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A
VIEW
OF THE
English Constitution
With Respect to the
Sovereign Authority of the Prince,
AND THE
Allegiance of the Subject, &c.

The Third Edition.

With a Defence of the
VIEW,
By way of Reply to the several Answers
that have been made to it.

By WILLIAM HIGDEN, D.D.

London, Printed for S. Keble at the *Turks-Head*,
and R. Gosling at the *Miter* in *Fleetstreet*. 1710.

A
V I E W
 OF THE
English Constitution,
 WITH RESPECT
 To the *Sovereign Authority* of the
PRINCE,
 And the *Allegiance* of the
SUBJECT.

In Vindication of the *Lawfulness* of Taking
 the OATHS, To Her Majesty, by
 Law Required.

By WILLIAM HIGDEN, M. A.

LONDON, Printed for Samuel Keble at the Turk's-
 Head in Fleet-street, over against Fetter-lane, 1709.

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 M. A.

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THE HISTORY OF THE
 CONSTITUTION OF THE
 PARLIAMENTS OF GREAT
 BRITAIN AND IRELAND
 FROM THE FIRST
 MEETING OF THE
 PARLIAMENTS OF GREAT
 BRITAIN IN THE
 YEAR 1707 TO THE
 PRESENT TIME
 BY
 WALTER DAVENANT
 ESQ. OF THE MIDDLE
 TEMPLE
 VOL. I. PART I.

To the READER.

AFTER I had passed, so many
 Years of my Life, without be-
 ing able to Reconcile my Self
 to the Oaths; in the Course of my
 Studies, I met with some Passages,
 which gave me Cause to suspect, that
 I had in some particulars mistaken the
 English Constitution: And altho' they
 did not carry so great a Weight and Evi-
 dence, as to induce me to alter my Sen-
 timents in the main; yet I confess they
 made me pause, gave me occasion for
 Reflection, and inclined me once more
 to take a Review of the Judgment I had
 made so many Years ago; with an In-
 tention, that if upon this Inquiry, I
 should find my *former Judgment* was well
 grounded, to sit down under it in a
 quiet and inoffensive way, whatever In-
 conveniences might attend it: If not,
 then, with my Judgment, to alter my
 Practice.

The *Method*, and *Result* of my Inqui-
 ries, the Reader will meet with in this
 Discourse. And whilst I was making
 them,

To the R E A D E R.

them, I was very free, and open in discourſing with as many of my Old Friends, as were willing to talk with me upon this Head, and with Thoſe eſpecially, whom I took to be beſt acquainted with our Conſtitution, and moſt verſed in this Controverſy. And could I not have ſolv'd their Objections to my own ſatisfaction, I ſhould have ſtopt here; and theſe Papers, as they were never intended for the Publick at firſt, had never ſeen the Light: Part of which are Two Letters in Answer to the Objections of Two of my Friends, with little Alteration, more than was neceſſary, to make them of a Piece, with the reſt of this Diſcourſe.

If any Gentlemen of the Law, ſhould think this Little Piece worth their peruſal; they may be apt to ſay, that I have labour'd ſome Points too much, in proving (what was Obvious) the Legiſlative Authority of Kings *for the time being*, but I was ſenſible that ſome, whom I ſhould be heartily glad to ſerve by this Diſcourſe,

To the R E A D E R.

Diſcourſe, were not ſo well apprized of this Matter.

Now if any one asks, why I was convinced no ſooner? I ſhall return a very ſhort, but a very True Answer: Becauſe I had not ſooner a thorough Inſight into our Conſtitution, and Laws, relating to this Great Point.

An Opinion, or a Practice of Twenty Years Standing; will always have the force of Prejudice on its ſide; but this will make but a light Impreſſion on Minds, which have this ſingle Important Queſtion in their View: Whether the Thing be Lawfull or Unlawfull, a Duty, or a Sin?

The Succeſs which this Diſcourſe hath met with, amongst ſome of thoſe that have ſeen it in Ms. has been no ſmall Inducement to the Publication of it. And, I hope, I have treated the Subject in ſuch a manner, as not to offend thoſe, whom it may not convince.

All Subjects, Thoſe eſpecially, where Conſcience is concern'd, or which any way

To the READER.

way relate to the Christian Faith and Manners, ought certainly to be managed, with that Charity and Meekness, which are the most Genuine Fruits of the one, and the greatest Ornaments of the other. But in what a different manner do we often see, even sacred Subjects treated, so that it may be almost a Question whether these Wars of the Pen, are not in their way, almost as Destructive to the Managers of them, as those of the Sword. 'Tis undoubted, that they who propagate Error in this way, will find it a grievous Aggravation of their Fault, and they who defend the Truth after the same manner, will at least lose that Reward, which otherwise they might have hoped for. And all who use these unlawful and unchristian Arms, may have some reason to fear, without Repentance, lest that Expression may be too properly applied to them, in a Sense beyond what the Poet intended.

animasque in vulnere ponunt.

The

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CHAP. I.

The Supreme Authority of the English Government rests in the King for the time being, and the Allegiance of the Subjects is due to him by the Common Law of this Realm.

I Shall first consider the Authority of the King for the time being, by the Common Law, and then by the Statute Law of this Realm. Now Common Law is common Custom and Usage, or Judicial Proceedings and adjudged Cases, and they appear in Judicial Records and the Year Books.

As for common Custom and Usage, which by an uninterrupted Practice, through a long Tract of time obtains the force of Law; This is so evidently on the side of the Regnant King, that the People of England always submitted and took Oaths of Fidelity to the Thirteen Kings, who from the Conquest to Henry the VII. came to the Throne without Hereditary Titles, as well as to the Six Hereditary Kings who Reigned in

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in that Period ; and this so universally, that I don't know there are any *Non-jurors* to be found in all those Reigns. Of those Kings few met with greater Opposition than *William* the I. and yet after his Government was settled, Oaths of Fidelity were universally taken to him. *Ingulpb* who liv'd in his Reign, saith, *After his return into England, having commanded every Inhabitant of England to do him Homage at London, and to Swear Fealty to him against all Men: He caused the whole Land to be measured, nor was there a Hide of Land in England but he knew it's Value and Owner. The Oaths were, it seems, as strictly, exactly, and universally tender'd, as the Lands described in Doomday-Book; and yet we hear not of one Refuser. Roger de Hoveden speaks of another time, when he commanded, That the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots, Earls, Barons, and Sheriffs, should with their Tenants by Knights Service*

* *Reversusque in Angliam apud Londoniam hominum sibi facere, & contra omnes homines fidelitatem jurare, omnem Angliam incolam imperans totam terram descripsit, nec erat hida in Anglia quin va- lorem ejus & possessorem scivit. Hist. 516. See also W. of Malm- bury de Willelmo primo fol. 59.*

† *Ut Archiepiscopi Episcopi Abbates, Comites, Barones, Viceco- mites, cum suis Militibus sibi occurrerent Saresbrie, quod cum venis- sent milites illorum sibi fidelitatem contra omnes homines jurare coe- git. In Willelmo Seniore p. 164.*

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meet him at Salisbury, and when they came thither, he made their Tenants Swear Fealty to him against all Men. If we descend to the other Kings, who Reign'd without an Hereditary Title, we shall find none of their Subjects refused to Swear Allegiance to them.

It is no wonder if some who submitted, revolted afterwards (and from what Kings have there not been Revolts?) or that when they revolted, they objected to the King's Title, and made it a pretext for their Re- volt. Thus *Odo* Bishop of *Bayeux* and Earl of *Kent* being, as *William* of *Malmsbury* re- lates †, highly discontented, because the Bi- shop of *Durham*, and not himself, was Chief Minister, as he had formerly been, Rebel- led against his Nephew King *William* the II. and with some other great Men who were discontented too, formed a powerful Party against him in favour of *Robert* Duke of *Normandy*, who he said had a better Title, and would make a better King. But this is no prejudice to what I have asserted; since it is evident, that he himself as well

† *Cum omnia non suo arbitrato (ut olim) in regno disponi videret (nam Willelmo Dunelmensi Episcopo commendata erat rerum pu- blicarum administratio) livore ictus & ipse a rege descivit, & multos eodem surro in fecit, Roberto Regnum competere, qui sit & remissioris animi, &c. De Willelmo secundo, l. 4. fol. 67.*

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as the other Great Men whom he drew into his Party, had lived as Subjects and sworn Allegiance to King *William*; otherwise their Revolt could not be charged with Perjury, as it is by the Archdeacon of *Huntingdon*. †

Of all the great Men we meet with in our History, none were more likely to have stood out against the Government of a King *de Facto*, than *Roger* Earl of *Glocester* Base Brother to the Empress *Maud*, and afterwards the great Supporter of her Cause, and Bishop *Merks* of *Carlisle*; and yet it is certain, that the former swore Allegiance to King *Stephen*, and the latter sat in *Henry* the IVth's first Parliament, in which those Acts were pass'd that we have in the Statute Book, for it was at the close of that Parliament he made his Speech in behalf of King *Richard*, and some time after pleaded that King's Pardon for a Conspiracy against him, of which he stood condemned to dye.

It has been, I know, observed, that *Robert* Earl of *Glocester* did Homage *Conditionally*

† Omnes namque Nobiliores procerum in Willielmum juniorem non sine perjurio bellum moventes, & Robertum Patrem suum in regnum adsciscetes, suis quique Provinciis debacchantes. *Hent. Huntindoniensis Hist. L. 7. fol. 213.*

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to King *Stephen*, which is true enough; but then it is as true, that none of the Conditions which he interposed, had any manner of regard to the Titles, either of *Maud* or *Stephen*, as may be seen in † *William* of *Malmfbury* who lived at that time, and dedicated his History to that great Earl.

When we hear of a numerous Party that espoused the Title of the House of *York*, we are apt to look upon them to have been so many *Non-jurors* to the Kings of the House of *Lancaster*. But this is a great mistake, for all the Partizans of that House lived in Submission, and took Oaths of Allegiance to the three *Henries*; nay, *Richard* Duke of *York* himself, the Heir of that Family swore Allegiance several times to King *Henry* the VI. particularly in the 29th Year of his Reign, in as full Terms as could be well expressed. His Revolt afterwards was under colour of Redressing Grievances, however he made use of his Arms, and his Power when he got it, to set up his Claim. And altho' his Son *Edward* the IV. succeeded against *Henry* the VI. and got the Throne, yet when he was driven from it,

† *Malmsh. Historia Novella fol. 101. G. AD E. Ten*
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Ten Years after, the Nation submitted again to Henry the VI. who upon his Readeption held a Parliament.

Precedents I confess are not always Arguments of the strongest kind, if the Persons themselves are of no great Authority, or the Precedents few, or as many Precedents may be produc'd on the other side. But that of so many Millions as have liv'd under *de facto* Kings, of so many Bishops and Clergy-men, some of them eminent for Learning and Piety; of so many Temporal Lords and Statesmen of great Abilities; of so many Lawyers and Judges, some of them renown'd for their Skill in their Profession, particularly in Henry IVth's Reign, as my Lord Chief Justice Coke says, *the Courts of Justice were fill'd with Men equal to any of their Predecessors in the Knowledge of the Law.* That of all these who liv'd in so many different Reigns, to think there should be none who understood the Constitution and their Duty, or had Virtue enough to suffer for it; is to entertain a very mean, or a very hard Opinion of our Ancestors. In Modesty, we cannot but allow them to understand what the

† *Istis. Part. 3. Ch. 1.*

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Constitution was in their Own times, at least better than *We* can at this distance, and in Charity believe that they acted agreeable to it. And if it was the Constitution from the Conquest to Henry the VII. as this universal Practice and *common Usage* of all Orders and Degrees of Men, must at least induce a very strong Presumption that it was, it will be found, I believe, that the Constitution has descended the same to us; for there has no Law been made, since that time, concerning this matter, but that of the Eleventh of Henry the VII. which justifies this Practice, and enacts the *Usage* into a *Statute of the Realm*.

But Secondly, If we will be so severe to our Ancestors, as to believe, that none of them understood their Duty as Subjects, or if they did, none of them practis'd it, and that they acknowledged an Authority which the Laws condemned; we shall then surely find this Authority disown'd, in the succeeding Reigns of Hereditary Kings, those especially, who made their way to the Throne with the Destruction of their Rivals. But instead of that we find the Subjects justified in what they had done by those Kings, who in all the Proceedings of their Courts of Judicature, and in their Acts of Parliament, acknowledg'd that very Authority

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to which the Subjects heretofore had sworn, and paid their Allegiance. Could it then be the Duty of Subjects to disown an Authority for the sake of Kings *de jure*, which Kings *de jure* themselves own? Nay when these Kings after the *de facto* Government was determin'd, and their own Government establish'd, own'd the Authority of their Predecessors *de facto*, is it reasonable for Subjects to disown the Authority of such Kings, whilst they live under their Government, and there is no other Government but *That*? Or can any of the Subjects do so, without opposing their *private Opinions* in matters of Government, to that which they themselves confess to be the *supreme Authority and Judgment* of the Kingdom? And can the Peace of Communities be maintain'd, or any Government subsist on these Terms. And that Kings *de jure* have acknowledged the Authority of Kings *de facto* in as ample a manner as they have done that of their Progenitors of the most undoubted Right; I appeal to the *common Law*, and *Statute Law* of this Realm to the *Year Books* for the one, and the *Statute Book* for the other, which will reduce this Controversy to Matter of Fact.

I begin

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I begin with the Year Books of the Reigns of such Kings *de jure*, who cut out their way to the Throne with their Swords, and the Destruction of their Rival Kings *de facto*, and therefore the most unlikely of any to acknowledge them, and yet we find their Authority as much acknowledged by these Kings *de jure* in all their Courts of Judicature, as that of any of their Ancestors of the clearest Title. Upon the Death or Demise of any King of England, (by whose Authority and in whose Name the Laws are administered) all Actions, Suits, &c. which were depending in any of the King's Courts, were discontinued, and the Parties put off, so that the Plaintiffs were compell'd to begin their Actions again, or to sue a *Resummons* to revive their Actions until the end of Edward the VI. C. 7. provided a Remedy. Thus it was after the Death of Edward the IV. in the Courts of Edward the V.

In Michaelmas Term in the 1st Year of Edward V. Fol. 1. And upon this they were at Issue, and after the Issue the

† De Terminis Mich. an. 1. Regis Edwardi. Fol. 1. Et sur ces fuer a issue, & apres l'issue le de. f. fut l'issue mayprise par reconnaissance, & apres l'issue fut discontinue par le demise le Roy. Edw. quart.

De-

Defendant gave Bail by Recognizance, and afterwards the Issue was discontinued by the Demise of King Edward the IV. Thus in the Courts of Edward the IV. after the Dispossession of Henry VI. viz. in the 1st Year of Edward IV. Fol. 2. They were at Issue in Hilary Term in the 39th Year of K. Henry VI. and the Plea was discontinued by the Change of the King. And in Trinity Term the said A. B. came into the Court, and was committed to the Fleet, and now he comes and pleads ut supra. And to this it was said, that he could not have the said now, because by the Demise of the King, the Plea was discontinued and the Bail discharged, &c.

† In Trinity Term in the 2d. Year of Edward IV. fol. 10. Billing affirmed, that one brought a cuin Vita, in the time of the other King, and the Tenant pleaded an Entry since the last contin-

* Ils fueront a issue & ces fut le terme de St. Hillari l'an 39. Rby Henry VI. & l'issue fut discontinuee par eschaunge le Roy. Et al terme de Trinite veigne le dit A. B. en Court & fut comise al feta, & ore il vient & pled ut sup. Et a ceo fait dit que il ne poit aver le dit ore pour ceo que par le demise le Roy le plec fut discontinuee & ceux mainparours discharge &c.

† De Termino Trinitatis anno 2d. Edwardi quarti Fol. 10. Billing vrs com. un avoit un cui in Vita en temps l'autre Roy, & le T. avoit pled un ent. puis darr. contin. & dd. judg. de bre. En sup. ceo fuer. a issue, & tout puis fut discontinuee per demise le Roy.

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nuance, and demanded Judgment of the Writ, whereupon the Parties were at Issue. But all after was discontinued upon the Demise of the King (that is, King Henry VI.)

* Thus after the Dispossession of Edward the IV. by Henry the VI. In Michaelmas Term in the 49th Year, from the beginning of the Reign of Henry VII. and the first of the Redaption of his Regal Power Fol. 13. In the Court of Common-pleas, it was moved amongst the Judges, where the Parties were at Trial in the time of the other, King Edward the IVth, and at Nisi prius it was found to be put off without a Day by the Demise of the King. Littleton saith that it was adjudged, that where the Parties were at Issue, &c. it was discontinued by the Demise of the King, ut supra.

† Thus after the Death of Richard the

Termino Michaelis anno ab inchoacione regni Henrici Sexti & Recaptione Regie potestatis primo Fol. 13. En le termen banke fut movee entre les Justices que l'on entrans les Parties fuerunt a issue en temps l'autre Roi Edwarde le quart & al nisi prius trouvee fut mise sans jour par demise le Roy. Littleton dit que il ad este adjuge que l'on les parties fuer. a issue la parole fut mise sans jour per demise le Roy, ut supra.

† En quarta impedit par la Deane de Vert. & ils fuer. a issue en temps le Roy Richarde le tierce & discontinuee per demise le Roy.

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III. in the 1st Year of Henry VII. Fol. 8.
 En quare Impedit by the Dean, &c. against
 &c. they were at Issue in the time of K. Richard
 the III. &c. and it was discontinued by the
 Demise of the King. (viz. Richard III.)

From all these Cases I observe, that as
 Edward the Vth's Judges by allowing the
 Actions depending in Edw. the IVth's Reign
 were discontinued by his Death, did thereby
 acknowledge his Authority by which, and
 in whose Name the Law were administered
 in his Reign. So when Edward the IVth's
 and Henry the VIIth's Judges, allowed all
 the Actions and Suits depending in the Reigns
 of Henry the VIth, and Richard the III.
 were discontinued by their Death or De-
 mise, they likewise acknowledged thereby
 the Authority of those Two Kings, by which
 and in whose Name the Laws had been ad-
 ministrated in their respective Reigns.

But as the Law makes no distinction
 betwixt the Authority of a King *de Jure*,
 or a King *de Facto* in the Administration
 of the Laws, so we may hence make this
 farther Observation, That the Law makes
 no difference betwixt the Death or Dispos-
 session of a King, when another is in Pos-
 session, but looks on the latter, as well as
 the former, to be a Demise of the King,
 and that without any distinction whether

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it be the Dispossession of a King *de Facto*
 or a King *de Jure*, of Henry the VIth, or
 Edward the IVth.

And as the Law puts no difference be-
 twixt the Death or Dispossession of a King,
 but makes both to be a Demise, so from
 these Cases we may in the Third Place ob-
 serve, that by the Demise of a King, whe-
 ther *de Facto* or *de Jure*, his Authority is
 by Law determined and at an End, and
 the Laws thence-forward Administer'd by
 the Authority of the King in Possession,
 and by his Authority only.

2ly, From the Year Books we may Ob-
 serve that all the Grants, Licenses, Let-
 ters Patents, Gifts, and in short, all the
 Regal Acts of the Three Henry's of the
 House of Lancaster, and of Richard the III.
 are pleaded and allowed in all the Judi-
 cial Proceedings of Edward the IVth's, and
 Henry the VIIth's Courts of Judicature, to
 be as Valid as if they had been the Grants,
 &c. of any of their Progenitors of the
 most uncontested Titles. Bagot's Case is
 that which has been usually urged and
 debated in this Controversy; and some may
 be apt to think, this is the only Instance
 that is to be given, but in Truth the Years
 Book's Furnish us with abundance of the
 like

like Cases. *Bagot's Case* alone was cited, I suppose by my Lord Chief Justice *Coke*, not only because he thought that Case was of it self *Decisive*, but because it was the *only Case* in the Year Books, where the Authority of a King *de Facto* had ever been *disputed*, and yet Judgment given for it; and because several *Points of Law* relating to that Authority were there *maintained*.

The *only Case* I say where this Authority had ever been *disputed*, and yet even then not *disputed* at *Common Law*: for the Council against *Bagot* seem'd well enough aware, that the Authority of a King *de Facto* was *good* at *Common Law*, and therefore what they endeavour'd, was only to *Oppose Henry the VIth's* Authority, and to set aside his Patent of Naturalization granted to *Bagot* by Implication from the Statute made in *Edward IV. Chap. 1.* which declared what Grants &c. of the Three *Henry's* of the House of *Lancaster* should be *Valid*, and having made no Provision therein to Confirm *Patents of Naturalization*, they would therefore have *Bagot's* Patent to be *Implicitely annulled* by this Statute.

† Now

† *Bagot's Council* pleaded, that notwithstanding this Act; *Henry the VIth's Letters Patents of Legitimation* are good, because *King Henry* was *King in Possession*, that it was necessary that the Realm should have a *King* under whom the *Laws* should be kept and maintained. Therefore altho' he was in but by *Usurpation*, yet every *Judicial Act* done by him concerning the *Royal Jurisdiction* shall hold good, and shall bind the *King de Jure*, when he returns to the *Crown*, &c. Thus *Charters of Pardon Licenses of Mortmain*, &c. shall be good. That the *King* that now is shall have the *Advantage* of all *Forfeitures* made to *King Henry VI.* and for a *Trespas* committed in *Henry VI. time*, the *Writ* shall run *contra pacem Henrici VI. nuper de facto & non de Jure*, and that a *Man* shall be *arraigned* for *Treason* against *King Henry VI.* in compassing his *Death*, because the said *King* was not merely a *Usurper*, for the *Crown* was entailed upon him by *Parliament*, that any *Gifts*, or *Grants*, made by *King Henry*

† Plus d'asse *Bagot*, ore fuit le matter retiere & touche, q non obstant cet Act les Patentees de Legitimation sint bones car le Roy Henry fust Roy en possession & il covient q le Roialme soit un Roy soub q les leys seront tenus & maintain &c. Anno IX. Ed. IV.

which

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which were not to the diminution of the Crown shall be made good. † That if he that is now King, had in King Henry the VIth's time granted a Charter of Pardon it would be Void now, for every one that shall Grant a Charter of Pardon must be King in Fact.

A Learned Person, who in a Book published some Years since, opposed the Authority of Bagots's Case, was mistaken in translating these Words which he renders thus, *That if Edward the IV. in King Henry the VIth's Reign had granted a Charter of Pardon it would be void, for every one that Grants a Charter of Pardon ought to be King de facto;* and from this Mistake explains these Words to signify no more than that a Pardon granted by a King de jure out of Possession cannot have its Effect, and be pleaded and receiv'd in Court, whilst he is out of Possession. Whereas they plainly mean, that had Edward IV. granted a Pardon when he was out of Possession, it would be void even now when he is King, and in Possession, and therefore is void in Law, not void for want of Power to enforce it.

† Et fuit dit q. si cesty q. est ore Roy en temps le Roy H. est fait chart. de pardon ces sera void a ore car chascun q. fera chartre de pardon couient estre Roy en fait, &c.

It

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It was indeed Bagots Council that urged these Points of Law. But can any Man believe, that in the Courts of Edward IV. who had waded through so much Blood to the Throne, and was so jealous of any thing that favour'd the Lancastrian Kings; they durst have made this Plea, if they had not known it to be Law? Or that the Council on the other Side would not have contradicted or answer'd it if they could, as it concern'd their Clients Cause? or the Judges have over-ruled it as they ought in behalf of the Right of their Prince, by whose Commission they sat, if it had not been Law. But as the opposite Council did not deny any of these Points of Law maintain'd in this Plea: So the Judges were so far from over-ruling it, that one of them, Judge Billing delivers his Opinion agreeably to it in these Words, *that to every King by reason of his Office (in which Office he took Henry VI. to be invested,) it belongs to do Acts of Justice and Grace, Justice in executing the Laws, Grace in granting Pardon to Felons, and such a Legitimation as this.* And after consulting with the Judges of the Common-pleas, the Court accordingly gave Judgment for Bagot, that is, for the Validity of the King de Facto's Patent, and consequently of his Royal Juris-

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Jurisdiction, though not confirmed by the King *de Jure* in a Statute made expressly for that purpose. I need make no Remarks on the Points of Law maintain'd in this Case, they are so plain, and the force of them so fully, though briefly contain'd in my Lord Chief Justice Coke's Notes upon the Words *Seignior de Roy* in the Statute of Treason, which I shall have occasion to Cite afterwards, and therefore shall only add the Abridgement of this Case, as it is given by *Brooke* who was Lord Chief Justice of the Common-pleas under Queen *Mary*.

* *Nota, Dicitur & non negatur quod de proditione facta tempore Hen. VI. que fuit Usurper del Crown, le party sera arraigne pour ceo tempore E. 4. vel hujusmodi, pour compassant le mort de Roy Hen. VI. quod nota, & sic vide quod trespasse tempore unius Regis pot estre puny tempore alterius Regis comment que l'un fuit Usurper.*

The Year Books, as I said especially those of *Edward* the IV. and *Henry* the VII. abound with Cases wherein the Authority of Kings *de facto* (of *Henry* the VI. and *Richard* the III. in particular) is fully acknowledged: You may find their Grants indeed sometimes Disputed; but then it is in such a manner, as their Authority is at the same time fully

Tit. Treason N. 10.

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acknowledged. They who would set aside any of their Grants, or oppose some Right that was claimed by Vertue of them, (as of *Richard* the III's for Example) did not pretend, no not in *Henry* the VIIIth's Courts, where they might safely have done it, if it had been law, they did not pretend, I say, that *Richard* had not the Regal Authority, and consequently his Grants were void, but they either made exceptions to some legal Defects in the form of the Grant, or pleaded that such a thing did not pass in the Grant, or that King *Richard* the III. was deceived in granting a Reversion, when there was no Reversion, † as may be seen in the *Abbot of Tewkesbury's* Case. In short, they made no other Exceptions, but such as they might have made to the Grants of *Henry* VII. in his own Courts: But if you would be thoroughly convinced of the legal Authority of a King *de facto*, and the Validity of his Acts, I recommend to your perusal some of those Cases in the Year Books, which will give you a clearer Idæa of it, than you can receive by any short Accounts or Citations from them.

3dly. As all these Judicial Proceedings in the Year Books are agreeable to that Maxim of the Law of *England*; *That the Crown*

† See the *Abbot of Tewkesbury's Case. De Term. Trin. an. 8. Henr. VII. fol. 1.*

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takes away all manner of defects and stops in Blood, which is I think Decisive for the Authority of the King in Possession, so the Authority of this Maxim itself is very conspicuous in the same Books, where we read that all the Judges of the Realm, when they were solemnly consulted by the King in Parliament about the Attainder of Henry the VII. unanimously deliver'd it for Law, That the King is a Person able and discharged from any Attainder *eo facto* that he takes upon him the Government and is King; and alleged for a Precedent Henry the VIth's holding a Parliament in his Readeption, notwithstanding he was attained, and that *eo facto* that he assumed the Regal Dignity and was King, all was void, and there was no need of any Act to Reverse his Attainder. D. Term. Mich. an. 1 Henry VII. fol. 4. b.

It is to be observed, that according to the Opinion of all these Judges, whose Judgments, especially when Unanimous, as in this Case they were make part of the Common Law of the Realm. This Maxim is not to be Restrained to those Kings, who come to the Crown by Proximity of Blood, as some have imagined, but is to be Extended to all Kings in Possession, particularly to such who come to the Crown as Henry the VII. and Henry the VI. did in his Readeption; since it is to the

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the former, the Judges apply this Maxim, and make the latter a Precedent of it.

The last Observation I shall make from the Year Books is that by the Common Law of this Realm; Kings *de facto* are Legislators, or are vested with the Legislative Authority. For in the Year Books of Edward the IV. the Statutes of the Lancastrian Kings; and in those of Henry the VII. the Acts of Parliament made by Richard, III. are pleaded as Statutes of the Realm of Equal Force and Validity, with those made by Edward the IV. and Henry the VII. themselves.

† In the 3d Year of Edward the IV. In the Common Pleas on another Day the writ of forcible Entry sued upon the Statute of the 8th Year of Henry the VI. was now rehearsed. And the Writ was after this manner rehearsing the Statute, whereas in the Statute of our Lord Henry late King in the 8th Year of his Reign, Ordaining, &c.

* In the 10th Year of Henry the VII. And the King's Attorney said, that a voluntary

† Anno III Edward the IV. f. 24. En le commen bank a auter jour le bre de forcible Entre sue sur l'estatute de anno 8 Henry VI. fut reherce a ore. Et le bred. m. fut en maner tel reherceant l'estatut quare cum in statuto Domini H. nuper Reg. &c. VIII. Ordinant. &c.

D. Term. Trin. an. 10. Henry VII. f. 26. Et le attourney le Roy dit que Escape Voluntarye finable fut Enquirable devant Ju-

Escape finable, was Enquirable by the Justices of Peace, by a new Statute in the time of King Richard the III.

In the 11th Year of Henry the VII. † Nota that it was held in the King's Bench, that if a Man has feoffed, &c. It is good by the Statute of Richard the III.

C H A P. II.

The Sovereign Authority particularly the Legislative Authority of Kings for the time Being, and their Two Houses of Parliament, acknowledged by the Statute Law of this Realm.

Having shewn that the Legislation of Kings de facto is own'd to be good at Common Law, own'd in the Courts of succeeding Kings de jure, whose Rivals they were, I need not proceed to any more of their Acts, for when This, which is the highest Act of Government is valid, none of the rest of their Regal Acts can reasonably be

Justices de peace par un Novel Estatute En temps le Roy Rycharde le tiers.

† De Term. Mich. an. XI. Henry VII. fol. 2. Nota quod fuit sensus in banco le Roy qd si homine ad feoffers &c. que est bone par lestatute R. le III.

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disputed. And therefore shall go on to the next thing I propos'd to take a view of the Authority of Kings de facto by Statute Law, And here I shall begin where I ended under the foregoing Head, the Legislative Power of these Kings, and if I shall make it appear, that Kings de facto, as well by Statute Law, as Common Law, have the Legislative Power of this Realm; This Argument will be of it self Decisive, for nothing beneath the Sovereign Power can give Laws to a Community. The Legislative Power being in all forms of Government Essential to the supreme Power (in a Monarchy to the Regal Power) and inseparable from it. And therefore those Words in the dying Patriarch's Blessing, That the Scepter shall not depart from Judah nor a Law-giver from between his Feet till Shiloh come, are, as Bishop Sanderson hath observed, a Prophetick Description, that his Tribe should be advanced to the Regal Dignity, the Scepter being the known Ensign, and Legislation the Highest Prerogative of Regal Power. Now Kings de jure, and their Parliaments, have Recited the Laws made by Kings de facto and their Parliaments, in such a manner as acknowledges the Validity of their Laws, and Them to be Legislators of Equal Authority with Themselves, or any of their Progenitors of Undoubted Right.

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To this it has been Objected That a King de facto, as Richard the III^d's Acts are Legal, not by the Authority of those that made them, but by the Allowance of subsequent Governments, Lawful Kings and Parliaments, by reciting them in their Statutes, and Suffering them to be pleaded in Westminster-Hall have given them the Strength of Immemorial Custom and Common Law, Kings de Jure were willing that Richard's Acts should pass for Laws.

As this Hypothesis is not supported by any Authority; so it seems to be a Stranger to our Constitution; Inconsistent with it self, contrary to fact, and is entirely confuted by these Recitals themselves.

It is a Stranger to our Constitution in which Customs are sometimes by Acts of Parliament turn'd into Statute Law; but not Statutes, into Common Law or Custom.

It seems to be Inconsistent with it self, for if Kings de jure, by Reciting the Statutes of Kings de facto, and suffering them to be pleaded, gave them their Authority; then it is not true that they received their Authority from Immemorial Custom. And if they acquired their Strength by Immemorial Custom, then they had it not from the Recital and Allowance of these Kings.

Again

Again, That they did not Receive their Authority from the Recital of de jure Kings is evident, in that those Statutes of Kings de facto, which are not cited by them are of Equal Force with those that are.

And if they had received their Authority by the Strength of Immemorial Custom, they would not have been in Force till a long tract of time, and yet it is certain they were pleaded as Laws in force, some of them in a little time after they were made, and others a long time within the Memory of Man. But in truth, the longest Tract of time will not make that a Statute of the Realm which ab initio was no Statute of the Realm, nor will the allowance of Lawful Kings, or their being willing that Richard's Acts should pass for Laws make them so, if they were not Statutes before, they must be enacted in a Parliamentary way before they can be such.

It is contrary to fact; for as the Laws we are speaking of have been in force ever since they were enacted, so they have always been pleaded in Westminster-hall, not as Immemorial Customs, but as Statutes of the Realm, and been constantly cited in all our Acts of Parliament, not as common Law, but as Statutes of the Kingdom made by such Kings in their Parliaments holden at Westminster, or elsewhere, in such a Year of their Reigns:

Whereas

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Whereas when they recite any part of the Common Law they recite it in a very different manner as the 27 of *Henry the VIII. Ch. 10. Whereas by the Common Laws of this Realm, Lands, Tenements, &c.*

But nothing more effectually confutes this notion of these Laws, receiving their Authority from being Recited, than a View of some of these Recitals themselves; without which we shall but talk without Book. Now the Manner in which they are Recited evidently shews, that those Kings and Parliaments did not Recite them to make them Laws, or to Confirm them, but because they were Laws already in force, and for no other reason. The 19 of *Henry the VII. c. 3.* Repeals part of the 1 of *Richard the III. c. 3.* which had given Power to one Justice of the Peace to admit Prisoners to Bail in these words, *Where in the Parliament holden at Westminster the first Year of Richard, late in deed and not of right, King of England the Third; It was Ordained, and Enacted, among other divers Acts, that, &c. Wherefore the King, with the Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the Prayer of the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, That the aforesaid Act giving Authority and Power in the Premises, to any Justice of Peace by himselfe, in that behalf, utterly void and*

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and of none effect, by Authority of this present Parliament.

We may observe first, that tho' *Richard* is styled *in deed*, and not *of right* King of England, yet they acknowledge that he *Enacted Laws*, and that his Acts of Parliament gave Authority and Power in the Premises.

Secondly, That notwithstanding there were some Abuses committed under colour of this Law, as *Henry the VIIIth's* Statute Recites, yet the Abuses could not be Redressed nor the Law annulled, but by a like Authority of King *Henry the VII.* and his Parliament.

Thirdly, That so much of *Richard's* Statute as was not Repealed continued in it's Original Force. The 21 of *Henry the VIII. c. 16.* Against Aliens occupying their Trades, without paying like Charges with others in these Words, *where notwithstanding many good and necessary Statutes and Acts of Parliament have been published, ordained, and made, and especially one in the first Year of King Richard the III. and the other being made in the first year of the Reign of our dearest Father of Noble Memory, late King of this Realm, and in the 14th and 15th year of our own Reign concerning Strangers, Artificers, the said Strangers and Artificers*

*Artificers nothing dreading the said Statutes
ne the Penalties therein contained, &c.*

Doth Henry the VIII. make the least
Difference in the manner of citing the Sta-
tutes made by King Richard, and those
made by his Father and Himself? If we
can believe he cited his Father's and his
own Laws, in order to confirm them, we
may then believe he cited Richard's
for the same purpose. But if he cited
his Father's and his own, because they were
in Force already, he alledged Richard's for
the same Reason.

28 of Henry the VIII. Ch. 14. Enforces
a Statute of King Richard the III. against
some Abuses. Whereas in the Parliament
holden at Westminster, in the first Year of
the Reign of King Richard the III. among
other things it was establish'd and enacted, that
&c. nevertheless great Deceit is daily used in
selling of Wines and Oyls. For Remedy
whereof, it is enacted by the Authority of
this present Parliament, that the said Statute
and all other Statutes made for true gauging
and measuring of Wine, &c. Which Statutes
before this time be not repeal'd, or expir'd, shall
stand in their Strength and Virtue, and be
put in due Execution according to their Tenor
and Effects in every Behalf.

We may observe this Act of King Henry
the

the VIII. declares, that this Statute of King
Richard, as well as those other Statutes of
King Edward the III. &c. refer'd to, was
not before this time repealed, nor expired,
which Words plainly signify, that it was in
Force before this time, and therefore did not
receive its Force from this Recital.

Nor secondly, could it receive its Force
from Custom, for the Abuses it seems were
so great, that Custom was rather against the
Statute than for it.

Thirdly, The Act expressly says, this Sta-
tute of Richard, as well as those others, shall
stand in their Strength and Virtue, which is
as much as to say, that they had an Original
Strength and Virtue of their own, derived
from their proper Legislators, and consequent-
ly not from this Citation.

32 of Henry the VIII. Ch. 16. The King
our most Sovereign Lord, calling to his blessed
Remembrance the infinite Number of Strangers
and Aliens. -- Remembring also the manifold
Acts, and good Estatutes have been heretofore
made, as well by his own most noble Progeni-
tors, as by his own most Royal Majesty, for
Reformation of the same in sundry and divers
Parliaments, that is, viz. first, in the first
Year of the Reign of King Richard the III.
where it was enacted that, &c. and whereas
also in the 14th and 15th Years of the Reign
of

of our Sovereign Lord the King that now is, it was enacted that, &c.

14 of Car. the II. Ch. 13. Against the Importation of forreign Manufactures, contrary (saith the Act) to several Statutes made in the first Year of King Richard the III. in the third Year of King Edward the IV. in the 19. Year of King Henry the VII. and in the 5th Year of Queen Elizabeth. Here we see King Richard's Laws put in the same Rank, and acknowledged by Two Kings *de jure*, King Henry the VIII. and King Charles the II. to be of the same Authority with their own; and will any Man say that King Richard's Laws are cited, because they want Authority, and theirs because they have Authority? That his Laws are alledged in order to be made Laws, and theirs because they are Laws already? Which is to make the same Words, pronounced at the same time, and in the same Respect, to intend the most different things in the World, when there is no reason to be given, why any of those Laws were cited at all, but because they were Laws in Force antecedent to that Citation.

The Objector confin'd us to Richard the III's Laws, because of all our Kings, he'll give up none but him for a King *de facto*. However, we may observe, that altho Edward the IV. cites the statutes of Henry the IV.

IV. V. and VI. under the Titles of Kings indeed, and not of right, yet at the same time he owns them to be Legislators, and their Laws to be of equal Force and Authority with the Laws of any of his Ancestors, or with his own.

Thus 14 of Edward the IV. Ch. 2. Recites at large a Statute made the 9th of Henry the V. for the Protection of all Persons, that should go with the said King into France, or were there in his Service, from being non-suited at the Assizes, &c. whilst they were absent, which Act was to continue till the first Parliament after the King's Return into England. After this Recital King Edward the IV. and his Parliament enact, that the same Order and Protection shall be observed, and be as available for all manner of Persons that should pass into France with him, as it was for such Persons which did pass over the Sea, with the said late King Henry the V. and that all such Persons as shall now pass over the Sea with our Sovereign Lord the King, shall have and enjoy in every point, all manner of Advantages, as the said Persons to passing over the Seas, with the said late King had, should have had, and might have had, by the said Statute.

This Act of Henry the V. expired at the next Parliament that was holden after his Return,

Return, and therefore could not derive its validity from immemorial Custom. And as it expired long before this Recital of it by Edward the IV. it could not receive from the Recital that Force which expired before the Recital, and yet Edward IV. declares the validity of that Statute during the time for which it was made, to be equal to this made by himself, and challenges no more Authority for his own Law than he acknowledges that had.

Had Kings *de jure*, said the Objector, declared explicitly, that a King *de facto* had the same Legislative Authority with themselves, this would have been satisfactory. So many Kings *de jure* introducing Kings *de facto*, under the same Characters of Legislators with themselves, and their Progenitors; acknowledging Their Statutes when they cite them to be of Equal Authority with their Own, or with those of their Progenitors, is in truth and effect the same.

If it should be replied, with respect to the Statute last cited, that Henry the V. was by the Submission of the House of York a King *de jure*, this will not affect the Argument, because he was not so in the Opinion of the Legislator Edward the IV. who calls him a King, indeed, and not of right, at the same

time, that he so fully asserts His Legislative Power, as to make his Own but Equal to it.

Instances might be given of Statutes made by Kings *de jure*, in matters of the greatest Importance to Government, and where the Prerogative has been concerned, that have been afterwards Repealed by Kings *de facto*, and have stood Repealed ever since, and no Authority less, than that which made, can Repeal a Law. Thus the whole Parliament holden 21. of Richard the II. is Repealed 1 of Henry the IV. Ch. 3. Thus the Statute of Richard the II. which had multiplied the kinds of Treason stands Repealed by the 1 of Henry the IV. Ch. 10. which has reduced Treasons to the Old Standard of the 25 of Edward the III.

Instances might be given of Laws made by Kings *de facto* in favour of the Subject, which have afterwards been intrenched on by the Prerogative of a King *de jure*, which Intrenchment hath been declared by a King and Parliament *de jure*, to be against those Laws and Statutes of the Realm. So far is the Will of a King *de jure*, or Custom from giving such Laws their Authority, that the Awards and Proceedings of a King *de jure*, with some Custom on his side, were not able to controul those Laws, but have been declared

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clared *Illegal*, when they have been contrary to them.

How easy is it to give an Historical Account of the Legislative Authority of our Kings, that have reign'd without an Hereditary Title? Was not *William the I.* and *Henry the I.* &c. famous Legislators, and yet not Hereditary Kings. No, nor *Henry the III.* himself, when he granted the great Charter in the 9th Year of his Reign. And therefore when the Objector would give *the Statutes of Kings de facto, the Force of immemorial Customs,* which we see is not true in Fact. May it not be much more truly affirmed, that the Legislative Authority of Kings *de facto*, has the Prescription of many Ages, has been ever acknowledged in this Realm, thro' all the Successions of our Kings and Queens, and thro' all the Revolutions of Government, not only since the *Norman*, but in the *Saxon* times also, as appears from other Instances, as well as the Authority of *Edward the Confessor's* Laws, which were held almost sacred, tho' he was no more than a *de facto* King, so that the Authority of such Kings is own'd by our Constitution, and woven into it long before the Statute of the 11 of *Henry the VII.*

As to the *Allowance* which he conceives was given to *Richard's* Laws, because there was no Claim set up against him. It may be answer-

answered, if he means an *Allowance* that gave Authority to *Richard's* Laws, it is pure Imagination, as appears from what hath been already said. Secondly, A *Non-claim* makes no great difference in his case, as must be own'd by the Objector himself, who hath given him up for a *de facto* Man in the worst Sense, and worse than that, a Claim set up against him would not have made him. And yet thirdly, this *Non-claim* seems to be a Mistake, for on the one side *Henry the VII.* when Earl of *Richmond*, put up a Claim against him, as appears from 1 *Henry the VII.* ch. 6. in *Rastal's* Collections, and when he prevailed against *Richard* in the Pursuit of his Claim, he yet acknowledged the Authority of his vanquish'd Rival's Laws, and on the other side *Edward the IVth's* Daughters fled to Sanctuary, to secure their Titles and their Lives.

I come now to the *Attainders*, upon which I wonder this Gentleman lays so great a Stress, since he cannot believe those Attainders, either made or proved, the Persons attainted not to have been Kings and Legislators, whilst they exercised the Regal Power, when the Instances he himself gives of the mutual Attainders of *Henry the VI.* and *Edward IV.* prove the contrary. For notwithstanding the first Attainder of *Henry VI.* I know, he acknowledges him to be a King and a Law-giver, and *Edward*

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the IV. to have been the same in his Turn, notwithstanding the Attainder, that afterwards passed against him by *Henry* the VI. And the second *Attainder* of *Henry* the VI. by *Edward* IV. proves no more than the first, and leaves the Cause entire to be examined by the Merits of it. Not to mention, that *Edward* the IVth's Attainders of *Henry* the VI. were reversed and annulled, and *Henry* the VIth's Title restored by Act of Parliament in the first Parliament of King *Henry* the VII. However, he that owns *Henry* the VI. and *Edward* the IV. to have been Kings and Legislators, maugre those subsequent Attainders, has no reason to draw such a consequence, as he doth from the Language and Expressions of those Attainders, which in some, as well as some of the Attainders themselves, seem to be Stretches beyond Law, in the Heat of the Victor's Rage against his Rival, and are no more to be drawn into Consequence or Argument, than some of the Executions on the Scaffold without Process or Form of Law, in the Bloody Contest between those Two Houses.

And altho' *Henry* the VII. as the Objector says, in his *Attainder* of *Richard* the III. cal-

† 1 Hen VII. 16. Entitled *Restitutio N. Henrici sexti*, in the unprinted Rolls.

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led him only Duke of Gloucester. It is certain in his sedater Acts, and after this Attainder, he always gives him the Regal Title, styling him *Richard* late indeed, and not of right, King of *England*, and all succeeding Kings, in their Acts constantly give him the Title of King of *England*, without that or any Abatement: Nay, in *Henry* the VIIth's Courts of Judicature, as appears from the Cases I have cited above, and from a great many more I could produce, He is stiled King *Richard* the III. without that Addition.

'Tis certain farther, that the *Attainders* of their Persons did not *disannul* their Laws (which two Things he seems to confound), for *Edward* the IV. owns the Authority of *Henry* the VIth's Laws, notwithstanding his first and second Attainder, and so likewise would the Authority of those Laws, which *Henry* the VI. made on his Readeption of the Regal Dignity, have been owned, if they had not been Repealed by *Edward* the IV. for these Statutes made in the 49 of *Henry* the VI. did not sink of themselves, as some have imagined, and urged for an Argument: but were Repealed and Reversed as my Lord Chief Justice *Coke* says; for *Edward* the IVth's Act doth not *declare* them void, but *ordain and establish* them to be void.

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This

This is a sufficient Answer to the Argument against King Richard's Legislative Power, drawn from his Posthumous Attainder, and the Language of it, and which without this Answer would have been no Confutation of those Undeniable Proofs that have been given of his Legislative Authority, from the Acknowledgment of Legislators, whom the Objector owns for such. To which may be added two famous Instances more, wherein the Validity of King Richard's Laws was own'd in a most solemn Manner by King Henry the VII. and that very Parliament that attainted him, as well as by all the Judges of the Kingdom. Of which we have this account in the Year Books.

The first is the Method that was taken by the Advice of all the Judges, for the Reversing Richard's Act of Parliament that had bastardized Edward the IVth's Children.

† In Hilary Term in the first Year of Henry the VII. All the Judges in the Exchequer Chamber on the first day of the Term, by the King's Command, consulted about the Reversal of the Bill and Act that bastardized the Children of King Edward the IV. and Eliza-

† De Termino Hillarii an. 1. Henrici VIII. f. 4. Toutes les Justices en l'escheker chamber. 1. die Termini par le Command le Roy Commenceront par le reversell del bill & act que bastard les enfans le Roy E. IV. beth

beth his Wife: And gave direction that the Bill and Act was so false and scandalous, that they would not have the Matter, nor the Effect of the Matter recited, but only that Richard late Duke of Gloucester, and afterwards in fact, and not of right, King of England, caused a false and seditious Bill to be presented to him, which begins thus ----- Pleaseth it your Highness to consider these Articles ensuing &c. without reciting more, which Bill afterwards in his Parliament holden at Westminster was confirmed and auctorised, &c. The King, at the Special Request and Prayer of his Lord's Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons of this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, that the said Bill Act and Record be annulled and utterly destroyed, and that it be ordained by the same Authority, that the same Act and Record be taken out of the Roll of Parliament, and be cancelled and burnt, and be put in perpetual Oblivion, and also the said Bill with all the Appendancy, &c. * Note that the Record could

Et Elisabeth son feme. Et pristeront son direction pour ceo que le bill & l'act fut cy faux & slanderous que ils ne voill reherse le matter ne l'effect del matter mes tantselement que Ric jadis Duke de Gloucester & puis en fact & nient en droit roy d'engle terre fist un faux & seditious bill pur este mis a lay que Commence sic Pleaseth &c.

* Nota ensom que il ne pouvoit estre pris hors de l record sans act de l Parlement par la inadmittre & jeopardie de eux que au les recordes
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not be taken off the Roll, without an Act of Parliament for the Indemnity of those who had the Records in their keeping; but afterwards all was discharged by Authority of Parliament.

The Second is the Order that was taken for Reversing the Acts of Attainder passed by Richard the III.

† In Michaelmas Term in the 1 Year Henry the VII. A Question was put to the Judges, what Order shall be taken in this Parliament to Repeal certain Attainders, forasmuch as several Members of Parliament were attained. Memorandum, that on the first day of the Parliament of King Henry the VII. viz. on the 7th. of November, in the first Year of his Reign, the Judges in the Chamber, call'd the Exchequer Chamber, agreed, that all

en leur garde que fueront assente, & puis toutes discharges il fuit par auctorite de parlement.

† D. Termino Michaelis anno 1. Henrici VII. Un question fuit move des Justices quel Order serra en ceo Parlement de proceder de adnuller certain atteindes Entaunt que plusours que fueront en le Parliament fueront atteintes. Memorandum quod 1. die Parliamenti regis H. VII. videlicet 7 die Novembris anno regni sui 1. Justiciarii in Camera vocata le Eschequer chamber accorderont que toutes ceux queux these

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those Persons who were attainted, and were chosen Knights of the Shires, or Citizens, or Burgeses to this Parliament, that this Act of Attainder shall be first repealed, and annulled; and that the attainted Persons themselves shall not be in Parliament at the Reversal of the Act, and forthwith, when the Acts of Attainder against them shall be reversed and annulled, that all and every one of them, that is to say, the Lords and Commons shall come and take their Places, and then proceed legally, and as legal Persons. For those that are attainted, cannot be legal Judges. And then a Question was put, what shall be said for the King himself, since he is attainted also; and after consulting to-

fueront atteintes & fueront nommes chevaliers des counties ou citizens ou Burgesis a ceo Parlement que ceo acte de atteindre serra primes revoke & adnullé. Et que eux mesmes atteintes ne serrount en le Parlement at reversell de l'act, & tantost come les actes de atteindre vers eux fueront reversees & adnullés que eux toutes & chescun de eux cestassaver Seignours & comeynes viendront en leur lieux & donques procedont loialement & per loyals parsons, qar il nest convenient que ceux que sont atteintes serront loiales juges; Et donques fait move un Question que serra dit pour le Roy mesme pur ceo q. il fuit atteint, & gether,

gether, they all agreed, that the King is a Person able and discharg'd of any Attainder *eo facto*, that he takes the Regal Dignity upon him, and is King. *Townsend* said that King *Henry* the VI. upon his Readeption, held his Parliament, and yet he was attainted and the Attainder not reversed. And the other Judges said, that he was not attainted, but disabled from his Crown, Kingdom, Dignity, Lands and Tenements: and said, that *eo facto*, that he assumed the Regal Dignity and was King, all this was void. And so in this Case the King can Enable himself, and has no need of any Act to reverse the Attainder.

Here are Acts of Parliament made by *Richard*, which the *Objector* will easily grant

puis Communication eue entre eux tous accorderont que le Roy fuit person able & discharge dascun atteinder eo facto que il prist sur luy l'reign & este Roy. Town. dit que le Roy H. VI. en son readeption seignoit son Parlement, & uncore il fuit atteint & ne fuit reverse. Et les autres justices disoient que il ne fuit atteint mes disable de son Coron reigin dignite terres & tenements, & disoient que eo facto que il prist sur luy le royalle dignite il este Roy que tout ceo fuit voide, & issint icy que le Roy puit luy mesme Enable & ne besoign afeun act de le reversell de son Atteinder.

Henry

Henry the VII. was not willing should pass for *Laws*; and yet the Validity of these Acts was acknowledged, not only by all the Judges of the Realm, but also by the King and Parliament, who accordingly passed an Act to reverse them, before the Persons attainted could sit in Parliament.

These Acts of Attainder subjected the Persons attainted, to the Penalties of High Treason, tho' that Treason was nothing but conspiring, or bearing Arms against the late King, when in possession, for the Service of the King, who was now on the Throne: And yet the Judges, who had the Administration of the Laws, under the present King, were so far from acquitting them of this Treason, that they declar'd they were not *legal* Persons, and therefore subject to the Penalties, till a *new Law* was made to relieve them.

Had King *Henry* the VII. and his Parliament, had the same Notion of a King *de facto's* Acts, which this Gentleman has, they would never have put the Question to the Judges *what Method should be taken in Parliament to reverse Richard's Acts of Attainder*, or had the Judges known any thing of this Notion, and been perswaded it was *Law*, they would have answer'd in this Gentleman's Language, *that Richard was not le Roy, but only Duke of Gloucester, that he had*

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no Right to send out Writs for Elections, and by consequence the Two Houses being illegally convened, could have no Authority to vote and pass Bills; and having not the Legislative Authority, their Acts of Attainder, as well as all their other Acts, were so many Nullities. That to repeal them, and for the Persons attainted not to take their Places in Parliament, till their Attainders were repealed, would be to acknowledge the Validity of his Acts and his Legislative Authority.

And truly, considering how odious Richard had rendred himself to the whole Nation, to the Friends of the House of York, as well as to those of the House of Lancaster, and what a mortal Hatred Henry the VII. bore to him, and his Memory, considering he was now safe in his Grave without Posterity, or Friend left behind him to revenge his Quarrel, and considering the very Reversal of these Attainders was, as my Lord Bacon observes in his History of Henry the VII. *a tacit Reflection on the King's Party*, the Judges were, without doubt, well enough disposed to have given, and the King and Parliament to have received such an *Answer*, if the *Constitution* would have born it; nay, they could have given *no other*, if they had had the same *Notion* of the *Constitution*, which this Gentleman hath.

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But how different is the *Answer* which they gave? An *Answer* which expressly and fully own'd the *Validity* of Richard's Laws, and his Legislative Power, *viz.* That the Acts of Attainder, pass'd in Richard's Parliament, must be repealed by Henry the 7th's Parliament; and that not *ex abundantia Cautela*, but because the Persons attainted by Richard were not legal Persons, nor could sit in Parliament, until there Attainders were reversed. And there can be no reason given for this unanimous *Resolution* of all the Judges of the Kingdom, and of the Proceedings of the King and Parliament, perfectly agreeable to it, but that they all knew, the *Constitution* required it.

The *Resolution* of the Judges is as remarkable upon the other *Question*, that was put concerning the King himself, who was likewise attainted: That the King is a Person able and discharged of all Attainders and Disabilities *ipso facto*, that he assumed the Regal Dignity and was King. Of which I need say no more here, having already made a remark upon it, except it be that this Maxim of the Law has not only the *Authority* of the Judges, but also of the King and Parliament, who proceeded agreeably to it, in not Reversing the Attainder of the King, when they Reversed those of the Subjects: And by the way it furnishes

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shes us with a new Argument for the Legislative Authority of the King for *the time being*.

Thus we see by the Repeal of the Act, that bastardized *Edward* the IVth's Children, that *Richard's* Acts affected those, who by Proximity of Blood, had a better Title to the Crown than himself. His Acts are owned to be *valid* against the Heirs of the House of *York*, as well as that of *Lancaster*; in short, against every Person, but the Person who became King, after he became so, and then they were all *ipso facto* void.

But had the Lady *Elizabeth* assumed the Regal Dignity, instead of *Henry* the VII. this Act of *Illegitimation* need not have been reversed no more than *Henry* the VIIIth's Attainder: For as his Attainder was, so her *Illegitimation* would have been *ipso facto* void, had she been Queen.

Thus the Act that illegitimated Queen *Elizabeth*, was never reversed by Sir *Nicholas Bacon*, the Lord Keeper's Advice founded on this antient Maxim of the Law, that the Crown entirely takes away all manner of Defects, † as *Camden* relates it in the History of that Queen.

† Jurisprudencia Anglica jam olim pronunciavit Coronam semel acceptam omnes omnino defectus tollere. *Camden* p. 10.

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But besides the Consequence that immediately follows from this Resolution of the Judges, and the Parliament's Proceedings thereupon, it furnishes us with a new Answer to the Argument drawn from the Attainders pass'd against *Henry* the VI. and *Richard* the III. for if an *Antecedent* Attainder will not affect the Prince attainted in the Exercise of the Regal Power subsequent to it; then certainly a subsequent *Posthumous* Attainder cannot affect a Prince's *Past Exercise* of the same Regal Power.

It may not be amiss here to take Notice of another Objection, which is, that these Princes sometimes attainted some of the Leaders of the opposite Party, for adhering to their Rivals. But when they did this, their constant way of proceeding against such Persons was, by Attainders in Parliament, *ex post facto*, and not by Indictments in the ordinary Course of Proceedings, which shews, I think, at the same time, that to serve the King in Possession was not a Fault, nor could be punished as such, by the Laws that were then in Force. But to serve against him was, in so much that 1 *Henry* the VII. ch. 6. a Pardon was enacted in Parliament, to indemnify those who fought on his side against *Richard* III. Those who fought for the King for *the time being*, wanted no Act of Parliament to indemnify

indemnify them, nor had they any. King Henry the VII. indeed to quiet their Minds, passed a Pardon for them under the great Seal. But those who fought against the King in Possession, tho' in Pursuit of Henry the VIIth's Right, as it is worded in this Act, did not think themselves safe, till they had their Pardon passed in Parliament for it.

There is indeed no mention of Treasons in this Act of Pardon, no more is there in that of the 1 of Edward the III. or the 1 of Henry the IV. which were Acts passed for the Pardon of those who fought for Edward the III. against Edward the II. and for Henry the IV. against Richard the II. and seem to have been Precedents for this Act of Henry the VII. However, we have, seen that the Persons who were attainted of Treason, for joyning with Henry the VII. against Richard the III. did in the Opinion of all the Judges remain under those Convictions of Treason, and subject to the Penalties thereof, even after Henry the VII. was in Possession, till their Attainders were reversed by Authority of Parliament.

But now on the other side, did the King in Possession, or his Parliament, or the Parties concerned, ever think an Act of Pardon was wanting for those who fought for Him, against a Person out of Possession, whatsoever

ever Title he had, or pretended to have. Can there be one Instance given of this, in all our Laws or History?

C H A P. III.

The most material Objections to the Legislative Authority of these Kings answered.

AN Objection has been made, to the Legislative Authority of Kings for the time being, from the 1 of Edward the IV. ch. 1. which declares what *judicial Proceedings* of the *Three Henries* should stand good. The Objection is, that *some Acts of Parliament, relating to the Town of Shrewsbury, and to the founding some religious Houses, are there confirmed,* whence they inferr, that *the rest were in the same Condition, and wanted the like Confirmation.* But since the numerous Acts of Parliament, that were made by those Kings, during the Space of Threescore Years, have been always held valid, tho never confirmed; they ought to have made an Inference directly contrary, that those *Acts* relating to *Shrewsbury,* and some Religious Houses, tho confirmed, (thro' the Caution probably & at the Desire of those, that were concerned in them,) did not however stand in need of that Confirmation,

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mation, any more than all the other Acts of those Three Reigns, which have been valid, and except such as have been repeal'd, are *valid* at this Day, tho' never *confirmed*.

So likewise from *Bagot's Case* it has been made appear, that those judicial Proceedings, and Regal Acts of the *Three Henries*, which were not confirmed by the aforesaid Act of *Edward the IV.* were yet in his own Courts, held as *good* and *effectual*, as if they had been confirmed by him.

Others say, that the Laws of Kings *de facto* are suffered to continue, because they are, or may be, for the publick Good.

How then came such Laws as were not *beneficial*, to continue in Force? And yet we see that the Laws of Kings *de facto*, which have been found inconvenient, and against the publick Good, have continued in Force, till they were repealed, as well as their most *Beneficial* Statutes. And as for their Laws, that were for the publick Good, if they were not Laws by Virtue of the Legislative Authority of those that made them, the suffering them to continue, will not make them so. They must, as I have said, all be *enacted*, or *confirmed*, in a *Parliamentary way*, before they can be Laws. These Persons, I believe, will not say, that the publick Good will make Laws, least it should be made to serve some

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some other Purposes, which they are not willing to allow. It is indeed for the publick Good, that *good Laws* should be continued, but not upon an *illegal* and *defective Authority*, for that would be a publick Mischief. Nor is there any Necessity for it. One Act of Parliament made (for Example) by *Edward the IV.* would have been sufficient to have *confirmed*, all the *beneficial Statutes* of the *Three Henries*, and to have *declared* all the rest *void*: And there can be no reason given, why Kings *de jure* never did this, but because they knew they were valid without it.

Having mentioned the Statute of 1. of *Edward the IV.* ch. 1. where we first meet with the famous Distinction of Kings *in deed*, and *not of right*, give me leave to repeat an Observation, I have made already, that *before* this time, tho' *others* pretended a better Right to the Throne, than the Persons that possess'd it, yet they never assumed the *Regal Title* against the *Regnant King*, nor did the Constitution ever know any other King, but the *King* that possessed the Throne.

And since the Kings of the House of *Lancaster*, had been Sixty Years in Possession of the Kingdom, and the Heirs of the House of *York*, had almost all this time liv'd as *Subjects* under them, without setting up any

Claim; Obey'd their Summons to Parliament, and taken Oaths of Allegiance to them, particularly Richard Duke of York (who was the first of that House, that put in his Claim to the Crown,) it must be own'd that the Lancastrian Kings, at least Henry the Vth, and Vith, were not only *in deed*, but of *right* Kings of England; and therefore I may observe in the second place, that the *first time*, this Distinction of Kings *in deed*, and not of *right*, was ever used, it was *misapplied*.

Thirdly, That altho Edward the IV. calls the Three Henries no more than *Kings in deed*, yet he doth not *now* pretend that his Ancestors were Kings of *Right*, whilst the Three Henries were Kings *in deed*.

Lastly, it may be observed from what has been said, that even since the time this Distinction has obtained the *Sovereign Authority* of the English Government, as well *Legislative* as *Executive*, hath been ever acknowledged, both by our *Laws*, and *Lawyers*, to be lodged in the King *for the time being*; and that the Allegiance of the Subject has been due to him, and to him *alone*.

It is objected farther, that when Richard Duke of York, put in his Claim in † Parliament in the 39 of Henry the VI. The Lords up-

† *Parl. Roll. 39. H. 6.*

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on hearing the Cause betwixt the King and him, declared, that *his Title could not be defeated*.

In answer to this Objection, we must take Notice, that altho the Lords knew well enough the Duke of York's Pedigree, yet they say, *this matter was so high, and of such Weight, that it was not to any of any of the Subjects to enter into Communication thereof, without the King's high Commandment, Agreement, and Consent had thereto*. Whereupon they go to the King, who being not able to help himself, gave way to their hearing of the Cause, betwixt Himself and the Duke. After this, the Lords order the Judges, to offer what they could in Maintenance of the King's Title, who excuse themselves, saying, *It hath not been accustomed to call the Justices to Counsel in such Matters, the Matter was too high, and toucht the King's high Estate and Regaly, which is above the Law and passed their Learning, wherefore they durst not enter into any Communication thereof, for it pertained to the Lords of the King's Blood, and the Appa- rage of this Land to have Communication and meddle in such Matters*. If the Judges excused themselves from meddling with the King's Title, as a Matter too high for them, whose Office was only to administer the Laws under him: And if the Peers would not under-

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take to judge of the King's Title, without his Leave first obtained, tho' considering his Condition, this Application might perhaps be little more than Complement in them, and the King's leave only the Effect of the Force he was under, yet from what the Peers did, as well as what the Judges said, it follows, that, according to their Opinions, to judge, or over-rule, the Title of the Regnant King, must be much above the Sphere of *private Subjects*, and what no Government ever allowed. The Peers, after they heard what the Kings Attorney, and other Council could offer, for their Master's Title, declared, *That the Title of the Duke of York, could not be defeated.* Which how *partial* soever, was sufficient, after the King had submitted his Title to the Judgment of Parliament, to conclude *private Subjects then*: But has never been esteemed of Force to over-rule subsequent *Parliaments*, much less to justify *private Persons* to over-rule the Title of a Regnant Prince, and the Decisions of *Parliaments in their own times*, when they declare who *has* Right, and who *has not* Right, in a disputed Succession.

It is not without reason, that I have called this a *Partial Declaration*: For during the Space of 60 Years, that the H. of *Lancaster* had fate in the Throne, we never heard of such a Title in the House of *York*, as could not be defeated.

ted till *this time*, when the King's Army was *first defeated*, the King himself a *Prisoner*, and the Parliament, tho' call'd in the Kings Name, yet not by *his*, but the *Duke of York's Order*: And when the Debates were awed with the Presence of a Victorious Prince, it is no Wonder that they ended in a Declaration, *That this Title could not be defeated.*

Otherwise they might have declared, upon the *Principles* of the Gentlemen, with whom we are disputing, That the Title of the *Duke of York*, not only *could be*, but *actually was* defeated by his long *Submission*; by obeying *Summons* to Parliament; and by *Oaths of Allegiance* to King *Henry* the VIth. particularly that which he took in the 29 Year of his Reign, in these Words, *I Richard Duke of York, confess, and be known that I am, and ought to be humble Subject and Liege-man, to you my Sovereign Lord King Henry the VI. and owe therefore to bear you Faith, and Truth, as my Sovereign Liege Lord; and shall do always to my Lives End, &c. I never shall anything attempt by way of feat, or otherwise, against your Royal Majesty and Obedysance that I owe thereto, &c. †*

They must, I say, acknowledge the *Duke of York's Title* was defeated upon their

† See the Oath at large in Stow p. 395.

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own Principles, for when they are press'd with the Commands of Holy Scripture; *To render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsars, &c.* They think it a sufficient Answer, to say, that *Tiberius Cæsar* was a *Rightful* Governor: And when it is demanded, how he acquired a *Right* over the Roman Senate, and People, or the Romans a *Right* to the Government of *Judæa*; They reply by the *Submission*, and *Oaths*, of the Roman Senate and People, to *Tiberius*; and the like Submission of the Jews, to the Romans. Let us then borrow their own Principles and Answers, and apply them to the present Case. Had not the Heirs of the House of *York*, as well as all the People of *England*, lived longer in *Subjection* to the Kings of the House of *Lancaster*, when this Declaration was made; than the Senate and People of *Rome*, had to *Tiberius*, or *Augustus* together, when our Saviour gave this Command? Have we not more *certain Evidence* of the Oaths, which *Richard Duke of York* took to *Henry the VI.* than we have of the *Truth* of the *Lex Regia* of the Romans, or of any Act of *Resignation* of the Regal Family of the Jews? And was not the forementioned Oath of *Richard Duke of York*, a more full *Recognition* of *Henry the VI.* *Right* and *Renunciation* of his own Right; than the Oaths of the Jews, were to the Romans, or the Oaths
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of the Romans, to *Tiberius*? If all this be true, as it is, they must confess, the Duke of *York's* *Right* was *defeated*, and *Henry the VI.* was a *Rightful* King. If they will not, they must *never more* say, that the Rights of the Jews and of the Roman Senate was *defeated*, or that the Roman Emperors were *Rightful* Governors: And so they will lose more, than they could gain by this Denial, and will be hard put to it for a Plea to justify their own Practice against those Positive Commands of Scripture that enjoin *Subjection*.

But if they will abide by their own Answer, they must then acknowledge the Duke of *York's* Title was *defeated* upon their own *Principle*, notwithstanding this *Declaration* of Parliament: And so notwithstanding the same, might be *defeated*, as it *actually* was (tho' they durst no more assert this, than the other) by the *Legislative Power* of the Realm, which had settled the Crown in the House of *Lancaster*. In short they must acknowledge this Declaration of Parliament proves *too much*, and therefore proves *nothing* at all.

Lastly, this Declaration of the 39 of *Henry the VI.* as well as the Acts of the 1 of *Edward the IV.* were repealed and annulled by Act of Parliament, when *Henry the VI.* recovered his Throne: And altho' *Edward the IV.* forced him from it again, and attainted him; yet
Henry

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Henry the VII. in the first Year of his Reign, passed an Act of Parliament, wherein it is enacted, that all Acts of Attainder, or Disabilities, against the late King Henry the VI. to be void, annulled, and repealed, &c. * So that the Force of all the former Declarations, and Acts of Parliament, against Henry the VI. is taken off by this last Act of Parliament, which restores his Title.

Lastly, It is objected, that the Confirmation of the Judgment of Parliament against the two Spencers 1 Edward the III. was repealed 21 Richard the II. because it was Unlawful his Father Edward the III. being then alive, and a Prisoner.

This Act of Confirmation of the Judgment against the Two Spencers 1 Edward the III. was not declared void 21 of Richard the II. but repealed, and therefore valid, until repealed.

Secondly, That Repeal of the Judgment against the Two Spencers, and the whole Parliament, (as I have already observed) of the 21 of Richard the II. (as I observed before) in which it passed, was afterwards Repealed 1 Henry the IV. c. 3. Of all these Acts of Parliament relating to the two Spencers, My

* Rol. Part. 1 H. VII. N. 16. Restitutio. H. VI.

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Lord Chief Justice Coke, gives this brief Historical Account.

The Judgment of Parliament in 15. of Edward the II. against the Spencers was in the same Year by Act of Parliament Repealed, That Repeal was Repealed by Authority of Parliament 1 Edward III. That Repeal of Edward the III. was Repealed, 21 of Richard the II. and that of the 21 of Richard the II. was Repealed by Authority of Parliament in the 1 of Henry the IV. and so the Judgment against the Spencers stands in force, saith Sir Edward Coke, † so that this is so far from being an Objection, that it is a Proof of the Sovereign Legislative Power of a King *de facto*, and his Parliament, since they can repeal Acts passed in Parliaments holden under Hereditary Kings.

Thirdly, All the other Acts of Parliament that were made in the 1 of Edward the III. whilst his Father was alive, were ever held for Laws of the Realm, and one of them cited as such 16 Charles the I. c. 16. about the Boundaries of Forests. Whereas by Act of Parliament made in the 1 Year of the Reign of King Edward the III. &c.

Since therefore the Authority of Kings for the time being is so fully owned by Hereditary Kings and their Parliaments, owned in the highest Act of Government, in their Legislation:

† Institut. Pt. 4. c. 1. p. 25.

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Ought not this to conclude all Private Subjects? Can they disown this Authority, without opposing their Private Sentiments to that, which themselves acknowledge, to be the supreme Authority, and Judgment of the Kingdom.

Secondly, Since the Kings for the time being, with their two Houses of Parliament, have the Legislative Power, they must also have the supreme Power, the former being, as I have said, always Essential to, and inseparable from the latter. And therefore they can make any Laws, and do every thing that is within the Verge of that Power, for the Safety of the Kingdom, and of themselves.

Lastly, If the King, for the time being, hath, both by the Statute and Common Law, the Legislative Power of this Kingdom: Then the Obedience of the Subjects, is due to his Laws; and their Allegiance, which is no more, than Obedience according to Law, is due to his Person.

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C H A P. IV.

The Allegiance of the Subject due to the King, for the Time being, by the Statute Law of this Realm. With an Answer to the most considerable Objections.

BUT the Allegiance which is due to the King in Possession, doth not only follow by consequence, from his being invested with the Legislative Power, but we have *express Statutes* for it. The first is the Statute of *Treasons* in the 25 of *Ed. III. c. 2.* Which Statute declares, what Offences shall be adjudged Treason. And we have the Opinions of Two great Lawyers, my Lord Chief Justice *Coke*, and Lord Chief Justice *Hales*, (and no great Lawyer's Opinion, as far as I know, to the contrary) that by our *Sovereign Lord the King*, in this Statute, against whom these Offences are Treason, *is to be understood only the King in Possession of the Crown and Dignity, though he be Rex de facto, & non de Jure.*

And truly, if we consider, that this Statute did not make *new Species's* of Treason, but declare and fix those by *Statute*, which were before Treason at *Common Law*; and if we consider farther, that of the *Eleven Kings* that

that reigned from the Conquest, to *Edward III.* there were no less than *Eight*, who were Kings *de facto*, some through their whole Reigns, others in the beginning thereof, one of which Number, was *Edward III.* himself; and yet by the *Common Usage*, or *Law*, of the Kingdom, those Offences in the Statute, had always been esteemed *Treason*, and punished as such, when they were committed against those *Eight*, as well as against the *Three* Hereditary Kings: We may conclude, that as *Edward* the III. and his Parliament intended to declare those Offences *Treason*, which were so before by *Common Law*, or *Usage*; so by King in the Statute against whom these *Offences* shall be adjudged *Treason*, they must intend the King, against whom they were held to be *Treason* before, by *Common Law*, or *Usage*, which was always the *Regnant King*, altho without an Hereditary Title, especially when the *Legislator* himself *Edward III.* was *no other*, in the Beginning of his Reign.

But we shall easily be determined to this Sense, if we consider farther, that from the Conquest to *Edward* the III's Reign, and for a 100 Years after, the Distinction of King *de facto*, and King *de jure* was not known; but the *Regnant King* was the *King*, and there was *no other* King but *he*. There were of-

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ten others that, pretended a better Right to the Throne, than the Prince that was in Possession of it, and formed Alliances, and raised Armies to recover it. Thus *Robert*, the eldest Brother, set up his Claim, first against *William Rufus*, and afterwards against *Henry* the I. *Maud* against King *Stephen*: *Arthur* against King *John*: But in the mean time, they contented themselves with the Titles of Dukes of *Normandy*, &c. None of their Friends gave them the *Regal Title*, nor did they themselves assume it (no not the Heirs of the House of *York* some Ages after) against the King in Possession of the Throne and Kingdom, who alone was esteemed the *King*. And therefore, as those *Offences* only were declared *Treason*, by this *Statute*, which were so by the *Common Usage*, and *Custom* of the Realm: So by our *Lord the King* in this Statute, must be intended the *King in Possession*, since by the *Common Custom* and *Usage* of the Kingdom, He was the *King*, and there was *no other* King but *he*. Unless any one will run into so great an Absurdity, as to say, that for the greatest Part of the time from the Conquest to *Edward* the III's Reign, *England* was a *Monarchy*, without a *Monarch*; and there was *Allegiance* and *Treason*; but no *King* to whom *one* was *due*, and against whom the *other* might be committed.

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Since therefore *Treason*, can be committed only against the *King in Possession*, and the Constitution knows no other King but him, *Allegiance* can be due only to him. For *Treason*, which is the highest Violation of *Allegiance*, can be committed against none, but him, to whom *Allegiance* is due.

And so I come to the famous Statute of the 11 of *Henry VII. c. 1.* This Act hath lain under a great Prejudice, as if it introduced a *new Authority*, and a *new Allegiance*, not known before in our Constitution. But if a Law, that is made in Civil Matters, needed a Vindication, this is sufficiently vindicated by the foregoing Discourse, which hath proved, that the Authority of the King, for the time being, which this Statute secures, was ever acknowledged; and the Allegiance, which it declares to be due to him, was ever paid in this Realm, and both the *one* and the *other* justified by the *Common Law* and *Statute Law* of the Kingdom, in the Reigns of Hereditary Kings. So that this Act, is so far from being a *Breach* upon our Constitution, that it is *agreeable* to it. And therefore is drawn in such a manner, as made only in Affirmance of what was lawful before, for immediately before the enacting

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Words, it is expressly affirmed, and declared, that it is not reasonable but, against all *Laws, Reason, and good Conscience*, that the *Subjects*, attending upon the King, for the time being, in his Wars, or being in other Places by his Command, any thing should lose, or forfeit; and the reason given for this, is because, says the Act, this is *doing their true Duty and Service of Allegiance*; and then it follows, *be it therefore ordained, enacted, &c.* In the enacting Part also, this Service and Obedience, to the King for the time being, is again stiled, the *true Duty of Allegiance*.

This Law never appears with so great Advantage, as after such a View, as we have taken of the Legal Authority, of the *King for the time being*; for it's Conformity to the Constitution, is a sufficient Answer to the Objections, that have been urged against it. However, it may not be amiss to give a more particular Answer, to the most considerable of them.

First, they have objected to the *Authority* of the Legislator *Henry VII.* as not being a *King de Jure*. Were this true, we have seen that the *Kings for the time being*, have ever been own'd for *Legislators* in our Constitution, and neither *Common Law*, nor *Statute Law*, do make, or allow any difference to be made, betwixt the *Legislative Power* of a *King de Jure*

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Jure, or a King *de facto*. But a learned Gentleman, who in his Remarks on this Statute, made this Objection, has since acknowledged that *Henry VII.* was a *Rightful* King. Indeed in his own, or his Wife's Right, he had all the Titles that could be to the Crown.

2ly, It has been objected, that this Act doth only *indemnify* the Subjects, for serving the King for the time being. It doth not indemnify them in that Sense, as to *indemnify* signifies, to exempt them from the *Punishment* due to a *Crime*; but as it signifies, to save them *harmless* for doing their *Duty*, if a Competitor should get the Throne; and to Indemnify them after this manner, is to *justify* them: As the Act truly doth, by expressly declaring, *that to serve the King for the time being, is their true Duty and Service of Allegiance*; nay, the Act farther declares, *it is against all Laws, Reason, and good Conscience, that the Subjects should lose, or forfeit any thing for serving the King for the time being*; whereas were it a *Crime*, it would not be contrary, but *agreeable* to all these that they should suffer for it.

3dly, It has been farther objected, that this was a *Temporary* Statute, design'd only for *Henry the VIIth's* Reign. May we not make any Law, when it doth not serve our
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Hypothesis, Temporary as well as this? Is there any Expression, or Word, that determines our Allegiance to any particular *Person* or *Time*? What can be more *indefinite*, than the King for the *time being*, which reaches to *all* Kings of this Realm, and *all Times*? Besides what the Law requires, the *true Duty and Service of Allegiance*, is not *Temporary*, but must last as long as Government lasts. And what the Law provides against it declares, as I observ'd before, to be *contrary to all Laws, Reason, and good Conscience*, and therefore the Law, was design'd to be of *perpetual* Obligation; unless *Reason, and good Conscience* are *Temporary* Things.

4thly, Another Objection has been formed upon the Duke of *Northumberland's* Case, who was condemned for commanding an Army against Queen *Mary*, notwithstanding his Plea, that he acted by a Commission from the Lady *Jane Grey*, under the great Seal. Which shews they had no regard to this Statute of *Henry VII.* since that Lady was Queen *de facto*.

It is to be observed first, That Queen *Mary* in a Letter She writ to the Lords of the Council Notified her Claim, and Required them upon their Allegiance, to Proclaim Her Title at *London*. That this Letter was Deliver'd to the Lords, not on-

ly before they had Proclaim'd the Lady *Jane*, but before they had Published King *Edward's* Death, or so much as acquainted the Lady *Jane* with their Design, to set Her up to succeed Him, as appears both from the Bishop of *Sarum's* History of the Reformation, and Dr. *Heylin's*. The latter has Printed this Letter at large, in which there is a Passage that would induce one to believe, that She had been Proclaimed somewhere before She Writ it.

But not to insist on this, I observe secondly that the Duke of *Northumberland* did not plead this Statute, nor indeed had he any Right to it. For being the Principal Author of this Revolt, he was by the last Clause of this Act, cut off from any Benefit of it. This Act was made for the Security of those, who submit to a *King for the time being*, after he is established; not for those that overturn Governments, who, whatever they may plead for themselves, it can never be the *II. H. VII.*

Lastly, the Lady *Jane* was never settled in the Throne, but fell whilst the Duke of *Northumberland*, and his Faction, was struggling to thrust her into it against her own, as well as the Nation's Sense. Her Government was but in *feri*, she was not Queen *de facto*, She was no *Lawful* Queen, (as the Judges implied in their Answer to that Duke.) She had no consent of the Estates, no Recognition by Act

Act of Parliament, as all those Kings have had, whose Regal Authority has been own'd by the Laws, without an Hereditary Title; and therefore has had no Place allow'd her, in the Succession of the Kings and Queens of *England*. This, by the way, may serve for a sufficient Answer to another Objection, that is drawn from the *I. M. c. 4.*

CHAP. V.

An Objection from the Act of Recognition the I. Jac. I. answer'd.

IT is objected, that the *II* of *Henry the VII.* is virtually repealed, by the Act of Recognition *I. of Jac. I.* which declares, and enacts, that the Crown Descended on King *James the I.* by *inherent Birthright*, as the next and sole Heir, of the Blood Royal of this Realm, and then they desire the King to accept this as the first Fruits of their Loyalty to his Majesty, and to his Royal Progeny and Posterity for ever.

I answer first, that it is not pretended by those who make this Objection, that the *II* of *Henry the VII.* is expressly repeal'd by this, or any other Law. Nor is there any Reason to believe the Legislators design'd to repeal it by this Act of Recognition. For since he

Parliament knew that the supreme Authority, both Legislative and Executive, of the *Kings for the time being*, had ever been acknowledged at Common Law in the Courts of Judicature, and by the Acts of Parliament, of Hereditary Kings: That the Subjects of *England*, had always sworn and paid Allegiance to the King in Possession. And that a Statute of the Realm expressly requir'd this, and that the Crown, during this time, notwithstanding this, was held to be Hereditary: Since the Legislators, I say, knew all this, if they had design'd to have alter'd the Constitution, and laid a *new* obligation on the Subject, never to submit to any but hereditary Kings: It had been absolutely necessary for them, to have declared, and enacted, that the Subjects should never hereafter swear, or pay Allegiance to any but Hereditary Kings; that no Statutes, for the time to come, should be valid, but such as were made by them; and that the *II* of *Henry VII.* should be repealed and annulled: But since nothing of all this was done by them, it is evident, they had no design to do it. It is sufficient for us, they have not done it: For a Constitution is not to be alter'd; the whole Course of the Common Law to be inverted; and the Statutes of the Realm repealed by Implication, and that Implication no better, than an ill-grounded Conjecture.

Indeed

Indeed this Notion, of a virtual Repeal, seems to proceed upon a double Mistake. First, That the *I. James* the *I.* hath made the Descent of the Crown, more Hereditary than it was before; and 2ly. That the *II* of *Henry* the *VII.* can have no Place in an Hereditary Kingdom. Whereas it is certain the Crown was Hereditary, before this Act of Recognition, as well as since, as might be proved from several Testimonies, if there needed any more than this Act of Recognition it self, which recognizes King *James* the *I.*'s Title to the Crown, as *being rightfully, lineally, and lawfully descended of the Lady Margaret, &c.* So that this Act is only declarative of the old Hereditary Right, and not introductive of any new Right, and without any Alteration, leaves the Constitution as it found it. And therefore since the Crown was Hereditary before the *I. James* the *I.* when the Objectors confess the *II* of *Henry* the *VII.* was in force (otherwise they could not say, it was then virtually repealed) they must also grant, that the *II* of *Henry* the *VII.* may have Place in an Hereditary Kingdom.

2ly, That it may, and actually had Place in such a Kingdom, in the Judgment of a King and Parliament, is evident, from their Acts: For after the Crown had been entailed

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in the 1st Year of *Henry* the VIIth's Reign, on the Heirs of his Body, can we believe, that he designed by this Act of the 11 of his Reign, to break the Hereditary Succession of his own Children? Undoubtedly he did not: And therefore he and his Parliament did believe, that a Law which required the Allegiance of the Subjects to the *King for the time being*, might have Place in an Hereditary Kingdom; and so the 11 of *Henry* the VII. is as consistent with the Hereditary Act of the 1 *James* the I. as with the Hereditary Act of the 1 of *Henry* the VII: and the 1 *James* the I. is no more a virtual Repeal of the 11 of *Henry* the VII, than the 11 of *Henry* VII. is a virtual Repeal of the 1 of *Henry* the VII.

Wherefore as the 11 of *Henry* the VII. was not design'd to interrupt the Descent of the Crown, but to provide for the Peace of the Community, and the Security of the Subject, if the Hereditary Succession shou'd happen to be interrupted: So the 1 *James* the I. which was to secure the *ancient Succession*, was not design'd, in case that failed, to take away the *ancient Provision*, which had been made for the Preservation of the Community, and the Safety of the Subject.

The Distinction is very obvious, betwixt our advancing one that is not the next Heir
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to the Throne, and submitting to such a one when he is advanced, and possess'd of it. The first is Unlawful by the 1 of *Fac.* I. and so it was before; and the latter is as lawful since that Act, as it was before; seeing that Act doth not meddle with it. The utmost, I think, that can be inferr'd from the 1 of *Fac.* I. is, that it is a Direction, and Obligation, on the States of the Realm, and on the Subjects on the Death of the King, to recognize the next Heir (tho' the Word *Heir* is not express'd in the Act, when they speak of King *James's* Posterity.) But suppose the States should mistake the next Heir, or should place another in the Throne, or another should thrust him into it, and they Recognize him for King; (as the Legislators knew had been often done:) Doth this Act say the Subjects shall submit to none, but the next Heir? or shall not submit to him that possesses the Throne, as they knew they had always done? No such thing. Does it direct them what to do in this Case? Not that neither: And therefore it leaves them to that Course, which had been ever held through all such Revolutions of Government in this Realm; A course which had been warranted by the highest Authority in it; and which was afterwards enacted into a Statute, under King *Henry* VII. and not
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yet Repealed, but continues a Part of the Law of this Kingdom.

The Lawfulness of submitting to a Prince, whom it was Unlawful to set up, may be illustrated, and proved, from the Conduct of God's own People, to whom he had given a Law, *Deut. 17. 14. To set one from among their Brethren to be King over them, not to set a Stranger over them, which was not their Brother*: This made it unlawful for any Jew to contribute to the advancement of a Stranger to the Throne; and yet when Strangers got the Rule over them, they constantly submitted to them, without any censure for it; and when some of them made a Scruple of it in our Saviour's time, our Lord justified them, in their Submission to the Stranger that then Ruled over them, the Heathen Emperor *Tiberius*.

Thirdly, It is acknowledged by some of those who make this Objection of a virtual Repeal, that notwithstanding this Act of Recognition, *1 Jac.* the I. The Succession of the Crown may be limited by the Legislative Power, and since I have proved that the Kings for the time being, with their Two Houses of Parliament have the Legislative Power; acknowledged to have it by Kings *de jure* and their Parliaments, even since the 1 of

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K. James I. it undeniably follows, they can notwithstanding the so often mention'd Act, transfer the Right of Succession, and the Allegiance of the Subject with it, from the Next to a Remoter Heir, which cannot be deny'd, without transgressing a Rule allowed by all Laws, † without distinguishing (where the Law makes, nor allows any Distinction to be made) betwixt the Legislation of a King *de jure*, and of a King *de facto*; without pulling our legal Constitution to pieces, which has the Legislative Power of such Kings woven into it; and without opposing, as I have often said, their private Sentiments to that, which they themselves confess to be the Publick Judgment, as well as the supreme Authority of the Kingdom.

In the mean time, these Persons know there are others, who concur with them in disallowing the 11 of *Henry the VII.* do differ however with them in the other Point, and deny, that the Limitation of the Right of the Crown, is within the Verge of the Legislative Power: And when they are press'd with the Statutes, made in the Reign of *Henry the VIII.* which impower'd him to limit the Descent of the Crown, and the 13 *Eliz. c. 1.* which makes it High Treason during the Queen's Life, and Forfeiture of Goods and Chattels after her Death, to say that an Act of Par-

† *Ubi lex non distinguit, neque nos distinguere debemus.*

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liament is not of sufficient Force to limit and bind the Descent of the Crown: They argue from the 1 of *Fac.* the I. in the same way, and think it a sufficient Answer to say, that those Laws of King Henry the VIII. and Queen Elizabeth were Virtually declared null and void, or Virtually Repealed by the 1 of James the I. The Persons to whom I address this Argument do I know look on this Answer to have no Foundation: But I desire them to consider, what better Foundation they themselves have for their virtual Repeal of the 11 of Henry VII. by the 1 *Jam.* I. than the former have for their virtual Repeal of those Statutes of Henry VIII. and Qu. *Eliz.* and to consider withal, how easy it is by virtual Repeals to Erect our selves into Legislators, and Repeal as many Laws as we do not like. It is but to force a Consequence from a subsequent Law, and to say the Preceding Laws are not consistent with this Consequence, and are therefore virtually or consequentially Repealed by it.

But this way of arguing is no where less allowable than in *Acts of Recognition*, in which Parliaments have ever been very liberal of their Expressions, as may be seen in the Act of Recognition of *Richard* the III. and those of *Queen Mary* and *Queen Elizabeth* compared together. So that we need not draw Con-

quences from them, beyond the Express Letter of the Law; much less go about by such Consequences to alter the Constitution, and repeal Laws, which the Law-givers never intended. There is no more reason to believe *K. James* the I and his Parliament, did design by this Act of Recognition, to Repeal the 11 of *Henry* the VII. than *Queen Elizabeth* and her Parliament, did by the Act of Recognition in the first of her Reign, which runs in very High Terms, declares her lineally, rightfully, and lawfully descended of the Blood Royal of this Realm; and then they oblige themselves, and their Posterity for ever, to the Queen and the Heirs of her Body, (whereas the 1 of *James* the I. is in more general and looser Terms to his Royal Progeny and Posterity for ever.) And yet, whilst this Act of Recognition was passing in Parliament, it was debated, whether they should not Repeal the Statute of King *Henry* the VIII. which had declared the Queen Illegitimate, as *Queen Mary* had before Repealed, so much of it as concerned Herself. But this, as I have taken notice before, was judged to be unnecessary by the Lord Keeper *Bacon* (and the Queen and Parliament acquiesced in his Judgment) upon this Maxim, *That the Crown entirely takes away all manner of Defects.* So that in the Judgment of the Legislators, this Maxim of

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of the common Law of *England*, which is Equivalent to the Statute of the 11 of *Henry* the VII. has Place in an Hereditary Kingdom. And therefore we have no more Reason to believe, that King *James* and his Parliament, did by the Act of Recognition, design to abolish this Maxim of the Law, or Repeal the 11 of *Henry* the VII. than Queen *Elizabeth* and her Parliament, who acknowledged it, at the same time, that they enacted the Crown to be Hereditary in as High Terms at least as King *James* and his Parliament.

This Act of Recognition, which declared Queen *Elizabeth* rightfully, lineally, and lawfully descended of the Blood Royal of this Realm; was, one would have thought, a virtual Repeal of that Act of her Father, which made her Illegitimate: but the Parliament knew so little of virtual Repeals, tho' some lay so great a Stress upon them, that they passed an Act, to restore the Queen in Blood, to her Mother: for tho' the Crown took away all defects as she was Queen; yet as she was the Grand-daughter of the Earl of *Wiltshire*, she must be Restored in Blood, to be capable of inheriting the Estate of that Family.

To conclude against this imaginary Repeal of the 11. of *Henry* the VII. by the 1 of *James* I. The greatest Lawyers in the Kingdom have declared, since that Act of Recognition;

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tion; That Allegiance is due to the King in Possession, and have supported their Opinions by the Eleventh of *Henry* the VII. and therefore did not believe it Repealed by the 1 of *James* the I.

It has been said that the Oaths of Allegiance Enjoyn'd in the Beginning of K. *Jam.* I. Reign, was form'd on this Act of Recognition, and has tyed the Subject more strictly to the next Heir, than he was tyed before.

But this is a Mistake, for 1 the Oath of Allegiance was made in the 3. K. *J. I.* on the Occasion of the Gunpowder Plot, for the Discovery of Popish Recufants; and the Additions which are in it, to the former Oath of Allegiance, were all of them levelled against some Popish Tenets. And as for the Word *Heirs*, to which the Subject was sworn in that Oath, it is no Addition, but was in the old Oath of Allegiance, that is extant in *Britton*, who wrote under *Edward* the I. and was taken by the Subjects in the Court Leets, several Hundred Years before King *James* I. Reign: So that the Oath of Allegiance framed in his Reign, makes no Alteration in this Matter.

† *Sheringham* of the Kings Supremacy. p. 18.

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CHAP. VI.

This Account of our Constitution, and Laws, supported by the Opinions and Authorities, of some of the greatest Modern Lawyers, who lived in the Reigns of Hereditary Kings. And the Case of the Oaths resolved, from this Account of our Legal Constitution.

WE have already had the Opinions of the Lawyers, and Judges of *Elder Reigns*, for the Authority of the King for the time being, in their Judicial Proceedings, adjudged Cases, and in the unanimous Resolutions, which they have given, when they were consulted by the King and Parliament, in those Reigns, where that Authority was least likely to be favour'd. I will now produce the Opinions of the Lawyers of *later Reigns*, and of such only as lived since the Act of Recognition made in the 1 of James the I. Whereby we shall see, that they knew nothing of this imaginary vertual Repeal of the 11 of Henry the VII. by that Act of Recognition: And be convinced at the same Time, that the greatest Modern Lawyers have entertain'd the same Notion of the Constitution, which the Ancient had, perfectly agreed with them in this great Point of Law, concerning the Authority of

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of the King in Possession, and the Allegiance of the Subject which is due to him; and that the foregoing Discourse is supported with their Authority.

I begin with my Lord Chancellor Bacon, who in his History of Henry the VII. speaking in Praise of the Statute made, in the 11th Year of his Reign, which ordained, that no Person should be impeached, or attainted, for assisting in Arms, or otherwise, *the King for the time being*, saith, *That it was agreeable to Reason of State, that the Subject should not enquire, into the Justness of the King's Title, or Quarrel, and it was agreeable to good Conscience, that whatsoever the Fortune of the War was, the Subject should not suffer for his Obedience.* The Spirit of this Law was certainly pious, and noble, being like in Matter of War, unto the Spirit of David in Matter of Plague, who said, *If I have sinned, strike me; but what have these Sheep done.* Hist. H. VII. p. 241.

The Lord Chief Justice Coke, in his Comment on the 25 of Edward the III. ch. 2. the Statute of Treasons, saith, *This Act is to be understood of a King in Possession, of the Crown and Kingdom, for if there be a King Regnant in Possession, though he be Rex de facto, and non de jure, yet he is Seigneur le Roy within the Purview of this Statute: And the other*

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that has Right, and is out of Possession, is not within the Act: Nay, if Treason be committed against a † King de facto, and after the King de jure cometh to the Crown, he shall punish the Treason committed, against the King de facto. And a Pardon granted by a King de jure, that is not also de facto, is void. Inst. part. 3. p. 7.

The Lord Keeper Bridgeman, in the Trial of Cook the * Regicide, The last thing you have said for your self is this, that admitting there was nothing to be construed of an Act, or an Order, yet there was a Difference. It was an Act de facto, that you urged rightly upon the Statute of the 11 of Henry the VII. which was denied to some. God forbid it should be deny'd you. If a man serve the King in the War, he shall not be punish'd, let the Fact be what it will. King Henry took care for him who was King de facto, that his Subjects might be encouraged to follow him, to preserve them, whatever the Event of the King was. Mr. Cook, you say, to have the Equity of that Act, that here was an Authority de facto, these Persons had gotten the supreme Power, and therefore what you did under them, you do

† 11 H. VII. Bagois Case, 9 Ed. IV.
* Tryal of the Regicides, p. 146.

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desire the Equity of that Act. For that clearly the Intent and Meaning of that Act is against you, it was to preserve the King de facto, how much more to preserve the King de jure. He was owned by these Men and you, as King, you charged him as King, and you sentenced him as King. That that King Henry the VII. did, was to take care of the King de facto, against the King de jure. It was for a King, and Kingly Government, you proceeded against your King, your own King, and as yet King, and called him in your Charge Charles Stuart K. of England. I think there is no Colour you should have any Benefit of the Letter, or of the Equity of the Act. They had not all the Authority at that time, they were a few of the People that did it, they had some part of the Army with them; the Lords were not dissolved then, when they had adjourned for some time, they did sit afterwards, so that all the Particulars you alledge are against you.

The Lord Chief Justice Hales, in his Pleas of the Crown, in the Chapter of High Treason, says as follows,

What a King?

First, A King before his Coronation, a King within this Statute, when the Crown descends upon him.

Secondly, A King de facto & non de jure, a King within this Act, and a Treason against

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against him punishable, tho the right Heir get the Crown.

Thirdly, a Titular King that is not Regnant, as the Husband of the Queen, not a King within this Statute.

Fourthly, The right Heir to the Crown, yet not in Possession, therefore is not a King within this Act. †

Had I given the Opinions of Lawyers, of how great Name soever, that lived since the Revolution, they would have been received with Prejudice. It might have been said, they had too great an Interest in the Case, and could not have come to the Bench, nor the Bar, without this Doctrine; and therefore I have produced none * but such as lived in the Reigns of Hereditary Kings, where there was not the least Temptation, to *byass* them on this side of the Question. The Temptation, lay on the other side, it being no good way to make their Court, but more likely to bring themselves into Disgrace, with those Princes by whose Commission, and in whose Courts they sat; to declare in Effect, that if another

† Pleas of the Crown, 1 Ch. of Treason, p. 11. 12. Licensed by Lord Chief Justice Rainsford.

* The first Lord Chancellor, and the second Lord Chief Justice of both Benches in the Reign of King James the I. The third Lord Keeper, and the fourth Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, in the Reign of King Charles the II.

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Person got the Throne, who had no antecedent Right to it, he would be to all Intents and Purposes, as much a King as themselves, or their next Heirs; and the Allegiance of the Subject, would be due to him, and not to them. And therefore nothing but a full Conviction, that this was the Law of the Realm, could induce them, to *declare it* for such.

And as these great Lawyers delivered this for Law, so no Lawyer of Note, that I know, has contradicted them, no not in those Reigns, when they might have done it with *Safety and Advantage*: So that were this Case *doubtfull*, as I think, it is not the *unanimous Opinions* of great Lawyers, and Judges, of former, and later Reigns, Men of Probity, eminent in their Profession, and under no Temptation to be corrupted, is a safe and legal Resolution of this Case.

I have said a *legal* as well as safe Resolution; for the Judges by their *Office*, have Authority to interpret the Laws, and their Judgments judicially given are *Law*. So that if what *Grotius* says, † *That the Interpretation of the Force, and Obligation of an Oath, whereby Subjects are bound to the Civil Magistrate, belongs to*

† *Tum vero super vi jurisjurandi, quo Civis Magistratibus obligantur, interpretationem Politicorum & Jurisconsultorum esse arbitror, non Theologorum. Votum pro pace, p. 63.*

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Statesmen, and Lawyers, and not to Divines, be true in the general; it is still of greater Force in our Constitution, where the Judgments of Judges, as I said before, especially when they are unanimous, are *Law*.

From what hath been said, the *Case* of the *Oaths* will easily be resolved. For the *Oath* of *Allegiance*, is a *Legal Oath*, or an *Oath* appointed by *Law*; and the *Allegiance* we swear, is a *Legal Obedience*, or that *Allegiance*, and no other, but *that* which the *Law* requires: And therefore, as the *Law* is the *Measure* of our *Allegiance*, so is it of the *Extent* and *Obligation* of our *Oath* of *Allegiance*. And the *Law*, by requiring our *Allegiance*, to be paid to the King *in Possession*; *determines* our *Allegiance*, and consequently the *Obligation* of our *Oaths*, to the Prince that is *out of Possession*. In *Promissory Oaths*, all *Casuits* agree, there is this tacit Condition, *rebus sic stantibus*, and what is thus implied in the *Oath*, is supplied, and expressed in our *Laws*, by which the *Oath* is to be *interpreted*.

And since the *Kings* for the time being, with their Two Houses of Parliament, have by our Constitution, the *Legislative Power*, they are enabled to do, whatsoever is within the *Verge* of that Power, for the *Preservation* of the *Community*, and themselves. In particular

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cular, they can by *Virtue* of the *Supremacy* of their *Power*, which cannot be bound by any prior *Law*, or *Settlement*; for then the *supreme Power*, would be *superior* to its self, cut off, and extinguish old *Rights*, and create, and establish new *legal Rights*, and *Titles*, not only to private *Inheritances*, but to the *Crown* it self: The *Right* of the *Crown* having ever been, and by several *Statutes* of the *Realm*, expressly declared to be, under the *Direction* of the *Legislative Authority*. So that, whosoever stands excluded by the *Legislative Authority*, whatsoever they may have had, have now no longer any *Right*, or *Title*, to the *Crown*; and they, on whom the *Crown* has been settled in *Reversion*, are, in the *Possession* of it, *rightful* and *lawful* *Queen*, and successively will be *rightful* and *lawful* *Kings*, or *Queens* of this *Realm*. *Right* being nothing but a *Conformity* to *Law*.

C H A P VII.

Our Laws in this Point not contrary to the *Holy Scriptures* and the *Doctrine* of our *Church*, but rather agreeable to Both.

Some will be apt to say, that in all this *Discourse*, I have gone no higher, than the *Constitution*, and *human Laws*; but is this sufficient

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ent to satisfy *Conscience*? Yes, in matters of Civil Obedience, of which *human Laws* are the *Measure*, so long as there is nothing therein contrary to the *Law of God*. When our *Blessed Lord* was upon Earth, He *submitted* to the Government, under which he lived, made no *Alteration* in Matters of Government, but *left* the Governments of the World as he found them. In his Holy Gospel, and the Writings of his Apostles, we have Commands given us in general *to render to Cæsar, the Things that are Cæsars; To obey Magistrates; To be Subject to the higher Powers*; but we are left to learn, from the *Laws of our Several Countries*, who these *Magistrates, and higher Powers are*, to whom we are to be Subject, and this without doubt is the Reason of *Grotius's Rule*. *That the Interpretation of the Obligation of the Oaths, taken to the Civil Magistrate, is the Province of Statesmen and Lawyers, not of Divines*: because the *former*, are generally better acquainted, with the *Laws of their Country*, than the latter. What the Gospel adds in this Matter, is to set our Duty upon a higher Principle, by enjoyning us to pay for *Conscience sake*, that Obedience which human Laws exact, for *Fear of Punishment*.

The Constitution therefore, and our Obedience according to it, is sufficiently vindicated, if

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if there is nothing in it, *contrary to the Law of God*; for then the *Laws of the Kingdom* (which the *Divine Law* commands us to obey) do bind our *Consciences as Subjects*, and we are not only warranted, but *obliged to pay our Allegiance as the Law directs*.

But we may venture a Step farther, and affirm, That our Constitution, by requiring Allegiance to be paid, to the King in Possession, is so far from being *contrary*, that it is *agreeable* to the Holy Scriptures, as appears from our *Blessed Saviours Resolution of the Case that was put to him, whether it was Lawful to pay Tribute to Cæsar or not?* He bid them *shew him the Tribute Mony*, and only ask'd them *whose Image and Superscription it was* (i. e. who is in Possession of the Government?) And when they answer'd him *Cæsar's*, he immediately determines, *Render therefore to Cæsar, the things that are Cæsars, &c.*

Here it will be answered, that *Tiberius Cæsar* was a *Rightful Emperor*, the Senate, and People of *Rome*, having conferr'd the whole Authority, of the Roman Government on *Augustus*, by the *Lex Regia*. If we grant the *Lex Regia* to be genuine (which hath been denied in a Tract, *De fictione Legis Regiæ*.) since it is spoken of with so much Assurance, by the Emperor *Justinian*, in his Institutes: yet

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yet what is this to *Tiberius's* Title? the *Lex Regia*, did not entail the Empire on *Augustus's* Posterity; and if it had, *Tiberius* was none of them. And if we look into the first Book of *Tacitus's* Annals, we shall see, that he durst not, upon *Augustus's* Death, lay any Claim to it; but by Fraud (of which he was a great Master,) and Force, he wound himself into the Government, and the Submission of the Romans (such as it was) was his only Title.

But were the Romans themselves Rightful Governors of *Judaea*? The Law given by God, *Deut. 17.* seems to have been a fundamental Bar, to the Right of any Heathen to govern the Jews, and was probably the ground of this Question, which the Pharisees put to our Saviour. And tho' the Jews, had generally submitted to the Roman Government; for the Law, that prohibited them to set up a Stranger, to rule over them, did not, as I observed before, prohibit them to submit to a Stranger, when he had by Force set himself over them: However, there appears no Express Act, of the Resignation of the Sovereign Power to the Romans, like that of the *Lex Regia* to *Augustus*: Nothing but a forced Submission to a Superior Power, which many of them still scrupled; and the generality of the Nation, were in the mean time in Expectation, that a Prince of the Tribe of *Judah* would shortly

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shortly break the Roman Yoke, and restore the Kingdom to *Israel*.

But not to insist on this, let it be granted, that *Tiberius* was a Rightful Governor, of the Roman Empire in general, and of *Judaea* in particular. This will not weaken the Argument, that is drawn from our Saviour's Resolution of the Case. For our Saviour, doth not resolve the Lawfulness of their Subjection to *Cesar*, into his Right to the Government of *Judaea*, but into his Possession of it; the Coining of Money and raising of Taxes, which our Saviour lays down, for a sufficient Ground of their Subjection, being no manner of proof of the former, but an undeniable Sign of the latter.

And this is the Opinion of the Learned *Grotius*, as he has deliver'd it, in three several Books, written at different times, which shews it was the Result of his most deliberate Thoughts.

† In his *Votum pro Pace*, he saith, And if any one in our time, had shew'd our Money, and ask'd whose is this Image? Any Man, both the Learned, and the Unlearned, would readily Answer, The States of Holland's. I think all that live now in those Territories do

† Et si quis nostro tempore nummum ostendisset, & quaesisset, Cujus haec est Imago? quilibet & doctus & indoctus responsurus fuit, Ordinum Hollandiae Ego omnes qui nunc in illis terris vivunt sentio Obsequere

owe Obedience; nay, and if they are injuriously treated, patient Submission to those, who are now the Governors of the Towns and the People: For they are in Possession of the Government.)

* In his Admirable Book *de Jure Belli & Pacis*, he saith, Especially in a controverted Case, a private Person, ought not to take upon himself to judge, but to follow Possession. Thus Christ commanded Tribute to be paid to Cæsar, because the Mony had his Image, that is, because he was in Possession of the Government. This being (as he says in his Note) the most certain Sign of Possession.

† In his Annotations on the 22. c. of St. Mat. Explaining the Words, whose Image and Supercription is this? * In the 20. verse he says, As to make Laws, so to coin Mony is a Mark of Sovereign Power, for *ὄψιμα* Mony as Aristotle teaches, receives both it's Name

obedientiam, imo & si quid mali ipsis inferatur, patientiam debere iis, qui nunc sunt oppidorum populorumque Rectoribus: Sunt enim in Possessione Imperii. Vol. pro pace p. 62.

* Maxime autem in re controversa, judicium sibi privatus sumere non debet, sed possessionem sequi. Sic tributum solvi Cæsari Christus jubebat, qui ejus imaginem nummus præferebat, id est, quia in possessione erat Imperii, D. Jure B. & P. l. 1. c. 4. § 20.

† Quia ejus imaginem præferebat nummus, præferebat certissimum hoc Indicium possessionis. vide in Historia Jenuate Bezarum l. 18.

* v. 20. Τιμὴ ἢ εἰκὼν αὐτῆς ἢ ἐμπροσθεν. Sicut legem figure signum est summi imperii, ita ut nummum cadere, nam *ὄψιμα*, ut docet Aristoteles, & nomen suum, & vim habet *ὄψιμα* and

and Value from *ὄψιμα* the Law, hence to adulterate the Coin is ranked amongst Treasons. --- The Mony it self therefore receiving it's Value, from the Edict of Cæsar, and bearing Cæsar's Image and Supercription, declared, that Cæsar actually possess'd the Sovereign Power over Judæa, and that the Jews in using the Mony acknowledged it. It might be objected, that the Romans had the Rule over the Jews, and Cæsar over the Romans in fact, but not of Right. But Christ shews this doth not at all belong to the Question: for since the Peace of Nations, cannot be maintain'd without Arms, nor Arms without Pay, nor Pay without Taxes, as Tacitus speaks, it follows, that Tribute must be paid to him that governs, as long as he governs, as a Reward of the common Protection, which he affords us, who is in Possession of the Government, whosoever he be. Therefore, saith St. Paul you pay Tribute also, and not only out of

Hinc Majestatis criminibus accusentur nummos corrumpere. Ipse igitur nummum pretium habens ex Edicto Cæsaris, Cæsarisque nomen & vultum præferens, testabatur Cæsarem summum in Judæam Imperium ne ipsa obtinere, idque à Judæis nummo illo utentibus agnosci. Objici poterat, ipso quidem facto Romanos Judæis, & Cæsarem Romanis imperasse, at nullo jure. Sed Christus ostendit hoc ad propositam questionem nihil pertinere. Nam cum nec quies gentium sine Armis, nec Arma sine Stipendiis, nec Stipendia sine Tributis, haberi possint, ut loquitur Tacitus, sequitur ei qui imperat, tantisper dum imperat, pendenda tributa, ut pretium communis tutelæ, quam præstat nobis quisquis est publici imperii possessor. Propterea inquit Pau-

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Fear of Punishment, but regard into Justice and Equity; because under the Protection of the Powers, ye live secure from Violence and Injuries. † Render (as due) as St. Paul explains it, who, when he was treating of Tribute, subjoins, render therefore to all their Dues.

It is not my Design here, to examine those Texts of Scripture, nor the Argument from Providence, which has been drawn from them, and so much debated in this Controversy, how far, and in what manner, the Divine Providence is concern'd, in the Revolutions of States and Kingdoms, and how far it will, or will not justify Subjection, after the Revolution is past, and the new Government established. But without entering into this Dispute, after the View that I have given of the Constitution, I may take the Liberty to set the Controversy on a new Foot, and without incurring the least Suspicion, of committing Providence with Law, propose this single Question: That after the divine Providence has placed, permitted, at least, a Person to be placed in such a Station, that the Laws

lus, etiam tributa penditis nec sola poena formidine sed juris & aequi respectu, quia potestatum praesidio tuti estis a vi atque injuria.
 † v. 21. Ἀπόδοτε, tanquam debitum, ut Paulus explicat, nam cum de tributis egisset subjecit, ἀπόδοτε ἕν ἕκάστῳ τὸ ἀφεῖδός.

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of the Kingdom, acknowledge his Regal Authority, and require the Allegiance of the Subject to be paid to him. Whether to refuse to acknowledge him, for our King, or to pay Allegiance to him as such, is not to oppose both Providence and Law?

From the holy Scriptures, I come to the Judgment of our Church, as it may be collected from the Homilies. I do not pretend, that the Church has given her Judgment, by way of an express Decision of this Question; only that there are some Passages, to be met with there, which plainly favour that side of the Question, which we maintain; of which I shall here mention but one.

In the Sixth Homily against Rebellion, we have these Words: *The Bishop of Rome — cursing King John, and discharging his Subjects, of their Oath of Fidelity, unto their Sovereign Lord. Now had Englishmen, at that time, known their Duty to their Prince, set forth in God's Word, would a great many of Nobles, and other Englishmen, natural Subjects, for this foreign and unnatural Usurper, his vain Curse of the King, and for his feigned discharging of them of their Oath, and Fidelity, to their natural Lord, upon so slender, or no Ground at all, have rebelled against their Sovereign Lord the King? Would they have sworn Fidelity to the Dauphine of France, breaking their Oath*

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of Fidelity, to their natural Lord the King of England, &c?

It is well known, that King *John* was no more than a *King in Possession*; for *Arthur*, who was his elder Brother's Son, and put up a Claim against him, with his Sister *Eleanor*, whom he kept in Prison all his Reign, were nearer in Blood to the Throne, than himself; and yet we see the Homily calls him the Subject's *Sovereign Lord the King, and their Natural Lord the King of England*: Condemns those Subjects, that broke their Oath of Fidelity to him, and therefore justifies those that took, and kept their Oaths to him; and consequently Justifies others, who take and keep Oaths, to such Kings as he was. In a Word, had you lived in the Reign of King *John*, would you have given your Oath of Allegiance to him? If you would, you need not have refused it to any King since. If you would not, you would have refused an Oath, that the Church has judged *lawful*.

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C H A P. VIII.

Our Laws in this Point, agreeable to the great End, and Design of Government.

BUT our Constitution in this Point has the Suffrage of *Reason*, as well as *Authority*, on it's side, for if we impartially examine the *Reasons* and *End* of *Government*, we are soon convinc'd, that the several Communities of the World were not design'd, as so many Scenes for a few Persons to display their Glory in, and all the rest of Mankind to be only Instruments of their Power; but that Government was instituted for the Security, and Welfare, of all the Members of Civil Society. Our Church in the first Homily against Rebellion, has affirmed, *that the Government of a Prince, is a Blessing of God given for the Common-wealth, especially of the good and godly, for the Comfort and cherishing of whom, God giveth and setteth up Princes, and on the contrary part, to the Fear and Punishment of the Wicked.* A learned Bishop, and Casuist of our Church saith, that *publick Authority was instituted primarily for*

Potestas autem publica Jurisdictionis, ordinatur primario in bonum publicum ipsius Communitatis, in bonum vero persona tali potestate

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the publick Good of the Community it self; and but secundarily and consequentially only, for the Good of the civil Magistrate, as it is profitable to the Prince, that the Commonwealth should flourish. † Fortescue Lord Chancellor of England under King Henry the VI, quotes, and approves, Thomas Aquinas for the same Doctrine. St. Thomas, saith he, in the Book which he writ to the King of Cyprus, of the Government of Princes, saith, that the King is given for the Kingdom, and not the Kingdom for the King. Had Government been instituted, for the Sake of the Prince, and Subjects design'd to be only the Instruments of his Grandeur and Power; if the Prince came to be dispossest'd of his Kingdom, it would have then been reasonable for the Subjects, still to adhere to him, and his Posterity after him, tho' with the Loss of all the Benefits of Government, because they were all this while answering the End of it. But if Government was instituted, for the Sake of all the Members of the Community, then after they have done what they are able, to

predita, id est ipsius Magistratus, non nisi secundario & consequenter, quatenus nimirum utile est Principi, ut Respublica floreat. Sander-son de Oblig. Conscien. Prælect. 7. S. 4.

† Sanctus Thomas, in Libro quem Regi Cypri, scripsit, de Regimine Principum dicit, quod Rex datur propter Regnum, & non Regnum propter Regem. Fortescue De Laud. Legum Anglia. c. 37.

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maintain their Prince in the Throne, if he happens to be dispossest'd, and cannot afford them any of the Benefits of Government, can defend neither himself, them, nor his Right to govern them; It is not reasonable that they, for whom Government was instituted, should lose all the Benefits of it, and live Outlaws at home, or Exiles abroad for the Sake of him, for whom, it was not instituted, at least, not primarily instituted. The Consequence is as necessary, as the Principle, whence it is drawn, is true, which in short is this, that Government was made for Man, and not Man for Government, and both the one, and the other are countenanc'd, by our Saviour's Decision, of the Lawfulness of what his Disciples did on the Sabbath Day, upon this Principle, that the Sabbath was made for Man, and not Man for the Sabbath.

If it should be said, that this Argument, hath been made use of by some, to justify the Resistance of the supreme Magistrate, when he does not pursue, as they think, the Ends of Government. I answer, there is this great Difference, betwixt the Two Cases, that the Laws of the Land, which allow, and require Submission, forbid Resistance.

Secondly, They who employ this Argument for Resistance, are so far from pursuing the Ends of Government, by their Hypothe-

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sis, that they destroy the very Notion of it. For by making as they do any of the Subjects, as much Judges of the *publick Good* as those, who are invested with the Authority of the Government; and by giving them a Liberty, to overturn both the Laws, and Law-makers, when they do not pursue, what they think to be, the publick Good: They leave no *Authority* in the *Laws*, which according to this Opinion, are no more than *Counsels*, that the Subjects may take, or refuse, as they think fit: They leave no Difference, betwixt the *Governors* and *Governed*: † In a word, they have no such thing as Government, by not leaving any *Dernier Resort*, from which there is no Appeal.

C H A P. IX.

Our Laws in this Point, agreeable to the Practice of all Mankind, particularly, of God's own People, the Jews, and of the Christians of the Earlier Ages.

AN-D that this is a reasonable Notion of Government, we shall be farther convinced, now we come in the last place, to

† Si ubi jubentur, quærere singulis liceat, pereunte obsequio, imperium etiam intercidit. Tacit. Hist. 3.

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consider the Practice of Mankind. And here, I shall first consider the Behaviour of those, who may serve for Examples to us, I mean of Gods peculiar People the *Jews*, and then of the *Christians*, (of the *earlier Ages* especially) who succeeded them in that Relation.

That the *Jews* lived in Subjection to the *Midianites*, the *Moabites*, and other neighbouring Nations, when they were subdued by them, is evident from the Old Testament. That they became Subjects to *Pharaoh Necob*, K. of *Egypt*, who carri'd away *Jeboabaz* their King, Captive into *Egypt*, and set up *Eliakim*, to whom he gave the Name of *Jekoiakim*, to be King over them. After this, they came under Subjection, to the King of *Babylon*, who carried away King *Jekoiakim* Captive into *Babylon*, and set his Son *Jeconiah* on the Throne, whom after a Reign of 3 Months, he likewise removes to *Babylon*, and puts his Uncle *Zedekiah* in his Place, who in a while followed the rest into Captivity, after which the Remnant of the *Jews*, that were left in *Judea*, lived Subjects to the King of *Babylon's* Governors, as the Captives in *Babylon*, did to his Government there.

If it be said, that *God* by his Prophet *Jeremiah*, commanded the *Jews* to be subject to the King of *Babylon*. It may be answered, that they had submitted to the *Moabites*, to the

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King of *Egypt*, &c. without any such Command, that we know of, nay to the King of *Babylon himself*, before this Command was given, which was not till the Reign of *Zedekiah*, who was the second King, that the King of *Babylon* had set over them.

In the next place, it is to be considered, that altho *God's* Command, was of it self abundantly sufficient, to oblige them to submit, yet he was pleased to condescend to give them a Motive, or Reason, for this Submission, *I spake to Zedekiah King of Judah, according to all these Words, saying, bring your Necks under the Yoke of the King of Babylon, and serve him, and his People, and live. Why will ye dye, thou and thy People by the Sword, the Famine and the Pestilence, as the Lord hath spoken against the Nations that will not serve the King of Babylon.--- Wherefore should this City be laid wast? Jer. 27. 12. 13. 17.* And thus the Prophet *Jeremiah*, in his Letters to the Captives at *Babylon*, saith, *Seek ye the Peace of the City; where I have caused you to be carried away Captive, and pray unto the Lord for it, for in the Peace thereof, ye shall have Peace, Jer. 29. 7.* Which is thus expressed by *Baruch*, in his Exhortation to the *Jews*, *Pray for the Life of Nabuchodonosor King of Babylon, and for the Life of Balthasar his Son, that their Days may be*

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be on Earth, as the Days of Heaven. And the Lord will give us Strength, and lighten our Eyes, and we shall live under the Shadow of Nabuchodonosor King of Babylon, and under the Shadow of Balthasar his Son, and we shall serve them many Days, and find Favour in his Sight, c. I. v. 11. 12. Thus we see, when *God* commanded them, to submit to the King of *Babylon*, he was pleased over and above to add this Reason for their Submission, that they might thereby live secure under his Protection, and enjoy the Benefits of Government in Peace, and Tranquillity.

Whether the *Jews* thought this Command of *God*, or at least the Reason of it, the Preservation of themselves, under the Protection of Government, did extend to; and would justify their Submission in the like Cases; we find, that after the Destruction of the *Babylonish* Empire, without any such particular Command, they successively became Subjects of the *Persian*, after that of the *Græcian*, and at last, of the *Roman* Empire, which swallowed up all the rest.

Their Behaviour under that, which is call'd the *Græcian* Monarchy, deserves a more particular Reflection. After the Death of *Alexander*, (to whom the *Jews* had submitted) several Kingdoms having been formed out of his Conquests, *Judæa* was unhappily scituated,

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betwixt two of the most powerful of those Kingdoms : *Egypt*, where the *Ptolomyes* ; and *Syria*, where the *Seleucida* reign'd. And as these great Kings, were engaged in frequent Wars against one another; the most successful way, that either of them had to invade each others Dominions, was first to subdue *Judaea*, as sometimes one, sometimes the other of those Kings did; and if you look into *Josephus's* Antiquities, you will find, that the Jews became Subjects of the *Egyptian*, or of the *Syrian* Kings, according as those Kings, recover'd or lost the Possession of *Judaea*, and yet were so far from being reproach'd for this, that they were highly esteem'd by both for their Fidelity, because they continued firm in their Obedience to the King of *Egypt*, or to the King of *Syria*, as long as the one, or the other, could defend his Government over them.

If you would be satisfied in the particulars of what I have here affirm'd in general, you need only read the 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 Chapters of the 12th Book of *Josephus Antiquities* where you will also find they took Oaths of Fidelity to those Princes.

M. *Fleury*, in his *Manners of the Israelites* has given much the same Account of their Behaviour under these Kings. As they were situated betwixt the Kings of *Syria* and the Kings of *Egypt*; they obeyed sometimes the former,

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former, and sometimes the latter, according as these Kings were most powerful. * The Submission of the Jews, to *Alexander* their High Priest *Jaddus*, has been much disputed, and Books have been written upon it, *pro* and *con* in this Controversy ; but their interchangeable Submission to the Kings of *Egypt*, and of *Syria*, according as the former, or the latter, became Masters of *Judaea*, is clear, and admits of no Dispute.

As for the Behaviour of the *Primitive Christians*, after the Revolutions of Government, in the earliest Ages of the Church, we have no Instance of dispossest'd Emperors, claiming against their Rivals; (except it be that of *Maximus Thrax*, and his Son) and the Empire, not being Hereditary, there could be no claims of *Heirs*. That *Maximus Thrax*, rais'd a Persecution against the Christians, out of Hatred to the late Emperor, *Alexander Severus's* Family, of which many were Believers, we learn from *Eusebius*. † But how the Christians behaved themselves under the Rival Emperors, that were set up against the Two *Maximini*, we have no certain Account. Only in general we find that the two *Gordiani*,

* Comme ils estoient entre les Rois de Syrie, & les Rois d'Egypte ; ils obeissoient tantost aux uns & tantost aux autres ; selon que ces Rois estoient les plus forts. Meurs des Israelites. Part. 3. Chap. 3.
† Eccles. Histor. l. 6. 28.

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Father and Son, that were first saluted Emperors in *Africk*, and afterwards confirmed by the Roman Senate, met with a chearful Submission, both at *Rome* and throughout *Italy*, except in a few Cities; as well as *Maximus* and *Balbinus*, * who were created Emperors upon the Death of the two former, and before the Death of the *Maximini*. I cannot say there is any Testimony, that proves the Submission of the Christians in particular, to these Rival Emperors; Nor is there any, that proves the Christians, who were very numerous at that time, were singular in their Behaviour, amidst this general Submission: But in the 4th. 5th. and 6th. Ages we have several Instances, of the Christians becoming Subjects, to New Emperors, whilst the Dispossest'd Emperor was alive. I'll content my self with giving a Precedent of their Behaviour in each of those Ages.

In the Beginning of the 4th. Age, *Constantine* and *Licinius*, who were *Collegues* in the Roman Empire, having publish'd an Edict for the secure Profession of the Christian Religion; *Licinius* notwithstanding a while after began to persecute his Christian Subjects; for which, *Constantine* engages in a War against him, dispossest him first of some of his Provinces, and afterwards in a Second War, of his Empire of the East, and reduces him to a private

* See *Julii Capitolini Maximini Duo.*

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Life; and at last, upon his designing to raise new Commotions, puts him to Death. In the mean time, the Bishops and Christians, as well as the rest of the Subjects of *Licinius*, paid a chearful Obedience to *Constantine*, as he became Master of *Licinius's* Division of the Empire.

Some learned Men have said, *Constantine* was superior in the Empire to *Licinius*: But it is evident from *Eusebius*, that they were not Joint Emperors, in one Throne: * But the *Roman Empire* was divided in two Parts betwixt them. *Constantine*, as elder Emperor, when they met, might have Precedency in Place; but each Emperor was, in his own Part, *absolute*, and *independent* on the other; and therefore, when they were both Consuls, in the West that Year is inscrib'd, *Constantine the fourth, and Licinius the fourth time Consul*. But in the East, *Licinius's* Name stands first, in this manner. *Licinius Augustus the fourth, and Constantine the fourth time Consuls*. As *Valesius* proves out of the *Excerpta de gestis Constantini*.

In the Fifth Century, the Emperor *Zeno* was dispossest'd, and driven into *Isauria*, by *Basiliscus*, who, by Usurpation, mounted the Imperial Throne: And yet after he was

* *Ecccl. Hist. l. 10. c. 8. & in Vita Constant. l. 1. c. 49.*

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settled in it, had so general a Submission, that we find no less than 500 Bishops, and amongst them, Three of the Four Eastern Patriarchs, subscribing to *Basiliscus's* Circular Letters, for anathematizing the Council of *Chalcedon*, and *Leo's Tome*. It must be confess'd, that these Bishops, who discover'd such Puffillanimity, and Levity, in condemning the Council of *Chalcedon*, are not to be set up for Examples, but I do not find but the rest of the Subjects, particularly the great *Acacius*, Patriarch of *C. S.* a Man of inflexible Resolution and Courage, who maintain'd the Authority of the Council of *Chalcedon*, and could not be induced, by all the Menaces of *Basiliscus*, to subscribe his Circular Letters, did, at the same time, acknowledge his Imperial Authority, as much as those that had subscribed. †

Some, I know, have said that the Emperors were not pray'd for, *by Name*, in the earlier Ages. That they were prayed for when they were Pagans we are sure; whether by Name I'll not be positive: But that they were pray'd for by name, after they were Christians, I think there is no doubt*. That they were prayed for by name in the Age, we are now speaking of, we are assur'd by a Passage in

See *Vales. Not. ad vit. Constant. l. 2. c. 6.*

† See *Evagr. Eccl. Hist. l. 3. c. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.*

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Pope *Geladius's* Epistle, † *ad Episcopos Dardania*, where he takes Notice, that the Emperor *Zeno* colour'd over his Displeasure against *Calendion*, Bishop of *Antioch*, with a Pretext, that he had razed his Name out of the Dyparchs, in favour of the Two Rebels *Leontius* and *Illus*. *

In the Sixth Century after the *Goths*, had establish'd themselves in *Italy*, and made *Rome* the Capital of their Kingdom, and the *Romans* had lived a good while in Subjection to the *Gothick* Kings: The Emperor *Justinian*, about the Year 535. sends an Army into *Italy*, under his famous General *Belizarius*, upon whose approach *Theodatus*, K. of the *Goths*, quits *Rome*, and the *Romans* to avoid ruin open'd their Gates to *Belizarius*. However, in a little while, the *Goths* return'd under their new K. *Vitiges*, and laid Siege to *Rome*, which *Belizarius* defended, and forced them to raise the Siege, after they had lain above a Year before it. † *Silverius* was Bishop of *Rome*, when it was reduced by *Belizarius*, having been promoted to that See by *Theodatus*, late King of the *Goths*. He was at this time, under the Displeasure of the Empress *Theodora*, who re-

* *Vid. Euseb. In Constant. Life l. 4. c. 20.*

† *Epist. 13. in the 4. Tome of Lable & Cossart. Councils.*

* See *Evagr. Eccl. Hist. l. 3. c. 16.* and another Instance of the same, in his Successor *Anastasius*. *Evagr. l. 3. c. 34.*

† It appears from *Procopius de bello Gothico l. 1. c. XI* that *Silverius*, as well as the Roman Senate, and People, took Oaths to the *Gothick* Kings.

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solv'd to deprive him of his See, because he would not communicate with the Heretical Bishop *Anthimus*, and to advance his Deacon *Vigilius*, who was then at C. S. and had promised the Empress, he would communicate with *Anthimus*, if she would make him Bishop of Rome. This was resolved on, but she wanted a plausible Pretext for the Deprivation of *Silverius*: The true Cause of his not communicating with *Anthimus*, the *Acephalist*, she durst not own to the Emperor. But could she want a fair Pretence? Had not *Silverius* lived a Subject, under the *Gothick* Kings, and been advanc'd by one of them to the Roman See? And if this was a Fault, was not he more obnoxious than any Man, not only as he was Bishop, but also as the first Citizen of Rome? But this was so far from being esteemed a Fault then, that in the Account of his mortal Enemies, who were seeking his Ruin, it would not bear an Accusation: And therefore *Theodora's* Instruments, were forced, to have recourse to the Subornation of Witnesses, and to forged Letters, to prove him guilty of a Conspiracy, to betray Rome into the Hands of the *Gothick* King, when he laid Siege to It: * For to un-

* *Liberati Diaconi Breviar. c. 22.* who lived at the same time, *Anastasis Bibliothec. in Vita Silverii.*

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dermine a Government by Treachery, or to Revolt from it whilst it stands, were ever esteemed Crimes, but to submit to a superior Power never was, even their Enemies being Judges, when a Prince can no longer defend his Government, nor People against it.

I should now in the last Place, alledge the Practice of all Mankind; but this would be to write a History of the Revolutions, that have happen'd in all Ages, and Countries of the World, and of the Submission of Nations, to the new Governments after their Establishment. We need only look abroad, and see what is practised in our own time, in the several Parts of the Spanish Dominions, in *Italy*, in the Isles of the *Mediterranean*, in the *Spanish Netherlands*, and in *Spain* it self: In all which the Inhabitants take Oaths of Fidelity to the one, or the other, of their Rival Kings, as they come under their Power.

And what has been thus universally practised; is, as a learned foreign Lawyer affirms, as universally justified: 'Tis acknowledged by all, saith *Puffendorf*, that Subjects, after their Prince can afford them no Protection, may submit to another, to preserve themselves from Ruin. *

* *Illud omnes fatentur, posse populum Regi Subjectum, ad declinandum excidium, & postquam in Rege nihil amplius est presidii, alteri sese submittere. Puffend. de Jure natura & Gentium, l. 7. c. 7. § 4.*

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In Answer to this Argument, from the Practice of other Nations. It has been said, *that we know not what their Constitutions are, at least, they differ very much from ours.* There is no doubt, but their several *Constitutions* differ, in several Points from ours, and from each other too; and yet how much soever they differ, we find, that upon the common Reasons and End of Government, and from the Nature of the Obligations to it, the several Nations of the World, have *agreed* in this: That after they have done what they can to preserve their *Prince*, they are at Liberty to *preserve themselves*, under a new Government, when the Prince can neither defend himself, them, nor his Government over them. And without examining into the particular Constitutions of other Countries, after the foregoing Discourse, I may venture to say with some Assurance, that there is no Country in the World, where the Laws, after the Care they have first taken, to secure the Prince in his Throne, have made a better Provision, for the Peace of the Community, and the Security of its Members upon Revolutions; or do more expressly *allow, justify, and require* the Subjects to submit to the Prince in Possession, than *our own*; because, perhaps, no Country in the World, has had more Revolutions of Government, than *ours*. And to end where I began, since the *Laws*, which are the Rule of Civil Subjection, require This,

Oportet neminem esse sapientio rem Legibus.

F I N I S.

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 English Constitution
 W I T H
 Respect to the Sovereign Authority
 of the P R I N C E,
 A N D
 The Allegiance of the S U B J E C T.
 By way of R E P L Y to the several
 Answers that have been made to it.

By W I L L I A M H I G D E N, D. D.

London, Printed for S. Keble at the *Turks-Head*,
and R. Gosling at the *Miter* in *Fleetstreet*. 1710.

The PREFACE.

TO reduce this Controversy to Matter of Fact, was, I thought, the Way to bring it to a short and a fair Issue. For, that it has been the Common Usage of the Realm, for all Orders and Degrees of Men after Revolutions to submit to the Princes that were possess'd of the Throne with the Consent of the States: That the Authority of these Kings, to which the Subjects submitted, swore, and paid Allegiance, was owned in the succeeding Reigns of the Kings who were their Rivals: That the Judicial Proceedings, and adjudged Cases in the Courts of Kings *de jure*, which do fully acknowledge that *Authority*, are extant in the *Year Books* of those Reigns: That the solemn Resolutions, and declared Opinions of Judges, and great Lawyers, both ancient, and modern, which I have produced for this Authority, were really delivered by those Judges and Lawyers: That all the publick

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Statutes, which were made by Kings *de facto*, have ever had the Force of Laws of this Realm, have been always pleaded as such in the Courts of succeeding Kings that were their Rivals, without any Confirmation, or pretended Confirmation, and have been recited as such by Kings *de jure* and their Parliaments: That when the 25 *Ed. III.* was made, as well as in all times before that Statute, by the Common Custom and Usage of the Realm, the Unpossess'd, Unrecognized Heir was never stiled and held to be our Sovereign Lord the King by any: That the Prince in possession of the Crown and Kingdom was always stiled and held to be our Sovereign Lord the King: That in the 11 Year of *Henry VII.* a Statute was made, which declares that to serve the King for the Time being is the true Duty and Service of Allegiance, and secures the Subjects in the Discharge of that Service; and that this Law has never been Repealed by any succeeding King or Queen,

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Queen, but stands, at this day in the *Statute Book*, a Law of this Realm: Are all Matters of Fact.

Now there is but one way to answer Matters of Fact, which is to deny them. And tho' these Authors have attempted this in an instance or two, yet they have done it so faintly and unsuccessfully, and the Evidence against them is so clear and full; that instead of roundly denying these Facts, they have had recourse to the *Salvos* of *sub ratione juris*, and the *Presumptive Consent*, &c. with which (tho' they have not the least Authority for either from our Lawyers or Lawbooks) they think to turn off the force of what has been urged both from the Common Laws and the Statute Book. But this is not answering, but evading, 'tis setting up their private Opinions against Fact and Law, or laying the Laws aside, and setting an Hypothesis in their Place.

It is certain, that the Schemes of Government which have been form'd by

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some Men of leisure, are perfect Strangers to our Laws. Laws are Rules given by the Supreme Authority, obliging the Subjects to regulate their Actions by them, in order to the Publick Peace and Tranquility of the Realm; without any regard to the Patriarchal, or Popular Scheme. And therefore to such as dictate from either of these Schemes, that Maxim of Law is a sufficient Answer, *Lex non dicit, neque tu dicere debes.*

Some, I know, doubt, whether Human Laws are sufficient to justify our Actions in *foro interno*, and to satisfy Conscience. But they are to consider, that Conscience is to be directed by some Rule. In Matters of Faith, and Divine Institutions, Divine Revelation is our Rule; In Ecclesiastical Matters, as distinguished from Divine Institutions, the Laws of the Church; In Civil Matters, the Laws of the State, so long as they enjoin nothing contrary to the Law of God: If they do

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do, we have a plain Apostolical Rule, *To obey God rather than Man*; If they do not, we have another Apostolical Rule, as plain, *To obey Magistrates.*

God has given no particular Laws in Civil Affairs as to the Form of Government, or the Measures of Obedience, except it were to the Jewish Nation. Neither has the Revelation of the Gospel made any Alteration in this Matter. We are therein, I say, commanded in general *To obey Magistrates*, &c. but are left to learn from the Laws of every Country, who the Magistrate is, and what Obedience is due to him. Our Blessed Lord himself submitted to the Government under which he lived, and made no Change in the Governments of the World, but left them in the same State in which he found them. His Apostles, and their Successors after them did the same, whether they propagated the Gospel within, or without the Limits of the Roman Empire. The Advantage which Divine Revelation has brought

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brought to Government, and the Security it gives to the Thrones of Princes, is not by altering the Object, or the Measures of Civil Obedience, but by Establishing that Obedience, which human Laws exact for fear of Punishment, on a higher and a surer Principle, and with a more weighty and awful Sanction, than they can give; whilst it obliges us to be *Subject, not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience Sake.* Could it be proved that a particular Model of Government and Rule of Succession to it, hath been Instituted by God as a Law to Mankind, I should think my self not only obliged to Submit to it, but obliged to Submit to no other; since no humane Authority can prescribe against a Divine Institution: But till that is proved, I shall think my self obliged to submit to *every Ordinance of Men, or, as it may be rendred, to every Human Constitution, for the Lord's sake,* and to make the Laws of my Country, the Rule of my Obedience in Civil Matters.

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It has been objected that the Act of the 13 *Eliz. c. 1.* is expired. If that were true; it is never the less true, that the Legislature of the Realm hath in that Act asserted the Limitation of the Descent and Inheritance of the Crown to be within the Verge of its Power. But it is not true that the Act 13 *Eliz. c. 1.* is expired: The Penalty of High Treason indeed was Temporary, that Act making it *High Treason, only during the Queen's Life, for any one to affirm that the Queen and her Two Houses of Parliament could not make Laws of sufficient Force and Validity to bind the Descent and Inheritance of the Crown.* But the Act it self was so far from being Temporary, or expiring with the Queen's life, that it expressly makes it *forfeiture of Goods and Chattels, for any one to affirm the same after the Queen's Death.* *

After I have proved the Legislative Authority of the King for the time being, with his two Houses of Parlia-

* See Number V. in the Appendix.

ment :

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ment: I think, I need say no more of the Hereditary Descent of the Crown being limitable by Act of Parliament, which is the principal Question betwixt me and these Authors on this Head. Not whether the Crown is Hereditary? For that it is so, is agreed on both Hands: And the aforesaid Act is so far from making it Elective, that it plainly acknowledges the Inheritance of the Crown, whilst it asserts that its *Inheritance may be limited by Parliament*; nay the Act † expressly makes it equally penal, for any to affirm or maintain that the *Common Laws of this Realm, not altered by Parliament, ought not to direct the Right of the Crown of England, as to affirm that the Queen and her two Houses of Parliament could not limit the Descent and Inheritance thereof.* *

And therefore the Question betwixt these Authors and me is, whether the Hereditary Right and Descent of the

* See the beginning of the Clause of the Act Numb. V.

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Crown is indefeazible and unalienable? as they affirm: Or under the Direction of the Legislative Power? as I have not only affirmed, but I think, fully proved.

Having refer'd in p. 7. to *Lethington* the Scotch Secretary's Letter, and to *Sir Thomas Craig's* Book of *the Right of Succession*, for farther Proof that *Henry VIII.* did not execute the Power given him by Parliament, to nominate a Successor by his last Will and Testament, Signed with his own Hand, I have thought fit to Print a Citation from each of them in the *Appendix.* *

What *Lethington* says, carries the greater Weight, because he appeals for the Truth of it, not only to *Sir William Cecil*, the Minister of State to whom he writes, but to several Noblemen then alive, who could not but know, whether what he affirms to have been done in open Parliament thirteen Years before, was really done, or not; for his Letters

* Number VI, VII.

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bear date *Jan. 14. 1566*, and that was done in Parliament in the first Year of *Queen Mary*, which was in 1553. I need say nothing of *Sir Thomas Craig*, who wants no Authority with the Writers on that side of the Question: And therefore let me put the *Remarker* in mind that how little soever the Case of *Barbaricus* or *Barbarius*, which he cites from *Hottoman*, was to his purpose, he'll find by *Craig* * that it is mistaken too. If the *Remarker* has not mistaken *Hottoman*, *Hottoman* has mistaken the Case in Law.

I have been larger in my Reply to the Author of the *Remarks on Mr. Higden's Eutopian Constitution*, as he is pleased to call it, than to the Author of *A Letter from the Natural Born Subject*, because he does not so frequently and so long wander from the Question, as the latter, who sometimes

* *Right of Succession*, p. 297.

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loses Sight of it for many Pages together, however what is said to one of them, is generally a Reply to both.

As to the *English Constitution fully stated* which came very late to my Hands, I have only taken so much notice of it, as to shew, it would not have deserved more, had it come sooner.

I cannot but think my *Answerers* after they have read my *Defence*, must be convinced they have made very many and great Mistakes in our English History, which yet they have delivered with as great Assurance, and drawn important Consequences from them. It may possibly not be so easy to convince them of their Mistakes in Law, because the Sense of Laws will more easily bend to an Hypothesis, than Matters of Fact, which are inflexible. However a Conviction of their Mistakes in History should, methinks, lead them to suspect they may be mistaken in the Sense of our Laws, where their Assurance cannot be greater, than it has been in the former,

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former, and their Study, I believe, has been less. They should suspect this the rather, when they consider, that they differ from those, whose Profession it is, and who are in a manner unanimous in these Points of Law, whilst themselves who differ from them, do in several of these Points differ from one another too.

But whether the Writers shall make these Reflections or no, methinks some of their Readers, who are apt too implicitly to take things upon trust, should not, if they read on both sides, fail to make them. However I think neither should esteem it (as my *Answerers* have done) an ill Office in those, who believe them mistaken, to endeavor to set them right, and to bring them into an Establishment, which (if they could lay down their Scruples) they themselves would believe was for the Interest of their Country, and for the Interest and Preservation of a Community, that ought to be yet still dearer to us, I mean, that of our excellent Church.

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IN the Preface we meet with nothing to detain us, unless it be this Remark, I might have said, that some Acts made even by Kings *de Jure*, (as some made by Hen. VIII. a King *de Jure* and his Parliaments,) were never Repealed, and yet no more Notice taken of 'em in following Reigns, than if they had never been made, being against the English Constitution, and that Mr. H. knew this well enough, but wisely took no notice of it, because it would have spoil'd his Hypothesis.

The Remarker, I think, ought to have been more particular, and told us what were these Laws of King Henry VIII. which were never Repealed, and yet no more Notice taken of 'em in following Reigns, than if they

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had never been made. However, I doubt not but he means those Acts, which were made by King *Henry VIII.* to Limit the Descent of the Crown; since he Remark p. 84. says, that *all Acts made to Disinherit the next Heir, are Null and Void, being against the Constitution of an Hereditary Monarchy.*

But the Remarker was a little too forward, in saying, that I *knew there was no notice taken of these Acts in succeeding Reigns.* I know indeed there is a like Remark in the Preface to *Jovian*, (a Book which he recommends to me) but I knew it to be a mistake there, and shall prove it to be so here. In the Opinion of the learned Author of that Preface, there is *a fundamental Law of the Monarchy, which seems to Invalidate all Acts of Parliament that limit and bind the Succession.* It was by this Law, saith he, that the Act of Parliament, which Impower'd King *Henry VIII.* to dispose of the Crown by his last Will and Testament, to what Person or Persons he pleased, proved Ineffectual to the House of *Suffolk*, to which he bequeath'd it after the Death of Queen *Elizabeth.* If, saith he, these Statutes of King *Henry VIII.* were not Null and Void, by what Authority was the House of *Suffolk* Excluded, and King *James* admitted, contrary

trary to so many Statutes? To which Question this short Answer might suffice, that there was no Statute for the Admission of the House of *Suffolk*, nor for the Exclusion of King *James*, and the House of *Scotland*; nor was that Power of disposing of the Crown, which was given *Henry* the VIII. by Act of Parliament, ever put in Execution by that King for the Admission of the former House, or Exclusion of the latter. And therefore to say, that the House of *Suffolk* was excluded and King *James* admitted to the Throne contrary to many Statutes, is a Mistake both in Law and History.

But because this imaginary Nullity of the Acts of Settlement made by King *Henry* the VIII, has been urged with so much Assurance, to prove, that the Descent of the Crown cannot be limited by Act of Parliament: I shall shew, that those Acts were held valid in succeeding Reigns, and put in Execution according to their true intent and meaning.

The last of those Acts passed in the Thirty fifth of *Henry* the VIII. which made some Alteration in the former Acts of Settlement, and fixt the Descent of the Crown;

Pref. to *Jovian* p. 43. 44.

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and which the Author of *Jovian* expressly refers to in the Margen, as an *Act that was null in it self*.-----This Act, I say, consisted of two Parts. First, the Crown was to descend to that King's Son, Prince *Edward*, and the Issue of his Body; in default of such Issue, to the Heirs of the Kings Body by his present Marriage, whether Male, or Female; in default of such Issue, to the Lady *Mary* and her Heirs; and if she dyed without Issue, to the Lady *Elizabeth* and her Heirs.

Secondly, In case all these should die without Issue, the King had full Power and Authority given him by this Act, to dispose and limit the Crown to descend on such Person, and Persons in Remainder, and Reversion, as he should name, and declare in his Letters Patents under his Great Seal, or by his last Will in writing signed by his own Hand.

And was there *no Notice* taken of this Act of Settlement in succeeding Reigns? Not in *Utopia* it seems, but in *England* most signal Notice was taken of it, both in *Fact*, and in *Law*. First, in *Fact*; for Queen *Mary* * claimed the Crown chiefly by

* See her Letter to the Privy Council in *Heylm's History of the Reformation* p. 157.

Virtue

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Virtue of this Act, and She, or Queen *Elizabeth* could have no other Title to it. Both of them could not have a Title by Birth, and yet Both successively ascended the Throne by this Act of Settlement. Both had been declared by Law Illegitimate, in the Twenty Eighth of *Henry* the VIII. and one of them was not of Legitimate Birth, and therefore could have no other Title to the Throne, but what this Act gave her.

Secondly, In *Law*, there was as signal Notice taken of it; for the very Act of Recognition of Queen *Elizabeth*, part of which the *Remarker* has printed in his Appendix Num. 13. doth, in the other part, which he hath left out, declare, *that in and to the Princely Person of Queen Elizabeth, and the Heirs of her Body lawfully to be begotten, the Royal Estate, Crown, and Dignity of this Realm, with all Jurisdictions, &c. are, and shall be, most fully and rightfully invested and annexed, as rightfully and lawfully to all Intents, Constructions, and Purposes, as they were in her Father the late King Henry the VIII. * or her Brother King Edward the VI. or her*

* Here the Remarker breaks off.

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Sister Queen Mary, at any time since the Act of Parliament made in the 35th Year of King Henry the VIII. intituled, an Act concerning the Establishment of the King's Majesty's Succession in the Imperial Crown of this Realm. ----- And that it may be enacted by the Authority aforesaid, that as well this Declaration, as also the Limitation and Succession of the Imperial Crown of this Realm contained in the said Act, made in the said 35th Year of her most noble Father, shall remain and be the Law of this Realm for ever.

Could there be greater Notice taken of an Act of Parliament, than there was of this Act of Parliament, of which the Remarker saith, *no Notice was taken?*

But why was the other Part of that Act of Succession in the 35th of Henry the VIII. which empower'd that King to dispose of the Crown by his last Will, ineffectual to the House of Suffolk; and why did the House of Scotland succeed to the Crown of England? Not by reason of any Nullity of that Act of Succession, as the Author of *Jovian* imagines, but because King Henry the VIII. never executed the Power, which that Act gave him. He did not by his last Will, signed with his own Hand, exclude the House of Scotland, and bring

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bring the House of Suffolk into the Succession. There was indeed a Will drawn for that purpose, but it was never signed by the King, as the Act of Parliament expressly required, and such an extraordinary Power, as that was, must have been executed according to the precise Form of the Statute, that gave that Power; otherwise it was not valid. There was indeed a Stamp put to this Will by a mean Person, named *Clerk*, which would, not for the Reason aforesaid, have been a legal Ratification of the Will according to the Statute, had it been done by the King's Order, much less when it was done without his Order, or Knowledge. For tho' by this Act the King might, yet *Clerk* could not dispose of the Crown. Of all which there are undeniable Proofs in the Scotch Secretary *Lethington's* * Letter to Sir *William Cecil* the English Secretary, and in Sir *Thomas Craig's* Right † of the Succession. The former calls this a *forged Will*, and the latter, a *Forgery*, and both of them by undoubted Evidence prove it to be so.

* Appendix to the 1 vol. of the History of the Reformation N. 30.

† P. 343, 344, 345.

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Thus the *Remarker's no Notice*, and the Author of *Jovian's Nullity of King Henry the VIIIth's Acts of Succession*, and the *House of Suffolk's Exclusion*, and *King James's Admission to the Throne*, contrary to the Authority of many Acts of Parliament, appear to be, what I said they were, Mistakes both in Law and History.

How candid a Censure then was this of the *Remarker*, that I concealed what I knew to be true? which yet no Man could know to be true, because it was false, and which I knew to be false. What a handle has he given me, (were I disposed to lay hold on it) by breaking off in the Recognition Act of *Queen Elizabeth*, with an *&c.* * in the midst of a Sentence, which Sentence, (as the Reader might have seen had he printed it entire) doth take most remarkable Notice of this Act, of which the *Remarker* saith, *no Notice was taken*. It is not impossible, but it might be an oversight; and I shall be glad if it was so.

It is evident, as I have said, that either *Queen Mary*, or *Queen Elizabeth*, was illegitimate, and therefore could have no other but a Parliamentary Title to the

* *Remarkers Appendix Num. XIV.*

Crown :

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Crown: And yet it is certain, that *Queen Mary* was brought to the Throne chiefly by the Assistance of her Protestant Subjects, who yet generally did not believe her of Legitimate Birth; and *Queen Elizabeth* was proclaimed by the Authority of a Popish Parliament, who as generally believed her illegitimate. Which shews that both Protestants and Papists agreed in maintaining the Act of Succession, that was made in the 35th of *King Henry the VIII.* and consequently Both, believed the Descent of the Crown of *England* was limitable by Act of Parliament.

And as these Acts were held to be of force in succeeding Reigns: So none doubted of their Validity in the Reign of *King Henry the VIII.* when they were made; but all swore to the Succession as it was established by Act of Parliament; even *Bishop Fisher*, and *Sir Thomas More* that had been Lord Chancellor, who chose to lay down their Lives rather than take the Oath of Supremacy; and absolutely refused to swear to the Preamble of the Act of Succession, which affirmed the Nullity of the King's Marriage with *Queen Catherine*, the Lawfulness of his Divorce, and the Validity of his Marriage with *Queen Anne*: Yet both these Great Men voluntarily offer'd

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to swear to the Succession, as it was established by the 25th of *Henry the VIII.* which limited the Descent of the Crown to the King's Issue by *Queen Ann*, which according to their Opinions of the King's Marriage and Divorce they must believe Illegitimate, and excluded the *Lady Mary* whom they believed his Legitimate Issue.

Bishop Fisher in a Letter to Secretary *Cromwell*, gave the reason of his Conduct in this Matter: *I must beseech you, good Mr. Secretary, to call to your Remembrance, that at my last Being before you and the other Commissioners, for taking of the Oath concerning the King's most noble Succession; I was content to be sworn unto that Part concerning the Succession. And there I did rehearse this Reason which I said moved me. I doubted not but that the Prince of any Realm, with the Assent of his Nobles and Commons, might appoint for his Succession Royal such an Order as was seen unto his Wisdom most according. And for this reason I said I was content to be sworn unto that Part of the Oath as concerning the Succession. This is a very Truth as God help my Soul; albeit I refused to swear to some other Parcels, because that my Conscience would not serve me so to do.*

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As *Sir Thomas More* made the same Offer with *Bishop Fisher*, so we cannot doubt but he made it on the same Principle; or if any one doth doubt this, his doubt will soon be satisfied, when he reads the Conference betwixt *Sir Thomas More* and *Rich* the King's Solicitor, as it is related by my *Lord Herbert*. *

I need not descend to the Laws made in *Queen Elizabeth's* Reign, which declare the Descent of the Crown to be under the direction of the Legislative Power, or go to prove from Reason that the Supreme Power can limit the Descent of the Crown; tho' this one Reason I think is sufficient, because it cannot limit it self. Indeed nothing can limit the Supreme, but a superior Power, nothing but a Law of God: and let any one produce a Divine Law for Hereditary Succession in Kingdoms, and I'll grant it unalterable by any Humane Power, but since no such Divine Law can be produced, we must own the Descent of the Crown to be under the Direction of the Legislative Power.

This is more than was necessary for my own Vindication, against the *Remarker's*

* History of King *Henry* the VIII. p. 183.

Censure;

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Censure; but I have at the same time vindicated also that part of our Oath to maintain the Succession, as it stands limited to the next Protestant Heirs of the House of *Hannover*.

C H A P. I.

The Title of my first Chapter was this.
The Supreme Authority of the English Government rests in the King for the Time being, and the Allegiance of the Subject is due to him by the Common Law of this Realm.

AS in the *View of the English Constitution*, I laid down certain Propositions, which I made the *Titles* of so many Chapters, so I wish these Gentlemen had answer'd me in the same Method, that the Reader might have seen what were the Points in Debate betwixt us, and thereby have more easily judged, how far my Arguments, or their Answers, amounted to a Proof or a Disproof thereof. However, I shall keep to my own Method, and begin with the Defence of the first Chapter: Wherein I proved the *common Custom and Usage of the Realm* was so evidently on the side of the Regnant King, that the People of *England* always submitted, and took Oaths
of

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of Fidelity to the Thirteen Kings, who from the Conquest to *Henry* the VII. came to the Throne without Hereditary Titles, as well as to the Six Hereditary Kings, who reign'd in that Period.

The *Remarker* in Answer to this is very unfortunate in his first Argument, where he says, *that Allegiance is not due to a King de facto by Common Law; for what Common Law had the first King de facto to plead? Could he plead Custom before there was any such thing? This would be absurd in the first King de facto, whatever it were in others.* Now I never said or imagined, that Allegiance was due, to the first Non-hereditary King, by Common Law, but that it is *Now*, and for many Ages has been due to the King for the time being. * The first Non-hereditary King could not challenge Allegiance by common Usage; no more could the first King in the Hereditary Line, no nor by Inheritance neither; and yet the *Remarker* will not say Allegiance is not due to Hereditary Kings by common Law or Usage., Indeed, according to this way of arguing, *Common Law* or *Usage* could never be pleaded for any

* Remarks p. 3.

thing,

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thing, because it could not be pleaded for the first thing of that kind; and the longest Series of Precedents could signify nothing; because the first Precedent had no Precedent. Thus his Argument by proving too much proves nothing, and would however have been ill employed against me in this Place, where I had expressly asserted (as the Remarker himself takes notice) *that common Custom and Usage doth not obtain the Force of a Law till after a long Tract of time.*

The Remarker goes on. *We will grant all this (i. e. the common Custom and Usage of taking Oaths of Fidelity to all these 13 Non-hereditary Kings;) and yet the People of England might take Oaths of Fidelity to them, as coming to the Throne with an Hereditary Title for all that: For most if not all those &c. claimed as Heirs or Conquerors, or both; as William the Conqueror; and always declared they held the Crown by Title of Blood, and as such their Parliaments recognized them, and the People swore to them. In short, they were Kings de facto and Usurpers, but Allegiance was paid them as pretended Heirs of the Crown.*
 † They claimed and reigned sub ratione

‡ Remarks p. 4.

juris

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juris, and therefore Oaths were taken to them as Kings de jure, and not de facto.

* William the Conqueror and all his Successors reigned by an Hereditary Title, or a pretext to it. William the Conqueror declared himself King by Hereditary Title as well as Conquest. William Rufus claimed as Testamentary Heir to his Father, &c. p. 24.

† The Remarker has here jumbled together three things, that are of a distinct Nature, and require a distinct Consideration, viz. The Claims of these Princes, the Recognitions of Parliament, and the Submission of the People.

1st, As to the Claims of these Princes, he saith, *that they all claimed sub ratione juris, that they all claimed and reigned by an Hereditary Title, or a pretext to it.* That they all claimed sub ratione juris, under the Notion of some Right or other I readily grant: But that they all claimed by an He-

* Ibid. p. 14.

† Ibid. p. 21.

[The Natural Born Subject falls in with the same Hypothesis p. 38. & say: there will be left but three, that is Henry I. King Stephen, and King John, upon whom it can be alledged that they came to the Crown, without Pretence of an Hereditary Right, and in the 39th and 40 Page he attempts to prove that these three also came to the Throne with the same Pretences.]

juris

editary Right, or a Pretence to it, I deny. I further grant, that most of them claimed by Hereditary Right or a Pretext to it ; but then the *Remarker* knows, or ought to know, that several of these who claimed by Hereditary Right , did not mean what he does throughout his Book, when he speaks of Hereditary Right, as the only Right to the Crown, viz. a Right as next Heir by Proximity of Blood. To instance in *William I.* with whom the *Remarker* begins, and *who*, as he says, *declared he held the Crown by Hereditary Right as well as Conquest*, for which he refers us to a Charter of that King mentioned by *Dr. Hicks*. * Was *William* the Conqueror, or doth the *Remarker* believe that he was, or that he by these Words meant that he was, next Heir by Blood, to any of his Predecessors in the English Throne either *Saxons* or *Danes* ; Who, as all the World knew, was not Heir to any one of them by Proximity of Blood, and as a Bastard was Heir to no body ? What then doth that King mean by his Hereditary Right to the Crown ? If we will give him leave to explain himself, he tells us in another Charter, *That he was constitu-*

* *Literat. Septentrion. Dissert. Epistol. p 72.*

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ted by King **Edward the Confessor* the adoptive Heir of his Kingdom ; which agrees with the account that *Ordericus Vitalis* † gives of this Matter; so that there was not so much as a Pretence to what is commonly meant by Hereditary Right, but only to a Donation of the Crown from *Edward the Confessor* a King *de facto*, which was a Claim against the Hereditary Right of *Edgar Atheling*.

William Rufus, saith the *Remarker*, was Heir to his Father by Will ; and can he say this was a Claim by Hereditary Right, or any Pretext to it, which was no other than a Claim by Will, against the Hereditary Right of his eldest Brother *Robert* ?

But I need not particularly consider the several Claims, or Pretexts of the rest of these *Thirteen* Non-hereditary Kings, since the *Remarker* acknowledges, that several of them claimed by Conquest, or by Will, sometimes by a Nuncupative Will, and that attested but by one Witness, as in the case of *Stephen's* Succession, which amounts to no more than this, which I never denied, that

* A Charter in the Tower C. C.
In Regnum suum adoptivum heredem instituerat.
 † *Ordericus Vitalis 492.*

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all these Kings *de facto*, or their Friends for them, set up the Pretences to Hereditary Right, or made some other Claims, in order to gain the Consent of the States, and the Possession of the Throne; and I do freely own this to be true of *William the Conqueror*, and all his Successors *de facto*, as the *Remarker* says, and if He pleases, of all his *de facto* Predecessors too.

But Secondly, will the *Remarker* say that these Claims, or Pretences were the Grounds upon which the States, or Parliaments of the Kingdom, placed these Princes in the Throne, or recognized them in it, which he ought to have proved?

As for instance, suppose it was as certain (which is much to be doubted) that *Hugh Bigod* did make Oath, that *Henry the I.* gave the Crown from his Daughter *Maud* to *Stephen*, as it is certain that his Oath, (if he did swear it) was false, which, I think no body doubts. If the Archbishop of *Canterbury* was induced by this Oath to crown *Stephen*, can the *Remarker* prove, that the Great Men of the Realm were induced by the same Motive to recognize him? He may find in *Mr. Colliers Ecclesiastical History*, * that they

* p. 326.

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proceeded upon other Motives, as did the Pope afterwards in his Bull of Confirmation of his Title. The Bishop of *Winchester* who was *Stephen's* Brother, and had been the great Instrument of his Advancement, declar'd * in the Council of *Winchester*, that because it seemed too long to wait for *Maud*, who delay'd her coming from *Normandy* into *England*, they provided for the Peace of the Kingdom by permitting his Brother to Reign. Nay *Stephen* himself in his Oath (which *William of Malmesbury* hath inserted in his History) enumerating his Titles, pretends to None, prior to a National Consent; and will the *Remarker* say, this was an Hereditary Right, or any Pretext to it? No, the *Natural Born Subject* is against the *Remarker* here, saying, when all other Pretences fail'd, they [some of these Thirteen Kings of whom he was speaking] plead'd the Choice of the People. † The *Remarker* will possibly say, that as the *Natural Born Subject* departs from him here, so doth he at the same time contradict him-

* Itaque quia longum videbatur Dominam expectare, quae moras ad veniendum in Angliam necessebat (in Normannia quippe resedebat) provisum est paci patrie & regnare permissus est frater meus. *William of Malmesbury. Hist. Novella l. 2. p. 166.* who saith, he was present and heard this Speech.

† A Letter. p. 49.

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felt,

self, who had also affirmed, and been endeavouring to prove in the preceding Pages, that all these Thirteen Non-hereditary Kings, came to the Crown with Hereditary Right, or a Pretence to it. And the Remarker has reason to charge him with this Contradiction; for the Consent of the People is neither Hereditary Right, nor any Pretence to it. But I shall leave these two Friends to reconcile this matter betwixt themselves.

Of all these Kings none made so direct a Claim by Proximity of Blood, as Hen. IV. and yet that Parliament, which was so well inclined to set the Crown upon his Head, made no express Recognition of this Hereditary Right, which he pretended to, and they knew he had not. He had too much power to be told, he had it not; but on the other hand they pass'd no Act to Recognize it, but contented themselves to declare in general terms, *That the Duke should reign over them.* And accordingly in the Act of Parliament the 7. Hen. IV. c. 2. made to Entail the Crown to that King and his Four Sons by Name, there is not one word, that implies that Hen. IV. held it by Hereditary Right.

gdly. It doth not appear, that the People in their Submission had any regard to these Claims. The Remarker says indeed, the
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People submitted to 'em as of Right, but has not proved that they submitted to these Kings upon the score of Hereditary Right, or of any Right at all antecedent to their Possession; which of all things he ought to have done, if he would have answered *the View*, which concerns itself only with the Subject's Duty. He acknowledges these Kings *de facto*, knew there were better Titles than their own. And did not the People, who liv'd at the same time, know this as well as those Princes, or as the Remarker doth at this distance? If they submitted to the Regnant Princes only on the account of the Claims they made, why did they submit to the Prince, who had the worse Claim; and not reserve their Allegiance for the Prince, who they knew had the better Title? Why did they always submit to that Prince, who possess'd the Throne with the Consent of the States, or the Recognition of the Parliament, whatsoever his Claim was; and not to the Unpossess'd, Unrecogniz'd Prince?

So that all this stir which he has made about Claiming *sub ratione juris*, has only raised Dust about the Questions which are betwixt us on this Head; whether these *Thirteen* were really Non-hereditary Kings, or not? and whether, notwithstanding, this the Peo-

p'le of *England* submitted to them or no? That the People submitted to these Kings, he owns, where he so often asserts, *that they submitted to them, because they claimed sub ratione Juris*; tho' that they submitted for this Reason, he has no where proved. And own he must also, on his own Principles, that they were Non-hereditary Kings: For will the *Remarker* say, a Testamentary Heir is the right Heir? That *William* the Conqueror was King by Hereditary Right, because he declared, he was so, in another sense than the *Remarker* understands it? That *Henry I.* was next in Blood, because chosen as next by a Faction? That *Stephen* was Heir to *Henry I.* because one falsely swore, he made him Heir by a Nuncupative Will? If he will not say this, then these will still be *de facto* Kings, and the assertion of the View will still hold good, that, by the common Usage of the Realm, Allegiance is due to Kings *de facto*. * q. e. d.

* I need not go on to prove, that, upon the *Remarker's* Principles, the rest of these Thirteen were Non-hereditary Kings, since he in effect owns it of them all by Name, except of *Henry II* and *Henry III*. But doth he not know, that *Henry II* came to the Throne without an Hereditary Title, his Mother, *Maud* the Empress, being alive; and that *Henry III*. did the same, his elder Brother's Daughter *Eleanor* being alive? both which I shall prove in another Place.

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The Question, as I ever understood it, was What these Princes really were: Not, What they pretended to be. What Claims they truly had, or at least the People believed they had: Not, what Claims they made, or what Pretences were made for them? But since the *Remarker* has thought fit to change the state of the Question, I'll joyn Issue with him upon it, as he has stated it. Let us suppose then for once, that they all claimed *sub ratione Juris*. Was this alone a sufficient Reason for the Subjects to swear Allegiance to them? Yes; he positively affirms it. These are his Words, *so that 'tis plain, that all those Kings de facto claimed as de jure, which is, if there were no other, a good Reason for the Subjects not refusing to swear Allegiance to them.* p. 23. If the *Remarker* will abide by his Assertion, there's an end of the Controversy, and no Subject now ought to refuse to swear Allegiance to the Queen, who claims as *de jure*: And there is a better Reason still to take Oaths to Her Majesty, because she doth not only Claim *de jure*, but is *de jure* too. Tho' barely to Claim as such, is with the *Remarker*, and all the *sub ratione Juris* Men, a sufficient Reason to take Oaths of Allegiance now, and which they cannot refuse without renouncing this Principle. I do

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not see, but their Cause is lost either way. If to save their Hypothesis, they'll stick to their Principle of *sub ratione Juris*, they are in consequence of it oblig'd to take the Oaths now; but if to avoid the consequence, they'll let go this Principle, which is the main Salvo of their Hypothesis, their Hypothesis will fall with it, and they will, it is to be hoped, come into the Doctrine of the *View*, that it is the Custom and Usage, which is the Common Law of the Realm, to submit, and take Oaths of Fidelity to the Regnant Prince, whether with, or without an Hereditary Title.

His 3d. Answer is, *That these were Popish Times, in which the Pope with his Popish Clergy had a very great stroke in pulling down and setting up Kings, and had, or at least pretended to have, a Power of Absolving Subjects from their Oaths of Allegiance: and no wonder, if Subjects misled by the Pope and his Clergy, paid their Allegiance where they directed them.*
P. 14. *

* *The Natural Born Subject has the same Answer. Another Consideration, saith he, in Favour of our Ancestors in those Times, may be the Great Power of the Popes in those Days, who took upon them to dispose of all Crowns, particularly that of England, which they had once put in Subjection to them by King John. Letter p. 79.*

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That Popes have both taught and practised the deposing Doctrine, and have pretended to absolve Subjects from their Oaths of Allegiance, is beyond Dispute: But this has been generally done by them, when Princes have been Hereticks, or Fautors of Hereticks, or have made some Attempts on the *Regalia* of St. Peter, but they have rarely employed their Thunder, or their Graces in the Contests of Princes betwixt one another about their Titles.

And therefore the *Remarker* should have proved, that the several *Popes*, in these Times, did put in practice their pretended Power of absolving Subjects from their Allegiance, not barely that *Popes* pretended to such a Power of Absolution.

Nay 2ly. He should have proved farther, that our Ancestors in *Popish* Times had recourse to the *Popes* for such Absolutions; or that it was in consequence of such Absolutions granted by *Popes*, that they took Oaths of Allegiance to Non-hereditary Kings. But this he hath not proved, nor attempted to prove.

Our Ancestors, 'tis true, too easily submitted to the *Pope's* Supremacy, which was a Usurpation upon the Prerogatives of Kings, as well as upon the Rights of all Christian *Bishops*, who were his Collegues.
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However, they never permitted that Absolute Jurisdiction, which Popes claimed, to take place in *England*; but resolutely withstood many Papal Encroachments both in Church and State, and raised Diques and Banks against the Inundation of the Plenitude of their Power. I must always except the scandalous Submissions, that were made in the time of King *John*, to the more scandalous Ufurpations and Impositions of the Pope and his Legate *Pandulphus*, to which a Gap was open'd by the unhappy Circumstances of that Reign.

The Pope, as Supreme Pastor, pretends that all Christians, as being his Sheep, are under an Obligation to hear his Voice. He speaks to them by his *Legats à latere*, in his *Canons*, or *Laws*, and in his *Bulls*.

As for his *Legats à latere*, it appears by the † *Year Books*, as well as our *Histories*, that they were not permitted to come into *England* without the King's leave, and were obliged to take an Oath, that they would attempt nothing that was derogatory to the King, and his Crown.

As for the Popes *Canons* or *Laws*, they were never held Obligatory in *England*,

† 11. Hen. VII. fol. 10.

unless

unless they were received. When the Parliament was moved to admit the Papal Canon, which Legitimates Children born before Marriage, provided the Persons were married afterwards: All the Earls and Barons answer'd with one Voice, *that they would not change the Laws of England that have been hitherto used and approved.* †

The Pope, as Head of the Church, pretends to be the * Ordinary of Ordinaries, and the Collator of Collators. Notwithstanding which by the Statutes of *Provisors*, all Persons were prohibited to procure or accept of any Ecclesiastical Dignities, or Benefices from the Pope, by Collations, Provisions, or Reservations, under the pain of being imprisoned, till they had made Fine and Ransom at the King's Pleasure, &c. 25th *Edw.* III. and of being banished, and their Goods and Cattels confiscated, 13th *Rich.* II. ch. 2. Nay, all Licences from the King to execute such Provisions, are declared void by the 7th *Hen.* IV. ch. 8. and the Disturbers by such Provisions, notwithstanding the King's Licences, incurred a *Præmunire* 3. *Hen.* V. c. 4.

† 20th *Hen.* III. c. 9.

* See P. Simon's *Hist. of Ecclesiastical Revenues.* p. 86.

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As for the *Bulls* of Popes, they have been as little regarded. Their *Bulls* to exempt Religious Persons from Obedience, by the 3^d. *Hen. IV. c. 3.* and their *Bulls* to discharge the *Cistercians* or other Persons, from the payment of Tythes by the 3^d. *Hen. IV. c. 8.* the 7th. *Hen. IV. c. 6.* were declared void; And those that purchased, or put in Execution the said *Bulls*, incurred a *Premunire*. Even those *Bulls*, wherein the Popes enforced their Legislative by their Coercive Power, their *Bulls* of Excommunication, were declared to be of no force in *England* by all the Judges, as appears in the *Year Books* 8th. *Hen. VI. fol. 3.* 12th. *Edw. IV. fol. 16.* and 1st. *Hen. VII. fol. 11.* And any Persons that purchased, or executed the Popes *Bulls* of Excommunication against the Bishops of *England*, for executing Sentences given in the King's Courts, incur'd a *Premunire* by the 16th. *Rich. II. ch. 5.* And those that brought Summons, or Excommunications into the Realm in Derogation of the Statutes of *Provisors*, Forfeited all their Lands and Tenements, Goods and Chattels for ever, and incurred the pain of Life and Member by the 13th. *Rich. II. ch. 3.* And therefore in the Oath, which the Pope's *Collector* in *England* was obliged to take, amongst other things,

things, there were Two Clauses that he would not execute, nor suffer to be executed any *Papal Bulls*, or *Mandates* that were prejudicial to the King, or his Regality, his *Laws*, or the *Kingdom*.

And that he would immediately deliver to the King's Council all the *Letters* he should receive from the Pope, or any other Person, before he published them, † or delivered them to any Person living.

Before any Bishop's *Temporalities* were restored, he was obliged to Renounce upon * Oath all the *Words*, contained in the Pope's *Bull*, that were prejudicial to the King and his *Crown*: As well as to take the Oath of Homage to the King. † After which the *Writ* was

† Nullam executionem literarum vel mandatorum Domini Papæ per me, vel alium faciam, nec fieri permittam, quæ poterit esse præjudicialis Regiæ Majestati dicti Domini nostri Regis, aut Regali, legibus, vel juribus suis, vel eidem Regno.

Nullas Literas Papales nec alias recipiam, nisi eas citius, quo potero, deliberavero Concilio dicti Domini nostri Regis antequam publicentur, seu deliberentur alicui personæ viventi: Fœdera, Conventiones, &c. Tom. 8. p. 86.

* The Form of the Oath of Renunciation. I renounce all the *Words*, comprized in the Pope's *Bull*, made unto me of the Bishoprick of *Bathewick* be contrary and prejudicial to the King, our Sovereign Lord, and to his *Crown*. *The Book of Oaths* p. 137.

† Eo quod idem Episcopus omnibus & singulis verbis, in dictis literis Bullatis contentis, nobis & Coronæ nostræ

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issued out for the Restitution of his Temporalities.

When Pope *Boniface VIII.* sent a Monitory Bull to King *Edw. I.* to desist from his War against *Scotland*, pretending the Sovereignty of that Kingdom was held of the Apostolick See; The Lords, assembled in Parliament, declare in a Letter to the Pope, That their Sovereign Lord the King is, *by no means obliged to acknowledge the Pope's Jurisdiction, or submit to his Sentence with respect to the Sovereignty of Scotland, or indeed in any other temporal Matter whatsoever.* † And in one of the Statutes of *Premunire*, for bringing, or pursuing any Papal Instruments of Process, or Sentences of Excommunication for Executing the King's Commands, &c. It is declared, that *the Crown of England, which hath been so free at all times, that it hath been in no Earthly Subjection, but immediately subject to God in all Things, touching*

præjudicialibus, palam & expresse renunciavit Anno Regni Rich. secundi 21. Fœdera Conventiones, &c. Fol. 8. p. 20.

† *Quod præfatus Dominus noster Rex super juribus Regni sui Scotiæ, aut aliis suis Temporalibus nullatenus judicialiter respondeat coram vobis, nec judicium subeat quoquo modo, &c. Fœdera Conventiones &c. Tom. 2. p. 873. signed by about an Hundred Earls, & Barons.*

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the Regality of the same Crown; and to no other, ought not to be submitted to the Pope. And the Lords Spiritual as well as the Lords Temporal, and the Commons engage, that they will and ought to be with the King in those Cases, in lawfully maintaining of his Crown, and in all other Cases touching his Crown and his Regality, as they be bound by their Ligeance. 16th. Rich. II. ch. I could, were it necessary, produce from our Histories, and Laws, a great many more Instances of the same kind. But these are sufficient to convince the *Remarker*, that our Popish Ancestors had not that Deference he imagines they had, to the Authority of the Popes in all their Encroachments: That they had no Deference at all to their Authority in Temporal Matters: And that it was not upon Papal Absolutions, as he supposes, that they took Oaths of Allegiance to Kings *de facto*.

Lastly, The Government was generally settled, and the People had submitted, before there was any time for the Pope's Intervention.

What time had the Pope to interpose, when *W. Rufus* was kill'd the second of *August* in *Newforest*, buried the third at *Winchester*, where

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where * *Henry I.* was chosen the fourth day, and Crowned the fifth † at *London*, and the whole Nation immediately submitted to him? What Room was there here for the Pope's Interposition, or Dispensation?

All *England* is said, by *Henry of Huntington*, to have submitted to Stephen in the twinkling † of an Eye, who was Crowned, saith *William of Malmsbury*, the Twenty second Day after the Death of *Henry I.* All was over without the Pope's Interposition, who in his Bull afterwards took notice of his Election by the Nobility and Commons.

But the *Remarker* saith, that *Henry VII.* got his Title twice confirmed by the Pope p. 22. which is true: But it is as true,

* Occiso vero Rege Willielmo, post iusta funeri regio perfoluta in Regem Electus, (Henricus scil. primus) aliquantis tamen ante controversiis inter proceres agitatis atque sopitis. W. Malmsb. Hist. l. 5. fol. 88.

† Quapropter certatim plausu plebeio concrepante in Regem coronatus est Londoniæ Nonis Augusti 4to post obitum fratris die. Ibid.

Vid. Hen. Huntindon l. 7. fol. 26. b. Hoved in Henrico l. f. 268. b. plenario consensu & consilio totius communitatis Regni ipsum sc. Robertum refutaverunt & Henricum fratrem in Regem erexerunt. H. de Knyghton col. 2374.

* Repente omnis Anglia sine mora, sine labore quasi ictu oculi ei (Stephano sc.) subjecta est, Hen. Huntind. l. 8. fol. 221. b.

Coronatus est ergo in regem Angliæ Stephanus undecimo Kalendas Januarii Dominica vicesima secunda die post excessum avunculi. W. Malms. Hist. Novell. l. 1. f. 101.

that

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that he did not procure even the first Bull in Confirmation of his Title, till the second Year of his Reign, long before which time the whole Nation had submitted to him, and the Parliament entailed the Crown on him, and the Issue of his Body, which was done in the first Parliament, and first Year of his Reign. So that the *Remarker's* own Instance is against him, and proves, as well as those which I have given, that in submitting to those Kings, they acted as *English Men*, not as *Papists*.

But whilst the *Remarker* is giving Reasons, why the People might, and ought to, have submitted, he is endeavouring to prove, that some did not submit, or that the Submission was not so universal, as I have represented it, and as he, at other times himself seems to grant it was, and ought to have been. I had said, that in all these *Thirteen Reigns of Non-hereditary Kings*, I did not know there were any *Non-jurors to be found*. Before these Answers to my Book were publish'd, I was told by some of my old Friends, that I should find there were *Non-jurors heretofore*; and I believe, some expected a long List of Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal, and Commons, who had refused Oaths of Fidelity in every one of those

† See the Lord Bacon's Hist. of Henry VII.

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Reigns:

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Reigns: But they may now see, after the *Remarker's* Inquiries thro'out all those *Thirteen* Reigns, he has been scarce able to name *Thirteen* Non-jurors; and when I have examined those he has named, they may find that Most, if not All were certainly no Nonjurors, and that he has not been able clearly to prove One of them was so.

I began with *William I.* and * proved Oaths of Fidelity were universally taken to him. The *Remarker* † thinks the *Testimony* of Ingulph which I alledged doth not prove this. It proves what I alledged it for, that the *Conqueror* issued out an Order for every Inhabitant of England to swear Fealty to him, as well as all their Lands to be measured and valued. I added, that we bear not of one Refuser; nor has the *Remarker* been able to produce one. He would indeed have the Abbot of *St. Albans* to be a Non-juror. What did he refuse to take an Oath of Fealty to *K. William I.*? No, but he offer'd opposition to *Duke William*. He may as well reckon *Harold's* Army for Non-jurors, who opposed *Duke William* when he Invaded England; and yet as well as others that opposed him, submitted to him, after he was King of England. So that I may still say, we do not yet hear of one Refuser amongst all his Subjects. But what can be more express, than *Hoveden's* Testi-

* View p. 2.

† Remarks p. 15.

* Remarks p. 122.
mony,

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mony, which I produced at the same time, * That the great Men and Tenants by Knight's Service swore Fealty to him at *Salisbury*? But of this the *Remarker* has taken no notice: To these I will only add one Testimony of *William* of *Malmbsury*, who saith, † that *William I.* without any opposition bound all the Freeholders, whatsoever their Tenure was, by an Oath of Fidelity to him: and another of *Ranulph Higden*, who, speaking of some of the greatest Men of the Nation, saith, || these, with the rest of the Nobility having given Hostages, and sworn Fealty, submitted to the *Conqueror*.

I could by the like positive Testimonies of the most Authentick Historians prove, that the People of *England* submitted, and took Oaths to such of his Successors, who came to the Throne as he did, without an Hereditary Title. As to his immediate Successor, *William Rufus*, He, as *Brompton* † relates it, was advanced to the Throne in a great Council of the Kingdom. After which the whole Nation cheerfully submitted to his Government, and took Oaths of Fealty to him, as *William* of

* View p. 2.

† Ut sine ulla contradictione—omnes liberos homines cujuscunque essent, suæ fidelitati sacramento adigeret. de *Willielmo I.* p. 59. b.|| Hi omnes cum cæteris nobilibus, datis obsidibus, cum fidelitate ei jurata, manus ei dederunt. *Polychron.* l. 6. in fine.

† Convocatis Terræ Magnatibus Col. 983.

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* *Malsbury*, and the *Annals of † Waverley* assure us.

But I am unwilling to tire the Reader with what is not necessary, for those who are well skilled in the English History know this to be true; and those who are not, will be convinced of it, when they shall see, that those few, whom the *Remarker* has gleaned for Non-jurors thro' all these Reigns, are after all no Non-jurors.

I said || *there had been Revolters in some of those Reigns*, and the *Remarker's* Non-jurors will I believe prove to be no better, and some of them, those very Persons whom I named, or had in my Eye, when I said so. *Odo* Bishop of *Baieux*, who was the chief Author of the Revolt from *William Rufus*, had assisted at his Coronation, as Earl of *Kent*, and Justiciary of *England*; and must, as well the great Men whom he drew into his Party, have sworn Allegiance to *William Rufus*; otherwise their Revolt could not, as I said, † have been charged

* *Moxque* volentibus animis Provincialium exceptus est, & claves Thefaurorum nactus est, quibus fretus totam Angliam animo subjecit suo. De *Willielmo* 11. l. 4. p. 67.

† *Omnis* gens Angliæ ei subdita est, & fidelitatem juravit. Ad An. 1087.

|| *View* p. 3.

‡ *View* p. 4.

with

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with Perjury, as it is by the Archdeacon of *Huntington*.

But the *Remarker* will not have this Revolt charged with Perjury, but call'd * *Repentance*. However this Testimony proves, they had taken Oaths of Fidelity (which was what I alledged it for) otherwise there had been no colour for the Charge of Perjury. And whilst the *Remarker* stiles it *Repentance*, he seems to have overlook'd my Citation † from *William of Malsbury*; which shews, that Ambition, Picque, and Discontent, were the Springs of this Rebellion. But let not these Persons stand, or fall by the *Remarker's* judgment, or mine; let us rather hear, what judgment our Ancient English Historians have passed upon Them, and their Enterprize.

William of || *Malsbury* calls It a Revolt, and *Perfidiousness*, and Them *Renegado's*, and *perfidious Persons*. The Archdeacon of

* *Remarks* p. 21.

† *View* p. 3.

|| Ita totis defectionis viribus in eum cui nec prudentia nec fortuna deerat, frustra sæviebatur. De *Willielmo secundo*. l. 4. fol. 68.

Quientiam *Willielmus Dunelmensis* Episcopus, quem Rex à secretis habuerat, in eorum perfidiam concesserat. *ibid.* fol. 67. b.

Desertores, perfidos *ibid.* b. p. 68.

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* *Huntington* brands It with the Note of *Wickedness, Perjury, and Rebellion*, and gives Them the *Character of Traytors and faithless Persons*. *Roger de Hoveden* † calls it an *execrable Fact, the Treason of the Normans*. And having described their Conspiracy, he says, *Odo Bishop of Baieux, Geoffry Bishop of Constans, and Roger Earl of Shrewsbury, &c. were the chief Authors of this accursed Enterprize.*

The *Annals of Waverley* || compare *Odo's Treachery against the King, to that of Judas Iscariot against our Blessed Saviour*. And almost every one of these Historians have observed, that the famous * *Wulstan* Bishop of *Worcester*, who was esteem'd the Holiest Person of his time, espoused the King's Cause with the greatest Fidelity and Zeal.

* Non sine perjurio bellum moventes. l. 7. fol. 213.

Rogerus in castello Nordaie sceleris exercitium non segnius inchoavit ib. Gilebertus ei rebellabat ib. Rex vero terras infidelium fidelibus suis distribuit ib. Episcopus vero multique proditorum propulsi sunt in Exilium ib.

† Execrabile factum, Traditionem Normannorum. Roger de Hoveden in Willielmo juniore. fol. 268. b.

Hujus execrandæ rei principes extiterunt. Odo Baiocensis Episcopus, Gaufridus &c. ib.

|| Ipse vero volebat Regi quemadmodum Judas Iscariot fecit Servatori nostro. Annal. Waver. ad An. 1088.

* Wulstanus in sanctitate nostro sæculo nominatissimus. *W. Malmsh. de Episcopis Wigerniensibus.*

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By this time the *Remarker* may be convinced, that *Odo* and his Party were not Non-jurors, and were so far from being esteemed Penitents by our Historians of greatest Antiquity and Note, that they are set forth by them in the blackest Colours, and stigmatized for Revolters; and consequently, that the Notions of Government in the Ages wherein they wrote, were very different from the *Remarker's*: † That Subjects then believed Allegiance, and Oaths of Allegiance, were due to the Regnant Prince, and that it was a very heinous Crime to revolt from him, and their Oaths, tho' it were in favour of a lineal Heir. It may be observed, that these Historians (except the Compiler of that part of the *Annals of Waverley*) did not write under *William Rufus*, but the Two first of them in the Reign of *Henry II.* and the III. in that of *Henry III.*

The *Remarker* doth not deny, that *Robert* Earl of *Glocester* took an Oath to King *Stephen*, and doth not pretend to find any more Non-jurors, till he comes to *Hen. IVth's* Reign.

As for *Thomas Merk*, Bishop of † *Carlisle*, who as I said, accepted, and pleaded *K. Hen. IVth's* Pardon, which is extant in *Rymer's* † *Fædera*, I urged it to the *Objector* as an Argu-

† Episcopi Karliolensis de omnimodis Proditionibus Pardonatio. &c. Fædera Conventiones T. VIII. p. 165.

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ment *ad Hominem*, who said, he could no believe so great a Man had made such an acknowledgment of Henry the IVth's Authority. But certainly his obeying that King's Summons to Parliament, and doing all that was required of the Lords, at that time, in order to their Admission, and Session in Parliament; and his sitting in that Parliament, where so many Acts of Richard II. and the whole Parliament of the 21st of his Reign was repealed, was much more: And whether he could be a Member of H. IVth's Parliament, and not a Subject of his Government, I leave to the Objector, and the Reader to determine.

The Remarker goes on. *The same may be said for Richard Scroop Archbishop of York, (here the Remarker cites his Declaration against K. H. IV. and saith upon it) would the Archbishop have thus lain before the People the heinousness of Perjury, and violation of Oaths, if he had sworn to K. Henry? If he had done so, he had been self condemned.*

* That I cannot help; the Remarker must look to that, but I doubt not, notwithstanding all he has said, to prove against him, that Archbishop Scroop acknowledged H. IVth's Authority, and was as zealous in his Service, as any of the rest of his Subjects.

* Remarks p 17.

He

* He was one of those who went to the Tower to King Richard, to put him in mind of his Promise to quit the Government, and was constituted one of the King's Proxies to declare his Renunciation. † He assisted at the Coronation of K. H. IV. at which time, he, *must take the Oath of Homage to him.* He assisted at the great Council || which K. H. IV. summoned in the first Year of his Reign, to demand Aids of the Lords Spiritual, and Temporal against his Adversaries, the Kings of *France*, and *Scotland*, who were making Preparations of War against him. In which Council this Archbishop of York, * as well as the Archbishop of *Canterbury*, and other Bishops, granted the King a Tenth to support him in this War, which was undertaken by *Charles IX.* of *France*, in order to restore his Father in Law, *Richard II.* who was then alive ||. In the fifth Year of this King's Reign, the Archbishop's Name stands first in the List

* Collier Eccles. Hist. p. 606.

† Ibid. p. 609.

|| *Rymers Fœdera* &c. Tom. VIII. p. 125, 126. Memoranda de magno Concilio &c.

* Les Ercevesques de *Canterbiri* & stand foremost in the List of *d' Everwick* the Persons, who at this great Council granted the King Aid for this War.

|| Collier's Eccles. Hist. p. 613.

of

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of the Privy * Counsellors, who were commissioned to treat on the King's Part, with the Earl of *Northumberland*, about the Exchange of Castles, Lands, &c. The *Remarker*, it seems, knew nothing of all this, and therefore proceeds.

And as he in all probability was a Non-juror, so doubtless were most of his Party, for it would have argued great weakness in him, to impart his great Design of restoring K. Rich. against Henry the IVth. in possession, unless his Partizans had been Men of the same Principles with himself, that is, either Non-jurors, or true Penitents. † The *Remarker* here goes no higher than probability. Is not this at best, to give us Conjectures instead of History? He might e'en as well have taken the *Natural Born Subjects* short Historical way, who says, that we must suppose the *Opposers*, whom, in the next sentence, he calls *Non-compliers*, were likewise *Non-jurors*, at least, some of them; || but Supposals and History are very different Things.

But what does the *Remarker* mean, when he talks of *Archbishop Scroop's great De-*

* *Fœdera Conventiones*, &c. Tom. 8. p. 364.

† *Remarker* p. 18.

|| *Letter* p. 40, 41.

sign

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sign of restoring K. Richard, who was murther'd five Years before this Design? For *Richard's* Death was in the first Year of K. H. IV. and the *Archbishop's* Conspiracy was not till the sixth Year of that King.

But let us now come to *the Archbishop's Party*, who, as the *Remarker* saith, were doubtless most of them *Non-jurors* too; and they were indeed much such *Non-jurors*, as the *Archbishop* himself. The *Earl of Northumberland*; his Son, the *Lord Piercy*; commonly called *Henry Hotspur*; his Brother the *Earl of Worcester*; the *Bishop of Bangor*; and the *Lord Bardolph* were, with the *Archbishop*, the Heads of the Party. The *Earl of Northumberland*, and his Son *Henry Hotspur* joyn'd H. IV. when he * was Duke of *Lancaster*, immediately upon his landing at *Ravensthorpe* in *Yorkshire*, and march'd with him against K. *Richard*; went with *Archbishop Scroop* to that King, to put him in mind of his Promise to resign: Had † the *Ile of Man* given to him, and his Heirs, by K. *Henry IV.* to hold by the Service of carrying the *Lancaster* Sword at the Coronation of the King, and his Heirs;

* *Collier Eccles. Hist.* 601.

† *Rymer's Fœdera* Tom. p. 89, 90, 91. *Ibid.* 126.

and

and was made Constable of England for his great Services : || And at the great Council aforesaid, engaged to assist the King with ninety Men, and Twenty Archers. As for his Brother, the Earl of Worcester ; it appears by a Passage in the same great Council, that he was K. H. IVth's Ambassador to the King of France : And by the Subscriptions, in the Council so often mention'd, we find, that the Bishop of Bangor granted the King a Tenth, and the Lord Bardolph engaged to serve the King in Person, without Pay, in his War against France.

He adds, 'tis to be hoped, Mr. H. will not deny those Four to be Nonjurors, * who, as mention'd by Stow, p. 32. opposed Henry the IVths. being made King, which they might very well do, and yet submit to him after he was so. Their Opposition to him before he was made King, is no manner of proof of their Non-submission afterwards.

Was not, † saith the Remarker, Owen Glendour, the famous Welsh Captain, who maintain'd a War against H. IV. in behalf of his lawful King, a Non-juror ?

The Remarker seems here to be in Utopia. Whom doth he mean, by this lawful

|| Rymer's Fædera, &c . p, 125, 126.
* p. 19.
† Ib.

King,

King, on whose behalf Glendour maintain'd a War against K. H. IV? Doth he mean K. Richard II? He was dead before Glendour took Arms: Nay, before K. H. IV. went into Scotland, when Glendour, as Mr. Collier * saith, took advantage of that King's Absence, and raised a Rebellion? Doth he mean then, Edward Mortimer Earl of March? He took the Field for Henry IV. against Owen Glendour, who made him Prisoner, as the same Historian observes. And, as both Sir John † Hayward, and Stow || tell us, put him in Irons, and cast him into a deep and vile Dungeon.

Owen Glendour's War, which the Remarker seems to justify, began with a Riot, and ended in Rebellion, which is the Name Mr. Collier gives it. And Stow, and Sir John Hayward give us both the occasion, and design of his Rebellion: The former takes notice, that * he had a Controversy with Reginald Lord Grey of Ruthine, and because he was not favour'd in his Cause, he began first to spoil that Lord's Lands, &c.

* Collier Eccles. 614.
Ib. 678.
† Life of K. H. IV. 143.
|| Stow p. 327.
* Stow p. 326.

And

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And the latter * gives him the Character of an ill Man, and saith, he and those Welsh that joyn'd him, design'd to recover their Freedom and throw off the English Government. And so much for the Remarkers famous Welsh Captain.

As for Frisby the Monk's Answer, it is not sufficient to prove he had never submitted, no more than Archbishop Scroop's Declaration proves he was a Non-juror. Besides, this was in the 3d. Year of H. IVth's. Reign, two Years after the Death of Rich. II. when there was no Claim set up against H. IV.

Well! But if they were not Non-jurors, he will have them to be Penitents, as repenting of their rash and unadvised Oaths, and returning to their Allegiance, as a Test of their Repentance. † I answer ist. The Remarker himself will not esteem those Penitents, that acted upon such Motives, as the Earl of Northumberland, and his Son Lord Piercy, and his Brother, the Earl of Worcester did, who, as Holingshead relates, in the Beginning of his Reign, were faithful Friends, and earnest Aiders of K. H. (and I have

* Life of Henry IV. p. 140.
† Remarks p. 19.

proved,

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proved, they were so from Authentick Memoirs,) but began now to envy his Wealth and Felicity; and especially they were grieved, because the King demanded of the Earl and his Son, such Scotch Prisoners, as were taken at Homeldon and Westmoreland, which they claimed as their Prize; * (being the Kings Generals in those Actions.) I will not say, that all revolted upon the same Motives; but whatever were their Motives, that their Revolt was unjustifiable, I dare appeal to Mr. Collier; nay, to the Remarker himself.

Mr. Collier, after he had taken notice of the Earl of March's unfortunate Expedition against Glendour, in Defence of K. H. IV. adds, and tho' this Earl upon a Disgust for not being ransomed, engaged afterwards with that Welsh Gentleman, against the King: Yet it does not appear, that he set up any Claim to the Crown. And in the next Reign, when Richard Earl of Cambridge, who married the Daughter (it † should be Sister) of this Earl of March, form'd a Design to dispossess King Henry, and set

* Holingshead p. 521.

† Anne Wife to Richard Earl of Cambridge, was the Sister, not Daughter, of Edmund Mortimer Earl of March.

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*the Crown upon his Father in Law's * Head. The Earl of March was so far from asserting his Right, and abetting the Enterprize, that he immediately went to King Henry V. and made a Discovery. Now the Branches of March and York, letting their Claim sleep all this while; the Subjects had no reason to begin a War, or quarrel the Government in the House of Lancaster. † What then becomes of Bishop Merck, of Archbishop Scroop, with the Earl of Northumberland, and the rest of that Party, of Frisby, and all the Revolters of this Reign? It is certainly no small Crime for Subjects to begin a War with their Prince, and throw a Nation into Blood and Confusion, when they had no reason for it, and this was what they did, and what they had no reason to do, as Mr. Collier has stated the Case of this, and the next Reign, and he might have added of H. Vith's. Reign too. But all these Revolters the Remarker has produced, are condemned by his own Principle too, viz. That*

* It should be, Brother in Law's Head. Eccles. Hist. p. 678.
We have also this account of the Earl of March's discovery of this Conspiracy to King Henry V. in Stow, p. 346. But I often chuse to cite Mr. Collier's Ecclesiastical History, when I could cite other Historians, because the Remarker will not suspect, that Mr. C. has neglected that side of the Question, which he maintains.
Kings

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Kings de facto claiming as de jure, (as he says, all our Kings de facto did) is, if there were no other, a good Reason for the Subjects not refusing to swear Allegiance to them. And will he say, those Subjects had good reason to repent of Oaths of Allegiance, which they had good reason to take, and therefore good reason to keep? Or that they are true Penitents by revolting from such Oaths, and the Princes to whom they took them? Let him shew how they can be at the same time inexcusable Revolters, and true Penitents. And could he have produced Non-jurors, he had produced them only to condemn them, for refusing to take Oaths of Allegiance, which in another place, he says, they had good reason not to refuse.

The Remarker however, is so well pleas'd with his Argument on this Head, that at the end of his Book, he resumes it, and goes over again with these Non-jurors, in a List of Queries. He says in his Preface, I have at the end of the Remarks added some Queries, which may be of Use, and give light to some Passages in the Book; but I am aware, it will be said by some captious Readers, that I forget my self, because I propose some things by way of Queries, that were urg'd in the Remarks as Arguments to prove, that there were anciently such People, as we now
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call Non-jurors, &c. but I can assure them, there is no such matter. I did not forget my self, but did it designedly, and for reasons best known to my self, which I am resolv'd, I will not give. The Remarker saith, he will not give us his Reasons for adding these Queries, after he had told us a little before, that he added them, that they may give light to some Passages in the Book. These Passages do not want light, we understand them well enough, but strength; and that the Queries do not afford them. But whatsoever the Remarker's Reasons were for proposing these Queries, which he is resolved not to tell us, if the Testimonies I have given him, are not taken from Utopian, but English History, he had very good reason to have spared both his Remarks, and his Queries about Non-jurors of former Reigns. However, tho' he has, I shall not repeat the same things, for the Reply I have made to his Remarks, will be an Answer to all that is pertinent in his Queries.

I said that the Partizans of the House of York * took Oaths of Allegiance to the three Henries; that the Heir of that Family, Richard Duke of York, had several times

* View page 5.

sworn

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sworn Allegiance to King H. the VI. particularly, in the 29th Year of his Reign, and this I added, because no Body I supposed, would suspect that any would scruple to take Oaths to King Henry VI. upon the score of a Person, who had himself sworn Allegiance to him. The Remarker doth not pretend to produce any one that refused the Oaths in this Reign; nor does he deny, that the Duke of York himself did swear Allegiance to King Henry VI. He only disputes the consequence, that I drew from his long Submission, and repeated Oaths of Fidelity, and saith, he did not by swearing give up his Right, which shall be consider'd in its proper place, the Question here, being only this, Whether he, and all the Partizans of that House, had lived in Subjection, and taken Oaths of Fidelity to King H. VI. which the Remarker grants. So that I have, I think, sufficiently made good what I asserted in the View, that it has been the custom and usage of the Subjects of this Realm to submit, and take Oaths to Non-Hereditary, as well as to Hereditary Kings; and the Remarker's fruitless Enquiries after Non-jurors in these Reigns, have only served for a further confirmation of this Assertion.

Having proved this universal Submission; I added, that if the Subjects had thereby

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acknowledg'd an Authority which the Laws condemned, we should then have found this Authority disowned in the succeeding Reigns of Kings *de jure*. But instead of this, we find Kings *de jure* in their Courts of Judicature, and their Acts of Parliament acknowledging this Authority, to which the Subjects before had sworn, and paid their Allegiance; for the truth of which, I appealed to the common Law, and statute Law of the Realm; to the *Year Books* for the one; and the *Statute Book* for the other: Which reduced this Controversy to matter of Fact.

From the *Common Law*, I produced several Cases, (I could have produced many more) out of the *Year Books* of the Reigns of Kings *de jure*, wherein their Judges declared, that all Pleas, Actions, &c. that were depending in the Courts of their immediate Predecessors, Kings *de facto*, were discontinued by their Deaths; in the same manner, as the Judges of Kings *de jure*, declar'd the Actions, &c. depending in the Courts of their immediate Predecessors, Kings *de jure*, were discontinued by their Deaths; and consequently hereby acknowledged, the Laws were as legally administred by the Authority of Kings *de facto*, as they were by Kings *de jure*. The Remarker's Answer to this is, that these
Laws

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Laws had their Authority from the presumed Consent of the King de jure. p. 32, 35.

Claiming sub ratione Juris, and the *presumptive Consent* of the King *de jure*, are the two Machines that have been invented to Salve this Hypothesis of Government. The former, as we have shewn, is of no use, because they have no ground to fix it on; and the latter is a meer *Chimera*. For is there in all these proceedings, the least Intimation of this supposed Authority, or presumptive Consent? Is every thing done by it, and yet nothing ever said of it? Are not these Proceedings at Common Law, a plain Confutation of it? The Laws certainly are administred, and legally administred by the Authority of that King, by whose *Demise* all Pleas &c. depending in his Reign, are legally discontinued. And did not the Common Law, as it was held, for Instance, in the Courts of *Edward IV.* declare, that all the Actions, depending in *Henry VIth's* Reign, were discontinued by his Dispossession and declared it for this reason, because it was a *Demise of the King*. Whereas, had the Laws been administred in *Henry VIth's* Reign, by the Authority of the *presumptive Consent* of *Edward IV.* before he was in Possession, why were not all Actions continued by the same Authority, after he was

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in Possession? Why discontinued by the Demise of Him, by whose Authority they were not administered? It would have saved the Subjects much time, trouble, and expence to have had their Suits continued, and not to begin all anew upon Edward IVth's coming to the Throne. But how much soever this would have tended to the publick Good, (which is the case where they set up this Authority of a presumptive Consent) the Judges of Edward IVth's Courts knew nothing of this Authority; and therefore declared, according to the Common Law of this Realm, that all the Proceedings at Law were discontinued by the Dispossession of H. VI. because it was a *Demise* of the Crown. For from the several Cases which I alledged, I observ'd that the Law makes no difference betwixt the Death, or dispossession of a King; but holds the latter, as well as the former, to be a *Demise* of the King, and that, whether he was a King *de jure*, or *de facto*.

Against the Authority of Bagot's Case, he urges from the Author of the Case of Allegiance to a King in Possession. *That Bagot's Counsel in their Plea do not urge the validity of a King de facto's grants without a Limitation, that it be no Injury to the Legal Right of the Crown, and thence supposes, they*

they are not valid against a King *de jure*. In Answer to which, I must take notice, that the words here are not truly translated by that Author, for the Limitation is to such Grants of a King *de facto*, *que ne fueren en menysbement de son Corone*, which were not to the minishment of His Crown, calling it at the same time, the King *de facto's* Crown. 2dly. This *Limitation* of Grants doth not respect the Rights of any Person; but the Rights, Lands, Honours, and Dignities of the Crown it self. Which Limitation held as well in Grants made by Kings *de jure*, as in those made by Kings *de facto*. As far as those Legal Rights of the Crown were prejudiced by them, so far they were invalid. And therefore in the ancient Oath, taken by the Kings of England at their Coronation, the King swears, *that he shall keep all the Lands, Honours, and Dignities, righteous and free of the Crown of England in all manner holy without any manner of Minishments, (the word used in Bagot's Case,) and the Rights of the Crown hurt, decay or loss to his Power, shall call again into the ancient Estate &c.* This Clause of the Oath, * fully explains the limitation of Grants in Bagot's Case, and may at the same

* It is the first Oath in the Book of Oaths.

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time serve for an Answer to what is urged by the *Remarker*, in the next Page from *the Case of Allegiance*, and by the *Natural Born Subject*, * concerning *Henry II's* Revocation of King *Stephen's* Grants † of *Crown-Lands*.

I observ'd, it was urg'd as Law by *Bagot's* Council, *that if he that is now King* (meaning *Edward IV.* and implying he was not King then) *had in King Henry the VIth's* Reign granted a *Charter of Pardon*, *it would be void Now*, for every one that grants a *Charter of Pardon*, must be King in fact; and that the Author of *the Case of Allegiance*, leaving out, probably by an Oversight, the Particle *Now* in his Translation of those Words, would have them signifie no more, than that a *Pardon granted by Edward the IV. when out of Possession, could not have its Effect, and be pleaded and received in Court, whilst out of Possession, for want of Power to enforce it.* In Answer to which, I observ'd, that *Bagot's* Council did not say, if *Edward IV.* had granted such a *Pardon*, before he was in Possession, it would have been void in *Henry VIth's* Reign, whilst he was

* *Remarks* p. 34.† *Letter* p. 37.

out

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out of Possession, (that might indeed be for want of Power,) but it would be void *Now* in the 9th Year of *Edward the IVth's* Reign, when he is in Possession, and the whole Power of the Kingdom in his Hands; and was therefore void in Law, not void for want of Power to enforce it. What says the *Remarker* to this? Why, he repeats the Objection without taking any notice of my Answer to it, and roundly affirms, *it was void for want of Power, and for no other reason.* * *i. e.* he understands the Law better than it was understood in *Edward the IVth's* Court. He may think so. In the mean time however he must grant, that his Author was mistaken in the Translation, and in the point of Law that was maintain'd in that Court. But what Authority doth the *Remarker* oppose to it? None at all: Nor any thing, but an inconclusive Argument of his own. *That a Prince who had granted a Pardon to a Subject, when out of Possession; would not after he came to the Throne yield, that he should be tryed, condemned, and executed; because he was out of Possession, when he granted it.* † It is very likely that he would not. But doth

* *Remarks* p. 35.† *Remarks* p. 36.

it

it therefore follow, that the Subject is *Rectus in Curia*, and pardon'd in Law? It certainly doth not; for tho' the Prince will not suffer him to be executed; and tho' the Pardon which was granted before he was in Possession was void; yet this Disjunctive admits a *medium*, which is, that he may, and probably would, grant a new Pardon now he is in Possession, to secure him.

I observ'd, that as the opposite Council did not deny any one of those Points to be Law, which were maintain'd in the Plea for *Bagot*: So *Billing*, who was Lord Chief Justice of the *King's Bench*, deliver'd his Opinion agreeably to it, and after he with the rest of the Judges of that *Bench* had consulted with the Judges of the *Common Pleas*, who agreed with them, the Court gave judgment for the validity of *Bagot's* Patent, *i. e.* for the *Royal* Jurisdiction of the *King de facto*. There are, as I said, a multitude of Cases where the same Authority is acknowledged. It was never disputed but in *Bagot's* Case, and there, as we see, judgment given for it. None of these things are denied by the *Remarker*, and he is sensible they are against him, and therefore calls them *Pretended Authorities out of my Year*

* *Remarks p. 32.*

they

they not in the Year Books of the Reigns of Kings *de jure*? But these too it seems, are *Pretended Authorities* when they do not suit with the *Remarker's* Hypothesis.

* He says, he owns and knows no one that denies, that the Crown takes away all manner of *Defects and Stops in Blood*, to be a Maxim of the Law; but then he would restrain it to Hereditary Kings without any Authority, nay, against the Authority of all the Judges of *England*, who, as I observed in two famous Cases, have applyed this Maxim to Non-Hereditary Kings, to which having nothing to answer, he takes sanctuary † in his Maxim *sub ratione juris*.

C H A P. II.

Being a Defence of the second Chapter of the View. That the Sovereign Authority, particularly, the Legislative Authority of Kings for the Time being, and their Two Houses of Parliament, is acknowledged by the Statute Law of this Realm.

HAVING towards the End of the first Chapter of the View, proved by the

* *Remarks p. 37.*
† *Remarks p. 38.*

Common

Common Law of this Realm. That the Legislative Power is lodged in the King's for the time being, and their Two Houses of Parliament. In the second Chapter, I proceeded to prove the same, by the Statute Law of this Realm.

For the Legislative Authority being essential to the Supreme Authority and inseparable from it, (since no Power that is less than the Sovereign Power can give Laws to a Community,) if I could make it appear, that Kings *de facto*, with their Two Houses of Parliament, had the Legislative Power of the Realm, this of it self would be a decisive Argument in this Controversy, and the *Remarker* himself at the latter end of the Book, where he resumes this Question, owns, that *the whole Cause depends upon the* * *Legislature.*

The Argument, which I urg'd in maintenance of the Legislative Authority of these Kings, was this, That Hereditary Kings and their Parliaments, have cited the Laws made by Non-Hereditary Kings and their Parliaments, in such a manner, as acknowledges them to be Legislators equally with themselves, or any of their Progenitors.

The *Remarker* acknowledges, *the Acts*

* *Remarks* p. 100.

made

made under Kings de facto to be Statutes, and Laws of the Land, but not by the Authority of Kings de facto, but by the Allowance, and presumptive Consent of the King de jure. * At the latter end of his Remarks, where he resumes this Subject, he doth not deny those *Laws are in force; but denies, that they derive their Force from the Authority of those that made them.* This he repeats over and over again, as often as he has occasion, to speak of the Laws of Kings *de facto.* So that the single Question betwixt us is, whence these Laws derive their Force, whether from the Authority of the Kings and Parliaments that enacted them, or from *the presumptive Consent*, as he says, *of Kings de jure.*

And 1st. It is to be observed, that altho' the *Remarker* owns them to be Laws, yet he knows not what to call these Laws. *Statute Laws*, he durst not call them; for he saith, *they were not Laws of England, be-*

* *The Natural Born Subject agrees with the Remarker.* There was a necessity, *saith he*, not to vacate the judicial Proceedings in the Reigns of H. IV. V. VI. and this could not be done without *allowing* the Acts of Parliament upon which the judicial Proceedings did depend, and those Acts being good in themselves, so far as they related to the Subject, the lawful Kings when they came in, *were willing they should be continued.* Letter p. 43.

Remarks p. 40. P. 101.

cause

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cause made by Kings de facto, but because the King de jure, without the formality of a Confirmation, suffer'd them like our Common Laws, by usage to become Laws of the Land, being for the benefit of his Subjects, and again, they may obtain the force of Statute-Laws made by Kings de jure, by use as Cannon Laws * do. Are they then Common-Law? No, he durst not affirm that neither, nay, he yields to the Truth of what I affirm'd, that tho' Customs are sometimes by Act of Parliament turn'd into Statute-Law; yet Statutes are not turned into Common Law or Custom, and adds, the Objector doth not say, that these Statutes of Kings de facto, receive their Authority from immemorial Custom: and yet he himself saith, that Kings and Parliaments, by reciting them in their Statutes, and suffering them to be pleaded in Westminster-Hall, have given them the strength of Immemorial Custom, i. e. have made them as good Laws as others, even our Common Laws, which are so by immemorial † Custom.

So that here's a 3d. sort of Laws not known in Westminster-Hall. They are not Statute-Laws, but have the force of

* Remarks p. 38, 39.

† Remarks p. 40.

Statute-

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Statute-Law: They do not receive their Authority from immemorial Custom, but have the strength of immemorial Custom, and are not Common, but as good as our Common Laws. To repeat this Hypothesis, is to confute it. It is a sort of a Riddle, at least, it puts me in mind of the famous *Ænigma* of *Ælia Lælia Crispis, nec mas nec femina, sed omnia*. These Laws, which he at the same time owns to be in Force, are neither Statute Law, nor Common Law, and yet they are both: They partake of the strength of both, and are neither. They are no Laws as they are made, and yet for use, are all Laws, i. e. they are presumptive, they are Hypothesis-Law.

But 2dly. The Remarker is not only at a loss to know under what Class to reduce these Laws, at the same time that he owns them to be in Force; but leaves us at as great an uncertainty to know which of them are in Force. When he affirms, that these Statutes do not derive their Authority from the Kings and Parliaments that enacted them, but from the Authority of Kings de jure, could he have produced an Act of a King de jure, and his Parliament in confirmation of these Statues, (which alone could have given them Authority, had they had none originally) we should then have known

known which of these Laws were in Force; because we should have known, which had been confirmed. Or, could he have produced some exprefs publick Consent, given some other way by Kings *de jure* out of Parliament, tho' this would not have made them Laws of the Realm, if they had not been so before, yet we might have known, at least, according to this Hypothesis, which of these Statutes had been in Force; because we should have known to which such an exprefs Consent had been given. But when the *Remarker* derives the force of these Statutes, not from any exprefs and publick, but from a secret Consent, that we are to presume on, or guess at; He has left us no way to know which of these Laws are valid, and which are null.

The restriction, that the † *Remarker* adds to the validity of these Laws, that *they be not in diminution of the Crown, and for || the benefit of the Subject*, is so far from ascertaining their Obligation, that it leaves it still more doubtful; for as every Man before was left to guess at the Prince's Consent, so here Men are made Judges

† *Remarks p. 41.* || *Remarks p. 41.*

of

of what Laws are to the diminution of the Crown, or against the publick Good; of which different Men, as well as different Parties, having entertain'd different Notions, those Laws which are obligatory with some, would be esteemed Nullities with others. The safety of the Prince, the Peace of the Community, the Lives, Liberties, and Fortunes of the Subjects depending on the Laws, nothing ought to be more certain, and better known than their Obligation (to which therefore Promulgation has ever been held to be essential) whereas nothing is more obscure, uncertain, and precarious, than is the obligation of Laws by this Hypothesis, which leaves it in the dark, and makes it all over Guess, and Presumption.

Some, who have not throughly consider'd this matter, may wonder, how these Persons ever came to take up with so precarious an Hypothesis. But the truth is, they did it not on Choice, but were driven upon it by necessity. For not being able to deny the validity of the Statutes of Non-Hereditary Kings, and yet not knowing at the same time, how to acknowledge their Legislative Authority, without destroying their Cause, they were forced to look out for some Authority of Kings *de Jure*, for these Laws: But not finding any Confirmation, or

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publick exprefs Consent given to these *Laws* by such Kings, either in Parliament, or out of Parliament; there was no other way left, but to presume on their secret Consent to give Authority to them.

But this Notion of a *presumptive Consent* giving Authority to *Laws*, is as great a Secret, as the secret Consent it self. The *Remarker* agrees with me, that *Kings and Parliaments, Judges, and Lawyers have owned these Laws to be in Force*; but he has not been able to produce one Act of any King, or Parliament, or the Opinion of any Judge, or Lawyer, that ascribes their force to this *Presumptive Consent*. No, he flies to the Case of one *Barbaricus*, a subordinate Officer in the Roman State, which is no ways parallel to the Case before us, either in the Reason, or the Circumstances of it; and which proves nothing, but that the English *Law-Books* afford him not the semblance of any Authority. And what can be more absurd, than to derive the validity of so great a part of our Statutes from a *presumptive Authority*, which neither the *Statute Book*, nor any *Law-Book* doth acknowledge, nor take the least notice of?

4thly. This Legislation of the *presumptive Consent*, is not only utterly unknown to our *Laws*, but utterly inconsistent with them.

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them: For it resolves the Legislature, which by our Constitution is lodg'd in the King, or Queen, and the Two Houses of Parliament, into the sole Will of the Prince; and that (which makes it as ridiculous, as it is illegal) into his secret Will.

5thly. All the Lawyers, Judges, Kings, and Parliaments, who have owned the validity of these Statutes, have at the same time acknowledged the Authority of the Kings, and Parliaments that made them. They have not pleaded them, nor recited them in Acts of Parliament as Statutes in general, nor as *Laws* that obtain'd their force by Custom, or *presumptive Consent*: But they pleaded, and recited them as Statutes of the Realm, enacted by such Kings in their Parliaments holden at *Westminster*, or elsewhere, in such a Year of their Reigns. Of such Recitals, I have given several Instances in the II. Chapter of the View, which the *Remarker* saith, *might have all been spared*; and so it was indeed necessary they should have been spared, that his Hypothesis might be spared, these Recitals being so many Demonstrations against it. For by these Recitals it appears, that at the same time those Kings and Parliaments acknowledge the validity of the *Laws*, they acknowledge the Authority of their respective Legislators:

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may they acknowledge no other validity in those Laws, than what is derived from the Legislative Authority of those Kings and Parliaments that enacted them. And this they do as fully acknowledge (for they acknowledge it in the very same Terms) as they do the validity of the Statutes, and the Legislative Authority of any of their *de jure* Progenitors.

I referr'd to Laws made by Kings *de facto* in favour of the Subject, which had been afterwards intrenched on by the Prerogative of Kings *de jure*. Now if the Laws of Kings *de facto* were null in themselves, and had no Authority, but what they received from the consent of succeeding Kings *de jure*; then the Awards, and Proceedings of a King *de jure*, in opposition to the Laws of a King *de facto*, would be legal. But such Awards, and Proceedings have been declared by a King *de jure*, and his Parliament, to be illegal. Whence it follows, that the Laws of Kings *de facto*, are so far from receiving their Authority from the presumptive Consent of Kings *de jure*, that they are valid even against a King *de jure*'s express Dissent to them. See the I. Rich. III. ch. 2. and the *Petition of Right* 3. Car. I. But these Instances, as well as all the Recitals, the *Remarker*, and the *Natural Born Subject* wisely pass over.

When

When the *Remarker* has not been able to give the least shadow of a proof from our Laws, or Law Books, for this *Chimæra* of a presumptive Consent; I may be allowed to pass over his inconclusive Reasons, *why the Statutes of Kings de facto should remain in Force, and yet the Authority of those Kings not be acknowledged.* Only one of his Reason, I shall take notice of, because he repeats it, and lays great stress upon it, *viz. That Kings de jure suffer the Laws of Kings de facto to be in Force, because 'tis not safe to unravel things too far, to unbinge the Government, and to devest them of Laws they have been used to, and chose themselves.* * But supposing, as the *Remarker* doth, that such Laws had originally no Authority, to give them Authority by Act of Parliament, would be so far from *unravelling things, and devesting the People of their Laws,* that it would have been the only way to fix every thing, and secure their Laws to them. And one Act of Parliament in the beginning of *Edward the IVth's* Reign, for instance, which a Committee would have drawn up at two or three Sittings, would have confirmed all the Laws made by the Three Kings of the

* Remarks p. 40, 104.

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House of *Lancaster*. And there can be no reason why this Confirmation was not given, but because *Edward IV.* his Parliament, and Judges, knew they were valid without it. For when there has been reason to doubt of the validity of Acts of Parliament, it has been always thought fit to confirm them. As the Acts made 12. *Car. II.* because that Parliament was not call'd by the King's Writs, were all enumerated, and confirmed in an Act pass'd 13. *Car. II.* ch. 7. Entitled, *An Act to confirm publick Acts.* The *Natural Born Subject*, with great Assurance, asks me, *can you give one single Instance out of all our Records of any Act of Parliament made by a Rightful * King that ever was confirmed for want of sufficient Authority?* Here's one Instance for him, and a famous one; and he may find another 13. *Car. II.* ch. 13. But neither He, nor the *Remarker*, have been able to produce one publick Act, of all the numerous Acts that were made by the Three Kings of the House of *Lancaster* in 60. Years, that was confirm'd by *Edward IV.* or esteemed to want his Confirmation, (those few private Acts which were confirm'd, were confirmed for private Reasons) for without it, they were held to

* Letter p. 49.

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be of as good Authority, as his Own Acts. But the *Natural Born Subject* will have it, *that they are still liable to be question'd.* What! liable to be question'd by Law? By his, and the * *Remarker's* Hypothesis-Law; they may be liable to be question'd: Not by the Law of the Realm: No, not as it was held even in the Courts, and by the Judges of *Edward the IV.* for when it was urged, that *Bagot's* Patent of Naturalization granted by *Hen. VIth* was not good; because Patents of Naturalization were not confirmed in the Act of the 1. *Ed. IV.* ch. 1. which was made to confirm the judicial Proceedings of the Three *Henries*; This Plea was rejected, and judgment given for the validity of *Bagot's* Patent of Naturalization, which stood solely upon *Henry the VIth's* Authority. As this judgment of *Edward the IVth's* Judges may convince the *Natural Born Subject*, that the Doctrine he lays down with so much Assurance, *that such Acts, unless confirm'd, were still liable to be question'd for want of sufficient Authority,* is not Law: So is it a full Determination against His, and the *Remarker's* presumptive Consent-Authority; for here was no Room left to presume on *Edward the IVth's* Consent

* Letter p. 48.

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to this Patent, since he had left Patents of Naturalization out of that Act, wherein he gave his exprefs Consent to such Acts of the Three *Henries*, that he would have stand: And yet this Act by *Henry* the VIth's Authority, which had not *Edward* the IVth's Consent, was held valid without it, as valid as those that had it, or as any of his own Acts.

The *Objector* according to this Notion of the presumptive Consent-Legislation, said *Richard* III. Acts of Parliaments pass'd for Laws, because *H. VII.* was willing they should pass for Laws. To convince him of his Mistake, I instanced in two Acts of Parliament made by *Richard*, One which bastardized *Edward* the IVth's Children, Another that attainted *Henry* the VIIth's Friends, which (the last especially) *Henry* the VIIth was certainly not willing should pass for Laws: Nay he was unwilling, as my Lord *Bacon* observes, so much regard should be paid to *Richard's* Attainders, as to have them formally repealed. And yet when the Judges were consulted, they unanimously declared, that the Persons attainted could not take their Places in Parliament, until their Attainders, tho' passed by a King *de facto*, were reversed by Act of Parliament.

The Author of *the Case of Allegiance* having said, that these Attainders were reversed,

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versed, not because they were valid, but out of *Caution*. I observed, that the reason the Judges gave for the Reversal, that they were not legal Persons, till their Acts of Attainder were reversed, shews, that it was not *Caution*, but the Constitution that required it. Upon which the *Remarker* says, what *Mr. H.* drives at, I know is this, that the Attainder of a *de facto*, must be reversed, otherwise the Person attainted, is not a Legal Person. * *Mr. H.* only cited the unanimous Resolution of all the Judges, who declared, that the Persons who were attainted by *Richard* III. King in Fact, and not of Right, were not Legal Persons till their Attainders were reversed. Which, saith the *Remarker*, is a gross Mistake, and they were reversed only out of abundant *Caution*. What, notwithstanding the King and Parliament proceeded agreeably to the Opinion of the Judges? Yes, notwithstanding this, He says, it is a gross Mistake, that is, the King and Parliament, and all the Judges of the Realm, were of One Opinion; and the *Remarker* is of Another. By which Authority are we to be concluded?

But the *Remarker* has another Answer,

* *Remarks* p. 46.

Ibid.

P. 48.

that

that the Judges knew H. VII. had no Right. If one should ask him, how he knows that the Judges knew this, he would be hard put to it to prove it. However, let us for once grant that they might believe so, and then he will be distressed by the Judges Resolution of the second Question, touching the King's Attainder, that the King [Henry VII. whom the Remarker says, they believed, had no Right] was a Person able and discharged of all Attainders, and Disabilities ipso facto, that he was invested with the Regal Dignity, and was King, and thus all the Objections against his Person, or his Title, from Attainders, or other stops, and defects of Blood, were entirely removed: So that let the Remarker take which side of the Question he pleases, that H. VII. had a Right antecedent to his Possession, or that he had not; one of the two Resolutions of the Judges, is directly against him, and neither of them for him. If he says, H. VII. had a Right antecedent to his Possession; their first Resolution concludes against him. But if he says, he had no antecedent Right; their latter Resolution is decisive against the Remarker, and for the Sovereign Authority of the King for the time being.

Towards the latter end of the Book, where the Remarker resumes this Argument, he makes

makes an objection to the Legislative Power of the Three Henries, from the 1. Edward IV. ch. 1. where he calls them pretended Kings, and other Statutes where he calls them Kings indeed, and not of Right; but this Objection was obviated by what was said in the view, as the Remarker might have observed, but since he did not, I must repeat part of it.

1st. Whenever Edward IV. cites the Laws of the House of Lancaster, he always gives them the Title, of late Kings of this Realm in Deed, and not of Right; whereby he owns them to have been Kings of this Realm, but withal, that they ought not to have been so. Nay, he doth not even now pretend, that his great Uncle, Edmund Earl of March, or his Father Rich. Duke of York, according to the Remarker's Hypothesis, were Kings of Right during the time, that the Three Henries were Kings in Deed. Neither He, nor his Parliament, nor Judges, ever imagined, (as the Remarker and Natural Born Subjects do,) that the unpossessed, unrecognized Heirs were Kings de jure, subsisting at the same time, that others were Kings in Fact. But notwithstanding this abatement of Title, whenever Edward IV. cites their Laws, he acknowledges their Legislative Authority to be equal to that of any of his Predecessors, and challenges no other

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other Authority for his own Laws, than he owns theirs had, and ought to have * had.

2dly. As we never meet with this distinction of Kings *in Deed*, and *not of Right*, throughout all the Revolutions of Government, till in this Statute of *Edward IV.* So it is to be observed, that it is in the Statutes only of the immediate Rivals and Successors that we meet with it, but never afterwards. It is only in the Statutes of *Edward IV.* that the Three *Henries*; and in those only of *Henry VII.* that *Richard III.* is stiled King *in Deed*, and *not of Right*. In the Statutes of all the succeeding Kings and Queens, the Three *Henries*, and *Richard III.* are stiled Kings of *England*, without the least diminution of Title.

3dly. At common Law, in the Courts even of their Rivals, the Regal Title is constantly given them without any Abatement. Whenever *H. VI.* is mention'd in the Courts of *Edward IV.* the same Title is given to him, that is given to *Edward IV.* when He is mention'd in the Courts of *Edward V.* When *Henry VI.* is mention'd in the Courts of *Edward IV.* He is styl'd *l'auter Roy*, as *Edward IV.* himself is stiled *Roy qui ore est*. All the difference betwixt them is, One, is

* See 14. *Edward IV.* ch. 2. printed at the end of this Book. the

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the late King; and the Other, the present King. The same stile is observed in the Courts of *Hen. VII.* when *Richard III.* is named.

Another Objection has been drawn by consequence from the *Attainders*, and the Language of them; which, as I had said, was no confutation of those full and direct Proofs, which I had made of the Legislative Authority of the Kings for the time being. Nor could the *Objector*, with whom I was then engaged, say they were: Who acknowledged both *H. VI.* and *Edward IV.* to be in their Turns, Kings and Legislators, notwithstanding their mutual *Attainders* of each other. Nay, the *Remarker* himself p. 44. says, *as for Attainders there is no great stress to be laid upon them, because they are used on both sides.* However, towards the end of his Remarks, not knowing well what else to lay a stress upon, he is for laying a very great stress upon the *Attainders*. But before he had done this, he ought to have consider'd.

1st. That the very same Parliament, that attainted *Richard III.* did however, as I have observed already, so fully acknowledge his Legislative Authority, that they had, as we have seen, no other way to relieve the Persons who lay under the Penalty of his

his Acts of Attainder, but by repealing them. They did not say, with the *Remarker*, and *Natural Born Subject*, that they were not Kings, nor Legislators; that their Acts were Nullities, or had no legal Effects: No, they expressly acknowledged they had such legal effects, as could not be vacated, but by an Act of Parliament: Which plainly shews, that whatever other Consequences may be drawn from the Attainers of these Kings, there can be no consequence drawn from them, that will affect their Legislative Power.

2dly. That, as an antecedent Attainder cannot touch a Prince in his subsequent Exercise of the Regal Power: So for the same reason, a subsequent Attainder cannot affect a Prince in the Exercise of his Regal Power antecedent to the Attainder. And for both these, I have produced undeniable Authorities, to which the *Remarker* has given no other, but the thred-bare Answer of *sub ratione juris*.

3dly. The *Remarker* has affirmed, but not proved, that these Kings were attainted for their Exercise of the Regal Power. *Henry VI.* was not, as he supposes, p. 70. attainted by *Edward IV.* for that reason, but for the Death of *Richard Duke of York*, at the Battle of *Wakefield*. And as the *Remarker* may see

see, by what hath been said, what unjust Consequences he draws from the Language of the Attainers: So there needs nothing more to convince him of the Injustice of this Attainder, than the History of it as it is related by the Author of the *Ecclesiastical History*, which I have so often cited. After this Author had given some account of the Agreement made in Parliament between King *H. VI.* and *Richard Duke of York*, he adds, *the Duke of York's next Point was to secure the Queen. This Lady, he had reason to imagine, would not sit down tamely, and see her Husbands Royalty Eclipsed, and her Son disinherited without some Attempt for their Recovery. To prevent being embarrass'd from this Quarter: The Duke prevail'd with the King to send for the Queen, and her Son to London. The Queen instead of obeying the Order, levied an Army in the North, under the Command of the Dukes of Exeter, and Sommerset. The Protector (for so the Duke of York had got himself made in Parliament) receiving Intelligence of this Preparation, leaving the King under the Guard of his * Friends, the Duke of Norfolk, and the Earl of Warwick, march'd down with a small Force to Wakefield, where fighting rashly at a great Disadvantage of Numbers, he*

* i. e. The Duke of York's Friends.

lost his Life and the Battle. * Now it was for the loss of the D. of York's Life, that H. VI. was attainted in the first Parliament of Edward IV. And therefore our Ecclesiastical Historian goes on, in this Parliament Margaret the late Queen, Edward call'd Prince of Wales, and several others, were attainted for the Death of Richard D. of York. And which is more remarkable, the Act of Attainder pass'd upon the late King Henry the VI. † So that H. VI. you see, was attainted, not for his past Exercise of the Regal Power, but for the Death of the D. of York. Wonderful Justice! attainted for the Duke's Death, who was slain at Wakefield, when H. VI. was a Prisoner at London; and slain by an Army, that was raised not only without, but against his express Order; for H. VI. even by this Account, was so far from giving any Encouragement to his Queen's Attempt, that he commanded her to come to London with her Son, and acquiesce.

It will not be improper here to answer an Argument of Prinn, and the Remarker, That Richard Duke of York was King de jure, tho' never in Possession, because Per-

* Collier's Ecclesiastical History p. 677.
† Ibid. 679.

sons

sons were attainted of High Treason for his Death; but these Attainders are no proof, that he was King de jure; for the Attainders were founded on the Act of Parliament 39. H. VI. by which Richard was declared Heir apparent of the Crown, and it was made High Treason to compass his Death: and therefore the Lord Chief Justice Coke says, if the Heir apparent to the Crown be a collateral Heir apparent, He is not within the Statute of the 25th Edw. III. untill he be declared by Parliament, as it was in the Duke of York's Case. †

Lastly, This Attainder, as well as another posthumous Attainder of Henry VI. were reversed 1. Henry VII. wherein it is declared, * that the King, our Sovereign, remembering how against all Righteousness, Honour, Nature, and Duty, an inordinate seditious and slanderous Act was made against the most famous Prince of Blessed Memory, King Henry his Uncle, at the Parliament holden at Westminster the fourth day of November in the 1st. Year of the Reign of Edw. IV. late King of England, whereby his said Uncle contrary to the due Allegiance, and

† Coke's Inst. Part. 4. c 1. p. 7.
* In the unprinted Rolls i Hen. VII. N. 16. Restitutio Henrici Sexti.

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all due Order was attained of High Treason. Wherefore our Sovereign Lord, by the Advice and Consent of the Lords, &c. ordaineth that the same Act, and all Acts of Attainders, Forfeiture, or Disablement, be void, annulled and repealed, and of no Force, nor Effect. This was the last Act of Parliament, relating to this Attainder of Henry VI. which gives us an Idea of it, very different from what the Remarker has given, and leaves these Attainders without any force to bear the great weight he lays upon them.

I observ'd, that when Princes proceeded against any Persons for adhering to the King for the time being, their constant way of proceeding was by Acts of Attainder in Parliament *ex post facto*, and not by Indictments in the ordinary Course of Proceedings; which shews, that to serve the King in Possession, was not a Fault, nor could be punish'd as such, by the Laws that were then in Force. The Remarker doth not deny the Fact, but saith, the *true reason why they were attainted, and not tryed as other Malefactors, was because they were such notorious Rebels, that they ought to be made Examples of, by an extraordinary way of proceeding to deter others from the like; * but*

* Remarks p. 47.

not

not for want of Laws in Force against them. He has not yet proved, that to serve the King for the Time being makes Men notorious Rebels, or Rebels at all; nor by what Law they can be convicted of High Treason for doing that Service. But to pass by that and come to his Argument: Were there ever more notorious Traytors, and Rebels in this Nation, than the Gun-powder Conspirators, and the Regicides of 48? And yet both the former, and the latter were convicted, in the ordinary course of Proceedings, by Indictments on the 25. Edward III.

The *Natural Born Subject* denies the Fact, saying, *this was not the constant way of proceeding; for many were put to Death without Attainders: The Duke of Sommerfet, and several other Lords, and * Gentlemen were put to Death without Attainders, by Edw. IV. for fighting for Henry VI.*

There were Executions indeed, as I took notice, in the Heat of the Victors Rage, without any Colour of Process; and I said, that some of the Attainders were no more to be drawn into consequence, than those Executions: And if this be what the *natural born Subject* means, when he says there

* Letter p. 95.

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where

were Persons put to Death without Attainders, he says true, but trifles at the same time; for this is still a more violent Course than Attainders themselves. But if he means, the Duke of Sommerfet and the rest were put to Death upon a Sentence after a Conviction by a Jury, in the ordinary Course of Proceedings by Indictment, why did he produce no Testimonies from History in Proof of it? If this Author expects to be believed without Authorities, yet it is too much to believe him against Authorities. Now Stow relates the Matter thus. *After the Battel of Tewksbury, King Edward entering a Church in Tewksbury with his Sword drawn, a Priest brought the Sacrament against him, and would not let him enter until he had granted his Pardon to these that follow; Edmund Duke of Sommerfet, Strother Lord St. John's (whom the natural born Subject splits into several other Lords,) Sir Humphrey Audley, and twelve more. All these, where they might have escaped, tarried in the Church, trusting in the King's Pardon, from Saturday till Monday, when they were taken out and beheaded.* * Sir William Dugdale, in his Account of this Duke of Sommerfet, saith, that notwithstan-

* Stow in Edward IV. p. 44.
 † Coke's Inst. Part 4. c. 1. p. 7.

ding

ding he fled from the Battel of Tewksbury, he was overtaken and there lost his Head. Some say that he got into the Church for Sanctuary and there was killed, Leland's Itinerary Vol. 6. 93. And will the natural born Subject call this putting Men to Death in the ordinary way of Proceedings? Hollingshed indeed makes mention of a Trial of the Duke of Sommerfet, &c. And suppose we should take his Account of this Matter, rather than that which is given by the other Historians (which is not reasonable) yet even this I think will do the natural born Subject no Service; for Hollingshed tells us, what Persons sat as High Constable, and Earl Marshal, which plainly shows, that if there was any Trial, it was before a Court Martial flagrante Bello, where absolute Power, and not the Laws of the Land take place, and which is as far from the ordinary Course of Proceedings, as that of Attainders.

* Dugdale's Baronage Tom. 2. p. 125.

C H A P. III.

A Defence of the third Chapter wherein some other Objections to the Legislative Authority of these Kings are answer'd.

THE Objection from *Edward IVth's* Confirmation of a few *private Acts* I have answered in the foregoing Chapter, and turned it upon the Remarker, in that there was not one of the numerous *publick Acts* that were made in the Reigns of the three *Henries* ever confirmed, and yet stood, and, except such of them as have been repealed, do stand in Force to this Day. But the Remarker says, that *King Edward IVth's Non-repealing their Acts*, was sufficient to give them the Force of Laws, being beneficial to the Subject. This is but his *Crambe* of presumptive Consent in other Words, and as he has express'd it, he might with as much reason have said, that a Falshood, by not being contradicted, becomes a Truth; or that the many Errors of the *Remarks* and the *Letter* would, if they had not been confuted, have commenced so many Truths, as that the *Non repealing of an Act*, which was originally null, gives it the Force of a Law.

* Rem. p. 51.

As for their Laws being beneficial to the Subject, and for the publick Good, to which he partly ascribes their Obligation (for he knows not well where to place it) this he often repeats, without taking the least notice of what I had said in Confutation of that Notion, or giving any Account how those Laws which were not for the publick Good, but prejudicial to it, came to be in Force, and to continue in Force in the Reigns of their Rivals (and they continued in Force till they were repealed) as well as their most beneficial Statutes.

Instead of considering the Answers I gave to the Objection that is drawn from the Revocation made 21 *Richard II.* of the Confirmation of the Judgment against the two *Spencers* 1 *Edward III.* he has referred me to a learned Author, who had not himself consider'd those Arguments I offer'd.

And as before I gave the Lord Chief Justice *Cokes's* Opinion for the Validity both of the Judgment against the two *Spencers* 1 *Edward III.* and of the Repeal of 1 *Henry IV.* of the Revocation of that Judgment 21 *Richard II.* So let the Remarker try where he can name any Lawyer of note that has been of a different Opinion; nay, let him look into the Statute Book, and see whether all

* Rem. p. 41.

the Statutes made 1 Ed. III. whilst his Father was alive, are not this day in Force, (as one of them is cited for a Law of this Realm 16 Car. I. c. 15.) and whether all the rest of the Acts made 21 Rich. II. as well as that of the Revocation of the Judgment against the two *Spencers*, have not ever since stood Repealed, and do stand repealed at this day by the Authority of *Henry IV.* and his first Parliament. As for instance, an Act of the 21 *Richard II.* had multiplied the Kinds of Treason, which Act was Repealed 1 *Henry IV.* c. 10. and Treason reduced to the old Standard of the 25. *Edward III.* * And can the *Remarker*, or *natural born Subject* show that any Man was ever tryed for Treasons upon the Statute of *Richard II.* after that Statute was Repealed by *H. IV.*? Or will they say that notwithstanding that Repeal of *Henry IV.* any Man may be now, or might at any time since have been tryed for Treason by the 21. *Rich. II.* and not by the 25. *Edward III.*?

After this, I need not say that this Repealed Parliament of the 21. *Rich. II.* on which these two Authors lay so great a Stress, was

* Witness the Statute of 1 H. 4. c. 10. Whereby all those Acts which were made Treasons in the divided time of R. II. were reduced to this of Ed. III. The Argument of A. B. Laud's Council. Hist. of his Trial p. 425.

not

not duly elected, and summoned, the Knights being not chosen by the Commons, *prout Mos exigit, sed per Regiam Voluntatem.* And as for the Lords, *summoneri fecit Rex omnes Dominos sibi adherentes.* And as it was not regularly call'd; so neither did it act with Freedom, but was held *viris armatis & Sagittariis immensis*, as is declared in the Parliament Roll 1 *Henry IV.* n. 21, 22.

Another Objection, which I considered, was the Declaration of Parliament 39. *Henry VI.* That the Duke of York's Title could not be defeated. This I said was a partial Declaration of an awed Parliament, when the King's Army was defeated, and the King himself the Duke's Prisoner: Otherwise they might have declared, that his Title was defeated by Acts of his own, as well as by Acts of Parliament. They might, I said, have declared this, upon the Principles of those with whom we are disputing; who when they are press'd with the Commands of Holy Scripture to render unto *Cæsar* the things that are *Cæsar's*, &c. think it a sufficient Answer to say, that *Tiberius Cæsar* was a rightful Governor by the Submission and Oaths of the Roman Senate and People to him, as the Romans had before acquired a Right to the Government of *Judæa* by the Submission of the Jews. Since therefore the Title of the Regal

Regal Family of the Jews was defeated by their submission to the Romans; and the Title of the Roman Senate and People defeated by their Submission and Oaths to *Tiberius*: Upon the same Principle, the Duke of *York's* Title was defeated by his long Submission, obeying Summons to Parliament, accepting and executing Commissions under *H. VI.* and repeated Oaths of Allegiance to him, particularly that in the 30th Year of *H. Vth's* Reign.

In Answer to which, the *Remarker* first represents the Duke of *York* in *Durefs*, when he did all this, and therefore would have it to be void. *What our Kings* (calling the Duke of *York* King, who never call'd himself so, no, not when he had *H. VI.* Prisoner) *are forced to do in Durefs against themselves and their own Right, is of no Force, p. 26.* Again, *all this might be, and and yet the House of York might not give up their Right, and quit their Claim; but waited only for a more favourable Opportunity when they should get out of Durefs. d. 53.* Who would not imagine by this Account, that the Heirs of the House of *York*, (at least *Rich. Duke of York*) had pass'd their time in Prison? I have shew'd already, that *Edmund Earl of March* put himself at the Head of an Army, for *H. IV.* against *Glendour*, and discovered to *H. V.* the Con-

Conspiracy of the Earl of *Cambridge*, his Brother in Law against that King: I might shew further from Sir *William * Dugdale*, That he served King *Henry Vth* in his Wars in *France*; from *Rymer †* that he was in the fifth Year of *Henry Vth.* made Admiral at Sea. That in the sixth Year of that King, He was constituted Lieutenant of *Normandy*, and Warden of the *Marches*. And that in the first Year of *H. VI.* He was made Lieutenant of *Ireland* by that King, as appears both from ** Dugdale* and *† Rymer*. And to shew you how good a Subject he was, and what an entire Confidence these two Kings had in him, I'll give you || Part of a Commission from each of these Kings to *Edmund Earl of March* who dyed in *Ireland. Jan. 19.* in the * third Year of *Henry VI.* after he had lived in this en-

* Baronage Tom. 1. under the Title of March.

† *Rymer's Fœdera*, Tom IX. p. 472.

* Baronage ut supra.

|| *A. D. 1418. An. 6. H. 5. Rex omnibus ad quos &c salutem. sciatis quod nos de fidelitate, probitate, & circumspetione carissimi consanguinei nostri Edmundi Comitis Marchie plenius confidentes, ordinavimus & constituimus ipsum Comitem Locum tenentem & Custodem generalem omnium Terrarum & Marchiarum totius Ducatus nostri Normannie, &c. habendum occupandum regendum & exercendum officium prædictum quamdiu nobis placuerit, &c.* *Rymer's Fœd. Tom. IX. p. 592.*

tire Subjection to the Three Kings of the House of *Lancaster*.

I might observe also from † *Rymer*, that *Richard* Earl of *Cambridge*, who married the Sister and Heir of the Earl of *March*, and who was Father to *Richard* Duke of *York*, assisted *K. H. V.* in his Wars in *France*. But I come to *Richard* Duke of *York*, who one would almost think, by the *Remarker's* way of speaking of his *Durefs*, that he was scarce ever out of Prison. But the *Remarker* may find in *Sir William Dugdale*, that in the eighth Year of *K. H. VI.* He was Constable of *England*. In the 10th of that King, he was sent with a Commission to secure the Sea Coasts of *Normandy*. In the 12th. He was sent General, with the Duke of *Sommerfet*, to suppress an Insurrection in *Normandy*. In the 13th was joyned with

* A. D. 1423. An. 1. H. 6. Rex omnibus ad quos &c. salutem, sciatis quod nos, de fidelitate & circumspicione carissimi consanguinei nostri *Edmundi* Comitis *Marchie* & *Ultonie* plenius confidentes, de Avifamento & Assensu magni Concilii nostri, ordinavimus & constituimus ipsum Comitem Locum tenentem Terræ nostræ *Hiberniæ*, habendum &c. à primodie quo idem comes, vel deputatus suus in terra nostra prædicta applicabit usque ad finem novem annorum proximo sequentium & plenariè completorum. *Rymer's Fædera* Tom. 10. p. 282.

† *Dugdale Baronage under the Title of March.*
‖ *Fædera* &c. Tom. 9. p. 250.

him

him in Commission to govern *France*. In the 18th of *K. H. VI.* was constituted Lieutenant and Captain General for all *France* and *Normandy*. In the 23d of that King was made Regent of *France* and *Normandy*. In the 29th of *H. VI.* was constituted Lord Lieutenant of *Ireland*. In the 32 of *H. VI.* was made Protector of the Realm, and in the 35th *H. VI.* made Lord Lieutenant of *Ireland*. *

And let me now ask the *Remarker*, whether these were not Instances of an entire Subjection in the Heirs of the House of *York*? Could they have given greater proofs of a voluntary Subjection, than by undertaking and executing these great Charges? And will the *Remarker* still say, they were in *Durefs*? In *Durefs*, when they were Admirals at Sea, Generals of great Armies in remote Countries, Regents, and Lieutenants of Great Kingdoms?

Not to enquire how many times the Duke of *York* repeated his Oath of Fidelity to *K. H. VI.* when he was admitted to those great Offices, or how often he took Oaths to him upon other Occasions, as that Oath which the Duke of *York*, and *Buckingham*, the Two Archbishops, Eleven Bishops, Six

* *Sir William Dugdale's Baronage*, Tom. 2. p. 159. 160. 161, &c. under the Title of *York*.

Earls,

Earls, Two Viscounts, Eighteen Abbots, Two Priors, and Seventeen Barons took in Parliament unto Henry VI. in the 33d. Year of his Reign, *Novemb. 25.* for their Allegiance unto the King. * Not to make this Enquiry, since that Oath || which the Duke of York took in the 30th Year of H. VIth's Reign at St. Paul's Cross, being a Renunciation of his Own, and a Recognition of H. VI. Right, was, as well his accepting, and executing those great Commissions, abundantly sufficient to defeat his Title. The Remarker, to avoid this consequence, will have the Duke of York to be in † *Durefs* when he took this Oath but let him look into *Stow* * and he will find, that he was at full Liberty at that time; nay, that in the 31st. Year of that Reign, he took this Oath again at *Westminster*, and at *Coventry* at sundry Times. † Since then he was not in *Durefs*, but at full Liberty, when He took and repeated this Oath, the Consequence sure is unavoidable. No faith the Remarker, Grant this too that he was at Liberty, what then? Why then you'll

* See the *Book of Oaths* p. 145.

|| See *Stow* p. 395.

† See *Remarks* p. 26, 53.

* *Stow* *ibid.*

† *Stow* p. 396.

say

say he had quitted his Claim. I beg Mr. H's. pardon, no such matter I can assure you, but the quite contrary; for the very swearing of Allegiance upon an Agreement, was so far from weakning his Title, that it rather strengthened it. * That Oath which Mr. H. calls a Recognition of Henry VI. Right, was indeed or *de facto* Henry VI. Recognition of Richard Duke of York's Right, for faith he, Richard Duke of York took this Oath upon an Agreement. † He goes on, if all be true which I have said, as it is, the Gentlemen may still say, that the Right of the Jews and Roman Senate was defeated, and that the Roman Emperours were rightful Governours, because the Jews and Roman Senate had submitted and sworn Allegiance to them; and yet nevertheless the House of York, tho' they had sworn Allegiance to the Possessor, had still a good Title, and such as the Usurper by the Agreement owned. The Gentlemen he speaks of may abide by their Answer, and yet not own that the Duke's Title was defeated, and may boldly assert, that his Title was not actually defeated by the Legislative Power of the Realm. Neither need they acknowledge, that this Declaration

* *Remarks* p. 26, 27.

† *Remarks* p. 59.

of

of Parliament proves too much, for it proves what it was brought to prove, and no more. †

But now if all this be false, which the Remarker says is true, that Richard Duke of York took this Oath upon an Agreement which acknowledged his Right: And if the contrary to it be true, that this Oath mention'd in the View, was not taken upon the Agreement, but taken and repeated several Years before the Agreement; then it follows, upon the Remarker's, and these Gentlemens own Principles, and way of Reasoning, That as the Right of the Jews and Roman Senate was defeated by their submission to the Roman Emperors: So was the Duke of York's Title defeated by his long and absolute Submission and repeated Oaths of Allegiance to K. H. VI. That as the Duke's Title was thus defeated by the afore-said Oath, since the Oath was taken before the Agreement, Defeated I say, upon their own Principles by the Duke's own Act and Deed, notwithstanding this Declaration of Parliament: So, notwithstanding the same, it might be defeated, as it actually was, by the Legislative Power of the Realm, and there-

* Remarks p. 60.

fore

fore this Declaration of Parliament proving too much, proves nothing at all.

These Consequences are unavoidable, and this Declaration, that the Title of the Duke of York could not be defeated, must be given up on their own Principles, if that be false, which the Remarker affirms to be true, that this Oath was not taken untill the Agreement: And false it certainly is; for the Agreement in Parliament between K. H. VI. and Richard Duke of York was made in the 39th Year of K. H. VIth's Reign; but this Oath was taken a great many Years before it; the first time at St. Paul's Cross in the 30th Year of H. VI. which was 9 Years before the Agreement, and again at Westminster, and Coventry at fundry times * in the 31 Year of H. VI. which was 8 Years before it.

'Tis true, that the Duke of York took an Oath upon the Agreement; but as this was taken several Years after the Oath, which I cited and insisted on in the View: So was it a different Oath, and of a different Nature from that, as is known to all who are well acquainted with the History of that Age, and as the Remarker might have known by

* See Stow as cited before.

H

those

those Words of the Oath which I cited, or might have seen in *Stow* p. 365. (whether I referr'd the Reader,) and may see in the *Appendix* * to this Book, where he'll find both these Oaths. And whatever the *Remarker* thinks, I was not so very absurd, as to go about to prove, that the D. of *York* had defeated his Title 9 Years before the Declaration of Parliament by an Oath, which he did not take till after that Declaration.

I cannot but wonder, that the *Remarker* and some others do so boldly adventure to pronounce upon our Behaviour in this Age, from the Proceedings of that Age, which they appear to be so little acquainted with. The *Remarker* puts the Duke of *York* in *Durefs*, when he took this Oath of Recognition to *H. VI.* so often mention'd, tho' *Stow* expressly takes notice he was then at full Liberty. He makes him not to take this Oath till after the Agreement; when it is evident from *Stow*, that he had taken it the third time eight Years before it: And by a complication of these Mistakes, (to pass by the rest that he has made in this Matter) He makes the D. of *York* to be in *Durefs*, when he took this Oath to *H. VI.* in the 39th Year of his Reign; when every one, who knows any thing of this History, cannot but know the Reverse of this to be

* Numb. II. III.

true,

true, and that when the Agreement was made and this Oath taken, the Duke of *York* was at full Liberty, and in full Power; and *H. VI.* not in the *Remarker's* imaginary *Durefs*, but the Duke of *York's* real Prisoner.

The *Remarker's* Hypothesis indeed required, that the Duke should never have taken any Oath of Fidelity to *H. VI.* till after the Agreement, or that he should be in *Durefs* when he took it; otherwise his Title would on the *Remarker's* Principles be defeated by his Oath. Far be it from me to say the *Remarker* knew this to be false, I rather charitably believe he did not know it to be so; but that he was so possess'd with his Hypothesis, that he thought he knew that to be true, which any History of that Time could have told him was false; and did not see those Facts, which almost every Body else does see.

Every Body, I mean, who is not to the same Degree possess'd with his Hypothesis. For here's very lately come to my Hands a 3d. Answer, under the Title of *The English Constitution fully stated, with some Animadversions on Mr. Higden's Mistakes about it,* in which the Author falls into the *Remarker's* Mistakes, that the Duke of *York* did not take the Oath to *H. VI.* cited in the View till after the Agreement, saying, when

H 2

Richard

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Richard Duke of York took that Oath (which Mr. Higden lays so much stress on) the Parliament was sitting, to whom he made his Claim. * Enough has been already said in confutation of this Mistake. I shall only observe from the Repetition of it by the full Stater, that when Men write from an Hypothesis, they almost as naturally fall into the same Track of Errour, as those that write from certain Memoirs, agree in a true relation of Facts. For the full Stater did not, it seems, take up his Mistakes in this matter from the Remarks; since he tells us † that Book came not to him, till he was got to the 69th. Page of his own Book; nor could he, any more than the Remarker himself could, take them from any Historian: Nay, which is more surprizing, he tells us, that by my directing them to Stow, I had help'd him to see at large that whole Agreement between the King and the Duke. || Now it is not plainer in Numeration, that 31 goes before 32, and that 39 is after both those Numbers; than it is in Stow, that the Duke's Oath, on which I laid so great a stress, was taken by him in the 30th. Year, repeated twice in the 31

* English Constitution fully stated p. 23.

† English Constitution fully stated p. 69.

|| Ibid. p. 25.

Year

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Year of H. VI. and that the Agreement was not made till the 39th. Year of that King: And yet while the full Stater is animadverting on my Mistakes, as if he had read Stow backwards, he makes the Agreement to be before that Oath, i. e. he makes what pass'd in the 39th Year, to be done before that which pass'd in the 30th and 31 Years of that Reign, and upon this Mistake he forms his Argument to prove me mistaken.

I have more charity for him too than to believe he said this, because his Argument required it; but I may say if he did not read Stow backwards, he read him under the most violent Impressions of his Hypothesis.

Under these Impressions, he goes on, saying, in such a Case as this, 'tis no wonder, if they who espoused the Title of Richard Duke of York submitted, * and took Oaths to Henry VI. while there could be no Injury thereby done to the right Heir, he himself consenting and doing the same. Here he ventures further than his Friend the Remarker, who has not pretended to produce any Non-jurors in Henry VIth's Reign: Whereas the full Stater here supposes, that all, who espoused the Duke of York's Title in the 39th Year of Henry VI. had never submitted, or taken

* The English Constitution fully stated p. 24.

H 3

Oaths

Oaths before that time: altho' at the same time he is not able to produce one Non-juror in that Reign, or a single Authority to support his Assertion, for which he has no better Foundation than his own Mistake, that the Duke himself never submitted, or took an Oath to H. VI. before that time. Then, saith he, they submitted and took Oaths, the Duke consenting and doing the same, as if he had not done the same long before. He knew nothing it seems of the entire Submission in which the Duke had lived; nothing of the many important Commissions that he had accepted; nothing of those great Offices that he had executed under Henry VI. (of all which I have given some account above) no more than of the Oaths that he had taken to him before this time: by which the Reader may judge how well skilled he is in the English History, and well qualified to give the full State of the English Constitution. Before I read this Book, I thought I must have excused myself to the Author, for not having taken notice of it sooner (Several Sheets of this Defence having passed the Press before I saw it) but after this, the Reader, may possibly think I shall want his Excuse, if I should take any farther notice of it. When the full Stater sent his Book in MS. to his Friend,

of whom it seems he had borrowed the Statute Book, and some other Books in order to make his Animadversions on the View, he says to him, *excuse me I pray, for keeping them so long; a Business one's unaccustomed to, was like but to go on slowly, and to be but awkwardly done at last, p. 1.* and as he said this of his Book, after he had writ it; so in this I perfectly agree with him, after I have read it, and shall therefore take my leave of him, leaving the rest of his Mistakes to be corrected by what is said to the Watchmen on higher ground, as he calls the Remarker, and N. B. Subject.

Having proved in the View, that Kings for the Time being with their Two Houses of Parliament had the Legislative Power, they must have also the Supream Power, the former being always essential to, and inseparable from the latter. To which the Remarker answers, *therefore Cromwell having the Legislative Power, was supream and King for the time being.* * And to his Answer I reply, therefore Cromwell was not Supreme and King for the Time being, and for this Reason among others, because he had not, nor ever was acknowledged by our Kings and Parliaments to have had the Le-

* Remarks p. 62.

gislative Power. The Acts of Parliament of all our Kings *de facto* have stood, as I have shewn, by their original Force and Virtue without a Confirmation; but the *Remarker* cannot but know that *Oliver's* Acts sunk of themselves without a Repeal; or if he doth not know it, he may be convinced of it by the Statute Book, and *Scobel's* Collections.

If *Mr. H.* says, that *Cromwell's* Acts were not fully owned by the Hereditary King, that will not answer the Difficulty. *

What does the *Remarker* mean? Does *Mr. H.* say, *Cromwell's* Acts were not fully own'd? *Mr. H.* says, they were not own'd at all by any of our Hereditary Kings. The *Remarker* goes on.

For if he had the Authority, and was the Legislator, the Heir ought according to *Mr. H's* Hypothesis to have own'd his as well as any other King *de facto's* Acts, † i. e. if *Cromwell* had had, what he had not, he would have been, what he was not. But according to *Mr. H's* Hypothesis, *Cromwell* had not the Legislative Power, nor was King for the Time being, and therefore the Hereditary King was not oblig'd to acknowledge his Acts, as he never did.

* P. 61.

† P. 62.

Ought

Ought not this then, (to use *Mr. H's* Words) to conclude all private Subjects? Can *Mr. H.* then disown this Authority, without opposing his private Sentiments to that which himself acknowledges to be the Supreme Authority and judgment of the Kingdom? Yes, *Mr. H.* can disown *Cromwell's* Authority, without opposing his Sentiments to that which himself acknowledges to be the Supreme Authority and Judgment of the Kingdom: And may yet very well affirm, what he has proved, that the *Remarker* cannot disown the Legislative Authority of Kings for the Time being, which is own'd by Hereditary Kings and their Parliaments, without opposing his private Sentiments to that which himself acknowledges to be the Supreme Authority and Judgment of the Kingdom.

Lastly, I observ'd, that since Kings for the Time being have by the Statute and Common Law, the Legislative Power of this Realm, the Obedience of their Subjects is due to their Laws, and their Allegiance to their Persons. And then, say I, answers the *Remarker*, the Obedience of the Subjects was due to *Cromwell*. He should have proved it, as well as have said it; but that he never can do from my Principles, or our Constitution, by which *Cromwell* had not the Legislative

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gislative Power, and therefore the Obedience of the Subjects was not due to his Laws. This as well as the rest of his Consequences, do not follow from my Principles, but from his own Mistakes about 'em.

The Reader may observe, that when the *Remarker*, and *Natural Born Subject* are distressed for an Answer, and cannot relieve themselves by *sub ratione juris*, or the presumptive Consent, they frequently call in *Oliver* to their Assistance. This is what is call'd arguing *ab absurdo*. But when they first mistake or misrepresent my Opinion, and then draw absurd Consequences from it, the Absurdities, as well as the Mistakes, are their Own.

But once for all to dispatch *Oliver*, who is so often introduced by these Writers. First, as I have observed, that as by our Constitution he had not the Legislative Authority of the Kingdom, nor was ever acknowledged by our Kings to have had it, and therefore could not have the Sovereign Authority of the Kingdom: So 2dly. It is as true *è converso*, that he who had not the Regal Title and Office, could not have the Legislative Authority in this Monarchy, in which by our Constitution, a Law cannot be made without a King or Queen; and therefore all the *Ordinances* of the Two Houses of Parliament,

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liament, all the *Acts* of the *Rump*, and all *Oliver's* Acts funk of themselves as Nullities *ab origine*. Such a Protector as *Oliver* was, is a Monster not known to our Constitution or Laws; but King and Queen are not meer Titles, but carry with them the Regal Office and the Sovereign Authority and Jurisdiction of the Realm, which is known to our Laws, and is the Soul of them.

3dly. Those only have been acknowledged for Kings, *for the Time being*, who have been placed in the Throne by the States of the Realm, and recognized by Parliament. Whereas *Oliver* had not the Consent of the 3 Estates of the Realm, even for his Protectorship: Two of the 3 Estates, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, had been long before laid aside, and it was no better, than a Mock-representation of the 3d. Estate, the base and ignominious Tools of his Ambition, with the help of his Fanatick Army, that made him Protector.

CHAP.

CHAPTER IV.

A Defence of the fourth Chapter, in which the Allegiance of the Subject was proved to be due to the King for the Time being, by the Statute Law of this Realm, with an Answer to the most considerable Objections.

ALthough the Allegiance of the Subject to Kings for the Time being doth follow as a necessary Consequence from their being invested with the Legislative Authority, yet I took notice, that we had also express Statutes for it.

As first, the Statute of Treasons made 25. Edw. III. which declares what Offences are Treason against our Sovereign Lord the King. And that by our Sovereign Lord the King in this Statute, is understood only the King in Possession of the Crown and Kingdom, tho' he be Rex de facto, and not de jure, we had the Opinions of two great Lawyers, the Lord Chief Justice Coke and Hale; and no great Lawyer's Opinion, as far as I knew, to the contrary. Could the Remarker have produced any great Lawyer that has contradicted either of these chief Justices, he would not have produced Prin,
at

at least he would not have produced him alone, who never had any great reputation either for Skill or Integrity. But because Prin makes both Pages in the Remarks, let the Remarker read Mr. Collier's Preface to his * Ecclesiastical History, where he examines Prin's 2d. Vol. of Records, and thinks he finds him light upon the Scale, and that there lye strong presumptions against his Skill or Integrity, or both, which may serve, saith he, as a Caution of that Author in other Matters.

The Remarker † cites however Moor's Reports where it is said, that Allegiance follows the Natural Person, (and that must, saith the Remarker, be understood of the King de jure, as if a King de facto had not a Natural Person,) for if the King is by Force driven out of his Kingdom, and another usurps; notwithstanding this, the Allegiance of the Subject does not cease, tho' the Law does. I could in this very Case cite a Paragraph, which I am sure the Remarker will not subscribe to: But to go no farther than his Citation, in which by another that usurps under whom the Law does cease, he would understand a King de facto, but this cannot

* Preface p. 4.

† Remarks p. 65, 66.

be,

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be, because the Law is so far from ceasing under a King *de facto*, that it is admitted not only actually, but legally admitted by him, and discontinued only by his *Demise*, as I have shewn not only from *Bagot's* but several other Cases. And therefore by *another that usurps*, must be understood a *Simon Monfort*, a *Lady Jane Grey*, or an *Oliver* under whom the Laws did cease, and no judicial Proceedings were valid farther than they were afterwards confirmed.

He cites *Coke's* Report of *Calvin's* case, where it is said, *true and faithful Legiance, and Obedience is an Incident inseparable to every Subject as soon as he is born.* And he calls it *Natural Allegiance*, saith the *Remarker*, which *can never be due to a King de facto, in opposition to a King de jure.* * These last Words are the *Remarker's* Gloss, but the Words of the Report amount to no more than this, that every Person is born in subjection to Government, and to whomsoever the Laws of that Government under which he is born, direct him to pay his Allegiance, to him he ought to pay it: And why that may not be to the King for the Time being, if the Laws require it, I see no reason; for certainly the Laws of Nature do neither tell us who is our Prince, nor what measures of Obedience are due to him. If they did,

as

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as the Laws of Nature are every where the same, Persons would be entitled to Sovereignty by the same way, and the measures of Obedience would be the same in all Countries, in *England*, in *France*, and in *Poland*, which no Man sure will say: And therefore Natural Allegiance is the same with Legal Allegiance, and *go both together*, as the *Remarker* has observ'd from *Sir Edw. Coke. p. 81.*

But since he has cited *Calvin's* Case, let me put him in mind of a Maxim laid down there (than which there is not a clearer in the whole Case) *Protectio trahit subjectionem, & subiectio trahit protectionem.* Which being understood, as it ought to be by the whole tenor of the Case, of the Protection of a King, is of it self sufficient to determin the Sense of the 25 *Edw. III.* against the *Remarker*, and to put an end to the whole Controversy.

Judge Hale's Opinion, as 'tis represented in his *Pleas of the Crown*, is of no value in the World, saith the *Remarker*, because it was a *Posthumous* Work written in his younger Years about the End of *K. Charles I.* p. 65. The Work indeed was *Posthumous*, but genuine; and he in his younger Years, tho' not so very young towards the latter End of *K. Ch. I.* but as young as he was, he was at that time one of the brightest Men of his Profession; otherwise he would not have been

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been chosen of Council to the E. of *Strafford*, and Archbishop *Laud*, and design'd for the Blessed Martyr himself, had he thought it fit to have pleaded in that villainous Court. Tho' he was probably the youngest of Archbishop *Laud*'s Council, yet Archbishop *Sancroft* has put this Note in the Margin of the History of that great Prelate's Tryal. *That the Lord Chancellor Finch told him, that the Argument which was deliver'd by Mr. Hern. at A. B. L. Tryal was not his (tho' he pronounced it) but Mr. Hale's, afterwards Lord Chief * Justice.* But because the Remarker, speaking with the last contempt of this Book, says, *no one that is a Lawyer would make use of such a Work, tho' Mr. H. † does,* he may find it cited as a good Authority by the late Lord Chief Justice *Holt* in a printed Tryal; and I am told by those that frequent the Courts, that it is frequently cited with Authority both from the Bench and Bar.

As the Remarker has attacked the Reputation of the Book, the *N. B. Subject* attacks the reputation of the Author. *Then for Hales, saith he, He was a Judge under Oliver, as you may see in his Life by Dr. Burnet. And therefore there lay not the least Tem-*

The Troubles and Tryals.

* *History of A. B. Laud's p. 422.*

† *Remarks p. 65.*
ptation

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ptation (he means, there lay a great Temptation in his way,) *to palliate and smooth over a Cause, wherein he had been so far concerned.* * But he should have told us how little Sir *Matthew Hale* had been concerned; he should have told us, that before he took this Commission, he was much urged to accept it by some eminent Men of his own Profession, who were of the Kings Party, as Sir *Orlando Bridgeman*, and Sir *Geoffery Palmer*; and was also satisfied concerning the lawfulness of it by some famous Divines, in particular, *Dr. Sheldon* and *Dr. Henchman*, who were afterwards promoted to the Sees of *Canterbury* and *London*. That tho' he did accept this Commission from *Oliver*, he would make no Declaration acknowledging his Authority, nor try any State Prisoners †; and he was constant to his Resolution, and never did either of them. Had the *Natural Born Subject* told us this, as he might have done from the Book that he cites, he had done Justice to this great Man's Memory, and would have let the Reader see, that the Chief Justice did, as our Laws do, make a manifest Difference betwixt a King *de facto*, and an *Oliver*; and that the former is within the purview of

* *Letter p. 76.*

† *See the Bishop of Sarum's Life of Sir M. Hale, p. 36, 37. &c.*

the 25th *Edw.* III. and the latter is not. In the mean time, how scrupulous is the *N. B. Subject* in his Chronology, who makes the Judge tempted to deliver this Opinion in his *Pleas of the Crown*, to smooth over a Commission that he did not accept till many Years after that Book was written? for the Commission was not taken till 1653, and the Book was written in *K. Charles* the first's Reign, as he may see in the *Remarks*.

The *Natural Born Subject* mentions a MS. of the Chief Justice's, which yet I don't perceive he has ever seen; for he doth not tell us where it is to be found, nor cites any thing from it, and therefore I need say nothing to it.

2dly. This appeared, I said, to be the sense of the Statute, not only from the Opinions of the greatest Lawyers, but also from the nature and design of the Law, which was only declarative; not to make new *Species's* of Treason, but only to declare those Offences to be Treason by this Statute, which were so before by common Law and Usage. And therefore as those Offences only are Treason by this Statute, which were so before by the Common Law and Usage of the Realm: So by the *King* in this Statute, against whom those offences are Treason, He only must be understood, who was King by the same common Law and Usage, which I have prov'd to be the Regnant King. Upon which the *Remarker* says,

says, *Mr. H. is a bold Man to assert this, for I believe, he has not one Lawyer (since the Conquest, (provided he can find one Regnant King without an Hereditary Title or a Pretence to it) that will stand by him in this Assertion, ** and yet he himself has just before been opposing the Authority of two Chief Justices, *Coke*, and *Hale*, for asserting the same; and who asserted it, without his Proviso, or any thing like it; and has not been able in the mean time to produce one Lawyer, unless it be *Prin*, a very indifferent one, that has contradicted either of them.

But, I said, we should easily be determined to this sense of the Statute, when we consider that as before this Statute, and a long time after it, the distinction of *King de jure* and *de facto* was not known: So the Regnant King only could be King in this Statute, since there was no other King but He: Others indeed sometimes pretended a better Right to the Throne, than the Prince that possess'd it; but they never assum'd the Regal Title, nor did their Adherents ever give it them, nor the Historians who wrote in those Times or of them, and of this I have given several Instances.

Remarks p. 67.

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The *Remarker* talks of *the Right Heirs not assuming the Regal Title, because in Durefs p. 52. and says, there are Cases when a Man dare not say, his Soul is his own, p. 69.* What does the *Remarker* mean? Was this the Case of *Robert Duke of Normandy*, when he claimed either against his Brother *King William Rufus*, or *Henry I?* Of *Maud* when she claimed against *King Stephen*, and had him for some time in real Durefs? Of *Arthur*, against *King John?* Which were the very Instances I gave. Were not these Sovereign Princes in Possession of large Territories, and *Maud* the Wife of a Sovereign? And were not every one of them, in their times, at the Head of powerful Armies, when they set up their Claims? But in *Utopia*, it seems, this is to be in Durefs. But to bring the *Remarker* thence into *England*, what hinder'd these Claimants from taking the Regal Title, when they invaded the Kingdom with strong Armies? Was it not because they knew, that the Realm knew but one King, who was the Regnant King? and who therefore, as I said, must be the King in this Statute, since there was no other King but He.

The learned and ingenious Ecclesiastical Historian, whom I have so often cited, when he comes to the Reign of *King Stephen*,
makes

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makes it the Reign of *Maud*, and dates all the occurrences of that Time by the Years of her Reign, until the Compromise betwixt *Stephen* and her Son *H. I.* But in this he stands alone without any Authority either ancient or modern, nay, against the Authority of all the ancient Historians from whom he collects the History of this Reign, who constantly call it the Reign of *King Stephen*. A strong Presumption, that this Author's notion of Government was no more known to the Writers of that Time, than *Maud's* Reign was. Why did he not also make it the Reign of *King Edgar Atheling*, and not of *King William I?* Of *King Robert*, and not of *King William II.* or *King Henry I.* before the Compromise made with his two Brothers successively? Why not the Reign of *King Arthur*, and not of *King John?* Of *Queen Eleanor*, and not of *King John*, or *King Henry III.* until *Eleanor's* Death? &c. He had as much Authority and Reason for this Change in all those Reigns, as in that one in which he has made it.

But to return to the *Remarker*, who produces some Instances to prove, that Treason may be committed against a King out of Possession. As it was by the Murderers of *King Charles I.* and others that were executed, and pardoned for Treason against
I 3 King

King Charles II. tho' out of Possession. * But I do not see how these Instances are to his purpose; for it is certain King Charles I. was both King *de jure* and *de facto* too: And therefore the Lord Chief Baron Bridgeman saith to Cook the Regicide, King Charles was owned by these Men and you as King, you charged him as King, and you sentenced him as King, you proceeded against him as King, and as yet King. *

As for the Case of King Charles II. tho' he was not in Possession, yet there was no King in Possession against him; and therefore he did, what Edward IV. durst not, assume the Regal Title before he was in Possession, and dated the beginning of his Reign from his Fathers Death, and call'd the Year of his Restoration, the 12th. Year of his Reign. Whereas Edward IV. did not assume the Regal Title till the 4th. Day of March, on which he took Possession of the Throne with the consent of the States; from which Day, and not from the Day of his Fathers Death, he began the Date of his Reign. Nay, Henry VI. himself who had before been almost 39. Years in Possession, doth not, upon his Readeption, reckon the 10 intermediate Years of Edward the IVth's

* The Trial of the Regicides, p. 146.

* Remarks p. 69, 70.

Posses-

Possession, as part of his own Reign; and therefore in the Year Books, the Date runs thus; *Anno ab inchoatione Regni Henrici VI quadragesimo nono, & Readeptionis Regiæ potestatis primo*, and not *Anno Regni Henrici sexti quadragesimo nono*.

As to the case of the Murderers of Edw. II. who were put to Death for Treason, tho' he was out of Possession, Sir Edw. Coke says, *it appeareth by Briton to compass the Death of the Father of the King is Treason, and so was the Law holden after that; for after Edward II. had dismissed himself of his Kingly Office and Duty, and his Son by the Name of Edward II. was crowned, and King Regnant, those cursed Caitifs, Thomas Gourney and William Ocle, and others were attainted of high Treason for murdering the King's Father, who had been King by the Name of Edward II, and had judgment to be drawn, hang'd and quartered; the like judgment was given against Sir John Mautrevers Knight, and others as being guilty of the Death of the King's Uncle Edmund Earl of Kent, which at that time (being so near of the Blood) was by some also holden Treason: But now this Act of the 25th. Edward III. hath restrained High Treason in case of Death la nôtre Seignior le Roy la-*

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compagnie, & al eigne fitz & heire le Roy.
Instit. Pt. 4. c. 1. p. 7.

The *Remarker* proceeds to the famous Statute of the XI. of *Henry VII.* chap. 1. and says, *I might send Mr. H. and his Friends to a Book entitl'd, Animadversions upon the Modern Explanation of the II. of Henry VII. chap. 1. or &c. and to the Case of Allegiance to a King in Possession, * &c.* The first of these Books is little more than an Abridgment of the second, and I do not know any thing considerable in either, but what was, or might be answer'd from the *View*. Some of the most considerable Arguments in both were answer'd there, without mentioning the Books in which they were urged, which I thought the civilest way, and to give a true Account of the English Constitution supported by Law and History, I took to be the shortest way of answering the rest.

That, the King who is in Possession of the Throne, and the full Administration of the Government and Laws, with the consent of the Estates and a Recognition of Parliament, is the King for the time being, to whom this Statute declares Allegiance is due,

* *Remarks p. 72.*

and

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and secures the Subject in the Discharge of it, was the *Ancient* Explanation of this Statute; and if the Arguments of this Author's Book had not been otherwise answer'd, the Title alone which calls this a *Modern Explanation* (whilst his own is in truth the *Modern*) was sufficient to shew how much he was mistaken in the Controversy. If this *Explanation* of the Statute obtain'd since the Revolution only, why did he not give us the Opinions of elder Lawyers for that which he would have pass for the *Ancient* Explanation of it? Which had been the only way to have made good the Title of his Book. But indeed, it was not possible for him to give us the Opinions of Lawyers, which they themselves had never given.

And to shew this was not possible for him, I'll briefly represent the Traditionary sense of the Lawyers upon this Question. And we need go no higher than the Reign in which this Statute was made, when the Judges, as I have observed, upon *Henry the VIIIth's* coming to the Throne, unanimously deliver'd it as a Maxim of the Law of *England*, that *the Crown takes away all Defects and Stops in Blood*, which Maxim being at common Law, as it were, the Counter-part to this Statute, shews, that this Statute

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Statute and the Explanation of it which he calls *Modern*, was the Law of *England* before this Statute was made.

In *Henry VIII.* Reign the Conference abovemention'd, betwixt Sir *Thomas Moor*, who had been Lord Chancellor, and *Rich*, who was then Sollicitor General, is a sufficient Evidence, that those great Lawyers, howsoever they differ'd in another Point, yet agreed in this, that the Regnant King with a Parliamentary Authority, was entitled to the Allegiance of the Subject.

In *Queen Mary's* Reign we have the Opinion of the Lord Chief Justice *Brook*, who recommends his Abridgment of *Bagot's* Case with a *Nota* (that contains much the same Doctrine at common Law, which is declared and enacted in this Statute,) and no Lawyer in that, or any other Reign since, has so much as put a *Query* upon it.

In *Queen Elizabeth's* Reign, we have Sir *Nicholas Bacon*, her Lord Keeper, asserting in Parliament the aforesaid Maxim, which, as I have said, was at common Law the Counterpart to this Statute, and the Queen and Parliament proceeding agreeably to his judgment.

In the Reign of King *James*, we have that Lord Keeper's Son, the Lord Chancellor *Bacon*, who at the same time that he gives this

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this Explanation, gives the highest Character of the Statute it self.

In King *Charles I.* Reign, we have the Lord Chief Justice *Coke*.

And in King *Charles II.* Reign, the Lord Keeper *Bridgeman*, and Lord Chief Justice *Hale*, all bearing Testimony to the Authority of the Law, and to this Explanation of it; which had the Animadverter consider'd, he certainly would never have call'd it the *Modern Explanation* in the Title of his Pamphlet, and possibly never have published his Pamphlet at all.

As to the Objection against the Title of *Henry VII.* the Legislator, which is insisted on by the *Remarker*, and the *Animadverter on the Modern Explanation*, if there needs any further Answer than what has been already given in the *View*, Mr. *Collier* will give it, and I hope, conclude the *Animadverter* at least by what he says: * *As to Henry VIIth's Birth, it may be observed, that he was descended from a younger Branch, and that the House of York stood foremost in the Succession: But if his Title appears questionable upon this Score, the Queen by her Acquiescence seems to have*

* *Ecclesiastical History in H. VII. p. 703.*

dropt her Claim, and transferr'd her Right to him, saith Mr. Collier. Nay, we find that after her Death, Henry VII. quietly enjoyed the Crown according to the Act of Settlement made in the first Year of his Reign.

The Remarker here, as well as in other Places, sometimes repeats their Objections without adding any new Force to them, or disarming my Answers of their Force, and sometimes without so much as taking any notice of my Answers; particularly that which has been esteemed the most considerable Objection against this Statute, the Duke of Northumberland's Case, which was fairly and fully answered in the *View*, p. 67, 68, 69, he has, without taking notice of any of my Answers, urged anew, * as if there had been nothing said to it.

And therefore, instead of reinforcing my former Answers to the Objections against this Statute or this Explanation of it, I shall only desire the Reader to give himself the Trouble to read them in the *View*, and with them the Statute it self, which I shall print at the end of this Defence, † because I have met with some, who have taken upon them

* Remarks p. 78.

|| View p. 65, 66. &c.

† Appendix Numb. IV.

to judge of this Question, without ever seeing that Statute.

The Remarker gives this Law hard Names, saying, *it is a very ridiculous Act, if design'd to be perpetual*, p. 79. and that *the Constitution, if Mr. Hs. Notion be allowed to be good, is not only the most ridiculous, but most unrighteous and pernicious Constitution in the World*, p. 7. Not to observe here, what the Reader may observe in several other places of this Writer, that he, as well as some others, takes both Mr. Hs. Notion and the Law by halves; but in Answer to the hard Names that he gives this Law, I need only shew, that the Lord Chancellor-Bacon, who was one of the greatest Men of his Age, and who lived under a Prince of an undoubted Title, had a very different notion both of the Justice and Wisdom of this Act of Parliament. He says, *it was agreeable to reason of State, and to good Conscience too, That the Spirit of this Law was pious and noble, just and magnanimous*. But how great a Man soever my Lord Bacon was, he may not be of so great Authority with the Remarker, as a Writer of his own side: And since he has recommended one of that Authors's Tracts to my Perusal, I shall recommend to him a later, and, I think, a better Piece that came from the same Hand, where

where the *Remarker* will find a Character of this Statute, very different from that which himself has given of it. After this Author had taken notice of the Severities of some former Revolutions, which yet he says, had been only against Men who had been in Arms, and not the thousandth part of them neither, much less of any others, and that by way of Attainders; he adds, *and even these Severities were thought by Henry VII. and his Parliament so harsh and cruel, so contrary to Reason and Humanity, against all Law, Reason and good Conscience, as the Act express'd it, that they did all that Men and Law could do to put a final End to it, that such Proceedings and Practices might never more be seen in the English Nation. This is that famous Statute, (11. Henry VII. c. 1.) which expressly provides, that from henceforth no manner of Person or Persons that attend the King for the Time being in his Wars, or act by Commission from him, be in no wise convicted, &c. This is certainly the utmost Provision of Law, and 'tis impossible, that any stronger can be made by Men. And whatsoever other Constructions may be made of this Statute, 'tis evident that thereby all violent Excesses of Revolutions are not only restrained, but perfectly taken away; that however it may happen in the Field, and in the Heat of*

*of War, yet that no after Ravages should be committed, and Men should not be destroyed by Law who had escaped the Sword. I need not reflect, how suitable this Law is to the mutable Estate of Mankind, and the Vicissitudes that constantly accompany all humane Affairs. * This Author wrote this Book with a Temper, which I could wish for their own sakes the Remarker and Natural Born Subject had imitated.*

C H A P. V.

A Defence of the Fifth Chapter of the View, wherein the Objection from the Act of Recognition, 1. Jac. I. is answer'd.

IN the fifth Chapter of the *View* I answer'd the Objection of the Virtual Repeal of the 11. Henry VII. Chap. 1. by the 1. Jac. Ch. 1. And yet the *Remarker*, who thinks this Statute 1 Henry VII. ch. 1. was virtually, if not actually repealed by the 1. Jac. I. p. 79. says, it was null and void in itself, p. 87. But certainly if it was repealed, it was in Force before it was repealed; and therefore not null and void in it self: Or if it was null in itself from the time it was

* The present State of Jacobitism. A second part in Answer to the first. p. 12, 13.

enacted

enacted by King *Henry VII.* it could not be repealed above 100 Years after by his great Grandson *K. James I.* But the pretended Nullity, and imaginary Repeal of this Law, as well as the real Contradiction betwixt these two, are all the *Remarker's* own.

And yet the *Remarker* is ready to yield all that is inferr'd from the 11 of *Henry VII.* if we had, saith he, a Law wherein it was declared and enacted, that such a one (he is speaking of a King that is not the next Heir) was to be King to all Intents and Purposes.* Is not the 11th of *Henry VII.* such a Law? And why then is this Law null in it self, any more than that Law would be? And why will not this justify the Subjects, as he grants that would, when it is to all Intents and Purposes such a Law, as that which the *Remarker* supposes would not be null, but would justify the Subjects in recognizing such a King.

The rest of his *Remarks* on this Chapter of the View are so confused perplexed and inconsistent, that they want no other Confutation. But because he lays a great stress upon one of them, it shall be particularly consider'd. To shew saith he, that

* *Remarks* p. 85.

King

*King James I. was Rightful Heir, the Act of Recognition does not say, that he was Rightfully descended of Henry VII. but of Margaret (mark that) who was rightfully descended from Elizabeth Daughter of Edward IV.** The *Remarker* here uses too great a Liberty in deducing *King James's* Descent, leaving out some Words, and putting in others, which are not in the *Act*: For the *Act* doth expressly derive his Descent from *K. Hen. VII.* his Grandfather (tho' he says it doth not) as well as from *Queen Elizabeth* his Grandmother; and doth not affirm, (as he says it doth) that the *Lady Margaret* was any more rightfully descended from *Queen Elizabeth*, than from *King Henry VII.* This *Act* of Recognition takes notice of the Happiness of this Kingdom first in the Union of the Two Houses of *York*, and *Lancaster*, and then in the Union of the Two Kingdoms of *England*, and *Scotland*, in the Kings Person, † who, as it follows in the *Act*, is lineally, rightfully, and lawfully descended, of the Body of the most Excellent *Lady Margaret Eldest Daughter of the most renowned King Henry VII.* (let the *Remarker* mark this) and the High and

* *Rom.* p. 82.

† See the *Act of Recognition* 1 *Jac. c. 1.*

K

Noble

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Noble Princess Queen Elizabeth his Wife, Eldest Daughter of King Edward IV. the said Lady Margaret being Eldest Sister of King Henry VIII. Father of the High and Mighty Princess of famous Memory, Elizabeth late Queen of England. Indeed, according to the Remarker's Hypothesis, King James I. Descent shou'd have been derived by the Lady Margaret, only from Queen Elizabeth Eldest Daughter of King Edward IV. by her Husband Henry Earl of Richmond; and the Act should not have said, that King James was Rightfully descended of the Lady Margaret Eldest Daughter of the most renowned King Henry VII. &c. And therefore the Remarker agreeably to his Hypothesis, ventures to affirm that the Act doth not say so, whereas we see the Act doth as much say that he was Rightfully descended from K. Henry VII. as from Queen Elizabeth that King's Wife, since it expressly affirms that he was Rightfully descended of the Body of the most Excellent Lady Margaret, Eldest Daughter of the most renowned King Henry VII. and the High and Noble Princess Queen Elizabeth his Wife. And the Remarker may find in Letbington the Scotch Secretary's Letter to Sir William Cecil, that the House of Scotland insisted on their Claim to the Crown of England, as being

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being the Eldest remaining Issue of King Henry VII. *

I said, in Conclusion, against this imaginary Repeal of the 11. of Henry VII. by the 1. of James I. C. 1. that the greatest Lawyers in the Kingdom have declared since that Act of Recognition, that Allegiance is due to the King in Possession, and have supported their Opinions by the 11. of Henry VII. and therefore did not believe it Repeal'd by the 1. of James I. And have not as good Lawyers declared the contrary? saith the Remarker. † If they have, it would have been of Service to his Cause to have named some of them, as I have named Lawyers in the next Chapter, who have not believed this Statute of King Henry VII. Repeal'd by the Act of Recognition of King James I. But the Remarker had a good reason why he did not Name his several good Lawyers, and I Challenge him to Name one good Lawyer, who has maintain'd this Chimerical Repeal, which brings me to the Sixth Chapter.

* Appendix to the 1 Volume of the History of the Reformation.

† Rem. p. 90.

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C H A P. VI.

A Defence of the Sixth Chapter, wherein this Account of our Constitution and Laws was supported by the Opinions and Authorities of some of the greatest Modern Lawyers, who Liv'd in the Reigns of Hereditary Kings, and, the Case of the Oaths resolved from this Account of our Legal Constitution.

HAVING, as occasion serv'd, given the Opinions of great Lawyers and Judges of Elder Reigns, I proceeded in this Chapter to the Opinion of great Lawyers of later Reigns, whereby it appeared that the greatest Modern Lawyers entertain'd the same Notion of our Constitution with the Antient; and have perfectly agreed with them in this great Point of Law, concerning the Authority of the King for the time being, and the Allegiance of the Subject, which is due to him. And here I produced the Opinions of such only as Flourish'd since the *Act of Recognition* of King *James I.* to shew also, by the way, that they who Liv'd since that Act, have had the same Notion of our Constitution in this matter, with those that Liv'd before it. And even amongst these, I produced the Opinions of such only as Liv'd under Hereditary

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ditary Kings, as of the Lord Chancellor *Bacon*, and Lord Chief Justice *Coke*, in the Reign of King *James I.* of the Lord keeper *Bridgeman*, and Lord Chief Justice *Hale*, in the Reign of King *Charles II.* where there was no Temptation to Byass them on that Side of the Question, and as these great Lawyers deliver'd this for the Law of *England*, so, I said, no Lawyer of Note has ever contradicted them in those Reigns, where they might have done it with Safety and Advantage.

What saith the *Remarker* to this? Does he deny these were great Lawyers? That he does not. Does he deny these were their Words which I cited? Not that neither. Has he produc'd any Lawyers of Note that have contradicted them? Not one, except his Friend *Mr. Prin*, who need not be excepted out of that Number. What then doth the *Remarker* say. *Why*, he says, *he doth not think, whatever Mr. H. may do, Lawyers to be the best Casuists, and knows but too well, that what is Law in one Judges Time, is not so in another.* * If that were true in some Points, yet I hope He'll allow, That to be Law, which has been held for such in all

* *Rom. p. 92.*

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Judges Times, and which he cannot shew has been contradicted by any Judges at any Time, which is the Case of this Point of Law before us. I never said, *Lawyers were Universally the best Casuists*, I think Divines much better, only where the Case of Conscience depends, as it doth here, on the Case in *Law*, he that is the best Lawyer, is certainly the best Casuist.

One would wonder what this Writer has been doing, in making a Book of *Remarks*, chiefly upon the Opinion of Lawyers, and the Sense of our Laws, whilst he has so mean an Opinion of both. Whenever he is pres'd Home, he cries out both against the Lawyers and the Laws. If I cite the common Laws of the Realm; they are *my Old Customs, Musty Year Books*, p. 8. and the *pretended Authorities of the Year Books*, p. 32. If I cite the Resolutions and Opinions of the greatest Judges and Lawyers: *Then Lawyers are not the best Casuists*, p. 92. *Lawyers are but private Men and fallible, and their Opinions are but private Opinions, and so of no Authority on either Side*, p. 90. If I cite Acts of Parliament; *they are Null and Void in themselves*, when they are against him, p. 87. It is no News, I suppose, to the Reader, that the *Natural Born Subject* has as little regard for the Laws. If it is, he may take this
Passage

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Passage for a Specimen of his regard to them, where this Writer arguing, in his way, on the Statute of *Henry VII.* saith, *there were always such Fools as thought an Act of Parliament a great matter on their Side.* *

These Passages would give an impartial Reader a Suspicion, that, when Men are so much against the Lawyers and the Laws, they are a little Conscious to themselves, that the Lawyers and the Laws are against them; and that, whilst they are putting in their Exceptions to the Antient Customs of the Realm, to the Year Books, to the Opinions of Lawyers, to the Resolutions of Judges, and to Acts of Parliament, they would leave us no other way to Learn what is Law, but from their Hypothesis.

I need add nothing, to what is said in the View, concerning the Oaths; for since the Oaths are appointed by Law, and must therefore be interpreted according to Law, the Points in Law being once Establish'd, the Lawfulness of taking the Oaths follows as a Conclusion from it's Premises.

* *Letter p. 90.*

C H A P. VII.

A Defence of the Seventh Chapter of the View, that our Laws, in this Point, are not contrary to the Holy Scriptures, and the Doctrine of our Church, but rather agreeable to both.

THE Law-point, being thus Established, was, I said, a sufficient Direction for Conscience in matters of Civil Obedience, so long as there was nothing in it contrary to the Law of God. Here then the *Remarker*, and *Natural Born Subject* should have tried their Strength, and shewn that our Laws, in this Point, are contrary to God's Laws. This was the Place to have proved, what one of them does plainly, and I think both of them do suppose, that there is a certain Form of Civil Government and of Succession to it, of Divine Institution, and if they had done this, they had, I confess, effectually answered the *View*; since no Human Laws can Prescribe against a Divine Institution. In the mean time, whilst they only beg the Question, which they have not so much as attempted to prove here, and by what has been attempted elsewhere, I am satisfied, they never can prove, the Position of the *View* does stand, and is like to stand good,

good, that the Constitution, and our Obedience according to it, is sufficiently vindicated, if there is nothing in it contrary to the Law of God: for then the Laws of the Kingdom (which the Divine Law Commands us to Obey,) do, as I said, bind our Consciences as Subjects; and we are not only warranted, but obliged to pay our Obedience, as the Law directs.

This was sufficient for my purpose, that our Constitution, as I represented it, was not contrary to God's Law. However, I ventured a step farther, that our Laws, by requiring Obedience to the King in Possession, are agreeable to the Holy Scriptures, according to our Saviours Resolution of the Lawfulness of Subjection to the Roman Emperor *Tiberius*, because he was in Possession of the Government. This these Authors grant was our Saviours Resolution, but they are in the mean time, for giving other Reasons for the Subjection of the Jews to the Romans, *i. e.* they are for giving Reasons, which our Saviour did not give, and which therefore I need not consider; since our Lord did not here determine the Lawfulness of Subjection to the Roman Emperor, for any of those Reasons which they suppose, but for this one Reason which he gave, (as they themselves can-

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cannot deny,) namely, that he was in Possession of the Government.

I cannot but, by the way, take notice, that this Command of our Blessed Saviour to the Jews, to be Subject to the Roman Monarchy, which was Elective, is an Invincible Argument against those, who maintain, that which is call'd, the Patriarchal Scheme of Government, to be of Divine Institution, and obligatory to all Mankind: For had it been so, our Saviour without doubt, when the Question was put to him about the Roman Government, and the Lawfulness of Submission to it, would have recall'd his Hearers to the Divine Original Institution, and told them, that *from the beginning it was not so*, that the Government under which they lived, was a Deviation from the Divine Institution: As when the Case of Divorce was put to him, notwithstanding the general Practice both of Jews and Gentiles, He reduced Mankind from the Deviation, to the Divine Original Institution of Marriage. But so far was our Blessed Saviour from delivering any such Doctrine, that He Commands Subjection to the Roman Emperor, and acknowledges his Authority was from God, *St. John 19. 11.*

I said, our Church had not given her Judgment by way of an Express decision of the Question, but that the Passage I cited from our

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our *Homilies*, favour'd our Side of the Question, and if the *Remarker*, and *Natural Born Subject* are not Conscious it does so, why doth the former throw in, not over decently, so many Abatements to the Authority of the ** Homilies*, and the latter say *the Compilers of the Homilies might think Eleanor was Dead?* † As if those Learned Persons, were not as well acquainted with the History of that Age, as we, who are above a Century and half farther distant from it, than they were. *But they had the Pope, and the Dauphine of France in their View.* They might have them, and yet have King *John* and his Niece *Eleanor* in their View too. Let me ask the *Natural Born Subject*, whether, if he had Liv'd at that Time, he would have acknowledged himself a *Natural Subject* of King *John*, as the *Homilies* call *the English Men his Natural Subjects?* Let me ask both these Writers, whether they would have call'd King *John* *their Natural Lord, the King of England?* Whether they would have call'd the Oath, which the English Men took to him, *their Oath of Fidelity to their Natural Lord?* And whether they would, without any limitation or restraint

* *Remarks p. 96, 97.*† *Letter p. 102.*

have

have condemned the Breach of it, as the Homilies do? If not, they do as good as confess, that these Passages do favour our side of the Question.

C H A P. VIII.

A Defence of the Eighth Chapter of the View, that our Laws, in this Point, are agreeable to the great End and Design of Government.

THat Government was instituted for the publick good of the Community, and the security and welfare of all the Members of it, is what the *Remarker* grants p. 97. and what he adds, *yet Care was always taken primarily of the Prince*, is what I have asserted too in this Chapter, and * elsewhere, and doth not in the least weaken the Consequence which I have drawn from this Principle; for if Government was instituted for the sake of all the Members of the Community, it will still follow, that after they have done their utmost to maintain their Prince in the Throne, and he happens to be

* See View at the foot of p. 98, &c. and p. 112.

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dispossess'd, and cannot afford them any of the Benefits of Government, can neither defend Himself, Them, nor his Right to govern them, it is not reasonable, that they for whom Government was instituted, should lose all the Benefits of it, for the sake of him, for whom it was not, at least, not primarily instituted.

However this Principle, which the *Remarker* saith, *no Body questions, the Natural Born Subject calls the Thred-bare Cant of the Common Wealths-men.* * The *Remarker* grants the Principle, but denies the necessary Consequence of it, which, it seems was easier for him to do, than to deny a Principle, which all, who have writ reasonably of Government, have ever allowed. But the *Natural Born Subject*, to avoid the Consequence, is hardy enough to deny the Principle, as he does in effect, when he calls it, *the Thred-bare Cant of the Common Wealths-men*, without any regard to the great Authorities, of the Church in her Homilies, of Bishop *Sanderson*, *Thomas Aquinas*, and Lord Chancellor *Fortescue*, which were produced for it. † And I desire him to take the Reverse of this Prin-

* Letter p. 103.

† View p. 97. 98.

ciple,

ciple, and try what Profelytes he can make to it.

I took notice, that some had made an ill use of this Argument, to justify the Resistance of the Supreme Magistrate, when he does not, as they think, pursue the publick Good of the Community. But this is to abuse the Principle, and draw a false Consequence from it; and must therefore the *Natural Born Subject* draw another false Consequence, and deny the Principle it self to be True? Especially when he owns at the same Time, that, *I have guarded against this false Consequence*, * he should have said, I have shewn † that the Laws, which require Submission, have guarded against it, by forbidding Resistance; and that the very Reason of Government has guarded against it; for if there is not a *Last Resort*, from which there is no Appeal, and against which there must be no Resistance, it is not Government, but Anarchy.

* Letter p. 103.

† View p. 99, 100.

C H A P.

C H A P. IX.

A Defence of the Tenth Chapter of the View, that our Laws in this Point are agreeable to the Practice of all Mankind, particularly of Gods own People, the Jews, and the Christians; of the earliest Ages.

I Gave an Account of the behavior of the Jews, in their Subjection to the *Midianites, Moabites*, the Kings of *Egypt*, and after that successively to the *Babylonish, Persian, Grecian, and Roman Empires*. To which the Remarker says, *the Midianitish, and Moabitish Princes, Ruled over them as Conquerors, not as Usurpers*. * The *Natural Born Subject* says, *your last Chapter beginning at Page 100. tells us to Page 105. That the Jews submitted when they were Conquered*, † (after I had proved it again Lawful for the Jews to submit to Princes, whom it was not Lawful for them to set up) he says, *but what was this Case, it was only that of Conquest, when Strangers got the Rule over the Jews*. || So that, after all that has been said on that Side, against the Title of Conquest, these

* Rem. p. 99.

† Letter p. 106.

|| Letter p. 97.

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Two Authors fall in with it, and justify Submission on that Score.

But what does the *Natural Born Subject* mean, by saying, *though the Jews constantly submitted, they as constantly Revolted, whenever they could get the opportunity, as you may see in the History of the Judges, and of the Maccabees.* * Had he truly represented their Case, he would gain little by it; for if their Submission was justifiable, their Revolt was still inexcusable. But their Case is very falsely represented; for the Jews did not Revolt under their greatest Oppressions, from those Strangers who got the Rule over them, but Liv'd Subject to them, till upon their Cry unto God, he particularly rais'd up and appointed them Deliverers, to whom he gave Authority to Rescue them, as is evident from the History of the *Judges*, to which he appeals. Thus *Ehud* † was particularly Authorised by God, to deliver them from the *Moabites*; and *Gideon* ‖ from the *Midianites*, which were the Two Instances I gave from the Book of *Judges*. In Bishop *Overall's* Convocation Book, it is said, *the Israelites had been Eighteen Years in Subjection to the Moabites, as they had been a*

* Letter p. 97.

‖ Judges 6. 11, 12, 13, 14, &c.

† Judges 3. 15.

little

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little before Eight Years to the Aramites. They knew that it was not Lawful for them of themselves, and by their own Authority, to take Arms against the Kings, whose Subjects they were, though indeed they were Tyrants: And therefore they cried unto the Lord for Succor. Who, in Compassion of their Servitude and Miseries, appointed Othoniel to deliver them from the Aramites; and afterwards Ahud from the Moabites. In the Choice of which Two Judges it is to be observ'd, that the Scriptures do tell us that God rais'd them up, (and therefore it is most certain he did so,) and also that in such raising of them to their Places, he made them Saviours to his People, (as the Scriptures speak) giving them thereby Authority to Save and Redeem the Israelites, from the Tyrants that oppress'd them; without both which Prerogatives, it had been altogether Unlawful for them to have done as they did. * This was evident enough from those Places in the *Judges*, which I refer'd to, but the *Natural Born Subject* having, as I have good reason to believe, a high Esteem for the *Convocation-Book*: I thought a Citation from it might more Effectually convince him, of the Sense

* Page 51. 52.

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of those Places, and of his Error in Point of Fact, that the *Jews constantly Revolted from the Strangers that got the Rule over them, when they could get an Opportunity*; and in Point of Right, that they might Lawfully do so; for if he did not think so, he had no reason to mention their Revolt at all.

What he refers to in the *Maccabees*, is, I suppose, the Revolt from *Antiochus the Great*, but if he looks into the *forefaid Convocation-Book*, * he'll find a very different Account of that matter, from what is commonly given of it; and such an Account, as will do him no Service; but if he'll not be concluded by That, the Common Account, he knows, is as little to his Purpose.

In Answer to my Argument, that it was Lawful for the *Jews* to Submit to a Stranger, though it was not Lawful for them to set a Stranger to Rule over them, as appeared from the Law, *Deut. 17. 15*. The Remarker says, *but if Mr. H. had Read on, he would have found, that they were to set over them him, whom the Lord their God should Choose. They had nothing to do to set up, or pull down Kings.* † Nor did I say they had, and what he says, *should have been added*, is so

* Page 67.

† Remarker p. 87.

far

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far from taking off the force of my Argument, that it adds to the force of it. For if they might not *in any Wise set a Stranger, i. e. a Heathen King over them, but one from among their Brethren*, and that *One whom the Lord their God should choose*; and yet notwithstanding this, they might live in subjection to *Strangers*, to Heathen Princes, who were not their Brethren, and whom the Lord their God did not choose; this undenyably proves, what is asserted, that it was lawful to submit to Princes, whom it was not lawful to set up.

The Remarker goes on, *but if God for their Wickedness set a Stranger over them, they were bound to submit to him, because it was his doing, as it was in setting the Babylonians, Grecians, Romans to rule over them, to chastise them for their Idolatry and Rebellion against him.* * But how did God set the *Romans, Grecians, &c.* to rule over the *Jews*? Not by an express Nomination, as he did *Saul, David, &c.* but by his Providence governing the Events of War. So indeed, and no otherwise, it was God's doing. And was this a sufficient reason for the Submission of the *Jews*? Yes, the Re-

* Ibid.

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marker says, they were bound to Submit to them, because it was God's doing. And what is this more or less, than to resolve the Reason of Submission into Providence, and to set up a Providential Title? But this was when God set Princes over the Jews for their Wickedness, to Chastise them for their Idolatry, and their Rebellion against him. And had God thus by his Providence, set Princes over the Jews, to Rescue them from Idolatry, or to secure them from the danger of falling into it, would it not have been equally God's doing? And is not this the same Reason in General, which the Remarker gives, for their Submission: And as good a Reason in particular, when it is for their Safety, as when it is for their Chastisement? Both these Writers have particularly enumerated the several Answers that were made to Dr. Sherlock's Case of Allegiance, and have loudly call'd upon me for a Reply to them, though for what Reason I know not, unless it be, because I never medled with the Argument of Providence. How far, and in what manner the Divine Providence is concerned in Revolutions of Government, or how far it will, or will not justify Subjection, after the Revolution is passed, and the New Government Established, which was the great debate betwixt the Doctor, and his Answerers,

rers, and which, as my Design did not oblige me, I never entered upon, but set the Controversy entirely upon a New Foot, as I took Notice in the View. * If they still think a Reply is necessary to those Answers, which were made to the Case of Allegiance to Sovereign Powers, the Remarker, who has here taken up that Hypothesis, is the only Person, that I know, who is obliged to give it.

I proceeded to shew, that the Behavior of the Primitive Christians, was agreeable to that of the Jews. To all which the Remarker only says, that Mr. H. may Consult Bishop Usher's Power of the Prince, Dr. Hick's Jovian, Dr. Sherlock's Case of Resistance, Dr. Digg's Unlawfulness of Subjects taking Arms. † And when the Remarker Consults them again, I believe he'll only find, that they have given numerous Examples of the Non-resistance of the Primitive Christians to the Emperors, and Kings, under which they Lived, but not one Example of Non-subjection to them, on any pretence of a defect in their Titles.

The Natural Born Subject, seems to think it some Advantage to his Cause, that I say

* Page 94.

† Rem. p. 100.

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in the Three first Centuries, there is no other Instances of Dispossess'd Emperors claiming against Rivals, but that of the Two *Maximini*.

But since, in this Instance, I have proved a general Submission to the Emperors in Possession, and he has not pretended to prove the Christians were not comprehended in that general Submission. Nay since *Julius Capitolinus*, who Writes the History of the Two *Maximini*, excepts only *Capelianus* a Governor in *Africk*, and a few * Cities, as adhering to these dispossessed Emperors, can we believe, if the Christians had done the same, he would not much rather have excepted them, who at that Time, and before that Time, made a great part of the Empire, fill'd *their Cities, their Senate, their Armies, and all Places*, as *Tertullian* says, † but *their Temples*? And therefore this, tho' the only Instance in this Period, is a very considerable one.

It is Observable that the Author of *Jovian*, is entirely on the Side of the Emperors in Possession. After he hath related *how the Army in Africk, upon bearing || of the barba-*

* *Paucae civitates fidem hosti publico servaverunt. Julii Capitolini Maximini Duo.*

† *Apologet. c. 37.*

|| *See Jovian p. 34. 35.*

rous

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*rous Pride and Cruelty of the Emperor Maximinus, brought the Purple to the Proconsul Gordianus and made him Emperor, and how the Senate at Rome out of hatred to Maximinus, Confirm'd the Choice of the African Souldiers, and declared Gordianus, and his Son Augusti, and denounced Maximinus, and his Son, Enemies to the Empire, he adds, at the same time Capelianus in Africk, Rebels against Gordian, that is, he Rebell'd when he took up Arms against the Emperor in Possession, on behalf of the Dispossess'd Emperor Maximinus, under whom Capelianus had been made Governor of the Mauritania's. For this is what Capelianus did, as is evident from * Capitolinus, and what the Author of Jovian here calls Rebellion.*

In the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Centuries, I said, we had several Instances of Emperors Dispossess'd, and of the Christians becoming Subjects to New Emperors, whilst the Dispossess'd Emperors were Alive; as in

* *Sed Gordianus in Africa primum à Capitolino quodam agitari cepit, cui Mauros regenti successorem dederat. Tunc Capelianus Victor pro Maximino, omnes Gordiani partium, motu partium in Africa, interemit, &c. Julii Capitolini, Maximini duo.*

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the Case of *Licinius*, and *Constantine* in the Fourth; of *Zeno*, and *Basiliscus* in the Fifth; and of *Justinian*, and *Vitiges* in the Sixth Century.

What doth the *Natural Born Subject* mean, by saying, that these *Dispossess'd Emperors*, who had no Right but Possession, lost their Right with their Possession, * when they had the same Right that any of their Predecessors had, or Successors either? Or, by saying that these Cases are *Forreign to an Hereditary Monarchy*, † when we are not speaking of the Heirs or Sons of Emperors, but of *Dispossess'd Emperors* themselves? And when he cannot say, if the Empire had been *Hereditary*, that their Heirs would have had better Pretensions after their Fathers Deaths, than these *Dispossess'd Emperors*, though *Elective* only, had during their Lives.

The *Remarker* also may Observe, as a further Answer to what he has advanced p. 87. that here are Instances of Emperors that did not submit, but claimed and made War after their *Dispossession*, which he might have observed also in several other Instances that I gave, where the *Jews* notwithstanding

* Letter p. 106.

† Ibid.

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became Subjects to the Princes in Possession.

I said this had been the Practice of all Mankind, as well as of the *Jews* and Christians, upon Revolutions to submit to New Governments after they were Establish'd.

The *Remarker* saith, if he should follow me in Revolutions that no way Concern us, he is Confident he should find them much more favourable to his Point, than mine. * But he must first follow me in those Revolutions, before he can have any Grounds for this Confidence, and when he shall do so, and take a survey of the Behaviour of all the Nations of the World, upon Revolutions both in former and later Ages, he'll see Reason to abate of his Confidence, and confess his Mistake. He'll find that upon these Events, the great Question has been, not, whether they shall Submit or no? But whether they shall obtain good Terms upon their Submission, and preserve their Antient Immunities and Privileges, under their New Masters? Let Subjects preserve an Inviolatible Fidelity to their Prince, and do their utmost to preserve him in his Throne, and then, if after they have run the greatest hazards for him,

* Remarker p. 88.

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he happens to be Dispossess'd, neither their Prince, the World, nor their own Consciences can Reproach them, if they Endeavor to preserve the Community and themselves. And if some will be Singular in their Behavior, and instead of calmly considering the Nature and Ends of Government, and the Vicissitudes, to which it ever hath, and from the Lusts and Passions of Men, ever will be exposed, will frame Schemes of Government without Authority, either from Scripture, or the Laws of their Country, that are so far from promoting the great Ends of Government, that they would render That, which was Design'd for the Ease, Security, and Welfare of Mankind, to be a Snare, a Rack, and oftentimes Ruine to them, under those Vicissitudes which so frequently happen. If Men I say, will frame such Schemes, they may I think be modestly contented to Practice upon them themselves, and not rashly to Censure (as these Two Authors do) all who differ from them, which is almost all Mankind.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Reflections on some of the Errors of the Natural Born Subject, and on his Opposition to the Remarker in some Points.

AS these Two Authors Arguments and Errors are generally the same: So what has been said to the one, is commonly a Reply to the other, as well as to what is Material in the *Extract of Prin's Plea*: Yet because I have taken more Notice of the *Remarker*, than of the *N. B. Subject*, I shall bestow some Considerations upon him in Particular.

To complain of his Misrepresentations, or to take Notice of all his Mistakes in History, would be almost endless: I shall therefore only Animadvert on some of his Mistakes, about the Thirteen Kings, from the Conquest to *Henry VIII.* who I said came to the Throne without Hereditary Titles. And to make me mistaken in the Number, he takes it Exclusively of *William I.* and *Henry VII.* the first and last King in that Period. Whereas it is plain, I included them in this Number, otherwise there could not be Thirteen, who came to the Throne without, and Six, with Hereditary Titles, as I affirmed there did in that Period: A less hasty Writer would have given himself the Leisure to have counted Nineteen, rather than

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than have made a Mistake, by Endeavouring to Charge his Adversary with one. He therefore begins with *William II.* and says.

*But Robert the Eldest Son of the Conqueror, contended with his Brother William II. for England, and at last came to a Compromise with him, to have it after his Death. * And is it ever the less True, that William II. came to the Throne without an Hereditary Title, because there was a Compromise afterwards; which Compromise this Author entirely Mistakes, when he says that by it, Robert was to have the Crown after William's Death: For by the Compromise William's own Son's, were to have it after his Death; only in Case he should leave no Son, Robert was to succeed him in the Kingdom of England; as William was to Succeed Robert in the Dukedom of Normandy, in Case he should Dye without a Son. Which is Evident from the Terms of the Compromise, as it is transmitted to us by the Arch-deacon of Hunting-ton, † Roger de Hoveden, ‖ and Hemingford. **

* Letter Page 36.

† Rex fecit concordiam cum fratre suo. Statuerunt, si quis eorum moreretur prior aliter sine Filio, quod alter fieret hæres illius, *Hen. Huntindon Hist. L. VII. p. 213.*

‖ Inter se constituerunt ut si Comes (*Sc. Robertus*) absque Filio legali matrimonio genito moreretur, hæres ejus fieret Rex (*Sc. Willielmus junior*) similique modo si Regi contiguisset mori, hæres illius fieret Comes. *Rogeri de Hoveden Annal, Pars. I. p. 265.* * Hemingford ad An. 1090.

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The *Natural Born Subject* goes on, *he made the like Compromise with his Brother Henry I. who Marry'd the Heiress of the Saxon Time, Edgar Atheling having before submitted. * Not the like Compromise, as he has misrepresented it, but the like Compromise as I have related it, from our Ancient Historians: For by the Terms of it, Robert was not to Succeed Henry, as the Natural Born Subject Imagines, but his own Sons: But if he should Dye without a Son, then Robert was to Succeed him in England, as he, in the like Case, was to Succeed Robert in Normandy; as the Compromise is given us in the Annals of Waverley; † and by Henry of Huntington. ‖*

In these Three Lines he commits another great Mistake, when he says *Henry I. Married the Heiress of the Saxon Line. He Married indeed Maud the Daughter of Margaret Queen of Scotland, Sister to Edgar Atheling. But for Maud's being the Heiress*

* Letter Ibid.

† Quod Consul unoquoque Anno tria mille, marcas argenti ab *Anglia* haberet, & qui diutius viveret foret Hæres alterius, si alter sine recto hærede moreretur. *Annal Traver. 1001.*

‖ Quod *Robertus* unoquoque Anno tria mille, marcarum argenti haberet ab *Anglia*, & qui diutius viveret, hæres alterius esset si alter absque Filio moreretur.

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of the Saxon Line, I believe he has no better than *Almanack Authority*, for in the Chronological Tables of our Kings in some *Almanacks*, I have seen this Remark upon *Henry I. Marriage, The Saxon Line restored*. But had the *Natural Born Subject* known, as he easily might, that *Maud** had Four Brothers, *Edgar, Alexander, David*, and *Edward*, (of † whom *Edgar, Alexander*, and *David* were successively Kings of *Scotland*, and that the Race of the Scottish Kings were descended from † *David*,) he would never have made *Maud* an Heiress. For tho' he Streins his Hypothesis, I think, to make a Daughter an Heir to a Crown, yet he will I doubt not Confess his Mistake, in making *Maud* the Heiress of the *Saxon Line*, now he knows she had Four Brothers. Here I might ask this Author (since he sometimes doth not allow Cession, to transfer the Right to a Crown,) when the Right to the English Crown, was Extinguished in the Heirs of the *Saxon Line*, of the House of *Scotland*? And when our Kings of

* *Henricus majores natu Anglia congregavit Londonia, & Regis Scotorum Malcolmi & Margarete Reginae, Filiam Matildem nomine, sororem etiam Regum, Edgari, Alexandri, & David in conjugem accepit. Roger de Hoveden, Page 268. b. 270. a. &c.*

† *Simon of Durham Names Six Brothers of Maud. Inter Decem Scriptores, p. 202.*

England

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England upon his Principles commenced Rightful? Or whether ever before King *James VI.* came to the Crown of *England*? He proceeds.

And *Stephen the Usurper* made the like Compromise with *Maud the Empress, Heiress of Henry I. and with her Son Henry II. who accordingly did Succeed him.* * Now this which he calls a *Like*, was a different Compromise from the Two former: For by the Terms of it, *Henry II.* was immediately to Succeed upon the Death of *Stephen*. It is another Mistake to say that *Stephen* made a Compromise with *Maud*: For he made the Compromise only with her Son *Henry*, and we cannot find that his Mother had any share in it. The Compromise it self is preserved in the Tower, and is Printed by *Mr. Rymer*. † In which there is no mention of any Resignation or Cession of *Maud*, nor is there any Plenipotentiary or Agent for her, or her Husband, the Duke of *Anjou*, amongst the Names of those that Sign'd that Agreement. How much soever *Dr. Brady*, in his Answer to the late very Learned Bishop of *Worcester*, was concerned to prove *Maud's* Cession, being not able to produce any Testimony of it,

* *Letter Ibid.*

† *Conventiones Fædera, Vol. 1. p. 13.*

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from any of our Historians, he is contented only to suppose it as probable. * And therefore *Maud* having never Resign'd that we know of, either before, or after the Compromise, and being Alive; when her Son *Henry* came to the Throne, (and living to the Fourteenth Year of his Reign,) † he could not be said to Ascend it as the next Heir. I might lastly take Notice, that this Author as well as the *Remarker*, are Mistaken in the Terms of the Agreement betwixt *Stephen*, and *Henry II.* as they may themselves be convinced by the aforesaid Charter of || Agreement, and the Account that is given of it by *Henry of Huntington*, * and *Roger de Hoveden*. †

* *An Inquiry into the Remarkable Instances of History and Parliament Records.* p. 27. 28.

† Anno 14 *Henrici* Regis obiit, *Matildis Imperatrix Mater Ejus.* *Annal. Waver.* 1167.

|| Sciatis quod Ego Rex *Stephanus*, *Henricum* ducem *Normannie* post me Successorem Regni *Angliæ*, & Hæredem eum jure Hæreditario constitui, & sic ei & Hæredibus suis, Regnum *Angliæ* donavi & Confirmavi, Conventions, &c. p. 13.

* Ipsum (*Henricum Sc.*) siquidem Rex in Filium suscepit adoptivum, & hæredem regni Constituit. *Hen. Huntingdon*, p. 258.

† Pax *Angliæ* reddita est, pacificatis ad invicem Rege *Stephano*, & *Henrico* duce *Normannie*, quem Rex *Stephanus* adoptavit sibi in Filium & Constituit hæredem & Successorem Regni. *Hoveden*, p. 281.

Arthur

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Arthur Duke of *Britanny*, saith the *Natural Born Subject*, did Homage to his Uncle King *John*, and soon after Dyed. But did not *Eleanor* Survive her Brother, and King *John* too, and Live a close Prisoner to the Day of her Death? Which was in the Twenty Fifth Year of King *Henry III.* as we are assured by *Matthew Paris*, * a Witness beyond exception: so that *Henry III.* as well as *Henry II.* (of whom only there could be any doubt of all these Thirteen Kings,) notwithstanding what this Author Imagines, did not come to the Throne as the next Heirs.

Some may suspect that I have ransackt the *Natural Born Subject's* Book, for these Mistakes, to present them here at one View; but if they Please to turn to the latter End of the Thirty Sixth, and the beginning of the Thirty Seventh Page, they'll find them altogether, in the Order I have cited them, within the Compass of Twenty Two Lines: and I cannot but Observe, that whilst he is so much in the Dark, that he Stumbles almost at every Step he takes, he is yet triumphing over my imaginary Mistakes about

* Et Circa idem tempus Obiit *Alienora*, Filia *Galfridi* Comitis *Britannie*, in Clausura diuturni carceris sub arcta Custodia reservata, Anno 1241. *Matthew Paris*, p. 574.

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these Thirteen Kings, and with a more than ordinary Air of Assurance says, *was the * Thirteen then that Mr. Higden Speaks of, a Mistake of the Printer for Three, that it should have been? And I will take even these Three from him in the next Page, and leave his Summ Total a Naught.*

But to pursue him no farther in his Errors on this Head, and to Correct them at once, I'll set before the Reader a Table of these Thirteen Kings, in one Column; and of the Lineal Heirs, in another.

* Letter p. 38.

The

A TABLE Shewing,

1st. The Time when these 13 Kings came to the Throne.	2ly. The Lineal Heirs that were Alive at that Time, and when they Dyed.
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William I. Anno 1066. Brompton	Edgar Atheling Heir of the Saxon Line, survived both William I. and William II. and, as is Evident from the <i>Annals of Waverley</i> , was Alive in the 6 Year of H. I. His Sister <i>Margaret</i> , who Married the King of <i>Scotland</i> , besides her Daughter <i>Maud</i> Married to K. H. I. had 4 Sons, of which 3 were Successively Kings of <i>Scotland</i> , <i>Edgar</i> , <i>Alexander</i> , and <i>David</i> , from whom descended the Race of the Kings of the <i>Scots</i> . <i>Hoveden.</i>
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William II. Anno 1088. Brompton	Robert Duke of <i>Normandy</i> the Eldest Son of <i>Wm. I.</i> who after a Compromise with <i>W. II.</i>	Malcolm IV. William Alexan. II. Alexan. III. and
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Henry I. and another with *John Baliol*
 Anno 1100. *Hen. I.* was upon *Rob. Bruce*
 Brompton a New Breach, and *Dav. Bruce*
 War, brought a *Ro. Stuart,*
 Prisoner into *En-*
gland, where he *&c.*
 Dyed, 1134. being
 the 34th. Year of
 his Brother *H. I.*
 Reign. *Ann. Waver.* *Sir George*
Prior Hagustald. *Mackensy.*

Stephen *Maud* the Empress, Daughter
 Anno 1135. of *H. I.* who was not only before
W. Malinsb. *Stephen,* but also before her own
 Henry II. Son *Hen. II.* in the Line, Dyed
 Anno 1155. in the Year 1167. which was
 Brompton the 14th. Year of *Hen. II.* Reign.
Annals of Waverley.

John *Arthur* the Son of *Geoffery.*
 Anno 1199. *Job.* Elder Brother Dyed, 1203.
 Mat. Paris the 4th. Year of *John's* Reign,
 Henry III. *Mat. Paris.* But his Sister *Elea-*
 Anno 1216. *nor* Dyed not till the Year 1241.
 Mat. Paris which was the 25. Year of *H. III.*
Matthew Paris.

Edward III. *Edward II.* his Father was
 Jan. 1326. Murdered the *September* fol-
 Henry de. lowing, *Circa festum beati*
 Knyghton *Mathei.* *Knyghton*
Richard

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Henry IV. *Richard II.* Dyed the *Febru-*
 Septem. 29. *ary* following. *Stow*
 1399.
 Stow *Edmund Mortimer* Earl of
March, descended from *Lionel*
 Duke of *Clarence,* the 3^d. Son
 of *Hen. III.* Dyed in 1425. being
 the 3^d. Year. of *Henry VI.*
 Henry V. *Dugdale's Baronage*
 Anno 1412. *Stow*

Henry VI. *Richard D. of York,* the Son
 Anno 1422. of *Anne,* Sister to the E. of *March,*
 Stow and of *Rich. E. of Camb.* Slain
 in the Battle of *Wakefield* 1460.
 being the 39th. Year of *Hen. VI.*
Stow

Richard III. *Edward V.* and his Brother
 Anno 1483. the Sons of *Edward IV.* Mur-
 Sr. Thomas dered the first Year of *Richard III.*
 More. Reign. *Sir Thomas More*

Henry VII. *Elizab.* Daughter of *Edw. IV.*
 Anno 1485. whom *Hen. VII.* Married in the
 Ld. Bacon. first Year of his Reign. His Mo-
 ther the Countess of *Richmond,*
 who was then Alive, was before
 him, in the Line of *Lancaster.*
Lord Bacon

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But of the *Natural Born Subjects Errors* of all kinds, (which from his *unmoved Primum Mobile*, to his Modest Exhortation in the End of his Book, are not a few) I shall take Notice only of one more.

When I was Speaking of the Submission of the *Jews* to the *Romans*? I added that the generality of the Nation were in Expectation, that a Prince of the Tribe of *Judah*, would shortly break the *Roman* Yoak, and Restore the Kingdom to *Israel*. Upon which the *N. B. Subject* says. *And that Prince did come, and was then among them. And he gave it up too, and commanded them to Submit to Tiberius, though he call'd himself the Son of David.* *

After our Blessed Saviour had so expressly Disclaimed a Temporal Kingdom, and † so fully declared the Nature of his Kingdom, I wonder how this Author could fall into this Error, that Christ had a Temporal Kingdom, which he gave up, and Commanded the Jews to Submit to Tiberius. Christ, as God, is King of Kings, and Lord of all Creatures, but I am sure the *Natural Born Subject* will not say, that he gave up this Eternal Kingdom. Christ, as Man, has a Spiritual Kingdom, but

* Letter p. 98.

† Mat. 20. 25, &c. Jo. 18. 36.

neither

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neither will this Author say that he gave up this Kingdom, which he doth, and will retain, till the End cometh, when he shall have deliver'd it up to God even the Father. 1 Cor. 15.

But Christ, as Man, had no Temporal Kingdom, and utterly Disclaimed any; so that the Temporal Kingdom, which the *Natural Born Subject* says he gave up, he never had. And therefore at that Time, when he Commanded them to Submit to *Tiberius*, or at any other Time, He could not give up a Kingdom, which he never had.

This Error is severely censured in Bishop *Overal's* Convocation Book. 'Tis many ways very plain and evident that the *Jews* did expound all those Places of the Prophets, which do notably set forth the Spiritual Kingdom of our Saviour Christ, to be meant of a Temporal Kingdom, which he should erect upon Earth.--- There are some so much addicted in these Days unto the said erroneous Opinion of the *Jews*, as for the Advancement of the glory of the Bishop of Rome, they will needs have Christ to have been here upon Earth a Temporal Monarch. Inasmuch as some of them say in effect that neither Augustus Cæsar nor Tiberius his Successor were lawful Emperors from the time of Christs Birth, for above the Space of Thirty Years, until our Saviour had required the *Jews* to pay Tribute to Cæsar.---

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But those are Men not to be feared, for to say the Truth of them, they are all in effect either gross and unlearned Canonists or else but new upstart Nerians, and with great Affinity with the Canonists; who meaning as it seemeth to outstrip the Jesuits, do labour as much to make the Pope a Temporal Monarch, as the Jesuits have done for his pretended spiritual Monarchy. * I do not in the least suspect this Author of any Design of advancing these Papal Pretensions, nor is his Notion with respect to the Temporal Kingdom, which he saith Christ gave up, altogether the same with theirs; and yet, as far as he espouses the Notion of a Temporal Monarchy that our Saviour had, so far is he censured by this Convocation-Book. An unfortunate Writer! Who thinks a particular Scheme of Government is laid down in the Scriptures as a Law to Mankind; and yet in interpreting some Passages of Scripture with Relation to Government, has, we see, more than once fall'n into Errors, that stand Condemned in that very Book, for which, this is good reason to believe, he has the greatest deference.

* Page 110, 112, 113, 114.

Tho'

Tho' these two Authors in many things agree so well, as if they wrote in Concert; yet we have seen, that they sometimes differ from one another, as well as contradict themselves: I shall take notice of a few more of their mutual Differences, and their self-Contradictions, and so take my Leave of them for this time.

They differ about the Reputation of the Book which they answer. The Remarker tells us, he made his Remarks on the View, because he heard wherever he came, that it was applauded by Men of deep Reach, and profound Judgment, and such as made a Figure in their several Professions, * tho' by the way it seems all these Persons, of whom he gives so great a Character, were not able to distinguish Utopia from England. Or, if they were able, he is not: According to the Title of his Book, he, or they must be Visionaries.

But the Natural Born Subject differs from the Remarker, and says neither Whig, nor Tory is pleas'd with the View. † If so I am at a loss to know for what Reason he should give himself the Trouble to answer a Book that

* Preface to the Remarks.

† Letter p. 4.

no

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no body was pleas'd with, unless it were to shew his great Skill in English History.

There were sometimes Disputes about Titles of which, the Remarker says, the Populace were not competent Judges and in such Cases the Possessor was sworn to as rightful, and it was but reasonable, if the Right Heir could not be discover'd, or his Title cleared to the Satisfaction of the Subjects, who were to swear to him; for in this melior est Conditio Possidentis. * Again speaking of the Duke of York's Title, *what would Mr. H. have more? Here the Great Men (who were then the proper Judges) declare his Right and Title.* † If the Populace were never competent Judges about *disputed Titles*, how come they to be so at this time? And if the Great Men were the Judges heretofore, why are they not so now, and *what would the Remarker have more?* Why is he not concluded by their Judgment now? Both these Authors sometimes, but the Remarker very often to get rid of an Argument gives up his own Cause. But the *Natural Born Subject* denys the great Men are Judges, and says, *in a Competition for the Crown, there is nothing else to be done*

* Remarks p. 15.

† Ibid p. 26.

but

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but every Man to satisfy his own Conscience the best he can, as to the Right of the Competitors. But as to any judicial Determination, there can be none upon Earth; * He is here diametrically opposite to the Remarker. But the great Error of this Author is, that he doth not consider Men as Members of Civil Society, who in civil Matters in order to the publick Peace of it, must be concluded by a Publick Judgment; but looks upon them as so many Independent Individuals, I may rather say, as so many Independent Governors, whilst he censures not only the Judgment of other Men, but the Publick Judgment too, when it differs from his own: But I am not here to dispute, but only to shew how he differs from the Remarker.

There is nothing perplexes these two Authors more, than Oaths, Cessions, and Submissions, about which they sometimes differ from one another, and sometimes contradict themselves; tho' in the main they agree in their Management, making Submissions, Cessions, and Oaths, to give up, or not to give up a Right or Claim, as it serves their present Argument. Thus the Submission of the Jews, and the Submission and Oaths of

* Letter p. 74. 75.

the

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the Senate, and People of Rome, shall give up their Right ; but the long Submission Oaths, &c. of the House of York shall not abate their Right, nor Prejudice their Claim as the *Remarker* says, p. 26. And the *Natural Born Subject* says, *That Age will be a Precedent of the most inflexible Loyalty, which the Usurpation for sixty Years Continuance together, nor Success, nor Prescription, nor Acts of Parliament, no nor the Submission or Resignation of those who had the Right could abate, they saw these were not free and voluntary, and therefore would lay no Stress upon them* ; p. 70, 71. And yet at another time to get rid of the Argument from the Homilies, and to favour King John's Title, he says, *Arthur was dead and his Sister Eleanor a Prisoner in King John's Hand, and her Life at his Mercy every Hour ; so that there was no Claim made by her, or for her* p. 102. The Heirs of the House of York could never quit their Claim by sixty Years Subjection, accepting Commissions, or repeated Oaths, tho' at perfect Liberty ; (For by this time the *Natural Born Subject* may be sensible, that he had no more reason to put them under Constraint, than the *Remarker* had to put them in Durefs.) And yet here the bare Non-claim of *Eleanor*, who was a Prisoner, shall serve the turn. At another time *Edgar Atheling*, who, I suppose, even he will not

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not say, was more free than the Heirs of the House of York, shall by Submission and an Oath of Fidelity transfer his Right to *William the Conqueror*. *William the Conqueror*, says the *Natural Born Subject*, *obtain'd a Right, because Edgar Atheling the true Heir submitted and swore Fidelity to him*, p. 38, 39. Is not this *deceive* *us* *to* have a greater regard to an Hypothesis, than Truth. And here, by the way, I might observe, how he passes by *Edgar Atheling's* Sister, *Margaret Queen of Scotland*, who was then truly the Heiress of the *Saxon Line*, tho' at another time, we see, he can make her Daughter *Maud* to be the Heiress of the *Saxon Line*, who was no Heiress at all, having Four Brothers alive.

Whether the Hereditary Descent of the Crown is Limitable by Act of Parliament, is a Question, upon which the Writers of that side are as much divided : But to confine my self chiefly to those with whom I have been engaged in this Controversy. The *Objector* holds the Descent of the Crown is limitable by Act of Parliament. The *Natural Born Subject*, and *Remarker* both deny it. The *Natural Born Subject* denies it ; because he believes the Right of Succession by Primogeniture, is of Divine Institution, and a Law of the whole Earth. If the *Remarker* is of the

the same Opinion, (which he doth not plainly declare) he differs very much from the Learned Author, whose Book * he hath so often recommended to me, who in his *Preface* goes no higher than human Authority, or a fundamental Law of the Monarchy, which he supposes has fix'd the Succession. He saw there were no grounds in the Holy Scriptures to fix the Succession on divine Institution or Law. On the other hand, the *Natural Born Subject* is, I believe, convinced, that it cannot be unalterably fix'd by human Law; since he appears to be of my Lord *Bacon's* Opinion, || which I think is very true, that the Supreme Power may dissolve, but cannot bind it self, so that I have thus far both these Authors with me against each other: The Author of *Jovian* agreeing with me against the *Natural Born Subject*, that the Succession to the Crown is not establish'd by a Divine Law; and the *Natural Born Subject* agreeing with me against that Author, that the Succession cannot be unalterably fix'd by human Law.

But to satisfy the *Natural Born Subject* and the *Remarker*, that I have not mistaken that Author's Sense in his *Preface*, they may

* *Jovian* || *Letter* p. 18. find

find in the Book it self (which I desire the *Natural Born Subject* especially to observe) that he is so far from making Succession to a Crown by Primogeniture to be of Divine Right, that he denies Monarchy it self to be of divine Right, exclusive of other forms of Government. For after he has run thro' other Forms of Government, whether *Aristocracys*, or *Democracys*, as the Government of *Sparta*, of *Venice*, and of the Cantons of *Switzerland*, and observed wherein the Sovereignty was, and is respectively lodged in each of them, he says, *I was the more willing to make this Observation, that when I speak of Sovereign Princes, I may not be maliciously traduced, as if I spoke of them exclusively of other Sovereigns, as if Monarchy were of sole Divine Right. For want of this Distinction, other Authors have had this invidious Imputation laid upon them.* *

But if the *Remarker* shall say, he Agrees with the Author of *Jovian*, he must then at the same Time Confess, that he is directly Opposite to his Partner in this Controversy, the *Natural Born Subject*.

* *Jovian* 240, 241.

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'Tis True, that amidst all these Differences, they at this Time happen to agree (tho' some of them not very consistently with themselves) in one Conclusion, deduced from Premises, as different as their Principles; but had they lived in some of the Reigns, we have before discoursed of, and pursued their different Principles, they would have form'd (for they would not have found any) different Parties, and been some of them Jurors, and others Non-Jurors then.

As I have hitherto taken no notice of the hard Words, Angry Invectives, and rash and uncharitable Censures, which make so many Pages of both these Answers; so I shall always neglect them; being perfectly satisfied, that there was nothing provoking in the *View*, which, whatever it wanted, did not want Temper; and I hope I have made no Retaliation in this *Defence*: For to forgive the Authors, and not to imitate them, is the best use that can be made of that way of Writing.

F I N I S.

A P P E N D I X.

Number. I.

Anno XIV. Edwardi Quarti.

Item, Our said Sovereigne Lord the King remembering that it was Ordained, Enacted, and Established, by Authoritie of the Parliament holden at *Westminster*, the Second Day of *May*, in the Ninth Yeere of the Reigne of the Noble King *Henry V.* late in Deed and not of Right, King of this Noble Realme of *England*, as heereafter followeth. * *Item*, whereas the taking of Assises generally, hath long ceased throughout this Realme of *England*, because of a Statute and Ordinance made by our said Sovereigne Lord the King, at his Second Passage towards the Partes of *Normandie*, and by his Counsell: Our said Sovereigne Lord considering the great Diseases and Damages, which divers of his Liege People have had and sustained by the same ceasing, hath straightly Comanded, and Commandeth, that his Justices shall hold the Assises through the Realme of *England*, in

* Here begins the Recital of Henry the Vth's Statute.

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the manner used and accustomed. And to Eschew the disherifons of the same Persons, which now be passed and shall passe in this Voiage Royall of the King, (which God Speed,) and also of the Persons which be abiding in the Service of our Sovereigne Lord the King, in the Parties of *Normandie* and of *France*, it is ordained and provided, that in every Protection with the Clause of *Volumus* to be made for every of the same Persons, there shall be in the Clause of the Exception of the same contained Omission of these Words, *assise nove disseisine*. And that all Protections be allowable for them, and every of them, in all the Counties of our Sovereigne Lord the King, in any Place where such Protection is cast forth for any such Person, in all the Pleas of Assises as well of *No. diss.* as of *Fresh Force*, without any difficulty. *Provided always*, that the Judgements to be given from henceforth in such Assises Arraigned or to be Arraigned, shall not be prejudicial to any of the said Persons so abiding in the King's Noble Service beyond the Sea, as is aforesaid, which hath any thing in Reversion or Remainder in such Lands or Tenements, whereof such Assises be or shall be Arraigned, if they that have in Reversion or Remainder of such Lands or Tenements be not Named in the same Assises, but that they bee against them

Voyde.

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Voyde. And this Ordinance shall endure till the Parliament, which shall be next holden after the next coming againe of our Sovereigne Lord the King into this Realme of *England*. And if this Ordinance touching the said Persons, abiding in the King's Service beyond the Sea, and also touching the said Persons, which have passed and shall passe in the said Voyage, be not sufficient for the Ease and Surety of them, it is accorded and assented, that the Lords of the King's Council for the time being, shall have full Power by Authority of this present Parliament, to set, ordaine and provide sufficient Remedy for the Ease and Surety of all the said Persons and every of them, as to the said Lords shall seeme Available and Expedient in the case, after their good Advice and Discretion. * Our Sovereigne Lord the King will and hath Ordained, Enacted, and Established, by the Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament Assembled, and by Authority of the same, that the same Order and the same Lawe, comprised in the said Statute and Ordinance, shall be now observed and kept, and shall be as Available for all manner of Per-

Here ends the Recital of Henry the VIIth Statute.

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sons,

sons, which now shall passe over the Sea with our Sovereigne Lord the King in this Voyage Royall, and there shall abide in his said Noble Service as they were, for such Persons which did passe over the Sea with the said late King, and there did abide in his Noble Service. And that all such Persons, which now shall passe over the Sea with our said Sovereigne Lord the King, shall have and Enjoy in every pointe all manner of Advantages, as the said Persons so passing over the Sea with the said late King, had, should have, and might have had, by reason of the said Statute. This Act and Ordinance to endure till the next Parliament, which shall be first holden after the next coming of our Sovereigne Lord the King into England.

Rastall's Collections Vol. I. p. 316.

Number II.

The Oath which Richard Duke of York took, to be True, Faithful, and Obedient Subject, to King Henry the Sixth, at St. Pauls Cross, in the Presence of the King and most of his Nobility, in 1452. being the 30th. Year of Henry the Sixths Reign.

I Richard Duke of York, Confess and Beknow, that I am, and ought to be, humble

humble Subject, and Liege-Man, to you my Sovereign Lord King Henry VI. and owe therefore to bear you Faith and Truth, as to my Sovereign Liege Lord, and shall do all Days unto my Lives End, and shall not at any Time Will or Assent, that any thing be Attempted or done against your most Noble Person, but wheresoever I shall have Knowledge of any such thing imagined or proposed, I shall with all Speed and Diligence possible to me, make that your Highness shall have Knowledge thereof, and over that, do all that shall be possible to me, to the withstanding and let thereof, to the uttermost of my Life. I shall not any thing take upon me against your Royal Estate; or Obeysance that is due thereto, nor suffer any other Man to do, as far forth as shall be in my Power to let it: And also shall come at your Commandement whensoever I shall be call'd by the same, in Humble and Obeysant Wise, but if I be letted by any Sickness, or Impotence of my Person, or by such other Cause as shall be thought by you my Sovereign Lord Reasonable, I shall never hereafter take upon me to gather any Rowt, or to make any Assembly of your People, without your Commandment or License, or in my Lawful Defence, I shall report me at all Times to your Highness, and if the Case require, to my

Peers, nor any thing Attempt against any of your Subjects, of what Estate, Degree or Condition that they be. But whensoever I find my self Wronged and Agrieved, I shall sue Humbly for Remedy to your Highness, and proceede after the Course of your Lawes and in none otherwise, saving in my own Lawfull Defence in manner abovesaid, and otherwise have to your Highness, as an Humble and True Subject ought to have to his Sovereigne Lord. All these things abovesaid, I Promise you truly to Observe and Keep, by the Holy Evangelists contained in the Book that I lay my Hand here upon, and by the Holy Cross I here Touch, and by the Blessed Sacrament of the Lords Body, that I shall now with his Mercy Receive, And over, I agree me, and will, that if I any Time hereafter, as by the Grace of our Lord God I never shall, any thing Attempt by way of Feate, or otherwise against your Royall Majestie, & the Obeysance that I owe thereto, or any thing take upon me otherwise than is above expressed, I from that Time forth be unabled held, and taken as an untrue and openly foresworn Man, and unable to all manner of Worship, Estate and Degree, be it such as I now occupy, or any other that might in any Wise grow unto me hereafter. And this I have heere promised and Sworn,

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proceeded of mine own desire and free Volunte, and by no constraining or Coaction. In Witness of all these things above Written, I *Richard Duke of York* above Writ, Subscribe with my own Hand and Seal.

This Oath he also took at Westminster, and at Coventrie at sundry Times in the 31st Year of K. Henry VI. Stow. Page 396.

Number III.

The Oath which Richard Duke of York took, upon the Agreement in 1460. in the 39th. Year of King Henry the Sixth.

IN the Name of God *Amen*, I *Richard Duke of York*, Promise and Swear by the Faith and Truth, that I owe to Almighty God, that I shall never Consent, Procure or Stir, directly or indirectly, in Privy or apart, neither (as much as in me is) shall suffer to be done, consented, procured or stirred any thing, that may found to the Abridgement of the Natural Life of King *Henry VI.* or to the hurt or diminishing of his Reign, or Dignity Royal by Violence, or any otherwise against his Freedom or Liberty, but if any Person or Persons, would do or presume any thing to the contrary, I shall with

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all my Might and Power withstand it, and make it to be withstood, as far as my Power will stretch thereunto. So help me God and his Holy Evangelists.

Stow P. 410.

Number IV.

Anno Undecimo Henrici Septimi.

C H A P. I.

TH E King our Sovereign Lord calling to his Remembrance the Duty of Allegiance of his Subjects of this Realm, and that they by Reason of the same, are bound to serve their Prince and Sovereign Lord for the Time being, in his Wars, for the Defence of him and the Land, against every Rebellion, Power, and Might, reared against him, and with him to enter and abide in Service of Battel if Case so require; and that for the same Service, what Fortune ever fall by Chance in the same Battel, against the Mind and Will of the Prince, (as in this Land sometime passed hath been seen) that it is not Reasonable, but against all Laws, Reason, and good Conscience, that the said Subjects going with their Sovereign Lord in Wars,

Wars, attending upon him in his Person, or being in other Places by his Commandement within this Land, or without, any thing should lose or forfeit for doing their True Duty and Service of Allegiance. It be therefore Ordained, Enacted, and Established by the King our Sovereign Lord, and by the Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament Asssembled, and by Authority of the same, that from henceforth no manner of Person or Persons, whatsoever he or they be, that attend upon the King and Sovereign Lord of this Land for the Time being, in his Person, and do him True and Faithful Service of Allegiance in the same, or be in other Places by his Commandement in his Wars, within this Land or without: That for the said Deed and True Duty of Allegiance, he or they be in no wise Convict or Attaint of High Treason, nor of other Offences for that Cause, by Act of Parliament or otherwise by any Process of Law, whereby he or any of them, shall Lose or Forfeit Life, Lands, Tenements, Rents, Possessions, Hereditaments, Goods, Chattels or any other things, but to be for that Deed and Service utterly discharged of any Trouble Vexation or Loss. And if any Act or Acts or other Process of the Law, here-

hereafter thereupon for the same happen to be made contrary to this Ordinance, that Act or Acts or other Process of the Law whatsoever they shall be, stand and be utterly void. Provided alway, that no Person or Persons shall take any Benefit or Advantage by this Act, which shall hereafter decline from his or their said Allegiance.

Number V.

Anno Decimo tertio Reginae Elizabethae c. I.

*An Act whereby certain Offences be made
Treason.*

AND be it further enacted that if any Person shall any ways hold and affirm or maintain that the Common Laws of this Realm, not altered by Parliament, ought not to direct the Right of the Crown of *England*; or that our said Sovereign Lady *Elizabeth* the Queen's Majesty that now is, with and by the Authority of the Parliament of *England*, is not able to make Laws and Statutes of sufficient Force and Validity to limit and bind the Crown of this Realm, and the Descent, Limitation, Inheritance, and Government thereof. Every such Person

son so holding, affirming or maintaining during the Life of the Queen's Majesty shall be judged a high Traitor, and suffer or forfeit as in Cases of High Treason is accustomed; and every Person so holding, affirming or maintaining after the Decease of our said Sovereign Lady, shall forfeit all his Goods and Chattels.

Number VI.

*A Citation out of a Letter of Lethington
the Secretary of Scotland to Sir William
Cecil the Queen of England's Secretary.*

NOW let us examine the Matter and Circumstances how King *Henry VIII.* was by Statute enabled to dispose the Crown. There is a Form in two sorts prescribed him which he may not transgress, that is to say, either by his Letters Patents sealed with his Great Seal, or by his last Will signed with his own Hand: For in this extraordinary Case he was held to an ordinary and precise Form; which being not observed, the Letters Patents, or Will cannot work the Intent or Effect supposed. And to disprove that the Will was signed with his own Hand; you know that long before his
Death

Death he never used his own Signing with his own Hand; and in the time of his Sicknes, being divers times pressed to put his Hand to the Will written, he refused to do it. And it seemed God would not suffer him to proceed in an Act so injurious and prejudicial to the Right Heir of the Crown, being his Neice. Then his Death approaching, some as well known to you as to me, caused *William Clark*, sometimes Servant to *Thomas Heneage*, to sign the supposed Will with a Stamp (for otherwise signed it was never) and yet notwithstanding some respecting more the Satisfaction of their Ambition, and others their private than just and upright Dealing, procured divers honest Gentlemen, attending in several Rooms about the King's Person, to testify with their Hand-writings the Contents of the said pretended Will, furnished to be signed with the King's own Hand. To prove this dissembled and forged signed Testament, I do refer to such Trials as be yet left. First; the Attestation of the late Lord *Paget* published in the Parliament in Queen *Mary's* Time for the Restitution of the Duke of *Norfolk*. Next, I pray you on my Sovereigns behalf, that the Depositions may be taken in this Matter of the Marquess of *Winchester*, Lord Treasurer of *England*, the Mar-

Marquess of *Northampton*, the Earl of *Pembroke*, Sir *William Petre*, then one of King *Henry's* Secretaries, Sir *Henry Nevell*, Sir *Maurice Barkley*, Doctor *Buts*, *Edmond Harman Baker*, *John Osborn* Groom of the Chamber, Sir *Anthony Dennis*, if he be living, *Terris* the Chirurgion, and such as have heard *David Vincent* and others speak in this Case; and that their Attestations may be enrolled in the *Chancery*, and the *Archives*, *in perpetuam rei memoriam*.

Collection of Records at the End of the 1 Vol. of the History of the Reformation.
Page 269.

Number VII.

A Citation out of Sir *Thomas Craig's Book of the Succession in Answer to Doleman alias Parsons the Jesuit, who endeavoured to set up King Henry VIIIth's Will, p. 334, 345.*

THIS good Man (meaning *Doleman*) like himself always adds that the Seal or Stamp was enough in this Affair, so that with him it is sufficient to answer the Intention of the Parliament, says he, that his

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his last Will had his Seal (his *Stamp* *) put to it, tho' at the same time there is no mention in the said Statutes of the Seal (*Stamp*) to his Testament, but of his Subscription, and in an Affair of that Importance as that last Will was, that it should be subscribed by the King's Hand was the least that might be, seeing the Seal (*Stamp*) could be put to it by his *Amanuensis* even after his Death. Yet I shall say nothing of those two Acts or Statutes, tho' they exceed the Condition and Power of Mortals, nor how such Power could be given to any Man, whatever his Dignity be, in an Hereditary Kingdom; seeing at that time many things may happen which may disturb his Judgment; yet tho' this might be dispenced with in so great a Prince, who could ever endure than an Affair of the greatest consequence should be entrusted to his *Amanuensis*, and to his report that he was commanded by the King to set the Seal (*Stamp*) to it, or that such Power could be given to him as that by his setting the Seal (*Stamp*) to it, the true and lawful Succession of the Kingdom should be taken away: Who will believe it? Certain-

* I have taken the Liberty after the Word (*Seal*) to add (*Stamp*) for so it ought to have been expressed.

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ly the House of *Suffolk* at this rate, should they get the Kingdom, could not owe it to the Right of Succession, but to *Clark*, one of the lowest sort of the People, who acknowledged openly before Queen *Mary* and her *Privy Council*, and also before the *Parliament*, that he put the Seal (*Stamp*) to it, after King *Henry* had lost the Use of his Reason, or was past Sense and Memory, and who also was forgiven for that Crime, and obtain'd the Queen's Pardon upon his Confession. For who can be better believed in *Crimine falsi*, that is, in Forgery, than the Author and Forget himself?

But *Doleman* says, that the two Acts of Parliament cannot in reason be eluded or overthrown by the Testimony of that *Clark*, or of others, concerning himself or his own Fact, wherein they say that the King's Memory was gone when the Seal was put to the Testament. But the Forgery in putting the Seal (*Stamp*) to that Paper may be evidently enough made appear even from those two Acts of Parliament themselves remaining in their Force. And it is quite another thing, the King could have done such a thing, and the King did it. The King also could by virtue of those two Acts have nominated his Successors: But who will say that he ever did name his Successors? Moreover had that Seal (*Stamp*) been put to the Paper by his Command, yet even that did not come up to the Intention and Purport of those Two Statutes. For as the Bishop of *Ross* observes and all the Lawyers * if the Form appointed be omit-

* *Si Forma a lege tradita sit omissa, eâ totus actus vitiatur.*
ted,

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ted, the whole Proceeding is null'd by that Omission. * Especially when that Form that is prescribed for any reason ought to be observed, † even after the reason ceases; for which it was introduced. Wherefore unless the King had observed and kept himself, to that Form in making his last Will, which was appointed in those two last Acts, the transferring of the Kingdom from the true Heir could never have been established or confirm'd by such his Will. But seeing this reason hath been fully explained both by the Bishop of Ross, and by my self, I forbear to say any more of it here.

But our Author says, that this last Will of King Henry, which was not only authorized by Two Acts of Parliament, but enrolled in the Chancery, ought not to be overthrown by one or two Witnesses. But it's evidently false that that Will was Authorized by two Parliaments, tho' the Power of making such a Will was granted to that King by those Parliaments, yet that Will was never Ratified. For what was done a long time before, cannot ratify what is done after, especially if it be done in a different Form. This Man is an ill Lawyer, a worse Historian, but the worst of all Divines, who thus perverts Law, History, and the Sacred Scriptures.

* Bald. in L. non dubium C. de Legibus.

† L. Si fundus de rebus eorum, qui sub tutela & cura sunt, non alienandis.

F I N I S.