in which some got to Plymouth, whilst others put back to Portsmouth, they did not reach Cork until the 9th and 10th of November. The Troops were immediately embarked, and every thing in readiness a few days afterwards; but, from the state of the weather, it was not in their power to put to sea until the 10th of February following, when they failed. A considerable part were driven back on the 13th and following days, and refailed on the 24th. This is a succinct statement of the Expedition from Cork; on which it is only further necessary to observe, that the Extracts, published in the Appendix, of Letters from Major-General Whyte, who commanded the Troops of this Expedition, are complete refutations of the circumstances mentioned in the House of Commons, at an early period of the session, when an attempt was made to charge Ministers with having neglected, in a criminal manner, to provide the Force at Cork

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with the articles requisite and usually allowed for the health, comfort and accommodation of Troops embarked for the West Indies.

One principal difficulty of the Expedition remains to be mentioned, a difficulty which, at that period, was sensibly felt by Government, even in the most trifling Armaments, and which, in the Embarkation of between 30 and 40,000 People, became an object of the most distressing magnitude; I mean the Supplies required from the Victualling Department, not only for their passage, but for their support after their arrival. The recollection of the extreme scarcity, and daily increasing dearness of Provisions being fresh in every man's memory, it can only be necessary to mention the subject; as it is impossible in common candour not to admit, that it must have been a most arduous undertaking, which could not have been completed without the utmost caution and good management.

To return to the Embarkation at Portsmouth and Southampton, I can scarcely suppose that any one will advance that it was not completed with the utmost possible dispatch, after the arrival of the East and West India Ships. The characters and zeal of the General and Admiral, under whose care it was conducted, would be a sufficient answer to any assertion of this nature, which hitherto at least, I have never heard from any quarter. The following facts, however, find their place in these observations.

The principal part of the tonnage necessary for the Embarkation of the Troops did not reach Portsmouth till the 20th of October,

October, and on the 21st Sir Ralph Abercromby was furnished with his final instructions:—from that day until the 25th the same tempestuous weather, which did so much injury to the Ordnance Ships, then in the Downs, or on their passage thither, prevented all communication with the shipping at Spithead; so that the Embarkation commenced on the 26th only, and, being several times afterwards interrupted by the same cause, was not perfectly completed until the 2d of November.

The state of the Expedition at the period of its Embarkation is so accurately described in the Extract of the Official Letter from Sir Ralph Abercromby to Mr. Dundas of the 27th of October, that I shall be satisfied with a reference to this important Document.

The causes which detained the Convoy at Spithead from the 3d to the 13th of November have been already explained; and I have only to remark upon them, that the effect of each day's delay became a fresh cause for further delay. The force of this general observation will be felt by those who consider the daily consumption in water, provisions, and every other article of at least 30,000 Men, the necessity of replacing it, the shortness of the days at that period, the frequent interruptions of all communication with the shipping, consisting of upwards of 200 Sail, lying at a considerable distance from each other, in every direction from Portsmouth to St. Helen's, and the numerous accidents they met with in every gale of wind. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the unremitting efforts of the Officers in the different Departments enabled the Convoy to get under weigh on the 13th and 14th of November, leaving only one or two Transports behind.

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I shall not attempt to follow it through the unparalleled calamities by which it has since been affailed. Those who may entertain an opinion different from mine with respect to the management of the preparatory arrangements of the Expedition, must here at least suspend their censure, and join with me in a candid acknowledgment of the zeal and exertions by which the disasters of the first dispersion were so rapidly repaired, and in a sincere admiration of the perseverance and skill which (as long as resistance was practicable) resisted the continual pressure of danger and distress which marked every stage of the second attempt.

An endeavour has been made to trace the cause of delay, and to attach the principal blame to the original Plan, and not to the conduct of the Expedition. It was perfectly compatible with the candour of those, who, at different periods of the present War, have censured Ministers for sending Reinforcements to the West Indies by small Detachments, to reprobate a contrary line of conduct on the present occasion; and Ministers have shewn themselves consistent in both instances, by stating the difference of circumstances under which they acted. At an early period of the War, the state of the army would not admit of large Bodies of Troops being sent in one Division. Supposing, however, such an effort to have been practicable, what object was it to answer in the Leeward Islands after their reduction by Sir Charles Grey? Nothing farther remained to be done for that Quarter than to reinforce their respective Garrisons, and we have fully proved that all the Detachments deemed necessary for this Service were sent at different periods, and as nearly as possible, in the proportions required by Sir Charles Grey, forming his judgment on the spot. The fatal disease which broke out
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about the time of their arrival, the new and unjustifiable mode of Warfare adopted by the French, together with other unfortunate occurrences already mentioned, rendered these reinforcements ultimately inadequate to the purposes of their destination.

The object of the present Campaign in that Quarter was to add several important conquests to our present Possessions, and, by expelling the Enemy, to provide for the security of the whole. The state of our Forces, the period of the War, and the conduct of the Enemy, required of us to act upon these principles.

Would it have been sound policy, for the attainment of any secondary consideration, to have reduced the means of offence below the proportion requisite in the opinion of every experienced Officer for the abovementioned purposes? This might have happened, if, in the principle of the Expedition, the reduction of the Enemy's Possessions had been rendered subservient to their expulsion from the territory they had laid waste in Grenada and St. Vincent's.

The official Correspondence and Papers laid before the House of Commons by Mr. Dundas, relative to the means of preserving the Health of the Troops, and providing for their comfort and accommodation on their passage, and after their arrival, in the West Indies, are so satisfactory, and display so fully the constant and humane attention of Government to these most important points, that it can only be necessary, in referring to these Documents, to observe, that in the equipment

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ment of the Expedition every regulation established for the health of the Troops was properly enforced, and that every article of medicine or diet was provided, and appropriated in the manner and proportion suggested by the professional Men and experienced Officers who were consulted on this occasion.

The salutary effects of these improvements, and the care with which the Troops were embarked, have exceeded, I believe, the most sanguine expectations of Government. Every part of the Expedition which sailed from Portsmouth in December was exposed to uninterrupted fatigue and bad weather for near two months. About one half of the Forces, after this long struggle, were obliged to return to England; and on their arrival it certainly afforded no less astonishment than satisfaction to find that the diminution of Effectives, by Sicknefs and disease, in each Regiment, scarcely exceeded the proportion which might have been expected in Quarters at home during the same period. The remainder, having effected their passage, arrived at Barbados in the same healthy condition. These general statements, I believe, are made from the specific returns of each Transport, except three only which are still missing. All the reports of the Sick, landed both in England and Barbados, agree in attributing the prevailing disorders to the effects of the inevitable fatigues and hardships of the Voyage; and that no symptoms of a contagious or dangerous nature had made their appearance. At Barbadoes scarcely a doubt was entertained that, by a little rest and refreshment, their health would soon be recovered; and it is now ascertained, beyond a doubt, that nearly the whole of those who were landed unwell in England required

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no other assistance, and are now in a condition to rejoin their respective Regiments*.

I believe that no Expedition was ever undertaken from this Country to the West Indies, or any other distant quarter, nearly equal in magnitude to that I have now described; and I am satisfied that none was ever prepared under more circumstances of inevitable difficulty and embarrassment; and yet it does not appear that any Armament for the West Indies was ever dispatched at an earlier period.

The Armament which was sent against Martinique in 1758, under General Hobson and Commodore Moore, failed in the end of November, and appeared before that Island on the 6th of January. The failure of this attempt induced the Government to undertake a second Expedition in 1761. The principal part of the Force was detached from America under General Monckton, and notwithstanding the advantages of a short and more certain passage, it did not reach Martinique until the 7th of February, 1762†; and was attended with the most complete success. The same year the famous Expedition against the Havannah was fitted out, and sailed from Portsmouth on the 5th of March only. The Troops were landed on the 7th of June, and that important Possession was not reduced until the 14th of August following.

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* The return of a Division of the Troops, which having put back to England with Rear-Admiral Christian on the 29th of January, was re-embarked in February, and sailed with Vice-Admiral Cornwallis, is a striking proof of the very healthy Condition of that part of the Army which returned to England.—This Division re-embarked fit for duty 1479 Men, and left behind only 19 Sick in the Hospitals at Portsmouth.

† It can hardly be necessary to observe, that if Admiral Christian's Convoy had met with an ordinary passage when it sailed in November, it would have been at its destination by the 1st of January following.

The Force by which St. Lucia was conquered in 1779, it is true, reached Barbados on the 10th of December; but no part of it was sent from this Country. It was a Detachment of 5000 Men from the American Army, urgently required for the preservation of our West India Possessions, threatened by the Enemy with a superior Naval Force and a large Army. A fortunate occurrence of circumstances induced the Commanding Officers to attack St. Lucia, and the celerity of their success fully justified the attempt. The powerful Armament of the Enemy, under Count D'Estaing, with 10,000 Land Forces on board, arrived just in time to witness the surrender of the Island.

The Expedition under Sir Charles Grey and Sir John Jervis, which in this very War produced such important successes, sailed from Spithead on the 26th of November, 1793.

From the want of regularity in the returns of the Force in the West Indies, during the last War, it does not appear possible to state precisely the greatest number of Men employed in that quarter at any one time during that period.

By an official return, however, of the year 1778, we find the whole Army in the West Indies then consisting of 1494 Men; in 1779, of 8975 Men; in 1780, of 10,091; in 1781, of 7,175 Men; in 1782, of 4823 Men.

By these official documents it appears that, except in the year 1780, the Army in the West Indies was constantly under 10,000 Men, at a period when we had superior Fleets and the united efforts of France, Spain, America and Holland to oppose in that quarter. In the present contest the Enemy have never been able

able to send a Naval Force of any consequence to the West Indies. Until the last Campaign Holland and Spain were acting in alliance with us; the latter, as well as America, is neutral at this moment, and notwithstanding all this difference of circumstances, it is obvious, from the statements already given, that the British Land Forces in the West Indies, exclusive of Provincial Corps, from the 1st of January, 1794, to the present period, have considerably exceeded the proportion allotted for their defence during the American War; and that the Force now sent thither is far indeed beyond what has ever before been employed in that quarter of the World.

A great part of the Troops placed under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby is actually arrived at Barbados. It cannot be expected that Ministers should give any explanation of the instructions under which they are to act, or of the operations expected from them this season.

From the appearance of affairs I feel, however, a well-grounded confidence, that our situation in that quarter will soon be materially improved. I may be disappointed in this expectation, but whatever may be the result in this respect, the general statement given by Mr. Dundas of the Expeditions provided for this Campaign will remain an irrefragable proof that every human precaution was taken to procure to His Majesty's Arms in that quarter that decisive success which, by enabling us to terminate the War with glory and advantage, would have completed the Character of an able Minister, and have satisfied the best Ambition of an honest Man.

F I N I S.

APPENDIX.

ACCOUNTS and PAPERS

Presented to the HOUSE OF COMMONS, respecting
the Expeditions to the WEST INDIES, since the
Commencement of the present WAR.

No. 1.

An ACCOUNT of the Number of Men destined for the Expedition to the West Indies, under Sir Charles Grey, at the Clofe of the Year 1793.

14 Regiments, at 600 Rank and File each	-	-	8,400
Flank Companies of 14 Regiments	-	-	1,960

			10,360
Artillery and Artificers	-	-	400
			10,760

No. 2.

An ACCOUNT of the Number of Men withdrawn from the Forces destined for the Expedition to the West Indies, under Sir Charles Grey, and placed under the Command of the Earl of Moira.

8 Regiments	-	-	-	-	-	4,642
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No. 3.

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No. 3.

An ACCOUNT of the Number of Men who, after the Conquest of Martinique, Saint Lucia, and Guadalupe, were detached to Saint Domingo by Sir Charles Grey.

The 22d, 23d, and 41st Regiments,
and

The Flank Companies of
the 35th Regiment.

Note.—The 22d, 23d, and 41st Regiments, embarked - 1,683 R. & File,
their Flank Companies, with those of
the 35th Regiment, embarked - 518

2,201 Total.

No Returns of their Numbers, on their Arrival in the Leeward Islands, were received from Sir Charles Grey; but as the Three Regiments were sent on to St. Domingo, without being landed at Guadalupe, it is to be presumed that there was no material Alteration in their Strength. The Flank Companies had been landed for a short Time, but no Statement has been received of a Diminution of their Numbers.

No. 4.

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No. 4.

RETURNS of the Number of Men detached from Europe and the Continent of America to the West Indies, between the 1st of January 1793, and the 1st of April 1796.

1793.	— from America	—	—	950 Rank and File.
	Nov. 26, with Sir Charles Grey, including			
	400 Artillery	—	—	6,118
1794.	March 22d	—	—	2,377
	April 1st	—	—	240
	— 28th	—	—	80
	October	—	—	100
	— from Gibraltar	—	—	2,219
1795.	February 15th, including 450 Artillery	—	—	5,534
	March 18th, from Gibraltar	—	—	964
	April 10th	—	—	598
	May 24th	—	—	2,319
	August 4th	—	—	1,895
	Dec. 9th, including 97 Artillery	—	—	7,942
	— 29th, from Gibraltar, including 100			
	Artillery	—	—	2,485
1796.	February 10th, including 29 Artillery	—	—	2,956
	— 26th, including 206 Artillery	—	—	4,731
	— 28th, including 500 Artillery	—	—	6,470
	March 20th, including 226 Artillery	—	—	6,234
				<u>54,212</u>

No. 5.

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No. 5.

An ACCOUNT of the Number of British Infantry serving under the Command of the Earl of Moira, in June 1794, and on the 1st of August 1795.

1794. June	—	—	—	5,692
1795. August 1st	—	—	—	5,290

No. 6.

COPIES of HIS MAJESTY's Orders in Council, appointing a particular Board for the Conduct of the TRANSPORT SERVICE.

ORDER of His Majesty in Council for establishing a New Board for Transports; and appointing Hugh Cloberry Christian, Philip Patton, and Ambrose Serle, Esquires, Commissioners of the said Board.—Dated 4th July 1794.

* AT the Court at ST. JAMES's, the 4th of July 1794,

P R E S E N T,

The KING's Most Excellent MAJESTY in Council.

HIS Majesty, taking into Consideration the great Extent and Magnitude of the Transport Service of the Army, and that the same, together with the various incidental Services which have arisen in the Course of the War,

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War, cannot be conducted by the Principal Officers and Commissioners of the Navy,* without great Detriment and Inconvenience to the more immediate Duties of their Office, in attending to the Concerns of the Navy; and that, therefore, great Public Benefit would arise, if this important Branch, as well as those other Services under the general Direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, for the due Performance of which no particular Arrangement at present exists, was to be put under the Management of a separate Board, under the Denomination of a Board for Transports—His Majesty is thereupon pleased, by and with the Advice of His Privy Council, to approve of the Establishment of a particular Board for the Conduct of the Transport Service, and of those other Services, under the general Direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, for the due Performance of which no particular Arrangement at present exists: Such Board to consist of Three Commissioners, Two of whom to be Officers belonging to His Majesty's Navy, and a Third to manage the Correspondence and Accounts incident to the said Establishment.

And His Majesty is hereby pleased to appoint Hugh Cloberry Christian, Philip Patton, and Ambrose Serle, Esquires, to be Commissioners for conducting the Service incident to such Board for Transports accordingly.

And His Majesty is further pleased to approve of the Appointment of a Secretary and other Officers, necessary for carrying on this Service, with an Allowance of Salary to the said Commissioners, Secretary, and other Officers, according to the Establishment hereunto annexed, during their Continuance in the said Employments respectively.

And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury are to give the necessary Directions herein accordingly.

(Signed)

Steph. Cottrell,

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No. 6.

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No. 6. *continued.*

ESTABLISHMENT of the New Board for Transports.

To Three Commissioners, at £. 800 each per Annum	—	—	£. 2400	—	—
To each, in Lieu of Gratuities, House-Rent, Coals, and Candles, &c. £. 200 per Annum	—	—	600	—	—
To the Secretary	—	—	400	—	—
To the Clerks,					
One at	—	—	150	—	—
One at	—	—	120	—	—
One at	—	—	80	—	—
For each Sea Commissioner,					
One at £. 80	—	—	160	—	—
Agent to the Board	—	—	300	—	—
Shipwright Agent	—	—	200	—	—
Messenger	—	—	50	—	—
His Assistant	—	—	30	—	—
			£. 4490	—	—
			20	—	—
			4510	—	—
Necessary Woman	—	—			

No. 6.

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No. 6. *continued.*

ORDER of His Majesty in Council, transferring the Care and Custody of Prisoners of War from the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded, to the Commissioners for Transports; also for appointing Two additional Commissioners, &c. to the said Board for Transports.—Dated 15th July, 1795.

AT the Court at ST. JAMES'S, the 15th of July 1795.

P R E S E N T,

The KING's Most Excellent MAJESTY in Council.

WHEREAS there was this Day read at the Board, a Report from a Committee of the Lords of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council; viz.

‘ Your Majesty having been pleased, by your Order in Council of the 3d of this Instant, to refer unto this Committee, a Memorial from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in the Words following; viz.

“ May it please your MAJESTY,

“ We humbly beg Leave to represent to your Majesty, that in order to enable the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded Seamen to pay every necessary Attention to the Duties of that very extensive and important Department, it appears to us to be expedient that they should be released from the additional Charge and Custody of Prisoners of War, excepting such of them as may, either from Accident or Disease, become Objects of Chirurgical or Medical Assistance; we therefore most humbly submit to your Majesty, whether it may not be advantageous to your Majesty's Service, that the Direction and Management of all Matters relative to the Prisoners of War, should be transferred to some other Department more competent to the Execution of that Branch of the Public Service; leaving, however, with the Commissioners

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No. 6. *continued.*

“ of Sick and Wounded Seamen, the occasional Management
 “ and Direction of Sick Prisoners, under such Regulations as
 “ may be judged fit to be established for that Purpose.”

‘ The Lords of the Committee, in obedience to your Majesty’s said Order of Reference, have taken the said Memorial into Consideration, and concurring in Opinion with the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, do agree to report to your Majesty, That it will be of Advantage to your Majesty’s Service, that the several Duties relative to the Care and Custody of Prisoners of War, heretofore executed by the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded Seamen, should be transferred to the Transport Board; and as the Duties already annexed to that Department are found to be sufficient to engage the Attention of the present Commissioners of that Board, the Lords of the Committee take Leave humbly to submit to your Majesty, that your Majesty may be pleased to authorize the Lords Commissioners of your Majesty’s Treasury to appoint Two additional Commissioners for the Transport Service, for the Purpose of attending to the Care and Custody of Prisoners of War, with such Clerks and other Officers as the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury shall judge requisite, to assist the said Commissioners in the Execution of this Branch of the Public Service.’

His Majesty, having taken the said Report into Consideration, was pleased, with the Advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed, and to order, That the several Duties relative to the Care and Custody of Prisoners of War, heretofore executed by the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded Seamen, be transferred to the Transport Board, excepting such of the said Prisoners as may, either from Accident or Disease, become Objects of Chirurgical or Medical Assistance. And His Majesty is hereby further pleased to order, that Two Commissioners be added to the Establishment approved by His Majesty’s Order in Council, bearing Date the 4th of July 1794, for the Conduct of the Transport Service, for the Purpose of attending to the Care and Custody of Prisoners of War, with such Clerks and other Officers as the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury shall judge requisite, to assist the said Commissioners in the Execution of this Branch of the Public Service. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty’s Treasury, and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, are to give the necessary Directions herein, as to them may respectively appertain.

(Signed)

Steph. Cottrell.

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No. 7.

AN ACCOUNT of all HOSPITAL STORES sent to the West Indies for His Majesty’s Service, in the Years 1794 and 1795; specifying the Ships in which they were sent:—And of all Applications from the Hospital at St. Pierre, in Martinique, on this Subject.

SUMMARY of HOSPITAL STORES shipped in the Years 1794 and 5, for the Use of His Majesty’s Forces in the West Indies.

ARTICLE.	1794.				1795.				TOTAL.
	C.	D.	E.	F.	G.	H.	I.	K.	
	Martinique.	Jamaica.	St. Domingo.	Barbadoes.	Leeward Isles.	Leeward Isles.	St. Domingo.	Ship Ulysses.	
Sets of Bedding	—	700	1000	700	700	6000	6000	1000	
Hospital Marq. and Tents	—	6	10	6	—	60	40		
Bowls	200	650	1000	650	—	6000	8000	1500	
Trenchers	300	450	1000	450	—	6000	8000	1500	
Platters	300	150	200	150	—	1200	1200	200	
Spoons	500	450	1500	450	—	9000	1200	2000	
Mops	100	40	100	40	—	600	600	100	
Birch Brooms	—	50	100	50	—	600	400	70	
Hand Scrubbing-Brushes	—	—	40	—	—	240	160	30	
Long Scrubbing-Brushes	—	—	—	—	—	—	200		
Long Sweeping-Brushes	—	—	—	—	—	—	400	70	
Hand Sweeping-Brushes	—	—	—	—	—	—	400	70	
White-washing Brushes	—	—	—	—	—	—	50	10	
Water Buckets	—	20	60	20	—	180	200	30	
Clothes Pins	—	—	—	—	—	—	4000	700	

continued.

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No. 7. *continued.*

ARTICLE.	1794.				1795.				TOTAL.
	G.	D.	E.	F.	G.	H.	I.	K.	
Dishes - - - - -	100								
Bed Pans - - - - -	30	40	50	40		300	200	34	
Stool Pans - - - - -	50	10	20	10		120	100	17	
Chamber Pots - - - - -	100	150	250	150		1500	3000	500	
Urinals - - - - -	50	50	60	50		300	300	50	
Bafons - - - - -	24	10	30	10		180	200	50	
Blood Porringers - - - - -	100	10	30	10		180	120	20	
Common-size Plates - - - - -		24	70	24		420	320	50	
Large-size Plates - - - - -		12	40	12		240	160		
Spoons - - - - -		48	200	48		1200	1000	160	
Ink Stands - - - - -	4					18	12		
Four-Quart Saucepans - - - - -	24	10	20	10		120	100	20	
Three-Quart ditto - - - - -	24	10	20	10		120	100	20	
Two-Quart ditto - - - - -	24	10	20	10		120	100	20	
Quart Pots - - - - -	36	70	150	70		900	600	100	
Pint Pots - - - - -	36	70	150	70		900	1000	200	
Fumigating Lamps - - - - -		10	20	10		120	80	10	
Watering Pots - - - - -						60	80	10	
Kettles - - - - -	100	180	250	180		1500	1000	200	
Tea Kettles - - - - -			10			60	50	10	
Lamps - - - - -	36	40	60	40		360	300	50	
Candlesticks - - - - -	100	30	50	30		300	200	50	
Lanterns - - - - -	30	8	20	8		120	100	20	
Funnels - - - - -		8	20	8		120	100	20	
Sets Measures - - - - -		4	10	4		60	40	6	
Hand Lamps - - - - -						120	80	10	
45-Gallon Coppers - - - - -		1	5	1		24	16	3	
40-Gallon Coppers - - - - -		2	5	2		24	16	3	
35-Gallon Coppers - - - - -						12	16	2	
Iron Trivets - - - - -		3	10	3		35	50	8	
3-Gallon Iron Pots - - - - -		10	20	10		120	80	14	
Iron Tea Kettles - - - - -			10			60	40	10	
Flesh Forks - - - - -		4	10	4		60	40	6	
Soup Ladles - - - - -		4	10	4		60	100	6	
Pairs Scales and Weights - - - - -		4	10	4		60	40	6	
Pairs Steelyards - - - - -		2	10	2		60	40	6	
Cocks and Keys - - - - -		10	20	10		120	100	20	
Spades - - - - -		8	20	8		120	100	16	

continued.

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No. 7. *continued.*

ARTICLE.	1794.				1795.				TOTAL.
	G.	D.	E.	F.	G.	H.	I.	K.	
Shovels - - - - -		8	20	8		120	100	16	
Hatchets - - - - -		12	30	12		180	120	20	
Felling Axes - - - - -		4	10	4		60	40	6	
Hand Saws - - - - -		4	10	4		60	40	6	
Cross-cut Saws - - - - -			10	3		60	40	4	
Small-framed ditto - - - - -		3					40	6	
Augers - - - - -		2	10	2		60	40	6	
Tap Bores - - - - -		4	10	4		60	40	6	
Gimbles - - - - -		12	40	12		240	160	6	
Nails - - - - -	8000	20000	3000		120000	30000	10000		
Screw Nails - - - - -			2000		12000	8000	2000		
Hammers - - - - -		4	10	4		60	40	6	
Cooper's Adzes - - - - -		2	10	2		60	40	6	
Pairs Snuffers - - - - -					120	80	15		
Packing Needles - - - - -		12	40	12		240	160	30	
Sewing Needles - - - - -		500	1000	5000		6000	4000	6000	
Turn Screws - - - - -		4	10	4		60	40	6	
Carving Knives and Forks - - - - -							12	6	
Doz. Knives and Forks - - - - -		4	10	4		60	40	6	
Padlocks - - - - -		16	40	16		240	160		
Cwt. Barley - - - - -		4	10	4		60	40	44	
Cwt. Oatmeal - - - - -		4	10	4		60	80	200	
Cwt. Currants - - - - -		3	5	3		30	20	5	
Cwt. Raisins - - - - -		2	4	2		30	20	5	
Cwt. Loaf Sugar - - - - -		1	2	1		12	8	2	
Lbs. Ginger - - - - -		6	20	6		120	80	12	
Lbs. Candles - - - - -	700	1500	700		9000	6000	1000		
Cwt. Hard Soap - - - - -	25	2	10	2		60	50	10	
Half Firkins Soft Soap - - - - -		9	20	9		120	80	14	
Gallons Lamp Oil - - - - -	103½	78½	170	79½		1020	680	120	
Gallons Sperm Oil - - - - -						165	110	10	
Gallons Genoa Oil - - - - -		24	51½	26½		300	200	40	
Lbs. Cotton Wick - - - - -		20	40	20		240	160	30	
Bushels Salt - - - - -	1	45	90	45		540	500	80	
Lbs. Sperm Candles - - - - -		30	72	30		450	300		
Half Hhds. Vinegar - - - - -	20	9	20			120	80		
Lbs. Portable Soup - - - - -							200		
Cwt. Rice - - - - -		4		4					

continued.

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No. 7. continued.

ARTICLE.	1794.				1795.				TOTAL.
	G.	D.	E.	F.	G.	H.	I.	K.	
Lbs. Muscovado Sugar	—	168	—	168	—	—	—	—	—
Gallons British Spirits	—	10 ¹	32 ¹	10 ¹	—	—	—	—	—
Cots, with Feet	—	100	200	100	—	1200	1000	170	—
Cots, without Feet	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Filtering Stones	—	—	1	2	—	12	8	2	—
Lbs. Thread	—	20	40	20	—	240	160	30	—
Lbs. Twine	—	10	30	10	—	180	120	20	—
Yards Flannel	—	98	285 ¹	68 ¹	—	1551	1034	164	—
Yards Ofnaburgh	—	143	429	143	—	2992	2008	340	—
Yards coarse Towelling	—	—	—	—	—	—	100	20	—
Yards Oil Cloth	—	—	—	—	—	—	400	70	—
Cabbage Nets	—	50	50	50	—	300	200	50	—
Yards Cloathes Line	—	—	—	—	—	—	1000	200	—
Bearers for wounded Men	—	30	50	30	—	300	200	—	—
Shower Baths	—	1	1	1	—	6	4	—	—
Washing Machines	—	1	1	1	—	6	4	—	—
Cwt. Small Coal	—	1	5	1	—	15	9	—	—
Floor Cloths	—	8	20	8	—	120	80	—	—
Grofs Corks	—	—	—	—	—	200	—	—	—
Pieces Thread Gauze	—	4	—	4	—	—	—	—	—
Ledgers	—	—	2	—	—	12	8	2	—
Folio Account Books	—	—	10	—	—	60	40	2	—
Letter Books	—	2	1	2	—	12	8	2	—
Steward's Books	—	—	10	—	—	60	80	10	—
Memorandum Books	—	6	4	10	—	60	80	10	—
Reams Hosp ^l Stoppages	—	2	1	3	—	18	12	2	—
Printed Discharges	—	500	350	1200	—	6000	14000	2000	—
Diet Tables	—	—	—	—	—	6000	2900	4000	—
Stewards Weekly Statements	—	—	—	—	—	—	1000	200	—
Lifts for Wages paid	—	250	150	500	—	3000	4000	400	—
Lifts for Stores received and issued	—	250	150	500	—	1500	1000	200	—
Quires Royal Paper	—	10	6	20	—	60	50	10	—
Reams Foolscap Paper	—	6	4	10	—	30	30	5	—
Reams Post Paper	—	1	1	2	—	6	10	2	—
Quires Blotting Paper	—	10	6	20	—	60	60	10	—
Quires Marble Paper	—	3	2	5	—	30	20	2	—
Reams Wrapping Paper	—	5	3	10	—	60	60	10	—
Papers, Black Ink Powder	—	24	8	20	—	120	80	10	—

continued.

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No. 7. continued.

ARTICLE.	1794.				1795.				TOTAL.
	G.	D.	E.	F.	G.	H.	I.	K.	
Papers, Red Ink Powder	—	2	1	2	—	12	8	2	—
Penknives	—	12	6	10	—	60	40	6	—
Erafing Knives	—	2	2	2	—	12	8	2	—
Quills	—	1000	500	1500	—	9000	6000	1000	—
Pens	—	1000	500	1500	—	9000	6000	1000	—
Pencils	—	24	8	20	—	120	100	20	—
Plummets	—	—	—	—	—	—	30	6	—
Lbs. Sealing Wax	—	4	2	5	—	30	20	3	—
Lbs. Wafers	—	2	1	3	—	18	12	2	—
Oz. Pounce	—	2	2	2	—	12	8	2	—
Round Rulers	—	4	—	—	—	—	24	8	—
Pounce Boxes	—	2	2	2	—	12	8	2	—
Boxes, Marking Irons	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Branding Irons	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Stamping Irons	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Stock Locks	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	—

K 2

HOSPITAL

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No. 7. *continued.*

HOSPITAL STORES shipped for Martinico in 1794.

Shipped *per* the
 Young William,
 Concord,
 Arethusa,
 Olive Branch,
 Galitia,

} Portsmouth.

16th May, 1794.

WOOD.

100 Dishes.
 200 Bowls.
 300 Trenchers.
 300 Platters.
 500 Spoons.
 100 Mops.

PEWTER.

100 Chamber Pots.
 50 Stool Pans.
 50 Urinals.
 24 Bafons.
 30 Bed Pans.
 100 Blood Porringers.

TIN.

24 One-gallon Saucepans.
 24 Three-quart Saucepans.
 24 Two-quart Saucepans.
 36 Quart Pots.
 36 Pint Pots.
 36 Lamps.

STORES.

25 Cwt. Hard Soap.
 103½ Gallons Lamp Oil.
 20 Half Hhds. Vinegar.

STATIONARY.

6 Memorandum Books.
 500 Printed Discharges.
 250 Lifts for Wages paid.
 10 Quires Royal Paper.
 6 Reams Foolscap Paper.
 1 Ream Post Paper.
 10 Quires Blotting Paper.
 5 Reams Wrapping Paper.
 2 Letter Books.
 2 Reams Hospital Stoppages.
 250 Lifts for Stores received and issued.
 3 Quires Marble Paper.
 24 Pencils.
 24 Papers Black Ink Powder.
 2 Papers Red Ink Powder.
 12 Pen Knives.
 2 Erasing Knives.
 1000 Quills.
 1000 Pens.

30 Lanthorns.

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No. 7. *continued.*

30 Lanthorns.
 100 Kettles.
 100 Candlesticks.

4 lbs. Sealing Wax.
 2 lbs. Wafers.
 2 Ounces Pounce.
 2 Pounce Boxes.
 4 Ink Stands.
 4 Rulers.
 2 Cases for Stationary.

HOSPITAL TENTS, BEDDING, and STORES, shipped for Jamaica, 1794.

Shipped *per* the Minerva Transport, 27th August, 1794.

BEDDING.

700 Sets of Bedding.

TENTS.

6 Hospital Marquees and Tents.

WOOD.

650 Bowls.
 450 Trenchers.
 150 Platters.
 450 Spoons.
 40 Mops.
 50 Birch Brooms.
 20 Water Buckets.

PEWTER.

40 Bed Pans.
 10 Stool Pans.
 150 Chamber Pots.
 50 Urinals.

10 Bafons.

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No. 7. *continued.*

- 10 Bafons.
- 10 Blood Porringers.
- 24 Common-size Plates.
- 12 Large-size Plates.
- 48 Spoons.

T I N.

- 10 Four-quart
 - 10 Three-quart
 - 10 Two-quart
 - 70 Quart
 - 70 Pint
 - 180 Kettles.
 - 40 Lamps.
 - 30 Candlesticks.
 - 8 Lanthorns.
 - 8 Funnels.
 - 4 Sets of Meafures.
- } Saucepans.
- } Pots.

IRON, BRASS, &c.

- 1 Forty-five Gallon
 - 2 Forty Gallon
 - 3 Iron Trivets.
 - 10 Three-Gallon Iron Pots.
 - 4 Flesh Forks.
 - 4 Soup Ladles.
 - 4 Pairs Scales and Weights.
 - 2 Pairs Steelyards.
 - 10 Cocks with Keys
 - 8 Spades.
 - 8 Shovels.
 - 12 Hatchets.
 - 4 Felling Axes.
 - 4 Hand Saws.
 - 3 Small-framed Cross-cut Saws.
 - 2 Augers.
 - 4 Tap Borers.
- } Coppers.

12 Gimblets.

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No. 7. *continued.*

- 12 Gimblets.
 - 8000 Nails.
 - 4 Hammers.
 - 2 Coopers Adzes.
 - 4 Turnscrows.
 - 16 Padlocks with Screw Staples.
 - 12 Packing Needles.
 - 500 Sewing Needles.
 - 48 Knives and Forks.
 - 12 Stock Locks.
 - 1 Box-marking Iron.
 - 2 Burning
 - 2 Stamping
- } Irons.

S T O R E S.

- 4 Cwt. Barley.
- 4 Cwt. Oatmeal.
- 3 Cwt. Currants.
- 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ Cwt. Raisins.
- $\frac{1}{2}$ Cwt. Loaf Sugar.
- 6 lbs. Ginger.
- 700 lbs. Candles.
- 36 lbs. Sperm^d Candles.
- 2 Cwt. Hard Soap.
- 9 Half Firkins Soft Soap.
- 78 $\frac{1}{2}$ Gallons Lamp Oil.
- 20 lbs. Cotton Wick.
- 24 Gallons Genoa Oil.
- 45 Bushels Salt.
- 9 Half Hhds. Vinegar.
- 4 Cwt. Rice.
- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ Cwt. Muscovado Sugar.
- 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ Gallons British Spirits.

S U N D R I E S.

- 100 Cots, with Feet.
- 30 Bearers for wounded Men.
- 1 Filtering Stone.
- 1 Shower Bath.

1 Washing

[80]

No. 7. *continued.*

- 1 Washing Machine with Wringer.
- 1 Cwt. Small Cord in Hanks.
- 20 lbs. Thread.
- 10 lbs. Twine.
- 98 Yards Flannel.
- 143 Yards Ofnaburgh.
- 8 Floor Cloths.
- 50 Cabbage Nets.
- 10 Fumigating Lamps.
- 48 Yards Thread Gauze.

STATIONARY.

- 1 Letter Book.
- 4 Memorandum Books.
- 1 Ream Hospital Stoppages.
- 350 Printed Discharges.
- 150 Lifts for Wages paid.
- 150 Lifts for Stores received and issued.
- 6 Quires Royal Paper.
- 4 Reams Foolscap Paper.
- 1 Ream Post Paper.
- 6 Quires Blotting Paper.
- 2 Quires Marble Paper.
- 3 Reams Wrapping Paper.
- 8 Papers Black Ink Powder.
- 1 Paper Red Ink Powder.
- 6 Pen Knives.
- 2 Erasing Knives.
- 500 Quills.
- 500 Pens.
- 8 Pencils.
- 2 lbs. Sealing Wax.
- 1 lb. Wafers.
- 2 Ounces of Pounce.
- 2 Pounce Boxes.
- 2 Cafes for Stationary.

Shipped in the Thames, per the Minerva Transport, 27th August, 1794.

Return

[81]

No. 7. *continued.*

Return of MEDICINES sent to the West Indies, 1794 and 1795.

		Tons.	Packages.
1794.			
January 30th.	Shipped <i>per</i> Albion	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	7
— — —	— — Colquit	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	6
May 1st.	Forwarded to Portfm ^o for Forces in Martinique	1	2
— 16th.	Shipped <i>per</i> Barbadoes Planter	1	2
— 17th.	— — Barbadoes Planter	4	7
— 18th.	— — Supply	3	6
— 19th.	— — Jupiter	3	6
— — —	— — Barbadoes Planter	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	5
— 20th.	— — Supply	6	11
— — —	— — Jupiter	10	18
September 11th.	— — Minerva	20	36
October 20th.	— — Minerva	8	16
— — —	— — Minerva	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	18
— — —	— — Minerva	3	5
November 13th.	— — Packets	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	11
December 2d.	— — Packets	5	10
— — —	— — Packets	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1
— 15th.	— — Packets	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	7
— — —	— — Packets	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	4
Total sent in 1794		90 $\frac{1}{2}$	178
1795.			
April 29th.	Shipped <i>per</i> Packets	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	6
May —	— — Packets	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	3
— 7th.	— — Phillippa Harben	14	28
— 14th.	— — Packets	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	11
— 16th.	— — Barbadoes Planter	2	4
July 23d.	— — Packets	5	10
October 15th.	— — Bridgwater	3	6
— 16th.	— — Francis and Eliza	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	12
— — —	— — Boddington	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	15
— — —	— — Elizabeth	10	18
— — —	— — Douglas	5	9
Carried forward		62 $\frac{1}{2}$	122

L

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No. 7. continued.

			Tons.	Packages.
		Brought forward	62 $\frac{1}{2}$	122
1795.				
October 16th.	Shipped per	Sir Edward Hughes	14	25
—	—	Ponsborne	1	2
—	—	Contractor	15	27
—	—	Princess Royal	1	2
—	—	Valentine	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
—	—	King George	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
—	—	Sir Edward Hughes	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	3
—	—	Genl Elliott	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
—	—	Raymond	6	11
—	—	Britannia	6	11
—	—	Valentine	6	11
—	—	William Beckford	6	11
—	—	Golden Grove	6	11
—	—	Brothers	6	11
—	—	Bushey Park	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	3
—	—	Francis and Eliza	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	3
—	—	Trelawney Planter	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	3
—	—	Douglas	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	3
—	—	Forwarded from Plymouth by Dr. Boone, 18 Voyage and 12 Regimental Chests	10	30
—	—	Forwarded from Portsmouth by Dr. Hayes and Mr. Gibbs, 36 Voyage Chests	7	36
—	—	Forwarded to Cork, 12 Detachment Chests	6	12
—	18th.	Shipped per Ulysses	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	123
—	23d.	— — Princess Royal	$\frac{1}{2}$	2
—	—	— — Prefcot	2	6
—	—	— — Portland	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	4
		Carried forward	227	475

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No. 7. continued.

			Tons.	Tonnage.
		Brought forward	227	475
1795.				
November 11th.	Shipped per	Lord Sheffield	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	11
—	—	Columbus	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	20
—	15th.	— — Themis	12	22
—	15th.	Forwarded from Southampton, 4 Divisions of Medicines	40	80
—	24th.	Shipped per Packets	4	8
—	28th.	— — Three Sisters	11	21
December 8th.	— — Packets	— —	5	10
	— —	Maria Isabella	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	36
	— —	Bridgwater	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	52
	— —	George and Bridget	20	40
		Total sent in 1795	354	775
	— — —	1794	90 $\frac{1}{4}$	178
	— — —	1795	354	775
		Total Number of Tons and Packages of Medicines sent to the West Indies in 1794 and 5	444 $\frac{1}{4}$	953

L 2

HOSPITAL

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No. 7. *continued.*HOSPITAL TENTS, BEDDING, and STORES, shipped for St.
Domingo, 1794.Shipped *per* the Minerva, 28th August, 1794.

BEDDING.

1000 Sets of Bedding.

TENTS.

10 Hospital Marquees and Tents.

WOOD WARE.

1000 Bowls.
 1000 Trenchers.
 200 Platters.
 1500 Spoons.
 100 Mops.
 00 Birch Brooms.
 40 Hand Scrubbing Brushes.
 60 Water Buckets.

PEWTER.

50 Bed Pans.
 20 Stool Pans.
 250 Chamber Pots.
 60 Urinals.
 30 Basins.
 30 Blood Porringers.
 70 Common-size Plates.
 40 Large-size Plates.
 200 Spoons.

TIN.

20 One Gallon Saucepans.
 20 Three-quart ditto.
 20 Two-quart ditto.
 150 Quart Pots.

150 Pint

[85]

No. 7. *continued.*

150 Pint Pots.
 250 Kettles.
 10 One Gallon Tea Kettles.
 60 Lamps.
 50 Candlesticks.
 20 Lanthorns.
 20 Funnels.
 10 Sets of Measures.

IRON, BRASS, &c.

5 Forty-five Gallon Coppers.
 5 Forty Gallon ditto.
 10 Iron Trivets.
 20 Three Gallon Iron Pots.
 10 Iron Tea Kettles.
 10 Flesh Forks.
 10 Soup Ladles.
 10 Pairs Scales and Weights.
 10 Pairs Steel Yards.
 20 Cocks with Keys.
 20 Spades.
 20 Shovels.
 30 Hatchets.
 10 Felling Axes.
 10 Hand Saws.
 10 Cross-cut Saws.
 10 Augers.
 10 Tap Borers.
 40 Gimblets.
 20000 Nails.
 2000 Screw Nails.
 10 Hammers.
 10 Coopers Adzes.
 10 Turn Screws.
 40 Padlocks with Screw Staples.
 40 Packing Needles.
 1000 Sewing Needles.
 10 Dozen Knives and Forks.

10 Cwt.

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No. 7. *continued.*

S T O R E S.

10 Cwt. Barley.
 10 Cwt. Oatmeal.
 5 Cwt. Currants.
 4 Cwt. Raisins.
 2 Cwt. Loaf Sugar.
 20 lbs. Ginger.
 1500 lbs. Candles.
 72 lbs. Spermaceti Candles.
 10 Cwt. Hard Soap.
 20 Half Firkins Soft Soap.
 170 Gallons Lamp Oil.
 40 lbs. Cotton Wick.
 51½ Gallons Genoa Oil.
 90 Bushels Salt.
 20 Half Hhds. Vinegar.
 32½ Gallons British Spirits.
 200 Cots with Feet.
 50 Bearers for wounded Men.
 2 Filtering Stones.
 560 lbs. Small Cord in Hanks.
 40 lbs. Thread.
 30 lbs. Twine.
 285½ Yards Flannel.
 429 Yards Osnaburg.
 20 Floor Cloths.
 50 Cabbage Nets.
 20 Fumigating Lamps.

S T A T I O N A R Y.

2 Ledgers.
 10 Folio Accompt Books.
 2 Letter Books.
 10 Stewards Books.
 10 Memorandum Books.
 3 Reams Hospital Stoppages.
 1000 Printed Discharges.

500 Lifts

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No. 7. *continued.*

500 Lifts for Wages paid.
 500 Lifts for Stores received and issued.
 20 Quires Royal Paper.
 10 Reams Fools Cap Paper.
 2 Reams Post Paper.
 20 Quires Blotting Paper.
 5 Quires Marble Paper.
 10 Reams Wrapping Paper.
 20 Papers Black Ink Powder.
 2 Papers Red Ink Powder.
 10 Penknives.
 2 Erasing Knives.
 1500 Quills.
 1500 Pens.
 20 Pencils.
 5 lbs. Sealing Wax.
 3 lbs. Wafers.
 2 oz. Pounce.
 2 Pounce Boxes.

Shipped in the Thames, per the Minerva Transport, 28th August, 1794.

HCSP

[83]

No. 7. *continued.*HOSPITAL TENTS, BEDDING and STORES,
Shipped for Barbadoes 1794.Shipped *per* the Minerva Transport, 29th August 1794.

BEDDING.

700 Sets.

TENTS.

6 Marquees and Tents.

WOOD.

650 Bowls.

450 Trenchers.

150 Platters.

450 Spoons.

40 Mops.

50 Birch Brooms.

20 Water Buckets.

PEWTER.

40 Bed Pans.

10 Stool Pans.

150 Chamber Pots.

50 Urinals.

10 Bafons.

10 Blood Porringers.

24 Common Size Plates.

12 Large Size Plates.

48 Spoons.

TIN.

10 One Gallon Saucepans.

10 Three Quart ditto.

10 Two Quart ditto.

70 Quart

[89]

No. 7. *continued.*

70 Quart Pots.

70 Pint Pots.

180 Kettles.

40 Lamps.

30 Candlesticks.

8 Lanthorns.

8 Funnels.

4 Sets Measures.

IRON, BRASS, &c.

1 Forty-five Gallon Copper.

2 Forty Gallon Coppers.

10 Three Gallon Iron Pots.

4 Flesh Forks.

4 Soup Ladles.

4 Pairs Scales and Weights.

2 Pairs Steelyards.

10 Cocks with Keys.

8 Spades.

8 Shovels.

12 Hatchets.

4 Felling Axes.

4 Hand Saws.

3 Cross-cut Saws.

2 Augers.

4 Tap Borers.

12 Gimblets.

8000 Nails.

4 Hammers.

2 Coopers Adzes.

4 Turn Screws.

16 Padlocks with Screw Staples.

12 Packing Needles.

500 Sewing Needles.

4 Dozen Knives and Forks.

3 Iron Trivets.

12 Stock Locks.

M

1 Box

[90]

No. 7. *continued.*

- 1 Box Marking Irons.
- 2 Stamping Irons.
- 2 Burning Irons.

S T O R E S, &c.

- 4 Cwt. Barley.
- 4 Cwt. Oatmeal.
- 3 Cwt. Currants.
- 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ Cwt. Raifins.
- $\frac{1}{2}$ Cwt. Loaf Sugar.
- 6 lbs. Ground Ginger.
- 700 lbs. Candles.
- 36 lbs. Sperm. Candles.
- 2 Cwt. Hard Soap.
- 9 Half Firkins Soft Soap.
- 79 $\frac{1}{2}$ Gallons Lamp Oil.
- 20 lbs. Cotton Wick.
- 26 $\frac{1}{2}$ Gallons Genoa Oil.
- 9 Half Hhds. Vinegar.
- 45 Bushels Salt.
- 4 Cwt. Rice.
- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ Cwt. Muscovado Sugar.
- 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ Gallons British Spirits.

S U N D R I E S.

- 100 Cots, with Feet.
- 30 Bearers for wounded Men.
- 10 Fumigating Lamps.
- 1 Filtering Stone.
- 1 Shower Bath.
- 1 Washing Machine, with Wringer.
- 1 Cwt. small Cord in Hanks.
- 20 lbs. Thread.
- 10 lbs. Twine.
- 68 $\frac{1}{2}$ Yds. Flannel.
- 143 Yards Osnaburgh.

8 Floor

[91]

No. 7. *continued.*

- 8 Floor Cloths.
- 50 Cabbage Nets.
- 48 Yds. Thread Gauze.

S T A T I O N A R Y.

- 1 Letter Book.
- 4 Memorandum Books.
- 1 Ream Hospital Stoppages.
- 350 Lifts printed Discharges.
- 150 Lifts for Wages paid.
- 150 Lifts for Stores received and issued.
- 6 Quires Royal Paper.
- 4 Reams Foolscap Paper.
- 1 Ream Post Paper.
- 6 Quires Blotting Paper.
- 2 Quires Marble Paper.
- 3 Reams Wrapping Paper.
- 8 Papers Black Ink Powder.
- 1 Paper Red Ink Powder.
- 6 Pen Knives.
- 2 Erasing Knives.
- 500 Quills.
- 500 Pens.
- 8 Pencils.
- 2 lbs. Sealing Wax.
- 1 lb. Wafers.
- 2 Ounces Pounce.
- 2 Pounce Boxes.
- 2 Cafes for Stationary.

Shipped in the Thames, *per* the Minerva Transport, 29th August 1794.

M 2

HOSP1.

[92]

No. 7. continued.

HOSPITAL BEDDING shipped for the Leeward Islands
1795.

Shipped per the

John,	} Portsmouth,
Chatham,	
Fanny,	
Scarborough,	

12th July 1795.

Seven Hundred Sets of Bedding.

HOSPITAL TENTS, BEDDING and STORES,
shipped for the Leeward Islands 1795.

Shipped per the

Britannia,	} River Thames.
Genl Elliott,	
Valentine,	
Ponfborne,	
Raymond,	
King George,	
Granada,	
Sir Edw ^d Hughes, Contractor,	

September 1795.

6000 Sets of Bedding.
60 Hospital Marquees and Tents.

WOOD.

[93]

No. 7. continued.

WOOD.

6000 Bowls.
6000 Trenchers.
1200 Platters.
9000 Spoons.
600 Mops.
600 Birch Brooms.
240 Scrubbing Brushes.
180 Water Buckets.

PEWTER.

300 Bed Pans.
120 Stool Pans.
1500 Chamber Pots.
360 Urinals.
180 Bafons.
180 Blood Porringers.
420 Common Size Plates.
240 Large Size Plates.
1200 Spoons.
18 Ink Stands.

TIN.

120 One Gallon Saucepans.
120 Three-Quart Saucepans.
120 Two-Quart Saucepans.
900 Quart Pots.
900 Pint Pots.
1500 Kettles.
360 Lamps.
300 Candlesticks.
120 Lanthorns.
120 Funnels.
60 Sets Measures.
60 Tea Kettles.
120 Hand Lamps, Miles's Patent.
60 Water Pots.

IRON.

[94]

No. 7. *continued.*

IRON, BRASS, &c.

- 24 Forty-five Gallon Coppers.
- 24 Forty Gallon Coppers.
- 12 Thirty-five Gallon Coppers.
- 120 Three Gallon Iron Pots.
- 60 Iron Tea Kettles.
- 60 Fleth Forks.
- 60 Soup Ladles.
- 60 Pairs Scales and Weights.
- 60 Pairs Steelyards.
- 120 Cocks with Keys.
- 120 Spades.
- 120 Shovels.
- 180 Hatchets.
- 60 Felling Axes.
- 60 Hand Saws.
- 60 Crofs-cut Saws.
- 60 Augers.
- 60 Tap Borers.
- 240 Gimblets.
- 120000 Nails.
- 12000 Screw Nails.
- 60 Hammers.
- 60 Coopers Adzes.
- 120 Pairs Snuffers.
- 60 Turn Screws.
- 240 Padlocks, with Screw Staples.
- 240 Packing Needles.
- 6000 Sewing Needles.
- 60 Dozen Knives and Forks.
- 35 Iron Trivets for large Coppers.

STORES.

- 60 Cwt. Barley.
- 60 Cwt. Oatmeal.
- 30 Cwt. Currants.
- 30 Cwt. Raisins.

12 Cwt.

[95]

No. 7. *continued.*

- 12 Cwt. Loaf Sugar.
- 120 lbs. Ground Ginger.
- 9000 lbs. Candles.
- 450 lbs. Spermaceti Candles.
- 60 Cwt. Hard Soap.
- 120 Half Firkins Soft Soap.
- 1020 Gallons Lamp Oil.
- 240 lbs. Cotton Wick.
- 300 Gallons Genoa Oil.
- 120 Half Hhds. Vinegar.
- 540 Bushels Salt.
- 165 Gallons Spermaceti Oil.

SUNDRIES.

- 1200 Cots, with Feet.
- 300 Bearers for wounded Men.
- 120 Fumigating Lamps.
- 12 Filtering Stones.
- 6 Shower Baths.
- 6 Washing Machines, with Wringers.
- 15 Cwt. Small Cord, in Hanks.
- 240 lbs. Thread.
- 180 lbs. Twine.
- 1551 Yards Flannel.
- 2992 Yards Osnaburg.
- 120 Floor Cloths.
- 300 Cabbage Nets.
- 200 Gross Quart Bottle Corks.

STATIONARY.

- 12 Ledgers.
- 60 Folio Account Books.
- 12 Letter Books.
- 60 Stewards Books.
- 60 Memorandum Books.
- 18 Reams HP. Stoppages.
- 6000 Lifts printed Discharges.

3000 Lifts

[96]

No. 7. continued.

3000 Lifts for Wages paid.
 1500 Lifts for Stores received and issued.
 60 Quires Royal Paper.
 30 Reams Foolscap Paper.
 6 Reams Post Paper.
 60 Quires Blotting Paper.
 30 Quires Marble Paper.
 60 Reams Wrapping Paper.
 120 Papers Black Ink Powder.
 12 Papers Red Ink Powder.
 60 Pen Knives.
 12 Erasing Knives.
 9000 Quills.
 9000 Pens.
 120 Pencils.
 30 lbs. Sealing Wax.
 18 lbs. Wafers.
 12 Ounces Pounce.
 12 Pounce Boxes.
 6600 Printed Diet Tables.
 6 Cafes Stationary.

HOSPI-

[97]

No. 7. continued.

HOSPITAL TENTS, BEDDING and STORES, shipped for St. Domingo 1795.

Shipped per the

Francis and Eliza,
 Boddington,
 Ulysses,
 Douglas,
 Trelawney Planters,
 Portland,
 Bushy Park,
 Meanwell,
 Ranger, and
 James,

} River Thames.

September 1795.

BEDDING.

6000 Sets Bedding.

TENTS.

40 Hospital Marquees and Tents.

WOOD.

8000 Bowls.
 8000 Trenchers.
 1200 Platters.
 12000 Spoons.
 600 Mops.
 400 Birch Brooms.
 160 Hand Scrubbing Brushes.
 200 Long ditto.
 400 Long Sweeping Brushes.
 400 Hand ditto.

N

50 Brushes

[98]

No. 7. *continued.*

50 Brushes for Whitewashing.
 200 Water Buckets.
 4000 Cloaths Pins.

P E W T E R.

200 Bed Pans.
 100 Stool Pans.
 3000 Chamber Pots.
 300 Urinals.
 200 Bafons.
 120 Blood Porringers.
 320 Common Size Plates.
 160 Large Size Plates.
 1000 Spoons.
 12 Ink Stands.

T I N.

100 One Gallon Saucepans.
 100 Three Quart ditto.
 100 Two Quart ditto.
 80 Watering Pots.
 600 Quart Pots.
 1000 Pint Pots.
 1000 Kettles.
 50 One Gallon Tea Kettles.
 300 Lamps.
 200 Candlesticks.
 100 Lanthorns.
 100 Funnels.
 40 Sets Measures.
 80 Hand Lamps, Miles's Patent.

I R O N , B R A S S , &c.

16 Forty-five Gallon Coppers.
 16 Forty Gallon Coppers.
 16 Thirty Gallon Coppers.

50 Iron

[99]

No. 7. *continued.*

50 Iron Trivets.
 80 Three Gallon Iron Pots.
 40 Iron Tea Kettles.
 40 Flesh Forks.
 100 Soup Ladles.
 40 Pairs Scales and Weights.
 40 Pairs Steelyards.
 100 Cocks with Keys.
 100 Spades.
 100 Shovels.
 120 Hatchets.
 43 Felling Axes.
 40 Hand Saws.
 40 Small-framed Cross-cut Saws.
 40 Cross-cut Saws.
 40 Augers.
 40 Tap Borers.
 160 Gimblets.
 80000 Nails.
 8000 Screw Nails.
 40 Hammers.
 40 Coopers Adzes.
 80 Pairs Snuffers.
 40 Turn Screws.
 160 Padlocks with Screw Staples.
 160 Packing Needles.
 4000 Sewing Needles.
 12 Large Carving Knives.
 40 Dozens Knives and Forks.

S T O R E S.

40 Cwt. Barley.
 80 Cwt. Oatmeal.
 20 Cwt. Currants.
 20 Cwt. Raisins.
 8 Cwt. Loaf Sugar.
 80 lbs. Ginger.

N 2

6000 lbs.

[100]

No. 7. *continued.*

6700 lbs. Candles.
 300 lbs. Sperm. Candles.
 50 Cwt. Hard Soap.
 80 Half Firkins Soft Soap.
 680 Gallons Lamp Oil.
 110 Gallons Sperm. Oil.
 160 lbs. Cotton Wick.
 200 Gallons Genoa Oil.
 500 Bushels Salt.
 80 Half Hhds. Vinegar.
 200 lbs. Portable Soup.

SUNDRIES.

1000 Cots, with Feet.
 200 Bearers for wounded Men.
 8 Filtering Stones.
 4 Shower Baths.
 4 Washing Machines, with Wringers.
 1000 lbs. small Cord, in Hanks.
 160 lbs. Thread.
 120 lbs. Twine.
 1034 Yards Flannel.
 2008 Yards Osnaburgh.
 100 Yards Towelling.
 400 Yards Oil Cloth, for Beds.
 80 Floor Cloths.
 200 Cabbage Nets.
 1000 Yards Cloaths Line.
 80 Fumigating Lamps.

STATIONARY.

8 Ledgers.
 40 Folio Account Books.
 8 Letter Books.
 80 Stewards Books.
 80 Memorandum Books.

12 Reams

[101]

No. 7. *continued.*

12 Ream Hospital Stoppages.
 14000 Printed Discharges.
 2900 Diet Tables.
 1000 Stewards Weekly Statements.
 4000 Lifts of Wages paid.
 1000 Lifts for Stores received and issued.
 50 Quires Royal Paper.
 30 Reams Foolcap Paper.
 60 Reams Post Paper.
 60 Quires Blotting Paper.
 20 Quires Marble Paper.
 60 Reams Wrapping Paper.
 80 Papers Black Ink Powder.
 8 Papers Red Ink Powder.
 40 Pen Knives.
 8 Erasing Knives.
 6000 Quills.
 6000 Pens.
 100 Pencils.
 30 Plumets.
 20 lbs. Sealing Wax.
 12 lbs. Wafers.
 8 Ounces Pounce.
 8 Pounce Boxes.
 12000 Admission Tickets.
 24 Round Rulers.

HOSPI-

[102]

No. 7. *continued.*

HOSPITAL BEDDING and STORES for Ship

Ulyffes—1795.

October 1795.

1000 Sets of Bedding.

W O O D.

1500 Bowls.
 1500 Trenchers.
 200 Platters.
 2000 Spoons.
 100 Mops.
 70 Birch Brooms.
 30 Hand Scrubbing Brushes.
 70 Long Sweeping Brushes.
 70 Hand Sweeping D°.
 10 Whitewashing Brushes.
 30 Water Buckets.
 700 Cloaths Pins.

P E W T E R.

34 Bed Pans.
 17 Stool Pans.
 500 Chamber Pots.
 50 Urinals.
 50 Basons.
 20 Blood Porringers.
 50 Common Size Plates.
 160 Spoons.

T I N.

20 One Gallon Saucepans.
 20 Three-Quart Saucepans.

20 Two

[103]

No. 7. *continued.*

20 Two-Quart Saucepans.
 10 Fumigating Lamps.
 10 Watering Pots.
 100 Quart Pots.
 200 Pint Pots.
 200 Kettles.
 10 One-gallon Tea Kettles.
 50 Lamps.
 50 Candlesticks.
 20 Lanthorns.
 20 Funnels.
 6 Sets Measures.
 10 Hand Lamps (Miles's Patent.)

I R O N, B R A S S, &c.

3 Forty-five Gallon Coppers.
 3 Forty Gallon Coppers.
 2 Thirty-five Gallon Coppers.
 8 Iron Trivets.
 14 Three Gallon Iron Pots.
 10 Tea Kettles.
 6 Flesh Forks.
 6 Soup Ladles.
 6 Pairs Scales and Weights.
 6 Pairs Steelyards.
 20 Cocks with Keys.
 16 Spades.
 16 Shovels.
 20 Hatchets.
 6 Felling Axes.
 6 Hand Saws.
 4 Cross-cut Saws.
 6 Cross-cut Saws (small framed).
 6 Augers.
 6 Tap Borers.
 6 Gimblets.
 10000 Nails.
 2000 Screw Nails.

6 Hammers.

[104]

No. 7. continued.

- 6 Hammers.
- 6 Coopers Adzes.
- 15 Pairs Snuffers.
- 30 Packing Needles.
- 6000 Sewing Needles.
- 6 Turn Screws.
- 6 Large Carving Knives and Forks.
- 6 Dozen Knives and Forks.

STORES.

- 44 Cwt. Barley.
- 200 Cwt. Oatmeal.
- 5 Cwt. Currants.
- 5 Cwt. Raisins.
- 2 Cwt. Loaf Sugar.
- 12 lbs. Ginger.
- 1000 lbs. Candles.
- 10 Cwt. Hard Soap.
- 14 Half Firkins Soft Soap.
- 120 Gallons Lamp Oil.
- 10 Gallons Spermaceti Oil.
- 40 Gallons Genoa Oil.
- 30 lbs. Cotton Wick.
- 30 Bushels Salt.

SUNDRIES.

- 170 Cots, with Feet.
- 2 Filtering Stones.
- 30 lbs. Thread.
- 20 lbs. Twine.
- 164 Yards Flannel.
- 340 Yards Ofnaburg.
- 20 Yards coarse Diaper for Towelling.
- 70 Yards Oil Cloth for Beds.
- 50 Cabbage Nets.
- 200 Yards Cloaths Line.

STA.

[105]

No. 7. continued.

STATIONARY.

- 2 Ledgers.
- 2 Folio Account Books.
- 2 Letter Books.
- 10 Stewards Books.
- 10 Memorandum Books.
- 2 Reams Hospital Stoppages.
- 2000 Printed Discharges.
- 4000 Printed Diet Tables.
- 200 Stewards Weekly Statements.
- 400 Lifts for Wages paid.
- 200 Lifts for Stores received and issued.
- 10 Quires Royal Paper.
- 5 Reams Foolscap Paper.
- 2 Reams Post Paper.
- 10 Quires Blotting Paper.
- 2 Quires Marble Paper.
- 10 Reams Wrapping Paper.
- 10 Papers Black Ink Powder.
- 2 Ditto Red Ink Powder.
- 6 Pen Knives.
- 2 Erasing Knives.
- 1000 Quills, and 1000 Pens.
- 20 Pencils, 6 Plummetts.
- 3 lbs. Sealing Wax, 2 lbs. Wafers.
- 2 Ounces Pounce.
- 8 Round Rulers.

O

EXTRACT

[106]

No. 7. *continued.*

EXTRACT of a Letter from Mr. Mallet, Director General of Hospitals; dated Barbadoes, January 21st 1794, to Mr. Keate.

AS the Packet fails immediately, I shall avail myself of the Opportunity to mention to you the universal Complaint, from all these Islands, by the usual Annual Supplies being hitherto withheld, both of Medicines and Stores.

The Fleet from Ireland were very sickly on their Arrival here; I found 8 or 900 Sick sent on Shore, without the least Provision for their Reception, there being neither Stores, Utensils, or Medicines here, but what we have been obliged to supply from the Hold of the Atlantic Hospital Ship, and should not the Roebuck soon arrive, I fear great future Distress will be the Consequence.

Two more Hospital Ships are directed to be prepared, and the Supplies for them must still come from the Atlantic. The Difficulties attending these Divisions in our Situation are inexpressible, and almost impracticable in their Execution, and are greatly increased by the endless Demands of all Sorts of detached Corps for Medicines.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Mr. Mallet, Director of Hospitals, to Mr. Keate; dated St. Pierre's, Martinique, March 15th 1794.

THE Roebuck has since arrived; but the Continuance of extraordinary Sickness at Barbadoes, occasioning repeated Demands for Medicines, and the unhealthy State of the Army in general, makes it necessary that a fresh Supply should be sent out as speedily as possible.

I am ordered by the Commander in Chief to enclose you a List of such Articles as the Physicians judge most material for this Army, and hope no Time will be lost in forwarding them; small dispensing Chests should be sent out for such Purposes, the Want of them has been greatly felt—must also trouble you with an Invoice of Stores and Utensils wanted by the Purveyor, which I hope will be forwarded by the same Opportunity as the Medicines.

Having

[107]

No. 7. *continued.*

Having no Official Knowledge of the Numbers or State of the Garrisons in the Windward and Leeward Carribee Islands, can only mention the general Necessity of sending to each (if not already done) Medicines and Stores proper for the Climate, which, from the unhealthy State they have experienced for some Time past, they are greatly in Want of. By the last Return from Barbadoes, the latter End of February, there were still upwards of 700 on the Purveyor's List—we have this Day 481 in the Hospitals at this Place.

EXTRACT of a Letter from General Sir Charles Grey, K. B. to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Camp before Fort Bourbon, Island of Martinique, March 16th 1794.

THE Consumption of Medicines being so very great, it becomes necessary to send a further Supply as speedily as possible; and enclosed is the Copy of a Letter and Lists, which the Director General of Hospitals here transmits to T. Keate, Esquire, Inspector General, by the Packet, of the Articles and Quantities required.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Dr. Clifton, Director of Hospitals; dated Martinique, May 12th 1795.

WITH the last Reinforcements we had no other Medicines but what should have come out in the Middle of last Year, agreeable to the Invoice then sent with a Part of them, which we then received.

From the great Sickness of the Army, the Losses we sustained therein at Guadaloupe, and the numerous Detachments we are bound to supply therewith, in the various Islands where active Operations are now unfortunately going on, I find the Hospital here exceedingly bare of many of the most useful Medicines and Necessaries, and have therefore been frequently very reluctantly compelled to order them to be purchased here, where they are in general extravagant'y dear, to relieve the Necessities of the Army.

We have been much in Want also of Sago; great Quantities of which have been purchased.

O 2

EXTRACT

[108]

No. 7. *continued.*

EXTRACT of a Letter from Doctor Macdonald, Purveyor to the Forces; dated St. Pierre, Martinique, July 7th 1795, to Mr. Keate.

ON the 11th of May I had the Pleasure to write to you, stating that I was distressed as a Purveyor, by the Demands of the different Islands for Bedding, &c. which you said were coming out in a Transport; we have not yet heard of her, and we are very bare both of that and Hospital Stores.

I am glad the Medicines you mention are on their Way, for we are obliged to buy Articles here at an extravagant Price. I likewise hope there is a Supply of Hospital Stores coming, and Stationary; the last was on Board Ship so long that it was quite useless.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Mr. Jones, Surgeon to the Forces, to Dr. Clifton; dated Martinique, July 10th 1795.

IN Consequence of the Capture of the Ship with Hospital Stores, I beg Leave to represent to you, that the following List of Surgical Apparatus is absolutely necessary for the Use of this Army.

- | | | |
|--|--------|--------|
| 12 Cases of Amputating and Trepanning Instruments. | | |
| 1 Set of Cupping | — | Ditto. |
| 24 Sets of Pocket | — | Ditto. |
| 1 Case of Dissecting | — | Ditto. |
| 6 Cases of Tooth | — | Ditto. |
| 12 Cases of Crooked Needles. | | |
| 2 Dozen of Gloves | Ditto. | |
| 12 Ball Scoops. | | |
| 6 Lancet Cases. | | |
| 6 Long Seton Needles in Silver Canulas. | | |
| 2 Dozen of Crooked Scissars, Forceps and Probes. | | |
| 6 Sets Splints, lined with Leather. | | |
| 2 Sets Injecting Apparatus for Hydrocele. | | |
| 2 Fracture Boxes. | | |
| 6 Canulas for Empyema. | | |
| 6 Double Screw Tourniquets. | | |
| 6 Dozen 18 Tailed Bandages. | | |

EXTRACT

[109]

No. 7. *continued.*

EXTRACT of a Letter from Dr. Macdonald to Dr. Clifton, Director of the Hospitals; dated St. Pierre's, Martinique, July 11th, 1795.

I HAVE to represent, that from the great Demand of Stores from the different Islands, and from the Disappointment of the Transport with Bedding destined for all the Islands, that the General Hospital is in great Want of every Kind of Purveyors Stores. Therefore I apprehend it will be necessary that the Commander in Chief signify the same to Government at Home.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Dr. Clifton, dated July 11th. 1795, St. Pierre, Martinique, to Mr. Keate.

AMONG the captured Vessels is the Phillipa Harbin, bound to this Port, in which I find, by much collateral Information, although I have no Official Notification of it, a great Quantity of Medicines and Stores had been shipped for the General Hospital here, now under my Direction. Certain it is that I have received none, and the Wants of the Hospital in these Respects are great beyond all Conception.

I have found it my Duty to make these Circumstances known to Major General Irving, our present Commander in Chief, who is to communicate them to Government. I think it proper also thus to acquaint you with them, and to request your immediate Attention to our Wants; permit me at the same Time to suggest, that if no immediate and safe Conveyance should offer for this Island, it would be very adviseable to send partial, and well-afforded Parcels of the Articles I have desired may be sent by every Packet.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Dr. Clifton, Physician to the Forces; dated General Hospital, St. Pierre's, Martinique, January 15th 1795, to Mr. Keate.

FINDING that the Medicines which had then lately arrived did not by any Means correspond with the Invoice sent out, I made a Report thereof to the Commander in Chief, who made every Search, in vain, at Barbadoes and elsewhere,

[110]

No. 7. *continued.*

elsewhere, for the deficient Packages so pointed out by me, agreeable to the Report of Mr. Wilfon, the Apothecary now in England I hope, and who, if necessary, can further elucidate the Matter. Some Time after this a Letter arrived from Mr. Mallet, the Director, to Dr. Brown, as senior Physician, stating that a great Part of the Medicines intended to be sent here, and of which the Invoice had been forwarded, were still in certain Transports in the River, which had not been able to overtake the Convoy. This cleared up the Mystery to me; but we are still without the Medicines, and are now in Want of the principal ones.

Being tired out with waiting for our long expected Fleet with the Reinforcements, which I supposed would convey these Medicines, I have thought proper to call a Medical Board to decide upon what Medicines, and what Quantities thereof, as well as what Instruments and Utensils, were necessary to be sent for, and in consequence I now enclose you our List thereof. There are many unnecessary ones I think, but as every Gentleman has his own peculiar Mode of Practice, I thought it would be wrong to attempt to cramp them in what they might deem would be useful to the Sick under their Care. Our Loss of Medicines too at Berville Camp, Grandterre, where the Sick were almost innumerable, and at Fort Matilda, Guadaloupe, will help to account for the Number and Quantity now desired. I beg Leave to entreat you to order the inclosed List out as soon as possible, and to direct the Apothecary General to be more careful than he has been in designating by particular Invoices, if it possibly can be done, the particular Medicines, Instruments, and Utensils sent out in each particular Transport; as for Want thereof much Confusion often occurs, exemplified in those now expected, and a Part of which has long since arrived.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Dr. Clifton, Director of Hospitals, dated Martinique, August 6th 1795, to Mr. Keate.

I HAVE the Pleasure to acknowledge the Receipt of your's of June 2d. I am sorry to find thereby that so great an Error had crept into the First Copy of a List of Medicines sent for, as that which you state relative to the

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No. 7. *continued.*

the Quantity of Musk; the Apothecary, in his great Hurry in copying the Invoice on the Day the Ship sailed, must have put down 20lbs. for 3, because, as you rightly suppose, we never could have sent for such an enormous Quantity of such an Article. I am very sorry to announce to you, that all the Medicines and Hospital Stores which you sent out in the Phil-lipa Harbin in the last Convoy, have been taken by the French, and carried into Guadaloupe, where an Officer that went with a Flag of Truce saw them. By this Loss the Hospital is reduced to the utmost Distress, and which I am endeavouring to remedy as far as in my Power, by purchasing at the adjacent Islands such Articles as we are most in Want of. You will see the Necessity of supplying us, if only partially, without Delay; and if by every Packet you would furnish us with small and well-assorted Articles, it would be a more certain Way than Convoys, which are often so long detained. I am very glad to perceive by your Letter, that you consider the Hospital here as a Depot, from whence the Windward as well as the Leeward Islands are to be supplied with Medicines, as I have ever viewed it in that Light, and relieved their Wants as far as the Surgeons there stated them to me, and as the Store in the Hospital would allow me.

I have also occasionally supplied some of the Regimental Surgeons with Medicines when, as often happens, their Chests have been kept back, or when, from the Nature of the Service, they have sustained unexpected Losses therein; as, for Instance, at the Evacuation of Fort Matilda, Guadaloupe, and Morne Fortunée in St. Lucia, and which I hope you will approve of.

No. 8.

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No. 8.

An ACCOUNT of the Total Expenditure incurred in the Transport Service for the Expedition to the West Indies, in the Years 1794 and 1795, so far as the same can be ascertained.

Navy Office, May 1796.

An ACCOUNT of the Total Expenditure incurred in the Transport Service for the Expedition to the West Indies, between the 1st January 1794 and the 31st August following, as far as the same can be ascertained: Prepared pursuant to a Precept of the Honourable House of Commons, dated the 28th April 1796; viz.

Freight for 8 Months of 32,000 Tons, at 13s. per Ton per Calendar Month	£.	s.	d.
Value of Ships detained by the Enemy on their returning as Carrels	166,400	—	—
Abate the Sums for which some of them which were released were fold	40,535	—	—
	14,290	—	—
Bedding and other Necessaries for the Troops	26,245	—	—
Building Cabins and other Accommodations	6,628	6	8
Pay of Agents	3,036	—	—
	2,851	14	4
	£.	205,161	1 —

The Whole amounting to the Sum of Two hundred and Five thousand One hundred and Sixty-one Pounds One Shilling.

Mem^d.—This Business devolved to the Transport Board on the 1st September 1794.

A. S. Hammond.

C. Hope.

Geo. Marsh.

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No. 8. continued.

Transport Office, 3d May 1796.

An ACCOUNT of the Expenditure incurred at this Office for the West India Expeditions, between the 1st September 1794 and 31st December 1795, so far as the same can be ascertained; viz.

PARTICULARS.	SUM.		
Freight of Transports, and other Vessels, for the Conveyance of Troops, Provisions, and Stores	£.	s.	d.
Value of Ships captured by the Enemy	588,945	4	1
Bedding for the Troops	16,859	9	11
Building Cabins, and making other Preparations on Board Transports for the Troops	24,975	—	—
Medical Stores, and various Articles of Refreshment for the Troops	9,500	—	—
Pay to Officers employed as Agents of Transports	8,616	2	7
	5,577	7	—
	£.	654,473	3 7

The whole Sum is Six hundred and Fifty-four thousand Four hundred and Seventy-three Pounds Three Shillings and Seven Pence.

R^{pt}. George.

Ambrose Serle.

John Marsh.

No. 9.

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No. 9.

Copy of a joint LETTER from Sir Charles Grey and Sir John Jervis, dated the 13th of April 1794; and a Copy of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey, dated the 6th and 8th of May; together with Extracts of Letters from Sir Charles Grey, of the 16th and 25th of March, 12th, 22d, and 29th of April, 6th of May, 11th and 13th of June, and 8th, 17th, and 21st of July, 1794, to Mr. Secretary Dundas.

Copy of a joint Letter from Sir Charles Grey and Sir John Jervis, to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Boyne, off Point à Petre, Guadaloupe, 13th April 1794.

S I R,

Boyne, off Point à Petre, Guadaloupe,
13th April 1794.

AFTER the Reduction of this Island, the Remains of the Force originally furnished for the Expedition will be barely sufficient to garrison and secure the important Conquests achieved by the Valour of His Majesty's Land and Sea Forces; and very efficient Men being nominated to command the Islands, no active Service can arise to call for our joint Exertions during the Hurricane Months: We therefore beg Leave to submit to His Majesty's Ministers, that if they judge fit to call us to England by an immediate Dispatch on the Receipt of this, we shall have ample Time to communicate such Opinions as we may be able to collect touching the Form of Government necessary to be established for the permanent Safety of the conquered Islands, (a Measure of the greatest Magnitude) to concert the Operations for another Campaign, and return to these Seas at the Expiration of the unhealthy Season.

We have the Honour to be, &c.

Charles Grey.
J. Jervis.

Right Honble.

Henry Dundas, &c. &c. &c.

Copy

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No. 9. continued.

Copy of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Martinico, 6th and 8th of May 1794.
(Marked Secret.)

One Inclosure.

Sir,

Martinico, May the 6th 1794.

IN my Public Letter of this Date, I have reported to you the Arrival of the 22d, 23d, 35th, and 41st Regiments from Ireland; and that Brigadier-General Whyte, with the 22d, 23d, and 41st, will proceed for Jamaica To-morrow to reinforce Major-General Williamson, to whom I wrote last Night by the Jamaica Packet, which was fortunately going past; and herewith I transmit the Copy of my Letter to him on this Subject. I have concerted an Expedition with the Admiral against Cayenne, and we hope to sail in a few Days, drawing what little Force can possibly be spared from these Islands for the Purpose, so as not to leave the French a Port or resting Place to assemble at in this Part of the World, should we succeed.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Charles Grey.

Postscript. May 8th.—Since closing the foregoing Letter, we have received Information that the Enemy have completed their Fortifications, and received such considerable Reinforcements at Cayenne, which was our Object, that there remains not a Prospect of Success with the small Force to be drawn from these Islands, and therefore we have relinquished all Idea of it; in consequence of which I have ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Lenox, with the Flank Companies of the 22d, 23d, 35th, and 41st Regiments, to follow the Three Regiments just sailed with Brigadier-General Whyte, as a further Reinforcement to Major-General Williamson at Jamaica.

Charles Grey.

The Right Hon.

Henry Dundas, &c. &c. &c.

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Copy

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No. 9. *continued.*

Copy of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Major-General
Williamson; dated Martinico, 5th May 1794.

(Marked Secret.)

In Sir Charles Grey's (Secret) of the 6th and 8th of May 1794.

Sir, Martinico, May the 5th 1794.

I HAVE the Pleasure to acquaint you of our having made a Conquest of Guadaloupe and all its Dependencies; viz. The Saints, Mariegalante, Deseada, &c. the Whole being surrendered on the 22d Ultimo; and having before acquainted you with the Capture of Martinico and St. Lucia, we are now in complete Possession of all the Windward and Leeward Charibbee Islands. The Trade from England, and also the Cork Fleet, are just arrived, with the 22d, 23d, 35th, and 41st Regiments. The Trade will proceed To-morrow, under Convoy of the Swan Sloop of War, to be joined by others; and the Day following Brigadier-General Whyte, with the 22d, 23d, and 41st Regiments, will proceed to put himself under your Orders. You will find him an active, experienced, and zealous Officer, possessed of considerable Abilities, and I am much indebted to him for the great Share he has had in contributing to our Conquest here. If you intend those Three Regiments for *Service* at St. Domingo, you can send an Order to meet them, for landing there accordingly, immediately on your receiving this Letter. I observe Colonel Horneck is Senior to Brigadier Whyte; and if he be at Jamaica, as I understand he is, it may be necessary to appoint him Brigadier-General also, which I leave entirely to you; but he must remain at Jamaica, so as not to interfere with Brigadier Whyte at St. Domingo *on any Account*.—I detain the 35th Regiment here; as I purpose going on an Expedition to Cayenne in a few Days, and cannot leave these Islands weakly garrisoned, especially at this Time, that there appears to be some Apprehension of a War with America, and the Troops here are very sickly indeed, attended with considerable Mortality, in consequence of the hard Service they have undergone already. It was my firm Intention to have gone to St. Domingo myself; but the Circumstances already mentioned, of Sickness, &c. the unsettled State of these Islands, and the Expedition to Cayenne, will prevent it.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Charles Grey.

Extract

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No. 9. *continued.*

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary
Dundas; dated Camp before Fort Bourbon, Island of
Martinico, March the 16th 1794.

THE 22d and 41st Regiments, from Ireland from St. Domingo, are not yet arrived, and shall be forwarded without Delay, whensoever they appear, with an Officer of Ability and proper Rank to command them.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary
Dundas; dated Camp before Fort Bourbon, Island of
Martinico, 16th March 1794. (Marked Secret.)

AS the Chance of War is always doubtful, I could not say more than I have done in my Public Letter of this Date with Propriety, so long as a Fortress deemed almost impregnable, as that of Bourbon is, continues to hold out; but as our most strenuous Efforts are unabated, I do not despair of forcing it to surrender, and in Time to attempt the Capture of the other Islands; on the Supposition, however, that effectual Care will be taken at Home to prevent their receiving any Reinforcements from France.

The Necessity of your sending more Troops to me immediately, together with Ordnance and Ordnance Stores, &c. to be in Readiness for the Purpose of garrisoning these Islands, in case we should succeed in the Capture of them, is so evident that it needs not to be pointed out to you, Sir, towards enabling me to proceed to St. Domingo with a Force somewhat respectable; being a Measure I eagerly wish to embrace the Instant this Service admits of it.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary
Dundas; dated Fort Royal, Martinico, the 25th March
1794. (Marked Secret.)

IT is necessary at this particular Time, and unsettled State of the Island, to leave a respectable Force, and I intend 1,200 Men *at least*, as a Garrison for

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N^o 9. *continued.*

for the different Forts and Posts; which will diminish my Force for another Expedition so materially, that the Necessity for a speedy Reinforcement will be very obvious to you, Sir, and I wish Part of that Re-inforcement should consist of Eighty more dismounted Dragoons, with Saddles and Bridles, &c. as I find them very useful, and wish to augment them to One Hundred, having Twenty already.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Point à Petre, Guadaloupe, April 12th 1794. (Marked Secret.)

IT being impossible, with the Force I have left, to secure the Conquests already made, and also to venture upon further Service at this late Season of the Year, the Admiral and I have determined to secure the Conquests made; and therefore, after leaving a sufficient Garrison here, under that able Officer Major General Dundas, our Intention is to proceed without Delay to visit the Islands, placing a sufficient Garrison, with an Officer of Experience and Ability, to command in each of those conquered; arranging and settling every necessary Matter in the best Manner that may be in our Power, until His Majesty's further Pleasure may be known, also supplying our old Islands with a proportionable Number of Troops, &c. which I have been obliged to drain so as to leave them almost totally without any, to enable us to accomplish the Acquisitions we have made during the Service of this Campaign. By the Time this necessary Work may be finished, the Hurricane and deadly Season will be nearly set in, and indeed the Troops and Seamen already begin to fall down, therefore I submit to your Consideration the joint Letter written by the Admiral and me; at the same Time I beg you to believe, Sir, and that you will assure His Majesty, I have no Wish to return Home whilst there is the least Probability of *active* Service here, but to devote the Remainder of my Life in promoting the Glory and Honour of His Reign.— During the Hurricane Months, and unhealthy Season, however, I think that cannot be better promoted than by my returning Home, to make a faithful Report of the Islands, and to offer my humble Ideas respecting the Settlement of our newly acquired Territory; a weighty Concern, on which depends their Security, Happiness, and Advantage to the British Empire; and, at the same Time, to propose my Plan, and the Forces necessary for the next Campaign,

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No. 9. *continued.*

Campaign, as well as to recruit myself, not a little worn down by Fatigue and the Climate, and to enable me to start again as early as possible in Autumn, to open the Campaign with recovered Strength and Effect, in whatever Service His Majesty may then be graciously pleased to entrust and honour me with; but which my remaining in this Climate, during the sickly Months, might, and most likely would, put it out of my Power to execute in the Manner I wish. Whatever His Majesty's Pleasure may be, upon this and all other Things, I shall cheerfully and heartily exert myself to accomplish, and to answer His Royal Expectation; but allow me again to impress on your Mind, that I mean it most truly for the best, and to enable me to act with recovered Strength, as well as Zeal, on any future Service, in which I may be employed; therefore I entreat His Majesty's Indulgence on this Occasion, to be communicated to me as early as possible.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Basseterre, Guadaloupe, April 22d, 1794. (Marked Secret.)

THE Visit which the Admiral and I purpose making through all our Islands very soon, to regulate and settle whatsoever may require it, will take up some Time in the Execution; and we purpose leaving these Islands to return to England in the Beginning of July next, in case we should not *then* have received any Answer to our joint Letter on this Subject, as I am really so worn down by Fatigue of Mind and Body, and the Climate, that my continuing here during the sickly and Hurricane Months would reduce and weaken me to that Degree, as I am persuaded would prevent my being able to execute to my Satisfaction any Service on which I might be employed in Autumn; whereas by returning to England during those Months, my Strength would be restored, and I would be ready to sail for the West Indies again, or to go on any other Service the Moment it might be His Majesty's Pleasure. Allow me therefore to repeat my Solicitation, that you will make my humble Representation to His Majesty for His Royal Permission to return to England in the Beginning of July next, and to assure His Majesty that my Exertions to promote the Good of His Service can only end with my Existence.

Extract

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No. 9. *continued.*

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Basseterre, Guadaloupe, the 22d April, 1794.

IN former Dispatches I have mentioned that Lieutenant General Prefcot was left to command at Martinico, and Colonel Sir Charles Gordon at Saint Lucia; and the Conquest of Guadaloupe and its Dependencies being now also completely accomplished; I have placed Major General Dundas in the Command of this Island, with a proper Garrison; and His Majesty may place the firmest Reliance on the Ability, Experience, and Zeal for the Good of His Service and their Country, of those excellent Officers; to whom I request the same Allowance may be made that is to Civil Governors of other Islands, to enable them to bear the heavy Expences to which their Situation subjects them.—Although I have not been wanting, in my several Dispatches to you, Sir, to bestow just Praise on the Forces I have the Honour to command, yet I conceive it a Duty, which I embrace with infinite Pleasure, to repeat, that to the Unanimity and extraordinary Exertions of the Navy and Army on this Service, under Fatigues and Difficulties never exceeded, His Majesty and their Country are indebted for the rapid Success which, in so short a Space of Time, has extended the British Empire; by adding to it the valuable Islands of Martinique, Saint Lucia, Guadaloupe, The Saints, Mariegalante, and Deseada; but they are now so worn down by Fatigue, the Climate, and consequent Sickness, and the sickly Season also advancing, that it is not possible to attempt any Thing farther during this Campaign.

I have ordered the Flank Companies belonging to the Regiments in the West Indies to join them respectively, and shall wait for Orders how to dispose of those from Ireland.—I shall proceed with the Admiral in a few Days to visit all our Islands, as well those formerly in our Possession, as those recently captured, to fix proper Garrisons, and to settle every Thing necessary in the best Manner that may be in my Power.

Extract

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No. 9. *continued.*

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Guadaloupe, 29th April, 1794.
(Marked Secret.)

One Inclosure.

In the present Situation of the conquered Islands, I find it a Matter of Expediency and Necessity, for the Security of them, to raise a new Corps, to be called The Island Rangers, and to consist of 250 Private Men, Part Cavalry and Part Infantry, with Non-commissioned Officers in Proportion: The Whole to be commanded by Captain Charles Maitland, of the 17th Light Dragoons, who is now here, and Aid de Camp to Major General Dundas, with the *Provincial Rank of Major*; but having provincial Rank only in a temporary Corps, he does not mean to give up his Troop of Dragoons in Ireland, which he purchased.—If, therefore, this Appointment is understood to interfere with his Troop, he begs it may be fully understood that he relinquishes this, and abides by the Troop, which I request may be attended to accordingly.—Inclosed is a hasty Sketch of the Plan for raising this Corps, which will be immediately perfected, and put in Execution, to be composed of those who can be depended on, and have Knowledge of the most secret Recesses in the Islands; the Brigands, being numerous in the Woods, must be rooted out, which will take up some Time to do effectually, so as to restore Peace and Happiness throughout the captured Islands; which is already encreasing hourly, by our Pursuit of the wicked and dangerous, and adding to the Number of our Prisoners.—I have no Doubt but the Government of this Island will be completely and firmly established, by the Steps that are taken, and that I shall leave it so in a few Days, to proceed to Martinique, and settle every Thing there in like Manner.

In Sir Charles Grey's (Secret) of the 29th April, 1794.

The present unsettled State of the conquered Islands, and the intestine Commotions which have so long agitated them, render much Care and Caution necessary, in re-establishing, as soon as possible, Order and Tranquillity.

To effect this with least Fatigue to the Troops, and to put a Stop to the Rapine which has in all Parts been too long practised, the Commander in

Q

Chief

No. 9. *continued.*

Chief finds it highly expedient to raise a Corps to assist in preserving the Peace of those Islands, by co-operating, when necessary, with the Troops, and in preventing them, after the Fatigues of so severe a Campaign, from being harraffed unnecessarily, where it can be avoided.

Formation of a Corps, to be called *The Island Rangers*, with Provincial Rank.

Captain Charles Maitland, of the 17th Light Dragoons, Major Commandant of the Whole.

Guadaloupe	{	Capt. Augustine Depré	{	Troop of Cavalry to consist of
		Lieut. Salick Gartside		1 Capt. 1 Lieut. 1 Cornet, 1 Q ^r
		Cornet Christ. de Borne		M ^r , 3 Serj ^s , 3 Corp ^s , 1 Farrier, 1
		Qua ^r Ma ^r ,		Trump ^r , and 50 Privates.

To receive the Pay and Cloathing of English Dragoons.

One Company of Infantry.

Guadaloupe	{	Capt. Louis de Grand Pré	{	Company of Infantry to consist of
		Lieutenant,		1 Capt, 1 Lieut. 1 2d Lieut. 4
		Ensign,		Serj ^s , 3 Corp ^s , 1 Drum ^r , and 50
				Privates.

The Corps to be raised for the Island of Martinique is to be composed in the same Manner, and of like Numbers; that for St. Lucia, of a Company consisting of 1 Captⁿ, 2 First Lieut^s, 1 Second Lieut. 1 Q^r Mastr^r, 4 Serj^s, 1 Corp^s, 1 Drum^r, and 50 Privates—20 of which are to be mounted.

Guadaloupe, April 29, 1794.

Extract

N^o 9. *continued.*

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Martinico, 6th May, 1794.

I HAVE the Honour to acquaint you that the Fleet with the Trade from England, and the Cork Fleet, with the 22d, 23d, 35th, and 41st Regiments, arrived here Yesterday; and this Day the Trade proceeds to Jamaica, under Convoy of the Swan Sloop of War, to be joined by others.

To-morrow Brig^{er} Gen^l Whyte will proceed for Jamaica, with the 22d, 23d, and 41st Regiments, there to put himself under the Command of Major General Williamson.

The Troops who have served the Campaign are turning very sickly, and it is attended with considerable Mortality, in consequence of the Fatigues they have gone through, followed by the present very warm Weather, &c. and, as I cannot reconcile the Idea of leaving these Islands weakly garrisoned, at the Time that some Apprehension of a War with North America prevails, I detain the 35th Regiment in these Islands.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Guadaloupe, the 11th June, 1794.

AFTER Brigadier General Whyte had sailed for Jamaica and Saint Domingo, with the 22d, 23d, and 41st Battalions, and was followed by Lieutenant Colonel Lenox with their Flank Companies, joined by those of the 35th Regiment, I paid a Visit, with the Admiral, from Martinico to St. Lucia, where I found every Thing going on very much to my Satisfaction, under the Command of Brigadier General Sir Charles Gordon.—Soon after our Return from thence we paid a Visit to Guadaloupe, where all was proceeding in the same Manner under the Command of Major General Dundas.—We then went to Antigua, and I visited the Works on the Ridge and Monkhill near English Harbour (of which I shall make my Report when I return to England) at the same Time the Admiral inspected the Dock Yard, Stores, &c. at that Place. Our next Visit was to St. Christopher's, where I inspected the Situation and Works on Brimstone Hill, which I deem impregnable. At this Island we received an Express of the 4th Instant, with the unwelcome News of the Decease of Major General Dundas, who died of a Fever at

Q 2

Guadaloupe,

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No. 9. *continued.*

Guadaloupe, after a few Days Illness, and in him His Majesty and his Country lose One of their bravest and best Officers, and a most worthy Man.—I, too, feel severely the Loss of so able an Assistant on this arduous Service, and a valuable Friend ever to be lamented.—Before Day of the 5th, another Express arrived at St. Christopher's from Guadaloupe, with Intelligence that several Sail of French Line of Battle Ships, with Frigates, Transports, and 2,000 Land Forces on Board, had appeared off Point à Petre, Grand Terre, on the 3d Instant. An Express also arrived the same Day from St. Domingo, with a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Whitelocke, by which it appears, that he had serious Apprehensions for the Safety of the Troops under his Command, unless speedily re-inforced, as his Numbers were so very much reduced by Sicknefs and other Causes; but the Re-inforcements I sent by Brigadier General Whyte and Lieutenant Colonel Lenox, must have joined him long before his Letter reached me, and will give him perfect Security.

The Admiral made immediate Sail for Guadaloupe, and we reached Basse Terre in the Afternoon of the 7th Instant, receiving further Intelligence that the Enemy had landed, forced Fort Fleur de Epée before Day of the 6th Instant, and were actually in Possession of it, with Fort Louis, Fort Gouvernement, the Town of Pointe à Petre, &c. and their Shipping anchored in the Harbour. I landed immediately at Basse Terre, and the Admiral proceeded with the Ships of War to Pointe à Petre, &c. and their Shipping anchored in the Harbour. I landed immediately at Basse Terre, and the Admiral proceeded with the Ships of War to Pointe à Petre, where he anchored at Noon of the 8th Instant, during which I continued visiting the Posts, and giving the necessary Orders at Basse Terre; and in the Evening of the 9th following I returned to the Boyne, to concert Measures with the Admiral for regaining Pointe à Petre and Grande Terre. We have sent to the different Islands to collect all the Force that can be spared, in particular the Flank Companies, Part of whom are already arrived; and as every Effort shall be made on our Part, at the same Time that we can thoroughly depend on the Bravery and Exertions of our Troops and Seamen, I hope soon to render a good Account of this Second Expedition, having their Ships completely blocked up within the inner Harbour, which are now found to consist of Two Frigates, One Corvette, Two large Ships, appearing to be armed en Flute, and Two other Ships within Land, so that it cannot be exactly discovered what they are. Their Troops consist of about 1,500 Men, joined by some Mulattoes and Negroes, since landing, of course.

Extract

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No. 9. *continued.*

Extracts of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Boyne, off Pointe à Petre, Guadaloupe, June the 13th, 1794. (Marked Secret.)

I BEG Leave to represent to you, that unless a considerable Re-inforcement of Troops be speedily sent to these Islands, there will be great Risk of losing them, as there cannot be a Doubt but the French will make strenuous Efforts for Recovery of them.

Having acquainted you, in my Dispatch of the 6th Ultimo, that Brigadier General Whyte had sailed for Jamaica and St. Domingo, with the 22d, 23d, and 41st Battalions, I have now only to add, that Lieutenant Colonel Lenox followed him a few Days afterwards, with the Eight Flank Companies of the 22d, 23d, 35th, and 41st Regiments.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Berville Camp, opposite Pointe à Petre, Guadaloupe, the 8th of July, 1794.

IN my Dispatch of the 13th Ultimo, I had the Honour to acquaint you of my Intention to land on the Side of Fort Fleur d'Epée, and try to regain Grand Terre, so soon as what Force could be drawn from the other Islands should be collected; accordingly, having been joined by most Part of it, I ordered Brigadier General Symes to make a Landing with the Grenadiers under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Fisher, and the Light Infantry under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Gomm, which was effected without Loss or Opposition, early in the Morning of the 19th Ultimo, at Ance Canot, under Cover of Two Frigates, the Solebay, Captain Lord Garlies, the Enemy retiring, and the same Troops moved on to Gozier, and took Possession of it in the Afternoon, which the Enemy abandoned, burning some Houses. As the Enemy had Possession of a Situation that commanded the Road to Fort Fleur d'Epée, I detached Three Companies of Grenadiers and Three Companies of Light Infantry, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Fisher, who marched at Twelve o'Clock, in the Night between the 25th and 26th Ultimo, by a circuitous

No. 9. *continued.*

and most difficult Path, coming on the Back of the Enemy at Six o'Clock the next Morning, who fled; One of their Sentries fell into his Hands, and he took Possession of that and Two other commanding Heights. Having sent Two Amuzettes to that Detachment the same Day, the Enemy made an Attack upon the Escort, when mounting the Hill on which Lieutenant Colonel Fisher's Detachment was posted, who attacked and repulsed them.

The Enemy continuing in Possession of a Chain of high and woody Grounds, with difficult Passes, between our Posts and Morne Mascot, the Remainder of the Grenadiers and Light Infantry, with Captain Robertson's Battalion of Seamen, were pushed forward to the same Post; and on the 27th Ultimo the Enemy were attacked on all Sides by Brigadier General Symes, with the Grenadiers and Light Infantry, completely routed, and driven down to Morne Mascot, where they again made Resistance, but being charged with Bayonets they fled into Fort Fleur D'Epée.

Having collected considerable Force from the Town of Pointe à Petre and the Neighbourhood, arming Blacks, Mulattoes, and all Colours, they advanced in great Numbers the same Afternoon, under Cover of their Guns from Fort Fleur D'Epée, which so completely raked the Top of the Hill, that the Grenadiers could hardly appear on it until the Enemy were also there, and attacked that Part of Morne Mascot where Lieutenant Colonel Fisher was posted with the Grenadiers, when an obstinate Engagement took place, which lasted for some Time, the Front being within a few Yards of each other, and the Enemy's Number very superior, but the Grenadiers forced them down the Hill again with great Slaughter.

The 29th following, the Enemy having collected a still greater Force, cloathing Mulattoes and Blacks in the National Uniform, to the Amount of 1,500 Men, again attacked the same Post, and at this Time they had a Field Piece on the Right which enfiladed the Grenadiers, in Addition to their Guns in Front, which fired Round and Grape from the Fort. Having observed the Enemy making a Movement towards the Rear of the Grenadiers, to take Possession of a House and strong Ground which the 2d Battalion of Light Infantry, under Major Ross, was then ordered to occupy, but having some Distance to go, Four Companies of Grenadiers were detached under Major Irving from the Post on Mascot before the Engagement commenced, who seized the Post in the Rear, lest the Enemy might get there before our Light Infantry, which had however reduced our Force on Mascot at the

No. 9. *continued.*

the Time of its being attacked; but Major Ross, with the 2d Light Infantry, reaching the Post in the Rear soon after Major Irving, the latter instantly returned to Mascot with the Four Companies of Grenadiers, and having re-joined when the Engagement had lasted for some Time, the Enemy were charged with Bayonets, and driven from the Heights with still greater Slaughter than on their former Attack. During the First Day's Engagement, Lieutenant Colonel Fisher was struck with Grape Shot, occasioning Contusions only, and on the last his Horse was killed under him. During this Time Major Ross, with the 2d Light Infantry, was also engaged with the Enemy, and repulsed them with Loss on their Side. The Rainy Season being already set in, and this being the last Month for acting before the Hurricane Season, at the same Time that the Troops were exposed alternately to heavy Rains and a vertical Sun, together with the Circumstances of the great Slaughter recently suffered by the Enemy in the Two Attacks they made on Morne Mascot, determined me to make an Effort for finishing the Campaign at once, and I concerted Measures accordingly; ordering Brigadier General Symes to march in the Evening of the 1st Instant from Morne Mascot, with the 1st Battalion of Grenadiers, the 1st and 2d Battalions of Light Infantry, and the 1st Battalion of Seamen, commanded by Captain Robertson, who attacked the Town of Pointe à Petre before Day of the 2d Instant; but being misled by our Guides, the Troops entered the Town at the Part where they were most exposed to the Enemy's Cannon and small Arms, and where it was not possible to scale the Walls of the Fort; in consequence of which they suffered considerably from Round and Grape Shot, together with small Arms fired from the Houses, &c. and a Retreat became unavoidable, the more so, as the Troops are entirely worn out by Fatigue and the Climate, so as to be quite exhausted, and totally incapable of further Exertion at present. It gives me great Concern to add, that Brigadier General Symes was wounded, Lieutenant Colonel Gouin (an excellent Officer) and some other meritorious Officers, were killed on this Attack, as was also Captain Robertson of the Navy, a valuable Officer, and a great Loss to the Service.

I had every Thing in Readiness at the Post of Morne Mascot for an Attack upon Fort Fleur d'Epée by Storm, with the 2d Battalion of Grenadiers, 65th Regiment, Six Companies of Grande Terre, and the 2d Battalion of Seamen commanded by Captain Sawyer, waiting, as concerted, until I should hear whether Brigadier General Symes with his Division succeeded

No. 9. *continued.*

succeeded, or had taken Post near the Town of Pointe à Petre; but his Failure obliged me to relinquish the meditated Attack upon Fort Fleur d'Épée, by laying me under the Necessity of detaching the 2d Battalion of Grenadiers to cover the Retreat of Brigadier General Symes's Division. The Season for Action in the Field being past, and the Troops debilitated by the Fatigue of a long Campaign and the Climate, so as to become unable for further Contest, without Shelter from the scorching Heat of a vertical Sun, or the heavy Rains now so frequent, there remained no Choice but to retreat, and I brought the Troops, with every Thing we had at Morne Mascot, back to Gozier on the Night of the 2d Instant, detaching the 2d Battalion of Light Infantry and Loyalists by Petit Bourg to Berville, &c. on the 3d following to secure Basse Terre, and embarking the Remainder of the Troops during the ensuing Night.—The following Re-inforcements for the other Islands will sail immediately, at the same Time joining the Regiments or Parts of them to which they belong respectively, where they will be better recovered to take the Field again after the Hurricane Months, *viz.*

- | | |
|--|--------------------------|
| 4 Flank Companies of the 6th and 9th Reg ^{ts} | fail for St. Lucia. |
| 2 Flank Companies, 60th Reg ^t | - - - for St. Vincent's. |
| 2 Flank Companies, 65th Reg ^t | - - - for Grenada. |
| 1 Grenadier Company, 21st Reg ^t | - - - for Antigua. |
| 1 Light Company, 21st Reg ^t | - - - for St. Kitt's. |
| 1 Battalion Company, 21st Reg ^t | - - - for Dominica. |

All those Detachments being made, I retain on Basse Terre (being that Part of Guadaloupe remaining in our Hands) Petit Bourg, &c. the 39th, 39th, 43d, and 65th Regiments, 3 Grenadier and 3 Light Companies of the 15th, 58th, and 64th Regiments, from Martinico, with the Corps of Emigrants and Loyalists.

I have now occupied the Ground with my whole Force between St. John's Point and Bay Mahault, having erected Batteries with 24 Pounders, and Mortar Batteries at Point Savon and Point St. John, opposite to the Town of Pointe à Petre and the Shipping, both of which I shall endeavour to destroy, and which Situation gives perfect Security to Basse Terre.

As the Harbour is also perfectly blocked up by the Admiral, the Enemy must suffer every Distress; and should we receive Re-inforcements earlier than the French, there will not be any Difficulty in regaining Grande Terre immediately after the Hurricane Months shall be over.

Extract

No. 9. *continued.*

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Berville Camp, opposite Point à Petre, Guadaloupe, July the 8th, 1794.

(Marked Secret.)

I HAVE the Honour to acknowledge receiving your separate Letter of the 24th May last, communicating His Majesty's gracious Permission for my returning to England for the Recovery of my Health, which is truly much impaired; and I request you will represent to His Majesty, that I feel most sensibly his Goodness in granting to me His Royal Indulgence, being greatly weakened by the Climate and Campaign; thus circumstanced, I must avail myself of the Leave which His Majesty has been pleased to grant, although it grieves me infinitely to quit my Command before Grande Terre be retaken.

Your Dispatch of the 28th April past, states the Manner in which you purpose re-inforcing this Army by filling up with Recruits the 10th, 16th, 32d, 45th, 48th, 49th, 60th (3d Batt.) and 67th Regiments, which is now however impracticable, as those Regiments were drafted before my Arrival in the West-Indies, and the Skeletons are long since gone to England; nor do I deem this an unlucky Circumstance, as Recruits or Troops sent out in that Manner only serve to fill the Hospitals, and are swept away by the Climate, consequently are not of any Use here, therefore seasoned Regiments only should be sent. In Answer to your Secret Letter of the 6th May, I can only say, that about 6,000 Men should be sent to the West Indies as soon as possible; but as it may be difficult to collect so great a Number in a short Time, I recommend that from 1,200 to 2,000 Men be sent to re-inforce these Islands with all possible Expedition.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Martinico, July the 17th, 1794.

(Marked Secret.)

I HAD the Honour to acquaint you, in my Letter of the 8th Instant, of my Determination to avail myself of His Majesty's gracious Leave of
R
Absence

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No. 9. *continued.*

Absence to return to England, but was soon afterwards convinced of an absolute Necessity for my remaining in this Command some Time longer, by Letters received from Martinico and St. Lucia, and other Circumstances till then unknown to me, which induced me to sail for this Place immediately, where I arrived with the Admiral on the 13th Instant. I have accordingly determined to continue until the present unsettled and critical State of those captured Islands shall assume a more satisfactory Aspect, or till I may be relieved by another Officer to take the Command, who I beg may be sent soon; for I am but too sensible of my not possessing sufficient Strength to serve another Campaign, and of Course I cannot attempt it. Yet I see and feel too forcibly the Necessity of my remaining here a little longer, to reconcile the Idea of my leaving those Islands in the present Situation of Affairs, or in adopting a Measure so evidently and eminently requisite for the Good of His Majesty's Service, the Security of our Territory recently acquired, and the Interest of the Public.

I beg Leave to repeat my Solicitation for General Officers and more Troops to be speedily sent out to reinforce this Army, and I conceive Two or Three complete Regiments might be sent out in Frigates and Line of Battle Ships immediately, without waiting for a tedious Convoy and Transports, which would be of most essential Service, especially if they should arrive earlier than any French Convoy at Grand Terre, in Guadaloupe, as it would not only secure our present Possessions, but might enable us to recover that Part of the Island.

The Success of the Enemy in retaking Pointe à Petre, has occasioned the Discovery of many Persons in all the conquered Islands who are not well disposed to our Government, being such evil-minded, dangerous Spirits as should not now be suffered to remain, having before been deterred by our Success from manifesting their Principles. In the mean Time, from the Steps I shall take, I may venture to assure you of the Safety of Martinico, St. Lucia, and Basse Terre (the latter being that Part of the Island of Guadaloupe which remains in our Possession) and I may add, that I deem them to be in perfect Security, unless the Enemy should receive large Re-inforcements before we receive any. You know, Sir, my Army was not large at first, and that the Sword and Climate have diminished that Number too considerably, by both of which the commissioned Officers have suffered in the greatest Proportion, and that I have not received any Re-inforcements excepting some Recruits, most of whom are either dead or in the Hospitals.

Three

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No. 9. *continued.*

Three of the Four Regiments sent to me from Ireland, were immediately forwarded to their original Destination, Jamaica and St. Domingo, under the Command of Brigadier General Whyte; and having detained the Eight Battalion Companies of the 35th Regiment in these Islands (being One of the Four Regiments from Ireland) I replaced them with Eight Flank Companies from hence, under Lieutenant Colonel Lenox, who went also to Jamaica and St. Domingo, consequently my Number and Strength was less after those Four Regiments had arrived than before.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Boyne, off Guadaloupe, July 21st, 1794. (Marked Secret.)

I AM just returned from Berville Camp, opposite to Pointe à Petre, where I have the Pleasure to announce every Thing is perfectly safe and quiet, the Batteries nearly compleated; and the Men much recovered, and healthier in general than they have been, it being a wholesome Situation.

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No. 10.

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No. 10.

Copy of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Major General Williamson;
dated Martinico, the 10th May, 1794.

Martinico, the 10th May, 1794.

Sir,

SINCE writing to you last, at which Time I was preparing for an Expedition to Cayenne, we have received undoubted Intelligence of the Enemy's being reinforced at that Island, to the Number of near One Thousand Regular Troops, and that they have Four Thousand Blacks and Mulattoes in Arms; also, that their Fortifications were quite compleated, and would require heavy Cannon to be brought against them, which would take up too much Time, and a Force and Resistance so infinitely beyond what I could draw from these Islands to surmount, that it has determined the Admiral and me to give up all Idea of it for the present, when there remained not even a Prospect of Success. Besides which, the Sicknefs and Mortality increase much in these Islands: This, however, is attended with One good Consequence, and it was an additional Reason for relinquishing the other Expedition, that it enables me to give you a further Re-inforcement of Eight Flank Companies, viz. those of the 22d, 23d, 35th, and 41st Regiments, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Lenox, to sail immediately. Two Hospital Mates, properly belonging to the Island of Jamaica, sail with them, as does also Major of Brigade Grey (Captain Grenadiers 41st Regiment.)

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

C. Grey.

His Excellency
General Williamson, &c. &c. &c.

No. 11.

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No. 11.

Copy of a Letter dated 28th April, 1794; and Extracts from those of the 18th December, 1793, the 13th of January, 6th of February, 7th of March, 22d of April, 24th of May, 25th of August, 28th of September, and 21st of November, 1794—from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey, K. B. dated Whitehall, 28th April, 1794.

(Marked Secret.)

Whitehall, 28th April, 1794.

Sir,

YOU will receive this Letter by the Intrepid Man of War, which carries out 80 Light Dragoons dismounted, conformably to the Request contained in your Secret Letter, No. 13, with their Arms and Accoutrements, including their Saddles and Bridles.

Referring you to my Secret Letter, dated the 22d Instant, in which I have expressed my Anxiety to send you a further Re-inforcement the Moment it is practicable, I take this Opportunity of giving you the earliest Information of the Mode in which it is proposed to be done. Allowing a reasonable Time for the procuring of Transports, and for their Passage to Barbadoes, you will be perfectly aware that the Re-inforcement they would carry out, could not now arrive in the West Indies before the sickly Season of the Year; and this, as the Re-inforcement in Question must, in the present Case, necessarily consist of Recruits, is a Circumstance the more to be attended to: It is therefore judged proper to take the King's Pleasure for detaining in the

West Indies, the Regiments mentioned in the Margin, which are under Orders to be drafted, and to send out to them their respective Recruits from hence, in Time to arrive in the West Indies by the very Beginning of November next: These Recruits already consist of 1,300 Men, and, by the Time proposed for their Departure, it may reasonably be expected that they will consist of a Number sufficient, or nearly sufficient, to complete each of the above Regiments to 600 Rank and File, or, in other Words, will amount to 3,433 Men, the Number wanting

to

No. II. *continued.*

to complete the said Regiments, by the last Return of the 1st February, 1794. It seems a Circumstance very much in Favour of sending out the Recruits in the Manner above proposed, that they will thereby not only arrive at a healthy Period of the Year, but at a Time when, if at all, an Effort might, by a Possibility, be made by the French to regain what they have lost in that Quarter; the Recruits in Question will have the Benefit, in the mean Time, of being trained, and will besides have the Advantage on their Arrival in the West Indies, of being immediately incorporated with experienced and seasoned Non-commissioned Officers and Privates, and will, by their Means, become efficient Corps in a very short Time. These Considerations taken together, have induced His Majesty's Servants to adopt the Mode of re-inforcing you, which I have stated, and you may rely upon such a Re-inforcement as I have mentioned being sent from hence in Time to arrive at Barbadoes by the First Week of November next.

Should the Recruits for the drafted Regiments fall short of the Number, which I have supposed they will amount to at the Time of their embarking for Barbadoes, that Deficiency will be supplied by Recruits raised for the other Regiments in the West Indies.

I am, &c.

Henry Dundas.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey, dated 18th December, 1793.

(Marked Secret.)

Whitehall, 18th December, 1793.

Sir,

BEFORE this Dispatch reaches you, the Accounts of the Transactions which have taken place at St. Domingo must have arrived at Barbadoes, and it is likely that you may have acted upon them in such a Manner as to secure to Great Britain the Advantages obtained in that important Colony. Without

No. II. *continued.*

Without meaning to take from you the Exercise of any Part of that Discretion which your Instructions have vested you with, I think it right to state to you what occurs to me on the Subject of your Expedition, under the Circumstances which have recently occurred.

When you left this Country, I understood it to be your Intention to make your first Attempt on the Island of Guadaloupe, and perhaps likewise of St. Lucia; doubting how far, under the Diminution of your Force, which had taken place, it would be possible for you, during this Campaign, to take any Measures for the Capture of Martinico. Circumstances which may have come to your Knowledge since your Arrival in the West Indies, may have altered your Intentions, and I have a perfect Reliance that your Conduct will be regulated by what is, on the Whole, best for His Majesty's Service: But considering the Importance of preserving the Advantages we have already gained, and of establishing ourselves securely in the Island of St. Domingo, I should not act candidly with you, if I did not express the Feeling I have, that any Appropriation of your Force, if necessary for those Purposes, would be approved of, even if was to have the Effect of postponing, for the present, the Objects which you might otherwise aim at in the Leeward Islands. His Majesty being, however, desirous to strengthen your Hands as much as possible, I have the Satisfaction to inform you, that He has ordered the 22d and 41st Regiments to sail without Delay from Cork to Jamaica; and I am in Hopes that the Arrival of those Regiments there will enable Major General Williamson to make such Detachments to St. Domingo as, aided by the good Disposition of the Inhabitants, may secure the important Posts already obtained, and probably make a Progress in obtaining a Possession of the Remainder of the French Part of the Island. If that should prove to be the Case, you will possibly then have the Means in your Hands of making such a Distribution of your Force as may complete the Success of this important Enterprize, and secure the Whole of so valuable an Acquisition, without encroaching on the Force you would wish to apply to the other Objects of your Command.

Amidst the various pressing Services which demand immediate Attention, I am still unable to ascertain with Precision, whether One or Two more Regiments may not be spared for the Services to be performed in the Leeward Islands. Feeling, as I do, the utmost Anxiety that all our West India Objects might be obtained in the Course of this Campaign, I shall never lose Sight of adding, if possible, to the Means of doing so; but if it is found
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No. 11. *continued.*

be impracticable, I shall at least have the Satisfaction of thinking, that the best Use will be made by you of the Means which His Majesty has been enabled to put into your Hands.

I am, &c.

Henry Dundas.

Sir Charles Grey,
&c. &c. &c.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey; dated Whitehall, 13th January, 1794.
(Marked Secret.)

One Inclosure.

THE 22d and 41st Regiments sailed from Ireland to Jamaica, under the Convoy of the Alarm and Adamant, on or about the 10th Instant, and you will see by the inclosed Extract of my Letter to Sir Robert Boyd, that you may expect a Reinforcement of Two Regiments at the least from Gibraltar, as soon after Sir Robert Boyd's Receipt of my said Letter as possible.

In Mr. Dundas's to Sir Charles Grey, of 13th January, 1794.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Lieutenant General Sir R^d Boyd, K. B. dated Whitehall, 6th January, 1794.

THE Service which is going forward in the West Indies requires an immediate Reinforcement, and if the 1st and 18th Regiments should have returned to Gibraltar, it is His Majesty's Pleasure that they, after being completed

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No. 11. *continued.*

completed to 600 Rank and File per Regiment, be sent without a Moment's Delay to Barbadoes, and on their Arrival there to put themselves under the Orders of General Sir Charles Grey, commanding His Majesty's Troops on that Station. The Admiral will be instructed by this Opportunity to furnish the necessary Convoy.

I have named the 1st and 18th Regiments, from an Idea that they are likely to have returned to Gibraltar; but if, from any Distribution of the Force which has been made, these particular Regiments have not returned, it is His Majesty's Pleasure that other Two Regiments, made up to the Numbers I have mentioned, should be sent; and this Order must be understood to be given with no other Latitude, than what may arise from Circumstances unknown at Home, and which shall appear to you of a Nature to justify the refraining from carrying this Order into Execution, because it cannot be done with Safety to the Fortrefs under your Command. Nay, so much does the Service in the West Indies press for a Reinforcement, that if the Exigency of the Service at Gibraltar does not stand in the Way of it, His Majesty authorizes me to express His Wishes, that Three in place of Two Regiments should be detached to the West Indies. But as to this additional Regiment, I do not convey to you His Majesty's Commands in the same positive Manner I have done with regard to the other Two, leaving to your own Discretion to act agreeably to what you may conceive most consistent with the Importance and Exigency of the respective Services.

Upon a Communication which has been had with the Commissioners of the Navy, it is conceived that you have now a sufficient Number of Transports with you for the Performance of this Service; but if any Difficulty should arise on this Head, you must, if possible, endeavour to supply any Deficiency of Tonnage at Gibraltar.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey; dated Whitehall, 6th February, 1794.
(Marked Secret.)

IN my Letter to you of the 13th Ultimo, I acquainted you, that in Addition to the 22d and 41st Regiments from Ireland, Two Regiments at the

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No. 11. *continued.*

the least might be expected from Gibraltar, in consequence of my Letter to Sir Robert Boyd, of which I enclosed you an Extract. But as the subsequent Distribution of the Regiments sent from Gibraltar to Toulon will not allow of their Return to Gibraltar for the present, Two more Regiments, besides the 22d and 41st, are under Orders to proceed from Ireland to the West Indies.

Particular Circumstances which might have endangered the Safety of the Transports, having on Board the 22d and 41st Regiments, rendered it expedient for them, with their Convoy, to return to Cork, after they had set sail. They will now, however, sail again for the West Indies without Delay.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey; dated Whitehall, 7th March, 1794.

I HAVE Reason to suppose, that the 22d and 41st Regiments for Jamaica have already sailed from Cork, under Convoy of the Alarm and Belliqueux, to which Ships Orders were sent for sailing with the First fair Wind, on the 18th Ultimo. Under the same Convoy were directed to sail the 23d and 35th Regiments, which are the Two other Regiments, exclusive of the 22d and 41st, mentioned to you in my Letter of the 6th Ultimo. One, if not both of these Regiments, will, I hope, have embarked before the sailing of the Convoy. I trust that the above Regiments, with such Means as your own Judgment and Abilities shall dictate, may enable you to embrace the several Objects contained in your Instructions.

Extracts of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey; dated Whitehall, 22d April, 1794.
(Marked Secret.)

IN Addition to the Four Regiments (including Two for Jamaica) which sailed from Cork on the 22d Ultimo, under Convoy of the Belliqueux of 74 Guns,

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No. 11. *continued.*

74 Guns, and the Alarm Frigate, you may be assured that my Anxiety for the Execution of all the important Objects in View will not let slip the First possible Opportunity of sending you a further Re-inforcement; but the present Employment and Distribution of His Majesty's Forces will not allow me to state the precise Period when this can be effected: In the mean Time I shall, without Delay, give Directions for sending the 80 dismounted Dragoons, with Saddles and Bridles.

As you propose to attack St. Lucia next in Order, and afterwards Guadaloupe, I trust that the Regiments from Ireland, which I have mentioned in the former Part of this Letter, will arrive in good Time for strengthening your Hands, if not for attacking, at least for the Purpose of leaving Garrisons in those Islands.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey; dated Whitehall, 24th May, 1794.

IN consequence of the Request made by you, in the joint Letter from you and Sir John Jervis, His Majesty is most graciously pleased to allow you to return to Europe, for the Reasons you have suggested; you will therefore avail yourself of His Majesty's Pleasure, in such Manner as you are of Opinion will best suit His Majesty's Service, and your own Convenience. I have sent a Copy of the Letter above mentioned to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, in order that they may judge how far the Request of Sir John Jervis may be complied with, and that they may give their Orders accordingly.

It is of much Importance that, previous to your returning Home, all possible Assistance should be given for the Furtherance of His Majesty's Service in St. Domingo. I am therefore particularly anxious to draw your Attention to this Part of your Instructions, and to such Steps as may enable you, in Concert with Sir John Jervis, to send thither as great a Re-inforcement, both Naval and Military, as the Security of the Leeward Islands will admit of. This is the more material, because it is evident, that the Importance of any Assistance which can be sent to St. Domingo during the present Season, is very much enhanced by the Effect it must produce, in facilitating all future Operations in that Quarter. Should you, therefore, be of Opinion, that the

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No. II. *continued.*

Forces under your Command, exclusive of the Four Regiments which failed from Ireland the 22d of March last, are sufficient for the Security of the Leeward Islands, you will, in that Case, be enabled to detach all those Regiments to Jamaica, or St. Domingo, as you shall judge most proper, or such other Troops in lieu of them, as you shall be of Opinion the Circumstances of the Case may require.

You will be already informed, from my Letter of the 28th Ultimo, that 3,400 Men, to complete the Regiments under Orders to be drafted, will be sent from hence in Time to arrive in the West Indies by the First Week in November. A certain Portion of them, if judged necessary, may be allotted for the Service of the Leeward Islands; and from the Time of your Departure from thence and that of their Arrival, the Season alone, independent of other Circumstances, must render any Attempt from France in that Quarter impracticable.

Having stated these Particulars for your Consideration, I am confident, that whatever Measures can be taken, for aiding and supporting His Majesty's Service in St. Domingo, will be adopted by you.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey; dated Horse Guards, 25th Aug^r, 1794.

I RECEIVED, on the 18th Instant, by Lieutenant Colonel Coote, your Letters numbered 31 and 32, and on the following Day, by Colonel Dundas, your Letter No. 33, and have taken the earliest Opportunity of laying these Dispatches before the King.

His Majesty cannot but feel the greatest Concern that the Attempt which was made to regain Possession of Pointe à Petre was not attended with Success, and particularly that on this Occasion He has lost so many gallant Officers and Men. His Majesty at the same Time is fully persuaded that Brigadier General Symes, and the rest of the Officers and Men employed on this Enterprize, exerted themselves to the utmost of their Power, and though they failed in effecting the Object they had in View, that no Want of Spirit or of Zeal can be attributed to them.

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No. II. *continued.*

From the arduous and fatiguing Service which your Troops have so lately undergone, in the various important Operations on which they have been employed, and reduced as they are in point of Numbers, His Majesty is convinced that you have judged prudently in deferring to renew the Attack on Grande Terre until you shall be so re-inforced, that it can be done with a better Prospect of Success than could reasonably be expected at the Moment, and I have I hope good Ground for supposing that you will shortly find yourself in a Situation to be able to recover Possession of that Part of the Island which is now in the Hands of the Enemy.

Measures have already been taken for sending to you, with all possible Expedition, the 17th Regiment of Infantry from Southampton, and Three of the Regiments now serving at Gibraltar, viz. the 46th, 61st, and 68th, the Whole consisting of near 2,400 Rank and File, and I expect that by the 20th of next Month a further Re-inforcement of Three Regiments, consisting of not less than 2,000 disciplined Troops, will be ready to follow them from hence; on the Arrival of the Whole, or perhaps a Part of these Troops, I flatter myself you will feel competent to renew your Attack upon Grande Terre, and to dislodge the Enemy from every Possession they may have on any of the Islands in those Seas.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey; dated Horse Guards, 28th Sept. 1794.

THE Convoy, with a considerable Re-inforcement of Troops for the West Indies, being on the Point of sailing from Portsmouth, I avail myself of the Opportunity to explain the Causes of the Detention of the First Division, and of the Arrangement which has been made in consequence, for supplying you immediately from hence with the greatest possible Number of the Troops, which, by my Dispatch of the 25th Ultimo, you were led to expect, in Two Divisions.

The 17th Regiment left Portsmouth in the Beginning of this Month, with Two other Regiments, destined to relieve the 46th, 61st, and 68th at Gibraltar, and was to have proceeded from that Port with the Three last mentioned to Barbadoes; but the Transports having been obliged by the Weather to put into Plymouth, and to remain there until the Time fixed upon for the sailing of

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No. 11. *continued.*

of the Three Regiments, viz. the 31st, 34th, and 79th (forming the Second Division) was arrived; the 17th will proceed with the Two first of them, now in Readiness at Spithead, directly to Barbadoes, and in Company with the 81st and 96th, destined for St. Domingo, where I am much concerned to find that the Mortality among the Men has been as great as in the Leeward Islands. The distressing Accounts I have received of the reduced Situation of the Garrisons at the Mole, and at Port au Prince, render their speedy Arrival of the utmost Importance. I have thought proper to mention this Circumstance, lest you should entertain any Idea of detaining them, in order to assist in the Expedition on which you will naturally proceed against the Enemy at Guadaloupe, the Moment it is practicable. With respect to the 79th Regiment, some Causes, with which I am unacquainted, have prevented its reaching the Rendezvous at the Time appointed; and, as I have no Accounts of its having as yet actually sailed from Holland, I am unwilling that the Convoy should lose the Opportunity of the present fair Wind, and the Remainder of the Force has been ordered to put to Sea without waiting for its Arrival. I have every Reason to suppose that the Troops destined to relieve the Three Regiments under Orders to join you from Gibraltar, have left Plymouth with a fair Wind, so that you may expect this valuable Addition to your Force, nearly as soon as that which proceeds directly from England.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Charles Grey; dated Horse Guards, 21st November 1794.

THE First Division to join you will, I imagine, be the Three Regiments from Gibraltar, and next to them the Three Regiments from hence, the latter of which, from various unfortunate Circumstances, have but very recently failed; but as the Easterly Winds seem now to have set in, it is probable their Passage will soon be effected.

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No. 12.

Extract of a LETTER from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Major General Williamson, dated Whitehall, 13th December 1793; and Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Major General Williamson, dated Whitehall, 20th March 1794.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Major General Williamson; dated Whitehall, 13th December 1793.

FOR the more effectual Security and Protection of those Parts of St. Domingo, which have already or shall submit to His Majesty, I am to inform you, that the 22d and 41st Regiments of Foot will immediately sail from Cork to Jamaica, under Convoy of the Alarm and Adamant Frigates, and of the Fly Sloop of War. Each of the above Regiments will consist of 600 Rank and File, which, from what is stated to me by Lieut. Col. Dansey, will, with the Force already at Cape St. Nicola Mole, be fully sufficient for its Defence.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Major General Williamson; dated Whitehall, 20th March 1794.

I HAVE to lament that some unforeseen Circumstances, and since, a Continuation of Westerly Winds, before unheard of, and which still continues, have hitherto delayed the sailing of the 22d and 41st Regiments from Ireland.

No. 13.

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No. 13.

Copy of a Letter from John King, Esquire, Under Secretary of State, to
Major General Williamson, dated 3d April 1794.

Whitehall, 3d April 1794.

Sir,

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Dundas to inform you, that the 22d and 41st Regiments, for Jamaica, and the 23d and 35th Regiments for Barbadoes, sailed from Cork, under Convoy of the Bellicieux and Alarm, the 22d Ultimo, with a fine Gale E. S. E.

I am, &c.

J. King.

Major General Williamson,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 14.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Ralph Abercromby to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated 27th October 1795.

I HAVE now had an Opportunity of considering the Instructions you sent me, and of comparing the Means given me, with the End proposed. The Number of Troops required for the Windward and Leeward Island Service, has been furnished; in general they are well equipped, and are healthy.

The Transports on which the Troops are embarked are, in general, unexceptionable. The Hospital Staff is nearly complete.

Regulations for the Care of Men on Ship Board, and on their Arrival in the West Indies, have been framed by Military and Medical Men of Judgment and Experience; and no Pains or Expence have been spared to furnish

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No. 14. *continued.*

furnish the Troops with every Article for their Accommodation and Comfort, in Health and in Sicknefs.

The Artillery and Military Stores now embarked will prove sufficient for the Service. I have the fullest Confidence in the Temper and Professional Abilities of the Naval Commander with whom I am to act.

With all these Prospects and Advantages, it would be too presumptuous to count on the Certainty of Success; some of those Accidents and Disasters that have befallen other conjunct Expeditions may attend us.

The greater Part of the Troops *destined for the Charibee Islands*, are already embarked; and if the Weather should prove favourable, of which at present there is little Appearance, the Whole of the Infantry might be embarked on Thursday Morning.

No. 15.

Copy of a LETTER from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Jeremiah Fitzpatrick, Kt. M. D. dated 8th September 1794.

Horse Guards, 8th September 1794.

Sir,

THE King having been pleased to appoint you to be "Inspector of Health for the Land Forces, with a particular View to their Situation when on Board Transports," I have it in Command from His Majesty, to state to you the principal Objects of your Appointment, and the Duties expected from you; for the Discharge of which His Majesty places an equal Reliance on your Experience and Zeal, and on the Readiness of the respective Departments with which you will be connected, to afford you every Assistance and Facility towards rendering your Exertions of more immediate and extensive Utility to the Public Service.

Upon receiving Information that any Transports are to be prepared for the Conveyance of Troops, Horses, Live Stock, or Stores for the Armies Abroad,

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No. 15. *continued.*

Abroad, you are to examine how far the Vessels are calculated for the Purposes of their Destination; to suggest the most eligible Means of rendering and keeping them wholesome by Fumigation and Ventilation; to point out the Methods of fitting them up, best adapted to their Construction and Capacity, as well as to the Services for which they are intended; and to see that they are provided with all such Accommodations for Cleanliness and Comfort as shall be most likely to preserve the Men, while on Board, in a State of Healthiness, as well as with every Thing requisite for the Relief of those who may happen to be sick.

When any Corps are ordered for Embarkation, you will repair to the Port where their Transports are assembled, and observe that every necessary Preparation has been made for their Accommodation; that the Vessels are properly watered; that the Provisions laid in for the Use of the Troops are good of their Kind; that there is in the Possession of each Corps a due Supply of Hospital Bedding, Medicines, and Articles of Diet for the Sick; and, in short, that nothing is wanting for the Maintenance of the Healthy, or the Comfort of the Indisposed.

At the Time of Embarkation, you will, by personal Examination, inform yourself of the State of Health of the Troops, and, by Representation to their Commanding Officers, where the Occasion requires it, prevent any Man from being put on Board Ship, who shall appear to you in a Condition not fit to be embarked.

Your Requisitions on all Matters touching the Transport Service, are to be made to the Commissioners for Transports, or to their Agents on the Spot, who will have Instructions from their Board to cause what you recommend to be executed without Hesitation in all Cases, except where the Charge of making the proposed Alteration, or other Considerations attending it, shall appear to the Agents to be of such Magnitude, as to demand a previous Reference to the Commissioners, and where the Nature of the Measure suggested will admit of such Reference being made, without manifest Risk of Inconvenience to the Service.

What I have thus far stated, may be considered as marking your immediate Duties under the Commission which His Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer upon you; but I am authorized to say, that it is not intended to confine your Sphere of Action to the Objects above enumerated, should you be able, consistently with your Attention to them, to visit the British Army on the Continent, and obtain the Permission of His Royal Highness

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No. 15. *continued.*

Highness the Duke of York, to submit to him (through the proper Departments of that Army) any Observations that may occur to you as conducive to Improvement in the Mode of pitching Tents, and forming Huts, or other Covering for the Troops in the Field, or in Winter Quarters; in the Means of moving the Wounded and Sick from Place to Place, or of sending them over to this Country; and in the various Details of Hospital Service.

Lastly, when called upon at Home by the Commander in Chief, the Secretary at War, or the Army Medical Board, you are to give your Assistance and Advice in determining upon the properest Spots, in regard to Health, for the Erection of Barracks and Hospitals, and upon their Construction and fitting up. You are also, if required, to visit occasionally the established Hospitals and Barracks, in order that it may be ascertained beyond a Doubt, that in Point of Accommodations, Diet, Medicines, and Medical Attendance, every Thing practicable is done that can contribute to the Preservation of those who have devoted themselves to the Service of their Country.

Any material Occurrences in the Course of your Proceedings, you will, from Time to Time, report to me for His Majesty's Information.

I am, &c.

Henry Dundas.

Sir Jeremiah Fitzpatrick, Kt. M. D.

T 2

No. 16.

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No. 16.

COPY of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to the Commissioners for executing the Transport Service, dated 23d January 1795; and a Copy of their Answer to Mr. Secretary Dundas, dated the same Day.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to the Commissioners for executing the Transport Service, dated 23d January 1795.

Hisse Guards, 23d January 1795.

Gentlemen,

I THINK it right to transmit to you the Newspapers which were published this Morning, containing the Substance of some Parts of the Debate which took place Yesterday in the House of Commons, respecting the Situation of the Troops at Plymouth. Besides what is stated in these Papers, some Reflections were cast on the Conduct of Government for a supposed Inattention to the proper Accommodation of the Troops in Question; not only by embarking them on Board of Transports, supposed to have been appropriated to Hospitals, which had never been properly purified, but that a sufficient Quantity of Tonnage was not allowed to them. I am far from supposing that any of the Neglects imputed to your Department are well grounded; but at the same Time I feel it a Mark of Public Duty to call upon you to furnish me with such Explanations upon these Subjects as the Nature of the Case immediately requires, with a View to your Justification against the Complaints which have been alledged.

I am, &c.

Henry Dundas.

Commissioners for Transports.

Copy

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No. 16. *continued.*

Copy of a Letter from the Commissioners for executing the Transport Service to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Transport Office, 23d January 1795.

Nine Inclosures.

Sir,

Transport Office, 23d January 1795.

IN obedience to the Commands contained in your Letter of this Day's Date, we have the Honour to transmit the respective Reports of the Tonnage of Transports, appropriated for the Reception of the 96th, 81st, 34th, 31st, and 17th Regiments, together with the actual Number reported by our Agents to have been embarked in the several Divisions under their particular Charge.

These Transports sailed from Portsmouth on the 21st of October last, under Convoy of His Majesty's Ship the Trusty, and having reached the Longitude of 7° 31' West, and Latitude of 48° 20' N. they, in obedience to the Directions of the Captain of His Majesty's Ship Trusty, bore up for Plymouth, where they arrived on the 28th of October last, having parted Company with the William and Mary, having on Board 128 Men of the 17th Regiment; this Transport, it is believed, had attached herself to His Majesty's Ship Assistance, which Ship was charged with a Convoy bound to the Mediterranean.

Immediate Attention was paid, upon Return of these Transports into Port, and every requisite Addition of Tonnage, or Change of Transport, as existing Circumstances might render necessary, afforded: The Nature of which, together with our general Directions, upon a Subject we considered so essential, will be explained by the Copies and Extracts of Orders sent to and received from our several Agents.

Requests had been made for the Supply of certain Articles not allowed by established Custom for Troops embarked. The peculiar Situation of the Troops, under the Prevalence of a Westerly Wind, induced us to refer the Request to the Consideration of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, from whom we received Directions to provide the Articles,

N° 16. *continued.*

cles, the Nature and Extent of which are explained in the Paper herewith transmitted.

Wine had been previously supplied, and Sour Krout, from His Majesty's Victualling Office, upon our Request to the Commissioners of that Department.

We have the Honour to be, &c.

*Hugh C. Christian.
Philip Patton.
Ambrose Serle.*

The Right Honble.
Henry Dundas, &c. &c. &c.

EXTRACT

No. 16. *continued.*

EXTRACT from the General Embarkation Book, relative to the Regiments under the Direction of Captain George Rice, and destined for the West India Islands.

(1) In Letter from the Commissioners for Transports, 23d January 1795.

	Men	Women	Total Number.	Tonnage.
The 96th Regiment embarked at Plymouth on the 13th September 1794; their Strength 674	674	62	736	1,472
Transports appropriated—5 Ships, equal	—	—	—	1,760
Surplus Tonnage afforded this Regiment	—	—	—	288
The 81st Regiment embarked at Southampton the 27th September 1794; their Strength 989	989	—	989	1,978
Transports appropriated—7 Ships, equal	—	—	—	2,204
Surplus Tonnage afforded this Regiment	—	—	—	326
The 34th Regiment embarked first at Southampton in the Month of August last; landed in Zealand; re-embarked and arrived at Spithead 27th September 1794; their Strength 541	541	52	593	1,186
Transports appropriated—4 Ships, equal	—	—	—	1,225
Surplus Tonnage afforded this Regiment	—	—	—	39
The 31st Regiment embarked at Southampton in August last; landed in Zealand; re-embarked and arrived at Spithead September 27th 1794; their Strength 562	562	66	628	1,256
Transports appropriated—4 Ships, equal	—	—	—	1,262
Surplus Tonnage afforded this Regiment	—	—	—	6
The 17th Regiment embarked at Southampton the 3d September 1794; their Strength 660	660	—	660	1,320
Transports appropriated—4 Ships, equal	—	—	—	1,349
Surplus Tonnage afforded this Regiment	—	—	—	29

*Hugh C. Christian.
Philip Patton.
Ambrose Serle.*

COPY

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No. 16. *continued.*

Copy of a Letter from the Commissioners for executing the Transport Service to Captain Schank, Agent for Transports, dated 3d November 1794.

(2.) In Letter from Commissioners of Transports of 23d January 1795.

Sir,

Transport Office, 3d November 1794.

HAVING received from Lieutenant Skipsey, our resident Agent at Plymouth, a Report of the State of the Transports under the Direction of Captain Rice, destined to the West Indies, we find that there is a Probability that some Aid may be required from the Transports under your Direction, in which Case you will be cautious to appoint only such as, in every Point of Consideration, may be deemed perfectly fit for the Service proposed; and we acquaint you, that we have directed Lieutenant Skipsey to put under your Convoy the Admiral Parker, a disabled Ship, the Master of which you will order to accompany you to the River Thames to be refitted; and we equally desire, that if the Barnes (another Transport under Captain Rice's Orders) should, upon Survey, be found defective, that you will also take this Transport under your Orders, and cause her to attend you to the River Thames for the Purpose of being refitted.

We refer you to our Letter of the 29th of last Month, for the Instructions respecting the Proceeding of the Transports under your Directions; and we are to request, that if you are by any Cause detained at Plymouth, you will attend the Survey of the Barnes, and report to us not only your Opinion of her State, but also oblige us by communicating your Sentiments at large upon the general State and Condition of the Embarkation under the Direction of Captain Rice.

Captain Schank, Agent of
Transports, Plymouth.

We are, &c.

(Signed)

*H. C. Christian.
Philip Patton.
Ambrose Serle.*

Copy

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No. 16. *continued.*

Copy a Letter from Captain Schank, Agent for Transports, to the Senior Lieutenant Colonel of the Troops in the Transports under Convoy of the Trusty; dated 6th November 1794.

(3.) In Letter from the Commissioners of Transports, 23d January 1795.

Sir,

Plymouth, 6th November 1794.

IN a Letter from the Honourable Commissioners of the Transport Board, of the 3d Instant, I am directed to attend the Survey of the Barnes, and also to give them my Opinion at large on the general State and Condition of the Embarkation, now in Catwater and Plymouth Sound, bound to the West Indies.

Having complied with the Commissioners Orders, and having remedied such Wants as the Agents with me saw necessary, and finding that several sick Men had been landed, and many more were sick, and that the landing those Men would encourage others to wish for the same Indulgence, and which, if complied with, would lessen the Strength of the Army now on Board the Transports; I have therefore taken upon me, with the Advice of Captain Rice the Resident Agent, and Lieutenant Whitaker, to point out the Advantage it would be to make an Hospital Ship of the Amity Brig, and to divide the Men on Board the Troop Ships, or otherwise on Board the Victuallers, to put the Surgeons of the General Hospital, with their Medicines, on Board the Hospital Ship, with every other Necessary that can be had for the Good of the Sick, which would separate the sick and healthy Men, and would be a Comfort to both.

Trusting that this will meet with the Consent and Approbation of the Honourable Commissioners of the Transport Board, I am to request you will be pleased to give the necessary Orders for those under your Command to forward this Alteration; and if not under your Command, you will be pleased to send it to whoever you know has Authority, as I conceive it will be of great Utility to the King's Service.

To the Senior Lt Col of the Troops
in the Transports under Convoy
of the Trusty.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

T. Schank.

Attested,
Alex. Whitehead, Secy.

U

Extract

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No. 16. *continued.*

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant Skipsy, Resident Agent for Transports, to the Commissioners for conducting His Majesty's Transport Service; dated Plymouth, 8th November 1794.

(4.) In Letter from the Commrs for Transports, 23d Janr 1795.

THE enclosed Letter, and mine of Wednesday, will state to you the Intentions I had in View, with the Concurrence and Opinion of Captain Schank, to appropriate the Amity Brig to the Use of a temporary Hospital Ship; however, at a Meeting of the Lieutenant-Colonels of the different Regiments embarked for this Expedition (at which Captain Schank and myself were present) the Opinion of them was, that from the Size of the Amity she was barely sufficient for the present Conjuncture; and that from the now sickly State of the Troops, and the Probability of others becoming so, it would be highly necessary to make Application for a larger Ship to be applied for that Purpose; I therefore had intended to have written to you for the Lady Taylor, but your Letters of Yesterday (which from being afloat the Whole of the Day, I did not receive till Night) prevents the Application, and points out another Duty for her.

The Lieutenant Colonel is perfectly satisfied with this Change, and his Regiment is ordered to hold themselves in Readiness to remove from one Ship to the other at Seven To-morrow Morning. The Lady Taylor is in proper Condition to receive them, and I shall superintend the cleansing the Barnes for the Purpose she is to be applied.

Attested,
Alex. Whitehead, Secy.

Copy

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No. 16. *continued.*

Copy of a Letter from Captain Schank, Agent for Transports, to the Commissioners for the Transport Service; dated Portsmouth, 13th November 1794.

(5.) In Letter from the Commrs of Transports of 23d Janr 1795.

Hon^d Sirs,

Portsmouth, 13th Novr 1794.

I WAS honoured with your's of the 29th of October, containing the Copy of that sent to me at Cork, as also that of the 3d of November, wherein you have given me Directions to attend the Survey of the Barnes, and to give you my Opinion at large of the general Embarkation of the Troops under the Direction of Captain Rice; as also to transmit to the Agent for Prisoners at Forton, the Return I made you.

In Obedience to your Orders, with the Resident Agent, Captain Rice, and Lieutenant Whitaker, I proceeded on that Duty, employing myself and those Gentlemen as nearly as possible to the Instructions I had the Honour to receive from you, and directed Lieutenant Skipsy to acquaint you of our Daily Transactions, it being necessary that One of us should be employed on Board the Ships, making such temporary Arrangements as we saw necessary; and I continued on that Duty until the 11th Instant, when I sailed under Convoy of the Saturn, and with the Transports in the enclosed List.

My Opinion of the general Embarkation of Troops under Captain Rice, is like all others, before they leave Port, or have been some Time at Sea, in general not so clean and regular as could be wished, and the Complaints and Requests of the Officers of the Army are just the same as I have ever observed in the different Wars in which I have been employed in the Embarkation of Troops. These Complaints and Requests I do not mean to say are made with an Intent to retard the Service, or to ask more than Government liberally gives them, but proceed from a Want of Knowledge of what is really allowed them, and a mistaken Idea of what a Ship can carry; so that I may with Safety say, that according to my Judgment, that, with the Hospital Ship you have been pleased to approve of, and the Addition of the Intrepid of 360 Tons, whose additional Tonnage may be used to thin the Troops on Board the other Ships, or to be an additional

U 2

Hospital

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No. 16. *continued.*

Hospital Ship, provided she was supplied with Births or Hammocks for that Use; after which I do not hesitate to give, from under my Hand, they are as complete as any I recollect to have seen, or had the Honour to embark.

How far they may be in Want of Sour Krout, Medicines, or Medical Assistance, I will not pretend to say; but some of every Species, with Vinegar, Windfalls, Junk for Swabs, good wholesome Water, and being supplied with the Oil of Tar, agreeable to your Directions, I do not recollect any Thing that the Navy Board ever furnished, but what those Ships have.—The Complaints of the Barnes, which no Doubt the resident Agent has acquainted you of, appear to wholly lay with the Master, whose Conduct, while with me in the West Indies, was very reprehensible.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

J. Schank.

The Commissioners of
Transports.

LIST

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No. 16. *continued.*

LIST of ARTICLES supplied to the Transports at Plymouth, not usually supplied to Troops embarked; together with their Distribution.

(6.) In Letter from the Commissioners of Transports of 23d of January, 1795.

Plymouth, 1794.

Lieutenant William Skipsey,

Bought of John Wilkey.

Nov^r 14. 2 Tierces Moist Sugar, viz.

		C. Qrs. lbs.	
No. 1.	—	5	2 10
2.	—	5	3 —
		11	1 10 a 58/ £. 32 17 8

2 Tierces Ditto.

No. 3.	—	6	1 —
4.	—	6	— —
		12	1 — 60/ 36 15 —

22. 4 Tierces Ditto.

No. 5.	—	5	3 7
6.	—	4	— 17
7.	—	4	— 14
8.	—	5	2 2
		19	2 12 62/ 60 15 7

For

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No. 16. *continued.*

For the following Ships:

25.	General Elliot	-	5	3	24				
	Mellish	-	5	1	12				
	Progreſs	-	4	2	8				
	Doncafter	-	4	3	8	Tierce.			
	Francis and Harriet	5	2	4					
26.	Adventure	-	6	2	24				
27.	Amity	-	5	1	16				
	Hannah	-	5	—	24				
	Eolus	-	5	1	14				
	Ceres	-	5	1	24				
Dec ^r 1.	Harmony (2d)	-	7	—	16				
4.	James	-	2	3	12				
			64	1	18	60/	193	4	8
						9 Tierces	—	13	6
						<u>£. 324 6 5</u>			

Plymouth, 26th November 1794.

Lieutenant Skipsey, Agent of Transports,

Bought of Philip Bowen.

Raw Sugar.			Bought of Philip Bowen.		
			C.	Qrs.	lbs.
Lady Taylor	-		7	—	8
Pitt	-		5	2	16
			<hr/>		
			12	2	24 a 60/ £. 38 3 —
			<hr/>		
Lady Jane	-		5	—	24
Three Sifters	-		6	1	—
			<hr/>		
			11	1	24 64/ 36 13 6
			<hr/>		
			£. 74 16 6		
			<hr/>		
			Lieutenant		

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No. 16. *continued.*

Lieutenant William Skipsey,

Bought of William Fillis.

1794.
Nov^r 17. 1 Hhd. — 63 Gallons Vinegar, a 2/6 £. 7 17 6

Lieutenant Skipsey,

To James Giles, D^r.

1794.
Nov^r 22. Moist Sugar — C. Qrs. lbs. a 60/ £. 19 10 —

TOTALS.

£. 324 6 5
74 16 6
7 17 6
19 10 —
£. 426 10 5

Attested.

(Signed) *Alexander Whitehead, Sec^r.*

SCHEME

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No. 16. *continued.*

SCHEME for the Distribution of Sugar, at the Rate of Half a Pound each Man per Week for Two Months, being Troops destined for Foreign Service, under the Direction of Captain George Rice, Principal Agent.

Ships.	Troops.	Libs. of Sugar.	Women.	Children.	Libs. of Sugar.	Casks Sour Crou.	
General Elliott	—	152	608	15	—	60	4
Mellish	—	136	544	14	—	56	4
Monmouth	—	148	592	12	—	48	4
Firm	—	105	420	11	—	44	3
Doncaster	—	123	492	12	—	48	3
Eolus	—	147	588	3	1	14	4
Three Sisters	—	170	630	5	—	20	5
Amity	—	142	568	9	—	36	4
Harmony	—	146	584	7	2	32	4
Hannah	—	137	548	7	4	36	4
Adventure	—	169	676	19	—	76	5
Henry	—	153	612	14	—	56	4
Ceres	—	139	556	14	—	56	4
Progress	—	116	464	12	—	48	3
Francis and Harriot	—	141	564	14	—	56	4
Pitt	—	117	468	9	—	36	3
St. Mary's Planter	—	151	604	16	—	64	4
Lady Jane	—	134	536	12	—	48	4
Governor Wentworth	—	157	628	18	18	108	4
Lady Taylor	—	170	680	21	14	112	5
Pitt	—	139	556	14	10	76	4
Flora	—	28	112	5	3	26	1
James	—	51	204	15	8	76	1
Men	—	3,071	12,284	278	60	1,232	85
Women	—	273	1,112				
Children	—	60	120				
Hospital Ship	—	—	1,400				
Total	—	3,400	14,916	Attested, (Signed) Alex ^r . Whitehead,			

Attested,

(Signed) *Alexr. Whitehead,*

Secy.

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No. 16. *continued.*

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hay, &c. of the 31st Regiment, to Lieutenant Skipsy, Agent for Transports at Plymouth; dated 10th January 1795.

(7.) In Letter from the Commissioners for Transports, 23d January 1795.

Sir, Adventure Transport, 10th January 1795.

I THINK it my Duty, as commanding the 31st Regiment, to send the inclosed Representation of the Progress Transport; if it could be conveniently changed, I am well convinced it would be of material Advantage to the Service; if it cannot, I have to represent, that the Tinning of the Copper is entirely wore off, and request you will give Orders, while we remain here, to have them put in proper Order for the Use of the Troops.

Below you have the Dimensions of the Height betwixt Decks, which, in my Opinion, renders the Ship very improper for a Transport going to the West Indies.

I am, &c.

Adam Hay,
Lt. Col. 31st Reg.
Jas. Smith,
Lt. 31st Reg.

	Feet.	Inch.
Fore Hatch,		
Between Deck and Deck	5	7
Deck and Beam	4	8
Main Hatch.		
Between Deck and Deck	5	0
Deck and Beam	4	3

Attested,
Alexr. Whitehead, Secy.

Lieut. Skipsy,
Resident Agent for Transports
at Plymouth.

X

Copy

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No. 16. *continued.*

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Worship, Surgeon of the
31st Regiment, to Colonel Hay; dated 10th January
1795.

(8.) In Letter from the Commissioners of Transports, of 23d January 1795.

THE Progress Transport, having on Board Part of the 31st Regiment of Foot, is, in my Opinion, unfit for the Troop Service. She is extremely low between Decks, and from that Cause, principally, the Soldiers have had much Sickness among them, and it increases daily; so alarming is it now become, that they are dying very fast—Four have made their Exit in the Course of the last Three Days; and more dreadful Consequences are hourly to be apprehended, unless the Ship is speedily changed.—I feel myself under the Necessity of representing the State of the Ship to the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, Colonel Hay.

(Signed) *Benj. Worship,*
Surgeon 31st Regt.

Catwater,
10th Jan^r 1795.

To Colonel Hay,
commanding 31st Regiment.

Copy of a Letter from the Commissioners for executing
the Transport Service to Lieutenant Skipsey, Agent for
Transports at Plymouth; dated the 15th January, 1795.

(9.) In Letter from the Commissioners of Transports of 23d January 1795.

Transport Office, 15th January 1795.

Lieut. Skipsey,

WE have received your Letter of the 13th Instant, and acquaint you that Five Feet is the Standard Height allowed in the Transport Service. If Time will admit, and there be a Transport adequate to the Removal of the Difficulty

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No. 16. *continued.*

Difficulty stated in the Letter of Lieutenant Colonel Hay, of the 31st Regiment, you are at Liberty to afford the required Accommodation, but may not hazard Detention thereby in a Moment so critical as the present. We desire you to report why the Transports under Lieutenants Stuart and Hall did not avail themselves of the Westerly Wind to proceed according to their Orders.

We are,
Your affectionate Friends,

Resident Agent
for Transports,
Plymouth.

(Signed) *H. C. Christian.*
Philip Patton.
Ambrose Serle.

Attested,
Alex. Whitehead, Secretary.

No. 17.

Copy of a LETTER from Mr. Secretary Dundas to the Commissioners
for executing the Transport Service; dated 6th February, 1795.

Horse Guards, 6th Feb. 1795.

Gentlemen,

BY Letters which have been received from Sir Jerome Fitzpatrick, I have Reason to apprehend, that from the Sickness prevailing among the Troops now on Board the Transports at Plymouth, and the supposed infected State of some of the Ships, it may be necessary to have Recourse to you for other Transports for the Accommodation of the Troops in Question. Sir Jerome is going on with the Inspection of the Transports; and if my Fears should be well-grounded, you will, as far as the Extent of the Shipping at that Place put under your Charge will admit, direct your Agent there to comply with any Requisition which may be made to him by Sir Jerome for the Removal of the Troops from the Ships wherein they are now embarked, into other Transports free from the supposed Infection, for the Purpose of conveying them to the Places of their Destination.

I am, &c.

Henry Dundas.

Commissioners of Transports.

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No. 18.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to the Commissioners for executing the Transport Service; dated Horse Guards, 28th February 1795:—And, Copy of a Letter from the Army Medical Board to the Secretary at War; dated 26th November 1794.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to the Commissioners for executing the Transport Service; dated Horse Guards, 28th February 1795.

Horse Guards, 28th February 1795.

Gentlemen,

THE Secretary at War having transmitted to me a Report which he had received from the Army Medical Board, containing their Opinion upon the Articles of Diet necessary to be put on Board an Hospital Ship, when appointed to attend any considerable Number of Troops embarked for distant Service, and on Board every Transport on Board which such Troops are to be embarked, I herewith enclose to you a Copy of their Report; and I am commanded to signify to you His Majesty's Pleasure, that all the Articles therein recommended are to be supplied and sent on Board the Hospital Ship and Transports now fitting up for the Service, on which the Regiments mentioned in the Margin are ordered to proceed. And it is His Majesty's further Pleasure, that a small Quantity of Port Wine should be furnished for the Use of the British Army to each of the Transports, now under Orders to proceed to the Continent, for their Reception.

I am, &c.

Henry Dundas.

Commissioners for Transports.

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No. 18. *continued.*

Copy of a Letter from the Army Medical Board to the Secretary at War; dated 26th November 1794.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Sir,

AS we are ordered to recommend a suitable Medical Staff for 3,000 Men, who are about to embark for a warm Climate, with an Hospital Ship accompanying a sufficient Number of Transports, we beg Leave to recommend, agreeably to the former Report made by us, that a Hospital Ship shall carry out 2 Pipes of Port Wine, 6 Hhds. of Porter, 1 Cwt. of Lump Sugar, 6 Cwt. of Moist Sugar, 6 Cwt. of Rice, 6 Cwt. of Barley, 6 Cwt. of Oatmeal, 3 Cwt. of Salt, 6½ Hogheads of Vinegar, 5 Cwt. of Candles, 5 Cwt. of Soap, 1 Ton of fine Biscuit, 13 Cwt. of Potatoes, and Two Cannisters of Portable Soup, the Amount of which, we are informed, will not exceed £. 270; and also, that each Transport shall take out a small Proportion of such Articles as are most useful, viz. 10 Hogheads of Porter, 2 Doz. of Port Wine, 6 lb. of Portable Soup, ½ Cwt. of Pearl Barley, ½ Cwt. of Rice, ½ Cwt. of Moist Sugar, 12 lb. of Soap, the Amount of which will not exceed £. 34. for each Ship: But if the Proportion of Wine on Board the Hospital Ship, or any other Article, should be thought too expensive, or if the Article of Porter in the Transports may not be thought necessary for the well Men, the lessening the Quantity of these Articles may be adopted.

Signed,

Lucas Pepys.
John Gunning.
Thomas Keate.

Copy

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No. 19.

Copy of a LETTER from Mr. Secretary Dundas to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, 3d September 1795:—And, Copy of a Letter from the Army Medical Board to the Secretary at War; dated 22d February 1795.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, 3d September 1795.

Horfe Guards, 3d Sept. 1795.

My Lords,

I having been represented to me by several Officers of Distinction who have served in the West Indies; that it would materially contribute to the Health of the Troops employed in that Climate, if they could be furnished with a certain Daily Allowance of Porter during the ensuing Campaign; I immediately consulted with the Commissioners of Transports on the Means of sending with the Forces which are to proceed from England and Ireland on the Expedition now preparing for the West Indies, a Supply of this Liquor; and the said Commissioners having informed me, that a certain Quantity could be stowed on Board each Ship destined to receive Troops, I am commanded to signify to your Lordships His Majesty's Pleasure, that you are, without a Moment's Delay, to give the necessary Orders to the proper Department, to provide as much Porter as, on a Communication with the Commissioners of Transports, can without Inconvenience be received on Board the Ships above-mentioned; and to concert with the above-mentioned Commissioners the Time and Place of its Embarkation.

I am, &c.

Henry Dundas.

Lords Commissioners of
the Treasury.

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No. 19. *continued.*

Copy of a Letter from the Army Medical Board to the Secretary at War, dated 22d February 1795.

Sir,

WE have the Honour to acquaint you, in answer to your Letter, that we think the Health of the Soldiers on Board of Transports will be, in the First Place, essentially preserved by not crowding the Transports, and by having the Transports properly cleaned and regulated before the Embarkation of the Troops.

In the Second Place, we think their Health will be preserved by taking away entirely the Use of Spirits, and substituting Porter in it's Place. It is presumed, a Quart of Porter per Day may be supplied at little more Expence than the present Allowance of Spirits, and as these Spirits are to be diluted with Water, the Stowage for the Porter will not be increased.

As to the Articles of Sour Krout, Sugar and Vinegar, they may be proper for the Sick, but do not seem to be necessary for common Diet; they should be reserved for the Sick; and if Potatoes could be allowed as an Addition to their Provision for the short Time the Troops are at Sea, their Health would be much better.

(Signed)

*Lucas Pepys.
John Gunning.
Thomas Keate.*

No. 20.

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No. 20.

Copy of a LETTER from Mr. Secretary Dundas to the Commissioners for executing the Transport Service; dated 24th September 1795.

Gentlemen,

Horfe Guards, 24th September 1795.

IT having been represented to me by the principal Military Officers under Orders to proceed to the West Indies, that an Allowance of Potatoes to the Troops during their Passage would materially contribute to their Health and Comfort, it has occurred to me that a large Supply of this Article could be stowed on Board the Ships specified by you for the Conveyance of the said Troops, by appropriating to this Service the spare Tonnage which, by your Letter of the 18th Instant, appears to remain disposable, on Board the West India Ships taken into the Service of Government; I am therefore to signify to you His Majesty's Pleasure, that you are immediately to provide and put on Board the Ships destined to carry Troops from this Country to the Leeward Islands, a Quantity of Potatoes, sufficient for the Use of 15,000 Men for Fifteen Days, at the Rate of One Pound per Man for each Day. A Supply of the same Article sufficient for 12,000 Men, in the same Proportion, and for the same Number of Days, is to be provided at Cork, and put on Board the Ships in which the Force destined for St. Domingo is to proceed from that Port.

I am, &c.

Henry Dundas.

Commissioners for Transports.

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No. 20. continued.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to the Commissioners for executing the Transport Service; dated 24th September, 1795.

Horfe Guards, 24th September 1795.

Gentlemen,

IT having been represented to me by several Officers who have served in America and the West Indies, that the most beneficial Effects would be derived to the Troops employed in hot Climates, from a certain Allowance of Spruce Beer being made to them; and that in the West India Islands this Article may be made with very little Difficulty or Expence, from the Facility with which Molasses may be procured; I am to signify to you His Majesty's Pleasure, that you are forthwith to provide, and to ship on Board some of the Vessels destined to carry Troops to the Leeward Islands, a Proportion of Essence of Spruce, sufficient, with the other necessary Articles to be procured on the Spot, to make a Quantity of the said Beer, adequate to the Supply of 20,000 Men for Four Months, allowing One Quart per Day to each Man; and that a Quantity of the same Article, sufficient for the Consumption of 15,000 Men for the same Period, and according to a similar Allowance, be also shipped on Board the Vessels destined to proceed to St. Domingo.

It having been stated to me by Admiral Christian, that an Offer had been made to your Board, to supply the Troops in Question with Pickled Cabbage at a very reasonable Rate; and it appearing to me that this Article might materially contribute to the Preservation of their Health, and prove a useful Substitute for Sour KROUT, which cannot be obtained; I am further to desire that you will take immediate Measures for providing, if possible, a Proportion of the said Cabbage, sufficient to supply 15,000 Men for 50 Days, at the Rate of One Pound per Man for 20 Days, to be shipped on Board the Vessels destined for the Leeward Islands; and a Supply of the same Article, at a similar Calculation, for 12,000 Men, on Board the Ships destined to proceed from Cork to St. Domingo. If this last-mentioned Supply cannot be procured to the Amount now required, you will not fail to report this Circumstance to me without Delay, mentioning at the same Time what Quantity can be obtained, and put on Board the Ships before the 5th of next Month.

I am, &c.

Henry Dundas.

Commissioners for Transports.

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No. 21.

Copy of a LETTER from Mr. Secretary Dundas to the Commissioners for executing the Transport Service; dated 10th October 1795.

His Guards, 10th October 1795.

Gentlemen,

IT having been recommended by a Board, consisting of Medical Persons attached to the Army, and Military Officers, acquainted by Experience with the Effects of distant Voyages on the Health of His Majesty's Land Forces, that certain Articles hereafter enumerated, under the Description of Medical Stores for the Use of the Sick and Convalescents, should be put on Board all Ships employed in the Transportation of Troops, in the Proportion of

One Dozen of Port Wine.		
Portable Soup	—	6 lbs.
Pearl Barley	—	28 Do.
Rice	—	28 Do.
Molst Sugar	—	28 Do.
Soap	—	6 Do.

for every Hundred Men; I am commanded to signify to you His Majesty's Pleasure, that the Articles above stated, according to that Proportion, are to be provided for the Whole of the Force destined to proceed from Portsmouth and Cork to the West Indies, without a Moment's Loss of Time, and distributed in the several Ships and Transports destined for their Reception; and that a similar Provision is to be made for all future Expeditions of Troops ordered on Foreign Service, instead of the Supplies you were directed to furnish by my Letter of the 28th of February last.

I shall take an early Opportunity of transmitting to you an Extract of the Report made by the Board above-mentioned, containing several Suggestions with respect to the Mode of ventilating and fumigating Transports, and the Species of Provisions to be supplied to the Troops in Health, which it will be necessary that you should carry into Execution in any future Embarkations which

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No. 21. continued.

which may take place, and which, as far as Time and other Circumstances will allow of it, are to be attended to in the present Expedition to the West Indies.

I am,

Henry Dundas.

Commissioners for Transports.

No. 22.

PROPOSAL for a Board of Military and Medical Officers, to frame Regulations for the better Preservation of the Health of Troops at Sea, and on Service in hot Climates.

War Office, 10th September 1795.

SOME general Instructions, according to a long established Form, are given from the War Office for the Government of Regiments on their Passage to Foreign Stations; and in many Instances the Commanding Officers, maintaining by their interior Regimental Arrangements a constant and regular System of Discipline and Cleanliness among their Men while embarked, have been able to conduct them to their Destination in Health and perfect Fitness for Service. It must, however, be admitted, that for Want of more particular Instructions to each Officer commanding in a Transport, the Troops have too frequently suffered in their Health during the Voyage, through the Youth and Inexperience of some of their Officers, and the Inattention of others.

It seems, therefore, highly expedient to form a new Set of Instructions, calculated expressly for the Voyage, which should be printed and delivered to the Senior Officer of each Detachment embarked, and be hung up also in

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No. 22. *continued.*

the public Part of each Vessel; enabling the zealous Officer to do his Duty properly, and leaving the indolent one no Excuse for his Negligence.

It is of still greater Importance, to lay down some Rules for the Care of the Troops on Shore from their first Arrival in a hot Climate; to inform the Officers of the Precautions necessary for the Preservation of their own Health; to make them aware of the Seasons, and even Hours of the Day, when Labour and Fatigue are more or less prejudicial to the Men; to point out the Consequences of their being allowed to expose themselves, when it can be avoided, to the Damps of the Evening; the Necessity of preventing altogether, if possible, the Use of new made Rum, and of substituting other and wholesome Liquors; and, in short, to instruct not only the Commanding Officers, but the rest of the Officers, on the various Points which Military Experience, and Medical Judgment, may deem most conducive to the Preservation of Health in hot Climates.

The present Circumstances of Sir Ralph Abercromby's Command, seem to afford the most convenient Means of supplying these great Defects in our Military System. There are in the Army destined to serve with him, several General and Field Officers, who have crossed the Atlantic more than once in the Command of Regiments, and have served in the West Indies, and in the Southern Province of North America: There are also several Medical Men, who have been employed on the like Services. — From among these Two Classes a Board might easily be composed, with Orders to prepare for Sir Ralph Abercromby's Information, and by him to be submitted to the Duke of York, Two Sets of Instructions, containing such Regulations as they may agree to be best calculated for the respective Objects: the one to preserve the Health of Troops at Sea, the other to guard them, from their very first Arrival in the West Indies, against the general Influence of the Climate, and against the Diseases to which Troops serving there are peculiarly liable.

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No. 23.

REPORT of the Board appointed by Sir Ralph Abercrombie, to consider of Regulations for the better Preservation of the Health of the Troops on the Voyage to the West Indies, and on Service there.

IN consequence of Directions from the War Office, at the Application of Major General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, K. B. to assemble a Board of Military and Medical Gentlemen, for the Purpose of drawing up Regulations for the Treatment and Conduct of the Troops to embark for the West Indies, during the Voyage, and immediately upon their landing in that Country;

The following Gentlemen attended at Southampton on the 28th September 1795:

PRESENT,

Dr. Hayes, Director of Hospitals.

Dr. Hunter, Physician.

Mr. Young, Inspector General of Hospitals.

Mr. Weir, Inspector General of Hospitals.

Dr. Lindsay, Physician.

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Maitland, 9th Reg^t.

The Board proceeded to read the Observations transmitted from the War Office, marked No 1 and 2, and also several Papers which were laid before them, containing many useful Observations; and have come to the following Resolutions:

Ist. KIND OF TROOPS.

The Board thinks it is material to express their Opinion, that upon all Expeditions to the West Indies, it is of the utmost Consequence to the Success of the Enterprize, that the Troops destined for the Service should be composed of formed Soldiers; and further, that it is an additional Advantage, that they should have been some Time in a Climate approaching the Tropics, such as Gibraltar.

II^d. SEASON OF THE YEAR.

The proper Season for Troops to be embarked for a West India Campaign, is the last Week in September or first Week in October, in order that

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No. 23. *continued.*

that they may arrive early in November, from which Time there will be Six Months for active Operations.

III^d. TRANSPORTS.

The Transports to receive the Troops, should be some roomy Ships, not under 300 Tons; and sufficient Heights between Decks for a Man of a common Size to stand upright, and each Man should be allowed Two Tons, or, which would be better, Two Tons and a Half. The Transports, before the Troops embark, should be washed with Quick Lime, and thoroughly purified by Fumigation. The Men should sleep in Hammocks, which, with a View to Ventilation and Cleanliness, are greatly preferable to Standing Births. Each Transport should be provided with Awnings for the Decks. The Troops should not be embarked but as short Time as possible previous to their sailing; should they be detained from unforeseen Circumstances, they ought to be landed, to prevent Disease breeding in the Transports.

IVth. DISCIPLINE ON BOARD TRANSPORTS.

The Discipline to be observed by Officers on Board the Transports, particularly the Commanding Officer, we judge to be of the highest Importance; and the Particulars to be attended to, come under the following Heads:

Cleanliness
Ventilation
Exercise
Diet

FUMIGATIONS

PERSONAL CLEANLINESS.

The Hair should be cut short; it should be combed with a small Tooth Comb every Morning. The Hands, Face, and Feet, to be washed Morning and Evening. Twice a Week at least the Soldiers should be shaved. Once or Twice a Week, in the Morning, their Bodies should be washed all over.

CLEANLINESS in CLOTHING.

A Soldier should put on a clean Shirt Twice a Week; he should also have the Means of changing his Cloaths in case of Wet, by having a spare Jacket, and Pair of Trowsers.

CLEANLINESS

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No. 23. *continued.*

CLEANLINESS in the BIRTHS.

Their Births between Decks should be thoroughly cleaned by sweeping, scrubbing, and scraping every Morning—they should not be washed oftener than Once a Week, and that when the Weather is dry.

They should fumigate between Decks in the Morning immediately after the Place has been cleaned, and after each Meal, having previously removed, by sweeping, all the Filth or Fragments that have been left. The Bedding, whether Hammocks or Beds, should be brought upon Deck every Day, be well aired, agreeably to the Regulations in the Hammock Book. Great Attention should be paid to the Cleanliness of the Privies; and that Buckets of Water may be thrown down frequently in the Day, to prevent the Soil from sticking to the Sides of the Ships.

VENTILATION.

The great Object of Ventilation is to keep up a constant Current of pure Air through the Ship Night and Day. For this Purpose every Transport should be provided with proper Windsails, each having a long Hove, to be distended with small Hoops. They should also have Air Holes, Port Holes, or Scuttles properly disposed in the Sides of the Vessel. When the Weather is wet, there should be *Port Fires*, safely constructed, to be carried between the Decks. They should also be provided with large Bellows, or Patent Machines for Ventilation which ought to be worked Day and Night.

EXERCISE.

The Board think Regulations for Exercise of great Importance, being absolutely necessary for preserving Bodily Strength. With a View to this, the Men should be divided into Three Watches.

They shall be paraded *all* clean, Morning and Evening. They should be drilled as often as the Weather will permit; and when that is not practicable, they should use Shot as Dumb Bells. They may be allowed to dance, or use any other Diversion for the Purpose of Bodily Exercise, as often as their other Duties will permit.

DIET.

The Allowance of Provisions on Board the Transports should be the same as given to the Sailors. The Necessity of this Measure has appeared to the Board

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No. 23. *continued.*

Board in the strongest Light, and should be immediately adopted. Porter we deem preferable to Rum, or any other Liquor; and the Allowance of Two Pints per Day to each Man we think very ample. As Antiscorbutics, there should be Potatoes, Sour KROUT, and Onions, with the above Allowance. We deem the Articles of Provisions, under the Names of Small Species, as Butter, Cheese, &c. unnecessary, and would recommend that they be discontinued. There should be an Allowance of Mustard, Vinegar, and Pepper to each Man, or rather Mefs, per Week. The greatest Care should be taken that the Coppers be kept perfectly clean, and the Operation of cleaning be performed both before and after Use. Great Attention should be paid to the Condition of the Water.

FUMIGATION.

The Fumigation of the Ship we deem highly material, in order to prevent Mischief from confined Air. The Materials for Fumigation may be Brimstone with Saw Duff, or the Brimstone may be thrown over hot Coals—Nitre, to which a little Vitriolic Acid is added; or Common Salt, with the same Addition of Vitriolic Acid—Gunpowder wetted, or the heated Loggerhead in the Pitch Pot. The utmost Precaution should be used to guard against Accidents from Fire in making the Fumigation.

SICKNESS ON BOARD THE TRANSPORTS.

Hospital Ships should accompany the Fleet; and the Sick of the Transports should be removed on Board of them, for the double Purpose of preventing the generating Disease, or interrupting the Discipline of the Transports.

MEDICAL STORES FOR TRANSPORTS.

It has been proposed that certain Articles, under the Name of Medical Stores for Transports, should be furnished to each Transport; the following appear a suitable Allowance for every Hundred Men the Transport contains:

One Dozen of Port Wine.

Portable Soup — 6 lbs.

Pearl Barley — 28 lbs.

Rice — 28 lbs.

Molst Sugar — 28 lbs.

Soap — 6 lbs.

After

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No. 23. *continued.*

After the Arrival of the Troops in the West Indies, the Board would recommend that the greatest Attention be paid to the following Particulars:

STATIONS OF THE TRANSPORTS.

That the Transport come to an Anchor in a good Situation, when the Sea Breeze blows freely, and not to Leeward of low or marshy Grounds. After anchoring on a muddy Bottom, the Cable, when taken on Board, fills the Vessel with a bad Smell, and is productive of Disease; Care should be taken to clean it before it is stowed.

HEALTHY SITUATIONS.

When the Troops are landed, the most healthy Situations are high Grounds, carefully avoiding any Positions to Leeward of Swamps and Marshes; there is Reason to think that new cleared Grounds are very unhealthy.—Sandy Islands along the Coast, commonly called Keys, are remarkably healthy; as Situations of this Kind have no Water, Care must be taken that the Troops placed upon them be supplied with Water, such as is of a good Quality, and not brackish.

BARRACKS, QUARTERS, and ENCAMPMENTS.

When the Troops go into Barracks or Quarters, much Attention should be paid to their being roomy and in healthy Situations; and none of the Men should be quartered, if possible, on Ground Floors; the Men should sleep in Hammocks or Cot Frames with Legs; and, whether in Transports or in Quarters, the utmost Attention should be paid to Cleanliness: If the foregoing Precautions cannot be attended to, the Men had better be kept on Board Transports. Should the Troops be encamped, it would be material for the Preservation of their Healths to have the Tents boarded, as Straw is not to be had in the Country. It has been found in all Countries, that a frequent Change of Ground contributes greatly to the Preservation of the Health of the Troops in the Field; and the Board are of Opinion, that Attention to this Particular is no where of greater Consequence than in the West Indies.

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DIET.

No. 23. *continued.*

D I E T.

The Board considers the Regulation of Diet, in the West Indies, as an Object of the first Importance.—The Men should be divided into Messes, and should have Two regular Meals a Day; for Breakfast, Coffee or Cocoa, with Sugar; for Dinner, Salt Provisions, with Yams, and the Vegetables of the Country, and seasoned with the Spices of the Country.—Fresh Provisions should be served to the Troops as often as is practicable, and the Men should not be allowed to sell or to barter any Part of their Provisions on any Pretence whatever. The Butcher should kill the Meat in the Night, and Care taken that it be delivered early in the Morning, to prevent its being Fly-blown.—The Rum served to the Troops should be at least a Year old, and the Quality of it particularly attended to; when delivered to the Troops it should be mixed with Three Parts Water. Extra Allowance of Rum, or Porter, which is preferable, should be made in Cases of great Fatigue, long Marches, &c. Butter, being generally rancid, should never be issued to the Troops.—Care should be taken that cooking be performed in the Shade.

DISCIPLINE and EXERCISE.

Discipline and Exercise being materially connected with the Preservation of Health, it is recommended that the Men should be exercised moderately and regularly every Morning—they should go to Exercise at the Dawn of the Day, and should not be kept out longer than One Hour and a Half, or Two Hours at most—All Marches should be made by Night.—Bathing in the Sea, with proper Precautions, may be considered as highly salutary.—The Men should not remain in the Water longer than Five Minutes; they should not bathe oftener than Three Times a Week, and the best Time for bathing is early in the Morning.

SEASON FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.

On the Season for Military Operations in the West Indies, the Board think it useful to make the following Observations. The Season is healthy for Military Operations, from the Beginning of November until the End of April. The Time is determined by the setting in of the Rains, which always bring

No. 23. *continued.*

bring Sickness along with them—As soon as the Rains commence, an End should be put to Military Operations, and the Troops should be placed in the healthy Situations already specified.

DUTIES of FATIGUE.

No Cause has been more productive of Disease in the West Indies, than the Duties of Fatigue; whenever they are of such a Nature as they can be performed by Negroes, Care should be taken to have Negroes in Readiness for that Purpose. The Negroes should be employed to drag Guns, bring Water, carry Provisions, and do all Duties performed by Pioneers.

CLOTHING.

The Board highly approves of the Troops being provided with Two Flannel Waistcoats, One Pair of Flannel Drawers for Night Duty, Two Pair of Worsted Socks per Man—Also a Flannel Cap or Welsh Wig, and Two pair of loose Trowsers, made of Cotton Cloth, or Russia Duck—Half Gaiters of Cloth have been found useful as a Defence against Insects.

The Hats should be white.—They should be round, to shade the Face from the Sun, and high in the Crown, to defend their Heads from the Heat.—The Coats should be short skirted, and made sufficiently large to admit of buttoning across the Body.

Each Regiment should be amply supplied with Watch Coats. The Stocks should be made of Black Cloth, in preference to Leather, as better adapted to a warm Climate.

The Knapacks should be made of painted Canvas.

BITES of INSECTS.

Bites of Insects about the Legs often produce in the West Indies large Sores, if neglected.—A Non-commissioned Officer, therefore, should be particularly instructed to examine the Legs of the Men every Morning, and report the State of them to the Surgeon. The Surgeon should also inspect the Legs of the Men twice a Week. No Soldier should be permitted to walk without Shoes, to prevent Chiggers from getting into his Feet, the most common Cause of Sores and Ulcers.

No. 23. *continued.*

The Board think the printed Observations of Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Maitland so judicious and pertinent, that they recommend them to be re-printed, and distributed to all Officers going to the West Indies.

The Observations and Regulations adjusted by the Board, have a Reference chiefly to the private Men; but it must be obvious, that the Spirit of them, as far as relates to Diet, Cloathing, and Exercise, applies equally to Officers.

For them it is further of Importance to observe, that, upon their Arrival in the West Indies, they should avoid exposing themselves unnecessarily to Fatigue in the Sun.—That they should take Exercise regularly, Morning and Evening, and that they should be upon their Guard to resist that Languor and Inactivity, which the Heat of the Climate strongly tends to induce in all Europeans. Much Stress has been laid upon the Meals of the Private Men being ample and regular. It is of no less Importance to the Officer, who ought equally to avoid Abstemiousness in Diet, as he should Intemperance in the smallest Degree approaching to Intoxication.

There is not One of the Regulations recommended in the West Indies, or on Board the Transports, that will not require the Attention, and generally the *Personal Attendance, of an Officer*, to see them fully carried into Execution; without this, the wisest Measures, and the most judicious Regulations, must prove nugatory.

There are many Things recommended, which we fear will appear of a trifling Nature; but we beg that it may be recollected what used to be the Health of the British Navy Half a Century ago, and what it is now. A Voyage round the World, of Three or Four Years Duration, is now performed without Sicknes or Disease; whereas formerly, on a Voyage of as many Months, Half the Crew often perished. This wonderful Difference is only to be ascribed to unremitting Attention to many small Matters, often apparently trifling, and which, severally considered, appear of little Importance. It would be unpardonable not to profit by their Experience.

John M^cNamara Hayes.

John Hunter.

Thos Young.

P. Lindsay.

John Weir.

No. 24.

No. 24.

(No. 1.)—REGULATIONS to be observed by Troops embarked in Transports for Service Abroad, particularly by those destined for the West Indies; dated the 10th of October 1795, and signed by the Secretary at War—And, Regulations for the Use of His Majesty's Troops upon their Arrival in the West Indies.

War Office, 10th October 1795.

REGULATIONS to be observed by Troops embarked in Transports for Service Abroad, particularly by those destined for the West Indies.

REGULATIONS, &c.

THE principal Objects are;

- 1st. To guards against Accidents by Fire.
- 2d. To preserve the Health of the Troops by Cleanliness, Discipline, Regularity in Messing, and general Attention to the Treatment and Conduct of the Soldiers while on Board.

FIRE.

A Sentry is constantly to be placed at the Caboose; or One on each Side, if the Number of Soldiers on Board the Vessel are sufficient, with Orders not to allow Fire of any Kind to be taken without Permission.

The Commissioned Officers are to consider it their especial Duty to see, that in fumigating the Transports, every possible Prevention be used to guard against Accidents by Fire.

All Lights are to be extinguished at Eight o'Clock at Night, except the Lights over which there may be Sentries; the Officers Lights to be extinguished at Ten o'Clock, unless the Commanding Officer on Board should give his Permission occasionally for a longer Time. No Lights are to be suffered among the Men, except in Lanthorns.

No Smoking to be allowed between Decks.

FUMIGATION.

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No. 24. *continued.*

FUMIGATION.

The frequent Fumigation of the Ship is deemed highly material, in order to prevent Mischief from confined Air. The Materials for Fumigation may be Brimstone with Sawdust, or the Brimstone may be thrown over hot Coals; Nitre, to which a little Vitriolic Acid is added, or common Salt with the same Addition of Vitriolic Acid; Gun-Powder wetted, or the heated Loggerhead in the Pitch Pot.

CLEANLINESS, &c.

The Men are to wash their Feet every Morning, for which Purpose there must be Two Tubs of Salt Water in Readiness upon the Forecastle by Six o'Clock in the Morning, and again in the Evening.

They are to comb their Heads every Morning with a Small-tooth Comb; to be shaved Twice a Week at least, and Once or Twice a Week, in the Morning, to wash their Bodies all over; to put on clean Shirts Twice a Week; and to have the Means of changing their Cloaths when wet.

Great Attention is to be paid to the Cleanliness of the Privies, and Buckets of Water are to be thrown down frequently in the Day, to prevent the Soil from sticking to the Sides of the Ships.

The Bedding is to be brought upon Deck every Morning, if the Weather will permit, by Seven o'Clock; and to be well aired, in Conformity to the Regulations of the Transport Board.

The married People should not be allowed, if it can be avoided, to make separate Births *all over* the Ships, by hanging Blankets, which obstruct the Circulation of the Air; but should have adjoining Births in One Part of the Ship, if possible; and at all Events, the Women, as well as the Men, are to be most strictly subject to the Order of getting up at Seven o'Clock, A. M. when all their Partitions must be cleared away for the Day.

The Bedding being brought up, the Men are to proceed in sweeping, scrubbing, and scraping the Births and Decks; but the Decks not to be washed oftener than once a Week, and then only when the Weather is dry—the Time of fumigating between Decks is to be immediately after the cleaning of the Births, and again, if practicable, after each Meal, all the Dirt or Fragments of Victuals being previously removed by sweeping.

The Boards of the lower Births to be removed once or twice a Week, to admit of cleaning under.

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The Officer of the Watch is to be always present, and directing at the cleaning of the Births, &c. and when the Dirt is all cleaned away, to report to the Commanding Officer, who will order the Men to get their Breakfast at Eight o'Clock.

A general Parade to take place at Nine o'Clock, when every Man must appear as clean as his Situation will allow; his Hands and Face washed, his Hair well combed.

At Dinner Time, the Officer upon Duty is to attend to see that the Men are regular at their Messes; that their Rum is mixed with at least Three Parts of Water to One of Spirit; and should he observe any Circumstance of Neglect in victualling the Troops, he is to report the same to the Officer commanding on Board, who, if necessary, will make his Complaint thereupon, as also on any other Matters touching the Conduct of the Masters of the Vessels, to the Agent of Transports.

The greatest Care is to be taken that the Coppers be well and regularly cleaned, both before and after Use.

The Men are to parade again at Half an Hour before Sun-set, quite clean as their Persons.

Cooks to appear clean on Parade once a Day.

At Sun-set the Bedding is to be taken down.

At Eight o'Clock in the Evening every Man is to be in his Birth, except the Men on Watch—the Officer of the Watch to go round with a Lantern to see that the above is complied with.

The Whole to be divided into Three Watches, both Subaltern Officers and Men; the Watch gives all the Sentries, &c. &c.

A Captain of the Day to be appointed, to whom the Subaltern of the Watch will make his Reports, and the Captain to the Commanding Officer, if there be a superior Officer on Board.

The whole Watch to be always on Deck, except when Rain obliges them to go down for Shelter; and, in fine Weather, every Man should be upon Deck the whole Day.

They are to be drilled as often as the Weather will permit; the Use of Shot, as Dumb Bells, and any Diversions calculated for the Purpose of bodily Exercise, should be permitted as often as their other Duties will allow, as of the utmost Consequence in maintaining the Health and Strength of the Men.

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No. 24. *continued.*

THE SICK.

The Surgeon or Mate is to examine the Men's Hands at Morning and Evening Parade, and to observe, in general, if there be any Appearance of Disease in any of them.

The Sick should be separated from those in Health as much as possible; upon the first Appearance of any acute infectious Disorder, the Signals to be made to the Hospital Ship, and the diseased Man removed to her.

Certain Articles of Diet being put on Board each Transport, under the Name of Medical Stores, these are to be considered as intended solely for the Use of the Sick or Convalescents; they are to remain in the Charge of the Master of the Transport, and only to be issued upon Demand in Writing made by the Surgeon from Time to Time, as he shall judge proper, or when there is no Surgeon, upon Demand of the Commanding Officer. And the Surgeon or Commanding Officer is to give the Master, at the End of the Voyage, a Certificate that his Demands for the said Medical Stores have been made only upon proper Occasions, and have not been expended for any other Use than that of the Sick or Convalescent. It will be necessary for the Surgeon or Mate to guard the Men, when they get into a hot Climate, against Costiveness; and as, upon the first Arrival of the Transports in the West Indies, a great Number of Canoes will probably come off with Fruit, Plantains, &c. generally very green and bad, the Soldiers should not be allowed to buy such Trash, and should only be supplied with Fruit and Vegetables under the Order of the Officers, and by the Recommendation of Persons acquainted with the West Indies.

If the Soldiers are cleanly, well mess'd, and attended to in the several Particulars above directed, every reasonable Hope may be entertained of their Continuance in Health.

The foregoing Regulations cannot be so properly concluded, as by most earnestly recommending to the Officer commanding on Board each Ship to cause Divine Service to be performed on every Sunday that the Weather will permit, selecting, where there is no Clergyman on Board, an Officer whose Manners qualify him for that Duty. Independent of the strong Reason which, in a religious View, demands the Discharge of so important and sacred a Duty, the regular Performance of Divine Service has ever been found to produce and promote Cleanliness and good Order among the Soldiery.

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No. 24. *continued.*

The Instructions herein given for the Care of the Troops embarked in Transports, being founded upon the concurrent Opinions of a Number of Officers, both Military and Medical, of the best Judgment and of the greatest Experience, His Majesty relies upon their being observed by every Officer and Soldier with the strictest Attention.

Given at the War Office this 10th Day of October 1795.

By His Majesty's Command,

(Signed)

W. Windham.

(No. 2.)

War Office, 10th October 1795.

REGULATIONS for the Use of His Majesty's Troops,
upon their Arrival in the West Indies.

HIS Royal Highness the Duke of York having laid before the King the Report made by a Board of Military and Medical Officers, who had served in the West Indies, and in the Southern Provinces of America, assembled for the Purpose of drawing up Regulations for the Treatment and Conduct of Troops destined to serve in the West Indies, as well during their Voyage as on their landing in that Country; and His Majesty having been pleased to approve of the said Report, and of the Observations recommended therein, published at Martinico by Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Maitland, Deputy Adjutant-General, His Majesty has ordered, that the annexed Extract of such Parts of the said Report as relate to the Treatment and Conduct of the Troops on their Arrival in the West Indies, together with the Observations of Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, which are subjoined, with some Additions, shall be delivered to every Commissioned Officer now embarked, or who may hereafter embark, for the West Indies; and His Majesty enjoins all such Officers to pay the most particular Attention to the several Directions contained therein, not only as essentially regarding their own individual Safety, but as affording the most effectual Means of preserving the valuable Lives of the Soldiers entrusted to their Charge.

By His Majesty's Command,

Will^m. Windham.

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Extract

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No. 24. *continued.*

Extract from the Report of a Board of Military and Medical Officers, assembled on the 28th of September 1795, at Southampton, for the Purpose of proposing Regulations for the Treatment and Conduct of Troops, during their Passage to the West Indies, and on their Arrival in that Country.

After the Arrival of the Troops in the West Indies, the Board would recommend that the greatest Attention be paid to the following Particulars:

STATIONS of the TRANSPORTS.

That the Transports come to an Anchor in a good Situation, when the Sea Breeze blows freely, and not to Leeward of low or marshy Grounds:— After anchoring on a muddy Bottom, the Cable, when taken on Board, fills the Vessel with a bad Smell, and is productive of Disease; Care should be taken to clean it before it is stowed.

HEALTHY SITUATIONS.

When the Troops are landed, the most healthy Situations are high Grounds, carefully avoiding any Positions to Leeward of Swamps and Marshes; there is reason to think that new cleared Grounds are very unhealthy. Sandy Islands along the Coast, commonly called Keys, are remarkably healthy, but as Situations of this Kind have no Water, Care must be taken that the Troops placed upon them be supplied with Water, such as is of good Quality, and not brackish.

BARRACKS, QUARTERS, and ENCAMPMENTS.

When the Troops go into Barracks or Quarters, much Attention should be paid to their being roomy and in healthy Situations; and none of the Men should be quartered (if possible) on Ground Floors. The Men should sleep in Hammocks, or Cot Frames with Legs; and, whether in Transports or in Quarters, the utmost Attention should be paid to Cleanliness: If the foregoing Precautions cannot be attended to, the Men had better be kept on Board Transports. Should the Troops be encamped, it would

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would be material for the Preservation of their Health to have the Tents boarded, as Straw is not to be had in that Country. It has been found in all Countries, that a frequent Change of Ground contributes greatly to the Preservation of the Health of the Troops in the Field; and the Board are of Opinion, that Attention to this Particular is no where of greater Consequence than in the West Indies.

DIET.

The Board considers the Regulation of Diet, in the West Indies, as an Object of the greatest Importance, The Men should be divided into Messes, and should have Two regular Meals a Day; for Breakfast, Coffee or Cocoa, with Sugar; for Dinner, Salt Provisions, with Yams, and other Vegetables of the Country, and seasoned with the Spices of the Country. Fresh Provisions should be served to the Troops as often as is practicable; and the Men should not be allowed to sell or to barter any Part of their Provisions on any Pretence whatever. The Butchers should kill the Meat in the Night, and Care taken that it be delivered early in the Morning, to prevent its being Fly-blown. The Rum served to the Troops should be at least a Year old, and the Quality of it particularly attended to; when delivered to the Troops, it should be mixed with Three Parts Water. Extra Allowance of Rum (or Porter, which is preferable) should be made in Cases of great Fatigue, long March, &c. Butter, being generally rancid, should never be issued to the Troops. Care should be taken that cooking should be performed in the Shade.

DISCIPLINE and EXERCISE.

Discipline and Exercise being materially connected with the Preservation of Health, it is recommended that the Men should be exercised moderately and regularly every Morning; they should go to Exercise at the Dawn of Day, and should not be kept out longer than an Hour and a Half, or Two Hours at most. All Marches should be made by Night. Bathing in the Sea, with proper Precautions, may be considered as highly salutary: The Men should not remain in the Water longer than Five Minutes, and they should not bathe oftener than Three Times a Week; the best Time for bathing is early in the Morning.

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DUTIES

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No. 24. *continued.*

DUTIES of FATIGUE.

No Cause has been more productive of Disease in the West Indies than the Duties of Fatigue.—Whenever they are of such a Nature, as that they can be performed by Negroes, Care should be taken to have Negroes in Readiness for that Purpose. The Negroes should be employed to drag Guns, bring Water, carry Provisions, and do all Duties performed by Pioneers.

CLOTHING.

The Board highly approves of the Troops being provided with Two Flannel Waistcoats, One Pair of Flannel Drawers for Night Duty, Two Pair of Worsted Socks each Man; also a Flannel Cap or Welch Wig, and Two Pair of loose Trowsers, made of Cotton Cloth, or Russian Duck. Half Gaiters of Cloth have been found useful as a Defence against Insects. The Hats should be White; they should be round, to shade the Face from the Sun, and high in the Crown, to defend the Head from the Heat. The Coats should be short skirted, and made sufficiently large to admit of buttoning across the Body. Each Regiment should be amply supplied with Watch Coats. The Stocks should be made of Black Cloth, in Preference to Leather, as better adapted to a warm Climate. The Knapsacks should be made of painted Canvas.

BITES OF INSECTS.

Bites of Insects about the Legs often produce in the West Indies large Sores, if neglected. A Non-commissioned Officer, therefore, should be particularly instructed to examine the Legs of the Men every Morning, and report the State of them to the Surgeon. The Surgeon should also inspect the Legs of the Men Twice a Week. No Soldier should be permitted to walk without Shoes, to prevent Chiggers from getting into his Feet, the most common Cause of Sores and Ulcers.

The Board think the printed Observations of Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Maitland so judicious and pertinent, that they recommend them to be reprinted, and distributed to all Officers going to the West Indies. The Observations and Regulations adjusted by the Board have a Reference chiefly to the Private Men; but it must be obvious, that the Spirit of them, as far

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as relates to Diet, Cloathing, and Exercise, applies equally to Officers. For them it is further of Importance to observe, that, upon their Arrival in the West Indies, they should avoid exposing themselves unnecessarily to Fatigue in the Sun; that they should take Exercise regularly Morning and Evening; and that they should be upon their Guard to resist that Languor and Inactivity which the Heat of the Climate strongly tends to induce in all Europeans. Much Stress has been laid upon the Meals of the Private Men being ample and regular; it is of no less Importance to the Officer, who ought equally to avoid Abstemiousness in Diet, as he should Intemperance in the smallest Degree approaching to Intoxication. There is not one of the Regulations recommended in the West Indies, or on board the Transports, that will not require the Attention, and generally the personal Attendance, of an Officer, to see them fully carried into Execution; without this, the wisest Measures, and the most judicious Regulations, must prove nugatory. There are many Things recommended which we fear will appear of a trifling Nature; but we beg that it may be recollected, what used to be the Health of the British Navy Half a Century ago, and what it is now. A Voyage round the World, of Three or Four Years Duration, is now performed without Sickness or Disease; whereas formerly, on a Voyage of as many Months, Half the Crew often perished. This wonderful Difference is only to be ascribed to unremitted Attention to many small Matters, often apparently trifling, and which, severally considered, appear of little Importance. It would be unpardonable not to profit by their Experience.

War Office, 10th October, 1795.

Regulations for the Use of Regiments upon their Arrival in the West Indies, published at Martinique in October 1794. Now reprinted with some Additions.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE.

Martinico, 27th October, 1794.

The Commander in Chief is pleased to direct, that the following Observations, intended for the Use of Regiments on their Arrival from Europe

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in the West Indies, be printed and distributed to every Battalion upon its landing; and the General recommends to all Officers strict Attention to the same.

If the Officers who have been in the West Indies will reflect, they must be conscious that the Battalions in which there has been kept up the best interior Arrangement have been always the healthiest, and the most fit for Service. There is no Part of the World, where so much and so regular Attention is required, from the Commanding Officer down to the Ensign. Perseverance in Regimental Duty is here indispensable; without it, it is in vain to give Orders, or to draw up Regulations:—Yet it has been observed, in this consists our first Evil. There is an unaccountable Apathy, which seems to take Possession of almost every One, to the Subversion of Discipline and Attendance upon Duty. If Officers of all Descriptions will not fortify themselves with the Resolution to persevere in regular and daily Inspection and Attendance to their Men's Messing, &c. the Ruin of the Corps is inevitable. It is obvious, that the Conduct of a Commanding Officer is of the first Consequence. Soldiers are the most inconsiderate Beings on the Face of the Earth, and, if left to themselves, are in many Respects helpless. Indeed, every Machine must fail in Effect, if the Cause which sets it in Motion is weak or badly employed.—It is so with a Regiment. As the Foundation, therefore, of every Thing which is desirable, we must obtain the regular and minute Attention of all the Officers, to every Part of the interior Economy of the Regiment; not for a Spurt at first coming, but a continued uniform Discharge of this important Part of their Duty, without Alteration. This obtained, the next Point of Consequence is Regularity in Messing.—Soldiers should have at least Two Meals each Day; the First early in the Morning, the next, consequently, about One o'Clock: Fasting long in this Climate is productive of very bad Effects. It is very material to procure a good Breakfast; fortunately, it is not difficult: Cocoa, Coffee and Sugar are cheap, particularly the two last. These, with Bread, will make out a very sufficient Breakfast. Dinner must be regulated, and consist of the Provisions issued. But to these, with a very little Management, may be added a Variety of Roots, very nutritive and pleasant. A Yam differs very little from a Potatoe. It is material to have the Men early acquainted with the Vegetables of the Country. The Manioc, which is very common in the French Islands, resembles a Yam so much, that a Stranger may easily be mistaken in judging. The Manioc, in its natural State,

State, is a strong Poison, and it is possible that a whole Mess might be poisoned by such an Error. I have heard that at Guadaloupe the Negroes have at Times sold Manioc to the Soldiers, whether from Design or not I cannot say, but it is highly probable. It is understood to be the Intention of Government to issue Twice a Week to the Soldiers fresh Beef in lieu of the salt. There can be no Doubt of the good Effects of this Measure, where good American or Spanish Bullocks are procured; the First are by much the best Beef, and with this Assistance the Corps, in which a good interior Economy has taken Place, will find that their Men can have good Meals, and live comfortably; but to do this they must be cleanly; this is an important Duty; it improves all other Advantages, and lessens every Evil. Cleanliness in the Person of the Soldier, and in the Barracks, are certain Indications of a good Regiment. Filth and Dirt engender quickly, in this hot Climate, Diseases of a putrid Nature. The First Duty of a Morning should be to set the Negroes, allowed for Fatigue Duties, to clean the Barracks. No Dirt of any Kind should be seen in or near the Quarters at Seven o'Clock. If no Fatigue Negroes were allowed, it would then be requisite to have the Men to take this Duty by turns, or, occasionally, it might be imposed as a Punishment. It is needless to give Directions as to Cleanliness of Person; but, on Two Points, there is Room for some Observations, on bathing and wearing Flannel. People differ much about bathing; yet it seems generally agreed, that if it is not abused, that is, improperly done, it is of great Service; it undeniably promotes Cleanliness; and when People find it agree with them it is a great Pleasure to bathe; but Sea Bathing only should be allowed. No Man should stay more than Five Minutes in the Water, nor bathe oftener than Three Times a Week; neither should any One, who is not perfectly well, bathe. Under these Limitations bathing is serviceable. The 49th and 60th (4th Battalion) Two of the healthiest Corps in the Country, regularly bathed in the Sea, but with the beforementioned Precautions; the 9th, at St. Kitt's, did also. It was the universal Opinion, at the Close of this last Campaign, that we stood much indebted to the Use of Flannel for the Health we had till then preserved. The Men had been uniformly exposed to the Heat of the Sun, and to the Chill of the Night, frequently drenched in the hardest Rain, and obliged to remain under Arms, without changing Cloaths. To prevent the bad Effects of these Extremes is the Benefit proposed by using Flannel. Another is to preserve the Body from the sudden Checks of Perspiration,

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to which People who are careless of themselves, and therefore in particular Soldiers, are very liable. Any Exertion in this Climate immediately throws a Man into a violent Sweat; if in this Situation he mounts a Hill, or stands in a strong Current of Air, it is very probable he will cool too fast; it is pleasing to the Sensation, but very dangerous to Health. A Fever is the sure Consequence of the Pores being closed. Experience will have taught every one, that Linen next to the Skin, under the Circumstances we have been speaking of, feels cold, and encreases the Effect of the Air, as we put Linen Bags over Bottles, and place them in a Current of Air, to cool what they contain. Flannel preserves a Warmth on the Skin, it is therefore beneficial to Men exposed to the Changes of Weather, to the Extremes of Day and Night; but it does not therefore follow that it is so when they are quiet in Quarters. Probably in this last Case it is not, except for Night Duty. But all the Benefits to be derived from the proper Use of Flannel will be counterbalanced by greater Evils if the Flannel is not kept constantly washed and clean. If wore too long, it tends to Putrescence, and will certainly bring on putrid Disorders. On no Account should Flannel which has been worn by a Man who has died from Disease of any Kind be permitted to be used by another; it should be burnt always, without Exception. It is very dangerous to put on Flannel which is not dry, or indeed any other Cloaths. The old Evils now occurs, than which the Sword of the Enemy has been less destructive; no one can doubt what is meant—Rum. In the French West India Islands the Evil is still increased, for their Taffia is but one Degree from Poison. As all are agreed upon the pernicious Effects of this cursed Spirit, it will be superfluous to point out its Malignity, and difficult in Practice, though easy in Theory, to find a Remedy. All the Attention of the Officers and Non-commissioned Officers should be directed to prevent the Men from procuring it. It is a good Plan to have a Regimental Canteen near the Barracks, which is open at all Moments to the Inspection of the Officers. By this, Rum of good Quality only can be sold, and in some Measure, and with many Men, the Inducement to go into Town is lessened. It being under the Eye of the Commanding Officer, will also be a Means of preventing Men from drinking to Excess. This and unremitting Vigilance can alone be in any Degree effectual, particularly when the Men can have Access into Town. As it is an Evil of so great Magnitude, it demands proportional Resistance. It not only ruins the Health of the Men, but it undermines Discipline in every Way; as it gains upon a Corps it is like a Canker. To prevent the Soldiers

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diers from going into Town, where they will certainly get at Rum, Gin, &c. the Passport of a Field Officer of the Corps only shall be sufficient. And, as a further Precaution, a Subaltern Officer of the Day is to be appointed, with a small Party, with Side Arms only, whose whole Duty shall be to question every Non-commissioned Officer, Drummer, or Private, whom he meets in or near Town, to know if they have the Leave required; if they have not, to send them immediately to their Corps, with a Crime signed by the Officer of the Day. This Party will also confine drunken or disorderly Men, whether they possess a Pass or not. It is not permitted in the West Indies that an Officer should be allowed to keep a white Soldier as a Servant. As an Equivalent to the Officer for this necessary Restriction, they will be allowed a just Sum to hire Blacks or Mulattoes, which will be paid at stated Periods by the Commissary General: The Quarter Masters of Regiments will Monthly deliver to the Quarter Master General a Return for this Purpose, signed by the Commanding Officer, according to the following Proportion for the effective Officers:

A Field Officer, Three black Servants.

Captain — Two ditto.

Subaltern — One ditto.

Staff in the usual Proportion.

No Officers entitled in Two Capacities.

Inferior Dangers still remain. Many are sent to the Hospital, at least remain sick in Quarters, from eating unripe Plantains, and a Variety of Trash, which bring on Belly Ach and Dysentery. Every Thing of the Kind should be guarded against, and the Men be constantly cautioned on the Subject. The Men are to be cautioned against lying on the Ground, whenever it can be avoided, as it will fill them with Chiggers and other Insects, and if damp will give them the Ague and Fever. The Men ought not to be allowed to carry heavy Baggage, particularly in the Sun, nor to go without their Hats, which is a very common Case when they are doing small Jobs near their Barracks. Taking Draughts of Water when in a State of Perspiration has alone killed many, and sometimes suddenly. Europeans, upon their Arrival, are tormented by the Musquitoes; the most cautious cannot refrain from scratching, so great is the Irritation from their Bites; this produces Sores, which in bad Habits of Body grow worse. It is recommended to every Man to have constantly about him a Lime, which he will use to rub the Places which itch. The Juice of the Lime

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will allay the Itching, and consequently prevent scratching. Standing Orders (and the Neglect of them regularly punished) should be delivered on these Subjects, in each Corps, to Non-commissioned Officers. The Barracks ought not to be crowded with Women, nor Separations be suffered to be made by hanging up Blankets, &c. All Obstructions of this Kind have ever been found to have bad Effects. The Parades cannot be too early in the Morning, nor should they be in the Afternoon till near Sun-set, which will prevent the Men from being exposed to the Sun, than which nothing can be more hurtful. The Commanding Officer, and every Officer, should therefore pay constant Attention in preventing their Men from exposing themselves to the Sun, when it can possibly be avoided, and to procure high and cool Situations for them sleep on, whenever it may be in their Power. The foregoing are certainly the most material Points to be observed in the Management of the Men in this Climate, and if adhered to, will doubtless produce the best Consequences.

Frederick Maitland,
Deputy Adjutant General.

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No. 25.

EXTRACT from the Report made by Doctor Macnamara Hayes, dated the 10th November, 1795, on the Medical Equipment of the Forces under the Command of Lieutenant General Sir Ralph Abercromby, K. B. destined for the Leeward Islands.

Regiments.

THE Number of British Regiments assembled at Southampton, amounted to 20 Battalions, including Three 2d Battalions, viz. 2d, 25th, 29th, with 300 Men of the 26th Light Dragoons.

The Strength of these Battalions were from 800 to 1,000 Men each, except the 2d Battalions, which were from 4 to 600.

Though the Medical Staff of each Regiment should consist of One Surgeon and One Mate, many of the Regiments were without a Mate.

The State of the Health of the Soldiers appointed for this Service, was the first Object of Consideration; on this Principle a general Inspection took Place, where all those labouring under any Disease, Infirmary, or Incapacity whatever, which might prevent their taking the Field on their Arrival in the West Indies (such as the Aged, Boys, Men ruptured, or having sore Legs, &c. &c.) were ordered to be removed from their respective Regiments.

N. B. This Inspection continued to the last Hour of the Embarkation from Southampton, on Account of many Regiments having been drafted, and Recruits daily arriving to fill up the Regiments to their Complement of Men.

The Health of the Troops, while in Camp during the Summer, was remarkably good (the Number of Sick in the General Hospitals never exceeded 400) and of that Number One Third were not Medical Patients.

The Whole of the sick Troops in Camp were already received into the General Hospital, the Surgeons of Regiments not being able to provide themselves with Houses or Barns to form Regimental Hospitals.

Venereal Complaints, and Itch, were rather general amongst the Troops, and though every Attention was directed to the Cure of these Disorders, as well as to prevent their being carried on board Ship, it was found impracticable,

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cable, from the Number of drafted Corps, and Recruits who were daily arriving; failing, therefore, in this, it was determined to separate the Venereal Patients (above 300 in Number) who required a mercurial Treatment, and have them sent on board Transports, where, under the Direction of a proper Medical Staff, their Complaints may be removed during the Voyage, and the Number of Men preserved for the general Benefit of the Expedition.

The Regiments thus completed, and the Men in excellent Health, the next Object was to have each Regiment *well supplied* with Medical Assistants; *Medicines*, &c. being judged the best Method of guarding against the Calamities which have befallen the Troops lately employed in the West Indies.

Surgeons of draughted Regiments were generally attached to the Regiments as Surgeons en Second; and when a sufficient Number of them could not be procured, experienced Hospital Mates were appointed to serve in that Capacity.

An additional Regimental Mate was likewise generally allotted to each Regiment, and in case of any Deficiency, it was supplied from the General Hospital, so that each Regiment on Embarkation was possessed of *Two Surgeons* and *Two Mates*.

The Surgeons en Second were furnished from the General Hospital with a Set of capital Instruments, and each Mate with a Set of Pocket Instruments.

To each Regiment on Embarkation was likewise delivered from Hospital Stores the following Articles:

- 2 Regimental Chests of Medicines.
- 2 Voyage Chests of D^o.
- 200 Bandages.
- 60 Sets of Hospital Bedding, each consisting of
 - 1 Mattress and Bolster Case.
 - 1 Rug.
 - 1 Blanket.
 - 3 Sheets.

In Addition to the above Articles, having found from my Experience in the last War the very great Want of an *Hospital Tent*, Application was made to the War Office to have One furnished for each Regiment, by which Means such

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such of the Troops as may be seized with Fevers, Fluxes, &c. may be separated from the rest in the Tent, so as not to contaminate the healthy, whilst they themselves will be placed in a better Atmosphere for their Recovery.

The Regiments thus amply provided, the Troops were embarked, and where the Number of Transports for each Regiment exceeded Four, an Hospital Mate was put on board each, with a Medicine Chest, to give immediate Assistance to any who may become sick on the Voyage, with this particular Instruction, "that should any Disease, having the least Tendency to Contagion, make its Appearance, the Signal for One of the Hospital Ships should be made, and the Sick immediately removed."

Transports.

Previously to the Embarkation every Transport was inspected, and such as was deemed unfit for the Reception of Troops reported to the Commander in Chief.

Medical Stores were shipped on board each Transport, conformable to the Instructions of the Transport Board; to which were added, Means for Fumigation, according to the printed Instructions, with Lime and Brushes for white-washing between the Decks Once a Month.

The printed Regulations, for the Conduct of the Troops on board Ship, were given to the Commanding Officer of each Transport, with a particular Order from the Commander in Chief, "that the most implicit Obedience should be paid to them;"—the Commanding Officer and Surgeon on board each Ship were directed to report to the Commander in Chief on their Arrival, their Observations in what they were deficient, or exceeded in, during the Continuance of the Voyage.

No. 26.

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No. 26.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Major General Whyte, to Mr. Mr. Secretary Dundas, dated Cork, 11th December, 1795.

" I KNOW no Troops that ought to be, and are more sensible of the Liberality and Attention Government have shewn to them; and hope by their Conduct they will at all Times shew it."

EXTRACT of a Letter from Major General Whyte to William Huskisson, Esquire, Under Secretary of State, dated Cork, 1st February, 1796.

" THE exaggerated Reports of every Thing that happens here induces me to request they may not be paid any Attention to, as you may be assured of having the real State of whatever happens from me.—We continue in better Health than I could possibly expect from such tempestuous Weather, which never continues Six Hours the same."

EXTRACT of a Letter from Major General Whyte to William Huskisson, Esquire, Under Secretary of State, dated Cork, 4th February, 1796.

" There never were Troops embarked for Foreign Service where so great Liberality has been shewn, not only in Medicines, but in every other Thing where the Good or Comfort of the Troops has been considered."

COPY

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No. 26. *continued.*

COPY of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir J. Fitz Patrick; dated Horse Guards, 8th April, 1795.

Horse Guards, 8th April, 1795.

Sir,

UPON a Consideration of what you have stated to me respecting the Situation of the Military Hospitals and other Buildings allotted to the Reception of the Sick and Convalescents at Plymouth, it appears to me expedient that you should return without Delay to that Place, in order that the Improvements you have suggested in the Accommodation, Diet, and Medical Attendance of the Sick may be continued under your immediate Inspection, provided the Arrangements you have to propose for carrying them into Execution should meet with the Approbation of the proper Departments, to which, as I have stated to you in my former Instructions of the 8th of September, 1794, they must be submitted.

As the Duties which you are called upon to fulfil by these Instructions, and the Authority which you have received for this Purpose, under the Commission you hold from His Majesty, appear in some late Occurrences to have given Rise to a Misunderstanding between you and some Officers employed under the Army Medical Board, and the Barrack Office, which if not counteracted in its present Stage, would prove highly detrimental to the Service, I think it right to point out to you as precisely as possible, what I conceive to be the Extent of your Authority, in order that you may, on the one Hand, avoid any improper Interference with the Duties of others, and on the other, be able to ascertain in what Cases, and how far the Execution of the Plans you may have formed are within the Limits of your Instructions, or whether it will be necessary to refer them to the respective Departments, which they may concern, and obtain their previous Approbation.

The Departments under which you are immediately placed by the Nature of your Commission are, the War Office, the Transport Board, and the Barrack Office; and I am not aware of any Case likely to arise in the Relations which may exist between you or the Persons employed under them, to which the following Directions will not be found to apply.

Whenever the Agents or Subordinate Officers of these Departments on the Spot shall concur with you in the Propriety of any Alteration or Innovation

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No. 26. *continued.*

vation you may have to propose, and shall be competent, under the Powers vested in them, to accede to its being carried into Effect, you will, of course, meet with no Difficulty in proceeding to the immediate Execution of the Measures in question; but in all Cases in which the Persons above-mentioned shall differ from you in Opinion, or shall declare themselves not authorized to accede to your Proposals, it will be a Duty incumbent on you to transmit your Plan, without Loss of Time, to the Department to which it may relate, and to apprise the said Persons of your having so done, in order that they may have an Opportunity of making known their Objections, or of applying for further Powers, previously to its being taken into Consideration. By a proper Adherence to this Rule, and such conciliatory and unreserved Communications with the Persons above-mentioned, as your own Prudence will suggest to you, I flatter myself that the Inconveniences and Obstacles which you have hitherto met with will be overcome, and that I shall have the Satisfaction to learn that the Views of Government in forwarding whatever Arrangement can contribute to the Preservation of the Health, and to the Care, Comfort, and Accommodation of the Sick and Convalescents, in His Majesty's Forces, have not been disappointed.

My ardent Wish to attain this most important Object will, I am persuaded, be duly seconded by your Zeal; but I cannot, however, close this Letter without cautioning you against an Evil to which, from your Anxiety to promote the Public Service, you might otherwise unwarily contribute. The Point I allude to is the dangerous Tendency of making Remarks, or entering into Explanations in Presence of the Sick, and particularly of the Soldiers embarked or under Orders to proceed on Foreign Service. Conversations of this Nature, and especially if they are accompanied with any Strictures on the Conduct of the Medical or other Officers, to whose habitual Care the Soldiers are committed, will, if disseminated, create Uneasiness and Discontent, and destroy the necessary Confidence which ought to be reposed in such Persons. It is far from my Intention to intimate by this that you ought to omit noticing any Instance which may occur of Neglect or improper Behaviour; but it will be your Duty, in all such Cases, to confine the Communication of your Observations to the Officer superior in Command to the Person on whom the Blame may attach, or to the proper Department in Town, who will, I am confident, pay all due Attention to your Representation. I can only add, that you will at all Times find me ready to give the most effectual

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No. 26. *continued.*

effectual Support to your unremitting Exertions for the Amelioration of the important Branch of the Public Service committed to your Care and Abilities, and to assist your laudable Efforts in promoting your beneficial Pursuits for the Health and Comfort of His Majesty's Troops.

I am, &c.

*Henry Dundas.**Sir J. Fitz Patrick.*

COPY of a Letter from Sir Charles Grey to Mr. Secretary Dundas; dated Barbadoes, January 20th, 1794.

Barbadoes, January 20th, 1794.

SIR,

I HAD the Honour of receiving your Duplicate Dispatch of the 18th Ultimo, by the Terpsichore Frigate, on the 17th Instant, and instantly wrote to the Governor of Jamaica, a Copy of which is inclosed for your Information; and Yesterday I received the Original of the same Dispatch by Packet.

I shall not fail to embrace every Measure that may prove conducive to the Honour of His Majesty's Arms, and the Interest of the Public, which are inseparable; and being fully of Opinion, that it would be wrong to relinquish the Chance of capturing One or more of those Islands belonging to the French in our Neighbourhood, it is not possible to part with any of the Force now here at the Moment, when we are nearly ready to proceed on the Expedition.

Should I detach any Part of it to St. Domingo, or Jamaica, it would effectually reduce this Army to a defensive One; and should I proceed with my whole Force so far to Leeward as St. Domingo, it would not only expose these Islands to Hazard in the mean Time, but the Difficulty of returning in Transports after that Service might be over would be such, that all Prospect of Success might be vanished, as it is a circuitous and tedious Passage. Should therefore the present Chance of striking a successful Blow be now passed over, the Opportunity may never return; but I shall make an At-

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No. 16. *continued.*

tempt to force some of the French Leeward Islands very soon; after which, whether successful or not, I shall reinforce Jamaica and St. Domingo, as soon as it can be done, consistent with the Good of His Majesty's Service.

The Detachment of Artillery and Recruits, &c. for different Regiments, that sailed with us from Portsmouth for Jamaica, having proceeded, will prove a small Re-inforcement; and the 22d and 41st Regiments, mentioned in your Dispatch to have been also ordered for that Service, where they must speedily arrive, may prove so sufficient a Re-inforcement, that no further Aid will be required from the Part of the West India Army now here, which would prove a most fortunate Event, as being the only one that could bring it within the Bounds of Possibility to obtain all our West India Objects in the Course of this Campaign—a Hope expressed in your Dispatch of the 18th Ultimo.—Impressed as my Mind is with that Suggestion, and truly ambitious to fulfil His Majesty's Wishes and Expectations on this important Occasion, I feel the strongest Impulse to make every possible Effort, and to leave nothing untried that can contribute to it, being an additional and principal Motive for not weakening my Force at present, as that would preclude even the Hope or Attempt to accomplish our Objects in the Course of this Campaign.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

Charles Grey.

Right Honble.

Henry Dundas, &c. &c. &c.

The

The following authentic DIARY of the STATE of the WINDS in the DOWNES, from the 1st of October, 1795, to the 7th of March, 1796, inclusive, although not laid before the House of Commons, is here subjoined, as a necessary Elucidation of the preceding Pages.

October	1.	S. W. by W.	November	1.	S. W.
	2.	W. S. W.		2.	N. N. E.
	3.	E. N. E.		3.	N. N. W.
	4.	S. W.		4.	W. N. W.
	5.	W.		5.	W.
	6.	N. W.		6.	N. W.
	7.	E. S. E.		7.	W.
	8.	S. E.		8.	N.
	9.	S. S. E.		9.	E. N. E.
	10.	S. W.		10.	E. N. E.
	11.	S. W.		11.	N. E.
	12.	N. W.		12.	N. W.
	13.	S. W.		13.	N. W.
	14.	S. E.		14.	N. W.
	15.	W.		15.	N. W.
	16.	S. S. W.		16.	N. W.
	17.	W.		17.	W. S. W.
	18.	S. W.		18.	S. W.
	19.	S.		19.	W. S. W.
	20.	S.		20.	N. N. W.
	21.	S. S. W.		21.	W.
	22.	W. S. W.		22.	S. W.
	23.	W.		23.	N. W.
	24.	W. S. W.		24.	S. S. W.
	25.	W. S. W.		25.	N. W.
	26.	W.		26.	N. W.
	27.	S. S. W.		27.	W.
	28.	S. W.		28.	N. N. W.
	29.	W.		29.	W.
	30.	W.		30.	W. S. W.
	31.	S. W.			

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DIARY

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DIARY of the STATE of the WINDS,
continued.

December 1.	W. N. W.	1795.	January 1.	W. by S.
2.	W. N. W.		2.	S. W.
3.	W. N. W.		3.	
4.	N. W.		4.	W. by N.
5.	W. S. W.		5.	W. S. W.
6.	N. W.		6.	N. N. W.
7.	N. W.		7.	S. W. by S.
8.	E. N. E.		8.	S. E.
9.	E. N. E.		9.	S. E.
10.	E.		10.	E.
11.	N.		11.	S. S. W.
12.	S.		12.	S. W.
13.	S. W.		13.	W. S. W.
14.	S. W.		14.	S. W.
15.	S. W.		15.	W. S. W.
16.	S. S. W.		16.	W. S. W.
17.	S. W.		17.	S. S. W.
18.	S. W.		18.	S. W.
19.	W. S. W.		19.	S. W.
20.	W.		20.	S. W.
21.	S. W.		21.	S. W.
22.	W. S. W.		22.	S.
23.	W. N. W.		23.	S. S. W.
24.	W. S. W.		24.	W.
25.	N. W.		25.	W. S. W.
26.	W. N. W.		26.	S. S. W.
27.	W. S. W.		27.	
28.	W.		28.	S. W.
29.	W. S. W.		29.	S. W.
30.	N. W.		30.	S. W.
31.	S. W.		31.	S. E.

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DIARY of the STATE of the WINDS,
continued.

February 1.		March 1.	E. N. E.
2.	S.	2.	N. E.
3.	W. S. W.	3.	N. E.
4.	N. N. W.	4.	E. N. E.
5.	W. S. W.	5.	E.
6.	W. by N.	6.	N. E.
7.	S. S. W.	7.	N. E.
8.	W. S. W.		
9.	N. W.		
10.	N.		
11.	N. W.		
12.	W. S. W.		
13.	N. W.		
14.	N. W.		
15.	N. W.		
16.	W. S. W.		
17.	W. N. W.		
18.	W. N. W.		
19.	W. N. W.		
20.	N. W.		
21.	W. N. W.		
22.	E.		
23.	E. N. E.		
24.	E. N. E.		
25.	E. N. E.		
26.	E. N. E.		
27.	N. E.		
28.	N. E.		
29.	E. N. E.		

ERRATUM.

Page 58, Line 10, for Count *D'Estaign*, read Count *D'Estaing*.

