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CIVIL POLITY.

A

TREATISE

Concerning the
Nature of Government.

WHEREIN

The REASONS of that Great Diversity
to be observed in the Customs, Manners,
and Usages of Nations, are Historically
Explained:

And REMARKS made upon the Changes
in our English Constitution; And the dif-
fering Measures of our several Kings.

*Non unius populi, sed Generis Humani
facta discant* — L. Flor. Hist. ProL. Lib. I.

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yard. MDCCIII.

T H E

Preface Introductory.

I F we but consider the whole Race of Man- kind, as the undoubted Off-spring of the same common Parents, as the Almighty, by the Pen of the inspired Writer, hath re- vealed they are ; or if we consider them but as partaking of the same common Nature, as Ex- perience will plainly teach us they do ; or if we but consider them as born under the same ignorant, innocent, and helpless State, as Ob- servation will inform us is most true ; there be- ing no discernible Differences to be discovered in the early Infancies, between the Children of the most brutish Savages, and the more polite Europeans, excepting what is only external and accidental, such as Bulk, Colour, or Feature : We may justly wonder from what Source such a Diversity of Customs, Manners, Usages, Laws, and Methods of Living, that are daily to be ob- served amongst the Sons of Adam, do proceed : Why, for Instance, some Countries should be over-run with a Race of Men, that appear to have little more to distinguish them from Brutes, than their outward Form and Shape : And why other Regions, that have neither advantage in Clime, or Soil, should be adorned with Inhabi- tants that are enriched with Knowledge, and

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beautified with Learning; and not only so, but why the Inhabitants of the same Country should perhaps, after some Ages, despise or disuse those Forms or Methods, or at least alter and change such, as their Ancestors both practised and valued: Why some Parts of the Globe should at one time produce the greatest Masters of the most elaborate Arts, and most useful Sciences; and at another time a Generation of Men that are pleased only with Brutishness, and wanton only in Barbarity: Why the Inhabitants of some Countries, in some Ages, should be admired and dreaded for their daring Courage, and military Expeditions; and at others, why they should be reproached for their Cowardice, and despised for their Pusillanimity: Why some Cities should for some Period of Time flourish in Trade, and abound in Wealth; and at another lose or neglect their Traffick, and sink into a wretched and loathed Poverty. That these things have been, in Fact so, is undeniable; but from what Causes they have proceeded, or from what Sources derived, hath not been so easily discovered; by reason the great Diversity in their Kinds, and the great Uncertainty of their Continuance, do plainly manifest they are not congenite nor common to Mankind: Neither are they to be derived from any Natural or Physical Causes, such as Climate, Soil, or Disposition of Heavenly Bodies; because all Assurances of Time will inform us, that they have not been fixed or confined to particular

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particular Parts, nor kept pace with the Changes of Stellar Aspects, but have wandered, and uncertainly changed their Residences: Egypt, for Instance, and some other Parts of Africa, and Asia, that were in former Ages admired and sought after for Philosophy and Learning, are in this present sunk into a miserable Ignorance; and Greece her self, that so much gloried in being the Mistress of Arts, and Mother of Sciences, is now degenerated into that same wretched and unlettered State, that she had so much scorned and despised in Others; and some Parts of Europe are at this time celebrated for a Learned Knowledge, that were in former Ages pitied for their Ignorance, and derided for their Barbarity; some of the rough and Northern Nations now looking with the same Pity, and same Contempt, upon the present Inhabitants of ancient Greece, as the Grecians then did upon the People of these Northern Regions; each Country thus, in their turns, equally pitying, and equally despising the other. The same might be insinuated of Trade and Arms. These things having been in Fact so, and not being to be derived from our Natures, nor from any Physical Causes, nor not being immediately infused by any supernatural Assistance, which appears in that they are only acquired by Time, and attained by Diligence: It may not misbecome an Enquirer to examine to what they are to be ascribed, since their changeable and unsteady Fate is a leading Argument

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Argument to induce Men to think, that as they have not been always understood or practised by all People, so they have not been of any real use to Mankind in all Capacities; but that they only have become so, to particular People, from particular Reasons, and so really and truly proceed from, or at least relate to Society or Government. And that this is not unlikely, appears, First, from the great Variety of these things; there being as many sorts almost as Nations, which have been all valued where used.

Secondly, The great Uncertainty in their Continuance; for they have begun, improved, and ended with particular Governments; having flourished in some Proportion, as the People have multiplied, or as Wealth or Empire have increased: Never as yet having been observed in any mighty Numbers, or any great Perfection, where Men have lived together; but in small Hoards, or petty Companies, in large and wild Countries: And, on the contrary, are always multiplying and improving in flourishing Governments, or where Multitudes of People live near together, altho perhaps in very different Appearances, as shall be shewed by Fact and Reason in the following Discourse.

And what seems principally to have misled us, concerning the Nature and Origine of these Matters, hath probably proceeded from some of these Reasons,

1st. In

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1st. In that we have either narrowed our Thoughts in the Consideration of them, as supposing those only Valuable, that we know, teach, or practise; imagining, as it were, by that, as if all the rest of Mankind, whose Conditions or Circumstances are in most respects extremely unlike ours, should notwithstanding stand in need of what we do, and accordingly approve or condemn only such things as we esteem useful or not. Or,

2dly, In that we have drawn Arguments from uncertain and equivocal Terms, and from them concluded concerning the Nature of Things, without carrying our Enquiries, by an impartial Examination, to what truly they have proceeded from; which if we had done, we should perhaps have discovered such Things to have been meer Relations to our selves, as being but what have been gradually invented, or discovered, as Things useful to us; and accordingly to have had no real Value, as they can have no real Use, or indeed Existence, but to us only in our Circumstances.

For notwithstanding the present European People are apt to conclude, by the small Advantages they seemingly enjoy over other Nations, that Learning, and useful Arts and Sciences, are only understood in this Corner of the Universe; yet, I think, I may averr, that there never were any great Number of People that united, and lived together, but what have

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had somewhat in use amongst them; whereby they have had the same Advantages over Others, their Contemporaries, as Europeans at present have by the Means of those Arts they now know; such being in truth to them, in their then Circumstances, of the same Nature and Use, as what is now thus particularly so called, is to us in ours. It is true, these things having been different, according to the several distant Ages and Countries; and being perhaps taught and valued, as they are of use only to Men; and their Use arising from the Circumstances of People and Governments; and the present European People not being in the same Circumstances as those of distant Ages, or Countries were, they cannot require the Knowledge or Use of the same Things, and consequently are prone to dislike or despise them. For, in truth, what can induce Men to value things that are in their Natures useless? And the chief Reason why somewhat of the ancient Learning hath been so generally revived, hath proceeded in that the Christian Religion hath required it; which is common to all Europe. But of these things hereafter.

And as all things that are thus valuable amongst Men, seem to be but the blessed Effects of Society; I have therefore attempted to shew the Nature of Government, (but not the Beginning, for that being a Fact, and so requiring Records, and such being in their very Natures but subsequent to Government, can rarely

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by give us any Authentic Account of their Origin; the Basis upon which they stand, and what it is that cements and holds Men together, in the same Community; And then by what Methods Civil Politics are continued; why they flourish, and why after a time some are necessarily ruined; from what Reasons some are naturally Peaceable, and Others always Turbulent and Unquiet; why in some the general and common Good of the whole People is pursued, and why only a part of them in Others; why some are incident to sudden and violent Revolutions, and why all naturally decline from their first and Original Institutions. In the performing this, I have observed a plain and Historical Method, never advancing any Speculative Guesses, or Chimerical Whimsies, nor never supporting my Assertions with any particular Authorities to fill up, where I wanted any other Reasons; but have deduced my Proofs, either from the certain and undeniable Nature of Men, or from evident Fact.

But the Nature of this Discourse leading me to treat of very different Topics, and of consequence often obliging me to produce very different Proofs, and sometimes to draw Conclusions from scattered and dispersed Premises, which is almost unavoidable in so perplexed a Subject, which may occasion Difficulties to some Readers in carrying on the Thread of the main Design; I shall therefore, for the Ease of such,

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Such, here at once give a Scheme of the ensuing Work. At the first I have shew'd, that Men cannot well subsist in Solitude, and accordingly, that they always live in Companies, and that there is ever observed some kind of Order or Government amongst them, which naturally produces some Inequalities in the Fortunes or Conditions of Men; And then is proceed, in that Man thinks, can deliberate, hath a Sense of Pleasure and Pain; and a Power of moving himself, that he always will pursue what he then imagines his Good; it matters not in what he places it in, viz. whether it relates to his Soul, such as is Future Happiness; or to his Body, such as is his present Pleasure; or to his present or future Fame or Glory. And then, in that his Body being under a continued Fluxion, or Change of Parts, he becomes incident to a Multitude of Natural Wants, which give him Uneasiness, and therefore Desires of satisfying them; and that these are inseparable from his Nature; and that he hath a great Variety of other Inquietudes, that are only occasioned in that he is a Member of a Society; and that the perfecting his Desires is the utmost of Worldly Happiness; but in that he may be often hindered in the performing this, by outward Violence, or deterred from doing it by the Means of Laws; therefore he doth naturally covet such a State, as permits him a Liberty of prosecuting them, in

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in what Methods he pleases, of the Goodness or Reasonableness of which, he alone will judge. It is from this Reason all Men love Power; which they fully convince, in that they chuse rather to Command than to Obey, rather to give than to receive Laws. This altho' so clear a Truth, that every Man may both experience it in himself, and observe it in Others. Yet in that, some Persons being prejudiced against such Doctrines, will not perhaps be convinced by such kind of General Arguments; I have therefore farther proved them, First, From the Nature of Man; Secondly, From the Reasons of God's Laws; and, Thirdly, By the particular Practices of Men, especially of such that are not bounded by Laws. Then as what gives Men Uneasiness are of two sorts, viz. Either Wants real, or imaginary; so the first are irresistible, the second not; the first regard the Man, the second the Society.

2. That as some Government is inseparable from Men, so some Differences amongst Men are inseparable from Government, and that these Differences will Multiply and enlarge, as the Numbers of Men in the same Government or Polity encrease; that the making, or continuing this Difference amongst Men thus united in Society, requires some Marks, Signs, or Characters, by which Persons may be known and distinguished; that what makes these, are of divers kinds, viz. such as appear to the Eye, amongst

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amongst which are all valuable and uncommon Substances, or such as are inwardly acquired, as some personal Qualifications. And that these are the Sources from whence Trade arise, and from whence Arts, Sciences, Learning, and whatsoever else is valuable amongst Men do proceed; several Digressions concerning these Topicks; and then shewed how that these things have been known, improved, and practised in some Proportion to the Number of People, or to the Nature or Condition of Government.

3. That Men being by Nature equal, would never continue in a state of Subjection, by which (as being governed by Others) they cannot always pursue their own Desires, unless there was somewhat in Government, that did oblige Men to live in Obedience, and that this is the dread of Punishment. But that this Power of Governing and Punishing of Others, could never be continued in the same Persons, or the same Methods, unless there had been somewhat brought into Use amongst Men, that might induce the Governed, which are the greatest Numbers, to submit to the Will of the Governours; And that this arises from some acquired Advantage the Superiours have, to relieve the Wants of the Inferiours, and thereby to make them Dependant. Which proceeds in that Government, makes, or produces, some Laws, Orders, or Rules, by which a Property is ascertained to Men; And by that a Wealth or Money

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Money is introduced, which is what in particular Societies will be taken in Exchange for all other Commodities, and becomes the Standard of Value of all other things. That the Difference in Mens Tempers, Complexions, Ages, or Industries, will soon occasion this Money or Wealth to be very unequally possessed; That such Persons that have this Money being thus enabled to procure all the Necessaries for Men (a Number of which in all Communities will be in want of such) those that are Poor, or thus in want, will depend upon those that are Rich or have it; and so are ready to execute what they please: For this Reason Wealth and Civil Power can never subsist long separate in the same Community. But by reason the craving Wants of the Multitude, must soon consume an accumulated Wealth, unless there is some Method whereby it may be supplied; (for if the same Persons had not wherewith to keep the People in a Dependency, this Civil Power could not be continued in the same Hands,) wherefore this Wealth or Money must be circulated, that so it may be returned again into their Treasury who first had it; and this in Society is either performed by the Means of Land or Trade, the Methods of doing which is shewed.

4. The Reasons assigned why Religion influences Civil Politicks, and then proved that an Unity in Religion is not to be preserved in a dis-

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a disordered State, unless it made a separate and distinct Polity. The marvellous difference shewed between Divine and Humane Laws, the first only relate to the Man, the last to the Society. That all Civil Laws regard the Good of the Legislature, and therefore that no Person that is not some way concerned in the making Laws, can be directly secured by them, nor reap any advantage from them, any farther than as his Interest is interwoven with the Makers. What makes the Supreme Authority that there can be no difference in the Nature of it, and therefore, that the Distinction between a King de Facto, and de Jure, is trifling. That all Rights or Claims to such, have relation to Law; and that either Divine or Humane Laws may convey Rights to Men; that all Trusts, Offices, Honours, or Dignities, are Civil Rights, and only made by Civil Laws, which are altered as the Legislators please, and therefore no arguing from what was Right, to what should be so.

These and several other things are at first in the general only treated, and shewed how they proceed from the Nature of Man; but are afterwards particularly illustrated by what hath happened in our own Government; in the doing of which, the Causes of the several most material Alterations in our own English Polity are assigned, what the Government antiently was, upon what Founded, and how Supported, by

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by what Steps the Power Devolved into the Commonalty; how that although Henry the Seventh made the great and visible Change, yet the Wealth before his Time having gradually fell amongst the People, the Nation was really prepared for such an Alteration. The different Methods observed in the Succession, and the Reasons of such assigned. The several fruitless Attempts in divers Reigns to lessen the Power and Authority of Churchmen, and the Reasons why they then miscarried, but afterwards in Henry the Eighth's time succeeded. The principal Designs and particular Measures each Prince since the Norman Conquest pursued, and the Reasons urged of their different Successes. The variety and danger of Governing by a Party, by what Prince began, and why continued; that it hath been the unhappy Occasions of sinking the Glory of the English Nation in the Eyes of Europe, having really weakened us both at home and abroad.

5. The marvellous Differences in the several European Governments; the Reasons of the several Political Alterations in France, and why the Commons are oppressed in that Kingdom; and why Spain altho' sunk in Strength, yet hath preserved her internal Peace. But in the discoursing upon these Heads, I have been obliged to have recourse to History, wherein methinks, by the different Accounts that are often gave of the same things, there appears to be some Uncertainty. To escape then all Difficulties

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culties that may arise from that Reason, I have carefully avoided intermeddling with such Matters as have been controverted; for I have observed, the Disputes that have usually been between Historians, have been often about such things as are not properly their Province, such as is a Zeal for the supporting some Hypothesis they would defend, or for the undermining one they labour to overthrow; or at least about some attending Circumstances, as Time, Place, Numbers, or Names, which perhaps are there of no great moment; or in justifying, or reproaching the Action; or in squaring it to their own Notions; for as to what only relates to the Fact it self they would record, they for the most part agree: For which Reason I have deduced my Conclusions, from such notorious Facts that I think have not been questioned. But however, such Premises being to be taken, or known by Records, I must desire my Reader that he will not be too hasty in his Censures upon this latter part of the Discourse, unless he is thoroughly acquainted with our English Story, and of such other things as are necessary to be known for the Understanding of what is here intended: And that he will impartially consider the naked Fact, and not mislead himself by Metaphysical Speculations about Words. For in this Discourse I have either reasoned from the certain and undoubted Nature of Man, or from evident Fact; If therefore, Reader, I have

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sometimes assigned the Causes of Changes perhaps somewhat Different from what thou maist have formerly supposed them to have been: I request it of thee to be so ingenuous and so charitable in thy Judgment as to believe that proceeded (from what really it did) the very conceived Nature of the Fact, and not falsified in by any Heterodox, or wild Opinions of my Own. For I must acknowledge in those Changes and Revolutions that concern Religion, I have not departed from my Method of explaining such, by Natural and Political Causes, and so may seem to have excluded extraordinary Assistance, by thus narrowing of them to worldly Reasons. And not only so, but in my reasoning upon such, by too strictly aiming at the Discovery of Truth, I may perhaps incur Censure, in that I have not spared any one Church, Sect, or Party, but shewed that each of these when in Authority, have equally pursued the same Measures, that they have condemned in Others. But in doing of this, I have used no Calumny, for I have neither vilified nor reproached Religion in the General, nor no one Church or Sect in particular; but only proved by Fact, that such is, and hath been the Depravity of Humane Nature that even the dreadful Threats our Blessed Religion denounces, are not always sufficient to deter Men from pursuing their worldly Desires; for the Doctrines of no one Church, nor the Principles

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of no one Sect, have preserved their Members, from falling into the Vices common to the corrupt State of Mankind.

And altho' I have always been of Opinion that Authorities are of no great Moment either to Make, or Justify a Crime; Things being in their own Natures either Good or Bad, and do not become either better or worse, by being either approved or condemned by particular Men: Yet since there may be some Persons that will direct their Judgment more by Authorities than their own Reason; I shall therefore for their Sakes, urge as a Justification (for this manner of Writing concerning Religion) how that some of the most Eminent Divines, who have employed their Pens in giving the World an Historical Account of the several Changes and Progressions of different Religions in particular Countries; have also used and assigned Natural and Political Reasons for such. For notwithstanding it is without peradventure that Providence had an extraordinary part in the first planting the Gospel, and also in the separating our Religion from the gross Fopperies and Idolatries, wherewith it was over-run; which is the only part that I am to Apologise for, yet the Almighty using his Creature Man as the immediate Instrument in this glorious Work, did by him perform it, in such Methods, and ways, as were agreeable to his Nature, and to the ordinary Rules of his own Provi-

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Providence; No Miracles being employed after the first divulging this sacred Truth. The Almighty since the Apostles Time, not using any other Methods for this great Work, than his disposing the Heart of Men to undertake it, and Man using his Natural Faculties to effect it; Which being done by such Means, as fall under our Discoveries, it is from them only I have reasoned, as wanting other Helps to assist me.

Let some say that I have not done this with Judgment, but that I have done it with Ignorance; I shall therefore for their Sakes, urge as a Justification (for this manner of Writing concerning Religion) how that some of the most Eminent Divines, who have employed their Pens in giving the World an Historical Account of the several Changes and Progressions of different Religions in particular Countries; have also used and assigned Natural and Political Reasons for such. For notwithstanding it is without peradventure that Providence had an extraordinary part in the first planting the Gospel, and also in the separating our Religion from the gross Fopperies and Idolatries, wherewith it was over-run; which is the only part that I am to Apologise for, yet the Almighty using his Creature Man as the immediate Instrument in this glorious Work, did by him perform it, in such Methods, and ways, as were agreeable to his Nature, and to the ordinary Rules of his own Provi-

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CHAP. IX.

1. European Governments changable. 2. Clergy in France instrumental in the enslaving the People. The

ERRATA

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Civil

CIVIL POLITY.

A

TREATISE

Concerning the

Nature of Government.

CHAP. I.

1. Solitude unnatural to Man. Society of Men very different from the Herding, Flocking or Living in Companies of other Animals. 2. Man Thinketh, can Deliberate, under no necessity, a free Agent, determines himself. 3. What thinks conjoined to Body; Man's Body incident to continual Wants, which give Desires; proved several ways. 4. Man acts for some End; proved first, in that he hath Perception, Pleasure and Pain. Effects of that, difference between a thinking and unthinking Being; final Causes only respect the First; Secondly, in that

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God hath treated him as a free Agent, by giving him Laws; Thirdly, from the Practice of Men. Promises or Oaths little regarded, when they interfere with his present Designs, when the Dread of Punishment is but remov'd. Of the necessity of Laws; an Objection concerning Good and Pious Men. Act for their own Ends, proved. Nature of Man best Discovered in such as are above or exempt from the dread of Punishment from Humane Laws, who always apparently regard themselves.

IT is most certain Man cannot be long pleased to live in Solitude, the common Frailties of his Nature obliging him at the several Periods of his Life, to require somewhat to be received from others; for in his tender and budding Infancy he is incapable to provide for his own Subsistence. In his Blooming Man-hood he rages under warm Desires, which fiercely dispose him to Court the Company of those who are by Nature best befitted to relieve them; In his Withered and Decrepit Age, when his Health and Strength leave him, he plainly stands in need of assistance, from those whom formerly he hath Fed and Cherished: All which are Proofs his very Nature is not befitted for a lonely solitariness.

Besides the concurrent Practices of all, as yet discovered Nations, abundantly confirm this, there having been observed none of Humane

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Humane Race, but what live in Companies: The most Rude and Barbarous Savages that late Voyages give any Account of, are never observed singly to wander the unfrequented Woods; nor to reside alone in the uninhabited Deserts; but are always found to live together in small Septs or Hords, when their Numbers are not sufficient to raise larger and more powerful Governments, or when their Divisions or some other Reasons have not permitted their forming them.

And wheresoever any Numbers of People have associated, there always are observed some footsteps, some Marks of Order or Oeconomy amongst them; altho' such perhaps in their petty Hords are but few, simple, and imperfect, for the scantiness of their Numbers, and the simplicity of their Circumstances, do not seem to require many Orders or Laws, (if I may so call such, as are used by the Savages) seeming always to Multiply and Refine, as the Numbers of Persons contain'd in the same Community encrease, (as shall be hereafter proved) yet are the very Orders or Laws observed amongst these Barbarians, so adjusted to the Nature of their several Conditions, that they are found sufficient for their own present Peace.

And even these Savage People in their several Oeconomies, far transcend whatsoever can be observed to be practised by the wisest Brutes;

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Brutes; for amongst these may be seen the evident Marks of some Reason, and the undeniable footsteps of some foresight; their Orders or Laws being so contrived, as to look forward to prevent future dangers, and so fashioned as to intend the preservation of the *Life and Property* of every individual Member of the same Community.

Whereas amongst Brutes it is directly otherwise, for notwithstanding some of them at certain Seasons Flock and Herd, and Others always delight to live in Companies; yet that seems not to be the result of Reason or Foresight, but merely to proceed from that common Nature that is diffused thro' the same Species, by which being subjected to the same Wants, they are disposed to pursue the same Means, in order to attain the same End, that is, equally desired, or required by them all; and therefore herd as being directed by the same Appetite to seek after what their common Nature requires: For it is certain amongst such, there is never perceived any signs of regular and established *Orders, Laws, or Rules*; in that the stronger will often injure, nay, sometimes wound and destroy the Weaker, and that not secretly, but forcibly and openly, without any manner of concern, or dread, or fear of Punishment; which is never by Brutes publickly inflicted for any Violences: whereas amongst Human Race, notwithstanding
Men

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Men may have often the same desires, as having the same Wants, yet having reason and foresight, they have invented Methods by speech or otherwise to consent to Orders or Rules, by which the Weaker are protected from the Insults of the Stronger; the whole Community having agreed upon such *Terms* as may preserve every individual Member; by obliging themselves to Punish any Person, that shall break or violate their *Common Orders*.

But before I proceed any farther in these Matters, it will be expedient, for the better comprehending what is aimed at in this discourse, to premise somewhat of the general Nature of Man.

But in the performing of this, I shall not entertain my Reader with any Chimerical Whimsies, or Speculative Hypotheses (the wanton and diverting Amusements of Sedentary and thoughtful Men) but shall only apply my self, to what every Man by Experience may learn from his own Nature, or may plainly observe from the Practices of Others.

II. That Man thinketh, or that He partakes of a Thinking, Intellectual Nature, is a Truth too bright to be question'd, by reason all that Wisdom, Learning, and Knowledge, upon which he so much values himself, and by which he is dignified and distinguished from the inferiour Part of the Creation,
B 3 tion,

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tion, being evidently deduced from, and grounded upon that his Nature, and therefore is no more to be doubted than his Existence.

And that Man, or, if you please, this his Nature, hath a Power of Deliberation, that is, of weighing and considering upon what is then the Subject of his Thoughts, is but what every one's Experience will inform him: And what in Truth every One daily practises in Affairs of greatest Moment. This being in Fact so, Natural Reason will inform us, That the Being that can deliberate, and so hath Power of Consenting or not Consenting, Chusing or Refusing, giving Existency or Non-Existency, to what is thus the Subject of his Consideration, can be, as to that Matter, and at that Moment, naturally under no Necessity, Compulsion, or Constraint: For indeed it is an Absurdity to affirm, That a Being can have a Power to chuse or refuse, will or not will, do or not do, and at the same time to averr, that Being to be under a Necessity of Chusing, Willing, or Doing one Thing and not the Other; for that very Supposition is inconsistent with that his Power of Deliberation, which evidently implies the contrary.

Man then, or, if you please, this his Nature, or Mind, having naturally this Power of Deliberation, (Naturally, I say, for here at once I do declare, That it is not my Intention,

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ention, in any Part of this Discourse, to intermeddle with Religious Controversies, but purely to intend only Natural, or Political Reasons) might perpetually fluctuate under an Indifferency, not inclining to one Thing more than another, was there not Somewhat regarding himself, that should dispose him, in his Preference or Choice; and what doth thus determine him, proceeding immediately from himself, or his own Nature, in that he enjoys that Power before-mention'd, and in that he appears a free Agent, as being exempt (as to that Mental Action) from outward Compulsion, Necessity, or Force; And therefore, as what disposes him in his Preference of one thing before another, arises from himself, so it must plainly respect himself, and so regard either his own Pleasure, Ease or Happiness, or at least the Preservation of his own Subsistence: For which reason Man doth naturally act for some End, that is, doth alway aim at some Good to himself; altho' that sometimes may be so remote, or may be so intermixed with the Good of Others, or the Publick, as thereby not to be directly distinguished or regarded. For although all Mankind, when directed by their own Natures, do agree in that common Point, of pursuing what they believe their own Happiness, yet all Persons not placing their Happiness or Pleasure in the same Objects, do not pursue the same Methods to acquire it; And

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so their Proceedings do not all deserve, nor indeed all fall under the same Characters; For the Actions of Men seem not to be so much Characterized from their own intrinsic Natures, as they are from what Relation they are thought to bear to the Good or Harm of Others; which appears in that we often find such to have different Names, and different Esteems from different persons, being either condemn'd or praised, as the relaters like them.

III. But this thinking intellectual Nature, or if you please Mind of Man, being either a part of Body divinely modified, or a distinct substance lodged and inveloped in passive unthinking Matter, for I pretend not to determine its Nature, (such I understand as constitutes the gross body of Man), However being so perfectly united and conjoined to this Body, as thereby to make or to be considered as one individual being, each of them, viz. Body and Mind, being during Life mutually affected by each Other: And the Body being so composed, as to be under a perpetual Fluxion and Change of parts, there being a continual deceding, streaming, or discharging Somewhat from it, and a dayly Necessity of receiving others, to unite to it or nourish it, whereby naturally it remains incident to a Multitude of wants, which do give pains and uneasiness until removed or satisfied,

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satisfied, as every Man may experience in that, he hungers, and thirsts. Besides being surrounded with a great Variety of other Substances, that by constantly operating upon the Senses affect the Mind with a diversity of Sensations, some of which will be pleasing and agreeable, and so give a Willingness for the Continuing of them; whilst Others being troublesome become offensive and so create a desire to be removed from them; These and a Multitude of such like reasons attending Man in this Mortal State, do perpetually bring upon him, a great Variety of wants, pains, uneasiness, and of course desires.

And this intellectual Nature, or Mind having an immediate power of Operating upon the Body, and of communicating Motion or Rest to the Several parts, (as every one may experience in that he can move or not move, as he pleases) does use and direct this its Instrument, the Body, in the pursuit after such things, as it then imagines, will satisfy its Wants, remedy its pains, or fulfil its desires; which is obvious in that, no Man chuses to continue in pain.

But by reason a human Body is so constituted as to be liable to be hindred in its Operations by an outward Violence; Or may undergo punishment from human Laws, should it be employed in doing what is forbid by them, and by that means the Body

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dy may be kept from pursuing what the Mind wishes for, wills, or requires, and so the Man may be obliged to continue in a state of want, pain, or uneasiness, which his Nature abhors: For which reason it is most plain, that Man must naturally desire that his body may be at liberty, that is, in such a State, or in such a Condition, that he may prosecute, and endeavour to Obtain, what he then wishes for, that is, what he then thinks will relieve his Wants, remove his Pains, or satisfy his Desires, for so long as he suffers under Wants, or labours with Desires, he is not Easie, because he is not Content.

It is from this Reason, that altho the Common Necessities of Mans Nature, dispose him for Society, and the Conveniencies and Securities of Life encline him to consent and submit to live under Laws and Government; yet there Remains in his very Nature, a *Constant Desire after Liberty*, which evidently in fact discovers it self, (not to Multiply many instances) in that all Men are found more desirous to give than to receive Laws.

IV. But by reason this Short, and general way of Reasoning, may appear too Speculative and Refined, to be either comprehended or admitted, I shall therefore Endeavour to Confirm what hath here been thus

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this Summarily offered, by some other Plain and Pregnant proofs.

First, In that Man hath perception, for Natural Reason will inform us, that every Perceptive Being, must have some Sense of *Pleasure and Pain*, as being only Relations to such a Being, or rather Effects arising from such an Action or Operation in such a Being; for different Objects, operating differently, will produce different Effects, some of which will be friendly, and agreeable to a Nature that enjoys perception, and so will affect it someway, with what we term *Pleasure, Satisfaction or Delight*; And on the Contrary, Others will be disagreeable or injurious, and so affect it with what we call *Pain, Trouble or Uneasiness*, or with some degrees of the One or the Other: And then Man having such a Nature, and an Innate, Active power of moving or not moving himself, it is plainly a Consequent to these, He will Naturally incline to seek after and chuse such things, as are thus friendly and agreeable to his Nature, and on the contrary will always Endeavour to Shun and Avoid, what is Troublesome and Offensive: And then having learnt by his own Experience, or being informed by some other way, what Things, have, or will give him Sorrow, Trouble, or Pain, he Endeavours to avoid such, and that before such things actually offer themselves to him: Thus for

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for Instance we dayly see Men, take care to prevent future dangers.

It is true this general Assertion, may seem to admit of some Exceptions, in that Men are observed sometimes to choose Pain; but then if we consider this proceeds, in that there are degrees in these things, and that therefore the lesser Pain, Evil or Suffering, will often have the Esteem of being a Pleasure or a Good, when it is compared with the Greater; and therefore chose not as a Pain or Evil, but as a Means whereby to avoid a greater Evil; thus for Instance, Men will permit a Gangrened Member to be amputated, in order to preserve Life in the other parts; in doing this, the Infirm person does not directly choose the loss of his Limb, but the saving his Life by such an Operation.

And as Pleasure or Pain, are in some degree adjoined to all our Perceptions, so likewise do they some way Accompany all our Actions and Intentions, for whatsoever Men intend or do, (I speak only of such Persons, as being what we call *Compos Mentis*, can govern their own Thoughts, or Actions) they Evidently have a Regard to themselves, always endeavouring by such either to avoid some Evil, or to acquire some Good: This is Evident by Reason, and Confirmed by Fact, for Reason will teach us, that a free Agent that Thinks and Understands, will always consult and intend its own Happiness, or at least the

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the preservation of its own Existence, and not its Misery and Destruction: The first of which will be attended with somewhat we term Pleasure, and the last with somewhat we call Pain, and it is confirmed in fact, by but observing the dayly Practices of Men, how often they vary and change their Opinions and Purposes, sometimes pursuing one thing, and then Changing their Measures leave that, and follow a Contrary; Sometimes Approving and Applauding, what at another time they Vilify and Condemn; by which they plainly prove it is not from any Consideration of the intrinsick Excellency, or Imperfection, included in the very Nature of the Action, Intention, or Thing, they pursue, by reason if it proceeded from that, there could be no Cause for their so frequent Changing their Minds, such things remaining in their own Natures the same, but only and merely to the Relation such are thought to bear to the present or future Good, or Advantage of the Persons Designing or Acting; whose Circumstances being often someways altered, require different Mediums to Attain their desired Point: And so these things as being but Relations to them come to bear different Denominations, and Esteems: For we often find the very same Action to be applauded and admired by some, and to be vilified and condemned by Others;

thers; nay at different times, to be approved and reproached by the very same Persons.

But perhaps a particular Instance may somewhat Illustrate this Power Men have of choosing for themselves; And this Aim or End they have in this Choice, of avoiding Pain, or Danger, and of pursuing Pleasure, or providing for their own Safety. Let us then suppose a Rational Man placed upon a precipice, and there left to determine of his own Fate; will he not be very circumspect, before he moves, and consider well which way to direct his Steps for Safety? will he not Change his Course, as often as he perceives danger? and will he not place his Feet where he hopes for Security? if he does this, as it is most certain he will, he Confirms what I Argue for, viz. That he can deliberate, and direct himself, and does by that regard his own preservation: For if he doth not, he is not the Man I write of, but such a One as the Law Deems, *non Compos*, and so not to be trusted to his own Government, by reason he will not endeavour to preserve himself.

And this instance methinks does point out to us a lively difference to be met with, between the proceedings of a Thinking intellectual Nature, such a one as Man is, and meer passive unthinking Matter; for in the latter there is found no innate active Power,

Power, of beginning, or hindring its own Motion, nor of altering or changing its determinations; for Matter is always observed to move in a straight Line, never deviating from that its Course, unless diverted or hindred, and so necessitated to swerve from it, by some resisting Body; and its Motions are always in proportion to the strength and power of the received impulse. By which it plainly appears, that it hath no innate active Power of its self, that can give its self Motion, when once at Rest, or that can guide or direct it self in any of its proceedings, but that its several Motions, and their Determinations are entirely received from somewhat from without: And that therefore of its self, that is from its own Nature, it cannot act for an End, as having no Power to regulate it self. And that therefore, as a natural consequence of this Observation, altho' some substances formed and composed out of unthinking Matter, are observed to be very curiously and very regularly wrought, as may be instanced in Bodies appertaining to the Animal and Vegetable Kingdom, where the like are orderly produced by the like, yet this cannot proceed from the Nature of meer Matter, by reason that only moving by impulse, must act as directed; for which Cause the parts of Matter in the formation of all such curious and regular Bodies, its certain must be guided and directed by some knowing Being:
By

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By reason where there is no Thought, nor no Self-Active Power of Guidance, Natural Reason will tell us, there can be neither Foresight, Contrivance nor proposed End, and in meer Matter there appears neither of these: for which reason it is evident final Causes can only appertain to thinking and self-moving Beings, and are what makes a real difference, between thinking and unthinking Substances: For those of the first kind, have an actual intrinsick Power of moving, and directing themselves (as hath been observed concerning Man) and therefore always have a regard to their own happiness, or at least existence; whereas those of the latter sort have none, for being moved and directed by somewhat from without that is by impulse, can of themselves have no foresight; as having no power over their own Motions: Thus Man, who is enriched with a thinking Nature, Experience teaches us, can deliberate, and as a Consequent of that, can choose or reject, and hath a power to do or not do; And what therefore determines him in his preference, to give Existence or non Existence to what is then in his thoughts, is the Consideration he hath to his own Happiness or Existence, or their contrary, Misery or non-Existence; whereas unthinking Matter wanting such a Power, hath no such Prerogative: A Thinking Being therefore may be invited or perswaded,

but

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but merely as such, not to be Compelled, for our thoughts are out of the reach of Violence, and are not to be forced. (altho our Bodies may be hindred in the Executing them) but Unthinking matter is to be forced or compelled, but not invited or perswaded.

As therefore Man's Thoughts are free, as being in their very Nature exempt from external Compulsion, and as Man alone can and doth Judge of his own Happiness; so he must Naturally desire a liberty, or freedom for his Body, as thereby he may pursue what he imagines will conduce to it; for otherwise it is Obvious, his Body may be hindred in prosecuting what his Soul desires. It is for this reason, Man will naturally in all Governments, covet after such a State, as that he may be in a Condition to do as he pleases: For if he should be limited or restrained, he may be obliged to continue in such a State as is inconsistent with his present Felicity.

And this Experience teaches us, all Men in some Measure, according to the different Stations they Enjoy in the Community they live in, do; for how restless are Men in their pursuit after Authority, according to the Fortunes or Qualities they possess, each endeavouring in his own or proper Post to be uppermost, that so in that, enjoying some comparative Power, he may have the Pleasure

C

sure

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sure of giving and not receiving Laws: But of this hereafter.

Secondly, In that God himself hath declared in his Revealed Word (which is a sufficient confirmation of the Temper of our Natures) that he hath made Man after his own Image, and by that hath distinguished him from the other part of the Creation; by which Expression the Almighty seems to denote how he had given Man an absolute Sovereignty over his own Actions; and as a Testimony of that, hath treated him as a free Agent, by prescribing him Rules, and giving him positive Laws, by which he is to be Governed; and as a farther Proof of his Freedom, or Power of Directing himself, hath Annexed Rewards and Punishments, to such Laws, as the properest Methods to invite him, being a free Agent, to the observance of them. These Proceedings of the Almighty had been inconsistent with his Attributes of Wisdom and Goodness, had he not given Man such a Nature, as to enable him to deserve them, which could not have been, had he been formed only like Clockwork, and so moved to Action by meer Impulse, or Necessity.

Thirdly, This Truth is farther confirmed by the constant Practice of Men, for whatsoever is done by all Mankind, must proceed from his very Nature, and such is the perpetual pursuit of what he esteems his *Happiness, Pleasure,*

CIVIL POLITY. 19

Pleasure, Delight, Satisfaction, or Content: or his always aiming at some End in all his proceedings, that does in some way or other regard himself: He that doubts this, may but examine his own breast, for the Reason or Motive, why he prefers this thing and not that, and he will plainly perceive, it is founded in himself, and does ultimately regard himself: But by reason some Persons perhaps will not so seriously reflect upon their own Thoughts, as to discover this; or at least will be so partial to their Natures, as not to acknowledge it: or so wedded to some prejudices, as to disown it. I shall therefore to remove such Mens Scruples, endeavour to prove this by some other ways; and in performing this, I shall produce some common Instances, such as I hope are too notorious to be questioned, and yet will plainly manifest the Position, *viz.* That Men do in all their Designs or Actions Primarily and Principally Act for some End, and by that regard themselves, without any respect to others, any farther than they themselves are someway concern'd: But the doing this by particular Instances, would be an endless Labour, since that would require the examining of all the proceedings of Men, which being so many and so different, would take up Volumes, and be the Work of Ages: Neither shall I go about to prove it by enumerating the Frauds, Deceits, or other Villainies of Men, that are daily committed in all Governments;

wherein Men so notoriously come by the most unrighteous Methods, to get for themselves, by the injuring of others; (altho' such perhaps must be allow'd Proofs,) in that Men do and will pursue these measures, notwithstanding all Governments have annexed Punishments to their Laws, to deterr them from such unjust proceedings: However this Use may modestly be made of it, that it is a full Proof of the general Sense of Mankind, concerning their own Natures, in that they thus in their most solemn Proceedings, think it necessary to manacle themselves by Laws, and annex Punishments to these, as believing such the only Expedients to keep them from injuring others, which the satisfying their desires, would often lead them to do: For when the Danger or Sense of Punishment is removed, Experience, and the general History of Mankind will teach us, what small Trust is to be reposed in the goodness of Man's Nature: Nay how little his own Compacts, Promises or Treaties avail, such being rarely observed to be of any longer continuance, than they are supposed to be of any Advantage or Safety; for perhaps the Weaker dare not violate them, and it is not the immediate Interest of the Stronger to do it: Nay how that even the Sacred Sanctions of an Oath, in which Men call the great God of Heaven to be a Witness to their present Proceedings, and where they are threatned with a certain suffering for the violation

violation of it, yet by reason the Almighty doth not often pour down his immediate Vengeance upon the Violaters, how often are they neglected? so much does this his Nature in pursuing his own Ends, or what he then believes to be his present advantage, (altho' in a false and mistaken Method) prevail.

But perhaps it may be objected, that there are several Religious and Devout Persons, who do not seem to Act for any End or Interest of their own, but who always endeavour to regulate their Actions by the Divine Will; doing or not doing, as they believe God commands or forbids, without any respect to themselves; choosing rather to suffer than knowingly to violate his Laws.

Before I answer this Objection, it will be necessary to premise; That by Man's Acting for some End, or his someways regarding his own Interest, or himself; I do not only intend his aiming at only some private Gain, Profit or Advantage, as it is applied to Riches or Worldly Wealth; but in the general to any other thing that he is pleased with: For it is certain Men's minds are as different as their Palates, some Men preferring Wisdom, Learning, Religion, Honour, or a lasting Reputation, before Money, or Worldly Treasure.

This being thus premised, I think I may affirm, that the most Pious, and very best of Men, really and truly as much regard them-

themselves, and as much pursue their own proper Ends, as the most dissolute and luxurious; And the great difference that is to be observed in the proceedings of these Persons, arises, in that the first being strengthened by a holy and lively Faith grounded upon God's Promises, do place their own Ends, or Interest in a full Hope, and future Expectation of Eternal Happiness: For these Persons having deeply Engraven in their own Minds, a Belief of the Truth of the Divine Laws, and how the Almighty Can and Will hereafter, either Reward or Punish them, as they conform to them, or neglect them, they accordingly believe and do, in prospect of being Eternally Happy, or Eternally Miserable: And methinks the Almighty having adjoined Rewards and Punishments to his Laws, is a Proof, that Men were to be invited to an Obedience, by what regarded their own Natures: For in these Devout Men the consideration of this Future State, so outweighs Temporary Pleasures, as thereby to give the Preference to that side; whereas in Voluptuous and dissolute Persons, it happens directly otherwise, for in such, this Future State is not much dreaded, or at least not much considered: Altho' perhaps at some times both believed and feared, as we may often observe in the Sickness, or declining Years of such Persons. The Natural Reason of this seems to be in that the Mind of Man being of a finite Nature,

ture, is incapable of viewing a Multitude of Idea's at the same Moment, and therefore can only consider them successively: And what is not actually in the Mind, cannot then influence it any way; for which Reason unless the Mind, at the Moment it is willing Existence, or not Existence, to what is the Subject of its then consideration, hath some Sense of this Future State, or somewhat Analogous to it, it cannot be affected by it. Wherefore those Persons in whose Mind the Sense of this Future State is so deeply imprinted, that it is as 'twere always there, or at least ready to start up there; such Persons, I say, that have a constant Sense of this Future State, are by that means deterr'd from practising what others of more Voluptuous Minds pursue, who not having an immediate Sense of this Future State (for what is not, cannot operate) do what their present thoughts suggest.

That this is really in Nature So, methinks appears pretty evident, in that we may observe Men professing Christianity, who at some times will seem most strictly to conform to its most holy Precepts, Trembling at Wickedness, and Starting at what they believe a Sin: And yet at another time, will commit Crimes and Debaucheries, that are inconsistent with the Purity of such Doctrines; and afterwards repent and be sorry for what they have done; and these have interchang-

ably returned, the same Man wantonly Sinning, and afterwards as seriously Repenting.

But that we may clearly See the genuine Nature of Man, let us view him in such a State, where he is left at full liberty to follow his own desires, that is, where he is removed out of the Reach of Human Laws, and so out of the dread of Human Punishment, and there we shall evidently discover him; directing all his Measures for the Advancement of his own present designs; And such I take to be the State of all such Persons that have the *Supreme Power in any Community*; for they that make Laws must be themselves above Laws, by reason the Laws are only their Promulgated Wills, which they can alter and Change at pleasure: View these I say, that are thus plumed with Majesty, and decorated with Sovereignty, and observe how they direct all their Measures to their own Advantage; for it is found impracticable to bind these to any thing that is to their Disadvantage, when there is no force to oblige them to perform their Covenants; Promises, Oaths, or plighted Faith, being as often Neglected or forgotten, as they have been given, when ever such but interfere with their Ambitious designs: I shall not enumerate Particular Instances, to confirm so notorious a Truth, there being no Nation in *Europe* but may afford Examples of this kind. However our own late unhappy
Misfortunes

Misfortunes sufficiently evince, what small Trust, what slender Confidence is to be reposed in such Cobweb securities; for by those we were Experimentally taught, that Princes will not be Shackled by Laws or Oaths, whensoever they have a Power or Opportunity to Break through them. The like sad Truth we may learn, from the more deplorable State of some of our Neighbours; who might at this day have enjoyed their Religion and Liberties, had there been any Security in the Faith of Princes.

But not to insist upon Instances between Princes and their Subjects, since some Modern Doctrines may perhaps Justify, or Excuse breach of faith in such Cases, by teaching that Royal Faith may be Recalled; in that Kingly Authority, being, as they assert, founded upon a Divine Right, is not to be lessened, by the Prince's Concessions: For, by that Doctrine Subjects can have no Right, by such promises, any longer than Majesty pleases, such being but meer Acts of Grace, or Marks of Sovereignty, which may be recalled; by reason whatsoever appertains to an Office of Divine Institution, is not to be altered by any Human Authority; And Kings being only Gods Ministers entrusted by him in that Office, can have no proper Authority of themselves to lessen it.

I shall therefore to Obviate any Arguments
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that may be drawn from such doctrines, observe how little Compacts, Treaties, Promises, or Oaths are Regarded, between Sovereign Princes, or independent States, whensoever the Violating such administers any Advantage to the Stronger party; And the Persons which enjoy these Powers, being in a kind of State of Nature to each other, that is equal, for being Supreme themselves, in independent *Communities*, are not Subordinate to any; for they acknowledge no Superiority nor Subjection, and each partaking of the same Privileges, of being Supreme, and giving Laws to their particular People, are therefore Equal, for which reason they must have a Reciprocal Right to each others Promises, if it be allowed that Man ever hath any by such.

But in the performing this, that deference and Respect, that is justly due to Crowned Heads, and Sovereign States, will not permit me to descend to particular Instances of Notorious and Repeated breach of faith, that are yet fresh in our Memories, for that would too much Reflect upon some Princes, that are as yet to be numbred among the Living; I shall therefore to avoid an unmannerly Treatment of Crowned Heads, only in the General remark what is most Notorious to all *Europe*: How that Armies have entred some Neighbouring Provinces, the Dominions of other Princes, Seizing, Ravaging, and Destroying, when at the same time

time the Publick Ministers of the same Crown, have carried Olive Branches, protesting and promising nothing but Peace, and Friendship; How Fleets in time of Peace, have been Intercepted, Towns, and Fortresses Beleagured or Surreptitiously taken, Countries Pillaged, Subjects Rissed or Ruined, nay Sovereign Princes themselves made Prisoners, and all this before the Temple of *Janus* was opened or War Proclaimed; how repeated Leagues have no sooner been signed, but they have been Violated, and Oaths no sooner taken but broken: And these things seem to be approved, in that the Injured or Oppressed, are neither Assisted nor Relieved by their Neighbours, unless their own immediate Securities induce them to it; and these have not been peculiar to any Single Prince, but are what have been Practised by Several.

By which proceedings it may be concluded, that Man, if left at liberty, would always prosecute his own desires, without any Regard to the Good of Others, any further than as such is intermixed with his Own; by reason Princes, or Persons in Authority, (who are of the Same Nature) and are Exempt from the Penalties, or Enforcements of Human Laws, have no Regard to the Peace and Welfare of Others; any longer than the Continuance of such is for their own Interest, Ends or Safety; and not

not only so, but they seem tacitly to approve the Violating of Treaties, and breach of Faith, whensoever dominion is to be acquired; in that they do not unite to punish such as Violate them: In short, if we may guess at their Opinions by their Actions, to perform Promises, and to be just to Treaties, seem to be esteemed by them, but as the Proper Provinces of private Men, who being doomed to live under Laws, and therefore are obliged by Penalties, to perform their promises, and fulfill their Covenants; but that they themselves being placed in Supreme Authority, and so without the immediate reach of Punishment, are not to be obliged by such; but that their own Ends, Interest, or Safety, is what in Wisdom they ought to respect.

For did Princes or those in Authority, but Steer their Actions by any other Needle than that of their own Advantage; did they not dayly alter and vary their Measures according to the several Views they have of that; did they not lay hold of all Opportunities of enlarging their dominions, or aggrandizing their Power, did they ever stop at any means, that promised fairly to advance Empire, or gratify their Ambition, how happy might Mankind live, the Subjects of differing Princes might enjoy a peaceful security: No fears, no dreads of Ruine, would disquiet their Thoughts: Since there

there is no *Prince, State, Country or People in Europe*, but might believe themselves safe from Ravage, Ruine, War, or Devastation, were there any faith or security from Publick Treaties, Oaths, or Engagements, Christendom might enjoy an Universal Repose, Christians might be Blessed with soft and lasting Peace, Friendship might flourish, and good Will abound between Princes, and between their Subjects: No War, or Hatred, between Crowned heads, no barbarous butchering of Miserable Men, that are now in Multitudes destroyed in Bloody Battels, and are thrown in marvellous Heaps in Sieges, as base and Contemptible Rubbish, as if such poor Mortals, were not of the same humanity with greater Personages, but were compounded of a baser Metal, and so as much below the Care and Providence of the Almighty, as they seem to be of Princes his pretended Vicegerents? As if such worthless Images of the Great Creatour, (if I may so call them) were made for no other End, but to be the bloody and miserable Victims offered to the Pride, Ambition, Revenge, Folly, or Phrensy, of a Man, who is Naturally their Equal, and whom only Birth, Chance, or perhaps only their own Vanity hath thus Advanced to be their Ruler.

V. It is True these things will not appear Surprizing, if we but heedfully Reflect upon

on our own Natures, which do perpetually encline us to satisfy our own desires; and in order to that, to pursue such Measures, as we think necessary for such an End; and Princes or Persons in Authority, usually placing *Theirs* in enlarging Empire, or aggrandizing their own Power do therefore prosecute such, whereby common Calamities and Destructions ensue; whereas other persons not being in such publick Stations, are not in a Capacity to pursue such; however there designs cannot be accompanied with such Publick Misfortunes. And such being the Depravity of Human Nature, that temporary Advantages ordinarily have a stronger influence upon their Minds, as being present, than Future or Eternal Ones; by reason such being considered at a distance, do not make so deep Impressions. And then if Princes, like other Men pursue but their own Desires, yet being in Publick Capacities, their proceedings must Naturally Influence the Publick, and so occasion either Advantages, or Misfortunes, to the whole Body Politick, of which they are the Common Head: Whereas the Actions or Designs of private Men, seldom Extending beyond themselves or their own Families, rarely can affect many Others.

From what hath been thus Summarily and only in the general Remark'd, I think it may be Concluded, that Man when left
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to himself, that is, when he is out of the reach of Laws, or dread of Punishment, or force, doth in all his Actions Regard some End or Interest of his Own: and that this, for the most part, Regards some temporal Advantage, however in what thing soever he places it in, he will Naturally endeavour to accomplish it; This I think is but what Natural Reason will plainly teach us, in that he is a thinking Intelligent being, and hath a power over himself, and so will not choose to Continue in a State of Uneasiness, which he must do, if he cannot satisfy his own desires.

I shall now therefore prove that this is so far from being any defect or fault in his Nature, that it is Really and Truly the very Excellency and Perfection of it; and that if there is any Misfortunes attend him, by reason of this his Inclination, it only proceeds from his Misplacing, or his misapplying it, or in the prosecution of mistaken and unrighteous Measures in order to obtain it; which appears evident by what God hath undeniably done for us.

First, Naturally, in that having created us free Agents, He hath endowed us with reason and a power of governing our selves, that thereby we may know, and pursue our own happiness.

Secondly, As a Confirmation of this our Nature, he hath given us positive Laws, and hath invited us to Obedience, by the promise of Everlasting Happiness. And

And from this very consideration, what God hath thus done for us, in giving us Laws under such Conditions; and also by reflecting upon our own Minds, the very best of us need not be ashamed to acknowledge, that it is more in respect to our selves, that is to our own Happiness or Misery, that we submit to his Precepts, than to any consideration we have of the Goodness Excellency or Perfection of his Divine Essence: For did we not Believe and Know, that God hath a Power to Reward or Punish us, and that he will most certainly do it, I am apprehensive that the mere consideration of his perfections would not invite many to his Service, when such were not agreeable to their present Pleasures. And this methinks seems to be the sense of all *Divines*, by reason in their Religious Discourses they so Pathetically press Happiness or Misery, attending immortality, as a Motive to persuade Men to an Obedience to the Divine Laws; Nay had not the Almighty himself permitted the Sense of a Future State, to be used as a Motive to induce Man to Obedience, he would never have revealed it.

These things being, I suppose, sufficient to prove that Man as he is a thinking rational Being, doth, and always will, intend his own Happiness, Content, Pleasure or Satisfaction; that is, that he always proposes some Good to himself, or aims at some End, that regards his own Happiness or Existence: And that there-

therefore the Good as well as the Great, the Virtuous as well as the Vicious, the Religious as well as the Prophane, the Chast as well as the Voluptuous, all agree in this, that they intend their own Happiness; altho they marvellously disagree not only in the means whereby to obtain it, but in the very Object they place it in, as must be concluded from the difference to be observed in the several proceedings of Men.

CHAP. II.

1. *A permanent happiness never to be acquired in this life, yet always desired.*
2. *Satisfying Mens Wants, or fulfilling their desires the utmost of Worldly happiness.*
3. *Pleasure or Pain what determines to do, or not do. Wants give desires; two Sorts, Natural, and Relative; the last give great trouble, yet are not Irresistible like the first. Natural wants of two Sorts, One proper to the Body, the Other to the Mind.*
4. *Desires proceed from our Wants; when under desires, not content, and so not happy; Man will endeavour to satisfy them; His own Nature liable to wants, Content incompatible.*
5. *Man in society restrained by Laws, to which punishments are annexed; Punishment what, deters Man from violating Laws. Being a Pain: he avoids that, desires to*

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to Satisfy his wants; submits to him who can do this. He that relieves or feeds the people, will have them, and may Command them. 6. Necessaries of Life of a perishable Nature. Inequalities in such things will be amongst Men, Necessity of Exchange. In Exchanges Men aim at some equality, Requires a standard of Value, that of a durable Nature. The Money or Wealth of a People passes in Exchange for every thing. 7. Money will not multiply without Industry. No Bank of Money inexhaustible; Circulated by the Means of Land, or Trade; Cement of Government. 8. Political Powers grounded upon our Natural Wants. Religion hath an Influence upon Government, and why, shewed. Present Pam or Evil more prevalent upon most Men, than future; the Reason, Illustrated. 9. Political discourses uncertain; Occasioned by confounding Religion and Polity; which are derived from different Authorities, Religion of Divine, Civil Polity of human Institution, 10. Laws Regard the Welfare of those that make them. What ascertain property. 11. Human Laws respect particular Communities, being calculated only for that People, different in Countries. 12. Gods Laws respect all Mankind. Difference between divine and human Laws. 13. To explain Laws requires the same Authority as to make them. Gods Laws perfect so far as necessary to Salvation; uncertainty of Expositions; Mysteries not to be explained. 14. Religion

Religion. Divisions how multiplied. An Instance in Mahometism. 15. Recapitulation.

I. ALtho the pursuit of happiness is as inseparable from the Nature of Man, as the Tendency towards its own Center is to unthinking Matter; yet as the latter can never attain that desired Point, so the former can never enjoy an uninterrupted Bliss, a perfect and lasting Content. For his Body will often labour under Pain. Hunger and Thirst will return, the difference of Seasons and Inconveniencies of Weather, will Naturally happen, warm desires at some periodical times of his Age will attend him; And Anxious Cares for his offspring will disquiet him; all which must give some interruptions to his Content: add to all this a Variety of Infirmities, and Diseases, that will sometimes afflict him. And a Multitude of desires that must arise from the marvellous diversity of External Objects, that daily Operating upon his Senses, must differently affect him, for some by gently soothing, and softly touching those tender Instruments, will give a sort of pleasure, and therefore are both loved and liked; Whilst others more roughly striking those curious Organs, do give them disorders, and so are disliked and avoided; from these and such like Considerations, it is most manifest Man cannot in this Earthly State, Attain a permanent Happiness, a perfect and uninterrupted

rupted Bliss. But then if we remove our Thoughts a little further, and Consider him as a Member of a Community, we shall then perceive, how his most pleasing hours are often embittered with racking Cares; for disappointments in his designs will often happen, Envy and Emulations will sometimes arise when he sees others possess what he believes he deserves, or at least what he desires; besides a Multitude of Inquietudes that will encircle him, in that he is restrained by Laws, governed and overawed by Punishments, and censured and despised by Others, &c. by all which his Quiet or Content must be disturb'd.

II. Such then being the undoubted Nature, and also the Civil State of Man, it must follow, the utmost of his Happiness must consist but in the then Enjoyment of what will remove, or satisfy his present desires, that is, the Attainment of what he wishes. For as by an uneasiness arising from the Want of what is desired, his Quiet is interrupted, so by the Satisfying that his Content is for the present restored: But in that he may be hindred in the pursuit, after such things, as he imagines will perform this, should he be bridled by Laws, or restrained by Violence, (for Natural Reason will plainly teach us, if he is restrained, he may be hindred in the acquiring what his desires aim at) for which Cause Man must naturally covet such

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a State, as that he may be in a Capacity to pursue such Methods, as he is perswaded will satisfy his desires, and thereby cure his discontent. And that a State of Liberty, or being in a Capacity of doing or not doing, as Man pleases, in order to accomplish this and thereby perfect his then happiness, is what Man really thirsts after; appears, not only evident from the consideration of his Nature, but is confirmed from his Constant Practices; for no one Man is ever observed to choose servitude or voluntarily to Subject himself to the will of Another; (it is true Mens Necessities often oblige them to it) but that is not properly Choice, for who is there amongst Men, but had much rather be Master than Servant, Patron than Slave, but prefers to Rule rather than to Obey? It is from this Source, the publick Calamities that so often afflict Kingdoms, proceed, which appear by the frequent Strugglings between Prince and People, and between Subject and Subject, about Liberty, Superiority, Preeminence and Authority; It is likewise from the same Fountain, the private Misfortunes in particular Families, arise, occasioned by the disobedience of Children, or Stubbornness and Wilfullness of Servants, in that all these would not willingly be under restraint, but would be left in a Capacity of pursuing their own desires: for being denied or forbid that, they fall into those recited Crimes.

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But notwithstanding this settled Inclination after Liberty, yet there are none of human Race but what associate, and live in Companies; and but what form and observe some Order, some Government amongst themselves, by which this desired Liberty must be restrained; for where Men are Subject to the will of Others, as it is plain in Government some must be; there they must be in some Measure stripped of this desired Power, of doing as they please. To comprehend then how this is performed, we must consider that the common Necessities of Mans Nature encline him to Society, that Society amongst Equals, is not to be continued without settling some Rules, Laws or Orders, that such must introduce some Civil differences or Superiority, (for he that Commands must be Superior to him that Obeys); the difficulty then appears to be, in discovering how that Superiority, or Authority is continued in any one, or more Men; when Naturally every *Man* is more desirous to give than to receive Laws; and yet some sort of Order or Government is Common to all Mankind; what then is the Cement or Bond that holds Men thus together, must be somewhat that is common to Men, which I shall now endeavour to show.

III. Pleasure

III. Pleasure and Pain are the two hinges, upon which Mens Resolves Principally turn; the first is always Coveted, the last Avoided; the frequent Return of his Natural Wants give him great Uneasiness, the satisfying of which, is a Pleasure, and therefore desired; but he cannot always perform this in Community without Punishment, (which being a Pain he will endeavour to avoid) in that the Laws of the Community may forbid the pursuing of what his desires aim at; for which reason, as his Natural Wants will incessantly sollicite him, to Satisfy them; So the dread of punishment from the *Community*, will deter him from performing of it, by such Methods as the Civil Laws forbid.

But before I proceed to explain what is here further Intended, I think it will not be Improper to premise somewhat, of what I have termed Wants, or what gives Men uneasiness, and so of Course Excites desires.

Our Wants may not unfitly be divided into two sorts, One of which are Natural and therefore Real, and may be considered as Appertaining to Men in all States.

The Other are only Relative and therefore Imaginary, as having no foundation in his Nature, but respect him only in *Society*, that is, as he is a Member of a particular *Community*.

The First of these may again be divided into two kinds, viz. First such as properly Arise from his Body, as Hunger, Thirst defence against the Inconveniences of Weather, &c.

The Second are such as only relate to his Soul, or Mind, when it is Considered as Capacitated to Subsist; after the Death or dissolution of the Body: of this sort are to be Numbred the dread Arising from an Expectation of Eternal Misery, or the Exclusion from Everlasting Glory, for it is certain that even the Sense of these, altho looked upon at a distance, or in futurity may and do actually Affect him, for he having a perswasion of a Future Subsistence and a Power of Considering, that the time that is to come will be present; And that then he must undergo those Dreadful Sufferings, the very Thoughts, or Apprehensions of that Wretched and dismal State, will give him present Anxieties, and thereby Create immediate desires, to avoid them.

The Second General Sort, such as I have called Relative, or Imaginary, have no real footing in Our Natures; but only Regard, or Attend Man, when he is considered as a Member of a Community, and so can relate to him but as he is in that State; of this kind are Riches, Honours, Dignities, Reputations, Superiorities, or Differences, amongst Men; for these and a great many more of this

this kind, are founded in, or plainly proceed from Society; And are only the Workmanship of our own Minds, which we form by Comparing the different Circumstances and Conditions of Men: And yet we so fondly dote upon these Poppets, these Airy Phantoms of our own making, as to Imagine our selves Wretched if we do not Enjoy them; as Eagerly pursuing them, as if they immediately related to our very Subsistences: Nay it is these glittering Trifles that give us the greatest Troubles, and heaviest Cares; for few Persons are so Miserably Wretched in Society, but that they may procure the Necessaries for Life, but such only, in a Civil State, are seldom esteemed sufficient, unless accompanied with some of these Vanities.

But notwithstanding these Relative or Imaginary Wants, are what usually give Men the greatest Inquietudes; yet such cannot come in Competition, with what we have called Natural or Real; for these immediately relating to our very Subsistence, are in their very Natures Irresistible; obliging us by the Severest Pains to endeavour the Satisfying them; thus for Instance, the Gnawing Pains of Biting hunger, will Compell Men to Contemn Laws, and to despise the Terror of Punishment, when by such they are forbid the relieving their Starving Natures: For notwithstanding Punishments, which always imply Pain, are what Men will Naturally endeavour

endeavour to Avoid; yet there being degrees in Pain, the Gentler when Compared with the Severer, will be esteemed as a Pleasure, and therefore Preferred; And the racking Pains of Famishing Hunger, or Scorching Thirst will far exceed the dreadfulest Threats a Law can make. It is for this Reason that Men will rather Steal than Starve, altho' the Laws of the Country declare it Death to those that Commit that Crime; For in this Case the present Internal Sufferings, are so Grievous, that our Natures are Compelled to endeavour the removing them, that so we may be Delivered from so Intolerable a Misery, whose Continuance must be destructive to our present beings.

Whereas on the Contrary, what I have termed Relative or Imaginary Wants, being only founded in the Judgments or Opinions of Men, (for they do not immediately Relate to our Subsistence) which they make in Society, by Comparing the severall Conditions, Fortunes, or Circumstances of Men, and so Judging of Happiness, not so much by what they themselves truly want, but by what they see or think others possess; So that altho these are the frequent Occasions of creating great Inquietudes, yet not being founded, as I have said, in our Natures, nor not immediately Regarding our Subsistence, they are not, like the former, unalterable, and Irresistible, but may and are by the Strength of our

our own Judgments, often Changed and withstood, for it seems to be for this purpose, that Ethicks, or Moral Philosophy is Instituted, that by the help of that we may Learn (as to these Vanities) to Regulate our desires, and thereby keep our Minds Content. However Certain it is that these are never pursued, but when there is an affluence of all the Necessaries for our Natural Wants. For when Men are Starving in a Desert, they are not solicitous about Wealth, but employ their Thoughts how to get Food to Satisfy their hungry Stomachs; When Men are wandering in a WilderNESS, and Each moment Dread the Ravenous Mouths of some hungry Tyger, they are not concerned how to obtain Sovereignty, or Dominion, but how to be delivered from their present dangerous Solitude. And further that these are only Relations between Men, and so imply Society, is plainly Evident to any one who will but Consider, how none can be Rich, where none are Poor, No one can be Great, where no one is Mean, Nor no one Superior, where none are Inferior; so that these things being subsequent or concomitant to Society or Government, can never be supposed to Exist, but where that is.

IV. This being premised, it is certain when a Man is in Want, he is someways uneasie

ease (be his Want either Real or Imaginary) and then he is not Content or Satisfied in his present State; by reason he then covets after, or desires somewhat that he hath not; and therefore his Nature will prompt him to pursue what he imagines will deliver him from this Inquietude: For it is evident no Man would willingly continue in Pain or Uneasiness. Whatsoever therefore Men believe, will contribute towards the removing this Pain or Uneasiness, they will Naturally pursue, and what will increase or continue it, they will shun or avoid: Wherefore if such as I have termed Relative or Imaginary Goods, such as Superiority, Honour, Glory, Wealth, &c. are really considered as somewhat wanting, and so give Uneasiness, they will be evidently coveted and pursued; and where there is no such Uneasiness from the want of them, they will be neglected, if not despised. And then, if it be considered, whatsoever Men desire, they would willingly obtain, and of consequence would be in a capacity to prosecute such Measures, as thereby to affect it; but by reason in Governments Men are bounded by Laws, which may restrain or hinder them from following such Methods, as they perhaps imagine are necessary for the attaining what they desire: That therefore Men must naturally covet such a State, wherein they may be in a condition to prosecute what they please, thereby to obtain their desired purposes. For
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notwithstanding some Men may object some of those things that are always esteemed praiseworthy, such as being Good, Great or Just, are of such a Nature, that they are not to be acquired or establish'd, but by pursuing such Measures as relate to Others, whereby that, viz. the Good of others is often considered as the first Motive or only Inducement to such Proceedings; Men usually stopping their Enquiries there, as if such virtuous Actions had no other Ends; yet if such are traced to their Source, they will be discerned primarily to respect the Actor, and but secondarily other Men. By reason no Man can directly affect Pain, Danger or Death; such things being inconsistent with his very Nature; if therefore he chuses these, it cannot be that he doth it, because he really likes them, (for his very Nature abhors them) but that he proposes some Advantages, some Ends to himself by them, that appear to him to transcend all the Anguish and Difficulties he is to suffer: Thus the Old Romans had so far inculcated the Sense of Glory into the Minds of their Citizens that they would scorn Danger, and despise Death (to Eternalize their Name) for their Countries Good; and thus the same (altho' now a mistaken Spirit) actuated the Arm of a bloody Felton to stab him, whom his Party accused as the cause of our then Publick Misfortunes, thereby to establish upon himself a lasting Reputation amongst

mongst those Persons he valued, for performing (as he thought) so Glorious an Act: For he was so far from endeavouring to conceal himself, that he shewed the Hand and Knife that he might be known: And thus the bigotted *Ravillac* imbrew'd his Hands in the great *Henry's* Blood, hoping by so execrable a Fact, to merit Heaven, altho' he lost his life. For as the latter of these perpetrated that horrid Murder, upon the hopes perhaps of future Rewards, for having by so bold and dangerous a stroke, delivered his Religion from a Prince he thought no Friend to it, so the former Sacrificed their Lives, as they thought for their Countries Good, that so they might immortalize their Names to Posterity. Besides it is not improbable but such Men that dare perform these bold undertakings may tast a present Pleasure by them, by viewing, as it were in their own Thoughts, the future Glories, that such great Actions must entail upon their Memories; For Man by considering the Images of things that are to come, does by that represent them, as if then really present, and so is immediately affected by them: And that this is really so, I think appears evident, in that Men so often please themselves with airy day Dreams of what they wish; for if they were not delighted with these Chimeras, they would never Cherish them, since being Creatures of their own

making, it lies in their Power to remove or continue them.

But to return: Relative or Imaginary Goods or Pleasures, having their Value or Esteem from Men, are as different as the Countries, Ages, Tempers, Complexion, or Circumstances of People, for some Nations Admire what others despise. Nay, One Man will value what another contemns; and at some Periods of his life, will dislike what at another he approves; it being as impossible to gratifie in these things, all Men's Minds with the same things, as it is all Mens Palates with the same Foods: Whereas our Natural and Real Pleasures are common to all Ages Countries and People, for every Man is pleased with satisfying his Hunger, with gratifying his Thirst, with easing his wearied Limbs, with defending his Body against the inconveniences of Seasons, &c.

V. However our Natures, or our Civil Conditions, rendering us incident to Wants; and such giving us *Uneasiness*, and so *desires*, is the reason, why we cannot slide away our Houts without some Wishes; for such not permitting us to be compleatly satisfied, in that we still want somewhat to be either added or removed; whereas, were we perfectly content, there could be no Motive to desire. But such a State being incompatible to Man for reasons already alledg'd, it must follow the

the utmost of his Happiness or Satisfaction must consist in the fulfilling his *desires*, since it is from them, or what causes them, that he receives his Inquietude: And therefore that he must naturally propend to acquire what will gratifie his *Wishes*, and that by such Ways and Methods as he imagines most proper. But Men living in Societies are Governed by Laws, by which they often are restrained from doing, what perhaps their *desires aim at*; and so are obliged to continue in a State of Uneasiness, which their very Natures dislike: For which Reason Men would never continue in a State of Obedience, unless Punishments were Annex'd to Laws, that would be more grievous when inflicted, than the present Uneasiness that moves the Violation of them; it is from this Reason Penalties are essential to Law, for Laws without such, would be but good Advice.

The Nature then, or common Necessities of Men encline them to *Society*, and that not being to be continued without Laws, by which the Members of that Body are to be Regulated and Governed; by which Law, *property also* is determin'd; that is, what shall be one Mans, and what anothers, is in that Community ascertained: And whosoever there invades what that Law hath made anothers, becomes liable to *Punishments, which being Evils or Pains, are what our Natures would avoid*: It is then this dread of Punishment

ment that deterrs Men from Violating Laws; and more especially in that they are so proportioned, as to out-weigh any Advantage that may be reaped by the Transgression of them. But altho' the dread of Punishment is what contains Man in Obedience, yet the Peace of *Society* could not be long Preserved, unless this Power of punishing was left to some one Man, or Men, that might indifferently inflict it upon Offenders; for should it be left to the discretion of every one to do this, confusion must immediately follow, by reason Interest, Passion, or Revenge, would often carry Men to unjustifiable Executions.

But notwithstanding the Nature of Government requires this, yet considering the Nature of Man, which Society (or if you please Government) doth not Alter, this Power could not be Peacefully continued in the same Persons hands; unless they likewise enjoy somewhat of a Common Advantage, whereby they may Cement or Unite Men to them; for if Man had no Advantage by his Obedience, he would never Submit to it, and if Men should withstand or Oppose this Power, all Orders in Society would be Confounded, and Government Subverted; to Comprehend then how this Power or Superiority is continued, in one, or more Mens hands, and so the Peace of a Community preserved, we must consider farther, how that Society or Government

Government will necessarily produce Inequalities, or Differences in the Fortunes and Conditions of Men, for there will be always found some, that have more Care, Cunning or Industry than Others, and so will make Provisions against future wants, and whatsoever is thus gained, the Laws of the Community gives them an Entire property to, and of Course they have a Power or Right to dispose of such things as they please. And Man in Society continuing subject to his Natural Wants, for Hunger and Thirst will return, which will by there gnawing Pains, incessantly Sollicite him to Satisfie them, which he having no Provisions of his Own, cannot perform; and if he takes what is Anothers, he Violates the Law, and so incurs Punishment: Being thus under the Sufferings of his Natural Wants which he cannot withstand, and under the Terrours of Punishment, if he Satisfies them, by unlawfull Methods, that is by taking what is not his own, both which, as Pains, being Grievous to his Nature, he will Avoid. He inclines, to supply these his Natural Wants that are Irresistible, by such Ways or Means, that are not attended with Pain, and so most easy and agreeable to his Nature. And there being a difference in the Fortunes of Men, as hath been said, that is some will have Gained (for it matters not at present by what Methods) greater quantities of such things, as are useful

ful for Man's Pleasure, Conveniency, or Subsistence and thereby have an Opportunity of Relieving them that need such, which if they do, they oblige them, and so as it were tye and cement them to their Interest, and so make them their Instruments to execute what they Command; for if such do not Honour and Obey these their Benefactors, they may withhold their Bounty, and so reduce these needy, to suffer under their Natural Wants: Or at least by the Laws, if they Relieve them by unjust Methods. If this Plenty then of Necessaries, or Provisions for Men, is Accumulated or Lodged in the hands of those that have the Superiority or Power in the Community, the Government there stands upon a sure Foundation, and may continue in Peace, the Members of it readily giving Obedience to their Laws. But if these Necessaries are obtained by Private Persons, in Quantities exceeding what they that have then the Power Enjoy, it is plain the Needy who cannot subsist, but by the Relief of these Wants, and who are always most in all Communities, will Naturally depend upon those, who can Relieve them: And the People being thus dependent upon those, who thus Feed them, will be ready to Execute what they Command; so that they having thus the People, have in Effect the Power: Which if they Execute as it is plain they may, for what can hinder them,

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They then unite the Power and this Property; but at the same time alter the Government, by removing the Power out of those hands, who before enjoyed it.

VI. But by reason the Necessaries or Conveniencies of Life, such Substances I understand as are used amongst Men, for their Food, their Drink or their Cloathing, are of a perishable Nature, and therefore cannot be long preserved; and yet are always Multiplied as the Numbers of Men united in Society encrease, and being for the most part the Products of the Earth, which are thrust forth in great variety, according to the different Soils or changeable Surfaces of the Land, or according to the divers ways of Cultivating, Employing or Manuring it; and these again Multiplied by an almost infinite Method of manufacturing or preparing them; for these reasons it is most evident, such things must be marvellously divided, and very differently possessed, whereby a Necessity of Exchange does Arise, for some Wanting what others Abound in, and they perhaps having Plenty of what the other Need or Desire, they by Exchanging what they can Spare, for what the other Wants, do thereby Supply Each others Necessities. But in Exchange Men always aim at some Equality, no Man being willing knowingly to give beyond the Value of what he receives, (for who is fond of being cheated) and

and the Value of Substances of different Natures are not to be adjusted, without some Established Standard, by which they may be compared. Besides the marvellous difference that may be observed in the Labour, Care or Industry of Men, by which some accumulate larger Quantities of these Perishable Substances, whereby they may be Enabled to Supply others Wants, and yet may have no Occasion, for any of those things the other hath; for these and such like Reasons, it becomes necessary in all Societies, to Establish some Standard of Value of a lasting and durable Nature, that measuring the Value of other things, might be taken in Exchange for them, and so would always buy what the Possessor Needs. This is what is Called the Money, and is in Communities the Common Measure, by which all things are Valued, and which will be taken for all things. And this is what is called the Riches, or Wealth of Men, for altho those who have Land, or any other Useful or Valuable Substances, may be said to be Rich; yet that not absolutely, but only by reason they may Convert that Land, or such substances into Money: So that ultimately it is the Coin or Money, that is the Wealth, which appears most Evident, in that the Land, &c. is valued by the Money, and will be taken for it. It is from this reason that whosoever hath the Wealth, that is the Money of a Country, (which being his property is

secured by the Laws) may if he hath prudence and Generosity to dispose of it to the Advantage of others, have that Influence upon them as to direct them as he pleases, and by so managing them, may soon seise the Government into his own hands, but of this hereafter.

VII. But by reason there can never be so mighty a Bank of Money accumulated, but that the continual Craving Wants of the Needy, (which will be always Numerous in Community) will gradually waste and drain; and then their Necessities not being any longer to be relieved from thence, they apply themselves to other Persons or Methods whereby to satisfy them, and so become forgetful of former Bounties; for which reason no Man or Men can well obtain or continue a Power in a Community, unless he hath some Methods whereby he may acquire a continued supply of Treasure, that so he may be enabled to support and continue his Interest in the People, by daily furnishing them with Money, whereby they may provide for their Necessities. And the Money in Communities can be circulated or moved about amongst its Members, and so brought back into their hands who formerly had it, but by two manner of ways, viz. either by the means of the Land, or by Trade: For Government, as hath been observed, establishing Property, He

or They that have the Property in the Land, may so dispose of it amongst others, as to make them dependant upon him; or may make such Reserves to himself of the profits of it, under the Name of Rents, as thereby to have the Money of the Country continually returned into his Hands: For the Proprietor of the Land, disposing of the Money or Rent which he receives of the Occupier, to the Needy, or such as some way depend upon him, and they buying the Necessaries of Life with that Money of the Occupier, the Money is by that means continually returned into the hands of the Proprietor. The same may be said of Trade, for Men by Exchanging and Bartering Moveable Goods, may thereby acquire a continued Supply of Treasure: And He or They that have the Treasure may for the reasons alledged have the People. It is from this Cause that in all Communities where the Incomes from the Land, exceed the Profits that arise by Trade, that the greatest Interest in the People or the Government, will be in the Proprietors of the Land, but on the contrary where the Advantages by Trade surmount what is gained by the Land; there it will be in those that have the Trade. The Truth of this appears, by but comparing the Present State of *Holland*, or the United Provinces, or the Towns of *Hamburg*, *Lubeck*, *Dantzick*, &c. with other *European* States,

States. The Reason of this is, that altho Men United in a Community, or living under one and the same Government taken Collectively, are considered but as making but one Politick Body, yet that Body being composed of a Multitude of distinct Persons, each of which separately considered hath a peculiar Interest, which he will always Regard; So then as the Majority of these People that Constitute this Body encline, the Balance must turn, or the Interest will be, for the Majority will make the whole; and then of Consequence as the profits of the *Land*, or *Trade*, are proportioned amongst these, the Power will be:

VIII. But altho Political Power is Originally Grounded in the Common Wants or Necessities of Men, which continually Arise from the very Nature of his Body, as has been already intimated; yet notwithstanding he having a Power of looking into futurity and thereby of foreseeing, that the Time that is as yet to come, will hereafter be, and that of Consequence that such Pains, or Miseries, that are adjoined to future time, will then be present, and so he to suffer and undergo them; for which Reason the Consideration of such after Sufferings, may give such a present Dread and Horror, as to deter Man, from the prosecuting his present Satisfaction, in such Ways or Methods, his Nature might direct

direct, were there no such Consideration: And so thereby becomes a Bond or Cement, to keep Men in Obedience to Laws: And it is from this Reason that Religion is observed to have some Influence upon Men in Government; for it is manifest were Men to look no further than this present Life, they could only be affected by the *Good*, or *Evil*, that properly appertain to it, for then they could have nothing further to Hope or Fear. But since a future State is so deeply imprinted upon the minds of Men, it is no wonder that Religious Considerations, that properly Respect that State so often are observed to Lead and Byass Men in the several Changes of Civil Government; for by an Earnest Consideration of a future State, they seem to forget some present or temporary Inconveniencies or Sufferings, by reason their Minds then being so entirely filled with the Hopes or Expectation of future Happiness, or Misery, that there is not room for the Consideration of any temporary advantages. Thus some Men have undergone the severest Sufferings, even Death it self, for this very Cause, as is evident from that large Catalogue of Martyrs, that former times have handed down to us. But notwithstanding this sometimes happens, yet present Wants, or Pains, will for the most part carry it against future *Hopes*, or *Fears*, there being but few, but are desirous of present

sent Ease. Whose Sufferings are like mine, is the Common Complaint; and, Give me any other Pain than this I undergo, is the Ordinary Wish; so unable our Natures appear to suffer under any present Torment; few Persons being to be found, but when pinched with present danger, or dreaded with immediate Fears, but will find some Salvo to remove their Scruples, if their Religion makes any, in order to deliver themselves from present Suffering; Examples are not wanting among the best of Men; the *Hebrews* borrowed the best Goods of the *Egyptians*, before their departure out of *Goshen*, and scrupled not to carry them away; *David* Personated Madness to secure his life, and contrived the Death of *Uriah* to avoid the Sin of Adultery, and scrupled not to eat the Shew-bread when in Want; The Apostles, when Hungry, pulled their Neighbour's Corn, and *St. Peter* when he apprehended Danger, denied his Master; so un-governable seems our very Natures, when Evils lie at our own Doors, that then we practise what formerly, when it did not affect us, we Disapproved and Condemned. Thus the best establish'd Church in the World, such a One that enjoyns nothing in her Doctrines, but what is immediately taken from the Sacred Text, or are clear deductions from such; nor nothing in her Discipline, but what is consistent with Divine Worship: A Church whose Hierarchy is besitted to the Civil Constitutions,

ons, and yet perfectly agreeable to what Holy Writ countenances; yet the supporting Members of this most excellent Church have not lately practised, what they had formerly taught; I need not, altho' it may be repeated to their Glory, recite the Case, it being so well known, that they were the happy Instruments in preserving the Rights, Liberties and Religion of a grieved and oppressed People. I only intimate this Glorious Instance, to shew how little Religion avails, when afflictions lie at our Doors, for then we may observe how that the best of its professors will often find Reasons or Arguments to batter down their former Opinions; Non-resistance and Passive-obedience (and that only respecting the Kingly Authority) had been the prevailing Doctrine of divers Members of this most excellent Church, yet no sooner had the Royal Authority began to strip this Church of its former Power, by tolerating Dissenters, erecting an Ecclesiastical Commission, in order to awe its Prelates, and to Model and Purge its Nurseries of Literature, but it began to cool in its Zeal for Loyalty; but when it had prosecuted its Bishops, and used violence upon some of its Learned Members, it absolutely renounced its passive Doctrines, and actually took up the Sword of Resistance, which it had formerly so Reproached and Condemn'd; so unwilling are Men to suffer themselves, what they would willingly have inflicted upon others. IX. It

IX. It is observable few Men are mistaken in their deductions, but when Errors are discovered in discourses, they are founded in their Principles, and this seems particularly Notorious in those of Government; for Political Discourses that appear fair and uniform, are sometimes erected upon very Sandy Foundations; and this it is probable hath in some Measure been occasioned, in that the Messengers of Peace, or Ministers of the Gospel, have frequently in their Holy Discourses so intermixt Political and Religious Matters, that they have been thought, (as being supported by such Divine Authorities) by some, to be in their very Natures inseparable, and so have considered them conjointly, as if they were fashioned by the same Authority, and so to be tryed by the same Rule; whereas if Civil Government is of Human Institution, and Religion of Divine; it is plain they arise from very different Authorities, and therefore to be measured by different Standards. Had God revealed to Man any particular Scheme of Government, he ought to have submitted to it, because Obedience and Submission is due to him, in whom we Live, and Move, and from whom we have our Being: But if the Almighty hath not Revealed any such particular Forms to Men, then it is certain he hath left Man at Liberty to fashion and contrive such Politicks himself, as may be most conducive to his

his own Happiness and His Glory; (and it is certain in Holy Writ, God hath not expressly revealed any such Forms) for otherwise Man's Condition must have been more wretched and unsafe than that of Brutes, by reason the Multitude of his Passions, if not bounded by Laws, would lead him to perform more enormous Mischiefs to his own kind, than the cruellest of them. But in Religion God hath done directly otherwise, for there God hath expressly declared what Man is to believe and do, upon the Conditions therein expressed: So that in Religion Man is not left at liberty to follow the Dictates of his own Judgment, but is to do or not do, according as the Almighty there commands or forbids, and that upon his Peril, as he will be Eternally Happy, or Eternally Miserable: So that here is a Marvellous difference; in the one, God immediately directs what Man is to do; in the other, God does, as it were, leave Man to his own guidance, that is to follow that Eternal Light of Reason that he hath set up in his Nature; for in that he hath not directly revealed what He is to do, there being no more footsteps of any one particular form of Government revealed in the Sacred Writings than there is any certain Order of Knighthood instituted there; for what some Learned Men by a trifling sort of Industry, have done in collecting a Number of Particular Texts, (which being separated from what

what they were apart, and which indeed gave them their genuine Sense) that may seem to favour their own Opinions, and to conclude from them of Forms of Government, is nothing to the purpose, for by that they only take the words, but not the Sense of Scripture; and should that dangerous way of reasoning be allowed, Men might make the Divine Writings speak what I dread to Name, even Blasphemy. If therefore it be certain that God hath not revealed any Forms of Polity, nor prescribed any immediate Laws or Rules for all Governments, as it is clear in the Gospel he hath not, (for as for what he hath done for his own People, the Jews in the Old Testament, is not our consideration) our Saviour himself not intermeddling with Government, but on the contrary solemnly declaring his Kingdom not to be of this World; then it is plain he hath left Civil Government upon the same footing it stood upon before his Coming: And then if we are desirous to know in fact what that was, we must examine the Records of Antiquity, (which by the Bye is only trifling, for we having the same Nature as our Fore-fathers, and so their equals, have the same Right to Model our own Affairs, as they had theirs, and are no more obliged to imitate them, than Posterity will be to Personate us) and by them we may discover, that their Measures and De-

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signs in the General were not different from what is practised in this present Age; that is, that Men primarily in all their Actions and Designs Regarded themselves, that is proposed some End, that might be Advantageous to them, in advancing what they thought their Happiness; And that in order to Accomplish this, they usually aimed at acquiring such a Power, that they might be enabled to do what they pleased, for it is certain Men were as restless in the pursuit after Authority then, as now. Thus the Great Alexander Thirsted after God-like Power, in giving Laws to the Universe; and thus Caesar enthralled Rome, that he might exercise unbounded Sovereignty. And therefore to put some bounds to this exorbitant Ambition of Man in well ordered Governments, it was so contrived that the Supreme Power should be so blended and divided, that no one Person might be in a condition to use it as he pleased.

X. But notwithstanding, Laws are what secure Mens Persons and Good, and so are besitted for the Common Benefit of the Community, every Man having Protection by them, yet these being made by different Methods and by different Persons, have often very different Ends, for the Authority of making Laws, being amongst several Governments diversly placed, viz. in some in a single Person, in others in a certain number of Men

Men, and in a Third in the whole People, and what gives Law, being in it self above Law, for they that make Laws, are Supreme in a Community, and therefore must have an absolute Power to Act as they Please; and Man Naturally Regarding himself, it must follow, that altho' Laws take in the whole Community, yet they will principally intend the Advantages of that Authority that made them: And this Assertion is Abundantly Confirmed by the Practices of Men, for it may be observed where that Sovereign Power is lodged in a single Person, as in all Absolute Monarchies, there the Law takes Particular Care to secure his Person and Interest, and but Collaterally that of the Subjects, as in the *Ottoman Empire* and all the Eastern Monarchies; where in a party of Men, there's principally, as in *Venice*, or *Poland*, and where the whole People must consent, the General Good of the whole Community, as Antiently in *Athens*, *Lacedemon*, and the *Grecian* Common wealth; and now in *England*, *Holland*, &c. altho' in somewhat different ways. And if it hath sometimes happened otherwise in some mixed Governments, it hath proceeded, in that particular Persons have been Corrupted by some present Advantages, which is an Inconvenience that will Attend such *Polities*. And as these Laws are what determine, what

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Men in their several Communities may do, and what they may not do, and so are the Measures of Obedience; for if Men transgress what the Law Commands, they Incur the Penalty of It. It must follow that the Actions and Proceedings of Men, must be Tryed by these, and as they conform or not, to these, they will be Approved or Condemned, that is such will be esteemed just or unjust: For if these Laws ascertain Property, and whosoever takes what this Law make Mine, invades my Property, and who does that does unjustly by me. It must follow that these Laws are the Measures of what in each Community, is Just or Unjust: For He that Treats my Body and Goods, according to this Law, by which they are properly Mine, does Justly by me, and if on the Contrary, Unjustly; for if this Law determines what is Mine, it is evident it must be tried by this Law whether it be Mine.

XI. Furthermore the Laws of a particular Community, are always intended to be so contrived as to Regard the Good or Welfare of that Community, or at least that part of it where the Supreme Authority is lodged, this I think is undeniably Evident in all Government, and such being the unhappy State of Men, Living under several Governments, that their Good, *Welfare* or *Interests*, will not be thought always to be the

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same, for there will be several things that will be Esteemed Convenient or Advantageous to Men dwelling in some States or Governments, that will be Injurious or Inconvenient to Others. This I think is plain from the very Nature of Government, and the different Circumstances of particular People, and is further Confirmed, in that the Civil Laws of particular Countries are so very different; which could never be, were not the Circumstances of Men, living under different Governments, diverse, and therefore required such different Laws; for it is certain there neither is, nor can be any one Law, that is befitted for the universal Good of all Societies; for Governments being in themselves so extremely Unlike; And each Intending its own Good or Welfare, and Laws being befitted for that End, It is certain these Laws must be as different as the Government or People are that make them. So that from the very Consideration of the Nature of Government, it is most obvious, there can be no one positive Law, adjusted to the Nature of all Governments, whereas in Religion it is directly otherwise, for there the Great God of Heaven being the only Law-maker, he respects the Universal Good of Mankind, giving Laws to all of them, under such Conditions, which if they perform, they may be Eternally Happy; and these are such as Abundantly manifest his Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, being

being suited to the general Nature and Condition of Men, under all Governments; for he may perform such, mauer all the Spight and Malice of his Superiors, for what State can be supposed so Calamitous but Men, may believe and do what is expressly enjoined in holy Scripture, and so are absolutely necessary for Salvation: It is true Governments may ordain the doing of what God forbids, and then the Rule is. It is better to obey God than Men, and rather suffer than obey; But still there can hardly be supposed such a State, but Man may perform what God Requires, for altho' Man's Body is in Chains, his Soul or mind is at Liberty, and our Religious Duties do not under the Gospel, as under the Law, consist in Ceremonies.

XII. But further, Gods Laws are General, and so respect the whole Race of Mankind, considered as his Creatures or Subjects, and accordingly the Enforcements to the Obedience of them, are likewise general, viz. future Rewards, or Punishments for all Men; whereas human Laws, Regarding only the Welfare of a particular Society of Men, their Enforcements are only Temporary, such as that Society can inflict, and so only affect the Members of that Body. Again Gods Laws chiefly relate to his own Glory, and Mans Eternal Happiness, and

so respect him as a Man, and not as a Member of this or that Community, which is evident in that they are tendered to all Men in all Ages, and in all Countries: But Mans Laws respect the Makers Good, or only the Welfare of a Particular Community: For which reason Gods Laws are expressed in such General and indefinite Terms, that so far as they seem to relate to Community, they require to be appropriated or applied to denote this or that End or Action of Man, with its Attending Circumstances, by the Civil Law of the Country; thus we may observe, they pathetically enjoin Submission, and Obedience, to the Supreme Power, by reason such Powers are of God: Yet do not determine the Form or Nature of that Power, nor the Rules, nor Measure of Obedience. It is true where it happens otherwise that God himself determines the Sense of his own Law, by ascertaining the full Signification of the Words in which it is expressed, so that it may be taken absolutely, as importing such a Thing or Action, and not Relatively as it Regards the Laws of the Country, there I say, it is not within the Compass of human Authority, to alter or make it otherwise. But where the precept is only General, and nothing Expressly determined as to the Absolute and Real Nature of the Action or Thing, there it is only the Laws of the Country, that can determine what

what is there so indefinitely Expressed. But to Illustrate this by a particular Instance: God Commands Men to Execute Justice and Judgment, and to render to Every Man what is his due, but it is the Law of the Country that determines what Justice is, and what is this Mans due, and what the Others. God enjoins Submission and Obedience, but it is the Laws of the State, that denote to whom it is due, and sets the Measures of both; because they are only Relations to such Laws. Whereas such things as properly Regard the Man, considered separately, that is Independent of Society, are not to be determined by any Laws of Society. Thus the *Credenda* of Religion that Concern him as a Man, and not as a Member of this or that Community, are Expressly Revealed in the Sacred Writings, by Reason Man is bound to Believe them, in whatsoever State or Circumstance he is in. Besides, Faith being only an Act of our Mind, it can only be Regulated by his Laws, that knows our most Secret Thoughts. These things plainly shew us a Marvellous difference between *Divine and human Laws*, and plainly point out to us, what things proceed, and are therefore to be Measured and Tried by the One, and the Other: And for Men to have Recourse to Holy Writ, that is to Divine Laws, for what is not there Revealed or Commanded; and indeed which

appears inconsistent to be so, unless the Almighty, whose Power is Infinite, had first altered the present Condition of Men, and the Variety of different Governments Established in the World, seems to be what may frighten the Weak Minds of some, who have the Power of Government, and may so make them an Easy Prey to their Crafty Neighbours; but will never Prevail upon Mankind, to submit to such their Rules, by reason God himself hath not declared them.

XIII. Methinks if Men would but seriously consider how that the same Authority is required to make as to Explain a Law, they would be more modest in their Expositions, and less severe in their Impositions, for then if these Holy Laws were Penned by Men, Divinely Inspired, they could not well be Explained but by Men endowed with the same Spirit: For should we admit that a Man not Divinely Assisted, may Explain, that is in effect, may make what he pleases to be Gods Law, (for so he doth that gives a different Sense of them) and so may give a Law to Man, that God hath not Revealed; Man must be in a perpetual jeopardy of his Salvation. For which Reason unless he that pretends to expound these Sacred Writings, can give us an Evidence that he hath the assistance of
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the same Spirit, we cannot safely acquiesce in them. And I am apprehensive few now will be so bold to pretend to that, or at least can give us Proofs, that they have any such Authority. Besides, if God in his Holy Writ hath revealed what is necessary for Man's Salvation, as our Church teaches he hath; and his own Glory and Man's Salvation is the End of all revealed Religion; why are Men to look farther than the Scripture it self for this, when our Guides own that is sufficient for this End? If it be objected, that altho' whatsoever is thus necessary is contained there, yet that is not to be Discerned or Learnt by every one; I Answer, if they can Read it, or Hear it, they may: Or otherwise it is, not the Rule our Church ownes; for it must want an Explanation either of the Words or Sense, or Both; if in the Words, why is it not altered? If in the Sense, it is imperfect, which is both Impious and Prophane to utter: Again, If in the Words, it being a Translation, recourse is to be had to the Original, which if known, what further Explanation can be required; if this cannot be known, or at least is disputed, how can it be determin'd, since there now wants an Authority to explain it: Besides, do not the same difficulties return, as to the Sense of Words to the Reader, in the Exposition, as in the Text, they being equally liable to different Constructions; Nay, Experience will teach us that some
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things that seemed Plain in the Text, are made Perplexed by Expositions; and if the Sense is imperfect, by what assistance do they recover it. He therefore that writes Expositions, Commentaries or Annotations upon any Writings, whether *Sacred or Profane*, and there pretends to unfold the Author's meaning, can in such only Publish, or at least give a Reason of his own Sense, but can never assure his Reader any farther than by his own Opinions, that this was the Author's; and how little certainty there is in any such, even upon the Sacred Text it self, there needs methinks be produced no other Proof than the great Variety, Number, and even Disagreement of such Published upon those inspired Writings. For how, for Example, can the Reader be ascertained that the Enigmatical Texts of the *Revelations of St. John*, are better Expounded by *Grotius* or *Hammond*, than by *Mead*, *Brightman*, or any others; that is, That the Genuine meaning of that Apostle contained in those dark Figures, is better explain'd, and more clearly understood by the former than the latter; for the Reader having little to guide him from the Nature of the Writing, can only judge of the Excellency, or goodness of the Exposition according to the degrees of Probability that arise from the Reasons the Authors assign for their Opinions, or from the Authority of the Men; both of which will, for the most part, be accordingly

ingly as he has been principled in his Education, or as Chance, Interest, or being of a Sect or Party shall encline him, as is evident from the different Judgments Men put upon those kind of Writings, they being so differently, by divers Men, approved and disliked. For these Expositions have had that change of Fate, as to be sometimes quoted and admired, and at another time exploded and disproved, and in Truth seem to have been employed, but to indifferent purposes, having been, as it's probable, the unhappy occasion of making Breaches and Divisions amongst Christians. For what God in those inspired Writings hath revealed, is either a *Mystery* or *Not*; if the first, it is evident from its very Nature, that he hath so revealed it that it should be believed, upon his Authority; that is, because he hath said it, but that the Mind of Man should not comprehend it; for could Man Naturally by the help of his own Faculties comprehend, what God hath propounded to be believed; it is plain it could be no *Mystery*, and if what God hath Revealed is not a *Mystery*, then it is clear, it is to be understood by the Words, since by them only God hath Revealed it: And whatever God hath thought fit thus to Reveal for Mans Belief or Knowledge, must relate either to his *Faith* or his *Obedience*: If to the first he is to believe it, because God hath Revealed it; and that without any respect to the probability

bability of the Proposition; if the second he is to Obey, because he as his Lord, hath enjoined it. To the first he gives his assent upon the Credit of the Proposer, who cannot, or will not deceive him, and not from any certainty in the proposition; for Man believes upon the Testimony of Others, which is properly Faith: For should Man assent to the Truth of a Proposition, by reason only that he is able, by the help of his Natural Faculties to deduce what is there proposed from some known or certain Principles, it could not then be pure Faith: For indeed would Man explain, what God as a Mystery hath proposed only to believe, he would in effect overthrow that very Faith, that is by God himself in Holy Writ, so much commended. And on the contrary whatsoever God hath there commanded us to *do*, is too plain and intelligible to stand in need of such explanation: And as for other Topicks, *viz.* such as are merely Historical, Chronological, or such as regard only the Laws, Customs or Manners of People contained in the Sacred Text, and do not directly concern our Salvation; let them that delight in such Speculations, enjoy a liberty of pleasing themselves with their own Sense, provided they observe that Pious Decorum, as not to confound our *Faith* or destroy our *Obedience*, by such their Learned Ramblings.

XIV. What

XIV. What Service we immediately pay to the Almighty, consists in Prayers and Praises; for admonitory discourses seem properly but to remind and persuade Men to the performance of Christian Duties, or to instruct Men in such, and are for that only Reason, of most Excellent and even Divine Use; for by such, Men are not only put in mind of their Duties, but when pathetically express'd, their Zeal is kindled, and their Thoughts are warmed into Resolutions of doing Gospel Acts of Charity, Goodness, Brotherly-love; and in short, their Duties to God, their Neighbours and Themselves. But when Men will daringly pretend to confound these, by intermixing Chimera's of their own, imperiously imposing Commands where God hath given none, and Prohibitions where he hath made none, by distorting and forcing these Writings to say what they please, in order to support or defend some empty Thought or extravagant Opinion, which they having espoused, would proudly impose upon Others; and so break that Golden Rule of doing as they would be done by; they methinks plainly destroy that Religious Institution; for by not regarding the plain Words of the inspired Writings, they sow the Seeds of Animosity and Divisions amongst Christians. Thus if I may be pardoned the Instance, it is remarkable in the first Ages, after the
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Planting that Jargon of Irreligion, *Mahometanism*, whilst the *Arabians* flourish'd in Letters, and according to the *Learning* of those Ages, employed their studies in a sort of *elaborate but useless Philosophy*; when they trifled away their hours in acquiring of skill in the wanton Art of Prating, by which they learnt how to trick and play with Words, as Jugglers do now with their Balls and Boxes, in cooking, catching, losing and then finding them, and shewing them in divers shapes numbers and colours. Hey *Gingo!* Now here is a Ball, Money, an Egg, Apple, and what not; for as these Men by dexterously confounding, and nimbly deluding the Eyes of the Spectators, occasion these different things to pass for the same Substance, thus by their Magick Metamorphosed, when really the Spectators sight is only deceived: Even so have these Men of Letters used Words, turning and winding them in different Shapes and Sences, sometimes to import one thing, and immediately to stand for another, thus dexterously, altho' differently using them, they at last conclude, as if somewhat certain and real had been always contained in the same sound, that had not been before clearly understood. For these Learned *Arabians* applying their heads to the makeing Expositions upon the impious *Alcoran*, intermixing, or rather endeavouring to square their Religion to their Learning, soon made their *Prophet speak divers Doctrines*, whereby

a Multitude of Schisms and Heresies were spawned, and Wranglings and Disputes arose about the most obvious Doctrines, from whence Sects and Parties were form'd that were hateful to each other, as such are now amongst Christians: But since their Wiser Governments under the severest Punishment, have not only forbid, but removed all occasions of such Altercations, by suppressing that kind of Literature, they have happily to themselves, tho' unhappily to their Neighbours, lived under the same Law in better Unity. The same thing may be observed concerning the *Jews*, who, before the entry of the *Grecian Learning* and Philosophy amongst them, seem not to have been divided into Religious Sects, as it is certain they afterwards did, into the *Pharisees, Sadduces, &c.* the first being *Platonists*, the last *Epicureans*.

XV. But to Return: *Religion* and *Polity* being Extremely different, as being Instituted by very differing Authorities; The first being what God himself hath immediately Commanded Man, in his Revealed Word; The second being what Man himself hath contrived by the help of such Natural faculties, as the Almighty hath gave him; The first then is only to be deduced from those Inspired Writings, but the last must be derived from the Nature of Man. To draw then Conclusions from the

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Sacred Text Concerning Government, is to make it Speak what it doth not Intend; And to use our Reasons Concerning Religion, is to Invade the Prerogative of Heaven. For as in the one we must begin from the Sacred Books; so in the other we must set out from the Nature of Man: And to know that we must have recourse to what we may Experience in our selves; and what we may Observe in Others, that so we may learn what is common to all Men, and is therefore essential to his Nature, and having discovered that, we need not mistake in our Reasons. There is nothing more certain than that *Man Thinketh*, and that he hath an Active Power of giving Motion or Rest to his Body, this is what Every Mans Experience will inform him, in that he can sit and walk, or sit still, and therefore Man having this Power, will always intend his own Good, Welfare, Pleasure, Interest, or Happiness; that is he will Naturally Act for some End, that ultimately Regards himself: And by reason he may be hindered in the Prosecution or Pursuit of what he Esteems his Happiness, or of what he hath placed it in, (for he only can judge of that) he will Naturally covet to be in such a State, whereby he may pursue what Methods he pleases in order to obtain it: that is he will always desire such a Power that he may do as he then pleases: For it matters not whether he can acquire it or not,

not, for still his desires after it will be the same. And then the state of his Body rendering him Incident to a great Variety of Dayly Wants, for Hunger and Thirst, &c. will Return, and such being his Nature, as to be uneasy under these, or in Pain from them, he Naturally Covets to satisfy them, for no Man can be pleased with Pain, or Contented under such Miseries; but by reason being in Government where the Law Establishes *property*, he cannot always gratify these his Wants, in the Methods he pleases, without Violating the Laws, which having Punishments Annexed he must undergo, which being Evils, or Pains, he will Endeavour to avoid: Man therefore will Labour to satisfy these Wants, by such ways as thereby he may escape Punishments; And all *Civil Polities*, supposing or necessarily producing or making an Inequality in the Possessions, Conditions, or Fortunes of their Members; for some will Abound in Plenty, and others again have a Scarcity of such Necessaries for Life; (or at least of such things as will procure them) as will Relieve the Wants or Necessities of those that labour under them; whereby the Needy will be enclined to depend upon them, and so to be guided and directed by them; and Money is what will do this, for which reason he that enjoys that may have the Hearts and Hands of the People. But by reason

reason there cannot be conceived a Treasure so unexhaustible but that the Wants of the Needy will drain it, and that being spent the Power that arose from it, must necessarily lessen; it is plain the Power could not be continued in the same Hands, unless the Money likewise could be returned into them; that so the People may be kept dependent upon the same Persons; for which Cause the Supreme Authority in all Governments, takes care to possess or continually to raise such a Treasure, as may keep the People, or at least such a part of them, dependent upon it, that so it may be enabled to Rule the whole: And wherever it has happened otherwise, the Supreme Authority hath soon been wrested out of their Hands, that is, the Government hath been Changed or Ruined, where it wanted such a Revenue, or Treasure to support it self. And this Money or Treasure, by which Government is thus continued, must be either Raised from Land, Trade, or Tribute, and accordingly as either of these are most Advantageous to the Persons enjoying the Supreme Power, the Inclinations of that Government will propend most to Favour and Encourage; for which reason where a People possess but small Tracts of Lands, compared to their Numbers, Trade will be there most Cherished and Regarded, as we may always observe it hath in Petty Common-Wealths, and Independent Cities. But where the
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Land Exceeds the Trade, there the Improvement of that is mostly respected; the same may be said of Tribute, for which way soever the Interest of the governing part leans, that is the Excess lies, that way the Balance of the Government will Turn, as shall be hereafter Proved. But by what ways soever Wealth is acquired, or in whatsoever hands it is lodged, there the Power will center; and if sometimes it seems to happen otherwise, that the Wealth and Power is separated, it can be of no continuance, (as hath been already Proved in the General, and shall be hereafter farther Proved;) for either the Power will by Violence seize the Wealth, or else it will gradually fall into their hands who have the Wealth. And He or They that enjoy this Power, will Naturally Endeavour to continue the Possession of it, that so being under no Restraints, that is not bounded or limited by any Superior Authority, they may be in a Capacity to pursue, whatsoever their Soul desires; what then puts the difference in the Proceedings of Men, thus placed in the Supreme Authority, and so being under no Law, can be under no Restraint, is the different Ends they Propose, or the different Methods they Pursue, in order to obtain such; for all Men aiming at the perfecting their own desires, will therefore undoubtedly choose such Methods as they Judge most Safe,
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and Expedient; and of course will study to continue or obtain such an Authority, that thereby they may be enabled to do it. Thus that Prince that Aims at Dominion, will Endeavour by all Methods to acquire it. He that is a Bigot to a Religion, will Labour to propagate it; And he that Thirsts after an Arbitrary Power, will attempt to Ruine the Laws of his Country. If therefore Princes Place their wishes in being Honoured and Esteemed, or in Erecting a lasting Monument of Fame, in the Minds of the People: Or if they have any Regard to future Rewards, or Punishment, as Revealed in Holy Writ, they will then delight in such Methods as are most promising for the attaining them; and such Measures implying or uniting with the Peoples Good, that therefore will be Regarded. But on the Contrary, if Kings look upon these things but as Empty Sounds, and use them as Varnish to Polish their Ambitious and Dark designs, they will then intend such things, as will gratify their own wishes, without Respecting the Destruction, Calamity, or Misery that may befall their Subjects: So that considering the Experienced depravity of Human Nature; (for how little do Men Regard Others, if they are but Exempt from the Common Calamity or Misery) it may be concluded, that the Excellency of a Government is, when the Constitution is so framed, that the Govern-

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ing Power can have no Interest, Advantage or Safety, separate or distinct from the Governed: For where that is, it will be usually pursued.

CHAP. III.

1. Power and Property not long to be separated.
2. Religion shews the Conditions for Salvation. Civil Authority by interposing in Religion, occasions Enemies.
3. Wars from Religion; such proceed from the fault in the Constitution.
4. Religion of two Sorts, viz. either Natural or Revealed, and what.
5. Revealed, Conveyed in Writing, liable to various Constructions.
6. Religious Opinions will propagate, and why.
7. Such have been occasioned by Learning; Multiply in distempered Governments.
8. Religion not the Basis of Government. Unity in Religion not to be Preferred in divided States, unless made a distinct Polity.

I. HAVING proved from the very Nature of Man, that Power in all Governments will necessary devolve into those hands, who possess the Wealth; and that if Power and Wealth should be by Violence separated, they must again Unite, the very Nature of Government not permitting such a Separation. And having likewise proved that the very Na-

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ture of Man leads him, to affect such a State that he may be in a Condition, or have a Power to pursue what he desires; and such a State not being always consistent with Laws, (by reason such may limit or restrain him) that Men therefore in Authority must Naturally Thirst after unbounded Power; let their *Aims, Purposes, Designs* or *Desires* be what they will, *viz.* either Good or Bad, Virtuous or Vicious, Pious or Irreligious; that so they may be at liberty, or in a capacity to pursue without controul, what they Wish, Design or Aim at. And that Man when once possessed of this unlimited Power, (let the acquisition of it be just or unjust) doth always execute it for this *End*; notwithstanding he may sometimes veil his Purposes under other Pretences, or varnish them with some Species of popular Promises. And that there can be no other Foundation, upon which Government can be Peaceably establish'd, that is, the Legislature and Administration continued in the same Form, or in the same Persons, (for when that is changed, that Government is ended) but when the Wealth and Power are united.

II. And having intimated how that the universality of Men have a real persuasion of a Future Subsistence after this life, and that they are then liable to Rewards or Punishments, according as they have lived here: And having

ing also shewed how the mere consideration of a Future State, in which they may partake of a Future Happiness or Misery, may so immediately affect the Mind of Man, as thereby to give him a present Concern or Sense of it, and so a desire of attaining the One and avoiding the Other; and as a Means to do this a desire to be permitted the Exercise of such Religious Services, as he thinks are required to obtain it. For this Reason, if the Supream Authority in any Community does so far intermeddle with Religion, (that is as here intended what God the Almighty *Law-giver* in his *Revealed Word* either commands or forbids,) as to enjoin their *Subjects* the doing or not doing, the performing or forbearing what *They, viz.* the Subjects, may suppose is not agreeable to those Sacred Writings; of the Sense of which each Man will believe he hath a right to judge, as being a Servant to the same God, and being concerned for his own Salvation: The Supream Authority by such Proceedings seeming, in the Opinion of their Subjects, to invade the Prerogative of the Almighty, by imposing Commands where they have no Authority, do thereby give an occasion of being hated and opposed: And it is from this Reason, that Religion hath been observed to have such an Influence upon the Fate of Governments; for Religion in most *European* Governments, being so blended with Politicks, that the Civil Authority find it expedient frequently

quently to enjoin its Members to assent and subscribe to some Doctrines, or to perform or do some Acts of Worship; which they, viz. the Subjects, may think unlawful, as not being in their Sense conformable to the Divine Laws, (which are the Measures of what they should believe and do) they often then (as believing it better to Obey God than Man) combine and resolve not to Obey such Ordinances, but rather suffer under them, if they have not strength to break through them, but never to conform to them: For Man by Religion intending his own Salvation, and that not being to be acquired, but by his performing the Conditions, which God in his revealed Word hath proposed, he must evidently covet (as a necessary Means whereby to attain his *End*), to be at liberty to believe or do what he supposes God hath there required of him; If therefore the Civil Authority enjoins what he thinks unlawful, as being in his Sense not agreeable to what God commands, he will not comply with it; by reason by so doing his Eternal Salvation may be endangered; and therefore he will either suffer or oppose. From this reason, Religion, that of it self is as harmless as the Lamb, and as peaceful as the Dove, becomes often as cruel as the Tyger, and as merciless as the Vulture; for by this Means are occasioned Hatreds, Persecutions, and Butcheries of Men, Engaging Princes in Cruelties, Subjects in Rebellion, and States in

in Civil Wars, and Confusion; for the Governing Power imposing, and the People disliking what is thus enjoined, Misunderstandings are mutually Created, whereby a Multitude of such Calamities ensue. For then Men first herding and meeting, in order to perform some Divine Worship, which they are perswaded they are obliged by the Laws of God to do; and that being forbid them, by the Laws of the Country, or otherwise being required by the Laws of the Country, to assent, subscribe, or do, what they Believe is not consistent with Gods Laws; (for whether they are in the Right, or not, is not Material, since every Man must believe his own Opinion so) they then Confederates, and of Course resolve either to withstand, or Suffer under such, as believing them unlawful, as being made by an incompetent Authority; since the Almighty, the Great and Universal Lawgiver, to whom all earthly Powers must Submit, hath in their Sense Ordained otherwise; and therefore they cannot be obliged by such an Authority. And thus from such beginnings having formed a Religious Sect, differing from what the Government Countenances, they grow to be a dangerous party, prepared and Ready besitted to Ruine that Authority by which they are thus oppressed. For being as they think Injured in their Religious Concerns, they grow uneasy, and dislike

like that Authority by which they Suffer, and so are enclined, in order to Ease themselves, to Ruine it, whensoever they have an opportunity to do it: For Men are too apt to conclude, that an Authority that Acts unjustly in some particulars, may be withstood in all.

Civ. Pol. of Locke

III. But notwithstanding Civil Wars, Tumults, and even Revolutions, have been occasioned or assisted by the pretences of Religion, as is manifest from what hath happened in this Isle, and in several of our Neighbouring Kingdoms; yet such can never Arise in well formed Constitutions, that is where the Balance of Power is Naturally and Equally laid, that is were the Wealth is Enjoyed by those who possess the Power; And not divided as it is, in the *European* Kingdoms, or States, where they partake of the Gothick Model; for where that is, they never did, nor ever can subsist long without some disorders; if there were no pretences, for such, upon the Account of Religion; for such Governments like Monstrous and disproportionate Births, can never Regularly perform their Natural functions, by reason they are not in their formations besitted for it, and therefore will often fall into such disorders, that will endanger their subsistence; until they are reduced into another Model, as shall be shewed hereafter.

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Whereas in well poized Governments where the Balance lies Equal, there notwithstanding the Subjects in Religion, where there is a Written Law to appeal to, will Judge for themselves, and so may make different Constructions of its Sense, and thereby raise different Opinions, Concerning Sacred Matters; yet the Execution of Civil Laws, being there Duly and Impartially Administered, for there the Supreme Power having no separate Interest, can have no inducement to partiality, all Laws being then for his Advantage: It is plain Religious Opinions can never be so far propagated as thereby to form a Sect, that may be enabled to disturb the Government; for that Authority will Suppress them, (as shall be proved by fact) before they rise to be formidable. Whereas in Governments where the Governing Power is divided, and so the parts may have distinct Interests, it must happen directly otherwise; for there those that are in the Administrations will have often different Ends, and so pursue very differing and contrary Measures, for which reason, Sects, or Parties in Religion, are sometimes Cherished, and sometimes Punished, according as those that are in Authority, think it may conduce to their own Designs. And there seldom being a Succession of Men that pursue the same Methods, it is no wonder if they often Multiply and Increase.

IV. But

IV. But Religion may be considered, as of two kinds, *viz.* either as Natural or Revealed, by Natural Religion, I understand that duty towards his Creator, that Man, by the Strength of his Reason, is capacitated to Learn and Know; for by that he is plainly taught, that he was not able to fashion, form, or give being to himself, nor to enrich himself with these Divine Faculties and Powers, which his own Experience demonstrates, he enjoys: And that he is not able of himself to perform or continue his Subsistence; and that therefore he must Receive these Blessings, from some other Superior Being, who having this Power over him, must be his Lord, as being able to Reward or Punish him, to Preserve or Destroy him. And that this Superior Being, who hath Dominion over him, hath likewise, as a perfection essential to his Nature, a Will to Execute this his Sovereignty, according as Man, his Creature and Subject, shall by his Obedience or Neglect, conform to, or slight, this Great and Eternal Law of Reason, which he hath Imprinted in lively Characters in his very Nature, as a Certain Guide to Regulate him in all his Actions, if he will but seriously Reflect, and Consult it.

By Revealed Religion I Intend all that Worship and Duty, that Men owe to God, upon the Account only, that God hath Revealed and Commanded such in those inspired

Writings we call the Old and New Testament; and likewise all those Duties that God there enjoins in Relation to others or our selves.

Since God hath been graciously pleased to manifest his Will in these Sacred Writings, and to introduce a Revealed Religion; the Generality of Christians seem to entertain a persuasion that the Almighty having now immediately declared his will by these positive precepts, and Instituted and Commanded a New Worship, (new I mean in respect of that, which is Connatural and Coeval with Mankind) in Mercy and Compassion to Man, hath thereby Superseded, what was Natural. This Methinks appears evident, in that there are not many, that can be observed to Regard what is only deduced from that Eternal Law; but if they conform to what Natural Reason will teach them, it seems to proceed, in that they believe such Duties are enjoined by Gods positive precepts, as may be inferred in that Men so much differ in the Sense and Nature of these Moral Duties; for if they performed them, as deduced from that Eternal Reason, they must have been like that, the same to all Ages, Countries, and People, whereas being found so very different, they look more like deductions from those written Precepts, which Remain liable to divers interpretations

tions, and so give an occasion to such a variety of them. Natural Religion then not being much regarded or practised amongst Men, seems not to influence Governments; I shall therefore premit the farther Prosecution of that, as not material to my present purpose, and apply my self to what I have termed Revealed.

V. Man's Duty towards God, his Neighbour and Himself, being conveyed down to him in a written Law, remains liable to various Constructions, and different Interpretations; for being delivered in Words, some of which bearing a Complex Sense, as comprehending divers Idea's, and those often relating to the Thoughts and Actions, attended with their several Circumstances, Objects and Ends of Men, will be very differently explained; by reason they want a settled Rule or Standard, by which their certain Sense is determined. And not only this, but divers other Misfortunes must attend such Ancient Writings, that will render their Sense perplexed; such I mean as must arise from the great distance of Time, Country, and thereby an Ignorance of Laws, Customs, Phrases and particular Idioms. Add to this, the Vanity and Improbability of Men, to add or omit, what they think most conducive to support and defend such Doctrines and Opinions, as they have wantonly or willingly espoused;

espoused; from whence it is probable have proceeded these differing Readings, to be met with in some of the Ancient, (and as esteemed by some) Authentick Copies. From these and such like Reasons, Men in all Ages finding or making, new or differing Constructions of the Sacred Text, have broached new Doctrines, and formed new and separate Worship, whereby Religious Sects or Parties have been made or encreased, (especially in the Gothic Governments, where the Governing Power being divided, it was unsafe or unpolitick to suppress them; or where it was the Interest or Safety of the Administration, according to its differing Purposes, either to Cherish or Punish them). For Man is Naturally fond of his own Opinions, always esteeming them True (for otherwise he would not entertain them and therefore is desirous to Propagate them; and when he is restrained from that, he is not satisfied: Where then a Sect or Party is formed, and the Governing Power will not permit them the exercise of what they thus believe True; they then are uneasy, and esteem that Power an Enemy to them. If then the *Supream Authority* countenances and espouses one, and permits That only to have the Government or Magistracy; it does by that Act throw off the Others; and in effect declares them Enemies, as not being to be trusted in any part of the Care or Safety of the Publick; and when any

any Religious Performances or Qualifications are enjoined or required of all such as are to be admitted into any Offices or Employments; it is plain there the Government requiring as a Condition for such, what those of such a Sect or Party cannot perform, it actually excludes all such of that Opinion out of the Government: And then they having no Interest in the State, they are but as Foreigners who living under it, have the Protection of it, as to their *Persons* and *Goods*; but having no Share in it, have not much Concern for it, and therefore will not have much disposition or readiness to Support or Defend it. So then the Strength or Power of that Community is not to be Measured by the Number or Wealth of these People, (altho they live in it) by reason they are indeed Enemies to it, (and so will contribute nothing but what force can extort) but only as the Number or Wealth of that Party is, who Really and in Truth only constitute the Government. And we may with concern observe, not only in our Own, but also in all the Neighbouring States, whatsoever Religious Sect or Party hath once gained or possessed the Civil Authority, they do always endeavour the Conservation of that Authority amongst themselves; and for this purpose use all imaginable Means to Discourage, Lessen, and Suppress all others: For if they should not do this, others might so gradually en-

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crease in Numbers and Strength, as to be able to dispossess them of it. It is for this reason, that the Prevailing and Governing Party (where their own Security will permit) do so often impose *Fines* or *Mullets*, or *inflict Punishments*, such as Banishment, Imprisonment; nay, sometimes even Death it self, upon those who are not of their Opinions, or at least will not conform to them. Oh Horror! I cannot without concern remark it; that Men who profess Christianity, should make such Unchristian proceedings, and that as they often pretend for a Christian End; when at the very same time in other Matters that do not immediately relate to the Interest of that Sect or Party, altho' of a more unchristian Nature, they will Publicly teach, that Cruelty is inconsistent with Christianity. Such proceedings then of that Sect or Party that is in Authority, must necessarily make those whom they Punish their Enemies, (as we plainly see in Fact it does): For Man Naturally will propend to deliver himself from Suffering, and therefore will never fail to execute the Means to procure his deliverance, whensoever he hath an Opportunity to do it: From whence have proceeded those Tumults, Disorders, Civil Wars, and even Revolutions, in States, and Kingdoms, that have been so often occasioned upon the pretences of Religion.

VI. Altho' the Various Senses, and different Interpretations of these Inspired Writings have given an occasion to such a Multitude of differing Sects, as have been Spawned or Formed; and altho' such at first were only the wanton Off-spring of an over-heated, or luxuriant Brain, swelled out with Ambitious Pride, or Vain Glory, arising from a Conceit of Wisdom or Learning; or else heated with some Enthusiastick Raptures, that were thought to be of Divine Origin, tho' truly proceeding from the Publishers Constitution; yet such Opinions, where the looseness of the Administration in Government gives an Opportunity to be Published, have been easily propagated. The reason of which seems to be, in that the Greater part of Mankind in all Communities, are such whose Livelihoods are acquired by Labour, which Employs too much of their time, to permit them to enjoy leisure for the pursuit of Knowledge; so that Remaining in Ignorance, they seem befitted to receive any impressions from bold and daring Men: And then living in Society, and often comparing their own Wretched and Miserable Fortunes with those whom they observe to Abound in Wealth, and wanton in Pleasure, they Really Envy and Repine: But the Civil Laws of a State being too strongly woven for them to break through, (for
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being Nurtured in Awe, and Bred up in Obedience and so debarred of the Means of Knowing, Using or Executing their own Strength) they remain incapable of freeing themselves from this Civil Bondage, which notwithstanding they dislike: And being in a Manner Excluded from what are thought the Pleasures of this Life, (and so not pleased with it), they are more disposed to hope for them in Another: And for this Reason seem always Prepared to Receive such Doctrines, as promise future Happiness; and that by such Methods as are most agreeable to their despicable Condition. And then these People, (whom Government hath thus made Comparatively Miserable by placing them so much below Others, who are as it were their Lords and Masters, Proudly Insulting over them, and sometimes using them with more Cruelty and Contempt than they do Brutes, that bear not the Image of their Maker) thus groaning under such Sufferings by Society, rarely tasting of what is Esteemed Worldly Pleasure, Thirst after a Deliverance which not being to be Expected here, they desire it hereafter. And then Envyng their Superiors, they are enclined to dislike what they see them Practise, (I speak as to what their Circumstances will not permit them to Imitate), and to think their Methods are not Agreeable to the Laws of Heaven; by reason they make such difference between
H Men;

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Men; whereas Christs Laws Promise Happiness without distinction to all: It is from this reason it is probable we so often observe that People of the meanest fortunes, usually disprove an *Hierarchy* in the Church, which makes a disparity in the Orders, or degrees of its Ministers, in that it so nearly Resembles the Civil Constitution which Ordains so vast an Inequality between its Members, and in which they have the Misfortune to be in the worst and Lowest Estate: And from the same reason they most usually Abominate all *Pomp, and Shew in Worship*, despise Ceremonies, and scoff at Musick, and dislike whatsoever else is used to Solemnize any outward part of *Divine Service*: But on the Contrary like and approve that Religion, that admits of no distinction between its Ministers, no Ceremonies in its *Worship*; but permits all things to be performed in a plain and homely dress, agreeable to the Customs and Manners they have been used to. This Conjecture is Abundantly countenanced by the different Opinions that are pursued here in *England*, by Persons of different Qualities and Fortunes; for it may be observed, that if Persons of great Wealth or Honour, (I intend not of such as have acquired either by Laborious Industry, or a parcimonious Living, but such as were born to Estates, or at least attained such by Methods, that re-

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quired them to live in Pomp and Grandeur), do unhappily swerve from the Communion of the Church of *England*, they ordinarily Unite to that of *Rome*, which preserving a Pomp and Magnificence in Worship, seems more to resemble their Daily and Domestic usage, which they like, as having the best part in it: Whereas the Meaner and Ordinary People, if they depart from the Established Church, they Commonly fall in with that of *Geneva*, or some other Sect, that uses no Pomp nor Solemnity in their Devotion.

VII. If we turn our Thoughts into the Enquiry of the Reason of the different and successive Changes that have happened in Religious Sects, we shall find them to have proceeded, from the different disposition Attending People, in several Ages, Countries, or Governments, Arising from the diversity of Laws, Manners, or Customs, of such; or from the particular Ends or Designs of different and Crafty Men; or from different Learning that hath at certain times been Esteemed and Valued; of the two first Sorts, each Age produces a variety of Instances, some of which shall hereafter be particularly enumerated; of the last I shall here only transiently observe, that Men heretofore applying themselves, to a sort of Learning, that produced but little of real

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Knowledge,

Knowledge, being principally Calculated for the Establishing a Reputation in the Professours, by teaching that some profound Excellencies, some undiscovered perfections were contained in a Learned Jargon of unintelligible and insignificant Words: And the professours of this, valuing themselves upon the marvellous progress they made in acquiring the Method of belching out this Enigmatical Cant, which being composed of barbarous and puzzling Terms, and particularly refined with undiversifying distinctions, which not being to be understood, served to Confound the Ignorant, and puzzle the Unlettered; whereby they had an Opportunity to infuse what Opinions they pleased: For the People admiring these Learned Doctors, were easily persuaded that somewhat Valuable if not Divine, was Contained in such Mysterious Expressions: And then these Learned Persons to whose hands all things that were Sacred, were Committed; Learnedly intermixing this their Philosophy, with what is Contained in the Sacred Writings, or rather wisely suiting the Sense of them to their Canting Learning, (for without that their Characters, or Reputations could not have been preserved, for had there been no difficulties, there would have been required no Explications) they soon disposed the Inspired Writings to say what they pleased; by which means Heresies multiplied, and Schisms encreased.

creased. This I think will appear evident, from the early dissentions that broke out in the Church of Christ, which for the most part were only Doctrinal, and by the Marks they bear, seem manifestly grounded, upon that Philosophy, that was at that time, in the greatest Esteem in the *Roman* Empire. For it is to be considered that after the *Roman* Armies had over-run *Greece*, and that Empire marvellously Enlarged by the Asiatick Conquests, its Great Men soon became tainted with Exotic Vices and Foreign Vanities, and sought all Methods whereby to distinguish themselves and to make their Persons and Parts more valued and Admired; and in order to this they apply themselves to what was called Learning: Whereas in the earlier and purer times, before Pride and Luxury, had Corrupted the Minds of Men in that Flourishing Empire, Learning was despised, and Philosophy forbid; the Great *Cato* procuring a Law against it, to prevent the Mischiefs, he foresaw would Arise from so Lazy and Useless a Study: For Dignities and Publick Offices in *Rome*, being Conferred by the Suffrage of the People, and that Government permitting Orations and Harangues to them, the great Men who had any hope of those Honours, took Care to besit themselves to make Speeches to cajole the People, as a means to obtain these great Employments; and the better to qualify their Sons for the obtaining

taining such Advantageous Offices, they usually sent them to be Educated at *Athens*, where the Learning that was taught them, consisting in great Measure in Rhetorick, and a sort of Philosophy, that seemed to be fitted to qualify Men, for that Divine Art of Prating, by which they could give a glittering varnish to the basest of designs; but however by the first they acquired a pleasing Stream of Words, by which they could raise the Passions of a gazing Audience; and by the last an Excellency of Playing, Jugling, and Tricking with them, shewing them in different Colours, and using them, in such Senses, as was best suited to their present Ends: And these Studies being so useful for the Advancing of Men to the highest Dignities, and greatest Trust in the *Roman* Common Wealth; it is no wonder that they Arrived at so high an Esteem, as being indeed in that Government a Qualification to obtain Preferment: It is true this afterwards was an Accidental Occasion of bringing Ruine to that Common Wealth; for its Members, being thus permitted to harangue the People, had thereby an Opportunity to impose upon the Crowd, for with specious pretences of Publick Good, they perswaded the People to espouse their Interests, in order to compass their Ambitious designs. Christianity miraculously succeeded in that Empire, its first and most Zealous

lous professors either having been bred up or applying themselves to this talking Study, that so being assisted with this prevailing Art, they might the better be enabled to win Profelytes, and to defend that most Excellent Doctrine, against the Philosophical Arguments of the cunning Heathens; some of them by thus intermixing their Learning, with their Religion, very early fell into Doctrinal Errors; which Misfortunes in Religion being discovered to have proceeded from that Philosophy, it became gradually to be disused; or at least the Nature of things were so altered, that the Learning came solely into such hands, whose Interests obliged them to turn their Studies another way; for afterwards the great business of the Men of Letters, was to find Arguments for the Advancing the *Power of the papacy and the Grandeur and Independency of the Church*; whereby they pretermitted those refined disputes about Doctrine, by which Heresies had been formerly multiplied, but fell into Controversies concerning discipline, and forms of Worship, which since have divided Christians, as Doctrines did before. But notwithstanding Learning, or some other Reasons, have administered Occasions for such diversity of Opinions in Religion, from whence Sects, or parties have been formed, that have given disturbance to the Peace of Governments; yet such could have never been

so widely propagated as to have had Numbers whereby to create such Mischiefs; unless Governments had been distempered; for otherwise the Administration would have prevented their Spreading. Thus for Instance, no disorders happened in the Republick of *Venice* by Religion, when the rest of *Europe* was in a Flame, neither hath the *Ottoman* Empire been torn by any Sects in Mahometism, whereas the Saracenicall One frequently was. And in the *Roman* Empire Heresies, Schisms, or some other Church Divisions, were as duly multiplied, as their Emperours were Dethroned, Butchered, or Changed; the Succeeding Princee rarely favouring the Religious Opinion, that was countenanced by his predecessours, but may be most usually observed, to Cherish some new one, or to connive at, or give some Occasion to Revive some Old, that so he might form a party, that might be Opposite to his Enemies Interest; upon whose Ruine he ascended the Throne.

VIII. And notwithstanding the Designs and Interests of Men that are in Power, or the Circumstances in Government, may and do sometimes induce the governing Power to very different and even contrary proceedings in relation to Religion; and thereby occasion disturbances, and effect even Revolutions; yet it is certain Religion is not the Basis, upon which

which Civil Government is founded; nor indeed the Bond or Cement that Unites or conjoins Men in Society: which appears evident, in that there are now Governments, where there is no revealed Religion acknowledged by Publick Authority, as in *China*; And in that Governments have subsisted, before there was any such thing: And that even in *Europe* where Christianity is professed, Men seem not in their Politicks to regard it. Besides, Altho' it warms Mens Thoughts, and inspires to great and glorious Undertakings; yet the Rewards for such being only in futurities, it is apt to give place to the present pressing Wants of Hunger or Thirst, by which the Body suffers, and which will be felt and heard, notwithstanding our Zeal for Eternity; for the feeding our Souls with the only hopes of Future Rewards, will not continue our Bodily Subsistence, which our very Nature will oblige us to endeavour to preserve: Nay farther, The Principal End of *Civil Polity*, is the Security and Preservation of Mens *Lives* and *Properties*; it is plain therefore it cannot be founded upon Religion, which is not essential to it, for that Principally intends the Salvation of our Souls. For which reason, altho' Religion hath often contributed to the shattering and destroying Governments; yet it hath never been the Principal or Only Instrument in Establishing one; for it hath always been subservient to Government, which appears

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appears in that an Unity in Doctrine or Discipline, hath never been Settled or Continued long in a loose Government or divided State, (*viz.* such as the *Roman* Empire was, or most of the *European* are) unless it was so constituted, as that the Directors and Guides of *It* were a Body Distinct, and Independent of the Civil Power, as it was here in *England* for the most part, before the Reformation, and is now in some *Catholick Countries*; and where such a Solecism in *Polity* is permitted, as two Independent Authorities in the same *Community*, there will be perpetual strugglings and bickerings between them, as it is certain there often was in former times here in *England*, and is still in some of our Neighbouring Countries: Yet notwithstanding this Misfortune in a State where Religion is a distinct *Polity*, yet there the Heads and Supporters of this *Ecclesiastical Government*, having an Authority to Punish any of its Members that shall transgress their Ordinances; and their Interests, and indeed their Preservation obliging them to continue an Unity, by reason Divisions must Usher in Ruine to their Authority, and then there lying no Appeal from their Courts to the *Civil Power*, their Judgments being definitive, they are hereby capacitated to preserve their Unity, as we may plainly observe is actually done by the *Roman* Church; for unless the *Civil Power* interposes, in such States where that Religion

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Religion is in perfection Establish'd, and so seems to connive at, or abett Heterodox Opinions in opposition to the Ecclesiastical Authority; it seems almost impossible for such to spread; (as we see it never could, or ever did in *Europe*, until countenanced by the *Civil Power*) as shall be shew'd hereafter; for the severe and dreadful Authority which Churchmen in such *Catholick* Countries possess, of doubly Punishing, *viz.* the Body with Imprisonment, or Death, by the Sentence of the *Inquisition*, and the Soul with the Terror of Damnation, by Excommunication, have thereby an opportunity of suppressing springing Divisions or Heterodox Opinions in their very Birth; as we have a late Instance in the Doctrines of *Molinus*, which in a manner vanished as soon as the Church thought fit to suppress them. Whereas, where the Reformation is established, it happens directly otherwise, for there the Ecclesiastical Authority having no Power of inflicting Punishments, but as permitted by the *Civil Power*; being indeed in such Places, only establish'd by Laws or Concessions from the *Civil Power*, are meerly dependant upon *That*; and therefore can never persevere or continue in a settled Unity, any longer than it is the Interest; Judgment or Safety of those that are in *Power* to keep it so: And the Purposes, Designs and Ends, of such being so very changeable, as rarely for any continuance to pursue the same Methods;

Methods; it is no wonder in such mixed and perplexed Governments, as have been establish'd here in *Europe*, we have so many differences and divisions in Religion, as have been observed to be not only in our *Britain*, but in other Neighbouring Countries, for the Persons concerned in the Government, so often shifting, the Administrations being seldom continued in the same Hands, they seldom tread in the same steps; but each Ministry in order to attain what it designs, takes such Measures in Religious affairs, as looks most promising for its present purpose.

C H A P. IV.

1. *Our imaginary Wants considered; effects of Communities.*
2. *Of no moment to Government, unless attended with Wealth or Authority.*
3. *People corrupted by Popular Acts.*
4. *Government makes inequality; That marks of distinction. Wealth employed to procure such; variety of them.*
5. *Poetry an Art of Delight, consists of Fable not Truth; liberty of Writing what may please; Rules collected from particular Authorities; vanity of such; Plays feigned images of the Actions and Designs of Men.*
6. *Play what, not to be adjusted to Rules, and why.*
7. *Delight the end of Plays, Instruction no part.*
8. *No standard of their Excellency*

Excellency, but as they please. Rules why collected from the Greek or Latin Poets; Audience and Criticks often disagree. 9. *Who composes the Audience, to be pleased, and how; Vices and Follies of others, not their own to be represented.* 10. *Plays may be suppress'd but not reformed, unless the Age first is.* 11. *Musick modified sound.*

1. **H**AVING in the former Chapter treated of our real *Wants* and *Uneasiness*, such as immediately relate both to Body and Soul, and shewed the Reasons why they Influence and Respect Government; it now remains that I consider our Imaginary and Fantastical Ones, such I mean as have no Existence in our Natures, but are meerly of our own Creating, being indeed but the Offspring of Community, where we consider our selves in Relation to Others, and so form *such*, by comparing the different degrees in the States, Conditions or Fortunes of Men; and by that raise those several Excellencies, Graces or Virtues that are so much valued and admired; such as are Honour, Glory, a Reputation for Wisdom, Courage, Learning, or whatsoever else is accounted Virtuous, or Praise-worthy; for that these things have no separate Existence out of Community, appears evident from the very consideration of their Natures, in that they are founded in the esteem of others, and are formed out of the Thoughts
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and Actions of Men, attended with their various Circumstances, Objects and Ends, which being collected and combined together under one single Word, are thereby considered as one intire Thing; and then, as such are supposed actually to Exist: For that Person who is supposed in his Designs and Actions to have a Regard to the *Good* and *Welfare* of Others, will most assuredly be Valued and Admired by them, and of consequence will be dignified with such Epithets, as denote their good Opinions, by reason he is willing and able to perform things that may be for common Advantage. Yet the meer Reputation for Virtues that relate to the general Good of Others, are never found to influence or endanger a Government, unless the Person who has that Character, enjoys such proportions of *Wealth* or *Credit*, that may Capacitate him by Acts of Bounty or Splendour, or Grandeur in living to help and assist the Needy, or such whose Fortunes are to be supported by such Consumptions as his State requires (which in all Community will be the Majority of the People) that so Men may someways depend upon him: Or unless he hath a part in the Governing Power, and thereby an opportunity of someways signaling himself by some Popular Acts, and by that means dazle the People into an Admiration of his Person, as if he alone was the only Bulwark to Protect them from the Insults of

of others who are in Power, and thereby allure Men to approve what he designs. For altho' sometimes Private Men may and are Esteemed for their Wisdom and Goodness, yet such without a Fortune or Wealth, are never sufficient to induce others, to Embark in such designs, as may endanger their own Safety; Thus had not *Melius* Abounded in Wealth, and *Manlius* been in Authority, by which the one had an Opportunity of Relieving the Peoples Wants; and the Other of discovering as he pretended, the Embezzlements of the Publick Treasures, and thereby of easing their Impositions, they could never have carried the affection of the *Plebeians*, to the Endangering the *Roman* Common Wealth. It is true this admits of Objections, in that Violent disorders have been Raised, or headed by private Men, and unknown Persons, witness those Tumultuary Insurrections, to be met with in our *English* Stories, as likewise that wonderful one by *Messaniello* at *Naples*; but then these altho' Violent were not lasting, neither were they occasioned from any Consideration of any Virtue, or Excellency in the Person that headed them, but were the Natural Effect of a distempered Government; which had gradually ripened, and then Burst out with Fury; for in all these Cases it is Evident the People, by reason of Edicts, Laws, or Usages, were either

either abridged, or deprived of some former Rights, or else were burdened with some new Impositions, or were some ways dissatisfied, at the Proceedings of the Governing Power which caused them to Mutiny, Confederate, and rise in Armes, and so actually Oppose the Administrations; and then perhaps wanting a Person of Quality, or Fortune to make their Head, they choose or Submit to be Governed by One, who had nothing to recommend him, but a happy Assurance, or a forward Zeal for the Common Cause. And this the very Necessities of their Circumstances, in order to preserve themselves, obliged them to do, for without some Established Order, Confusion, and of Course their Own destruction must Enſue.

II. But to Return; it must be acknowledged, that Virtues, or Excellencies, such as Fortitude, Justice, Wisdom, Generosity, and if you please Learning, can never be Esteemed, until they are known, neither can they be known until he that Enjoys them, hath some Opportunity of Publishing them; for no Man can Esteem another upon the Account of any Excellency, until he is assured that he possesses what he admires; wherefore to Establish a good Opinion in Others, it becomes necessary, that a Mans worth should be known to them: but that cannot be done

done by words only, in such things that plainly and in their very Natures require Action; And Great and Publick Actions, such as in their Effects someway Concern a Number of Men, or the Body of the People, are not to be performed, but by such Persons, who Enjoy great Wealth, or Possess great Power; because no Man will hazard his own Safety, in the behalf of another, unless he hath a prospect by such an undertaking, of some way Advantaging himself; for which reason no private Person in Communities, can Engage such a Number of People in his Interest, as thereby to Influence the Government, unless he himself partake of so much Wealth, or Power, as thereby to prevail upon the People, to listen to or pursue his Counsels, and that really upon the Account that they have had some Benefits by him, as may be concluded from what hath been already offered, concerning the certain and general Nature of Man. And for a further Confirmation of this, we may observe, how that the Greatness of Actions, the Prudence of Counsels, and in Truth the very Beauty of Expressions, are not Vulgarly valued, according to the Real and Intrinsic worth of the Things done, Advices given, or Words Expressed, but according to the Qualities, Fortunes, Dignities, or Circumstances, of the Person

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Acting, Advising, or Speaking. Thus the Actions of great Men, are Celebrated with Encomiums, suitable to the Dignity of him who performed them, whilst those of mean Persons, altho of the same Nature pass Unregarded: Men rarely proportioning their Esteem According to the worth of the Thing done, but According to the Person who is the doer: Thus the very Words of Princes are Quoted and Admired, not from any Excellency contained in them, but from the deference that is paid to his Person who said them; Men as it were tacitly Imagining, that Truth, Wisdom, or Knowledge, must always accompany great Personages. Supposing, as it were by that as if the Almighty had proportioned his Blessings according to the different Stations Men enjoy in Communities. The reasons of these Things are very obvious, in that Man Naturally aiming at his own happiness, will necessarily Value whatsoever he Believes will contribute towards the Attaining of it; and vast Numbers of Men in great Communities; labouring under Real or Imaginary Wants, will therefore Like and Esteem, whatsoever is done or said by those in whose Power it is to Ease or Relieve them, and great Persons having this Power, are always therefore flattered and Admired; whereas what is said or done by those, who have no Oppor-
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tunity to serve or Reward them, they seem no way concerned in, and therefore Remain in an Entire Indifferency. For this reason no danger can Arise from any popular Reputation, from personal Virtues, unless such are accompanied with Wealth or Power, or at least where they have the favour of such who really possess them.

III. But having already discoursed upon Wealth, and shewed the reason of its political Influence upon Government; and proved that Wealth and Power will not long continue separate; I should have concluded upon this Subject, but that I hope it may not be an unacceptable Pains Summarily to Enquire into some Imaginary or fictitious Pleasures, which altho they do not immediately affect Government, yet sometimes they are thought to do it Consequentially; such as Plays, Shows, Musick, or whatsoever else may be Publickly used or Represented, to please and delight the People. Thus the *Roman* Grandees Instituted Games, Plays, Feasts, Shows, Fightings of Men, and Baitings, and Destroying Beasts, in order to Endear themselves to the People, the better to Continue or Obtain Commands, Offices, or Dignities. But our *European* Governments not admitting Offices or Dignities to be acquired by such Popular

lar Methods, such Publick Entertainments are but rarely made use of by Private Men, for Men will not usually squander away immense Treasures, for the Pleasure of others, unless somewhat may be obtained by such for themselves.

IV. However Plays, Shows, and Musick, the pleasing Entertainment of Idle hours, having marvellously prevailed in this last Age, since the Indian discoveries have Advanced Trade, and Encreased Wealth, by which Luxury, its undoubted Off-spring hath wonderfully Flourished: For Wealth or Money, that is Gold or Silver, Naturally considered, as only Bright and Shining Metals, contribute but little to the happiness or subsistence of Man, as not being befitted by Nature to Relieve any of his Real Wants, and therefore of themselves are not of any Real Use, and of Consequence of little intrinsic Value to him: But they become so in Society, by reason they are Received in Exchange for all things that do; Gold and Silver therefore become Valuable by the Consent of Men, and can continue no longer so, than whilst they will procure what is Useful to them: Thus were Men Laden with Treasure left upon a desert, where there admired Gold, would not purchase Provisions for their Starving Stomachs, they would look upon such Substances with Scorn,

Scorn, and prefer the meanest Viands to those Valued Metals, for there such would be useless, seeing they might Starve Amidst their Treasure; and so be convinced by a Miserable Experience, how little of real Use, was Contained in such Valued Metals. But Government Naturally producing an Inequality amongst Men, such Persons who possess the Wealth, will someway endeavour to distinguish themselves; for without that, Wealth could be of no use, any further than as it procured the Necessaries of Life, neither could Power, be of any Continuance: For Wealth or Money not immediately contributing to the Relief of our Bodily Wants, (for Men do not eat or drink Silver or Gold) would soon become Neglected, were it not that it gave some preeminence to those that have it, more than the providing the Necessaries of Life, which cannot be in any other ways, than the supporting this Inequality amongst Men in the same Community, without which there could be no Government; for there can be no Government without some Order, and Superiority amongst its Members, by which Laws are Made and Executed: Whereby Money, or Wealth that makes this become necessary to Government, and those that Abound in that, not having an Occasion to employ so great a Proportion as they sometimes possess, in procuring the Necessaries, I 3 or

or Conveniences of Life; it would Remain a useless drug, a despicable Rubbish, could they find no other way to use it: But the very Nature of Society soon administers a variety of uses for it, for a Superiority would not be maintained without some Marks of Distinction, by which it is to be known, and such Marks are to be made or procured by Treasure, and then the Obtaining such Marks as are supposed to be annexed to Superiority, will always be Pursued and Coveted; And he therefore that hath Wealth, will rarely fail to Expend it that way. From this reason the Indigent and Needy or those of Scanty Fortunes, who turn their Thoughts to Industry, have in all Ages, and in all Countries, where Government is well Established, Employed their Heads and Hands, in the Composing, Contriving, or Fashioning, such things as seem most agreeable to the disposition or genius of the People or Time, by which they may procure Money or Rewards from those who Enjoy the Wealth; and they as readily purchase such Vanities, by reason by these they are distinguished and known; for then by possessing such things as are uncommon, they are Respected and Admired, Thus there is a Reciprocal dependence between Men in Community, the Indigent Compose Vanities, in order to gain the Rich Mans Wealth; And the Rich Man purchases

purchases them to continue the Marks of Superiority which he affects. Thus by the great Variety of Tempers, and the differing Applications of different Men have been produced a Multitude of Vanities, whereby to Please and Oblige the Rich. For Example some employ their Hands and Times in the curious Contrivances of Mechanical Inventions, such I mean as carry more of an Esteem from some Beauty or Curiosity in the Workmanship than from any Real use of the Works. And others bend their Minds, in the Inventing Dainties; or endanger their Bodies in the fetching Rarities to tickle and please the Palate with such Viands, as are thought Valuable, because not in Common use. And others Study how to Adorn the Houses, or Beautify the Persons, with such Furniture and Apparel, whereby the Rich and Great may be distinguished. Some contrive to please the Sight with Glittering and Pompous Opera's and Shows, and others to Charm their Ears with Ravishing Harmony of well tuned Musick. And some in proportioned Numbers Endeavour to divert the Idle hours, with pleasing Images of Elaborate Chime- ra's, lively Representations of Mighty Sounding Nothings, Gaudy Appearances, Painted Trifles, mere Illusions of supposed Existences, that like Specters, Ghosts, or Demons, never Appear but when they are conjured

up, or Painted by a *Poetical Magick*. By these the Minds of the Rich and Great are diverted, their Thoughts in their unemployed hours, being by such Vanities, turned from forming any dismal or melancholy Reflections, that might otherwise Start up, to impair their Pleasure.

V. Poetry is an Art perfectly invented for the Delight and Pleasure of Men, being only a feigned Narration in certain Numbers, which are called Verse, (and therein it chiefly differs from what is termed a Romance) of somewhat that is supposed may please; and the more delightfully to perform this, ungoverned Fancy is let loose to describe what Images, or Paint what Figures She pleases, and to gild them with the brightest Colour, and to embellish them with the most beauteous Shades that she can invent; and then pour them into the Ear under the softest stream of Words, and most Musical Cadencies that Language can mould. Or sometimes on the contrary, to disfigure or deform them with all the Monstrosities of Feature, and all the Moulds and Glemishes of Colour, that Ill-nature can suggest or say, as may be observed in what we call Satyr. For in this Art Fable and not Truth is intended, the Poet therefore being at liberty to write what he pleases, will always say, what he thinks will Please: And accordingly where he designs great Characters, he often

often Selects Excellencies to make or adorn his Hero that were never united in any single Nature, (witness *Virgil's Aeneas*, or *Homer's Achilles*) for having a Poetical liberty, he ransacks the whole Species of Mankind to Collect scattered Virtues, in order to Unite them in his single Hero to make his Character admirable: But the Poet is not always content with this; for sometimes he pulls the *Deities* from their Blessed Mansions, and makes them lacqueys to run at the commands of his feigned Puppets; and often obliges them to say and do what does not become their God-heads, and these extravagant and preposterous Whimfies, are often what grace and recommend a *Poem*; and those Persons who Embark in this bewitching Study, endeavouring to render the Art more elaborate, that so such Performances may be the more esteemed, have with a Pompous shew of unwearied Industry, turned over the Records of former Ages, to discover how the Ancients in early times, and in remote Countries, pleased those who were able to reward them; and to give the better lustre to their present labours, they pretend to establish Rules, and to discover unthought of Laws, which are forsooth to be strictly observed by every proficient in this fabulous Art: And he that shall hereafter dare to decline from these Orders, shall be sure to incur the Censure of the whole Tribe; And yet perhaps not one observe

serve what they so rigidly enjoin, and what they will be sure to condemn in others : Thus what trifling Criticisms about Words? what breaches of Order or Rules? What violating Characters? What maimed or decrepit designs? What indecent indecorums do they make or find who set up for Criticks? for they pretending to discover Blemishes and to find Faults, because the Poet hath not, as they say, exactly conform'd to such Rules as have been made or practised ; they blemish his labours, and expose the feigned indecencies and irregularities of his Work. Strange Whimsies! As if such Mouldy and trifling Rules which are only collected from the Writings of others, because such at that time, or in that Country, were observed to please, must be now the lasting Standard, and the only Method to do the same thing ; as if all Men in all Ages must have the same relish of these Fictions, and as if Countries, Customs, Laws, Usages, Manners, could make no difference in things that plainly depend upon them ; or as if the present Age, had not the same Advantage as the former ; but that the Antients enjoyed some prerogatives, that the Almighty hath not thought fit to continue to Mankind, and therefore the present, to be only governed by what the Ancients did. Or as if God had so lavished his store of Blessings upon our Fore-fathers, that there remained nothing for us, but to be their Apes,

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awkardly to imitate what they had excellently done, and so must not pretend to swerve from their Steps : whereas God's Store is inexhaustible, and Mans Nature the same, if he will but diligently employ it, the present partaking of the same Advantages the former had ; But to Return, Plays, for in that part of Poetry I shall only Instance, neither do, or ever can, entirely Exist at the same time, which is manifest in that they consist of different Scenes, and Acts, successively performed in the same place, and therefore must take up different times to be represented: And in that being only Images, or lively Representations of the Actions, Passions, Humors, and Designs of Men, with the various turns of Fortune, Copied out for Pleasure and Diversion of the Audience, they therefore want a Certain and Lasting Standard whereby to Compare them, for being intended as Pleasant Copies, for the diversion of others, they must be as Changeable as the Original, they are presumed to Represent: And their dress to be, so suited, as to be delightfome to the Audience ; whose Taste sometimes are very different, as Appears in that Plays have often had that fate, as to be both Applauded and Condemned.

VI. But that we may come to a Clearer understanding of these Matters, it will be necessary

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necessary to apply our Thoughts to the very thing or things that is intended, to be signified by this complex Word *Play*, and not mislead our selves by any Metaphysical Niceties, concerning a Term, whose Sense is to be determined by what it is used to signify, which being a Fact it is plain its Signification is solely to be bounded by that: The Word *Play* is used with us to express a Composure by way of Dialogue between feigned Persons, interchangably brought in by Scenes, and the whole divided into Acts; in which are intended to be Personated the Actions, Passions, Designs and Fortunes of Men, to the Pleasure and Diversion of the Audience. It is true, this Word *Play* is not always taken precisely to signify the same Collection of Things or Actions said or represented, as must be concluded from the different kinds of *Plays*, as also from the diversity of Plots and Representations that may be observed in them. It being sufficient for ordinary Discourse, that such General and Complex Terms, comprehend but some Properties, which being common to several Particulars, may induce Men to express such by one general Word, and by that means considering them as having but one common Nature; (by reason they thus agree in some Properties), they make them a distinct Species. But since what we thus call a *Play*, is but the Artful Product of Human Inventions, merely relating to the Actions and Designs of Men,

Men, which are as different as Ages, Persons or Countries; it is plain what is intended to represent these must likewise be so: It seems wonderful then, that Men should allow such a Solecism in Reasoning as to admit, (which indeed they cannot deny, the Fact being so Notorious) that the Humours, Customs, Manners, Usages and Methods of living, are in the Present Age very differing from what was practised by our own Ancestors, and much more from what was used by the Ancient *Greeks* and *Romans*; and yet at the same time to expect *Plays* that are but the pleasing Copies of such, should conform with those that were composed by the Ancients: And this it is plain Men in effect do, when they collect Rules from their Writings, and make them the Standards, to judge of the Excellencies of all such future Undertakings. Whereas it is in Poetry as in Grammar, in which the Rules were not Antecedent to the Language they pretend to teach, but taken from that, being in Truth only a collection of particular Authorities that are observed to agree, and therefore are reduced into general Words, which from thence become Rules. What *Scenes* then, what *Plots* or *Contrivances*, what *Vices* or *Follies*, what *Turns* of Fortune, what *Designs* were Pleasing and Delightful to the Ancients, or indeed to Persons living in remote or distant Countries, as being but the pretended resemblances of what was there said or

or done, may not be so to us, by reason we are unacquainted with the Originals; if it be said there be some things common to Men in all Ages and Countries, I grant it; but then I say they are not such as constitute the chiefest parts of the *Drama*.

VII. A Play then is a Composure wherein is Acted or Rehearsed, what is supposed to have been said, done or intended by Men: And what seems to give the Pleasure or Diversion to the Audience is, that they are not concerned in the Representation, but are placed as it were Judges of these Proceedings, and so enjoy a sort of Pleasure, in that they have a Right or Power, in either Rewarding or Censuring, that is, they seem here to have a Mental Sovereignty, either to Punish, Praise, or Pity, as they please. That this is so I suppose, Nobody will deny, that will give himself leisure to Examine his own Thoughts, or will but fully observe the Practices of others, or but deliberately consider the very Nature of the Thing; for I think no Man will be so vain, to affirm he goes to the Play-house, as he doth to the Church, to be reminded of his Duty towards God, his Neighbour, or himself; or as to the School to be Instructed in Learning, or Wisdom, but merely to be diverted or delighted; which is evident in that He there sees the Vanities or Follies of others

others exposed; and that this delight arises in that he is as it were Arbiter in these Proceedings, is very manifest, in that no Man is pleased in being made a Party, or Personated himself in them. They therefore who would Insinuate that Instruction is an Essential Part of a Play, would make the word to import what it doth not. For Instruction in the Sense as there used, must either regard *Truth* or *Knowledge*, the first it is plain it cannot in a Play Respect, by reason the whole *Drama*, is but a Fable, or at least if it partake of some Truths, yet they are so interwoven with fictions, as being set off, with Pleasing and Witty Beauties, or so deformed with such uncouth and ugly Blemishes, in order to delight the Audience, that they are not to be distinguished. As to the latter, A Play cannot Properly convey Knowledge, being only a Representation of the Actions, Designs, or Words of Men, which are supposed to be known already, or otherwise they would not be represented, nor indeed could not be pleasantly Relished by the Audience. It is true in a Play we directly perceive what is said or done, but then we only respect those Words or Actions performed there, our Minds resting upon them only, without any consideration to the Person of the Actor, any more than as he Personates Well or Ill; for we know he Personates or feigns

feigns another, for if he did not, it would not be a Play, for then the performances would be Real, as being done, by the very Persons themselves; the Truth of the first Part of this Assertion, will plainly appear if we do but Consider, that although we are sometimes diverted by the follies of a Lunatick, or Laugh at the Lewdness of a Debauchee, or Pity the Passions of a Man in Love, yet we do not call such Follies, Vices, or Passions, Representations, by reason they are the proper Acts of such Persons that perform them: But when such are Personated or Represented by others, then only they make a part of such Compo-
sures: In the first Case we are really Affect-
ed with the Actions or Passions, upon the account of the Person actually then trans-
acting that very thing. In the second we are touched at the Action or Passion, but not at the Person, who only Personates or Represents another, and so is no farther concerned in the Action, but only to Re-
present it Well or Ill: So that the Con-
cern of the Audience, rests upon the Acti-
on: Whereas, in the first it relates to the Real Person.

VIII. If then the *Drama* is not Conversant about Truth, nor doth not contribute to use-
full Knowledge, it is plain it is an Art Dedi-
cated to Delight; and that there can be no
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standing Measure of its Excellency; but what pleases most, will be most Valued. But perhaps it may be Objected, that this Assertion is Evidently false, by reason Mens Minds are observed to have as different Tasts of Pleasure, as their Palates have of Food, (I intend only Imaginary Ones) and that therefore it is as impracticable to please all Men with the same Things, as it is all Pa-
lates with the same Tasts: But that Men have and do disagree about these Matters, according to their Ages, Complexions, Countries, Fortunes, Customs, Usages, or Educations, as must be concluded from the differing purposes and designs of Men; and may be in a more especially manner confir-
med by the disputes that have been so warm-
ly bandied, amongst the greatest Philoso-
phers, (who may be supposed to have thoroughly considered these Things), in de-
termining in what they should place their *Summum Bonum*: Whereas there hath been found so universal an Approbation of the Excellency of some Plays, as seems not con-
sistent with so precarious a Standard: To Reconcile these difficulties that seem so opposite, we must consider, that what hath been generally allowed by those who are called Criticks, to have made the perfecti-
on of Plays, hath been, that they have been fashioned and adjusted by Rules; which Rules have been composed from
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Particular Authority, collected out of former Plays; and what induced Men to value these Authorities and to neglect others, was, That these were found to have pleased, or been esteemed beyond others: The Truth of the first appears by the Authorities that are quoted by these Rule Makers, to confirm the justness of them; for if they had proceeded from any other Reasons, they would have been produced; and the second from the very Nature of the Thing, for if they had not pleased, they would neither have been used nor valued. Ancient Plays being thus made the Ground of present Rules, and these Rules the Standards by which the Goodness or Badness of future *Dramatick Composures* are to be tried; it is plain what conforms to them must be approved, and what does not must be condemned and disliked. But what seems to have raised the *Greek* and *Latin* Poets to such an Esteem here in *Europe*, as to have these Rules only collected from their Labours, and the Works of all other Nations neglected, (for it is certain wheresoever a People have flourished by encreasing in Wealth and Empire, there always hath been Luxuries and Vanities) hath proceeded in that the Principal part of the Learning, by which Men have been Dignified and Esteemed in *Europe*, hath been taken to consist in the Knowledge and Skill of these Languages; neither of which being now the common dialect of any Country,

try, are ordinarily taught by the Books Printed in those Tongues: For which reason Men applying themselves to attain a Skill in such by these helps, have gradually come to value what is contained in these Books; for by that Means they have the Advantage of being thought to know somewhat, that others unskill'd in these Languages cannot attain to; and for the same Reason they are farther distinguished, as being esteemed not only Learned, but also valued; as if by that they had acquired some Perfections that were not to be attained by the unlettered. And what seems to have given the Preeminence to these Tongues beyond others, for it is plain, Language is only the Conduit to convey or record our Thoughts, and so Naturally there is, no Excellency in one beyond another; for they do not of themselves improve our Knowledge, or better our Judgments, (altho' they are the proper means by which it is often done) hath been in that the *Romans* extended their Empire over the *European* Countries; and altho' that was afterwards shattered and ruined by the Northern Nations, yet those Barbarous People, after they settled in that Empire, became pleased with what was *Roman*; and so put an Esteem upon their Language, in order to learn their Customs, Manners or Laws; But what principally contributed to the so general Use, and to the so great an Esteem being put upon the Knowledge

ledge of these Tongues was our most Holy Religion; for the Sacred Writings of Christianity, being for the most part originally Penn'd in the *Greek*; and the Services in the Primitive Times in the Western Empire, and the Writings of the *Fathers* of that Church being in *Latin*, as indeed being their Native Tongue; and that Primitive Usage of the *Latin* Service continued, (for reasons that are not proper here to be recited) in Countries, and amongst People where it was not understood, have been the real cause why those Tongues have been, where Christianity is planted, so much Used and Esteemed: And that this is so appears farther evident, in that the *Hebren*, *Syriack*, *Arabick*, *Coptick* or other Ancient Tongues, in which are found any Ancient Copies of any Books of the Old Testament; or in which are Recorded any Customs or Usages, or any Proceedings of the *Israelites*, or any People that any ways related to the Knowledge of them, are likewise in some Measure valued, and numbred amongst the Learned Languages, these likewise someways relating to our Religion: But to return, These things seem to be the Reasons for, and the Ground of the present Rules, by which the *Critick* who makes remarks upon these Works, usually tries their Goodness; whereas the Audience, who are unversed in these Rules, do not regularly take their Measures from them, but applaud

plaud or condemn such Labours, as they are pleased or displeas'd by them: Hence sometimes the *Critick* and the *Audience* have disagreed in their Judgments, but the Poet and the Stage having their Advantage from the Audience, have appeared more Solicitous in their Labours to please them, by whom they live, than to avoid the grinning snarls of a waspish *Critick*, who only finds faults because the Age is not pleas'd with what pleas'd the Ancients, or what he likes, because it pleas'd them. It is from this Reason, that notwithstanding these so much boasted Rules, Plays have kept Pace with the Practices and Manners of the Age, and have been as changeable as that, they being in Truth nothing but the Representations or rather the Aping or Mimicking of such, which have been so Represented, as the Audience might be pleas'd, without much Regard to Rules: This I think is undeniably Evident in that there are few Plays, in which the Three Celebrated Unities are Observed; and if in some few they have been, (which may be question'd) yet such are not in the best Esteem.

IX. We may in the Next place consider, that the Persons who Compose this Audience, and who are to be pleas'd, are mostly such as have Wealth, and so want to be diverted, or have leisure hours to be employed in such Pleasures; for those who

are doomed to the drudging Scenes of Labour, Trade, Attendance, or Study, have their Thoughts too much fixed upon those Concerns, or at least will not, or cannot admit of the Expence or time for such Pleasures, and therefore are more rarely allured to those Entertainments. In short the Audience in General appears to be composed of what we may call a gentile sort of People, who are not destined to Laborious Employments, or what requires great Sedulity or Attendance; but of such as by Birth, Fortune, Choice, or some Accident, are as it were, (by being thus Exempt from what requires great Diligence or Pains) left at their own liberty, as having nothing to do, but in the general to please themselves; and so only pursue what they term pleasure at large: These therefore choosing to distinguish themselves, from such who plod on, in their daily drudgery, take a Pleasure in Seeing the Actions, Practices, and Contrivances, of such who differ from them, to be Comically Personated, or rather Aped and Ridiculed: Or if the Composition is so contrived, that it requires the introducing any Characters that may be thought to Resemble them, it is only to decorate and to show an Honour and Esteem, by commending the Gallantry of their Actions, the Generosity in their undertakings, or their incomparable Courage or Prudence

in their Conducts, or in that to Represent them in such Colours, as will draw the Esteem of Men: Or when the Nature of their part, doth not require any such Heroical Proceedings; then the well bred Gentleman must Banter, Ridicule, or perhaps Cheat or Cuckold some of the other Class, or Act somewhat, that by exposing them, may give a luster to his own Gallantry: By these means the Audience must be pleased, by reason every Mans Opinion is the Standard, by which he tries the Actions and Practices of others, where such therefore are conformable to his, he likes, and is therefore pleased, when others do the same, (as they do, who Commend them), and on the contrary disproves such as do not, and then of course is pleased to see such Exposed or Ridiculed; for this Cause *Plays* can be only admired as the *Poet* hath *Fancy* or *Judgment*, to suit them to the temper of the Audience. But further to conceive rightly how it often happens, that this Audience that here in *England* is often composed of Men of very different Kidnies, and Tempers, should be so unanimously pleased, as sometimes they have been: We must consider that Persons who are conspicuous for Honour, Wealth, or Power, will always for Reasons already assigned, have an Influence upon Men of more Inferior Circumstances, who will Endeavour to oblige such, who are thus ca-

pable to Prefer and Reward them; and as a means to do this, will usually comply with them, Liking or Disliking, Approving or Condemning, as they do; as I think may be Inferred from that Common and Proverbial saying, It had the Approbation of such a Prince, or such a Lord, which is urged as an Authentick Proof of its Excellency; so prone are Men observed to make Judgment of things, not according to any Real or Intrinsic Worth, but according to their then Opinions, which are only taken from the Judgment of those, upon whom perhaps they depend, or who they would oblige; from these Measures, which every one may observe are practised, Men seem to Believe, as if the Almighty had so ordered things, that *Mens Brains* should be proportioned to their *Fortunes* or *Qualities*. However Men Flowing in Wealth, or Abounding in Power, frequenting those Theatrical Entertainments, and the Audience being to be pleased, (for they resort thither for that purpose): what pleases these Persons will seemingly please the Audience, or at least such a part of them, that shall be sufficient to recommend the *Play*. The Poet therefore always Labours to oblige those, upon whose Approbation the Fate of his work depends. For the Inferior Bench will Clap, or Hiss, as the Superior Frown, or Smile. For this reason the Poet doth not presume Ridiculously

lously to Personate, or Comically to Represent, the Actions or Practices of Men in Power, upon whose Smiles, or Frowns, his Fortunes turn; for should he Theatrically expose such, it would be, to *his own*, and the *Stages* loss, since the Audience is mostly composed of such Persons, who would not be pleased, for Reasons already assigned, with such Representations; because by that those very Persons, who are the very Life and Soul of such Assemblies, must be disobliged, by being laid open to the lash and Censure of Others. If it be objected, that the Success of some *Plays*, (in which Characters have been Introduced, and Ridiculed, that directly pointed at Qualities) plainly evince the falsity of this Observation, I think it may be answered where that hath happened, (which hath been but rare) it hath proceeded in that such a Character hath affected but some Persons of that form, and so being only Singular, it was not disliked: For Men seem not to disprove such Representations, unless they themselves or Persons Related to them were someways concerned: For as no Man is displeas'd, in seeing the Imperfections of others, unless they seem someway to affect himself; So no Man can be pleas'd to see himself so Personated as to be made the Diversion and Entertainment of others; the Reason of this is, because by that his Character is lessened,

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his Follies and Vanities Exposed, and so that Honour and Esteem that he thought was paid him, is darkened, by being thus brought down to the Censure of his Inferiors. It is from this reason that the Vices, Vanities, Immorality, or Follies, that are ordinarily Practised by Men of Quality, are rarely Ridiculed upon a Theatre, for the Characters in *Plays*, I intend now Comedies, being intended for a sort of Personating, or rather Aping or Mimicking, what is supposed to have been really said or done, such Words, Actions, or Vanities, are only to be Represented, as may Divert or Please, but not to Abuse or Reflect upon the Audience: And the Audience or at least the better part, who are the very Soul of the Assembly, cannot be pleased with such Comical Images, as are plainly directed to Ridicule themselves, let them be never so wittily contrived, or prettily dressed. But on the Contrary will be Pleased, and Admire the merry Representations of the Practices, or Dealings of such, who are of a very differing Character, Country, Temper, or Inclination; by reason the more the Manners, or Vanities, of such are exposed; the more their own, which are the reverse to such, are set off, and so as it were tacitly Commended. It is from this reason, that when-ever a *Court* is degenerated into Licentiousness, in that the *Prince*, secretly

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cretly favours, or Connives at Vice, (altho perhaps he may Publicly declare against it) and Encourages and Advances such who openly Practise it, (as being perhaps best qualified for his secret purposes): The Stage which is frequented by such Persons, and who as having the *Princes* favour, will be Esteemed good Judges of such performances, (Men being always ready to like as they do, who can perform or Reward them), must never dare to Ridicule the darling and beloved Vanities of them, by whose Breath they may be Ruined: But if they presume to touch upon so high Characters, it must be to their Honour; making or Representing their Vices, or Manners, as Qualifications to be justly Imitated: The Prophane Libertine must then be Characterised as a well bred and witty Gentleman, the Lientious Debauchee as a most accomplished Person: The Poet then must be a *Lucian*, Religion must be scoffed at, and Morality Burlesqued; Piety must be treated as puritanical Cant, and Honesty deemed Stupidity, and to be just esteemed Affected Pride. The truth of this will appear if we but compare our *English* Plays, before and since the Restoration of King *Charles*; for before that, there seems to have been observed a greater respect for Religion, and more modesty in the Scenes, than since; for after that time the Court seeming more barefaced

barefaced to Countenance Lewdness, and Laugh at Prophaneness, the Stage hath been so far from lashing such Vices, that its main business, hath been to Scoff and Ridicule the Sober and Pious; or at least that party of Men that have been supposed to be in an Interest contrary to that of the *Court*: Thus what hath usually made the Comical Scenes of most of our Modern *Plays*, has been the Representing the Practices and Dealings of the City, in such a sort, that may make them Ridiculous, for before the Wife must Jilt, her Husband a good Natur'd Cuckold, must be Cheated, Wheedled, Laughed at by the Spark his Wifes Gallant, who as a reward for his Pious Lewdness, is to be married, in the Conclusion, to a great Fortune, and so at once to better his Estate, that by his debaucheries he had profusely Ruined. Or perhaps when these Characters have been Thread bare, the Scenes have been Changed, but not the design of Ridiculing others, whose Manners are not agreeable to their *Own*; for then the Country-Justice, Squire, or well meaning Knight, is introduced to repeat By-words, or to speak trifling Sayings, or to act somewhat that is extremely Ridiculous, or else to be Cheated, Rifled, or Abused; and then to give the better Relish to these witty Fopperies, the Audience must be regaled, with the secret Lewdness of some *now come* Canting Parson,

Parson, who masks his Villanies under the specious Varnish of Scripture Expressions, and Ushers in his Vices, with some Hems, Sighs, and Pauses; and that the Audience may not be cloyed with the often Repetition of the same fooleries; perhaps Reverend Orthodox, trimmed out with Scarfe, and Rose Hatband, must sometimes be brought upon the Stage, to speak and do such things as will not become his Character: In short no sort of Men are to be spared, whose manners or Actions being differing from theirs, can, by being Comically Represented, yield any Pleasure or diversion to the Audience: And that will be all, Persons, who live in different Methods, or pursue different Ends, from those, who by thus frequenting the Stage, become the Proper Judges of its Proceedings. For it is even congenite to the very Nature of Man, to make his own Opinions, the Standard and touchstone, by which he tryes others, and accordingly as they conform or not to *this*, he approves or Condemns them: And these his Opinions being usually so gently instilled into his Mind that their Origine, is not perceived; he seems prone to believe, that they were planted there by the hand of Nature; and so is apt to conclude that they are, but what is Common to all Men; and therefore if others do no like or dislike, as he does, he imputes it to some defect in their

their Natures, or to some Perverseness or Wilfulness in their Tempers; and therefore concludes that such things are justly to be exposed, as not becoming a Rational Being.

X. These things thus briefly observed, I think we may plainly see, that those Wranglings and Disputes that have been so warmly bandied about our Modern *Plays*, some Charging, and others as Zealously vindicating the Immorality and Prophaneness of them that the former (admitting the Charge to be true) have neither gone far enough in discovering the Cause; nor the latter in their Justification; neither hath there been any effectual remedy proposed for such; for Men to pretend to reform the Stage in a Corrupt and Licentious Age, is a Jest: For since *Plays* are but the intended Copies of what is supposed to have been said, done, or designed: It is plain what must recommend such to the Audience, must be that they are so drawn, that they comically represent the Originals; for without that, the Poets Judgment must be censured, and his Composure condemned. For such representations being designed for Diversion, must bear some Apish resemblance to what they are pretended to imitate; for otherwise to pretend a Copy, and yet have no respect to any Features in the Original, is really to make none, since the very Nature of

a Copy implies some likeness. If therefore *Plays* are permitted, and the *Poet* in the composing of such, regards his Own or the Stages advantage, he must form or contrive such Scenes as will please the Audience, and that in a Corrupt and Licentious Age, is not to be pleased, but by immodest or immoral representations, or by ridiculing what is not agreeable to the Audience. For if we but observe that party of Men, who usually compose the Audience, and by whose Judgments *Plays* have their Fates, we shall find them such, as are not to be pleased, but by such Scenes and Characters, or by such witty contrivances, wherein others, not themselves are exposed; or if the *Plays* are of such a Nature as require no such Comical Parts; then it is true, they are only to be obliged by the lively representing some Passions or Heroick Gallantries, or by Pompous shews, or Musick that seems suited to the Grandeur of the Performance; if therefore the *Poet* should slight or neglect these Methods, by which only they are to be pleased, the *Pit* would soon be thin and the *Boxes* empty: And to propose the reforming the Stage in such an Age, while Vice is esteemed and Lewdness practised, is really going backward, or rather beginning at the wrong End; for the Original is first to be mended before the Copy can be safely altered: And by such Proceedings *Plays* may be sooner Suppress'd than Reform'd; for Licentious

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tious Persons would no more frequent the Theaters than Churches, should they only entertain them with Dialogues of Morality, or representations of Virtue or Good Manners, or should they Ridicule or Satyrically lash what the Audience affect or practise; for that would be to see themselves censured and exposed, which can never be pleasing. The only Method then to reform the Stage, is, to mend the Age, which is not to be altered but by the Governing Power, in Punishing and discountenancing all such who affect *Vice*, and encouraging and rewarding such as pursue *Virtue*; for Men Naturally will be as the Laws are, and the Laws will be as the Governing Authority is: If those in Authority do by their Laws and Examples really endeavour a Reformation in Manners, Men will gradually come to be more reform'd; and then will have a different taste of Pleasure, Vice would be disliked, and debauched, and loose Scenes would no longer gratify nor delight: the Stage must then be reformed, by reason the Audience would not be pleased with such Prophane or Immoral Representations. A Multitude of Instances might be produced, to shew that the Stage hath always Resembled the Age; the very differences that may be observed, by comparing the several Performances that Remain of this kind, in the *Grecian* Common Wealth, and in the several Ages of the *Roman* Empire,

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pire, so far as the History of those Times will give us light into them: But we need not go so far back for Proofs, since the great differences in the very Modern Performances do abundantly Evince it. These Representations in the several Countries of *Europe*, being as different as the several Nations are that Constitute the several Audiences.

XI. What hath been thus briefly, observed concerning Plays, may likewise in some measure be applied to *Musick*; for *Musick*, altho now reduced into Canons and taught by Rules, yet such were not Antecedent to the Art, but subsequent, as being taken from it. *Musick* if Naturally considered is only modified *Sound*, which affects the Organs of hearing in such manner, as thereby to give delight, and is from thence denominated: In order to Comprehend the ground of *Musick*, we must distinguish between what appears *Natural*, and so is universally agreeable to Men in all Capacities, and what is only Relative and affects only some sorts of Men: To do this we must consider, what dayly Experience will teach us, that our *Senses*, are *Inlets*, by which the Mind perceives the Operations of External Existences; And that the Mind does by the help, of these, distinguish between the differing objects that Operate upon the same

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fence: And that God hath as a farther perfection of our Natures, annexed very differing effects to these perceptions; for some seem so Gently, Softly, and Smoothly, to touch these tender Organs, as thereby to Sooth, and Please, and to Create, what we call Pleasure; whilst others more Roughly accost them, and by giving some disorder excite what we call Pain. Sounds will then differently affect our Ears; that is some will be pleasing, whilst others are troublesome or offensive; and what is called Musick, is Sound so modified as to be pleasing and agreeable to us: But then the modifying Sounds after Modes or Rules as in Musical Composures, wherein Notes, Proportion, Time, Beats, Sharps, Flats, &c. Are Regularly observed, can be only acquired Beauties, and are only such to those who have been taught to understand them; which is clear in that being only affections in us, and instituted by us, can have no Standards without us; being only a Luxuriant Product of a Neat hand, and wanton Thought; and are therefore known to none, but such who have been taught them; being gradually brought into use, as things difficult, hard to be Learned, and therefore Valued. And that this is certainly so, appears evident, in that the Beauty or Excellency of Harmony, is not judged of by Men unskilled in this Art, by any

any Rules, or Scales, of Musick, but merely from the Nature of the Sound; which is Abundantly confirmed by the undeniable practice of the greatest part of Mankind, who make what they call their Musick, that is what Pleases their Ears, to consist in nothing but confused Sounds, and Unharmonical Noise, (I speak if compared by the Canons of Musick Established in *Europe*): And not only so, but even here in *England* we may observe the greatest part of the Peasantry, put their Esteem upon Musick, not according to any Elegancies in the Composure, but according to the kinds or degrees of the Sounds; the Noisy Tunes of a Country Morrice, being as delightfome to their Ears, as the most elaborate Grounds, or softest Sonates; Nay such Persons seem so little affected at what are called Graces, that they will often prefer the Rude Noise, made by a Country *Scrape*, before the Harmonious Touch of a *Nicholaj*, or a *Banister*.

L 2 CHAP.

C H A P. V.

1. *What proved.* 2. *No difference in Nature between a King de Facto, and de Jure.* 3. *Government what; either Authoritative or Derivative.* 4. *Men Naturally equal, A Force, and Living Supreme Power essential to Government; not bounded by Law; makes Law.* 5. *Right supposes Law, either Divine or Human; Natural Laws cannot, positive Divine Laws have not conveyed Civil Rights, Municipal Laws do.* 6. *Supream Power what; King, Lords and Commons in England; Civil Rights may be altered; occasion of the distinction between a de Facto and de Jure King.* 7. *Supream Power, and the Acquisition of it different; Actions legitimated.* 8. *Residence does not make a Member of a Community; Consent is required.* 9. *Consent only makes a Member of a Society. Obligation dissolved, when the reason ceases.* 10. *Sense of Words to be determined by the thing signified; Errors from thence, and why.* 11. *Words used uncertainly; no certain Sense of several of them; an Instance in the Word King.* 12. *State of Britain uncertain before Cæsar; found divided into petty States; the People not unlike the Americans.* 13. *Government makes inequality; encreases with People and Dominions; what*

what the Bond of Society? continues Men in Subjection, where Government their Property; Money used, Gold and Silver why preferred. 14. *Recapitulation: Luxury the effect of Wealth.* 15. *Difference in the quality of Men produces Marks of Distinction, which will encrease; divers sorts of them.* 16. *The Motive to Foreign Trade.* 17. *Trade now the Business of Government; under what Government it best flourishes.* 18. *Popular Governments befitted for Trade, and why.* 19. *An Objection as to Northern Nations.* 20. *Arts and Sciences employ'd to make Marks of distinction, prov'd. Learning from the same Reason; different among different People, shewed.* 21. *Language encreases, Writing invented.* 22. *State of Britain at Cæsar's coming; Romans make it a Province of their Empire; Leave the Country; a digression of Courage; Cowardice and Fear different things.* 23. *Romans Planted Colonies; Origin of dividing Lands here; of Planting Christianity.* 24. *Britany forsok by the Romans, fall into Confusion, after a time chuse a King; call in the Saxons for their defence; Assign them Lands; who Conquer or Expel the Britains; ruine the Country; settle themselves; erect several distinct Governments; continue a property in Land; Dominion founded on Property, and why.* 25. *Conquests introduce Tyranny.* 26. *Saxons do not settle as Colonies; Northern Nations agreed in one Model of Government; Saxons all consulted*

sulted in Matters of Moment; settle their Government upon Tenure; Their Primitive Polities had no regard to Conquest, yet they fall into the same Vices. 27. In all their Expeditions had a Leader, who was afterwards called King; his Authority enlarged; a general Scheme of Alterations that Naturally will happen in Governments; Kings made Gods; Christians not behind the Heathens in admiring Royalty.

I. **H**AVING in the former Chapters deduced Government from the Nature of Man, and shewed how the continuing of it, in the same Methods, and the Preserving the Authority in the same Persons, is absolutely required that the Wealth should be United with the Power; or that the Supreme Authority should be someways or other invested with the Wealth, or at least such a Proportion that may keep the People in a dependance: For otherwise the Power will Politically devolve upon those who possess the Wealth, unless it be hindered by the interposition of Violence or Force: And having likewise observed how that altho' the severe oppression of the People, or the Invasion of their Civil or Religious Rights, may sometimes encrease or occasion Civil disturbances, by which means Changes and Revolutions in Government have proceeded; yet a Lasting and Peaceful Polity is not to be settled, but by placing the Power upon those who possess the Wealth, or else the Wealth will

will be violently Seized by those who have the Power: and where Violence or Force interposes against Law, it is plain there Order, or Government is outed, and so the Civil Polity in that particular ended. But that these things thus in the general argued, may not be looked upon as Speculative and Notional Chimera's, or as idle Day-Dreams dressed out with fictitious Images of supposed Existencies, and shewed as real Resemblances of things; when in Truth they are nothing but the wanton Thoughts of a Sedentary Amusement, and never did subsist as here represented. To give then a clear Proof, that what hath been here said, is really what hath been Practised by Men; I shall confirm it by particular Instances; but in doing this I shall not tire my Reader by travelling him thro' the rough and untrodden Paths of remote Countries, nor perplex him with the mouldy and imperfect Records of distant Ages; for by that I must swell this trifle into a voluminous Bulk; altho' there is none of these but will afford some hints, some maimed Proofs according to the Spirit they were writ in; (for it may be observed the Ancients, or at least that part that remains of their Writings, seem more to regard Battles or Romantick Fightings, than Political Remarks) however their Labours, if diligently observed will furnish us with a Multitude of Instances, to confirm or illustrate, what hath been here offered, were they but carefully collected, but

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that is not my design; for I shall only apply my self to what hath happen'd in this our *Britain*, or transiently in some of our Neighbouring Countries, the History of which being better known, the Inferences and Applications, will be more readily comprehended.

II. But before I descend to what I aim at, I think it may not be improper to clear my Way, by removing some Prejudices, that have so strongly possessed the Minds of some Men, as to be a hindrance to them, in the discerning the most obvious Truths, for Men by introducing a distinction, between a *de facto* and a *de jure* King, where really, and in the Nature of Things, there is no difference, have occasioned difficulties where in Truth there is none; and have by that greatly perplexed the Thoughts, and confounded the Judgments of such Men, who too much leaning to words, (as if somewhat real must be always contained in them) have from thence been misled, as imagining where there hath been formed a distinction in Words, there must be in Course a difference in things: Whereas in Truth there is *None* in *This*, as I shall now prove. But that I may avoid mistakes that may Arise from the uncertain use of Words, I shall for the present pretermit the Equivocal Term *King*, and apply the distinction to the Words *Supreme Power*, as bearing a more

more certain and determinate Sense; and shall afterwards prove how the same reasonings may be applied to the Name *King*, as it is, or hath been used in *England*. This I hope may not be an useless Labour, since it is most certain that some just and Good Men have been marvellously disquieted how to demean themselves, after Revolutions have been occasioned in Established Governments, whereby the Supreme Power, or at least a part of *it*, hath been Removed out of those hands, who legally possessed it, before such Changes happened.

III. But that I may begin right in this Matter, it will not be improper to consider what it is that Constitutes what we call Government amongst Men, (I intend only in the General, without any Relation to this or that form): And I think, I may affirm by that Expression is intended, the State of any Number of Men so united, as to Consent, Agree, or Submit, to Live together, under some Commons, Orders, Laws, or Rules: And this is continued in that there is some Common Tribunal Erected, to which Men may Appeal, to determine Controversies, and a Force adjoined, whereby to Punish, and so to Oblige to Obedience; for without the first, there must be Eternal Strifes, and without the last, Men would Submit, no longer than they pleased; either

either of which is inconsistent with such a State. The Word Government thus taken, will admit of a twofold Signification, that is when it is applied to Signifie, Men united in an absolute and independent State, such I understand where they acknowledge no Superior; or where it is used to Signifie a Subordinate One. By the first are understood all Free, Absolute, and Independent States, People, or Kingdoms, such as have a Power to make their own Laws, without any Regard to the Wills and Consent of others: Of the second are all Gilds, Fraternities or Incorporated Companies or Societies, formed within any such State or Kingdom, as also all Conquered Provinces, Countries, or Kingdoms, all which, have a *derivative* but no *Authoritative Power*; for what they Execute is only by Virtue of some *Grant* or *Patent*, from that *Sovereignty* to whom they are Subject; and so are only empowered to govern themselves in such things only as are so conceded.

IV. But by reason Men, who by thus consenting or submitting to Orders or Laws, constitute Government, seem Naturally to be Equal, as being of the same Humanity, born with the same Advantages, and same Imperfections, and derived from the same Common Parents, can never be conceived to continue long in this Civil State, (merely

ly because they have consented, or submitted to Laws) unless there is some living Authority, or Power, whereby they may be compelled to do it: For Orders or Rules amongst Equals would be but of a short Continuance; were Men left at their own discretion to submit or not, (and so they must be where there is no force) for this reason it becomes Necessary, that in all Governments, or such Civil Societies, that there should be some Established Authority or Power, Lodged or Committed to some Man, or Men, whereby He or They may be Enabled to Execute, what they have agreed may be for the Common Advantage: For without that considering the Corruption and Depravity of Human Nature, the great difference in Tempers, Ages, and Complexions, the almost Infinite Variety of Designs, Ends, and Interests, to be observed amongst Men, it seems altogether impossible, that any Number of Men, should peaceably continue to agree together, and live under any Common Orders, without some such Established Authority, to Judge of their Controversies, and who hath a force to oblige them to sit down by its decrees. For otherwise notwithstanding their Compacts or Promises, being under no Supreme Power to Punish or Oblige them, they are in a Condition to Judge for themselves, and so of Course would pursue what their designs aim

aim at; by which means Disorders, Quarrels, and Confusions, inevitably Arise, for Men making different Judgments of things, must necessarily lead them into frequent disputes. But an Established Authority to Execute Laws only, is not sufficient to maintain or continue the Peace of Society; for that requires somewhat farther, *viz.* An Authority also to make new, or to Repeal or Alter Old Laws, accordingly as the Circumstances of Government Require; for such is found to be the unsteady State of Human Affairs, as to be always incident to a Multitude of Vicissitudes and Changes; new and unthought of Accidents, Strange and Unexpected Events often arising, which not being to be foreknown, could not be provided against, whereby the Peace of *Communities* must be frequently endangered, was there not a living Authority empowered to apply proper Remedies to such unforeseen Accidents, that is, might make, alter, or repeal Laws, according to the present Exigences. Thus the very Nature of Human Affairs in Government, absolutely require that there should be some Legislative Authority, which is as a *Soul*, to Actuate, Direct, and Govern, Men united in this Political Body: And this Authority having thus a Power of Directing and Governing of Others, must be Superior to them; and then not being it self manacled, or bounded by Laws, which is most evident

evident, in that, it is what Makes or Alters Laws, and therefore cannot be confined by what it self made; and so is as to such Laws at Liberty, (that is can be under no force) but may do as it thinks Convenient; so that this Authority that is thus, Superior to all others, and whose will is a Law, is in every Community, what we call the *Supreme Power*. But this *Supreme Power* is diversly placed, according to the difference in the Several Natures or Constitutions of particular Governments; in some it is in one single Person, in others only in a party of Men, and in others ultimately in the whole Body of the People. But howsoever, wheresoever it is placed, what Constitutes this Authority, that is thus called the *Supreme Power*, is, that it primarily makes, gives and orders the Executing Laws, and has the force of the Community, and so of Consequence Punishes Offenders, acknowledges no Superior, is Accountable to none, there being no Appeal from its decisions; for if there lies an Appeal, it is not Supreme. For this Reason every Member of the Community, must Submit to its determinations, or else must undergo the Punishment it hath ordained for the Disobedient. Whosoever then possesses this Supreme Power of making Laws, &c. in a Community, whether any single Person, or whether any Number of Men, or whether the Collective Body of the People,

People, or their Representatives, is then this Supreme Authority; for otherwise it is not the Specified Power, by reason it is only the *Having* or *Executing* that Authority, or Power, that Entitles such to that denomination; for those Words are used to signify that Person, or Persons, who Enjoy that Authority. To say then a Man, or Men hath this *Supreme Power*, and yet at the same time to averr he or they have it not, is a downright Absurdity or a direct Contradiction; by reason Existency and Non-Existency is affirmed of the same thing at the same time. This being so, it is obvious there is no Foundation for that distinction of a *de facto*, or *de jure*, as applied to the *Supreme Power*, by reason there is no difference in the Nature of what is so termed, whereby to ground such a distinction.

V. But that we may come to a clear understanding of these Matters, so far as they may relate to that distinction, we are about to treat of a King *de Facto* and *de Jure*, it will be necessary to consider in what Sense the *English* Word Right, is here taken, (for it is supposed to Answer the *Latin Jus*) and we shall plainly see it bears relation to Government, by reason somewhat is supposed to be usurped that really appertains to Government; that of Right, or *de Jure*, belongs not

to him that hath it, but to another; so that it is in the hands of a wrong Party; and of course, he that hath a Right to it is injured, as being thus defrauded of it. Nothing can be said to be a Man's Right, that is, either that he hath a *Property* in it, or a *just Claim or Pretence to it*, but what becomes so by virtue of some Law; (Right here being a relation to such) by which the Civil Measures of Property are settled in Society; for it must be by some Law, that property is ascertained, that is, That it may be known what is one Man's and what another's: So that to come to a clear understanding of Right, we must first consider Law, for 'tis upon that Right is grounded. Law then may be consider'd of two sorts, *viz.* Either *Divine* or *Human*; by either of which Rights may be conveyed to Men: So then the Question must be by which of these Laws, the Right we are now treating of, is given to Men. To clear this difficulty, I shall succinctly so far as it relates to the present Case examine. But first I must premise that Divine Laws are to be considered under two heads, *viz.* either as *Natural* or *Positive*.

By Natural, I intend those Laws, that may be deduced by the Eternal Reason that God hath given Man to distinguish him from the inferiour part of the Creation; by which he is enabled to know what God as his Lord and Creator requires and expects from him.

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By Divine Positive Law, I understand what God hath expressly commanded Men in his Sacred and Revealed Word in the Old and New Testament.

The first of these Laws being Natural must be common to all Mankind, and therefore cannot convey Civil Rights, in that such relate to particular Governments only; and what we are now treating, is a Civil Right, as is most manifest, in that it is only found in some *Polities*; whereas had it been Natural, it must have been Universal: and methinks the very consideration of the different forms of Civil Government, gives us such undeniable Proofs, that such were not instituted or fashioned by any one General or Common Measure ordained by the Almighty, and so not immediately of a Divine Institution, but have proceeded from Man's own Contrivance, he being left as it were to his own discretion to form such, his Creator not having directly done it for him; for it is not likely, had such been squared by any common Divine Rules, but that there would have been a greater Resemblance than now is found between them: Besides the many imperfections with which most of them are clogged, seems to evidence they were not formed by an omniscient Author; from this great diversity in forms, and from the number and difference of Laws in particular Communities, may be inferred that God hath not delivered any general Precepts, to be the Measures

Measures of Civil Rights, (or at least that Mankind hath not believed he hath) and that therefore he hath left Man to his own Conduct in the Forming and Modelling of such, and accordingly Man hath contrived a great variety of them that are extremely different, as may be every where observed. It is true, Man is able by his Natural Reason to discover some general Duties that regard himself and others; but then they are of such a Nature that do not relate to him, as he is a Member of this or that Community but merely as he is a Man: Thus Man considering his own Subsistence, and comparing the Power of his own Natural Faculties, can plainly perceive that he was not able to give a being to himself, but was Created, Made or Produced, and is still preserved by the wonderful Wisdom, Power and Goodness of some other Being, which therefore is superiour to him, and hath Dominion over him; and as an Inference from that Truth, that he owes him Homage and Obedience, as being his Creature and Subject, and so entirely living at his Mercy: And that being thus the Subject of another, he can have no Dominion over himself, nor no Sovereignty over Others, who likewise are Creatures and Subjects, of the same God; Unless such Sovereignty is conceded to him, by the Express donation of the Almighty their common Sovereign, or by the Consent or Concession of Men, (who are Naturally his
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equals as being the Workmanship of the same God, fashioned by the same Mould, and enriched with the same Advantages, the Off-spring of the same Common Parents, Creatures of the same God, and Subjects of the same Almighty Lord and King) and therefore are all equally obliged to perform what God their Common Sovereign, hath by that Common and Universal Law of Reason, directed and required of them; which the very Considerations of his Divine Attributes will plainly teach us, must Regard the Common Good of Men. This Law then of Nature or Reason, that Respects all Mankind, as they are Subjects and Creatures of the same Lord, and King, cannot descend to determine particular Rights in Communities, by reason such Rights are too different to be reduced to any one Common Rule, and become only due, or to be claimed by Men, but as they are Members of such a Political Body, and so cannot Arise from any such Natural Laws, that Regard all Mankind. Nay further God having given Men a Faculty, or Power, of making Compacts, Promises, or Contracts, hath likewise given him a Right, or Power, of Performing such, (supposing the Conditions are not Repugnant to his Laws) for without that the Original Power of making such, had been to no purpose: Man then having promised or Covenanted, hath by that Act, transferred

transferred as much as in him lies somewhat to another, according to the Conditions contained in the Promise or Covenant: And what is thus transferred, becomes only the Right of another, by virtue of this Agreement, for it is supposed it was not so before; so then the Right that is thus founded, is solely owing to the Agreement, because it is conveyed by that, and not to any Law Antecedent to it. Rights then that become so by Virtue of Civil Laws, as it is plain all Dignities, Offices, or Trusts, that Relate to the Ordering or Continuing Government in societies do, (as being only Relations to it) are not to be measured by any Natural Laws, by reason such do not Regard particular Governments, but the whole Race of Mankind.

To the second, that God may make positive Laws to Govern Men in all Communities, is a Truth too bright to be denied; and that God did likewise Ordain Laws, for a particular People, *viz.* the Jews, is also Certain. But that God hath not in his Revealed Word, Commanded any one form of Government; or declared any certain Measures of Civil Obedience, or promulgated any Certain Rules, by which all Men, in their several distinct Governments, are to be directed, in such things I understand as immediately relate to the Civil Constitution, is I think as Certain; In that such

are not to be found in his Sacred Word: That God hath in his Revealed Will enjoined Obedience and Submission to the higher Powers, the Executing Justice and Judgment, and rendering to every Man his due, is without any manner of Controversie: But then the Bounds and Measures of Obedience, and to whom it is to be paid, the Executing Justice and Judgment, and the determining what is a Mans due, is as clearly left to the Laws of the Community. It being indeed impossible for the Mind of Man to conceive, that any General Laws or Rules, can be so Established, as to be befitted for the general Use and Benefit, of so many several Governments; that are observed to be so different in their Laws, Customs, Manners, Ends, and Interests; unless the Almighty, whose Power is Infinite, had first altered the present State of things. If therefore God hath not expressly declared his Will in these things, as I think it is plain he hath not, then it is certain he hath left it to Mans determinations. And then the Laws of each particular People, being what makes and decides the Rights and Properties of Men, contained under that Government: And every Place, Office, Honour, Trust, or Dignity, that properly belongs to the Making or Executing Laws in that Community, being perfectly a Civil Right, by reason it is

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Founded, or Derived, from the very Nature of the Civil Constitution; it must evidently follow, that the determining and ascertaining such Rights, must be from the Laws of that Community; by reason not being founded upon any Divine Law, there can be no other but the Municipal Laws by which they are measured, so then to judge of and decide these Rights, we must appeal to the Laws of the People, to whom they belong.

VI. Having proceeded thus far in *These* to prove, that all Civil Rights, or just Claims or Presentations to such Rights, have no other Origin or Foundation, but the Municipal Laws of a particular People; and then that all Rights, Claims, or Pretensions to Right, in any Power, Place, Office, Trust, or Dignity, that in any way appertains to the Supreme Power, or to any part of it, is a *Civil Right*. It now Remains that I descend in *hypothese* to apply what hath been said to our own Constitution, and by that means discover, whether there is any Room here in *England*, for that distinction, of a *King de facto*, but not *de jure*. The Supreme Power in every *Community*, is what gives it Laws, and what hath the force of it either in order to Punish such of its Members as are disobedient to its Ordinances; or to oppose the Violence of any foreign

foreign Enemy; that Person then, or Persons in whose hands these Powers are lodg- ed, are Supreme in that *Community*, such being the undoubted Marks of such a Pow- er; for He or They that can give Laws to Others; and have a force to Punish those, who will not Obey, must be *Superior to such*: And then there being no Superior whereby to direct or oblige *them*, it is plain He, or They, must be there *Supreme*: For these being the Proper Acts of such a Pow- er, He, or They that can Execute these Acts, must possess that *Power*. In *England King, Lords, and Commons*, conjointly taken execute these entire Acts, and therefore are the *Supream Power*; which is most evident in that they together, constitute the *Legisla- ture* for no one part of this Collective Bod- dy which composes what we call the *Par- liament*, can separately, by its own Proper Act, give Laws to the other, or make any for the Kingdom. This is too Bright a Truth, to admit of disputes, all Courts of Judicature only admitting of Acts of Parliament for Laws: Nay our English Princes who seem most to have Thirsted after unbounden Pow- er, and accordingly have made some Arbi- trary and Illegal proceedings, have usually varnished such by some Colour of Justice, in pretending such were grounded upon some precedent Custom or Law; by which pre- tensions, they tacitly acknowledge, they have

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Singly no Authoritative Right, but only a derivative one, to Execute what hath been formerly enacted or practised. However the Kings, Lords and Commons, giving Laws to the *Community*, being accountable to None there being no Appeal from them, are here in *England* the *Supream Power*: And this Power being only so, by those Acts of So- vereignty, whosoever does perform, or Ex- ecute those Acts, must possess that Power: And whatsoever this Power Enacts becomes a Law; and Laws are the measure of Civil Rights, so then as the Laws are, those Rights must be. And of Consequence if any Per- son had any just or legal Claim, Pretension, or Right, to any Place, Trust, Office, Hon- our, or Dignity, or any part in this Supream Power, it must arise by the means of some Law, or some Ancient Custom or Usage, (for such by being continued seem to have the force of Laws, by reason the Law not interposing in their Use plainly allows them) yet notwithstanding should the pre- sent Supream Authority, which is the Le- gislature, interpose, and either repeal, or abrogate this Law, or alter or destroy this Custom or Usage, or but supersede, or sus- pend them by a New Law: It is plain the former Law being by this new *One* re- pealed, or the Ancient Usage discontinued or destroyed, upon which Claims, Preten- sions, or Rights, were grounded, the Claims

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or Rights must likewise be so; so then what Person or Persons had before this New Law was made, any Claim, Pretension or Right to any such Office, Place, Trust, Dignity, Honour or Power, has now by the same Law none: And that this is in fact what hath been frequently done in our Constitution, appears undeniably evident by the many Statutes for Limiting and Altering the Succession of the Crown in several Reigns. It is true, after the *Lancastrian* Family, who had not the Right by a Lineal Succession, or Hereditary Descent, had enjoyed the Crown, during the Reigns of the Three *Henries* successively; the last of which Three Princes having the Misfortune to be placed in the Throne in his very Infancy, and so the Tutelage and Protection of his Person and Kingdom committed to others, produced Factions, which are Natural to Minorities. And afterwards when he came to Years to take the Government into his own Hands, the softness of his Temper administered more occasions of encreasing, than quieting or extinguishing such: For being a Prince of a weak Mind and Pious disposition; more befitted for a Cloister than a Throne; he seemed not to have much inclination to exercise Sovereignty, but employing his hours with his Beads and Prayers, he Committed, or rather left the Management of all Affairs of State to his Queen and Ministers, who by using the Royal Authority, to countenance their own designs,

signs, soon became envied and hated: whereby there arose a Multitude of Discontents amongst the Nobility, which in time broke out into Civil Wars, which proved the most Calamitous that had ever been known in *England*; for the former Wars had been only grounded in Disputes between the King and his Barons, between Prerogative and Liberty, which after some strugglings were usually accommodated by an Agreement, (for the then Polity required a King, and that Authority Barons) so that neither could then subsist separately. But here was a Dispute of Right between two Families, that was not to be Reconciled, but by the extirpation of one of them: And the Interests of both were so fatally interwoven with the Nobility, in whose hands the Power then was, that they seemed here equally divided; from which cause a Multitude of Skirmishes, and Battles were fought, and several Thousands of Lives lost before this Fatal Quarrel could be decided. *Henry* the Sixth, that Weak and Unfortunate Prince, being sometimes violently pulled from the Throne, and stripped of all the Ensigns of Royalty; and then again by the fate of Battle, advanced to the same Dignity; thus was this poor Prince alternately Kinged and Unkinged, thrust from the Throne and placed in an obscure Privacy; from that again raised to a Throne, from thence to a Prison, and then again to a Throne, and so to a Prison, and

and at last to his Grave. *Edward* the Fourth, Rival and Successour, the only remaining Branch of the House of *York*, who had the undoubted Right to Royalty according to lineal descent, being after such a variety of Fortunes at last peaceably possess'd of the Throne; like a Wise and Politick Prince endeavours by prudent Counsels to secure that Crown by Peace, which he had obtained by Violence. And the better to give some colour of Justice to these his bloody Proceedings, (for it is to be observed, that notwithstanding his pretended Title by lineal descent, his Accession to the Throne was by mere Force and Violence; for he wrests by Arms the Sovereignty out of the hands of *Henry*, to whom he had sworn Allegiance). Whereas *Henry* the Fourth, the first of the *Lancastrian* Family, was advanced to the Throne with a greater shew of Justice, as being admitted King after a Formal and Solemn Resignation, or Renunciation of *Richard* the Second, and that by the Choice, Consent or Approbation of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, being in Truth invited by the great Men, to Rescue the Kingdom from the Tyranny of *Richard*, and his hated Minions. But to Return; *Edward* having vanquish'd *Henry*, calls a Parliament which must be concluded, being Conqueror, was composed of Persons of his Interest or Faction, (for who of the contrary and oppressed Party durst dare to appear in that Assembly) procur'd an Act

Act to pass, by which the Three *Henries* are declared Kings only *de Facto*, but not *de Jure*, the Right having always been in his Family; by this Law the King would justify his violent Proceedings against the Pious *Henry*, and perswade the People that he had neither been Perjured nor a Rebel to his Sovereign; for the Sense of *Henry's* strict Piety and harmless Innocency, stuck deep in the Minds of the People, and therefore required some Reasons to justify *Edward's* severity to him. This I think gave beginning to that trifling distinction between a King *de Facto*, but not *de Jure*; for so far as I can observe, it never was used in *England* before that Statute, altho' there had been some Reason before for it, by the frequent interruption in the Lineal Succession. And to give some Lustre to this Law, the Act pretends to confirm such Statutes that should remain Laws, that had been made during the Reign of either of the *Henries*, supposing by that proceeding that such were no Laws until they were confirmed: But notwithstanding this, all the other Laws of the Three *Henries* that were not thus confirmed, have always been adjudged as good Laws, as those that had this confirmation. However this Statute seems to have been the Source from whence the Paper Disputes that have since perplexed Men concerning this trifling distinction, have been derived: Trifling I have termed it, in that this Law supposes such an Absurdity, as that such

such a Number of People as this Kingdom contained, should continue together so many Years, without any Legislature or Supream Power, and indeed without any Law, Rule or Order, for these depending upon the King, if there was no rightful King, that is in Truth no King, as hath been proved, then there could be none of these, and yet the Constitution remain'd; for they acknowledge a Power, but not a rightful One, whereas the Nature of that Power implies that what is so in Fact, must be so in Right. And if this was not so, Men could never be safe in their Obedience, since no Right in Government is to be proved any other way; and this is farther confirmed by the Concurrent Practice of our Ancestors, in that they have frequently altered this Lineal Succession, and yet never took notice of any difference between Kings, before, or since this single Statute.

VII. But a farther reason of the continuing of some Mistakes that seem to have been derived from this Law, hath been that Men have not distinguished, between the acquisition of this Power, that I have called Supream, and the Power it self. For it is plain, this Supream Authority may be acquired by very illegal and unjust Practices, such as being contrary to the Laws of God or Men, might have justly been withstood, and the Instruments Punish'd as Transgressors; which notwithstanding

standing were afterwards legitimated by the Success; thus *Caesar* might have been as justly Punished by the Laws of *Rome*, for his disobedience, as *Catiline* for his Conspiracy; and had he not succeeded in his Ambitious Enterprise, might have remained under as black a Character to Posterity; but his Success gave him Power, and that legitimated his Proceedings. So that *Brutus* and the Conspirators, those bold Asserters of *Rome's* Ancient Liberty, became as much Traitors, in that they Acted against the then Law, by stabbing *Caesar*, as if he had been the first branch of an Ancient Race of Rightful Kings. And the first *Brutus* who was a Principal Instrument in the Expulsion of the *Tarquins*, was by virtue in the Success of that very Age, so far from being branded with the Name of Traitor or Rebel, that he was termed *Rome's* Saviour; whereas, had he miscarried in that Attempt, he might have been justly Punished, and his Name might have remained infamous to future Ages; for whosoever in any Community possesses the Supream Authority, (it is no matter by what ways acquired) is then uncontrollable, and will be unaccountable, and so may legitimate Actions, that were before unlawful.

VIII. But to clear this Point a little farther; every Person that lives or continues in a Particular Country or Community, does not

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not by that residence become a Member of that Government; for to make him so is required somewhat farther, *viz.* That he Actually Covenants, Consents or Stipulates to it; either directly signifying his Assent by Promise, Declaration or Oath, or otherwise by Accepting or Acting in some Office, Place, or Employment under it, or at least performing some Conditions that the *Polity* requires: This I think is very evident if we do but consider Man as a free intelligent Creature, and therefore not to be obliged but by his own Consent: And this appears to be the Sense of Men in their most Solemn Proceedings, I mean their Laws, in that in such, they require such a Consent to be signified, as appears by the Oaths of Fidelity and Allegiance, which are enjoined or required of the Members of particular Communities, at certain times, or Ages. Nay further no foreigner here in *England*, is entitled by a Residence to any Privileges of a Natural born Subject, for altho' by thus continuing amongst us, he becomes Subject to our Laws, yet not having performed what is necessary for an *Englishman*, he remains but an Alien: and so disabled from Purchasing, Conveying, or Disposing of an Estate, or Executing any Civil Office or Employment: Nay our own Natives were incapable of doing these things, untill they had Actually Stipulated; either Antiently to the King and

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to each other, in their free-bourgs, or folk-motes, or to the King only in their Court-Leets; or to their several Lords at their Court-Barons, before they were admitted into their Lands: It is true these Customs are now disused, but still we may observe no Man is let into the Government, to Execute any Office, or Trust, in the Ancient Constitution, or any of those of a later date, but he does still actually Stipulate, and so seems by that to be made an Absolute Subject, or rather as a Member to be obliged in the Established Government: and this I think is not peculiar to us, but what is Universally practised through all *Europe*; for altho' in some Governments a mere Residence seems to make a Naturalization, and so qualifies for Civil Rights, yet where that is permitted, it is by virtue of some positive Laws, as we may remember it was unsuccessfully attempted here with us, as to have had one Law for a general Naturalization. But altho' mere Residence is not allowed to make a Man a Member of a *Polity*, yet it subjects his Person and Goods to the Laws of that *Community*; for it is only by the Laws of that Country, that he is entituled there to his Goods, for that reason as the Laws there give or ascertain his Right in them; so the same Laws may tax them, that is permit him to enjoy them under such Conditions as they think fit to impose.

IX. But

IX. But if only Stipulating, Promising, or Assenting, is what makes a Man a Member of this or that Community, as it is plain it does, by reason no Man can be obliged, but who hath consented; the question or perhaps difficulty will be, what can discharge a Man from this obligation, that hath thus Actually Promised, or Covenanted; to which may be answered, when the reason of that Act entirely ceases; for Every Man that is obliged, must be obliged to somewhat; if then that ceases to which he was obliged, (it matters not by what reason) the obligation ceases; because no Man can be obliged to what is not or hath no Existency. If then I am obliged to a Government, or to a particular Person, as he is a part of a Government, if that Government is dissolved or broke, my Obligation ceases: And this seems to be the approved sense of Men, in that they never scruple to withdraw from any Community, of which they are undoubted Members, by reason they have actually Covenanted or Sworn to it, or at least have performed what is required to make them such: Wherefore Men by such Practices seem tacitly to grant that such Promises or Oaths are only conditional, and are therefore reversible, or rather void, when-ever the reason of them ceases; or else I cannot conceive how Men could

could justly leave their own, and Plant themselves in foreign Countries: Or how People who have the Misfortunes to fall under the Government of different Princes, could safely Promise Faith and Allegiance, interchangably to him who is in possession; Or how indeed a Member or a Fellow of a College, who has sworn to observe the Statutes of the House, by one of which he is obliged to Celibacy, yet notwithstanding that, when he leaves the College, he marries and thinks himself not affected by that Oath: For the reason of the Oath ceasing, which was his being a Fellow, the Obligation is also allowed to do so: The same may be observed by all Gilds, Corporations, or Fraternities, for no Man thinks himself obliged any longer by his Oaths or Promises to such than he continues a Member of them, and if not of them why not the same of all independent Communities, the obligations of an Oath being always the same, and is not to be lessened or altered by the Dignity, or Meanness of the Subject it is employed about.

X. What seems to have administered some further difficulty about these Points, has been that unhappy prejudice that appears upon the Minds of some Learned Men, in that they talk as if they believed there was somewhat Real and Certain in Words, and that

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therefore the same things are always intended by the same Expression; by which means Men seem often in their Reasoning to have gone Backward, urging from the word or sign to the thing Signified, and by that means seem to conclude of the Nature of the thing signified, by their Sense of the word: Whereas Words being but the arbitrary signs of Mens Thoughts, nothing can be inferred from them, of the Nature of things; when therefore words are used to Signify any particular Fact or Substance; it is certain the signification of that word, is to be ascertained by that very fact, or thing, it is used to express; for otherwise the End of Language must be destroyed, since the hearer can never be able to understand, what the Speaker intends, for the word being esteemed to stand for a Sign or Mark of such a thing, the hearer takes it to refer to that; if then the Speaker intends, by his sign, what is not contained in the things signified, it is plain the hearer does not comprehend, what the Speaker intends, and so is left or involved in Errors; by reason he acquiescing in the word, takes it as intended for a sign, of what really it is not. But to apply this to our present purpose, it is most notorious the great business of the last Reigns was to advance the Regal Authority to an unbounded Height, and in order to perfect that great

great work, all Methods were pursued, that might be supposed would contribute towards it. The Universities therefore, those Seminaries of Virtue and Learning, were to be particularly Regarded, that such principles of Government might be there thoroughly imprinted upon the Minds of Youth, that were conceived would be the most conducive to the carrying on that Blessed design: For such Gentlemen by the advantage of their Education, being qualified to defend such Doctrines as were there Taught; and by the Strength of their reasonings, were able to propagate them, and by the Posts they enjoyed, had opportunity to do it: Add to this the Reputation of Knowledge and Learning, that is acquired by that manner of Education, for these and such like reasons, these Nurseries of Virtue, were so modelled that no Doctrines of Government were permitted to be taught but what were suited to this End, viz. the advancement of prerogative. And it is observable, what ever Doctrine or Opinions are early imprinted in the Minds of Youth, are not easily in Riper Years Removed: for when once such Opinions are Strongly fixed there, they are then looked upon as certain Truths; and are made principles or foundations of after reasonings; and therefore are not to be questioned: so then Men being thus prejudiced by the means

of these early Impressions, they will not readily admit of contrary Doctrines, by reason taking their own for true, they must Esteem the other False or Mistaken; until by farther Reasons or Authority they are convinced of the Contrary. Thus we every Day observe, how warmly some Men will Defend, the most Wild, and the most Unreasonable Doctrines; Nay will suffer in the defence of such Opinions, that could have nothing but an Education to Recommend them, witness the Voluntary Severities of the *Indian* Faquirs, and the Lamentable Sufferings of moderate Zealots, &c. The reason of this seems to be, in that every Man must and does Judge for himself, and in doing that, it is plain, he makes his own Opinions, the Standard by which he Judges of the Nature of Things, (because he can have nothing else whereby to do it) so that as such conform or not to this Standard, he either approves or dislikes them. And these his Opinions, (or this Standard) being perhaps nothing but what he hath Collected, or been Taught, it is no wonder if sometimes it is very dissonant from Truth: However it is certain he believes it True, or otherwise he would not Entertain it, for no Man would be Thought to be in an Errour. But to Return, the Universities being to be Governed and Directed, by such, who by reason of Places, Dignities, or Preferments, have a dependance

dependance upon the Court, and so are gradually enclined to comply with the Will of the Prince; for such Persons being only to be Preferred or Honoured, who most Zealously advance such Princely designs, it must be miraculous if some out of that August Body, will not Believe and Teach what will most certainly advance them: And accordingly the Practices of those Learned Societies, have given full Proofs of their Loyalty to the Throne, and good Manners to their Prince, in that they have usually complied with what he hath enjoined; as I think may be instanced from the Reformation to the Restoration of King *Charles*, and now to the happy Revolution under King *William*: It is true there are some particular Exceptions to this general Observation, but then it hath happened where there hath not been a sufficient time, or safe Opportunities to Model them; or where the Proceedings of the Prince hath been too Rash or Hot, in directly Invading the Privileges or Rights that immediately concerned that Body, or some Members of it; as may be instanced in their glorious withstanding the Illegal proceedings of King *James*; and some other late unhappy Instances, I do not write this to Reproach so Excellent a Body, but to shew that Men will in all Circumstances, pursue what is most agreeable to them; and that most Men in

in the World placing their happiness in Wealth, Honour, or Dignity, will ordinarily take such Methods as are most promising to attain such; And these Universities being the Nurseries for Ingenious Men, who are to fill both Church and State; and Dignities, and Preferments in the former, and Honours, Offices, and Employments in the latter, being at the disposal of the Regal Authority, such then as propose to Climb to Greatness, must comply with what that Authority requires, for without that it is not to be obtained.

XI. Persons then Educated in these August Societies, applying themselves to the Knowledge of such Languages, as have been most Celebrated for being the Conduits for conveying down whatsoever has been thought valuable by former Ages. And Men usually in perusing what is thus Writ in Forinsick Tongues, seem as it were to reduce what is there said to their own Language, as being most familiar to them; they therefore endeavour to find fit Words in their Own, to Answer what is expressed in that. And there being in all Languages complex Words, such I mean as comprise several Ideas; and many of these referring to the Thoughts or Actions of Men, attended with their several Circumstances, Ends and Objects, as most Words that relate to Morality

lity and Politicks do; and there being no remaining Rule to know precisely what was contained in the Nice Sense of each Word: It can be no wonder, if we but consider the different Ages, Countries, Laws, Customs, Manners and Complexion of Men, that they often differ in what they intend to signify by the same Exposition. However this is most certain, the Ancients themselves have not always used the same Word in the same certain and determined Sense, even in those Languages that we term Learned: I shall Instance in the Latin and Greek; if therefore we out of respect to them, do always apply the same *English* Word, to Answer the same Word in those Tongues, in which it is plain they have different significations; we must by that means likewise use our own Native Word in very various Senses. But Men seeming unwilling to acknowledge any Juggling in Words, for indeed that would be to lessen the Characters of such as use them, have by a pleasant distinction craftily found out a varnish to conceal it, by saying that Words, if not otherwise explained, are always to be taken in the Known and Literal, or else by way of Eminence, in the most excellent Sense. By which distinction is supposed two Absurdities. First, That there is a Known and Literal Sense of all Words, which is false, as is most manifest in that Words are but signs

of things which bearing no resemblance to what they should signify, can never be known until agreed; and can never be Universally agreed, in that a Personal intercourse, by which it is to be done, was never yet Establish'd for that purpose amongst Men: and that accordingly they have been used in very different and diverse Senses. Which appears in that Complex Words are so promiscuously and uncertainly used, that some of them bear very contrary Senses; which therefore must be explained before Known in which they are to be taken. And Secondly, In that when we consider and use Words to signify Relations, we often take such, as if there were somewhat real in the things: Thus when we consider things as Good or Bad, Perfect or Imperfect, they are so only in respect to our selves, or as we compare them with other things, for whatsoever Exists can want nothing to its Existency, and so is in its Nature perfect, for wanting nothing it must be so; it is Man only makes it otherwise, when he considers it as relating to himself; or when he compares it with somewhat as he thinks it should Agree with; for by his considering after that manner he makes it appear to be what it is not, and is thereby led into a Multitude of Errors. But to Return; what is supposed to be contained in most Complex Words, which are intended to signify the Thoughts

or Actions of Men, or bear relation to Society, are for the most part so huddled together, that the same signification is not often intended by the same Word, as will most conspicuously appear in that so common Word *King*, which we in the Translation of the *Roman* Authors make to Answer to the *Latin Rex*, and in the *Greek* to βασιλευς, and yet nothing is more plain than that these two Words were in both Languages used in very differing Senses. For the *Romans* promiscuously used the Word *Rex* to import not only a single Person, who was only a chief Magistrate, and so Acted Ministerially; but also applied it to signify a single Person, who had an absolute and uncontrollable Power: which two things altho' thus expressed by one and the same Word, yet were as opposite and different as Master and Servant.

For Instance, They used the Term *Rex*, to express their chief Magistrate from the Foundation of their City, until the Establishing of what they called the Consular Authority: And yet by the History of those times it appears, that their then Kings, had not Legally more Authority, than what was afterwards invested in their Consuls; for the greatest difference seems to be only in the continuance of the Office; for at the first Foundation of that Common-wealth, the Magistracy, which was the province of them both, (and not the Legislature) was in a single

single Person, and that for life, and so he was called *Rex*, whereas the second was in two, and these only annual; by the means of which Political device, the inconveniencies that had arose in the former Constitution were removed; for in that the Administrations continuing in the same Person for life, gave such opportunities to the *Tarquins*, as to endanger their Ancient Government: which being discerned by those who really loved, or who thought it their Interest to support the Common-wealth, they effected that Alteration of Kingly, unto Consular Authority; for the People being disgusted by the Arbitrary and Violent Proceeding of their Kings, were prepared for a tumult, and only wanted a favourable opportunity to begin it: The Chief then of those who aimed at the Common Safety, and the *Tarquins* Ruines, laid hold upon that Fatal occasion of *Lucretia's* Rape to begin their Premeditated Contrivance, which happily ended in the expulsion of that Family out of *Rome*, and the entire extirpation of the Regal Authority; and produced that new Form of Magistracy under two Annual Consuls. For no thinking Man can Rationally suppose that if the *Romans* had not been prejudiced against their Prince, by his Violent and Vexatious Proceedings, that ever the Violence upon one Woman could have produced so Fatal a Revolution: But the People being prepared
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by a long train of discontents, this spark proved sufficient to give fire to their Rage, which ended in the entire overthrow of that Office. But to return; It is certain the *Romans* did not use the word *Rex*, to import a single Person executing the chief Magistracy for life, but did likewise sometimes intend a short Temporary Magistracy, for in that Interval that was between the Death or Translation of *Romulus*, and the Accession of *Numa*, when the hundred Senators took the Royal Power into their own hands, and divided themselves into Tens, they then successively for five days only, carried the Ensigns of Royalty, and exercised the Kingly Authority, and so were termed in regard of their Number *Interreges*, but each for his five days Reign, was then a *Rex*, which afterwards continued in the Intervals of the Magistracy: The *Romans* then when they used the word *Rex* in Relation to their own Common-wealth, applied it to signify a single Person in the Magistracy; altho' they did not always express that by the word *Rex*, as may be instanced in the *Dictator*, who had a greater Authority than that of their first Kings; for it is clear at the institution of the first *Roman Polity*; the Legislature was not entirely in his hands they called *King* or *Rex*, as may be plainly collected from what their own Historians have writ, concerning the State of the Common-wealth

wealth under their first Kings. And not only so, but the *Romans* applied that Title to the chief Magistrate in Civil Affairs in all Foreign Countries, as particularly appears in that after their Empire was so far enlarged as to have its Tributary Provinces that Commonwealth did often declare or make Kings in such as their Instruments of Servitude; and then such People were left to be Governed by their own Laws, who notwithstanding were subject or subordinate to the *Roman* Senate. But the *Romans* did not only use this Word *Rex* which we Translate King, to signify the chief Magistrate in the Administrations of Civil Affairs, but also sometimes in a much larger Sense, *viz.* to import that, and the Legislature, when invested in a single Person. Thus the Eastern Monarchs who had absolute uncontrollable Power, were only termed *Règes* in that Language, and so not distinguished by the Name, from Princes exercising a more limited and bounded Authority; that Tongue using but the same Word to express such different Powers. The same may be said of the word *Βασιλευς* which was as differently applied in the Grecian Language; for Example, the Chief Magistrate in *Lacedæmon*, whose Office was only Ministerial, and was accountable to the People, and under the Bridle of the *Ephori* was Equally adorned with the Title of King,

King, as the Monarch of *Persia* whose Power was absolute and uncontrollable. Thus we may observe these Antient and what we call Learned Languages, used but one and the same single Word to express so different Authorities, which it is probable hath occasioned very great Mistakes; for Men often judging of things by words, are too apt to conclude, where the same word is used, there the same thing is intended; and especially when so expressed in those Languages, that are so much Valued; and so become prone to argue from the Sense of the word, to the Real Nature of the Thing. And learned Men have been lately inclined, (for Reasons already intimated in this our *Britain*) to take the Signification of the word King, in the most eminent Sense, that is that it doth imply absolute Authority, by which Acceptation they have advanced that Divine Doctrine, that where ever a King is there is, or at least ought to be, Sovereign and Independent Power, and *sic volo, sic jubeo*, is a Right Inseparable from his Person, who enjoys that Dignity; And He then that is a King, or is called or owned so, (for from what hath been observed, the Authority is different) hath a Right to do, as he pleases. Most miraculous Doctrine! that there should be so much Magick, or if you please Charms in Words, (I had almost said Divinity) that the very use of one single Sound, should

should entitle a Man even to Godlike Power. *Cornelius Agrippa* was a Novice in Occult Philosophy to these Men; for what trifling it was in him to lay down such elaborate Schemes, such tedious and uncouth forms of Conjurat[i]on, in order by the help of some barbarous words, and perplexed performances, to invoke some Chimerical and Imaginary Power, to foretel perhaps but a small Trifle; when these Men by the help only of four Letters, composing one single word, can endue a Man with an Omnipotent Right to do what he pleases. It is I must own according to this Doctrine somewhat wonderful to me, that the Number of Kings should lessen amongst us, and that Instead of Seven that there formerly were, (if not a greater Number) in this Isle, there is not as many Thousand; for I do not think Men are more self-denying in this, than in former Ages; and especially now the Temptations to Villany are more Powerful, by the late discovery of this *admirable Secret*. But to Return, our Language not being Exempt from the same Inconveniences, for it is plain we use promiscuously the word King, to signify a single Person, in any *Community*, who hath the Chief Administration of Civil Affairs without much Regarding the Nature or Power of his Authority, or his manner of Accession to it; as must be allowed, (not to extend our Instances to *Asia*,
Africa,

Africa, or *America*;) from what we do, when we speak of the Chief Magistrate of any of our Neighbouring Countries in *Europe*; for the Chief Magistrate altho' Elective in *Poland* is by us, as well dignified with the lofty Title of King, as the all Powerful Monarch of *France*; Nay he of the *Romans*, altho' in possession of no Countries, is as well so called, as He of *Spain*, who hath such vast Dominions. The former Princes of *Arragon*, who were so manacled by the Laws, as that their Subjects might legally withdraw their Obedience if they Violated them, were as much adorned with that Name, as *Philip* who broke through them, and laid aside their Ancient Liberties. Yet notwithstanding these things have been in fact so, yet such hath been the Prevalence of Education or Interest, that some Men have not only disputed, but even suffered for the defence of so Groundless and Extravagant an Opinion. For from this Source it is probable hath been derived, that Heavenly Doctrine that Kings are Gods Vicegerents; and yet they will not permit, that his Laws should bound them: That they are the Lords anointed, and yet sometimes according to their own Reasonings they are set up, or made by an Opposite Power, for such is Rebellion, or unjust Wars. Their Authority must be derived from Heaven; and yet they are not bound to Execute the Laws of Heaven;

ven; They must be by Divine Right, and yet their Power perhaps was acquired, by barbarous Cruelties, or wicked Violence. And thus according to these Doctrines having their Commissions from the Almighty they may without any peradventure do what they please, that is, Risse, Ruine, or Destroy, their Subjects; Which in short is to affirm that whatsoever Magistrate is called a King, or where any Person in Community is first in the Government, assumes or takes that Title, it matters not whether by Force, Fraud, Violence, or Right, or by the Ceremony of Crowning, he is from thence entitled to an absolute Sovereignty, and by consequence, altho the Elector of *Brandenburg* had no more Rights over the Persons or Fortunes of his subjects, than the Laws of his Country gave him: Yet the New King of *Prussia* may seize their Goods, enslave their Persons, and dispose of their Estates, and that by his Sovereign Authority: most Excellent Doctrine! as if the assuming a new Title should Empower him to make his People that were before his Subjects, now to be his Slaves. But the reason of the Propagating this extravagant Opinion here in *England*, being to be plainly deduced, from the Aims and Designs of the last Reigns as hath been already observed; I shall not then examine them farther, but only once again observe, that Words are only signs, and are therefore

fore to denote no more, than what should be signified by them; so that when they refer to particular Fact or Existency, their Sense should be determined by *That*: For if otherwise, Men make signs to stand for what they do not, and so render Language Unintelligible and Useless.

XII. These difficulties thus removed, that seem to have occasioned such doubts and disturbances in the Minds of Men, as thereby to endanger our Publick Peace, I shall now directly proceed, according to my Intended Method, to prove, that these general Doctrines, that I have laid down as principles of Government, are not merely Notional, but are such as have been always practised (altho' not always observed) by Mankind, in all Ages, and in all Countries, as will Evidently appear, from the Records that are left us by the Ancients; and by the Voyages, Travels, Discoveries, and Observations, of the Moderns. But that I may not tire my Reader with a Multitude of Quotations upon so Copious a Subject, I shall but now and then transiently touch at what hath been done in distant and remote Countries; but shall particularly apply my self to what may be observed concerning the Practices of our *British* Ancestours, and afterwards briefly run over some of the Proceedings of some other *European* People.

People. What was the State of the Ancient Britain, before the arrival of *Julius Caesar*, is somewhat uncertain, by reason Antiquity hath left us no Authentic Records of the practices of those dark and early Times: For what hath been Published by the Monks, such as *Jeoffry of Monmouth*, and others, about the succession of Kings, and concerning the Manners and Governments of the Ancient Inhabitants of this Isle, hath too much the Spirit of a Fable, or the Relish of Legend, to be either Quoted or Credited: It is then to the great *Caesar*, as I apprehend, that we are principally indebted for the first Ingenious, and to be valued Accounts, that now Remain of the early State of this our Native Soil. It is to him we are obliged, for all the Knowledge we have of the Usages, Customs, Manners, Governments, or Proceedings, of those our Ancestors: And by what he hath writ concerning them, we may evidently collect, that these Poor and Wretched People, were divided into a Multitude of small petty Governments, for in that part of this Country, which he calls *Cantium*, and we Translate *Kent*, there were then four petty Kings, which he there Names; by which means as being so divided they fell a more easy prey to their Victorious Enemies: Which Inconveniency being observed by some of these small Tribes, they Confederate, as a means whereby they may be enabled

to withstand the Power of the *Romans*; and so consent to make *Casibelaun* their King, Leader or rather General: And their Forces being thus united, they gave some stop to the progress of the *Romans*; but in success made them weary of that Confederacy, for they soon relapsed into their former division, each party being more solicitous to defend themselves, than to continue united in order to fatigue or destroy their invading Enemies. But it is not my purpose to write the History of those times, that being already done by other Hands, I shall therefore pretermitt the farther prosecution of these Affairs, and apply my self to what I intend. It appears most evident by the Writings of this great Man, that the Inhabitants were at his coming, divided into several distinct Tribes or Sects, and that each of these had its petty Prince, King, or Leader, and that these in Times of Peace Executed but little of Dominion, or had but a moderate Sovereignty; for *Tacitus* afterwards observes, that things of the greatest Moment, such as the Resolutions of Peace and War, were transacted in a general Assembly, and that these very Assemblies were convened by their Druids or Priests, and that these Conventions were sometimes composed only of their principal Men, and sometimes of the whole People: And that in time of War they transferred only an Autho-

rity to their King, General, or Leader; their common safety in times requiring it; for a division in their Counsels, in such times of Danger might be Fatal to them. In short if we but impartially consider the Ancient State of our *British* Ancestors, before the coming of the *Romans*, we may plainly find it agreeable to the present One of some of the *Americans*; or at least to what part of *America* was before the *Spaniards* entered there: The People here for the most part appearing as Wild, Barbarous, and Savage, to Them as the poor *Indians* did to the *Castilians*, for their Customs, Usages, and Manners were as different to the *Romans* as the wretched *Americans* were to the *Spaniards*, the Natives living for the most part like them, in Companies, Tribes, or Septs; their small States and petty Governments, being not unlike the *Indian* Hords, their Weapons of War, not much better than theirs; their Shipping or rather Boats, not Superior to the *Indian* Canoes. Their places of Strength were their Woods encompassed with Ditches, and Barricaded with Trees: Their Bogs and Mountains were their principal places of Retreat, and their Precipices and unknown Paths, what they esteemed their greatest Securities. If then the *Romans* had enjoyed the Advantages over the *Britains*, by the means of Horse and Ordnance, as the *Spaniards* did

did against the poor *Americans*, their Conquests here might have been effected with as much ease, as theirs was in *India*: But our Ancestors were too well acquainted with Horse to take them and their Riders, to be but one Animal, and so were not like the poor *Americans* terrified at the sight of the *Roman* Cavalry; and the *Romans* themselves had not the Knowledge, or use of Thundring Ordnance, that Godlike Instrument of War, and Death, that were so Dreadful to the Miserable *Indians*, in that they murdered at a distance, and in a manner Resembling that of Heaven, viz. by Thundering and Lightning; whereby these wretched People believed that the Mortal *Spaniards* were the Executioners of Divine Vengeance, by these Dreadful Engines, as just Punishments for their Sins and Impieties, and therefore were not to be withstood by Human Force. But however thus far we are assured by *Cesar*, and afterwards by other Historians, that the small States or petty Principalities into which the Inhabitants of this Isle were divided, would sometimes combine and unite, for mutual Defence, in case of Common Danger: And that then they did chuse or make one Common King or Leader, as must be concluded from what *Cesar* speaks of *Casibelaun*, and by several Instances to be collected out of *Tacitus*, as particularly the Confederacies under *Caractacus*, *Baodicia*, and such

such like; but then that this large Command continued no longer than there Remained a Sense of Common Danger, upon which alone it was founded; nay was often broke by unsuccesses, like some of our modern Confederacies. But however the Sense of Danger once removed, or this Confederacy by some other reason dissolved or broke, they again returned into their former divided States. And these petty States, Principalities, or Communities, were not peculiar to the *Britains*, or indeed the Northern Nations, but seem to be the first known and earliest State of Men, as may be inferred from what is left us by the Latine Historians, concerning the Governments of the *Italian* People, before they were all swallowed up by the *Romans*: As likewise by all the modern Accounts that have been collected, or discovered by any Voyages, Travels, or Conquests, in *America*; by all which it appears, that the two great Monarchies of *Mexico*, and *Peru*, had gradually advanced themselves to that mighty Grandeur, by uniting with, or Conquering the small and Original petty Hords, as appeared both by the traditions, and the Records of those People; the like may be observed concerning most other Nations, whether of *Asia*, *Africa*, or *Europe*, as may be collected from what Accounts we have of any such People: But this is more unquestionably confirmed by what

what is Recorded in Holy Writ, concerning the Lives of the Patriarchs; and of the Number of Kings that were found in that small Country of *Palestine*, before the coming of the *Israelites*. If then this was the earliest known State of Mankind, viz. That Mighty Numbers of Men, had not consented, or been obliged, to live together in Community, under one Government: (for it matters not as to my present purpose how such were originally formed, viz. whether by Force, Fraud, or Consent) for it will Naturally follow that the disparity in the Conditions, or Fortunes, of Men, thus united under these small Governments, could not be great; And it appears by fact they were not, as may be infer'd from Ancient History, as likewise from Modern Voyages and Travels: For the disproportions in the Qualities or Fortunes of Men, must be in some Measure as the Numbers are, in that there always is a wider difference, or more intermediate Numbers between, for Instance, one, and one Thousand, than between one and ten; where therefore the Numbers of Men are but small, the disparities between them cannot be great: And where the inequalities are but little, the Power attending or proceeding from such inequalities cannot be large: So then the lesser the Number of Persons thus united in a Society, or if you please, Government,

vernment, are, the nearer they approach to an equality; that is, the smaller the difference is between them. For which reason in such petty Hords or Societies, there is seldom found any other Foundation of Power beyond what is grounded upon a Mutual Consent between the thus Associated Members, which is rarely observed to extend beyond their common Safety; that is in Truth the preserving themselves in that Condition they are then in, in which every Man being concern'd, every Man is most usually consulted: But when any Society comes to be so far enlarged, as the whole Body of the People cannot be conveniently assembled, or some other reasons render such general Conventions, unfit or unsafe. Some then of the greatest Esteem, either by reason of their Age, Wisdom or Courage, &c. are selected to advise for the rest; as may be confirmed from particular Instances to be taken from the *Roman* Historians, concerning the Practices of the *Old Britains, Gauls, Germans,* or indeed *Italians,* which all came to have Councils composed of their Principal Men, who were to consult of their common Affairs. As likewise by what the *Hebrews* themselves practised, in having the chief only of their Tribes called into their Assemblies.

XIII. But

XIII. But however, be it what it will, wherever there is a *Polity* or *Government*; that is, where ever any Number of Men are United, or do live under any common Laws or Rules, and have a Tribunal to appeal to, to determine Controversies; there I say must necessarily be some difference between the Persons composing this *Polity*; by reason no Oeconomy or Order can be Established or Continued amongst Men, unless there is some Power or Force, whereby to oblige them to submit to the Laws, and to acquiesce in the determinations of the Tribunal: And whosoever is possess'd of this *Power* in that Community, must be Superiour to the Others, by reason *he* or *they* do Govern and can Force or Punish. And as the Number of Men in such Communities encrease this Power and Force whereby to oblige the Members to continue in Subjection and Obedience to the Laws, must likewise proportionably enlarge; for if this was not so, the Obligations to Obedience in great Communities must lessen; because the farther Men are removed from Force, the nearer they approach to Liberty. But this Power of giving or making Laws and the Executing them, or the use of this Force (for Laws without a Power to enforce, are but good Advice) whereby Peace and Subjection in Society is preserved, could never long continue in the same Persons, or in the same

same Manner, whereby the Peace of Society is secured, unless there is somewhat that may Link, Cement, Hold and Unite Men together, and so may be a means to oblige, or at least Powerfully encline Men to continue in this Established Subjection: For Men being by Nature equal, as appears most evident in that they are the Workmanship of the same God, Creatures of the same Creator partaking of the same Nature, proceeding from the same common Parents, born with the same Advantages, having the same Power of *doing* or not *doing*; and likewise all equally incident to the same infirmities, weakness and frailties, and all brought into the World in the same helpless and innocent State) can never be supposed to renounce so far their natural Rights, as to submit to be Governed, nay Punish'd by others, their Equals, unless they that are thus now civilly their Superiors had some Tye or Obligation upon them, whereby they find it, or think it, much safer and better to continue under this Subjection, than to Renounce or withdraw from it. For if there was not somewhat of this Nature whereby to encline Men to Obedience, it could not be conceived how so Free and Intelligent a Creature as Man, could ever be stripped of his Natural Right of Directing himself, that is of doing or not doing as he thinks fit, as hath been already proved. For altho Common

mon Dangers do often dispose Men to confederate, as a means to preserve themselves; and in that they submit themselves often to the Government of others, yet such Voluntary Compacts, are seldom of long Continuance; for we see Men are no sooner perswaded that it is their Interest or Safety to withdraw, but they usually do it; and how changable Mens Thoughts or Designs are, our own Experience will give us abundant Proofs. Was there then no other means whereby to preserve the Peace of Governments, but what is founded in the Words, Promises, Faiths, or Oaths of Men, it is very manifest from the Common Practices of Men, that such would be found but very thin and Cobweb Securities; in that Governments that have taken the exactest Care to Secure and Establish themselves, by imposing Oaths upon their Members, have notwithstanding been ruined; Oaths being as soon forgot, as there hath been an Opportunity to break them. For it is plain by what we have Experienced in our Own, and what we may observe in other Countries, that Men, in this our *Europe* are not always very tender of such Solemn declarations, when Power or Enforcements are removed: For how often will witty Interest, dexterously find out some Salvoes to extricate a perplexed Conscience, when it seems to be under any doubts, by reason what it hath sworn to, seems

seems somewhat inconsistent with it; for it doth not appear that Princes regard the most Solemn Treaties, or most Sacred Oaths, or Subjects their Fidelity or Obedience, whensoever they think it their Interest or Safety to violate such. To comprehend then how this is performed, we must consider, how that Civil Government necessarily puts Bounds to Mens Natural Rights, by Establishing a *separate and Civil Property*, that is, by ascertaining by some Orders or Laws, what shall be one Mans and what another; that so each particular Member may have a known and proper Right, and what thus by this Order or Law is made or declared, a *Mans property*, he has a Right or Power to dispose of as he pleases: *somewhat of Property* may be observed, wheresoever there is a Civil Society, even to the small *American* Hords, for these very Salvages would Barter, Trade, or Exchange with the *Europeans*, at their first coming upon these undiscovered Countries, as appears by the several Journals, Voyages, and Travels, made into those parts. And by reason the Crafts or Industries of Men, are by Experience found to be Extremely differing, the thus ascertaining property, will soon Produce, or Occasion great Inequalities in the possession of such things as are useful for Men in Society, for some will Industriously collect great Quantities of such things, whilst others as negligently omit

mit them; and each Person having a Right or Property, to what by his Labour or Industry, he hath obtained; no other can Violently Seize it, or take it from him, without Violating the Laws of the Society, (which have made or declared what shall be his), and so incurring the Punishment, that the Law inflicts upon Transgressors; and Men from these Reasons being thus unequally possessed of such things as are necessary or Expedient for their Being or Subsistence, such as are Meats, Drinks, Cloaths, &c. Or at least of what will purchase or procure such. Those who are in Want, are obliged to apply themselves to those who have Plenty, by reason such Necessaries of Life, are not in all times and in all Places to be collected: But he that by his own Care, Toil, or Industry, or any other Methods, hath acquired more than his Natural Wants require, is unwilling to part with what is the Fruits of his Labour to another, unless the other can supply him with somewhat that he wanteth or hath not, from this reason Men came Naturally to Barter, Trade, or Exchange, (which at first was only employed about such things, as contributed to Human Life, as is evident from the Practices of the *Americans* at this Day) for by this means each Mans Wants in that Society were to be supplied. But all Men in Exchanges will endeavour to keep to some Equality, and

and an Equality in Value, not being to be adjusted between different Substances, unless Men agree upon some Standard which should be the Measure of it. Besides some Persons who have Plenty of what others Wanted, may have yet no Occasion for any thing the others had, and therefore would not Exchange for what they did not need: And then most Substances that are of any Real Use to supply Mens Natural Wants, are of a Perishable Nature, and so not long to be preserved. Wherefore as a Remedy to these Inconveniences it became necessary in large Communities, to find out, and agree upon some durable Substance, that might be the Standard, and Measure of the Value of all things, whereby the Exchanges for the Perishable Necessaries of Life, might be Reduced to some Equality; Or where some Men could not, or would not, make such Exchanges, by reason they stand in no need of such Perishable Commodities; that then this Substance that is durable may be taken for them, and the Value of all Goods being to be measured by this Standard, and this not being like them Perishable, soon became to be more desired in Exchanges, than any of those Perishable Necessaries of Life. And what is thus made the Standard, or Measure of Value of all Goods, is what we term the Money or Wealth of a Community, and this always consists in some-
what

what that is not Perishable: For it is certain the same Substance hath not in all Ages, nor in all Countries, gone for the Measure or Standard of Value, as is manifest in that Shells or Beads was the Money among some of the *American* Hords, and Brass or Copper to the Old *Romans*.

It is true in *Europe*, and in the greatest part of the known World, Gold and Silver do, at present, enjoy this prerogative, which two Metals it is probable have been preferred to that Esteem of being the Money of most Countries, for these Reasons.

1st. In that they have not been in such Quantities as baser Metals, so that they being more scarce they become the more Esteemed, for before the discovery of *America*, those Metals seem not to have Flowed in such Marvellous Plenty.

2^{ly}. In that carrying a Shining and Glittering Colour, and being composed of Close and Compact Textures, their Glittering Surfaces do not so easily tarnish, the circumambient fluids not so readily Fretting, Corroding or Insinuating into them; and so are not so soon Injured or Spoiled, as Metals of looser Textures; thus for Instance we may experience, that Gold will Remain almost uninjured by time, and will not be diminished or destroyed by the Violence of Fire: It is true, Silver is not so lasting a Metal, and then not so Valuable: Yet Silver will Resist the
Injuries

Injuries of Time, or Violence of Fire, or Force of more Fluids, than any other known Metal; So that these properties seem to give them some Preeminence above others, and so the better to besit them for a Money or Coin.

34. In that they are also Malleable, and Fusible, and thereby by Nature adapted to Receive Stamps, and Impressions, that so Men may without much Trouble be ascertained of the Value and Weight: By which they are really preferable for this use to all Solid and Brittle Substances, which cannot be so Equally divided with loss, nor will not Receive Impressions to denote their Weight or Worth, which are given those as a Coin by Publick Stamp. By all which it appears that there is somewhat really intrinsic to these Metals, that better besit them to become a Coin, than any other known Solid and durable Substance.

XIV. But to Return, Government Naturally ascertains property, and property necessarily produces a Money, or durable Wealth, and Money readily purchases whatsoever in Society is necessary to Supply our Bodily Wants, and our Bodily Wants periodically repeating, by reason of that continual Fluxion and Change of parts, by which our Lives are continued: And the continuing or preserving our Lives, being what our
very

very Nature requires: It is plain then who-soever in a Society really possesses this durable Wealth, or Money, which will purchase or procure whatsoever is necessary for Life, and so will Satisfy Mens Bodily and Natural Wants, (which they cannot withstand) without Violating the Laws of the Community, and so without incurring the Danger of Punishment, (which is an Evil, and which therefore their Nature abhors), will Naturally Influence such Persons, that by reason of the meanness of their Circumstances, have not wherewithal of their own to do it; for which Cause the Needy will be inclin-ed to depend upon the Rich; by reason their pressing Necessities are Relieved by them, without any Danger of suffering from the Law; or perhaps without much Labour or Fatigue: For as only some present Danger, or some Real and Natural Necessity, could Originally induce Men to Subjugate themselves to the Will and Government of Others; so only some Necessary and Lasting Tye can oblige them to continue in that Subjection; which therefore must be founded in somewhat that is Common to Mans Nature, by reason, as I have said, some Government is always to be observed amongst Men: and that therefore must proceed from his inward Wants, which are the only things that are inseparable from him: For they continually Returning put him upon
P Endeavouring

Endeavouring to Satisfy them; and this durable Substance or Money being that which will always in Society purchase such things as will perform this; He or They therefore that have this Money or Wealth, will likewise have the Hearts of the People, if they have but a Soul to dispose of it, for this End. It is true this Money or Wealth, being a Moveable, may be seized by Violence, and so removed out of their Possession, who had the property in it; but then the Nature of Government is destroyed, when Force is employed to Violate Laws, and the same Violence may seize all other Properties: Yet notwithstanding into whose Hands soever this Wealth is transferred, or by what way soever it is acquired, whensoever a *Polity* is again fixed, it will always procure whatsoever is wanting to Men in Community. For which reason Money, Wealth, or Treasure are the Necessary Mediums whereby to Establish, or Continue a *Civil Polity*; and then as a Consequence to that, a Superiority or a difference in the Estates, Conditions or Fortunes of Men: For this Money being what will purchase every thing, and being of it self of a durable Nature, and so may be kept without loss, soon becomes what will be always Coveted in Exchanges; because it may be used at any time that the Possessors Wants or Desires require it. And this Money or Wealth

Wealth being so firm and lasting a Substance will gradually, by reason of the great difference in Mens Complexions, Tempers, Ages, Cares, Industries, Cunning, and other Circumstances, come in process of Time, to be very unequally Possessed; some perhaps Abounding in large Quantities, or Sums, whilst others have little or none; and such who have so great a plenty of it, that it cannot be employed in purchasing what their Natural Necessities require; would soon if there was no other way of using of it, look upon it as contemptible Trash, Dirt, or as useless Rubbish, for if it had no Real Use, it could be of no Real Value: But the various designs of Men have produc'd other ways whereby to employ it; And that is by Creating in particular Societies, imaginary, Fantastical, or Relative, Pleasures, which truly consist, in that the Rich may in Community by the help of these distinguish themselves from others; and so as it were raise an Esteem, and Admiration, as if they enjoyed somewhat that others cannot Obtain.

XV. But in order to come to a clearer Understanding of these things, I must repeat what I have already proved, *viz.* That Government Naturally makes an Inequality in the Estates, Conditions, and Fortunes of Men; and that these Differences or Inequalities

qualities amongst Men in Community may be known, there is required some outward Marks, Signs, or Characters, that so they may be distinguished, for without that, there could not be paid that Deference, or Respect, that should attend Superiors: So then to Support this Deference and Honour, to Superiors, which Government necessarily produces; It becomes Necessary to invent or make some Signs; or Marks, of this Superiority, for without that Government could not Subsist; in that Men could not easily know to whom Obedience was due. It is from this reason we may observe in all Societies, those Persons who are in Power, have always assumed some Marks, Signs, or Characters, by which they may be distinguished from others of the same Communities. And in large Communities, where particular Persons, that are not admitted into the Governing Power, have notwithstanding acquired large proportions of this Wealth, they will likewise, for the most part, employ it in procuring such Marks of Deference, as may distinguish them from such as have it not, which is usually by personating or imitating the Fashions, or Manners, of the Superiors; for by appearing so they seem in some Degree to have, what in reality they have not, and thereby beget a Respect, or raise an Esteem, in others, as if really they were their Superiors: This I think we may observe in all Governments, Men that have Wealth, will usually employ it that

that way, as appears in that they affect a difference in their Habits, Dresses, Houses, Furniture, Meats, Drinks, Equipages, in their manner of Education, forms of Speech, ways of Address, Behaviour, and indeed in what not; and what usually gives a preference to the liking of this, or that particular Custom, Habit, or Fashion, is, that it is practised by the Superiors, or that some Body that hath lived abroad, takes a liking to it, and so it gradually becomes Valued as unusual, or Recommended as useful, or may be of some Advantage to some Men, who by reason of their Wealth, or Power, will by degrees come to Influence others: As I think not to Multiply Instances, is evident, by that Succession of different Liquors, that are, and have been drank here in England; as likewise that variety of Habits and Dresses, and different kinds of Stuffs that have successively been worn and used.

But to Return; We may observe in the smallest Communities, such as the Indian Hords, that Person that hath the Superiority, which, by the bye, in times of Peace is but Moderate, doth notwithstanding by some outward Marks, distinguish himself from the rest of the Hord; but then his Dominions being but small, and the Number of his Subjects but few, and his Power but little; those Marks, or Badges, of Honour, are but in proportion to them, viz. His Head is perhaps, Adorned with Chaplets of different
P 3 Feather,

Feathers; his Neck enriched with larger Bracelets of Shells, or Beads; his homely Seat, in his Beastly Feasts, or Banquets, somewhat exalted, or Removed from his Subjects; his ragged Apparel (if any) somewhat different, and some course or rude respect paid him; but his People being but few, and his Authority not great, there is not Room for that Pomp, Grandeur, and Majesty, as in larger Empires; for there can be no degrees of Subordinate Offices, no swelling Titles of Honour, to interpose between the Prince and the Peasant, between the Hutt and the Throne; so that amongst these, the marks of distinction are but small and few; the Prince being to his People, as a Constable to his Parish, but a degree in Authority before them; and of consequence the Ensigns of his Sovereignty are as mean as his Power is little, and as his Subjects are few. And these Marks, Signs and Characters of the different Conditions, Fortunes and Authorities of Men under the same Government, seem gradually to Multiply and Enlarge in some proportion to the Number of the People contained under the same Polity, (it is true, The different Forms of Government make some differences, as shall be shewed hereafter) there being always to be observed a sort of Scale, Degrees or Steps of Ascent of such Marks or Characters of Superiority, gently arising, or gradually

dually encreasing, as the Person included in the same Polity Multiply (altho' these Marks or Characters are as diverse in their Forms as the Countries, Climes, Customs, Manners, Usages, Ages or Tempers of the several distinct People that are comprehended under the same Governments are distinct, wide, or removed), as I think may be concluded from the Marvellous disagreement and wonderful disparity that is to be observed between those mighty Emperours of *Asia* or *Europe*, who Lord it over so many People and Nations; and these petty *Indian* Kings, who only command over a single Tribe or Hord. The former always shining in such Pompous Trappings of Sovereignty and Greatness, as plainly shew that Mighty distance that is between them and their Slaves. Whereas the latter being but a little Remove from their Subjects, cannot glitter in such Ensigns of Majesty, for the number of his People does not admit of such a Subordination of Officers; nor such Titles or Degrees of Honour; nor such embroidered Robes, such Golden Thrones, such Enamel'd Scepters, such gilded Roofs and glittering Embellishments, such Numbers of Guards, Servants and Attendance, such difficulty of Access, such troublesome Ceremonies, such Waiting, Worship and Deference; and these Pompous Ornaments that thus decorate Majesty seem to arise in a sort of Order, according as the Number

ber of the People, or as the Wealth or Power of the Government enlarges, as I think may be inferred from that ascending difference to be observed, beginning at these petty Leaders of the *Indian* Hords, to the small and Petty Princes, Counts, Dukes, States, Kings, and so upwards to the more enlarged and unbounded Power of such as enjoy absolute Sovereignty, whether dignified with the Titles of Kings, Emperors, Czars, Grand Signiors or great Moguls; in all which these Marks of Superiority will be found to encrease in some Proportion to their Power and Dominion; still with some Respect to the Number of People they Govern. But these Marks of Distinction and Superiority, or Ensigns of Power and Wealth are of divers kinds; as,

First, They are observed sometimes to consist in the use of some Substances that become valued, in that they are rare, and not without difficulty obtained; as appears by the use of Diamonds, Rubies, Pearls, and other Precious Stones: as likewise by that of Robes, Garments or Apparel of Silks, Damasks or rich Embroideries, or in short in the use of such things, as being rare (whether composed of Natural Substances, or made by the hands of Art) are therefore dear, and so by reason they cannot be purchased by the Inferiour People, are prized and become used as Marks of distinction, by which

which their Wealth or Authority may be known. Or

Secondly, They sometimes consist in Guards and numbers of Retinue, and in conferring Titles of Honour or Dignities upon subordinate Officers; Or,

Thirdly, In sumptuous Palaces, Magnificent Buildings, or Gardens, &c. Or,

Fourthly, In some Actions, Gestures, Usages, Customs or Manners, which are to be taught by Education.

But the first thing that seems to have been used as Marks of distinction, to shew the Qualities or Fortunes of Men in Society, it is most probable, comparatively speaking, were some scarce and uncommon Substances; for it is plain it is the plenty of any Substance that depresses its value, and the scarcity advances it; it being clear, as the proportions of things are to the Coin, their value will be. I do not deny but that there are some Excellencies in some Substances that are esteemed valuable, by which such are distinguish'd and known; but then I affirm, what are thus esteemed Excellencies, would not, if such Substances were common, be so valued, nor of consequence so named: That sparkling brightness of a Diamond, or that glorious colour of a Ruby, that are now so much prized and admired; were such Stones but as common as Flints, and easie to be obtained as Pebbles, would not

not then so far recommend them, as that they should be placed in the Crowns of Kings, or preserved in the Cabinets of Princes? No: It is only the scarcity that makes those beauties to be admired, and so the Substances to be valued; for the Inferiour or Meaner People not being able to purchase such uncommon things, the Superior and Wealthier seek after them, by reason by the use of such they are distinguished and known, for it is plain, they have no other real Use. The reason of these things seems to be in that Man being a free and thinking Agent, naturally desires to Rule, that is, being in Society he covets to follow the Dictates of his own Judgment, which it is plain he cannot always do, unless he gives and not receives Laws; for if he is under the confinement or Government of another, he may be hindred in the Prosecution of what he desires; when therefore his Circumstances are such, as he cannot acquire Rule, he seems desirous to have some shew of it, and therefore endeavours to Personate his Superiours, that so he may be distinguished from the Meaner, and by that be Esteemed and Honoured: And it seems to be from this reason that those that possess Wealth, and yet are not in Authority, will readily part with their Wealth to purchase such things, as are in use by those that Are. But to proceed, the Native Climes, or Soils, of particular

particular People, not always yielding such Rare and Uncommon Substances, (for whatsoever is Common, let the intrinsic Beauties be what they will, would soon become used by the whole People), and so could be no Mark of distinction: Men therefore to procure such things as are unusual, leave their Native Countries, and wander into foreign Parts, in order to Collect exotic Commodities, that being brought from Abroad, become valued, and so are bought by those who possess either Wealth, or Authority; and thereby the Bringers by degrees do procure a Wealth to themselves: From these beginnings, foreign Trade began, as I shall particularly prove, which gradually Multiplying, and Flourishing, came in time to be Established, in such Order, and Oeconomy, as it is now found.

XVI. That this and this alone, viz. The making or continuing Marks of distinction between Men, was the Prime and Original Motive to foreign Trade, will appear, if it be considered that Men Naturally will not Court Danger, or affect Toil or Fatigues; for to induce Men to undertake that, is always required a hope of attaining somewhat by such as may compensate those hazards: Neither would Men undergo these difficulties, unless they were uneasy and dissatisfied, in that they have not, what

what they think may be this way obtained: For if Men have no Wants, they can have no desires, and therefore are Content to Remain in their present State. But our Wants by which we are uneasy, and from which our desires arise, are of two sorts, viz. Real, and Imaginary; by Real, I understand such as are inseparable from our Natures, and so Regard our very Subsistence, such as Hunger, Thirst, &c. By Imaginary ones, I intend such as are of our making, and do not immediately relate to our Being, but seem only to Regard Society, such as Superiority, Wealth, Honour, Reputation, and such like. Our Real or Natural Wants do not appear to be the primitive Inducements to foreign Trade, by reason there is no Body of Men, but that their Native Country, if industriously manured and employed, or at least the Water, or Air of it, but would yield what is necessary, for Satisfying their Natural Wants; and if Men will not employ their Labour, Ingenuity, or Industry in acquiring there the Necessaries of Life, it cannot be reasonably supposed, that they would pass the Danger of the Sea, the fatigues of Travels, the hazards of their Lives with Strangers, in order to obtain them; Since these it is plain, are attended with greater hazards and more difficulties, than the former. Besides it is plain, the Business of foreign Trade is not the procuring the Necessaries

Necessaries of Life, but the Vanities and Luxuries of it, for what is for the most part imported by Trade, does not descend directly to the common Mass of the People, their necessities being for the most part supplied by their own Countries product, but to the Superiour or Wealthier part: (it is true, it happens sometimes otherwise, but then it is when the advantages of Trade, or Government, have drawn so great a Number of People, into one City, Town, or Province, that the produce of the Soil will not provide for them, as in *Holland*). Nay further, Trade hath never been managed in any proportion, by such Miserable People, who inhabit in such unfruitful Regions, that seem most to require foreign Assistance: Witness those Savages that live in the Sun burnt Countries of *Africa*, or the Icy Regions of the North, or the Sandy and Barren Isles, which will scarcely yield, even with the greatest Application, a competency for the sustaining Life, if performed in a manner agreeable to a Civilized People: And yet notwithstanding these Inconveniencies, these People are never observed to traverse the World for Trade: But when forced by their common Necessities, rather chuse to forsake these unfruitful Regions, and go in quest of more fertile Countries. The same measures we may observe were taken by our Northern Ancestors, the *Goths, Huns, Vandals,* or *Saxons*, when by

by their wonderful Encrease, (there being no Laws to restrain propagation) the People became too numerous for the Countries, they would Swarm like Bees, and so one part of them would depart from their Ancient Abodes, and seek for fresher and more fruitful Habitations; but did not apply themselves to Trade, to satisfy their Necessities that way. And this seems to have been the Earliest Practice amongst Men; when their Native Country has been too Narrow or Barren to support their Numbers, they would leave that and go in pursuit of other Dwellings; but do not appear to have applied themselves to Trade, to supply their Necessities that way, as does evidently appear from what is Recorded of the Proceedings of several People in *Asia*, *Europe* and *America*, in all which are to be found clear Marks of such Transplantations, but none of Trade. What then gave beginning to Trade, was that Inequality amongst Men, that Government naturally makes, which requiring some outward Marks or Signs, whereby to distinguish such Persons who enjoy the Superiority, hath been a Motive to put Men upon seeking after, and procuring Foreign Goods, of divers kinds, whereby that difference might be the better continued, preserved and known: And these Marks being to be adjusted according to the several degrees of Superiority and Power, (for otherwise they could not be distinguished) it will

will follow, the greater the Number of People united under one Government, the more and greater must be these differences amongst its Members, and of consequence the more the Signs and Marks of these. For Government (as I have said) implying a Superiority, and a Superiority amongst Men not being to be continued without a Force to support it, it must follow that the Force must bear some proportion to the Number of the People Governed, for otherwise it could not be sufficient to defend it. And this Force being dependent upon the Superiours, for it is by that the Government is continued; this Force then being encreased, the Order and Offices by which it is composed and marshalled, and by which it is moved and directed, must also be multiplied (for whether we consider this Force as Civil or Military; it is plain the Magistrates in the former, and the Officers in the latter, must be multiplied as this encreases), and of consequence the Signs or Marks of such will likewise be so. So then the more numerous the People, the more elaborate the Polity and the more and greater degrees of Superiority: And so of consequence, the more and greater the Inducements to exercise Men's Ingenuities and Industries, both to invent, improve and collect such things as may serve as Signs or Marks of these degrees of Superiority: for which reason in numerous Communities

munities, we may always observe a sort of Progression in these things. For the greater the affluence of such Rarities are, that are thus brought in, be they the Ingenious product of Art, or be they that of Nature, the more still they are sought after; that so these differences between the qualities of Men may be continued: for it is clear, it is the outward Pomp and Shew that affects Mankind, and it is by that, by which a Deference, Awe and Respect is created.

XVII. Trade now in *Europe*, is made the great business of Government, it being found to be the surest Method by which a People may acquire Wealth; and such is the present State of Christendom, that whatsoever People most abound in Wealth; they may be enabled by Virtue of that, to procure and continue such a Militia, as thereby not only to defend themselves, but to give Laws to their Neighbours; for which reason Men have Seriously employed their thoughts to discover Methods whereby to enlarge it: I shall not therefore meddle with that, but only in the general shew, upon what foundation it must Stand, and what Governments are best calculated to make the greatest advantages by it; and what People must in proportion to their Numbers, make the greatest Consumptions of Foreign Vanities. For altho' the greater the Num-
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ber of People included under one *Polity*, the greater generally the differences amongst its Members, and the greater the difference the more the Inducements to the use of foreign Commodities: Yet notwithstanding all Governments, supposing the Number of the People to be equal, are not alike befitted, to make or continue a foreign Trade: For the Importation, and Consumption of Exotic Goods, are different things, and are often made by different Hands. For those Governments, that seem to make the greatest differences, in the Qualities, or Fortunes, of their Members, such as absolute and despotical Monarchies do, seem and are found to make the greatest Consumptions, (in proportion to those Persons, who have the Wealth, and Authority), of all foreign Vanities; by reason there is a longer Scale, or more degrees of Superiority in such Governments, and of consequence more marks of distinctions, and greater Pomp, and Grandeur, required in them: But such Goods be rarely imported by their own Members, (witness the *Turkey* and *Oriental* Trade, that are managed by Strangers) for in these Governments, the Subjects having no certain or real property, (all being at the will of the Prince) there is no encouragement to excite them to Industry, by reason they have no assurance of possessing, what they shall by Labour or Industry acquire, so that the miserable Na-
tives,

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tives do not often extend their Care beyond their own Subsistence. For which Reason, altho the Consumption of foreign Commodities, is greatest in such Governments, proportionable to the Number of them in Power, yet such Goods will not be usually imported by the Subjects of these Princes: For these Wretches having no Right, to what they have, beyond the Princes Pleasure, have little Encouragement to accumulate Wealth, which they cannot call their own: And it being incompatible, to the very Nature of such despotical Governments to establish a private property, it is plain an advantageous foreign Trade, can never long Flourish amongst such a People. The Reason of which is, in that a Legal, and lasting property, can never be ascertained in any Community, unless each particular Member, or at least each *Classe* of Men, have either *by themselves or proxy, some Share in the Legislature*; because whosoever is not someway concerned in that, can have no sure defence, against the oppression of those that are. For it is evident from the very Nature, (and is confirmed by the practices of Men) that what determines Man in his Choice, or Preference, of doing or not doing, (when left to his own liberty) as it is clear all Persons Acting in the Legislature are (by reason they are never Limited, nor Confined), is some real or appearing good: For which reason, every Man, in his

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his deliberate proceedings, does Naturally Regard himself, and only Collaterally others, as their Interests, or Concerns are intermixed and interwoven with his own. Such persons then, that are not immediately in Person, or mediately by their Representatives, someways concerned in the making, altering or giving Laws, their private Interests, being often separated from those that are, will be most assuredly oppressed, by reason there is no Persons that Regard their proper Good. Thus we may always observe, his or their Interest, are more especially respected, who have the Right and Power of making or giving Laws; where then that Authority is lodged in a single Person, he principally intending, what he esteems to be his own advantage, does not often Regard his Subjects Affairs, any further then as they relate to his own Interest, or Safety; and that being in such Government, inconsistent with the ascertaining a private property, that therefore is never to be done. And Trade then, that is grounded upon that property, can never Flourish long in such Constitutions; and if sometimes it hath, (as it is certain this Age admits of some Instances) yet it not being founded in the Nature of the *Polity*, can never be lasting; for in these Cases, its Flourishing Condition purely proceeding, from the Wisdom, and Virtue, of the Regnant Prince, who for a time thus wisely permits his People

ple to enjoy, what they by their Industry gain; but this having no other footing, than his personal prudence, can never rationally be supposed to be of any durance; in that the uncertain Circumstances of Affairs, may oblige him to different measures; besides no account of time, give us any Examples of a long Succession of Wise, and good Kings, in any Nation; and Trade altho' by the Wise Conduct of a single Reign, may wonderfully for that time improve; yet not being suited to the Constitution, it must be subject to interruptions, and therefore can never arrive to any marvellous height; for Trade like an Estate, altho' it is advanced but by Steps, yet it may be lost in a moment. Besides, where there is only so precarious a Title, to *private property*, as but merely the Princes Pleasure, there I say, altho' by the Princes Prudence, Trade may Encrease, yet notwithstanding it will rarely be managed by his own Subjects, (I intend foreign Trade) or at least if it be, the Wealth acquired by it will not be fixed in his Dominions, for when Men have gained Estates, they will endeavour to settle in such places, where the Laws, and not the Princes Pleasure, ascertain their *property to it*. To confirm this from the Practices of Men, we may observe, how that here in *Europe*, no sooner were the *Spaniards* setting up for an Arbitrary, and Despotical Power, in the *Netherlands*, but the Merchants

Merchants soon withdrew their Effects, their security being then endangered; and likewise how the Trade of *Portugal*, when the *Spaniards* Violently seized that Kingdom, and thereby threatned the Subjects property, was by the same means irrecoverably lost: And likewise how the Trades of *Persia*, *Indostan*, *Turkey*, and indeed all the *East*, is managed mostly by Strangers, or at least such as do not fix their Fortunes there, but rather disperse their Wealth into different Countries, or else entirely remove it, out of such Tyrannical Dominions. For it is most certain, every Man Naturally will endeavour to secure to himself, and to his Posterity, what is his own, or what he by his own Industry hath acquired; and therefore is desirous to remove what he hath gained, into such Places, or such Countries, where the very fundamentals of the Constitution, do give him an entire and lasting property; which not being to be had, (for reason already laid down) but where the People have a Share in the Legislature: The Numbers therefore of the People, living under free Constitutions must encrease, and their Trade and Wealth Flourish, as being the sure Asylums, to Receive and Protect such, as having gained Estates, desire to secure them; which Experience teaches us most Men are willing to do.

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XVIII. But that Community seems best besitted to be enriched by Trade, where the Legislature is entirely in the People; by reason in such Governments, Property is not only secured, but likewise the too Luxurious Consumptions of Foreign Vanities are restrained, or at least not encouraged: so that these amass Wealth by supplying others with what they will not or cannot consume themselves, for here the differences between the qualities of People, not being so wide and great, as where the Authority is lodged in a few or a single Person, the inducements to such Consumptions are not so strong: Neither indeed will the safety of such States, permit any private Persons to live in too much Pomp and Grandure; for should that be allow'd, there might be such a dependance created amongst the People, as thereby to put it in such Persons Power to endanger the liberty of the Constitution: Thus we see *Athens*, *Rome*, and lately *Florence*, lost their Ancient Liberties by the too great Wealth, Power and Popularity of their own Citizens. And thus we may observe, The wisest Law-makers took early care to prevent the mischiefs that must necessarily ensue in their Common Wealths, if immoderate Wealth or Power, (for without that, there can be no dangerous Popularity) should be permitted to be accumulated in private hands, as appears by *Lycurgus's* institutions at *Sparta*

Sparta, by the *Agrarian* Law at *Rome*, by the *Ostracism* at *Athens*. The discontinuance of which wise institutions, brought Ruine to these now decayed Governments; and thus we may observe in our Modern Commonwealths, where their Riches are acquired by Trade; the Laws of the Country take care their Estates should be equally divided amongst their Children, that so the Wealth may be shattered as not to become dangerous: And thus in such popular Governments as were founded upon Land; the Land it it self was divided, as we may observe by that Ancient Tenure of Gavel-kind here in *England*. Or where such Popular Constitutions have not taken care to provide against the inconveniencies that may arise from a mighty private Wealth; yet there they have made regulations in their manner of living, as may be observed at *Venice*; for in truth, it is not so much what a private Person hath; but what he spends, that gives him an opportunity of corrupting the People, and so endangering the Government: And thus *Lacedaemon* preserv'd herself so long as she continued in her primitive Purity of a moderate Equality amongst the Citizens; but when once by her Ambition in extending her Dominions, she broke her Ancient Order, and let in unequal Wealth, and of course, Luxury, she soon by that Corruption lost her Liberty. Wherefore the safety of such popular Government will not permit,

mit, nor indeed their very Natures do not require such mighty Consumptions of Exotick Vanities; and yet the People industriously pursue Foreign Trade; for which reason it is obvious the Wealth of the Neighbouring Countries must in large proportions Center there. As appears for instance, By *Holland*, where the lowness of the Interest plainly shews the plenty of Money.

XIX. But to Return; Perhaps it may be objected, that the Ancient State of our Northern Ancestours, such I intend as have been comprehended under the different Names of *Goths, Huns, Vandals, Danes, Saxons, Germans* or *Frankes*, is a pregnant Proof, that Trade hath not proceeded from the Source I have assigned, viz. as a means to support or continue a difference between Men, for if such differences enlarge, as hath been intimated according to the Number of the People and Exotick Commodities are consumed, in some Proportions according to these differences; it would naturally follow, that Trade must have been great amongst those Nations that were so very numerous, that their very Multitudes obliged them to leave their Native Countries, and seek for other dwellings. To which I think may be answered, that there would have been some weight in that Objection, had all these Multitudes been comprised under one Government, and had

had that been an absolute Monarchy; but neither of these being so, there is no difficulty in that Objection: for altho' it hath been in *Thes* proved, that inequalities amongst Men must naturally enlarge in some proportion according to the Number of the People: Yet it hath likewise been shewn, that some Forms of Government, do evidently require greater degrees of Inequalities, as hath been particularly intimated concerning absolute Monarchies. And these Northern Nations, altho' they appear to have been marvellous Numerous, yet the Nature of their Governments did not permit of so mighty inequalities amongst the People; nor of course did not require such dassing Marks, or glittering Ensigns of Sovereignty: for we may observe, that altho' these Names are promiscuously used to signify these Northern People; yet they were never Comprised or United under one Government; but were divided into a Multitude of distinct ones, as appears by the concurrent Testimonies of the Historians who speak of them, who always take notice of them as many distinct People, separate Nations and divided Governments, and accordingly had their distinct Kings, Leaders or Generals, whose Authorities in time of Peace seem not to have been great, since as the same Historians observe, they were all assembled and consulted in the things of the greatest Moment. It is true,

true, in their mighty Ravages and Warlike Expeditions, when they went in pursuit of better or warmer Climates wherein to Plant themselves, they then (the necessity of their affairs requiring it) Marched under one Common King or Leader, thereby to avoid confusion that must necessarily have arose from divided Counsels; yet notwithstanding they thus in these Expeditions obey'd a single Person; yet it is manifest from the very Natures and Forms of Government they left, wheresoever they planted themselves, that there was no absolute and despotical Authority in those they called their Kings, but only a meer limited and stipulated Power, as may be clearly seen by the Governments in *Europe*, that were formed by these People; for in all of them are found undeniable Marks in their very Constitutions, of the Peoples having a share in the Legislative Authority, there being no Person that had any real Property, but what had by himself or his Representative, some part in that Power: Altho' these Assemblies had somewhat of difference in their Forms, and were called by divers Names, according to the Language of each Country; thus in *Spain* they were termed Cortes; in *France* the Assembly of the States; in *Germany* and *Poland* the Diet; in *England* the Gemott, and since, the Parliament. From all which it may be concluded the differences among the People could not be very great,

great, when their Polities were but small; and every Person was someways or other concerned in the making Laws. It is probable from this reason the *Romans* met with so much difficulty in the Subjugating the *German* Nations; for notwithstanding being thus divided, they were the more unable to withstand the *Roman* Power; yet each Person being concerned in the making Laws, no one was oppress'd by them; so that each Person would heartily endeavour the defence of his Country, and the recovery of his Liberty: For being thus a free People they knew no Servitude, for their Laws being of their own making could not be grievous; but when Conquered by the *Romans*, they must receive Laws from them, and of course, Slavery; for the Conquerours would more respect the Advantage of their own Common Wealth, than that of the conquer'd People. For it was not here as in *Asia*, where the Governments being despotical, the People lived under a constant Servitude; so that their Conditions were equally miserable, whether under their own or stranger Kings; for by a Conquest their Masters were changed, but their Conditions not altered, being but Slaves under both; for this reason they would often tamely submit, even almost without fighting. But to Return from whence I have digressed, altho' I have affirmed, that the Inequalities amongst Men, and of course, the Marks and

and Characters of such, will be multiplied in some proportion, according to the Numbers of People; yet I have not asserted that these Marks or Signs of such, will be the same amongst all People, but on the contrary have observed, that they are as diverse, as the People, or Nations, are different; nay farther that there is a kind of Succession or Change by time, even amongst the same People in those things, as every one may observe, from the differing Customs, Usages, and Fashions, that every Age produces. And therefore altho' foreign Trade often contributes, for the Supporting, or Maintaining, those Marks, or Signs, of difference between Men, yet that is not used in all Governments; by reason such Marks may be continued by other ways; Trade not being the only thing that does it. So that altho' those Northern People were very Numerous, yet the Nature of their Governments might not, nor did not lead them to Trade themselves, or to encourage it by others.

XX. From the same source Arts are derived, and Sciences flow. viz. For the making or supporting a difference between Men in Society: which appears evident from these reasons.

First, In that they are never found, or at least but very few in Number, and those rude and imperfect amongst People, who

who live but in small Hords, or in petty Numbers: As is clear from what is observed by the barbarous Savages, whether in *Africa*, or *America*.

Secondly, In that they are as different and as diverse, as the People, or the Climates, where they are Valued, and Taught: This the very Nature of the thing proves, (if they are taken, as I suppose no body will deny they ought, to signify somewhat that is intended, for the good of Mankind, or at least that Society of Men, where they are practised), by reason Climates are so variable, and Countries so unlike, that the same Arts, cannot be of use to all People. And that they are not is most Certain, in that the Manufactures, and factitious Curiosities, that are wrought in different Countries, are found to be as differing, as the People, by whom they are made: And the things that are in use in remote Nations, have no more Resemblance to each other, than their Countries, or their Climes: Their Buildings, Furniture, and Domestick Utensils, their Meats, Drinks, and Apparrel, their Customs, Usages, and Manners, are as opposite between the *Eastern* and *Western* Nations, as their Countries are upon the Globe, and both as unlike to the *Europeans*, as they are to each other: And if so, it is plain their Arts must be so, by reason they are employed to Compose, Beautify, or make these

these. Neither is there any manner of likeness, in what is called the Learning of distant, and far separated Nations, for Learning taken in a general Sense, must, I think, and is, (if used in any certain and determinate one) be taken to import, a Knowledge of somewhat that is acquired by Study, by which Men are Valued, and distinguished; It is true, if we will apply it only to what is taught in the Schools of Europe, it may then, perhaps, be said to have a narrower signification; but then it doth not comprehend, what it is often used to import, by Travellers, Cosmographers, and Historians.

But not to engage about the uncertain Sense of Words, but to apply our selves to particular facts, it is certain Natural Philosophy, hath been always considered, as a part of Learning, and it is likewise as certain, that there have been a Multitude of Systems invented, and a great variety of Hypotheses framed, whereby to explain the several Phenomena of Nature, several of which are as unlike, as the Ages, Countries, or Persons, of the Authors; and yet perhaps have most of them at some times, or in some Countries, or by some People, been taught and admired. I need not instance in the different Systems, that have in different Ages, been publickly taught in the Schools of Europe; altho' some of them are extremely unlike; and so of Course, must have had the

the fate to be scorned and despised, by the contrary Sects, as we find they Anciently were in Greece: By reason these things are Abundantly known to every one that is moderately Conversant in Letters. Neither need I farther observe, since it is so notoriously known, how the Philosophy of the Ancient Chaldeans, Persians, or the Indians, Gymnosophists, or what is now taught and believed about these things, in the East or West-Indies; or what had formerly been known there, (for somewhat of this Nature, was taught in the Empires of Mexico and Peru, before the coming of the Spaniards into America) resemble but little those Hypotheses, that have been admired in Europe. If we consider Moral Philosophy as a part of it, we shall find, that to have been as different as the Countries, where it hath been taught, Confucius's Ethicks, so much admired by the Chineses, not being always agreable, to that of the Inca in Peru, or to what is taught in the Universities of Europe, nay the somuch Celebrated Ancients, not only disagreed in the means to attain what they call'd Virtue, but differed in their very Ends, viz. wherein they placed their Summum Bonum; so little they agreed in that kind of Philosophy. If we consider it, as comprehending Divinity, we must then acknowledge it, as different as the Religion of the several Nations, in all which, the Learned do by Arguments, satisfy

tiffy themselves, and others, that what they profess is true, and of Divine Authority. If we consider it, as consisting in a Knowledge, of the Opinions, or Authorities, of the Ancients, or in the Histories of the earliest times; It is plain, this must relate to such Opinions, or Authorities, as are valued, or to such Historians as are esteemed Authentic; which can neither be valued, or esteemed so, but where being conveyed down, they are known, and how little we have of these things, more than what we have collected from the *Greeks* and *Romans*, and the Sacred Text; all of which perhaps, take not in the tenth part of the Universe, I leave to others to consider. However other Nations have Ancient and different Authorities, Opinions, and Histories, which are by them recommended and taught; as appears by the traditional Records, (if I may be permitted to call them so), by reason being composed of different Knots, and Colours, they were not properly Speaking, Written, of the *Inca* in *Pera*, and more Authentic ones of the *Chineses*. If we take it for a skill in Language, it must be as variable as such, there being as many Tongues as Nations, that are never all to be understood, by any one Man: And then Foreign, or Strange Languages, become only to be Valued, and so Esteemed and Learned, for particular reasons, as I have already Instanced in the *Hebrew*,

Hebrew, *Greek*, and *Latin* here in *Europe*; and not from any intrinsic Virtue or Excellency, in the Tongue it self; and the reasons for the preferring particular Languages, by different Nations, that are Widely, and at a great Distance, placed upon the Globe, must be very diverse; and of Consequence, Learning as it relates to them must be so. If we Intend it only, to Regard some one or more Tongues, we plainly narrow it, by reason a Multitude of People, must have never Heard, or Known, those Tongues, yet have heard what Travellers, and Historians have called Learning. The same things may be said of it, if we consider it, as employed about Words, or our own abstract Thoughts, as *Logick*, and *Metaphysicks*, seem mostly to be.

Thirdly. In that the Learning in use amongst a particular People, or in a particular Country, hath usually Flourished or improved, as the People or Government did. And on the contrary, Withered, Declined, and Ruined, as *They*, or *That*, decayed or fell. There being always to be observed, a sort of progression in the Knowledge of things, or in the perfection of Arts, to which Men Seduloussly apply themselves; until the Reasons, that excite Mens Industry, to the prosecution of such things ceases, which ordinarily ensues upon the ruine of that Polity, under which they flourish'd: as particularly appears

in that Arts began and improved, and Sciences sprung up and flourished, as *Rome* multiplied in People, and Encreased in Wealth and Dominion: For what was termed Learning, was neither encouraged nor taught in *Rome*, until their Armies had visited *Greece*; and so *Rome* afterwards became enamoured with the *Grecian* ways: And again that same Learning insensibly declined, as that Empire mouldred, and was at last ruined, by the barbarous Nations, who like Conquerors, brought in their Old Customs and Usages, and obliterated for a time those of the *Romans*. And thus Learning spread in *Greece*, and flourished in *Athens*, until the Liberties of the one, were swallowed, and the Government of the other destroyed. And now those Nations are as Rude, Unlettered, and as much despised by the Learned World, as others heretofore were by them; the People there being sunk into a Wretched Ignorance; whereas Learning is at this time Cherished and taught in some parts of *Europe*, where formerly it was neither Known nor Valued. Nay, History will inform us, wherever a People have flourished, there hath been a sort of Progression, in Arts and Sciences, (altho' such have been, perhaps, as unlike as the Men, Countries, Ages, or Climate) and that these have for the most part, kept pace with Government, beginning, continuing, improving, declining, and entirely

entirely decaying with that: For a People once Ruined, or Subjugated, do rarely preserve their Ancient Usages; the Conquerors usually introducing not only a New *Polity*, but also their own Customs, Manners, and Laws, which being perhaps very differing from what was formerly practised, by the Conquered, gives birth to a new set of Arts, by which they may be supported; and a new sort of Learning, by which Men are to be valued; as is abundantly confirmed by what happen'd to the *Phenicians, Caldeans, Egyptians, Arabians, Grecians, and Romans*, in all which several Arts, and several different Sciences, Budded, Blossomed, and Withered, with those Governments or People; some of which do neither appear to be known or practised by others.

If it be objected, that admitting these things, as true in some parts of it, yet the observation will not universally hold so, by reason Learning is to be considered, as sometimes relating to Matters of use, as well as matters of Speculation; and that therefore altho', the latter may be, as Changeable as Mens Countries, or Complexions; as being but only a diverting amusement for Idle hours; yet the former being often employed about such Matters, as relate to the general Good of Mankind, is as diffusive as Mankind it self, as may be particularly Instanced in those parts of it, that comprehend Physick, Divinity,

nity, and Geometry : To which I think may be answered, that if we distinguish between the useful and pompous parts of these, we shall find, that notwithstanding it must be acknowledged, that they have made a progression in some particular parts, and amongst some particular People, yet that hath been in such things only, that can regard that particular People, and not the whole Race of Mankind ; and that such parts of these things, that have thus seemingly bettered, do for the most part more relate to the outward Pomp and Shew, than the inward and real use. For Instance, Physick, taking it as an Art employed about the recovering or preserving Health, must be, and is always found as different, as the Countries, Usages, Climates, Complexions, and manner of living of People ; for the diversity of Meats, and Drinks, Seasons, Climes, and Methods of Living, do, and Naturally must produce a difference in Diseases ; which are observed to require very differing Methods and Medicines, for their Remedies ; as is confirmed by the Practice of Physick as it is used in *China*, and in the *East* and *West-Indies*, &c. And diseases are observed to be as mortal in *Europe*, where the whole practice of Physick, is attended with so much Pomp, and such a Multitude of prescriptions, as it is amongst the more barbarous, or at least unlettered People, where it is more simple

ple and rude. It is true the modern discoveries in Anatomy, have given a Reputation to the modern Physick ; but yet they have added but little to our Knowledge of the Nature of Diseases, or their Remedies : neither doth it seem likely that they ever should, if we do but consider that so curious a Knowledge, does not give us any Power, whereby to direct the Operations of Medicines, by which alone Diseases are to be Remedied : And that Diseases are for the most part Seated in the Blood, Spirits, or Juices, and not in those parts, which Anatomy discovers to us : And how that all the curious Organized parts, when they are Diseased, can be only repaired, or mended, by the Blood, and Juices, which being continually impelled forward, by the Heart and Arteries, are not to be Regulated, and Governed, by us. Nay we may further observe, that altho' the Industrious *Malpighius* and curious *Grew*, have made very nice discoveries, in their Anatomies of Vegetables, yet such have produced no Improvements ; but merely the Pleasure of admiring their delicate Textures. Anatomy then may be of Use in Divinity, but not much in Physick, in that it gives Men a just occasion to admire the Wisdom, of the Almighty, in the so Regular and Stupendious Contrivances of Bodies, appertaining to the Animal or Vegetable Kingdom ; but it will not help us the curing of Diseases, in the former,

or the bettering or improving the Nature of the latter. If we consider Divinity, we ought to view it as it comprehends our Blessed Religion; and even in that. Oh horror! we may find its Systems as different, as there are Sects in *Europe*. But if we consider it more at large, as it is taken, to relate to what People esteem Divine; It is then as differing as Mens Notions are, concerning such Sacred Matters; and then the Blasphemous Theologies of the *Pagans*, pardon the Expression, may be observed as unlike, as their Gods or Worship: Several of which do find Arguments to defend their impious Doctrines, which are as differing as their Idolatries.

Asto Geometry, if considered in the general as conversant about proportion, It is manifest, it must every where be the same; but then if considered as rendred into Use, and so applied to this or that part, It is plain it hath made very different progressions, and hath had diverse Applications: The Business of foreign Trade, hath lately in *Europe*, marvellously advanced that part of it that relates to Navigation; and Wealth, and the Alterations of most *European* Governments, (that were originally founded in Tenure, and add to this the accidental discoveries of the use of Gun-powder) have occasioned an Improvement in those parts of it, that relate to Fortifications, Encampments, and all manner of Military Affairs: Whereas the Ancients seemed

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to have more particularly applied themselves, to that part that related to Architecture, in which, by the Stupendious performances, of that kind, it appears they far Exceeded, what hath as yet been done by the Moderns; witness the Walls of *Babylon*, the Temple of *Belus*, the Palace of *Persepolis*, the Pyramids of *Aegypt*, the Colosses of *Rhodes*, the Maritime Performance at *Carthage*, the Amphitheatres at *Rome*, and the Towers at *Byzantium*, not to Instance in a Multitude of other inimitable performances of the Ancients, which plainly shew their Skill, in that part of the Mathematicks, which were afterwards in a manner lost, by the destruction of those Governments. It is true the *Chaldeans* Encouraged that part of it, that related to the Knowledge of the Stars, and seemed to have applied that Art, to Genethliacal predictions, intermixing that with their Divinity, as taking the Stars to be the habitations of their Gods, and the Planets their Messengers. The *Greeks* as may be inferred from their Poets, Philosophers, and other Writers, seemed to have Studied it, in order to form Rules concerning the different Changes of the Air, the diversity of Weathers and Seasons, &c. in order to advance Tillage, Pasturage, and what relates to them; little Regarding any other things of use, until the great *Archimedes* taught them, who did such wonders at the Siege of *Syracuse*, that might give some

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countenance to what he had Boasted, that he wanted but an immoveable point to move the Earth. The Romans seemed not to have turned there Heads that way, any further than what related to some Military Affairs and Buildings, it is not unlikely, but that the Phœnicians, Tyrians, or Carthaginians, might have some Skill in some parts of that, as it related to Navigation, that are now Perished with those Nations and Governments: For it is certain by some Accounts we have of them, they made some Voyages, that were not to be performed by Coasting. And we have but little Knowledge of the State of those People, more than what is Collected, from the Greeks, or Romans, who were not very solicitous of making or recording observations, about such matters as were not by them Used nor Valued, as it is certain Navigation was not in the first Esteem amongst them. But if what *Barras* in his Decads, as quoted by the diligent *Purchase*, be true; that there was a Chart or Map of all the Eastern Isles, *Fretums*, Coasts, Countries, &c. before the Portuguese doubled the Cape. It is a full proof, that there had been used some Cunning in Sailing, more than Coasting before the discovery of the Needle. However some things appertaining to the Mathematicks, were in use by the Ancients, that are now lost or difused, as may be Instanced in the *Specula Ustorica*, by which *Pro-*
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clus destroyed the Fleet that Besieged *Constantinople*; all which are proofs to shew how these things have kept pace with Government; in that they have been, and are so diverse and changeable; and in that they have in their several parts, began, Flourished and Decayed, and if not Lost and Ended, yet have altered and changed with that.

XXI. And as these things have thus improved, as a People or Government Flourishes, so likewise have Words, or Languages, (the proper Conduits, by which they are conveyed) also multiplied, from the same reason; for Words, if Naturally and Physically considered, are but mere Sounds, Made, Modified, and diversified, by the Organs of Speech, and bear no Image, or Resemblance of what they Signify; and therefore their significations must be perfectly arbitrary: And then, the motion of these Organs that thus articulate, being Governed by the Mind (as is plain in that we can speak or not as we please), the signification of such Sounds, can only relate to what the Mind then intends; for which reason Words really are only signs of the Thoughts, or Conceptions of Men; (It is true they often relate to other Existences, but then it is as such are then before the Mind) for which reason it is most plain, the significations of these Signs, or Words, must be agreed upon, before they can
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can be known. The Truth of this appears, in that there are almost as many Languages, as there are Nations, each of which until Learnt, is a perfect Jargon to others: Whereas had Nature formed a Common Language, or had there been any likeness between *Words* and *Things*, there would not have been that diversity in Tongues. But notwithstanding God hath not made any one Common Language, for the use of Men, yet having endowed them with Capacities of Mind, and Organs of Body, to invent and form such signs, he hath Abundantly provided for them, in thus enabling them, to perform that themselves; and this they do by articulate Sounds, accompanied sometimes with Actions or Gestures, as may be observed in some Passions; and sometimes alone by Actions, as we see performed by deaf and dumb Persons, who being taught the use of such Signs, do thereby Communicate Thoughts. But the curious Contrivance of our Organs of Speech, and wonderful aptitude to so many Motions, hath produced such an Infinite variety of *Words*, that we see each People hath a peculiar set; and these have been multiplied or not, as the Necessities, Occasions or Reasons for the Use of Multitude, or but few of them, have required, in each Nation; for I think we may observe the Number of Words, and compass of Language, is always found adjusted to the Circumstances of the People: Thus it is observ-

observable, that Words have been multiplied, and Language enlarged, according as the Business, Trade, Ends, or Designs, of Men in the same Community, have Encreased: For Example how few the Words, how scanty the Language of the Barbarous *Africans*, or Savage *Americans*, or even of the People Inhabiting the Northern parts of *Europe*, for amongst these, is not required a Number of them, when their great Business does not extend beyond the providing for the Necessaries of Life: On the contrary how Copious, how Redundant, are some of our *European* Tongues, where the Reputation of being Esteemed Learned, the Multiplicity of Trade, the Desire of Wealth, the Thirst of Ambition, the Vanity of Luxury, Pomp, and vain Glory, the Honour of being thought Wise, the affectation of Rhetorick, to wheedle the Ignorant, or Rage of Poetry, to Charm the Gay, have continually administered, an occasion for the multiplying, Enlarging, and Changing them. And yet as the former have sufficient, to Communicate what their Circumstances, or Fortunes require; so the latter seem not to have more than what they can employ: For as in the first, the purposes and designs of Men, are but few; so their Words as signs to manifest these, cannot be many; whereas in the latter, they must encrease

or otherwise, they must want signs, to Express their Vanities.

But the inventing or agreeing upon Signs or Words, whereby Men may interchangeably Communicate Thoughts, is not sufficient, for Men living in large Communities, unless likewise such can be someways so Recorded and Registred, that they may be hereafter remembered or known: For Words or Sounds being of so fleeting a Nature, as to be no sooner uttered but they vanish, leaving no footsteps whereby it should be known that they ever existed; and the Memory of Man not being so capacious as to contain a present knowledge of all past Actions, (which the State of Humane Affairs may sometimes require) to supply this defect, an Expedient hath been invented, whereby things pass'd may be so Recorded, that future Ages may know what former have done; but this hath not been done in the same Methods by all People, for the *Egyptians* performed it by *Hiroglyphicks*; the *Americans* by variety of Knots, contrived of different Coloured Threads, and the *Chinese* by written Characters; but the most usual Method, such I mean as was practis'd by the *Greeks* and *Romans* was by Letters, that is by a kind of resolving Words, that are made by a variety of United Motions in the Organs of Speech, into their primitive and simple ones; the Marks or Signs of which simple Motions they call

call Letters, which being United or Placed together, stand for the Word, as these Motions joined make it; and so by that help things passed are known and preserved. But notwithstanding these Methods to perpetuate the Memory of things, yet what by the intercourse between differing People, occasioned by Conquest, Traffick or Travel, or some other Means; the particular Language of most People hath suffered and undergone a great variety of Changes, for which Reason it hath been difficult for After Ages, to be ascertain'd of the true and genuine Meaning of several Words, and especially when such bear a Complex sense: for there being no Rule to guide Men in what Sense a Word was there intended, and it having been perhaps in that Language used sometimes in very different ones; it must be extremely difficult to be ascertain'd how it is there to be taken, by reason he that writ it is not now living to explain his own Meaning, and there remains no other certain means whereby to do it. And from this uncertainty in Words, perhaps may be derived some of those different Readings and contrary Expositions that are to be met with upon the Writings of the Ancients, from whence have proceeded a Multitude of Disputes and Wranglings, wherein ingenious Men have exercised their Wits and Learning, to the Pleasure perhaps of themselves, and the Admiration for a time of others,

thers, but not to the lasting satisfaction of many; for there being nothing but the doubtful signification of Words, to appeal to, to determine such Controversies, (which in truth is what makes them), they must for ever remain undecided, as we see in fact they do, for in such Disputes, altho' each Disputant produces Arguments Powerful enough to invalidate former Readings, Opinions or Expositions, yet they are not strong enough to establish his own, but they remain liable to fresh Attacks from others, as those did he hath overthrown. But to Return; it is certain the Languages of People that have converse with other Nations are under a perpetual fluctuation or change; it may be a question whether the old *Hebrew* was not lost by the Captivity; but this is certain, that the Language of God's own People is now changed; the *Roman* Tongue manifestly altered with the several Ages of the City, and at last suffered an entire corruption by the intermixture of the barbarous Nations, our European Tongues are daily altering, new words being often admitted, and old ones disused, and these are either borrowed from some of the Neighbouring Nations, or else are derived from some of the Learned Languages, which being once received into use are sometimes taken to import what their Original Sense will not warrant; or at least are so compounded and defaced, that they

carry no likeness in their signification, to what has been intended by the Root; for which reason *Atymologies* are found to give us but little light into the genuine Sense of Words; but that Words, as they are only Arbitrary signs of the thoughts of Men, so they are very often Arbitrary, and very uncertainly used.

And as thus Trade, Arts and Sciences, and if you please, Learning, or whatsoever else is valuable or praise-worthy, that is acquired by Humane Industry, is the happy produce of a well-ordered and so flourishing Society; being all Originally founded in that difference between Men, that Government naturally makes: So on the contrary, All the Mischiefs, Cruelties, Bloody-contrivances and most detestable and inhumane Villanies that are ever practised by Men, are derived from the same Source: This will appear if we well scan People, inhabiting the most flourishing Countries, where we may always observe a Perpetual success of new and unheard of Crimes and Villanies invented and practised, Vices and Rogueries still encreasing; for when the Law by some extraordinary Provisions and severe Punishments, lops off some one that is become too enormous and common; like *Hydras*, a Multitude of new ones spring up in its place. To confirm this by Fact, let us but take a view of *America*, where we may observe that the Poor *Indians* that lived together but in

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small Hords or petty Companies, as they had none of those glorious Advantages that are enjoyed by Men, that live in larger and more refined Governments; so likewise they were not skill'd in those barbarous and villainous Contrivances and Cruelties amongst themselves, (for what they practise upon Strangers, seems only to relate to their own securities) as were plotted and used, in the mighty Empires of *Mexico*, or *Peru*, that are upon the same Continent, and whose People seem in all other appearances, (except that of Government), like the others, that were divided into small Septs. For in those great Empires, as they had all the Advantages, and Blessings of Government, so likewise they had all the Evils and Mischiefs of it, (altho' these were in very different Methods and Ways, to what were practised in *Europe*, or in other known parts of the World) according to the different Laws, Customs, Manners, Usages, and Complexions of the People, as will readily appear to any one, who will but read and consider the History of those Empires:

XXII. But to return to the *Britains*, it is probable, from what may be collected from *Caesar*, *Tacitus*, *Strabo*, and *Dion Cassius*, that the *Britains* being divided into a Multitude of Governments, had not before the coming of the *Romans*, ascertained a property

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erty in their Lands, that is, they had not so divided, and parcelled the Land, that each Man could know, and might Claim what Ground only was his *Own*, and what was another Mans: But the Soil seems to have been, promiscuously Common to them all; for altho' it is probable, they had a property in their Cattel, in which this Isle then Abounded; yet it doth not appear, they had any in the Land, but that like the old *Scythians*, or modern *Tartars*, they removed, and fed them as they pleased. For it is not likely, that Men should have separate and distinct Rights in the Ground, when they bestowed no Labour in the manuring of it, nor when they had neither Mounds, nor Bounds, to Separate, Distinguish, and Divide it: For the above recited Authors agree in this, That they had no Tillage or Husbandry, unless what *Caesar* intimates of some Corn upon the maritime Coasts, but that the Inhabitants lived by Hunting, and such Fruits as were the Natural produce of the Earth: And then having a sort of Community in their Wives, ten or twelve enjoying the promiscuous use of the same Women, there could be no marvellous Care of Raising, and Supporting, Families, where there was so little Security in the Legitimacy of the Children, nor of Course little Anxiety about perpetuating Estates, without which

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the Dignity of Families is not to be supported: And the Soil not being employed in Tillage, there was not then much Room for any other Improvements, by reason there could be no Manufactures, to better what was the Lands produce, where there was no Cloathing so that there then could be no Motives for a Division of Land, when there could be no Advantages to be made by it: for it appears by the earliest Accounts of those times, that our *British* Ancestors did not look much farther, than for the providing the Necessaries of Life; And in doing that, they only Banquetted upon such Dishes, as Nature frankly provided; neither did they Cloath, and bedeck their Bodies, with any other Dresses, than what she had prepared for them, Staining their Skins, being their Richest Embroideries, and variously Colouring them, their most Glorious Attire. But the *Romans* having Conquered these Wretched People, and being pleased with the Native Riches of the Isle, Resolve to make it a Province of their Empire, and take Measures to secure it accordingly; for they form Camps, and place Garrisons in several Places, whereby to Bridle the Natives, and keep them in Subjection; who upon all Occasions, seems very Resolute in the Defence of their Liberty, and very unwilling to Submit to their Yoak. But the *Romans* not only used

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used Force, to terrify them, but also Policy, and Gentleness, to invite and allure them to Obedience: For they Plant Colonies of their own People, and invite the Natives to come and frequent them, that so they might be Pleas'd, and Reconcil'd to their manner of Living, and thereby Improvements made, and so the Wealth, and the Revenues of their Empire enlarged; They likewise Erect their Tribunals, and Courts of Justice, whereby to Relieve the Injured and Oppressed, and Invite the Old Inhabitants to their Feasts, shew them their Baths, and in short endeavour to give them a Taste of their Luxury, and Voluptuousness; Nay they found Schools, and Encourage them to send their Children to be Educated at them; that so being early initiated in the *Roman* Customs, and Usages, they might when grown Men, more loath and dislike their Own. By these and such like Methods, and by a continued possession of some Hundred of Years, they had so Changed the Savage Temper of the People, that they seem to have been in most of their manners entirely *Roman*, Personating them in every Thing, as far as their Enslaved and Servile Conditions would permit; as appears by the Remains of Antiquity, that have since been found, and by the Accounts of those times, and particularly by the mournful Complaints

of Lamenting *Gildas*, where he pathetically Exclaims, against the Luxuries, Corruptions, and Sins of those People and Times, as the just Occasion of all the Miseries they Suffered, by the *Picts and Scots*, those Bloody Instruments of the Almighty's Wrath. But the *Romans* having governed this People as a Conquered Nation, had not permitted them the use of Arms, nor taught them the Arts of War, so that when the intestine divisions in that vast Empire, had gradually brought upon it those fatal devastations by the Barbarous Nations; and being unable to withstand, the furious Torrent of that Multitude of People, that broke in upon their Inland Countries, they became necessitated to Recal their Legions out of *Britain* to defend the Continent; and thereby to leave the helpless, and unarmed *Britains*, to the Mercy of such as would invade them; and they having been for a long time Dispirited, and Overawed, by the *Romans*, and unacquainted with Weapons, and unskilled in War, soon became a Prey to those Merciless People, (who had not been Conquered, or at least not kept in Subjection by the *Romans*, that possessed the Northern parts of the Isle): For the *Picts*, and *Scots*, brake in upon them, Ravaging, Ruining, and Destroying, all before them, the Miserable *Britains*, not daring to Resist, or Oppose. The

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Britains therefore tasting no security, by their new granted freedom, (for the *Romans* left them, to their own Government) Solemnly send to employ Assistance from their old Masters, to defend them against the barbarities of those Cruel People; thus preferring an Ignoble Servitude, and the Tyranny of a *Roman* Army, before a glorious Liberty, that was thus accompanied with Toil and War, for now they must take Arms to defend themselves: So much had a continued Subjection Reconciled them to Slavery, that they preferred that to a Liberty, that must be attended with Danger and Trouble. By which Instance we may Learn, how that a People, who had formerly been bold and daring, and who had appeared Resolute, and Obstinate, in the Defence of their Liberties, became afterwards to be so Effeminated, and Dispirited, when governed by others, as willingly to continue under that Yoak, rather than to fight and defend themselves; so much Men are pleased with what they are used to.

And yet afterwards which is very remarkable, the very posterity of these Men, when they had by time been Reconciled to freedom, and endeared to liberty, became again as Resolutely brave, as their Ancestors were Pusillanimous, and Base, Courageously fighting,

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ing, and gloriously maintaining their Country, and Liberties, in several Renowned Battels, against the Invasions of the *Danes*, and the Incroachments of the *Saxons*; so much Resolution had been acquired by Liberty; which a continued Slavery had worn out and lost.

This Instance methinks, gives us a Cogent Proof, that what we call Courage, Resolution, or Personal Bravery, by which I understand, such a scorn of Danger, that Men dare pursue, their intended purposes, altho' by doing of it, they run the Peril, or Hazard of their own Lives, doth not proceed so much from any Virtue, Temper, or Natural Complexion, of this or that Nation, People, or Family; as from the Nature of Governments, Customs, or Usages: For in this very Case, the Ancient *Britains* so long as they continued a free People, that is were governed by Laws of their own making, and so of Course were not debarred the use of Arms, but were accustomed to Wars; so long they were as Brave in their Persons, and as Bold in their Battels, as the Conquering *Romans*, and what seems to have turned the Scale to the Invaders Side, was not their want of Courage, but their divisions, as being then so many distinct People, and the advantage the *Romans* had by their

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Exactness of discipline: and yet as I have observed, the very posterity of these People, did by the means of Servitude, as being governed by the *Romans*, so far degenerate from the Virtues of their Ancestors; as not to dare to oppose or fight a barbarous Nation, that had no advantage in Arms, or Military Discipline: Nay the Accounts of those times, do represent them so Wretchedly Pusillanimous, and so Cowardly Base; that notwithstanding the *Romans* upon their second leaving them, had instructed them in the Arts of War, and given them patterns of their Weapons, and had raised a mighty Wall, as a defence against the Barbarous Nations, yet would their Souldiers that were to guard their Fortifications, stand Trembling in their very Turrets, and suffer the Enemy to drag them with Hooks, from thence, not daring to make any defence. In vain then, do the posterity of such a People, glory of their matchless Courage, when it is evident, from what hath been observed, that it cannot proceed from any Innate or Natural Temper, derived or descended from their Ancestors, nor from any advantage from the Climate, Country, or Food, but is merely the result of their Laws, or was derived from their Government; which Permitted, Encouraged, or Required such

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Customs

Customs, Performances, or Usages, by which Military Virtues, were acquired; which might not perhaps arise from any Foresight or Wisdom, but from the Necessity of Times, Circumstances, and unforeseen Accidents. And had perhaps *England* that now boasts of her martial Courage, but as long groaned under the same Servitude, as her Sister *Ireland* hath, her Inhabitants might have degenerated into a pusillanimity, agreeable to a Servile and Governed State; as it is certain, by what I have already observed, and shall hereafter confirm by other Instances, it hath formerly done: And whatsoever some Men may Boast of being derived from a Race of Men, that have always been Celebrated for their Valour, yet where there appears any ground for such pretences, it is plain it cannot proceed, from any Virtues, or Preeminence in their Natures, but merely from their Customs, Usages, or Education. By reason all our Knowledge, as to Safety, or Danger, arises from our Experience, as appears in that, a Child does not distinguish between them, for it will as readily handle an Edged Knife, as it will a Smooth Stick; neither will it shun a precipice, nor avoid the fire, until it hath learnt by its own Experience, or been taught by others, that Danger attends such things; and then having such dread-

ed Idea's fixed in its Mind, It is Startled, and Terrified, at the approach of either; until again by farther Experience, it hath learnt, that a precipice may be viewed without Danger, and a fire used with Safety, and then its fears lessen. And thus it is observable poor *Indians*, in the *Spanish* Conquest of *America*, who were at first dreadfully terrify'd at those terrible Instruments of Death, the Ordnance, in that they killed with flashes of Lightning, and Roaring of Thunder, and so they believed the *Spaniards* more than Mortals, and fled from that Cruel Nation, as from some angered and enraged Deities; yet since Time hath so Reconciled those wretched People, to those Engines of Death, that they can both See, Hear, and Use them, so much use contributes to the lessening or removing of Fears. For the difference that Nature seems to make in the Persons of Men, consists, in that to some she gives Strong, and Robust Bodies; to others more curious Organs of Sense; and to others a more Exquisite tone of Spirit, or some other Excellencies that Regard the Fabrick of the Body; by which in some there is a greater Aptitude, and Capacity, to Receive and Store Impressions for the Seeds of Future knowledge; for it is evident, Children do not bring much into the World with them, and if therefore their Minds are not furnish-

ed by Nature it is plain they must by Experience: And the Images, the Mind thus receives, are either *loved, or feared, liked or disliked*, as they affect it with *Pleasure, or Pain*; so then whatsoever Idea's afterwards Start up, if they please, and so they will, if resemble or partakes of the Nature of such things as we have learnt, have been Agreeable, Pleasing, or Advantageous; we then are ready to Prosecute and pursue them; but if on the contrary, we dislike and avoid them; for it is Natural to Man to Covet or Pursue such things as he loves and likes; and on the contrary to avoid such things, as he dislikes or dislikes, and the performing of this requiring or implying, some Bodily Action; the doing that Action, when considered as attended with Danger, is termed Courage; but when considered as avoiding it, is called Fear; whereas the motive to the pursuit of the one, or to the avoiding the other, was only as the Object, was loved or hated, desired or despised: So then Courage or the undaunted pursuit after somewhat, that is attended with Danger; proceeds according to the Notions or Opinions Men have of things, for no Man will knowingly, run himself into a Jeopardy, of his Life, (by reason that being a Pain or Evil, his very Nature must abhor it) unless he is possessed with an Opinion, that by so doing, he avoids a greater Evil, or may acquire a greater good; And

And this Opinion is not to be raised or fixed, but by his own Experience of the Nature of things, or by the Instructions or Examples of others: for which reason Men will, and do hazard their Lives, as they have been principled; thus some will daringly scorn Danger, in some ways that will shrink, grow tender, and avoid it in others, where perhaps there is not an Equal hazard; for Instance, some will fight a duel, and yet Tremble and withdraw from a Battel, where Multitudes engage, or where the Weapons or Instruments of Death, or manner of Danger are differing from what they had been used to; others on the contrary are bold in Battel, and yet dare not fight singly. Country People that are not used to Instruments of War, will be often Terrified at a Sword or a Gun, or some unusual Weapon; and yet perhaps will not Start at Death or Danger, if offered in a common Dress, that is in such ways as they are used to; as appears in that, they will boldly engage with Clubs, Sticks, or Hands, in such manner, as thereby to indanger their Bodies, if not their Lives; and look upon it as base and mean, to yield or withdraw from such disputes. Thus the Old Romans agreed upon Whips, as the dreadfulest Weapon, to Fright and Terrify their Slaves; by reason they were the Instruments with which they had

had formerly been Punished, and so the Sense of that, by the sight of those Weapons, being revived, would soon benumb their Courage. And thus the *Asiatick* People, that are governed by an Arbitrary and Tyrannical Power, and so are not permitted the use, or indeed sight of Weapons, unless when Punished, or Frighted by them, are so overawed, and dispirited, by their Slavery, that they are found pusillanimous, rarely recovering that dread and fear, that their Miserable Servitude hath engrafted in them. And the same reason may be assigned, why the *French* Infantry if composed of Natives, and new raised, are so rarely observed to equal their Neighbours, for consisting of the Peasantry, who are dispirited by their Servile Condition, so that when first in Arms, their dread only obliges them to Obedience, for if they fight, it seems more from fear of their Officers, than any Strength of Resolution; and for this Reason, the *French* abound in Commanders. Whereas these People after some Campaigns, that use hath a little removed the dread of Weapons, and Experience hath taught them, that they have now a Power, and Privilege, of Hectoring, and Lording over others, their former Sense of Cowardice, or Fear, arising from Servitude, gradually lessens and wears off, and they become more bold in Battel, and Resolute

olute in Danger: Yet notwithstanding, do not always equal their Neighbours, that are a free People, thus the *Swiss*, and Strangers, are the glory of the *French* Infantry. Whereas their Cavalry being usually composed of such, that are not overawed nor dispirited, by a Mean and Servile Education, but are early inured to the use of Arms, as being descended from the Gentry, or bred or nurtured by them, are observed as brave, courageous and daring as those of the Neighbouring Nations.

By what hath been thus briefly remarked concerning the Tempers and Resolutions of Men in different Governments; I think it may be concluded, that what we call Courage, Bravery or Resolution, is not so much the effect of a Natural Temper, as it is of a Free and Generous Education, an early liberty, and a use of such Weapons and Arms as are for Military Services; for by the first Mens minds are principled with such a Sense of Honour and Reputation, as will not permit them publickly to avoid danger; By the second they are induced to love and value that Government, of which they are Members, by reason they have a share, and bear a part in it, and so cannot be trampled upon and injured; the Laws in such Communities equally taking care of the Persons and Estates of all Men.

Men, so that every one being concerned in them, every one will endeavour to defend them: By the third, the early Impressions of fear, which are ordinarily infused into Children, to deter them from the use of Guns or any other Instruments of Death, are gradually worn off; so that being accustom'd to Weapons, they have more skill in their Use, and less apprehension of their Danger.

Notwithstanding what hath been here said, I do not deny but that some Persons, are in their own Natures, in some particular things more fearful than Others; that is, that there will appear greater Signs of sudden Disorders at the approach of some Objects in some Men, than there does in others: For I think what we term Fear, when applied to others, and not our selves, consists only in some disorders, whereby we discern an Inclination or Willingness in the Person to avoid, or fly from such things. And what occasions these disorders, which are thus called Fear, may be, I think, derived either from what we term Natural Antipathies; as we see some Person cannot endure the sight of a Cat, Toad, Cheese, &c. Or acquired Antipathies; by which I understand such things as being deeply imprinted on our Minds by some fright, arising from a sense of our sudden and imminent danger; of which History

ry affords a Multitude of Instances, which makes so lasting an Impression, that it is not so easily overcome, when ever any thing of the same Nature offers it self: But the reasons of both these being Physical, it is not my business here to explain. But then I averr what is named Cowardice is different from Fear; for the former is taken as opposite to Courage, and so is used, where Men dare not pursue their intended purposes, by reason they are beset with danger, as we may particularly instance in Battle, where Men endeavour to avoid danger, and so are called Cowards: Whereas Fear is used in a larger Sense, to signify any disorder, whereby a desire appears to avoid somewhat, without any consideration of immediate danger; thus we say a Man is afraid of a Cat or Toad, &c. yet if he dares fight, or is bold in Battle or Danger, we do not say he is a Coward: Fear then in some particulars may arise from our Natures, and so is not without difficulty to be removed, but Courage and Cowardice proceeds from other reasons, and so are as People are used.

XXIII. But to Return; The Romans planting Colonies in Britain, assigned them Lands which were to be Husbanded and Manured for their Subsistence and Advantage (as we see the Europeans do at this day by all their Plantations

Plantations in *America*) which Lands being divided according to their usual way in other Colonies, a separate and distinct Property was thereby ascertained; for without that there could be no Motive to induce the People to Industry; nor of course their Colonies could not have flourished, or indeed subsisted; whereas it is certain they both encreased in Wealth, and multiplied in People; but notwithstanding this, the *Romans* did not give the Lands of the whole Kingdom to their own People, for their Colonies were too few, and too small for such a Donation; but they left the Possession of what they could not employ to the Natives, imposing upon them such Tributes or Duties, as they thought fit to require: And the *Britains* by time observing, and learning from their Masters the *Romans*, what Advantages were to be made by the Manuring the Land; and perhaps their own Necessities requiring it, by reason the *Romans* would oblige them to Pay their Tributes, which was not to be done without some Industry: They likewise gradually fall into the same ways of Improvements, as I think appears in that they were able to pay the *Roman* Duties, which were most rigidly exacted: For the Tributes and Imposts continually carrying the Silver to *Rome*; it seems impossible there could have been sufficient left to pay such Duties, in a Country that produced

produced none, unless there had been some way, by which it was supplied; which could be only by a sort of Trade in Exchange, for somewhat that was the produce of the Earth, and this seems to have been gained in part, by Agriculture, in that *Britain* was looked upon, as the Granary, for the Western part of the Empire: Which it could never have been, had not the Natives applied themselves to husbandry, for there was not a Number sufficient of the *Romans*, as to have, (altho' with the greatest Application) produced such a Plenty, as *Britain* seems then to have afforded. Neither could the *Britains* have applied themselves to such Industry, had they not had some property, (altho' under Conditions), in the Land: for it is unnatural to think, that Men should voluntarily take Pains, to acquire, what they cannot call their own: Besides it was not agreeable to the Politics of *Rome*, to Ruine Countries, or Destroy People, but only to take the Government of them, and make an Advantage by them. From what then hath thus briefly been observed, of the Ancient State of the *Britains*, before the coming of the *Romans*, and during the time that they were in Possession of this Isle: it appears that the *Romans* first brought in the division of Lands, and of Consequence, the ascertaining Mens particular properties in them

them: By reason *Cæsar* took notice that at his coming, the Natives did not apply themselves to Agriculture, but only followed their Cattel, fed them where they pleased, lived by hunting, and upon such Fruits, as the Earth Naturally produced; and altho' he speaks of some Corn, upon the Coasts, yet he guesses from the Names and Manners of the People, that they who performed this were not the old Natives, but some People of *Belgium*, who traversing these parts, for Rapine, and Prey, might be left there. Whereas after the coming of the *Romans*, the Natives manured the Lands, which appears evident, in that some of their Tributes were paid in Corn; and that this must Naturally, and Gradually, produce a division of them, and so a property in them, is but what will appear to any one, who will but seriously consider these things; for if that had not been, Eternal Quarrels and Disputes must have continued, amongst these Wretched People; In that every Man being concerned in some Payment of these Imposts required by the *Romans*, Every Man would have endeavoured to have possessed that portion of Land, by which he might have most readily procured, what he was to pay; which not being to be had by every one, must have created Quarrels and Confusions; whereas the dividing of it, and adjusting

ing the proportion and payments, would preserve Peace amongst them. Besides, there being no division, before the coming of the *Romans*, and manifest foot-steps of it, after they left the Isle, it is plain, the Original of such divisions, did proceed from them, or at least was begun in that time, they possessed the Kingdom.

And it is not improbable, by the same helps, Christianity might be planted here, for as to those pretences of *Joseph of Arimathea*, &c. they look more like Monkish forgeries, (who according to the Vanity or Superstition of those times, took Pleasure in rendring every thing, Miraculous, Strange, and Uncommon), than any matter of Truth. It is certain, there were a great many Persons, during the Reigns of the Heathenish Emperors, not only in *Rome*, but in several other parts of that mighty Empire, who Believed, and Professed *Jesus Christ*; and therefore it is not unlikely but some of them might likewise be Planted in these *British Colonies*, or else be employed in their Military Legions, or might have some Commerce Trade, or Effects, here: By which means, they might come to have an Intercourse, and Acquaintance with the Natives: And then it is no wonder, if a Religious Charity so far prevailed with some of them, as

to endeavour the Conversion of these Blind and Ignorant People; who may be rationally supposed, (Naturally Speaking), to be inclined, in that they were under Servitude, and Oppression, to receive and believe those Blessed Doctrines, that Christianity holds forth, to all such as believe, and do, as there directed: And more especially, if we consider, that the Gospel promises of Eternal Happiness, that are offered to all Men, under the Conditions therein specified, must be most agreeable to those Wretched People, who labouring under a present Slavery; and so tasting but of little Temporal Felicity, more earnestly hoped for Future Happiness. Besides our Blessed Saviour particularly invites those that are in affliction, to come to him, and he will give them ease; and commands Men to Scorn the Pomp, and Vanitie, of this World; and solemnly declares, how difficult it is for the Rich, and Great, to Enter into the Kingdom of Heaven: All which Doctrines must be, in a most Especial Manner, agreeable to a People labouring under Misery, and groaning under Servitude, in that they have by that, a Divine invitation to a Future and Everlasting Happiness, whereas their Severe Masters are to enjoy but a short and temporary one.

Besides

Besides it is observable, there is this Charity attends Revealed Religion, that its professors have a Zeal to propagate it. This I think is Common to *Mahometism* as well as *Christianity*: But whether this proceeds from any Vanity in Men, as being desirous to make others of their Opinions, (for every Man if sincere in his belief, takes his own to be true), by reason they who are converted, or assent to them, by his Arguments, do by that tacitly acknowledge him to have been wiser or better: Or whether they do it, as they believe it a Duty, or Charity, that is required of them, to be Instrumental in the Salvation of others, by bringing them to a belief of what they profess, is a point I shall not take upon me to determine, not intending to Interest my self, in Religious, but only Civil Matters.

XXIV. But to Return; But altho' after the *Romans* had left this Isle, there happen'd a great variety of changes in People and Government, by the means of the several Nations that Ravaged, Conquered or Settled here, yet the property in the Land, (altho' without doubt often altered) yet never appears to have been entirely destroyed or abolished; in that there are no footsteps in History, of the Peoples here returning to the Primitive and Ancient *British* way of living,

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viz. by Hunting only, and by the Fruits that were the Natural produce of the Earth, and by wandering and feeding their Cattle in promiscuous Pasturage, as is practised by People where the Land remains in a common and undivided State. But they lived in Towns, and used Cloathing, as having been without doubt bettered and refined by the *Romans*. But the irruption of the Barbarous Nations had occasioned so many Calamities in the very heart of the *Roman* Empire, that they were necessitated to recall their Legions out of *Britain* to defend what they possessed upon the Continent: and so they leave this Isle to the Protection of its own Inhabitants, who being thus forsaken by their Rulers, and so the *Roman* Government dissolved and ended, were now at liberty to Model and Form new *Polities*. And accordingly as a Mob or Multitude left to themselves, they fall, according to their Inclinations, or led by their present Circumstances, into several distinct Principalities, Kingdoms or Governments, for *Gildas* expressly speaks of five Kings; and by what he writes concerning *Maglocunus*, who was one of them, it is not unlikely but there were many more. However, be that as it will, after about forty years Confusion that they had most grievously suffered by the *Picts* and *Scots*; the Calamities they underwent from these barbarous People taught

taught them that Division was inconsistent with their Peace and Safety; they then Unite and Choose one Common King or Leader, that so with United Force under one Head, they might be enabled to withstand their Enemies: But their Fortunes not being bettered under the Conduct of their first King, they desert, or if you please depose him, and then chuse a more Warlike Prince; but Death putting a Period to his more successful Reign; they are again Reconciled or receive their first King. But he having learned by his former Misfortunes, how unfit the Natives were at that time to fight in the defence of their Country, (and perhaps dreading, that a little insuccess might again occasion the loss of his present Authority) he resolves upon most desperate Counsels, *viz.* to call in the *Saxons* to his assistance, (a People in that Age renowned for their martial Exploits,) that so by help of their Arms, he might secure himself, and protect his pusillanimous Subjects against the Insults and Ravages of these Northern Nations: And the *Saxons* having successfully performed that Service, had Lands assigned them for their future Habitations. But these Warlike Strangers being pleased with the Native beauties of the Isle, and encouraged by the present Cowardice of the Inhabitants, seem resolved to fix their dwellings in these happy Regions; and that they might

might not live as *Vassals*, or at the Courtie of the fearful Natives; they invite others of their own Nation over, that so their Numbers being encreased, they might be able to subsist by their own Strength. And having obtained fresh Succors, they soon scorn to Obey those whom they came to assist, for Jealousies, Disputes, and at length Bloody Quarrels arise, between these new Comers, and the old Inhabitants, which, to be short, after a great many Bloody Battels, and a great Variety and Change of Fortunes, was at last ended in the entire Extirpation, or at least Subjection, of the old *Britains*, out of the most Fertile, and best parts of the whole Isle, there remaining nothing in their possession, but what is now called *Wales*.

But before I proceed, I shall beg leave to Remark, what I have before hinted, that altho' the old *Britains* upon the Recession of the *Romans*, were found so base and cowardly a People, that they durst not oppose, altho' in their own Defence, a Naked and Barbarous Enemy; (so much had the disuse of Arms, or a Servitude, dispirited them). Yet we find the very same People, after they had for some time enjoyed Liberty, that is were governed by Laws of their own making; that they became as Martial, and Brave, as they had been, before

fore they were Conquered, and Governed by the *Romans*: As is most evident, by that Stout and obstinate resistance, they gave the *Warlike Saxons*, in a Multitude of Bloody, and doubtful Battels, in many of which, they equalled in Courage, those very *Saxons*, they had called in to their assistance, upon the great Reputation of their matchless Bravery: And had not those bold Strangers prevailed by their Numbers, which came swarming into different parts of this Isle, and had not the Natives by their domestick Broils, assisted in their own Ruines; these Warlik Invaders, (such was the Valour of the *Britains*) might have been compelled to have Returned to their own Native dwellings.

But the *Saxons* at length, as I have said, prevailing, Ravage, Ruine, and depopulate the Country, Pillage and Destroy the Towns, overthrow the Temples, destroy or deface the Noble and Publick Edifices, of Refined Architecture, in short Ruine, or Demolish, the remains of *Roman* Luxury, and Greatness; (being perhaps better pleased with their own narrow, dark and disproportionate Buildings) in fine, like Conquerors, they Ranfack and Ruine whatsoever, was liked or valued by the Natives; that so by a Miserable devastation, there might remain

no Monuments of their former State; whereby to allure the People, to attempt the recovery of their Ancient dwellings.

But these Strangers, who thus having conquered the Natives, possess the Country, whether called Saxons, Jutes or Angles, for that matters not to what I intend, came over at several times, and under different Leaders, and so did Erect separate and Independent Governments, as most evidently appears, in that they founded several distinct Kingdoms, as was seen in the Heptarchy; For the Political Constitution of these Nations, were such, (as I have already proved, and shall farther confirm), as permitted the whole Body of the People, to be someway concerned in the Legislature, for which reason, being free Men, (as under no Servitude) and withdrawing from their own Communities, they owed no Subjection, but what they consented to: For the reason of their leaving their own Countries, to seek for, and settle in others; does not appear to be so much, from any Desire, or Ambition, of Ruling, or Governing, a Conquered, and so Enslaved People, as to Plant themselves, in better and more fruitful Regions: For it is most clear, wheresoever they settled themselves, (altho' in doing that, it is plain they must Beat, Drive out, or Conquer, the Natives)

tives) yet they did not settle as Colonies, or Plantations, that were to be dependent, upon the former Governments, from whom they had departed; (as the Romans formerly did, or as the Europeans at present do, that so such might be bettered and Enriched by them); But these People, when they thus transplanted themselves, Erected new Governments, which were absolute and independent: For we find no footsteps of Subjection, in these new Erected Polities, to any of those, from whom they departed. For these Nations in those their Expeditions, going as it is probable like Free-Booters, or modern Buccaneers, altho' they agreed upon order, as being perfectly necessary to carry on, and to secure their Conquests; yet each adventurer seems to have had some share in what was thus conjointly acquired, (as shall be hereafter proved from the very Nature of their Governments) and these petty principalities, thus separately formed, continued and flourished in most parts of Europe, for many Years, and was what in Britain was called the Heptarchy. But these several People that thus Conquered, or drove the Native Britains, from the best parts of the Country, altho' for a time, they seem in most of their ways, to have Regarded and Continued their own Customs, Manners, Usages, and Laws, yet they do not appear to have approved of that Com-

Community in the Soil, as they had used in their Native Country. For *Witichirdus* observes, that these People had no fixed dwellings, but that they lived like the old *Scythians*, or modern *Tartars*, and of course could have no separate properties in the Land. But whatsoever their manners were there, it is clear when once they settled here whether necessitated to it, as being Conquerors, or Invaders, (the better to secure the Country they had obtained) or whether preferring the *British*, before their own brutish Custom; it is certain they divided the Land, by reason they instituted, or continued Tenures, by which a Government amongst them was settled.

And amongst whatsoever People a property, or division in Land is once ascertained; it will most certainly, altho' perhaps by slow and unheeded Steps, produce a Government, more elaborate and refined, than were there is no such Foundation; as appears evident by fact, and Reason: First by fact, in that there is never found any great Number of People, included in the same *Polity*, where there is not a division, or property in Lands, as plainly appears by the *American, Arabian, or Tartarian*, Hords; in which Parts altho' a Multitude of People, are comprehended under the same Name; yet they

they live under separate and distinct Governments; none of which, comparatively speaking to other States, are very numerous: Neither is there that difference amongst the Members, nor that Oeconomy or Order, as in greater Governments. Secondly. By reason in that there can be no Ty, to Obedience, or Subjection, amongst a People, where there is but little Wealth, (when once outward danger is removed); neither can there be any marvellous Wealth, without a property in Land: Which appears in that Government as I have often intimated, implies an Inequality amongst Men, and that not to be continued without ordaining *property*; which must produce, what we call Wealth, and Land being the most secure and lasting Wealth, and Wealth the Cement of political Power: They therefore that have the Wealth, will plant it upon the Land, as being what is most Permanent, Useful, and Certain, and thereby the better secured to themselves and posterity: And thus we may observe most Men are willing to dispose of their Wealth or Money for Lands.

So then to Establish a Government, and thereby to secure their new acquired Dominions; it was absolutely necessary for our *Saxon Ancestors*, to divide and appropriate the Lands, that so a Government might be raised upon

upon a lasting and settled Foundation, which was what at that time the necessities of their affairs required: for should they have here continued in such a State, as they did in their own Countries, where they had ascertained no property in the Land, their Governments must have remained very precarious; by reason, coming over in such separate and distinct Bodies, they would soon by their own quarrels, (where there was nothing to Unite them) have destroyed each other, or at least must have become an easie Prey to the Natives their Enemies. From what then hath been said of these People it is clear, that their King or Leader, had but little Authority in time of Peace, neither in Truth if we consider the reason of the thing, is it likely it should be otherwise; for who can rationally suppose, considering the depraved State of Humane Nature, that ever Men should continue in subjection, (by which they often suffer) to any one Man, or Men, unless there was some Bond or Cement, that should so Oblige, Tye or Unite them to *Him* or *Them*; as thereby it might be better for them to obey, than not; which cannot be, unless there is a Wealth, which as it encreases, will produce a property in Lands, as hath been already proved. If then there can be no Bond, whereby to Tye or Continue Men in Subjection, but where there is an Establish'd Property,

and

and it is certain any Number of Men without some Government or Order, would soon become a meer *Babel*, a Confused and Ungoverned Mob: For Men in such a State being at Liberty, that is, under no Restraint or Force, would Act as they please; and so every one would be desirous to Command, but few to Obey, unless common Danger induced them to it; and then such Subjection would be of no longer durance, than the cause remained; as we find it happen'd among the old *German*s, and other Northern Nations, who would confederate and submit to a common Leader, when the necessity of their Affairs or common Safety required it; but that once removed, they would resume their former Liberty, and the like hath been done by the *Americans*. From which considerations it is farther manifest a Sovereign and Uncontrollable Power could never be enjoyed by any one Man or Men, independent of the Will and Consent of the People, unless there was such a Wealth possessed by such Person or Persons, as thereby to be enabled to keep the People, or at least such a Number of them, dependent upon him, that so he might rule arbitrarily: which not being to be had, for reasons already assigned, is the true Reason, why there is not, nor ever hath been, (so far as History does inform us) any one Government purely Arbitrary and Despotical,

but

but where a property in Land hath been Established; and then that the Lands, or at least such a part of them, or the profits from them, someways or other appertain, or are enjoyed, by him or them who possess that Power. And it seems to proceed from the same Reason, why in all small Communities where Wealth does not much flourish (such as the old *Germans* or these Northern Nations were, or the present *Indians* are; each Person in these petty Communities, is, or hath been someways by himself, or Proxy consulted in their Publick Assemblies, where all Matters of Moment are transacted; for among these a private Property in the Lands not being ascertained, there can be no Obligation to Obedience any longer or farther than their own Securities require: For which reason all, or at least the greatest part do consult of their Common Affairs, that so all may be interested in them.

XXV. And which is very remarkable, as such petty Governments have encreased in Wealth and Dominions (which must imply a Multitude of People, as being but the Natural Effects of one another) and have thus extended their ambitious designs to the Subjugating and Conquering others: They by thus employing their Craft, or Force to the enslaving their Neighbours, have gradually drawn the same

same slavery upon themselves or their Posterity; for by thus enlarging Empire, Men do inevitably enlarge the Differences and Inequalities, that will be amongst Men living under all Governments; and not only so, but the Securing or Multiplying Conquests, necessarily requiring the reposing a Trust in a single Person, which he, as Wealth encreases, will find occasions to continue; so that when a Crafty and Ambitious Man hath obtained Authority, who hath Courage and Cunning to improve Opportunities, (which can never long be wanting), and hath Wealth and Craft, to support Popularity, may, when he pleases to employ his Power, endanger, if not entirely subvert, the Rights and Immunities of those, who have thus unadvisedly raised him: And thereby establish a Tyranny upon them, (for if once the People are excluded the Legislature, and that they will soon be, when the force is removed out of their Hands, they have no security against the Insults of their Governours), and if therefore they, *viz.* The Governours use them Mercifully, they are in Truth obliged for it to them, (and not to the Constitution): And thus are Men Punished themselves, who have unrighteously thirsted, to Conquer and Enslave their Neighbours.

So Divinely just hath the Almighty ordered Human Affairs, that those Persons, that thus ungodlily put Yoaks upon the Necks of others, most certainly bring the same Servitude upon themselves, or their posterity. And those very Tyrants, that thus trample upon the Rights of a People, rarely go unpunished themselves, or if they Escape it, their posterity seldom enjoys the ill got Authority for many generations. It is true, these sorts of Punishments, make but slow progression, and therefore do not appear so Terrible, as to be observed; yet they are most certainly true, as might be shown from the *Græcians*, *Romans*, and I think from the Records, of all other known Nations.

It is true our *European* Popular Governments, do not seem to be befitted for Conquest, yet notwithstanding that it is most certain, there have been Governments, where the Legislature was in the People, that were so constituted, as to be adapted for enlarging Empire, as is particularly evident in that of the *Roman*, which arrived at mighty Dominions, by Conquering and Uniting with other Nations: Yet no happiness in the Laws of such Constitutions, (after once Empire is enlarged, and so mighty Wealth obtained), can secure such Governments; from being

being swallowed up in a Tyranny; by reason Conquered People must pay a Tribute, or someways contribute to the Wealth of the Conquerors; and Wealth will introduce Luxury, by which the Manners and Minds of Men, will be corrupted; for the Needy will Naturally lean to favour him, who abounds in Wealth, especially if he so uses it, as that they have an Advantage by him; and for that reason they will always encline to favour and approve his Proceedings; wherefore such a Person, can never want Commands, or places of Authority, when he aims at them; and then being once possessed of such, He will not want means whereby to continue, or enlarge them, and so gradually swallow up the Liberties of the Common Wealth. Besides in such Large and Flourishing Governments, there are often several, that are thus Great, Rich, and Popular; who persuing different or separate Ends, come to form different factions, by the help of which, the most Powerful tramples upon the others; and thereby as Head of that party, or faction, Establishes himself, first upon the Ruine of his Enemies, and at last in the Slavery of all, as happened in the *Roman* Common Wealth.

XXVI. Our *Saxon* Ancestors did not plant themselves in *Britain*, as hath been already proved, as a Colony, or as a People sent by a particular Government, that were to remain as a part, or dependent, and to acknowledge a subjection to that from whence they came; nor did they come as a mere Mercenary Army to Conquer the Country, that so it might be Govern'd as a Province of another Empire, that so by Tributes or Impositions collected from thence, the People who employed them might be enriched, as we see is done by all conquered Nations: But they came to Plant, Settle and Abide here, and to raise and frame *Polities* for themselves, that were independent, and acknowledged no Superiour; neither receiving Laws, paying Tributes, nor owning any Homage or Obedience to those People or Governments from whence they came. The Reason of which seems to be in that there was but little Wealth amongst those Northern People, whereby each Person was concerned in the Legislature; when therefore any Numbers had withdrawn from any of these bodies, there was no more Subjection or Obedience due from those who had thus withdrawn to those who continued in their former Habitations; than there was from them who remained, to those who departed, by reason they all had

had the same mutual Rights; so that there was no more of Duty remained to the one, than to the other: For it is not the Soil or the Country that makes Government, but the People or Inhabitants, for wheresoever they are, there is the Government; so that the People being thus divided, the Government likewise was. This perhaps may be thought new and strange Doctrine, yet this is not what was practised by our *Saxon* and Northern Ancestors only but also by the Holy Patriarchs themselves; for they also did divide and part Families, and so erected distinct and separate Governments; as their Numbers multiplied, and People and Flocks encreased. But the old *Saxons* not only permitted some of their Numbers to depart freely from them, but also when such that had thus deserted them, have any ways, (for want of Numbers or Assistance) been oppressed, distressed or endangered in the Countries where they settled, they have sent to, or suffered others to go to their assistance, and unite and remain with them: Not as mere Soldiers to fight for them, but to Plant and Inhabit with them; as is particularly evident from the several distinct Companies of both Sexes that come at different times into *Britain*; the like was performed in the Settlements upon the Continent, which were made by People living under the same kind of Government, altho' di-

stinguished by different Names, as *Goths, Vandals, Lombards, Franks, Normans* or *Huns*; for wherever any of these People settled, they erected separate and distinct Governments, without any manner of dependance, or subjection to those People from whom they departed; and which is very remarkable, all seem to have agreed in the same Common Model of *Government*, as may be evidently collected from what they left to their several Posterities in the different Countries they settled in, *viz. Italy, Spain, France* and *Africk*; which therefore may be concluded was somewhat conformable to what they had used in their own Native Countries: with this only difference, that being now in strange Places, where they had dispossessed the Inhabitants they were to maintain by Force what by their Valour they had obtained; for which reason the necessity of their Circumstances, as being in a State of War, obliged them to permit more Authority to their Leaders, than seems to have been enjoyed by their *Princes or Kings*, in times of Peace, during their Abode in their Native Countries. And this State of War remaining, by reason of the Natives whom they had excluded their Dwellings, and the Universal Hatred of the Neighbouring People, administered an occasion of continuing that Power in a single Person, and of consequence of introducing a greater Superiority

periority and difference amongst them, than what had been used in times of Peace at Home.

But this Military Authority that was at their first settling, so perfectly necessary for the security of what they had by violence seized, could not be continued, unless it was supported by a proportionable allowance of the Benefits that they had by their valour gained: It seems to be from this Reason, that we find in all the Governments instituted by these People, that their Leaders had Lands in some Proportion to their Authorities, or Commands, as appears by the Original Tenures; for it doth not appear they had any thing else, whereby they could Support, or Maintain, their Power and Dignity; by reason Personal Wealth in those early times, and amongst those Barbarous People, (for so the *Romans* called them), seems not to have been in much Use or Esteem: But however notwithstanding this unequal Division of the Soil, (as the Leaders having so great a part) yet the whole People seem to have so far Regarded their own security, as to reserve to themselves a share in the Legislature; (and that this might not be wrested out of their Hands), a property likewise in the Land; for without that,

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by their Conquest they must have lost their Liberty.

But to proceed to what relates to *Britain*: Our Ancestors, the Old *Saxons, Jutes, or Angles*, Arriving here, and having Conquered or Extirpated the old Inhabitants, do not seem by thus Changing their Country, to have departed from their Ancient Usage, of being consulted in matters of Moment, that relate to their Common Good, or Security: Altho' having been in an almost continued State of War, for many Years, the Necessity of their Affairs, obliged them to continue a Command or Authority, in a single Person, who was termed their King, or Leader: a War being scarcely to be managed without such a Power, by reason sudden Expeditions, which sometimes in such a State are necessary, are not well to be Executed, by slow Councils, and such they must be that are transacted in Publick Assemblies. And that this Authority might be supported, in which their safety depended, as being in continual Wars with the *Britains*, a Subordination of Tenure was instituted, by which their King or Leader was chief Lord, and so his Chief Officers to hold from him, as the People from them; all in some proportion to their Authorities: For in those early times those Northern Nations, had not so far applied

plied themselves to Trade, as thereby to procure a Personal Wealth, or at least had not such a proportion of such a Wealth, as to establish and raise a Government upon that; and their common Dangers, as being in a Strange Country, and environed with their Enemies, obliged them to Establish such a Government, as might be for their preservation.

And in the performing of that, the *Saxons* at their first settling here, Regarded these two things, *viz.*

First, That the whole Community, should be consulted in things of Moment, or if you please to express it in a modern Phrase, Should be concerned in the Legislature. And,

Secondly, That an Order and Oeconomy amongst them, should be Established upon Tenure, for in this alone, their Safety, and Preservation, in Regard of outward Danger, consisted.

The truth of the first appears, from the very Nature, and Foundation of our Constitution, for we find the whole People, who have or had any immediate property in the Soil, are and were consulted, either by themselves

selves, or proxies, in making Laws, and giving Money, and this hath been time immemorial; for I am not disputing whether the Commons of *England*, as now considered as a separate State, have always enjoyed the same Right, as they do at present; but all that I intend is, that those Persons who had a property in the Land, such as Anciently were the Thanes, Barons, or Great Men, had always a share in the Legislature; and that the entire property in the Land, was never absolutely in the Prince: For I take it to be clear, that the present form of *King, Lords, and Commons*, as now established, may be of much later date; for it is not to be imagined, but that *Political*, as well as *Natural Bodies*, must vary and change, and that they never do, or can continue in the same fixed or permanent State; but that they alter with the Circumstances of the People, or the Nature of the Times, as it is plain by several Instances, they have here in *England*: Yet the same Essentials of Governments may remain, altho' under different Modes and Appearances; as the same life may be continued, to a Natural Body, altho' that hath passed divers Vicissitudes and Changes, as we see it always does, from its Birth, to its Death; for all mundane things are under fluxions and Changes, there being nothing but the Almighty,

mighty that is unchangeable. That the whole Community were Assembled, and Consulted, in matters of Moment, by the Northern Nations, amongst which the *Saxons* are to be numbred, I think is without Controversie; and that this Usage was continued, I think is pretty clear, in that the People, (or at least some part of them) such who had the greatest share in the Lands, be they Thanes, Barons, or Freeholders, were likewise Consulted in making Laws; which appears evident by *fact*, and *reason*: By fact in that we find some Remains, in its being practised in the Hierarchy, The King and his Wives or Wisemen consenting to Laws; and in that the same Usage was continued, by the *Saxon*, and *Danish* Kings, after the whole Isle was reduced under one Government, and afterwards by the *Norman* Race, and in that there can be no certain time assigned of the beginning of this Usage, and therefore seems Coeval with the Government. From Reason, in that private properties were as well Secured, and continued, by the Nature of our Ancient Law, and Tenure, as the Regal One: Which could never have been, had not the People had a share in the Legislature; for in that Government, altho' the King was Chief Lord, and so *Escheats and Forfeitures* were to him, yet he could make no

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seizure of any Man's Estate by his Royal Authority, for it was the Law, and not the King, that was to determine such. Nay farther, the life of the King was only valued, like other Mens, in proportion to his great dignity: a Pregnant Proof that the People, or some part of them, were concerned in the ordering that Law, since the King had no other security for his Person, but in proportion to his Authority, than the Peasant. Nay farther, the then State of the Kingdom rendered it impossible for the Prince to Rule Arbitrarily, for altho' the chief Administration of both Civil and Military Affairs was in the King's hands: Yet it not being the Usage of those times to hire a *Militia*, or to have a *Mercenary Force*, (as being perhaps inconsistent with those Northern Governments, where the People had a right to consent to Laws) or that they really wanted a Personal Wealth to maintain stipendiaries: certain it is, the Forces of those times, and these People were composed of such as had the Land; for which reason the Soldiers were unfit to be the Instruments of Arbitrary Rule, since by that they must have brought a Tyranny upon themselves, and made their Lands, or Property to be held at the *Princes Pleasure*. The *Princes* then in those early times, wanting a Mercenary force, could not easily attain a Tyranny,

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for the very Force or Power that supported his Authority, would not be used to Enslave themselves, for it was they who had the Land. This reason alone, I take to be an undeniable Proof, that the Ancient Kings here, could never enjoy a despotical Power.

As to the second, that Order and Government, amongst these People, when settled here, was Established upon Tenure, is I think most evident, in that there not being then a Personal Wealth, or at least that was not used to Establish a force; (and no Government can subsist without that, for Laws without Enforcements are but good Advice) It is plain there was nothing else whereon to found it: And besides we find, it was, what was practised by those Nations, wheresoever they settled: And not only so, but here in *England*, the Lands were Anciently, obliged to find defensible Men, in case of an Enemy or Danger, which indeed was all that our Ancestors seemed to have aimed at, *viz.* The preservation of themselves, from outward Enemies; for our primitive Constitution, doth not appear to have been Calculated, for the Oppression of others, by the Enlarging Empire, but merely to secure themselves, in what they had gained, their *Polity*, having made Provision

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vision for defence, but none for Conquest, as shall be proved hereafter; from which we may conclude, that the Ambition of Conquering, and enslaving others, only to aggrandise themselves did not so early enter into the Hearts of these People, as for them, to besit their new Erected *Polities*, for such Tyrannical Ends; the utmost of their Wisdom seems to have been, in contriving such Models of Government, as being all concerned in, they might equally endeavour to defend themselves, without any regard to the Conquering or Oppressing of others. For Luxury, Thirst after Empire, and desire of Rule, with all their Attendants of Cruelty, Villany, and Inhumanity, do not seem to have harboured in the Thoughts, of these Innocent and Unpolished People, the utmost of whose desires, do not appear to have extended much beyond the obtaining the Necessaries of Life; until such time as breaking through like a Torrent into the *Roman* Empire, and fixing their dwellings in the Seats of Debauchery, and Profusiveness, (Vices inseparable, from Wealth and Empire, which the *Romans* enjoyed), and intermixing with a People softened with such Corruptions, as having long wantoned in affluence, these Northern People, gradually became forgetful of their former Virtues, and grew pleased with the Vices, and delight-

ed with the Extravagant follies, of their Conquered, and Effeminated Enemies; for the Circumstances of these Northern Nations, before the removal out of their own Countries, did not admit of such Luxuries, and Vanities, as were practised, and used by the *Romans*: But when once removed out of their Native Soil, and planted in more fruitful Regions, and intermixing with (comparatively speaking to themselves) a Luxurious People, become pleased with their manners, and Poisoned with their Vices, and so gradually fell into all the Follies and Vanities, that had occasioned the Ruine of those very People, whom they had thus Conquered: as appears by what hath been since practised, by the several Nations of *Europe*, that are derived from them, for Savage Cruelty, Bloody Revenge, Insatiable Ambition, Thirst after Empire, and Desire of Enslaving others, only to aggrandise themselves, had not enter'd amongst them, until leaving their Countries, their former simplicity, and Ancient Virtues also left them; for being then Seated in the *Roman* Countries, they became defiled with the *Roman* Vices, and were for imitating and pursuing *Roman* Measures; for now like them, they gradually come to aspire after Dominion, and grasp at Empire, endeavouring to enlarge their Territories, by Subjugating and Enslaving

ving others; like them endeavouring to reduce Countries into Provinces, and to bring Kingdoms under their Government, by that means to encrease their Wealth and Power; And as these things, (that are termed Acts of Greatness, and are Blazoned by Historians, as perfections in particular People) succeeded, so likewise did all the Effects of these; for differences, in the Qualities, Dignities, and Authority of Men, did multiply, and greater Inequalities, in the Fortunes, Estates, and Wealth, of particular Men arise; a Multitude of new Offices and Commands must be instituted, and glittering Titles of Honour Created, and variety of Marks of distinction Invented, for those things will keep Pace with Empire, as being in truth but Natural Effects of that; as is evident, from the very Nature of Government, and hath been always confirmed by the Practices of Men; as might be instanced in the *Roman* Common Wealth, where Offices and Dignities, Multiplied as Empire Encreased: And thus the same thing happend in the several Governments, of these Northern People, for when once they fell into the same designs, of extending their Dominions, and encreasing their Wealth, they likewise soon became Poysoned with the same Vanities, Vices and Follies.

XXVII. And

XXVII. And then these People beginning and establishing their new Governments, under Leaders, Princes, or Kings, (or as it hath been observed) the necessity of their Affairs required such a Command or Authority, having gained, and so were to maintain their new Dwellings by the Sword; or in that, such a Government is most simple and natural, or from some other unknown reasons; for it matters not from whence it was derived, or from what occasioned, since it is certain, so it was; that in all their Progressions, Conquests, and Invasions, there was always some one, who had a Preeminence, Authority, or Command; and accordingly in all their Settlements, had some Prerogatives, or Privileges above the rest, and larger proportions of Land assigned, or Duties, Services, or Revenues annexed, whereby that Authority was to be supported; as may be observed in the Countries where they settled by the Royal Demesns, or by the Services or Duties arising from the Tenure of the Lands: And these gradually increasing, as Wealth and Dominions enlarged, still promoted a greater dependance upon their *Prince or King*; by reason his Wealth and Power proportionably enlarging with the Territories and number of People, he must of course have greater opportunities to oblige more Persons; as having more Wealth to bestow, or expend, and more Offices, Places and

Commands to dispose of, and more Honours and Dignities to confer, (by all which Men in Community are to be obliged) than when his Dominions were narrow and scanty: For which reason Empire once encreased, more Persons look up to the Throne, as expecting Preferments from the Crown, in that he is then enabled to reward them; and accordingly more will endeavour to oblige the Prince, that so by deserving his favour, they may obtain what they desire. It hath been from this reason, *viz.* that these People after their first Settlements, always endeavouring to enlarge their Territories, have continually administered opportunities of enlarging the Power and Authority of their Kings: Whereby it hath come to pass, that in those Countries where there hath been a Succession of wise or crafty Princes, they have insensibly swallowed the Peoples Rights, and that by their own Concurrence: It is true, the Empires that were heretofore raised by those *Northern* People, have been of no long continuance, as might be instanced in those established in *Italy, France, and Germany*, for being of monstrous Birth and unnatural Growths, as really wanting a Foundation, in that being planted upon Tenure, in which the People had an Hereditary Property, they could not continue under the management of a single Person exclusive to the People; as

Imperium unum non potest esse in multis locis a

a Remedy for this inconveniency in those Countries, where the Royal Power was greatly enlarged, Princes the better to support this violent and ill-gotten Power were always obliged to depart from so much of their Authority, either to the Church, or to some great and *Popular Men*, as a means to induce such to be hearty Instruments to defend, and help to preserve their new acquired Powers, for they wanted other means to do it; by which very Expedient, the Princes themselves, or their immediate Posterity, have been endangered or ruined: For the Church, and these great Men thus increased in Wealth and Authority, broke those very Empires they were raised to defend; as may be observed from the several Proceedings of the *Popes*, in their disputes with the *Emperours*, and by the fatal Consequences that did ensue, upon the Erection of the *Hereditary Counts, Dukes, Princes, &c.* who soon came to oppose that very Authority that made them.

And this Observation, methinks administers an occasion of taking a short and general view of the diversity of Turns and Changes that have interchangeably succeeded in the Natures and Forms of Governments. Wherefoever we have any Records of the Origin and Beginnings of Empire, we may plainly perceive, that the Authority of the Prince,

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where there hath been one continued, hath gradually encreased with his Dominions; and that after a long process of Years, when such Empires are grown too big and too weildy to be manag'd: (for a weak Prince, or a depraved Ministry will soon disorder the regular Motions of that vast Machine, supposing there was no natural Defects or Monstrosities in its Formation) and thereby Diseases, Discontents, Irregularities and Confusions have entered, then this great Leviathan breaks: And out of his Bowels issues or arises a numerous swarm of other Governments; for Men having tasted the bitter effects of an unbounded Power, lodged or enjoyed by a single Person, for the very dissolution of Empire, or Changes, or Revolutions in Government, by which new Polities are framed, are not to be made, without great Sufferings to the People; (supposing the cruel Tempers, or bloody Natures, or impolitick Proceedings of the Prince, or his Creatures, had not otherwise produced them) and Men will naturally dislike whatsoever hath been grievous to them: Wherefore new Governments that are thus formed, or grow, or arise out of the Ruins of these large and decayed great Ones, are at first, for the most part, contrived for the safety and advantage of the People; for this reason, either Common-wealths, or mixed Governments, in which the People have

a share in the Legislature, have always sprung out of the Ruins of large and despotick Empires; I speak not where such have been destroyed by Conquests; but where they have been dissolved or broke by intestine divisions, or at least where such have contributed towards it: For Common-wealths (I intend such, that are so exquisitely formed, that do not give an opportunity to any of their Members to usurp such an Authority, as thereby to be impowered to oppress others) seem to be Governments of a later Birth than those, where a trust is reposed in a single Person, and seem only to be contrived as a Remedy against the inconveniences that were felt by the former: As I think may be inferred from the occasions and manner of their several Institutions in *Greece*, and *Rome*, and by that of the *Hebrews* under *Moses*: (for altho' that had a Divine Authority) yet the Sufferings in *Egypt* seem to have befitted the People for it, as may be collected from *Jethro's* advice to his Son-in-Law: the same may be said of the *Venetian*, *Florentine*, and other petty *Italian* Common-wealths, as likewise of that of the *United Provinces*; all which seem to have been formed as Remedies against the Sufferings, the People had undergone, by the means of Monarchical or Tyrannical Governments: And as these Governments, that thus spring out of the Ruins of an overgrown Monarchy, are
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at first calculated for the safety and advantage of the Community; so if afterwards they are possessed with the folly or phrensy of enlarging their Dominions, they do inevitably fall into a Tyranny; as hath happened to the *Græcian* and *Roman* Common-wealths, and to some of our Modern Europeans: For such is the natural frailty of Man, as to be pleased with Sycophantry, and such is the fate of *Monarchs*, that they shall never want it; for there will be Men in all Ages, who will always endeavour to raise themselves, by pleasing their *Prince*, by reason it is by his favour that they are to ascend to Honour: For which cause, the Persons of Kings have been bedaubed with the most fulsome Flatteries, having been represented as Gods, their Pedigrees being made Divine, and their Genealogies Sacred, being perhaps said to be begotten by *Jupiter*, or to be descended from *Hercules*, or at least some other Deity: and they themselves after a pretended *Apotheosis*, are to be worshipped as Gods; nay such hath been the madness and phrensy of Men, as in their life-times to adore their Statues, as imagining somewhat Divine in the Prototype, which perhaps they were not permitted to see. It is true, Christianity hath rooted out these enormous Impieties, as being inconsistent with its pure and sacred Doctrines: Yet some Christians have by their Opinions made it appear

appear, that they will not be out-done in Loyalty, or rather Flattery by the old Heathens; for they, (that the Throne of Kings might be firmly established) have lately broach'd a new, and formerly unheard of Doctrine, that doth effectually answer, what the ancient Pagans had ridiculously taught; for it being contrary to the Laws of Christ, to acknowledge such Gross and Idolatrous Opinions, as that Kings are of the immediate Off-spring of the Gods; and it being inconsistent with our Religion, to perform such irreligious and superstitious Worship to *Princes* as they did; These have found out a secret, whereby to reconcile their Loyalty and Religion, and so not be out-done by the Heathens; by which Expedient they are enabled to oblige their Prince, and yet not disobey their God; for notwithstanding, they dare not derive the Race of Kings (like them) from Heaven, nor place their Persons amongst the number of their Deities, yet that they might some way equal them, they have proved that their Commissions are sent by the Almighty, and their Authority comes from above; for they affirm, that the *Civil Office of a King is of Divine Right*. And Princes cannot be displeas'd with such excellent Doctrine, that countenances whatsoever they have a mind to do, with the Warrant of a Divine Commission, which being superiour to all Human

Human Laws, it is plain by that, a Prince can never be limited, bounded, or circumscribed. Most Heavenly Doctrines! and what without doubt, would have had the approbation of a *Caigula, Nero or Domitian*, or of the worst, and cruellest of the *Roman Tyrants*; Had the Primitive Christians been Masters but of this Secret, they might have won the Heathen Emperours to their side, and so have avoided Persecution; for those bloody Tyrants might have used their Religion then as well as their Numbers, for the punishing and torturing others. But alas, this Divine Doctrine was reserved for this Age, they poor Souls must suffer, because they could not by their Religion warrant Wickedness. Oh horrid Impiety! that ever Men, who believe in Christ, should dare to affirm, that the Almighty hath created his own Image Man, to be the sport and pastime, the miserable Diversion and bloody Entertainment of his fellow Creature, who is in all things like himself.

1. *The Saxons founded their Government upon Tenure; reserved a Property and Power to themselves, proved. Monarchy established but two ways.*
2. *The English Saxon Kings no Absolute Monarchy, farther proved.*
3. *Saxon Kings had large Authority. Opinions concerning the Succession. People, what.*
4. *English Laws of two sorts; viz. Statute and Common. Succession alter'd by the first. The Reason. Supreme Authority not bounded.*
5. *The Succession before the Norman Conquest, and for some time after, how made; not by Election, proved; nor by Lineal Descent. The Great Men declared the Prince performed Homage. No Natural Allegiance perfected the Constitution.*
7. *The Legislature could legitimate former Proceedings. Manner of Succession very different. Arguments from Precedents, trifling, proved.*
8. *Civil Rights alterable, proved.*
9. *God hath not determined the Rights of Kings, dangerous to argue from Examples even in the Sacred Text.*

BUT altho' the Saxons, at their first settling in Britain, conceded such a Proportion of the Lands, or such Duties, Revenues, or Services, to their Chief Leader, Prince, or King, as were suitable to that Trust, Authority, or Preheminence he had in the Community;

munity; yet they reserved likewise so much to themselves, as plainly demonstrated they did not intend to give up all Power and Authority into his hand; in that they took as much Care to secure their own private Possessions, as they did what was their Kings. For both were settled and bounded by the same Laws; which neither of them could immediately violate, by reason of that Division of the Force in that Constitution. And in these Proceedings, they plainly shewed the Prudence and Foresight of a wise People; for they so poised things in the Distribution of the Force, that the Government might be preserved, and yet the Prince have no Opportunity to become a Tyrant: For Government, as hath been proved, implying or making a Difference in the Fortunes and Circumstances of Men, and these People founding theirs upon Land; it is plain, the making or continuing an Order and Government amongst them, in which their very Safety consisted, must induce them to form a *Subordination of Tenure*; by reason it was by that, an Oeconomy was to be continued: For had they not ordained such a *Subordination in Tenure, and annexed Services to the Land*, their Constitution must have been maimed and imperfect, in that there then had been no Provision for mutual Defence against common Danger. And that these Services that respected mutual Defence, and publick Safety, which, were thus annexed to the Land, might be

be orderly and regularly managed and employed, it was necessary there should be some first of chief Power, which should have Authority to summon or call the Members together; whensoever Danger, or the Exigency of their Affairs, required it. And that this might be the more readily performed, there was a sort of Scale of Ascend established in Tenure; whereby the King, or Prince, as First and Chief Lord, might communicate the Reason, or give the Summons to the next great and immediate Officers, Thanes, or principal Tenants; and they still on to their subordinate ones; that so the whole People, or Force, might be raised. But that the Prince, by this Prerogative, might not have an Opportunity of engrossing the Power of the Community into his own hands, or might not harass them with Services, when there was no Occasion, or might not impose more upon them than was necessary for their Safety: All the Duties and Services, that were annexed to the Land, were ascertained; so that the Prince might not, neither could he, encrease or violate them; by reason, if he should have a Will, yet he wanted a Power whereby to do it, as having no Force, but what was thus founded upon the Lands; so that he must have used the People to have enslaved themselves. The Truth of these things appears, if it be considered, that the Lands were, before the Norman Conquest, liable to what was call'd the

Trinoda Necessitas, amongst which, the finding defensible Men, was one: Which had been superfluous, had the Prince had an Authority to have enjoined what he pleased.

2dly, In that the Vassal owed Homage, and promised Fealty to his immediate Lord; as is most clear from King *Edmund's* Laws, which require an Oath from all Persons to the King, in the same manner as they did it to their Lords; which therefore was more ancient than that to the King.

3dly, In that all Matters of Moment were transacted in their *Gemotts*, or Publick Assemblies, which came to be multiplied, and made subordinate to each other, as their Dominions enlarged, or People encreased: Which Proceedings could never have been continued, had the Prince possessed unbounden Power; by reason the treating of Publick Affairs in such Assemblies, is inconsistent with an Arbitrary Authority. And that this was so, is evident from their *Fribourgs*, to their *Hundred and County Courts*, and so on.

4thly, In that the People, or at least some part of them, had a Property in the Land, before the *Norman Conquest*: And no Records give us any Account of its being a Grant from the Prince, or indeed assigning any Beginning of it; and therefore seems to be coeval, or at least grown up with the Government.

5thly, In that there was a certain

5thly, In that there was *Boeland*, which was *Allodial*; no Services being to be imposed without the Consent of the Proprietor.

6thly, In that which was termed *Folkland*, the Tenant was obliged to his Lord, and so was at his Command.

7thly, In that the Life of the Prince was only valued, in proportion to his Dignity, like other Mens; there being a sort of Scale of Valuation, arising from the Villain to the Prince, which encreased according to their Qualities.

8thly, And certainly in that it is an Absurdity to affirm, that an Absolute Monarchy; that is, that an Arbitrary and Despotical Power, can, or ever did subsist, but where it was so founded, that all Authority was entirely in the Prince: which cannot be conceived to be, but by one of these two Methods:

First, Either where the Prince is absolute Lord, or Sovereign Proprietor of all the Land in his Dominions; as we see it is in the *Orroman*, and all the Oriental Monarchies: Or at least hath such a Share of them, as he may be enabled, by the Means of his own Vassals, or Tenants, who are dependant upon him, to over-balance the other People, and so to rule them at pleasure. Or,

Secondly, Where he some way possesses so large Revenues, be it from his own Land, or be it by Tributes, or other Impositions, that he is thereby impower'd to maintain a

standing, mercenary Milice; which being entirely dependant upon him, are separated from the Interest of the People, and so may be used to govern them, as the Prince pleases. Neither of which the Saxon Princes enjoyed, and therefore could not be Arbitrary.

The Truth of these two Propositions will evidently appear, if we do but consider, that a Law without an Enforcement, that is, a Power of obliging to Obedience, is at the best but good Advice. For if he that gives Laws, hath not a Force to oblige Men to submit to what he commands, they will be at liberty to obey, or not. And a Force whereby to perform this, is not to be established upon a single Person, except he enjoy somewhat whereby to oblige Men to do as he commands. Which is not to be done, for Reasons formerly assigned, unless he can some ways pay or maintain them. And that is not to be effected, but by one of the two above-mentioned ways, viz. either by Land, or Money.

It is, I affirm, but by one of these two ways, that a Prince can support himself in an arbitrary and despotical Authority. For notwithstanding some Men have asserted otherwise, by saying, that such an Authority may be supported by a Nobility, I humbly affirm, with all submission to such Opinions, that if by Monarchy they understand an absolute and uncontroulable Power in a single Person, I say,

it cannot, nor ever did subsist by a Nobility. The Reason of which is obvious; for altho' a Nobility may skreen the Prince from the Insults of the People, and may readily join with him, in enslaving and tyrannizing upon them: Yet then, what hath the Prince to defend himself against these Nobles? For these having an Hereditary Property, will not willingly depart from it; and then having a Force, by virtue of their Tenants and Vassals, are by that means in a Condition to oppose the Prince, whenever they dislike his Proceedings. So that altho' the Prince may be secured, by them, against the Commonality; yet still, in respect of these great Men, his Power is so far from being absolute, that it is very precarious: And this great Inconveniency in our ancient Government, being observed by that wise Prince Henry the Seventh, occasioned him to pursue such Measures, as thereby to break the exorbitant Power of the Nobility; by reason his Predecessors had been often endangered by them.

But if by a Monarchy they only intend such a subordination of Persons, and Estates, that seem to center a Power and Superiority in a single Person; whereby he hath the chief Administration of Publick Affairs, such as are executing Laws, convening the Legislature, and perhaps presiding or sharing in it, and using the Force of the Community, (which, by the by, being founded upon the Land, can never be

used to the Oppression of those who have the Land) neither is it to be raised or continued in Service, but as the Law directs: Yet the Nobility, that is such who have the Land, are to be consulted, and must consent to the making Laws: Then, I say, I acknowledge, that a Monarchy, in that sense, hath formerly, and now is supported by a Nobility. But then I averr, the supreme Power is not entirely lodged in a single Person; by reason the Nobility, or Proprietors in the Land, have a part in the Legislature, which is ultimately and properly the supreme Authority; and so the Prince is not Absolute: For in these Constitutions, altho' the Nobility may join with the Prince, in oppressing and tyrannizing upon the Commonality, as we see is done in Poland; yet they will not permit the Prince to invade or trample upon their own Rights.

II. The English Saxon Kings then never having enjoyed an absolute and sovereign Property in the Lands, nor a separate one, in such a part of them, as thereby to keep such a Number of People dependant upon them, as to be enabled to over-balance the other Proprietors, and so, by their Assistance, to rule Arbitrarily; nor having Rents, Profits, Tributes, Impositions, or Revenues, that could empower them to maintain a Stipendiary Milice, that being perfectly dependant upon them, might support them in such an absolute State,

as

as to rule as they pleased. For as it is evident from Fact, they never did, so it is clear from the Nature of that Government, that they never could, exercise such an arbitrary, absolute, and uncontrolable Power, as some Moderns seem to have assign'd them. Further, that the first of these two ways of supporting an absolute Power in a single Person, was never used by the Saxons, is pretty evident by that known Maxim of the Common Law, That no Man is to be outed of his Freehold: And that Services annexed to Tenure, were ascertained, and could not be alter'd, but by Consent. Neither could the second, in that Tributes, Gabells, Excises, or other Impositions, were not known or used by those People, they having gradually crept in amongst their Posterity, since Tenure hath been alter'd. Nay, as a farther Proof, had all the Lands in England been originally in the Crown, they could not have been alienated, but by Force, Compact, or Grant; which being a thing of such Moment, it is probable History, or Records, would have gave some Account of it, which it's plain they do not, but take notice of such things as imply Property in the People, by the different Customs and Usages that attended Tenure. All which are Proofs, that the Saxon Princes were never Proprietors of the Soil. It is the Government must precede Records; and for that reason, the Origin of such are usually dark and uncertain: Yet such things of moment,

moment, as the transferring the Land to the People from the Prince, whether by Compact, Grant, or Force, being also subsequent to the beginning of Government, could scarcely have escaped the recording, especially when things of this moment have been remembered.

Thus far being premised of the Nature of our Ancient Saxon Government; in which hath been proved, by the Proceedings of those People, the Truth of what before I had laid down; That Power, in all Governments, is inseparable from Property. And that, in our Ancient Constitution, the People, or at least a part of them, have always had a Property here; and, as a natural Effect of that, a Share in the Legislative Authority. And that the old Saxon Kings never were, nor in truth ever could be, Absolute and Despotical Monarchs; in that they never had either Personal Wealth, or Land, whereby it is to be maintained.

III. But notwithstanding the Saxon Government here in England, was not Absolute and Arbitrary, yet it is certain there was a notable Power or Authority lodged in a single Person, who was the Head or Chief in the Constitution, and he was called King: Our Enquiry now shall be, How the Succession to this Kingly Authority, thus entrusted in a single Person, who was the Head and Soul of the Polity, was continued. This is a Subject that hath been warmly and differently hand-

handled by Learned Men: Some affirm, that a Lineal Succession, or a Hereditary Descent, had always been observed, unless when Force or Violence interposed. And the Assertors of this Doctrine affirm, that this is most agreeable to Nature, Reason, and the Civil Constitution: For it is but natural, they argue, that the Son should succeed the Father; and but reasonable, that the Elder should be preferred, as having the Right of Primogeniture, and also most Experience and Ability to perform so great a Trust. And that the Nature of the Constitution, which could not subsist without a Head, do's require the ascertaining the Succession; for without that, it must have been imperfect; by reason Disorders and Confusions must have attended every Death; and that therefore it is not to be imagined that so excellent a Constitution should have permitted so material a Point: Besides the Law expressly favours a Lineal Succession; which is evident, in that the Eldest Sons inherit in most private Estates. And altho' the Defenders of this Doctrine are obliged to acknowledge, (the Fact being so very certain) that this Lineal Succession hath been frequently interrupted; yet they say, this hath been done by unrighteous and unjustifiable Methods.

There are others, who being convinced by the often Interruptions in the Succession, (for this Lineal Descent hath never continued for many Generations) recede from the former Opinion;

Opinion; and averr, that the Regnant Prince had a Right, or Power, to dispose of the Succession as he pleased; and to confirm this, produce Instances where it was done, and so draw their Conclusion from Fact to Right.

Whilst others not only deny, that the Succession was Lineally continued; but also, that the Prince in Possession had any Right or Power, of himself, to dispose of the Succession; but that whosoever succeeded to the Crown, was more obliged to the Election, or Approbation of the great Men, or People, than to any antecedent Hereditary Right, or to the Donation, or Will, of the last Prince. And this Opinion they endeavour to fortifie by the concurrent Practices of those early Times; where the People are often observed to interpose in the Succession, and to have sometimes preferred those to the Throne, who could have no other Claim than their Suffrages or Choice, so intricate, and indeed perplexed, hath the Succession really been, as thereby to give an Occasion of such Diversity of Opinions about it. But I shall leave these Gentlemen groveling thus in Uncertainty, to defend their own Doctrines; and shall proceed to what I intend; which is, to demonstrate how really it was. But before I do that, it may not be improper, to prevent Mistakes that may arise by Words, to declare in what Sense I shall understand the word *People*. I shall take it therefore to import, either the whole Collective Body of the
Community,

Community, or any Part or Number of them, that either by virtue of Choice, or some other Privileges, are considered as a part of the Constitution or Government, separate and distinct from the *Prince*, or *King*; (this I do, by reason, in those early Times, Lords and Commons were not, as now, distinguished) and when assembled, acting without any immediate Authority derived from him: As it is evident they do, when they are making Laws. For notwithstanding we should concede that their *Gemotts* were convened by the Royal Summons; yet it is evident, the Authority they there exercise, is either from themselves, or whom they represent.

I must likewise beg leave to remind my Reader of what hath been already proved, That Right, or Claim, presupposes Law, as being indeed, founded upon that: And that Laws are of two sorts, *viz.* either Divine, or Human; and that Rights may be derived from either of these. And how that there can be no Law, without some Enforcement, which is befit to the Nature of the Laws: That the Enforcements to God's Laws, are future Rewards or Punishments, which he can and will inflict; and to Man's Laws are Temporary ones, which the Legislative Authority have Power to execute; and that these are of two sorts, either Corporal, or Pecuniary; that is, such as either affect the Body, or Estate: That what then can entitle any Person to any
Claim,

Claim, or Right, to any thing, is either from a Divine or Human Law. And having proved, that the Claim, or Right, to Succession, to any Estate, Office, Trust, Honour, or Dignity, is a Civil Right, and so only derived from the municipal Laws of particular People. I shall now proceed to prove what these last Laws have, in this our Britain, determined of this Matter; and then shew, by Reasons drawn from the Nature of Government, why there hath been such a Diversity of Methods observed and practised by our Ancestors in this Affair, as it is evident, by several notorious Instances, there hath been

IV. But to do this, that it may be the better comprehended, it must be premised, that our Municipal Laws are of two sorts, viz. either Written, or Traditional; or, if you please, Statute and Common Law. The First are the known declared Will of the Legislative Authority; and therefore directly, and of themselves, have the Force of Laws.

The Second have the Force of Laws, by Consent, Custom, and Ancient Usage; for the determinate Time of their beginning, is not known, and therefore may be as ancient as the Constitution. These have the Force of Laws not directly as the former, but, in that having been used and continued without Interruption, they are taken for the presumed Will of the Legislature; because that Authority not forbidding

bidding their use, do's by that seem to approve them. For that is, what gives the Force of Laws to Common Customs, and Ancient Usages, in that being continued Time far exceeding the Memory of Man, they are presumed to be the Will of the Supreme Authority, who otherwise would not permit their Continuance.

By the first of these, viz. the Statute Law, the Succession to the Crown of England, hath frequently, since the Norman Conquest, been limited and altered, Successors having been made, or declared, who could have no Pretence of Right by Lineal Descent. This is too bright a Truth to be denied, there being so many several Statutes, or Laws, to be produced, to confirm it. The Fact then being unquestionable, the Question, if any concerns the Right, or the Authority of them that did it, that is, of the Legislature; that is, what they had to do to intermeddle with the Succession?

And this Question seems to bear a double Respect; One, as it concerns the Persons acting in the Legislature, who being under no Laws, but those of Heaven, are only answerable to the Almighty for their Proceedings. The other, as it regards the Mass of People, who being to obey, and not dispute the Acts of the Legislature, are therefore obliged to submit to what they do, unless they require, or enjoin what is repugnant to the Laws of

of God: And the Persons who are not concerned in the Legislature, are not answerable for what they do that are; the Almighty, before whom this Cause will lie, being too Merciful and Just, to punish one Man for the Sins of another.

However, it not appearing that God hath directly determined the Succession of Princes, as hath been already proved, it is plain, it is left to the Discretion of Men. But waving this, as not designing to assume the Person of a **Consultor**: Methinks this Question carries its own Answer, for it being concerning a Civil Right, and so derived from the Civil Law, and such Laws being alterable, such Rights must likewise be so: For the Civil Laws of Countries, being only the declared Will of the Supreme Authority; and it being an Absurdity to affirm the Supreme Authority can be restrained, or limited; for if it could, it was not Supreme; so then Laws, that are only the Will of that Authority, may be changed, or altered, as that Authority pleases. And then a Claim, Right, or Due, that becomes so by virtue of a Law, can no longer continue so, than that Law that made it: That Law then being repealed, or abrogated, the Claim, Right, or Due, that arose by that Law, must likewise be null'd and vacated: For it is trifling to imagine, that what was once a Right, by virtue of a Human Law, must for ever remain so, since Human Laws themselves are alterable:
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For such being, as I have said, but the declared Will of the Supreme Authority, and a Government amongst Men requiring such an Authority; whensoever that Authority vacates any of its former Acts, or Laws, they then cease to be so; and that Authority not being to be bounded, may alter or change them, as it judges it meet or expedient. Neither is it to be limited, or tied up, by any Precedents of the same Authority in former Ages, by reason the Present hath, and the Future will have, the same Power and Privileges the Former had; and all of them, in their several times, Supreme; that is, under no Restraint, but at Liberty to act at Discretion. It is true, this being a Trust those Persons acting in, ought, in all their Proceedings, to regard the Safety, Good, and Welfare of the Community, by whom they are entrusted; however, they are accountable to no Earthly, altho' they may be to the Heavenly, Tribunal.

And this altering the Succession, is no more than what is daily practised in other things; in that the Legislative Authority do often alter and cancel Laws, when they are inconvenient, and perhaps enact others of very different Natures: And if this was not done, it seems impossible that the Peace of Society could be long preserved; for if the Supreme Authority, which is as the Soul of the Body Politick, and is entrusted to judge for it, and to take Care of its Welfare and Preservation, could not alter and

change its Measures, according to Circumstances and Accidents; its Health, and indeed its Subsistence, must be frequently endangered, by reason no Human Prudence can foresee all things that may hereafter occur, and therefore cannot make Provisions against Mischiefs that were not known.

To apply this to our present Case: If the Supreme Authority do by any Law, alter, limit, or change the Succession, that Person, or Persons, who had any Right, or Claim, before this new Law, whether by virtue of any Custom, Usage, or Law, (for Custom, or Usage, for the Reasons already urged, may give a Claim or Right) can have now none; by reason what did entitle him or them to any such Claim, or Right, is altered, abrogated, or repealed; as it is certain every such is, by a subsequent contrary Law, be it made for repealing the whole Law, Custom, or Usage; or be it only for the annulling a part of it, or suspending it for a time, or against this Person; the Law, Custom, or Usage, in all other things, remaining in Force. The Right, or Claim, that was legal and good, before this new Law, is now, by virtue of this, vacated and nulled, as if it had never been; and then there can be no ground for any such Right or Claim.

But notwithstanding it is evident, by Fact, and Reason, that the Supreme Power hath an undoubted Authority, to alter, change, annul,

annul, or repeal, any Law, Custom, or Usage, and of Consequence, of any Right, Claim, or Due, arising or proceeding from any such; and that the Succession to the Imperial Crown of *England*, is a Civil Right, and hath accordingly been limited and altered several times since the *Norman* Conquest, by the King, Lords, and Commons, who are with us the Legislature: Yet still there remains a difficult Question, *viz.* How the Vacancy of the Throne, upon the Death of a Prince, was filled, before that Conquest, or indeed for some time after? Since all the Historians of those Times are unanimous in this, (altho' they may differ in other Matters) that the Succession was not always continued in the Lineal Descent, but did often undergo great Interruptions; Sons not having succeeded Fathers, nor the Eldest regularly preferred before the Younger; but sometimes a Brother, Uncle, or Nephew, nay an illegitimate Son hath filled the Throne: And this hath not been performed by Accident, or by reason of any Natural or Personal Defects, (such as Phrensie, Lunacy, or Infancy, Stupidity, or Idiotsim, nor by reason of their Absence) but it hath been practised, where there hath been no such Reasons to justify their Proceedings. Neither will the Accounts of those Times countenance an Opinion, that such Exclusions were made by the Consent of the whole Legislature, (as it hath been since the Conquest) there being the Remains of no Law to war-

rant it: Neither was it practicable to be done by that Authority, since the Prince, or King, who is by the Constitution a part of that Authority, was dead, before the Changes or Alterations in the Succession were made.

This, perhaps, is what hath englined some Learned Men to believe, that this Kingdom, in the English Saxon Times, and for some Generations after the Norman Conquest, was Elective. But that our Ancestors had that Regard to the Royal Family, as most usually to fill the vacant Throne out of the Progeny of the former Kings.

By this Hypothesis they propose to solve all the Difficulties, and reconcile all the Doubts that relate either to Fact, or Reason, that concern the Succession, viz. as well where it hath continued in a direct Line, as when it hath been interrupted. And besides, this wants not Probabilities to support it, in that there have been Elective Kingdoms of the Gothic Foundation: And in that the Succession hath been continued for some Generations in the same House, and most usually in the Eldest Branch, in such Governments, as may be instanced in the House of Austria to the Empire, and that of Oldenburg to Denmark, and so formerly in that of Sweden and Hungary. But notwithstanding these specious and promising Probabilities, to support this Opinion, yet I think it is most certain, this Kingdom was never purely Elective.

First,

First, In that the Government was founded upon Tenure, which rose by Steps of Ascent from the Vassal, or inferior Tenant, to the Thane, or Lord, and so on, until it ultimately centred in the Prince, as First and Chief Lord, and the Lands held by this Tenure, descended, undivided, in a right Line. Whereas the Other was equally divided between the Male Issue, and therefore, in all likelihood, the same Descent was observed, in what belonged to the Prince, or Chief Lord. It matters not to my Purpose, how this Difference in the Nature of Tenure arose, whether with, or, as I rather suppose, by degrees, after the settling the Government.

Secondly, In that the Constitution being founded upon Tenure, the very Nature of it required a Prince, or Head. And a Lineal Succession seems most likely to have been instituted, by reason it was most used, there being more of such Descents than Interruptions. And what makes it more probable, is, that a Hereditary Descent was what was observed by the Thanes, who had this Land, the Eldest Son always succeeding the Father. As appears confirmed by King Canute's Laws, which ordain the Heriot, that was to be paid by the Heir of those who had this Land, which could not have been so expressed, if it had been divided, or the Heir not known. Besides, the same manner of Succession seems to have been

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in use in most of the neighbouring Nations, whose Governments resembled ours.

Thirdly, and most certainly, in that the Constitution must have been maimed and imperfect had the Kingdom been purely Elective; In that it had made no Provision for a solemn Convention of the People, or at least the great Men, at any Death, whereby they might proceed to an Election: Whereas all Kingdoms, that are really Elective, do take Care that an Order and Government be preserved in the *Interregnum*, and do lodge also an Authority, whereby the States, or the Electors, may be assembled, in order to fill the vacant Throne: For if this was not done, each Prince's Death must introduce Anarchy and Confusion; for the People being left without Government, each Man would do what was right in his own Eyes.

If then the Crown did not always regularly descend in a right Line, neither was there any other Method constantly observed, nor was it purely Elective: And yet the very Nature of the Polity required a Head, Prince, or King; as it is most certain it did. It may not, perhaps, be an unacceptable Pains, to enquire how then the Throne, upon the Death of the Prince, was again filled; since it is most clear, the same Method was not always observed.

It is not improbable, but that the Original Constitution favoured a Lineal Succession, as hath been already remarked, there being more

of such than of the others. But then the same primitive Constitution had shared or divided the Legislature between the People, or a part of them, and the Prince; and had so laid the Force, that the Prince could not easily violate the Peoples Rights. And the Legislature, or Supreme Authority, is in all Governments above Law, as hath been already demonstrated: Wherefore all Persons, whilst acting in the Legislature, and so are, or make a part of it, are never to be bounded by Law; (it being an Absurdity to think, that what makes, and can alter Laws, can be restrained by them; for such Persons, whilst acting in that Capacity, being above Human Laws, are to be directed by their own Discretion, always regarding the Good of the Community; (and always excepting where the Laws of God Interpose) for they being there Supreme, can be accountable to none: (I intend so far, and for that time only as they are acting in that Authority.) For it is certain, those very Persons that constitute this Legislature, may at another time be in a Private Capacity, and so as much obliged by the Laws of their own making, as any other Members of the Society: And this Authority here being divided between Prince and People, each was to consent to its Laws. It is true, the King being the Head of the Government; and Chief Lord of the Soil; upon which footing the Polity stood: And the Government having instituted or ordained Pe-

penalties, or Forfeitures, upon those Persons who did not perform the annexed Services, or who did not live in obedience to the Laws; and these Penalties, or Forfeitures, being to the Prince, as Chief Lord, or Head of the Government: It is plain, in process of time, the whole Lands might have been swallowed by the Prince; but that these happening at several times, and the Legislature and Force being so distributed, that the People by them had such a Check upon the Prince, that he was continually necessitated to oblige some of them, by parting with these Forfeitures, by which means the Constitution was preserved.

This being premised, the People, or at least that part of them that were entrusted in the Legislature, being under no Civil Restraint, whilst acting in that Authority, but at perfect Liberty to do what they think most expedient for the Good of the Community, the Succession, properly relating to that, came naturally before them. But, then they being but a part, and not the whole Legislature, the Prince having a Share in it, they could not dispose of the Succession without his Consent; and the Prince cannot be supposed to have consented, in several Instances, by reason the Succession was determined so much to the Disadvantage of his Posterity: And yet such do not appear to be effected by Force or Violence.

To reconcile these Difficulties, we must consider, that the People, or at least the Nobility, making

making a part of the Supreme Authority, and that Authority being imperfect without a Prince, they, *viz.* either People, or Nobles, who had the Land, and who were the other part of that Authority, (and who composed the Force of the Community) considering themselves under no Restraint, as being a part of the Legislature, and that, as such, they were to regard the Publick Good, they would, upon a Death, declare a Prince, and so complete the Constitution, which was imperfect until that was done.

But to comprehend this Point rightly, we must consider, that the Government was not then as now; that their *Cemots*, or great Assemblies, in which Matters of Moment were treated, were not always convened by the Prince's Authority, but at some times assembled of course; by which means they had farther Opportunities of exerting their Power, than they can have, since that time they have only been convened at the Prince's Pleasure.

Nay farther, the Laws then did not suppose any Natural Allegiance, (that being but a modern Doctrine, which in truth appears like a Contradiction in Terms, for Men to talk of a Natural Allegiance, when Allegiance it self is but of Civil Institution) but a Civil one; which is clear, in that the Laws required Homage and Fealty from the Vassals of a King, at such an Age, at the Motes or Courts, to their *Thanes*, or Lords, and the great *Landes*, making

or Lords, performed this to their Prince, or King, as to their Chief Lord, at their *Gemots*, when they owned or recognized him; for the Ceremony of Crowning is of a much later Date. And that this was not only the Sense of our Ancestors, but was, and is, of most other Nations, appears evident by their most solemn Proceedings, I mean their Laws, in that they require their Subjects, at such Ages, or at such Times, or upon such Occasions, to stipulate with the Prince, or the Society, by swearing, promising, or some ways signifying their Consent to be a Subject to that Prince, or a Member of that Society: Which had been trifling and superfluous, had there been any Natural Duty, or Obligation; for, I presume, there are but few Instances, wherein Men are actually required to Covenant, where there is a precedent Natural Duty. It is from this Reason, why no Law requires any such from Children to Parents; for if a Natural Duty will not oblige Men, a Civil cannot. If then our Ancestors did not think themselves obliged, until they had covenanted or stipulated with their Prince, and that they assembled, at certain times, of course; and that the Force of the Kingdom was, in effect, but in a few Hands, the Vassals, or inferior Tenants, holding from their immediate Lords, and so obliged to them; and that the People, or these great Men, whilst acting in the Legislature, were confined by no Law, nor under no Restraint, as being assembled

bled for the Publick Good, to make or alter Laws. It can be no wonder if they often took upon them to declare a King, and then by covenanting and stipulating with him, confirm and make him their Lawful Prince, and thereby perfect the Constitution: For it was the acknowledging him, by their Homage and Fealty, that made him so. For notwithstanding it be admitted, that the Primitive Constitution favoured a Lineal Succession, in that the Government was imperfect without a Head, and therefore cannot be supposed to continue in such State, and not having made any other direct Provision, whereby to fill the vacant Throne, it is but reasonable to conclude it was done that way; it being most natural for Children to inherit what was their Fathers, and most reasonable for the Eldest to succeed in what was not to be divided. Yet notwithstanding this, the Nobility, as hath been observed, having such an Authority, and the Force or Power being so strongly invested in them, to support and maintain it, they would not fail to do what they judged meet or expedient in the Succession. And that this was not only the Practice of our Ancestors, concerning the Succession, but also their avowed Sense of Allegiance, I think might be proved by many Particulars: I shall only instance in one. In the Confessor's Time, Earl Godwin was accused by the King, as a Traitor, in his great Court, for the Murder of his Brother: It was there urged, the Earl could be

no Traitor to the King, having never performed Homage, Fealty, or Service to him. So little did that Age dream of Natural Allegiance, that they thought none was due, until Fidelity was promised. And from the same Reason, the Lords required That from their Vassals, at such Ages, or such Admission into their Lands: So that the great Men, upon the Death of the Prince, being as it were at Liberty, that is, under no farther Obligation, recognized the succeeding Prince as they pleased: which their Common Safety obliged them suddenly to perform, the Constitution plainly requiring such a Head: And the Person thus recognized, or declared, became their lawful King.

VII. From what hath been said, I think it is manifest, that the Succession to the Crown was Originally neither Hereditary, Testamentary, nor Elective, but that it did descend in very different Methods: For altho' the Nature of the Constitution required a Prince, or Head, yet the substituting the Person who should enjoy this high Dignity, was diversly performed; but howsoever, when it was once done, that is, when any Person was legally possessed of it, which was when he was owned and recognized by the great Mens Homage and Fealty, and so acknowledged as Chief Lord, he was by that their lawful and rightful King: For by this Act the Constitution being perfected, as having

having now an entire Legislature, they had an Authority to legitimate their own Actions, supposing any Irregularities had been contained in them. For the Original Constitution being founded upon a Subordination of Tenure, which Tenures being branched out into different Persons, each of which had an entire Property in that Part, he possessed; and all being collected or united into one Polity, it is plain there was requir'd one Principal Head, or Common Point, wherein they must all Centre: By reason, without that, one Common Life, Harmony, or Interest, could not be continued in so many separate and independant Members, which could be only united, by the means of this Head, into one Body Politick: That so, being actuated by this Head, they might have but one Common Life, and therefore be equally concerned for their mutual Preservation. For such is the undoubted Depravity of human Nature, that it doth not often concern it self for the Rights of Others, any farther, than as such someways relate to it self. This Men acknowledge in Fact, in that the wisest Governments take care to establish themselves, that it may be the Interest of its Members to preserve the Publick Peace, well knowing that there is but slender Trust in any other Security; Oaths, or Promises, being experienced to be but weak Ties, when Force or Power is removed. And this was what was practised by the ancient Kings, to secure the Succession in their

their own Posterity; for when, by their prudent Conduct, they had obliged the People, they did by that smooth the way for their Children to succeed: For the People, pleased with their Prince, would not then confederate to oppose his Son; for if they did, the Force of the Prince was not sufficient to effect it. And this, in those early Times, was not difficult for the Prince to perform, by reason Wealth and Empire were not much enlarged; Ambition, and Thirst after Rule, had not so far seized the Hearts of these People; as to put them upon projecting Measures of acquiring Dominion and Sovereignty: For the Business of our Ancestors, in those early Times, was more to preserve themselves, than to enslave others; those Desires gradually entering, as Wealth and Empire increased. When then a Wise and Virtuous Prince had reigned, as to have gained the Love, Esteem, and Hearts of his People; that is, had, during his Reign, pursued such Measures as were liked and approved by them; or had been successful in his Military Expeditions, whereby he was beloved and admired, the Son usually peacefully succeeded his Father, the People readily recognizing him: Or if the Prince, who was thus beloved, was partial in his Paternal Affections to his Children, (it matters not whether by Merit, or otherwise) he sometimes might, by recommending a Favourite, prefer a Younger to an Elder; or sometimes the Merits of the Person might occasion

caution. ~~On the~~ ~~Contrary,~~ if the Prince, by his Misfortunes, or by his Imprudent and Corrupt Conduct, had lost the Hearts of the People, they sometimes would entail their Dislike upon his Posterity, and exclude his immediate Issue, and perhaps place the Crown upon the Head of a Uncle, Brother, or Nephew. It is not my Intention to write the History of those Times, nor to tire my Reader, in inserting particular Instances to confirm the Truth of these things; by reason there is no Person that is conversant in the Writings of those Times, but must admit, that from the very Beginning of the Heptarchy, and long after the Norman Conquest, the Succession was never continued, for many Generations, in any one certain Form, or Method; but that sometimes, and indeed most usually, the Eldest Son succeeded; but that at others, the Uncle, Brother, or Kinsman, hath. In short, that neither of Lineal Descent, Testamentary Donation, or Formal Election, hath regularly been observed; but that sometimes the Prince, or King, hath been said to have succeeded by his own Right, at another time, by the Gift or Will of the former; and perhaps, at another time, by neither, but by the Election or Approbation of the People: So different hath the Succession anciently been, and so it is probable it must have continued, had the Government remained. For whatsoever Men may conclude, concerning Civil Rights, from our former Usages,

it is most clear, as Empire, People, and Wealth encreases, Forms, Methods, Modes, and Manners of Government, must, and do, alter and vary; and of course, Rights, Laws, and Customs, that arise from such, must do the same. This Consideration, I must acknowledge, has raised some small Wonder in me, to see ingenious Men engage with so much Heat about so trifling a Dispute; As whether this Kingdom was anciently *Hereditary, or Elective*; and appeal to Precedents, and ancient Practices of our Ancestors, to determine this Controversie: When it is plain, that those have been extremely different, and therefore may contribute to the multiplying and prolonging such Wranglings, but can never decide them; by reason there is neither Party but may produce Instances to countenance and strengthen their Opinions: Whereas, had they but leisurely considered the depraved Nature of Man, and the Frame and Model of the Ancient *Polity*, they might easily have determined their Disputes, by demonstrating, by Reason, how it must have been, as well as shewing, by Fact, how it was: For being a Civil Institution, as merely relating to Government, must entirely depend upon the Will of the Legislature, which, it is certain, may, and do often alter, according as the Interest or Good of the Community requires; and the Legislature, in our Constitution, being composed of different Members, whose particular Interests, or Judgments, may

may sometimes clash, or interfere, and then they having no Superior to decide their Controversies, because they themselves, collectively taken, are Supreme; It is plain, that part of this Supreme Authority, that hath the most Power or Force, must and will, at length, in all such Disputes, prevail. It is from this Reason, that we may observe some Princes, that have gained an Interest in the People, have disposed of the Crown, maugre all Opposition, as they pleased: And on the Contrary, how others, by disobliging the People, have been so far from disposing of the Succession, that they have been deposed themselves. And these things have been thus interchangeably practised; by which it is manifest, that the Power and Authority of the Prince hath been according to his Prudence, or Good Fortune, in so managing the People, as to have an Interest in them; and not from any Sense of Duty, Allegiance, or Right, arising from any former Law; for if that had been so, it must have been more certain than yet it hath been found. *VIII.* If then Men will ground their Duties of the Legalty, or Illegality, Right, or not Right, of the Succession, upon the Precedents of former Times, it is plain, they must always labour under Uncertainties, since the Practices of our Ancestors have been so different in that Matter, as never to have long ob- served

served any one particular Method. Nay farther, if that way of Reasoning was to be allowed, that Men cannot justly depart from the Practises of their Ancestors, in Matters relating to Civil Rights; it is plain, according to that Doctrine, no Man could be justly ascertained of his present Property; by reason our present Proceedings in Courts of Judicature, are, in many Particulars, different from what they formerly were; and our Laws, and the very Nature of Tenures, upon which our Government was founded, are also changed. I will not be so tedious, to multiply many Instances, but shall content my self with one material and unquestionable one: It is abundantly known, that Lands holden by the greater Services, such, I understand, as were mostly possessed by the Nobility, were *unalienable*, until *Henry* the Seventh's Time, and those by Military Service, or at least that Part that the Service was immediately annexed to, were not to be broken, or divided, until *Henry* the Eighth: the remaining Services, appertaining to that Land, were not entirely removed until *Charles* the Second. By which it is clear, by the Laws, or the Ancient Usages of this Kingdom, that the Heirs of those Families, that formerly possessed those Lands, should have, according to that then old Law, or Custom, a present Right to them, they being, as I said, by such *unalienable*. So that, according to that Doctrine, they must be unjustly de-

tained from them; because the present Possessors can have no Title, but what the late Laws gave them; which, in truth, according to that way of Reasoning, is none at all. For which Reason, should that Opinion be allowed, nothing but Ruine and Confusion must ensue, there being but few Persons, at this Day, that could be assured of the Justness of their Titles to their present Estates. I suppose the Defenders of this whimsical Doctrine, foreseeing the Fatal Consequences of it, if thus generally allowed, would confine it to the Succession only; but this being but a Civil Right, I cannot see by what Logick it is to be done. For if it should be generally allowed, it being so inconsistent with the Peace of Society, it would be so with the Sense of Mankind; as we plainly find it is, in that Men are not observed to scruple the Justness of their Titles in such Estates. However, it is clear, from the Nature of Government, that the Succession to the Regal Authority, and that to other interior Civil Rights, such as Land, &c. did equally proceed from the same Source, in that they were both founded in the Constitution; with this only difference, that if there was any Advantages to be allowed to either, by the Practises of our Ancestors, it must be the latter, in that the Succession to the Crown hath been so often interrupted, whereas the Hereditary Right of Tenure remained unaltered, for several Generations. I always intend to except

Forfeitures by Treason, and such like, where the whole Blood being tainted, the Estate devolved to the King, as Chief Lord.

IX. But perhaps some Maintainers of these Doctrines will affirm, that the Rights of Kings are sacred, and the Inheritances of Princes inviolable, as being founded upon no Civil Law, nor derived from no Earthly Power, but that they proceed immediately from God himself, who hath declared, that *by him Kings reign, and Princes administer Justice.* To which may be answered, That it is most certain, whatsoever God hath commanded, Man ought to submit to; but if God hath not determined the Power of Kings, nor the Rights of Princes, then it is plain he hath left it to Man to do: And that God hath not done this, hath been already proved. But perhaps it may be farther urged, that admitting God hath not expressly declared his Will in these Matters, yet the Practises of *Holy Men, the Patriarchs, or God's own People,* are what will warrant us to approve this Doctrine. To which may be answered, That there is nothing certain to be concluded from these Examples, since the Proceedings of the Patriarchs, the Prophets, and God's own People, in these Matters, have been different. Besides, it is a somewhat dangerous way of Reasoning, to conclude, that what hath been, by the Patriarchs, Holy Men, or God's own People, formerly done, may therefore be imitated

imitated by us, by reason these Holy Men have not always lived by the same Rules, nor always practised the same things; and therefore not leaving us Directions how we are to distinguish which we are to imitate, and which to avoid, we must be in the dark concerning such: If it be said, we need not want a Thread to guide us in these Matters, by reason the Sacred Texts directs us in that; such things as it commends, we may justly imitate; and what it disproves, we ought to avoid: I answer, that there is no Certainty in this Rule, in that there are several Instances of the Actions of Holy Men, that were not then disproved, that are now inconsistent with the Laws of Christ; for Polygamy, Concubinage, and what not, was not only practised by the Patriarchs, but by the Man, who the Scripture says was after God's own Heart. So dangerous a thing it is to raile Arguments from the Practises of Men, to justify our present Actions.

Having proved from the Customs and Practises of the Northern Nations, and from the Primitive and Original Saxon Constitution established here in *England,* that the People, or at least a part of them, had a Property in the Land, and that the Government was founded upon Land: And that the Proprietors of the Land had a Share or Part in the Legislature; which was secured to them, in that the Force of the Community was composed of such who had the Land: And that the King, or Prince,

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Prince, in those early Times, neither having Land, nor Revenues, whereby to keep a Force immediately dependant upon him, sufficient to rule and govern the People; neither did, nor ever could, exercise an arbitrary and unbounden Authority: And therefore that Property, or, if you please, Wealth, was never separated from Power.

CHAP. VII.

Edward the Confessor fond of the Normans, advanced by Earl Godwin, neglects him, who opposes the Normans. The King governed by them, introduces their Customs; a Help to the Norman Conquest. Duke William, a Faction here; his Pretences frivolous. 2. Factions the Motive to Duke William's Attempt; his Policy; declared King. Men zealous for a New King. Assistants to Harold made Traitors. He humbles the Religious, by what Methods; composes an Insurrection. 3. Establishes a Milice, and how. Two ways to secure himself by a Milice; either upon Land, or by Pay. He pursues the first, what Methods. 4. He appoints his Successor; endangered by the Normans. Princes Power precarious; why not enlarged. Historians misled by Words, Occasions of Civil Wars. 5. Power in the Barons, little in the Commons; but increased, and why. Succession altered; the Polity so, doth not require

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quire a King, as formerly, proved. 6. Henry the First labours to secure the Succession to his Daughter; by what Methods. 7. Stephen succeeds, advanced by the Bishops; permits Castles to be built; endangered; and how. 8. Henry the Second his Policy; endeavours to secure the Succession to his Son, his Methods. Attempts the lessening the Authority of the Clergy, miscarries in it. 9. Richard advanced by the Clergy, and why; supported by them. 10. John succeeds, by what means. His Exactions, by who withstood. His Affairs embroiled, by what Reasons. His Civil Wars, and various Successes, with the Reasons. 11. Henry the Third a Minor. Peace procured by the Prudence of his Guardians. He occasions new Civil Wars; his Measures. 12. Arbitrary Power not then to be acquired, and why. Different Fates of John and Henry; yet the Constitution continued unaltered. 13. Edward the First his Prudent Measures; performs great things, and why. 14. Edward the Second his Measures and Fate. 15. Edward the Third a Minor, Mother governs all. A Scottish War. Queen ruined; and how. Edward, Major, his Wife's Conduct. His Misfortunes in his declining Age, occasioned by his Son the Duke of Lancaster, and how. 16. Richard the Second his Measures, and the Reason of his Misfortunes. A Parallel between Edward the 2d, and Richard the 2d. 17. Henry the Fourth; how he establishes himself a Prince truly Wise and Great. 18.

18. Henry the Fifth, the then State of the Kingdom. Power of the Commons, probable Reasons of the Rise of some of their present Rights. Wisdom of the Clergy. 19. Henry the Sixth, a Child. Faction begin and increase. Cunning of his Favourite Suffolk. Weak Prince. Haughty Queen, beginning of the Dispute between the two Families. Civil Wars: different Successes. Victor legitimates his Actions by a Parliament. 20. Edward the Fourth his Policy. 21. Edward the Fifth murdered. Richard the Third ruined, and how. 22. Henry the Seventh projects, and effects an Alteration in the Constitution: What contributed towards it: done by Law; the Crown gained nothing. His farther Designs.

EDWARD, surnamed the Confessor, a weak Prince, the Son of *Ethelred the Unready*, being obliged by his Father's Misfortunes to leave his Native Country, was, by his Mother's Care, conveyed into *Normandy*; that so being out of the Power of those whose Interest it was to seek his Destruction, he might be brought up in Security. For the *Danish* Faction had so far prevailed, as to exclude his Family from the Throne. Being thus sent in his Young and Innocent Age, to be Educated amongst that People, he so strongly imbibed the Customs, Usages, and Manners of that Nation, that even in his riper Years, during the whole Course of his Reign, he plainly shewed

shewed the great Esteem he had of every thing that was *Norman*; preferring their Persons, and introducing their Customs, as Time and Opportunity would permit. For altho' he was exalted to the Throne by the Interest and Endeavours of Earl *Godwin*, he himself contributing so little to his own Advancement, that he seems not to have had a Soul, or Ambition, either to dream of Empire, or to thirst after Sovereignty: For being in *England*, under his Mother's Protection and Secrecy, at the Death of the last King of the *Danish* Race, he makes no Attempts to ascend the Throne, but implores the Assistance of this Great and Politick Earl, to convey him out of the present Danger, into his former Exile, that there he might spend an innocent Life in a retired Safety. But Earl *Godwin* dissuades him from such a Retirement, and promises him not only Security, but his Assistance, to set him upon the Throne of his Ancestors. It is not improbable but that Great and Cunning Earl had couched some Designs of his own, in that generous Undertaking, of Restoring one of the Branches of the Royal Family to the *English* Throne; for he could not but know that *Edward* was a weak and easie Prince, bred up in *Normandy*, and entirely unacquainted with the *English* People and Government, and therefore would be unable of himself to hold the Reins of Power; and that he being the First and Greatest in the Kingdom, and the Principal Instrument

in his Advancement, must naturally come to have the greatest Part in the Government; besides, that he might the more strongly unite *Edward* to himself, he had obliged him to promise to marry his Daughter. But notwithstanding these Politick Measures of this great Earl, *Edward*, once settled in the Throne, blatted all his Expectations: For altho', after some Delays, which plainly shew'd his Unwillingness, he at length consented, as having a just Sense of his Promise, to marry his Daughter; yet he still cooled in his Affections to his Father in Law, little regarding his Person, or Councils, being in a manner governed by his former Acquaintance, the *Normans*, who now come flocking in Numbers to his Court, and are preferred to the greatest Trusts, Offices, and Employments. Earl *Godwin* thus supplanted, by Strangers in the King's Favour; and divers others of the *English* dissatisfied at the Authority and Advancement of these *Normans*; this Earl easily forms a Discontented Party, to oppose this Foreign Interest. Which being known to the *Norman* Favourites, for the Earl was retired, they became alarmed, as apprehending Danger; and therefore prevail upon the King, to summon the Earl to his Great Court, there to answer to such Crimes and Treason, as should be objected against him; which were principally concerning the Death of the King's Brother, which the Earl had formerly denied, and the King had pardoned. The

The Earl does not obey the Summons, but insists upon Pledges for his Security; which not being granted, he arms, in order to secure himself. But this Quarrel being at length composed, to the Earl's Advantage; for he is again received into the Prince's Presence, and several of the *Normans*, his Enemies, are displaced and banished. But this Turn of Affairs in *Edward's* Court, did not extinguish that Faction: For it is clear, the Court, if not the Kingdom, was then divided into what, for Distinction, may be called the *English* and *Norman* Party; the last of which seems to have governed the King, as may be seen in that unrighteous Instance of that weak Prince's severe Proceedings against his own Mother, which were carried on against her by Archbishop *Robert*, and his *Normans*, malgré all the Endeavours of the *English* Clergy and Nation.

For notwithstanding after this Reconciliation between the King, and Earl *Godwin*, (who seems to have been beloved by the *English* Clergy, and People, in that he was the Head of that Interest, and always opposed these Foreigners, who are in all Nations envied and hated by the Natives, if placed in Authority or Power) the *Norman* Faction began sensibly to decline: Yet *Edward* continued secretly to favour them, and still reserved some of the most inoffensive of that Nation about his Person, and reposed his greatest Trust and Confidence

dence in them: Nay, such was his Partiality to that People, that he could not conceal his Fondness and Esteem of them; liking and approving every thing that was *Norman*, as appears, in that he endeavoured to introduce *Norman* Customs, Usages, Offices, Titles, as might be shewed in a multitude of Instances, but that is not my Business to do.

Edward, during his weak and impolitick Reign, preserved the Crown from the Hands of Strangers; yet, by his Affection and Partiality to Foreigners, he so weakened the *English* Interest, as thereby to lay the Ground-work of the ensuing Misery, brought in upon the Nation, by a *Norman* Conquest, which ensued in the Time of his Successor; for that seems to have been facilitated by the imprudent Measures of this weak Prince. For notwithstanding the great Power, and wise Conduct of *Harold*, after his Father, Earl *Godwin's* Death, did somewhat retrench the exorbitant Greatness of the *Norman* Faction; yet that Party, having the Favour, or Connivance of the King, could never be entirely extirpated. And this seems to be a principal Reason of the *Norman* Dukes Hopes in succeeding to the Imperial Crown of *England*; for it is unreasonable to imagine that so wise a Prince, as Duke *William* appears to have been, should ever have attempted to unpromising an Enterprize, as the Conquest of so Potent a Kingdom as this was, by the petty Power of an inconsiderable

Dutchy, had not Factions, and National Divisions, favoured and confirmed his Hopes; which appears to have been so great, as to have poisoned and divided even the Brethren of *Harold*. For as to what some have affirmed, concerning a pretended Donation, or Promise of *Edward*, of making Duke *William* his Heir and Successor, is a Reason so vain and frivolous, that it doth not merit a Refutation: For if ever there was such a thing, it must be made during *Edward's* Exile, at which time he had neither Right, nor Power, to make, or to perform such a Promise; for he could have no Right by Inheritance, by reason there was then Issue of *Edmund* his Elder Brother; and he could have none by Election, as not being himself then Elected King. *Edward* then having no Lawful Right himself, could not lawfully give what was not then his own: Such a Gift, then, or Promise, could convey nothing to *William*, and *Edward* afterwards himself bequeathed the Crown by Will to *Harold*. Neither had that weak Prince, if his Affections had really continued to *William*, such an Interest in the *English* Nobility, as thereby to prevail upon them to consent to such a Donation, which in those Times must have been to little Purpose, had they dissented. For *Harold* himself, altho' he had the Crown bequeathed by *Edward's* Will, yet so little use was that to him, that had not his own great Power contributed to the seizing of it, and

and obliging the Nobility to an Oath of Fidelity, it is likely he had never possessed it, since his Authority was afterwards endangered by his own Brethren.

For whatsoever Duke *William* might publish of this pretended Donation, as having no better Claim to justify his ambitious Proceedings; yet so wise a Prince would never have embarked in so unpromising a Design, as the Conquest of a Kingdom, by the Force of a small Province, had he not some other Assurance than so trifling a Title: For whatsoever some Men may talk of Rights to Crowns, and Titles to Kingdoms, had Duke *William* really had a Lawful one, (which, on the contrary, it is plain he had none) yet so daring a Person as *Harold*, being possessed of the Throne, who had fought and killed his Brothers, to defend himself in it, would never tamely resign it upon such Paper Arguments; Force, in truth, being the only Arguments that can convince Princes, that the Thrones they fill are not their own.

H. Duke *William* then resolving to attempt the Conquest of *England*, and finding his Forces, or Revenues, not sufficient for such an Undertaking, has recourse to his Neighbours for Assistance; who, as it is reasonable to believe, would not have been drawn into such an Expedition, unless there had been some favourable Prospect of Success, since they were

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to be rewarded out of what should be conquered; unless then National Divisions had gave some Grounds for Hopes by such an Undertaking: It is not likely that these would have accompanied the *Normans* upon such Conditions, as, No Purchase, no Pay. And that this really was the then State of *Britain*, appears evident, in that altho' *Harold* had in a manner obliged King *Edward* to declare him his Successor, and had accordingly assumed the Crown; and altho' the *English* Clergy seem entirely to have favoured *Harold*, in that he always espoused their Interest against the Strangers; yet so great were National Factions, and so hateful were even the Broils of his own Family, that the Nation broke into a Civil War; which altho' ended, by a Battle advantageous to *Harold*, yet the Enmity, Hatred, and Divisions, could not be so presently rooted out, but that there would remain some Remnants of Discontent, which facilitated the *Norman* Conquests.

However, Duke *William* having fought and routed the *English* Army, and their King killed, he began, like a prudent Prince, to consider by what ways to secure the vacant Throne to himself: For *Harold* being dead, the *English* Nobility, and Bishops, appeared wavering, perplexed, and divided, concerning whom they should recognize as King; which being known to the *Norman*, he, like a prudent Prince, wisely endeavours to temper their Minds, by Overtures,

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tures, and to cajole and oblige them, by Promises, thereby to win them to his Interest, but yet would not remove the Terror of his Arms, which might contribute to the disposing them to accept him for their King. He therefore now traverses the Country at the head of his Victorious Arms, marching forward, but not directing his Course for London, where the Lords and great Men were assembled, as if he was unwilling to offer any Violence to them, or to exasperate the People by any Attempt upon that City: And in his Marches, he pursues such gentle and merciful Measures, as plainly denote he was more desirous to ascend the Throne by the Election and Consent of the great Men, than by Blood, Battels, or Conquests. By these Methods, the Norman Party had Time, and Arguments administered, to persuade, or terrify, the Others into a Compliance: For certain it is, whether affrighted by his Success, or whether approving his Wisdom and Conduct, or whether believing it as the only Expedient to remedy their present Misfortunes, they agreed to acknowledge Duke William their King, and accordingly performed Homage, and swore Fidelity to him, as his Tenants and Vassals; and he reciprocally promising Protection and Defence, and to govern according to the ancient Laws of the Land. And now the vacant Throne being filled, and so the Government perfected, each Person was ready to complement and oblige his new

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Sovereign, and so to mark and punish all those who had been Abettors, or Assiliants to Harold; for all such who had been in actual Arms against their new King, are declared Traitors, and their Estates adjudged forfeited, which, according to the ancient Usage of the Kingdom, devolving to the Prince, he enjoyed by that means, an Opportunity of rewarding such of his Followers, as had by their Services deserved his Favour; and likewise of laying such a Foundation of Power amongst his own Creatures, as might enable him to secure the Crown to himself and his Posterity: For these Strangers that were thus invested in the Forfeited Estates, having no other Title than his Grant, must be closely riveted in his Interest, by reason it was the only way to preserve their new Possessions; and these Strangers, now made the Lords, and Proprietors of the Land, had thereby Opportunities, by Acts of Bounty and Mercy, to endear themselves to their Inferior Vassals, or Tenants, which now holding from them, would naturally fall into their Interest.

But this King was too wise a Prince to endanger his unsettled Throne, by too early obliging the English, who had not embarked in Harold's Quarrels, and who had so lately declared him King, as to go about to dispossess them of their Estates, when he had nothing to allege to justify such Proceedings; for this had been to have made all the English his Enemies;

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mies, besides, he had mighty Forfeitures to dispose of amongst his Followers, without such Courts: For we may observe, at the Beginning of his Reign, before his Throne was well established, he continued the ancient Methods of Government, seemed to countenance the Natives, and permitted the Courts of Justice to be open to all Appellants. For until such time as the Norman Interest was well rooted, it was not safe to be severe upon the English; so that Justice seemed so impartially administered, as if he equally favoured both Nations. It is true, he put the Administration into the Hands of his Normans; but then he did it by such easie Steps, as were not at first grievous to the old Inhabitants.

It is true, the Religious, of English Parentage, had always been very zealous for Harold, and these did not so readily run into the Interest of that Prince; and the marvellous Privileges that Churchmen at that time enjoyed, as being in a manner exempt from secular Punishment, and their Estates not forfeitable, he could not so easily reduce these Men into Terms, as he had the Laity. But that he might some way bridle this Body, and yet seem not to violate the Rights of Holy Church, he cunningly excludes them (as a thing not becoming their Sacred Offices) from intermeddling in Civil Affairs: And then as easily charges all the Lands of the Religious, that were of Royal Foundation, with Services common to other;

pretending,

pretending, that this was no Violation of the Immunities of the Church, since such Services were anciently annexed to the Land, which no appropriating to such Uses could destroy; besides, it might be supposed, that the Royal Founders intended that Reserve, since otherwise the Royal Authority must have been lessened by such Foundation, and the Strength and Force of the Kingdom weakened, which only consisted in such Tenure. By these Pretences, and Measures, he brings the greater Monasteries to a Dependance upon him, for being now obliged to Services, for their Lands, he had an Advantage upon them. These Proceedings, altho' managed with all imaginable Prudence and Caution, did notwithstanding raise a Hatred in the Religious, and produced Clamours and Railings from the Monks, who being the only Men of Letters of those Times, hath been the Occasion, why this great King hath been represented to Posterity under such Black and Bloody Colours: But the Wisdom, and steady Conduct of this great Prince, supported him against the Hatred and Murmurings of these Men, which were afterwards, either by Death, or otherwise, gradually weeded out, and their Cloisters filled with such as were more favourable to his Cause. It is true, this Interest, headed by the Abbot of St. Albans, and united to the discontented Nobility, raised such an Insurrection, that threatened his Ruine; but that he wisely complying

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with Necessity, procured an Accommodation without fighting; for foreseeing the great Hazard of that, and the fatal Consequence of a lost Battel, he wisely promises, and solemnly swears, to redress their pretended Grievances, and to govern, for the future, according to their ancient Laws. But these Terms being accepted, and the Armies dismissed, he begins seperately to break the Power of those, who being united, he was unable to withstand, and thereby prevent any future Danger from such an Union: And this he performed after so many different ways, that it was not observed, before it was effected; for some he cajoled, others he punished, and others he removed; for he dealt with each, as different Circumstances, or Times required; preferring, in these things, his own Safety before his Promises. In short, this Prince took all Politick Measures to secure himself in his new-gotten Throne; and being convinced by this, and some other Tumults and Insurrections of the Old *English*, how difficult it was to establish himself, without ruining them, he gradually does it; for now the *Norman* Interest, by a Possession of some Years, being strengthened, he was the better enabled to perform it. And in this he did no more than what is daily practised by Modern Princes, who do not ordinarily stop at legal Methods, when they think their own Security make it necessary, to weed out such of their Subjects as they think their

their Enemies; and especially when they have gained a Party powerful enough to assist them in it.

III. To be brief, *William*, surnamed the Conquerour, having by the Terror of his Arms, or by his wise Conduct and Councils, prevailed upon the *English* to declare and acknowledge him King; he, like a wise Prince, endeavoured to secure himself in the Throne; and this he foresaw was not to be done by him, who was a Stranger, unless he could establish a Milice, or Force, that having no other Title but his Grant, or what was derived from him, their Interests might be so interwoven with his, that they would be always ready to support and maintain his Authority: And that this Milice, or Force, must be so numerous, or so strong, that it might be able to counter-balance the Old *English*; which he foresaw would not readily unite to him, by reason the Circumstances of his Affairs, did oblige him to reward his own *Normans* out of the Estates of the Natives: For *William*, as hath been observed, coming with an Army of Adventurers, who were to be pay'd out of his Conquests, he could not safely unite with the *English*; by reason he had then been incapacitated to reward his Followers, and so might have been in danger from that very Army he brought with him. Being necessitated then to oblige his own People, and it being unsafe too early to

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oppress the *English*, (for Matters were then unsettled) he, at first, under the specious Colour of Justice, only declares the Estates of those that were in Arms with *Harold*, Forfeited: And so seems not to violate the Laws, nor to oppress those, who had but lately declared him King: and yet had an Opportunity of plentifully rewarding his *Normans*.

For whosoever will but consider the General Circumstances of those Times, or the particular ones of that Prince, or this Kingdom, will plainly perceive there were but two ways whereby he could propose to secure his new-gotten Throne.

First, Either by a standing mercenary Milice, that being paid by him, would be at his Devotion: but this was clogged with so many Difficulties, as not to be practicable: For this required a great Revenue, which the Circumstances and Usages of those Times, or those People, did not permit: for the Knack of raising Money by Gabells, Excises, Customs, or other Impositions, were not then in use in *Europe*, neither indeed could be, where there was such a Scarcity of Money. It is true, this King not being able, at first, to provide for his Army, was necessitated to take Measures, for the present, to pay them; (not having then seized the Forfeited Estates) But to do this, he was obliged to have recourse to most unrighteous ways, such as were the seizing the Plate, Riches and Wealth of some Churches, and Religious Houses:

Houses: But this, it was plain, was but an Expedient for once, and could not be repeated; neither was there any other Methods, by which it could have been continued, for Trade did not as yet flourish.

Or, Secondly, by founding a Lasting Milice upon Land, which should be so contrived, as that it might be entirely dependant upon him; and this Method was most agreeable to the Temper and Genius of that Age and People. Now it is at first sight evident, that this, in that Prince's then Circumstances, could not be done, but by dispossessing the former, and Native Proprietors of the Land, that so there might be room to settle his own People that had embarked with him: And yet it was not safe, on a sudden, and at once, (and that in a new and yet unsettled Government) to dispossess all the *English*; for his own Forces, altho' he had been successful in the Battel of *Hastings*, were not then sufficient to continue an Over-balance to the whole Kingdom; which, altho' it had been extremely divided, as hath been intimated, the great Men running into Factions, yet so violent and so sudden a Severity, as seizing the Estates of all the ancient Inhabitants, would have immediately united them against so Cruel and Common an Enemy. This Prince therefore, to avoid this Danger, and yet that he might be grateful to his Followers, prudently causes an Enquiry to be made after such who had been in Arms with

Harold, and then proceeds against them as Rebels and Traitors, and declares their Estates forfeited; which devolving to him, as chief Lord, he disposes amongst his Normans. And in those Times the great Men had mighty Possessions, and several of these accompanying Harold at the Battel of Hastings, the first Forfeitures were very great; which Forfeitures, in his new Grants, were burdened with such Services, as might have reasonably been thought would have secured the Possessors under his Command, and yet rivet them in his Interest; and afterwards happened quite otherwise, as shall be shewed.

By these Proceedings, this Great Prince settled, and as he imagined, secured his new Government upon a lasting Foundation, viz. Upon Land, the Royal Authority having little of other Support, but what arose by these Tenures, or from the Demesnes Lands. For the Lands were more perfectly annexed to the Crown, by this Prince's new Grants, than they had been before his Coming; for being freshly modelled, they were better suited for the Royal Interest, (which was then the only Security to the Normans, who then held them) than they had been before his Conquest. For by a long Continuance, during several Changes and Reigns, they had either gradually worn out several of the former Services, or else at their first Institution they were not so loaded, as they now are, by this King; for they were almost

almost grown independant of the Crown. In short, whatsoever some bold Assertors of the Rights of Kings may say, that Duke William absolutely conquered this Nation, and so draw what Consequences they please, viz. That Conquest entitled him to all Ancient Rights; and that therefore what are now enjoyed, are nothing but Grants or Concessions of that Prince, or his Successors, which cannot oblige any of their Posterity any farther, than as they consent to them, or confirm them; by reason each King, when in Possession, hath the same Rights and Power that his Predecessors had, and therefore not to be bound by any Act of theirs. Or, on the contrary, whatsoever others may say, that will deny any such Conquest, but urge that William was declared King by Compact; and, to confirm this, shew how, being crowned King, he solemnly swore to govern according to the ancient Laws of the Kingdom, and that then the great Men performed Homage and Fealty to him, as their lawful Sovereign. Which way soever Men please to admit William's Accession to the Throne, I think is not much material, for being once possessed of it, he did, as all wise Princes ever have done, labour by all Methods to continue himself in it. And in order to effect that, he made (according to the Usage of those Times and People) perpetual Grants of the Forfeited Lands to his Followers; and so did convey to them a certain Right or Property

erty in such, in every Particular, excepting such *SerVICES, or Duties,* as were specified and excepted in the Grants; by virtue of which, these *Normans,* or Strangers, had as real a Property in these new granted Estates, as the former *Old English* Proprietors had: And, as a Mark of this, were consulted, as a free People, in all Matters of Publick moment, unless in such things as they were oblig'd to by their Tenures, which, according to the Accounts of those Times, were not many. The Crown then being, for the future, to be supported by the Posterity of these Strangers, and they having, by these Grants, a legal and ascertained Property in these Estates; and the King having no other Milice, or Force, but what was in these People: And these People, in time, would naturally run into a Common or National Interest, by reason they now having the Estates, or Land, would soon be as zealous to preserve what they had, against the Incroachments of the Prince, as the former Natives; and then they constituting the Force, would not be used, as the Instruments, to trample upon the Civil Rights of themselves, for they now are become the greatest Proprietors in the Nation. For this Reason, supposing *William's* Accession to the Crown was by Conquest, yet notwithstanding that, neither he nor his Posterity could rule arbitrarily: For altho' his *Normans* would at first join with him, in oppressing the Natives, yet they would never

never in enslaving themselves; and upon them the new Government is mostly founded. And it is certain, in Fact, they did not, in that the Laws set Boundaries to the Power and Authority of the Prince, and likewise ascertained separate and proper Rights to them and their Posterity: Which, it is clear, could not have been, had this King or his Successors been absolute; it being an Absurdity to affirm him Absolute, and yet at the same time to admit, that he had Bounds set to his Authority, which he had no Right or Power to transgress.

IV. But *William,* commonly called the *Conquerour,* by his wise Councils, and steady Conduct through the whole Course of his Reign, had so moulded and tempered the Minds of his *Norman* Nobility, who are now made the Pillars of his Government, that he not only defended himself on his new gotten Throne from all the Attempts of his Domestick Enemies, but was also a Terror to his Neighbours; and did at last appoint which of his Sons he pleased, his Successor: For being displeas'd with *Robert,* his Eldest, he pretermitted him, and nominated *William,* surnamed *Rufus,* his Second, who was according to his Appointment owned and declared King. But this Second *William* seems to have deviated from his Father's Councils; for impolitically disgulting some of the *Norman* Nobility, he was endangered of being dethroned, strange Turn of Fate!

Fate! by that very Power by which his Father had obtained, and did maintain, the Throne: So certain it is, that Power cannot be divided from Property, and that even in a new-modeled Government: For in this very Instance; These Strangers having obtained such large Possession, but in the time of the first *William*, were now impowered to shake the Throne of the second *William*, his Son and immediate Successor; and this their Power so encreased in the succeeding Reigns, that they were sometimes able, not only to dispose of the Succession, but even to pull the Crown from the Head of the Reigning Prince, and to dispose of it to another. Thus that very Polity that the first *William* raised, to secure himself in the Throne, became afterward the unhappy Occasion of removing some of his Posterity out of it, and excluding Others from ascending into it. For these Great Earls, or Barons, (for so now they are called) having such vast Possessions, had such numerous Retinues of Servants, Tenants, or Vassals, that being dependant upon them, were always prepared to follow the Fortunes of their Lords. For which Reason, if the Prince had by any unsteady or sinister Councils, disobliged these Grandees, so that they confederated, they were able, not only to oppose him, but often to overpower him: For the Constitution having made no Provision for any other Force, or Milice, but what was to be raised from the Land, these

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Great Men, who had the greatest Shares in that, whenever they united, were able, by their Tenants and Vassals, to equal, and often to overmatch what Strength the King could raise; by which means, the King's Authority, in National Disputes, was but precarious: For the King not always having a Force to equal theirs, he was sometimes necessitated to give place to their Designs, contrary to his own Inclinations. It was from this Reason, that we find the Authority of the Prince, in the ancient Constitution, to have been so very uncertain; for it depending, in great measure, upon the Will of these great Lords, it was either enlarged, or narrowed, according to the Prudence or Cunning of the Prince, as he had the Knack or Opportunity of obliging or disobliging them; or in so managing his Government, as to make them Instruments to oppress and destroy one another. And the Prince did not want means to perform this; for notwithstanding he had no Milice, but what was founded upon the Land, yet having the Executive Part of the Laws lodged in him, and the Disposal of Honours, Offices, and Preferments, entrusted to him, and the appointing the common Ministers of Justice, (it is true, the Lords sometimes did wrest even these Prerogatives from him) had thereby an Opportunity of bringing several of the Nobility to his Party, and so of raising a Power whereby to oppress or ruine the Others, who

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were his Enemies, or did oppose his Designs. Add likewise to this, the marvellous Advantage that did accrue to the Crown, by having a Right to all the Forfeited Estates; for if the Prince could once gain such a Party, as to be able to overcome his Enemies, he, by proceeding against them as Rebels and Traitors, became Master of their Estates, by which means the Crown might in time have been possessed of most of the Lands of England; and then, if he had not again alienated them by New Grants, he might, by Virtue of those, have made himself Absolute. But the Circumstances of those Times, or People, would not well permit of this; neither could it be suddenly performed, for Precipitation in such vast Designs must certainly ruine them; for 'tis probable, the great Men that were of his own Party, would have been alarmed at such Proceedings. So then the accomplishing this, requiring more time than a single Reign, and there rarely happened in any Kingdom a Succession of great and wise Princes, (and never as yet hath in this) hath been the Reason why the Royal Authority remained, for so many Generations, in so uncertain and fluctuating a State, as sometimes to be depressed, and even trampled upon by the powerful Barons; and then again, by some unlucky Turn in Fortune, exalted for a time above their reach, and thus it continued bandied, by a great variety of Changes. For sometimes its Power seem'd im-

immoderate, triumphing over, and punishing at pleasure its Opposers; and perhaps, in a short time, its Authority depressed into the Dust, the Barons kicking at the Crown, and scoffing at the Sceptre, as may be seen by the great variety of Fortunes the Royal Authority underwent in the several Reigns of *William the First, Henry, Stephen, John, Henry the First, Edward the Second, Richard the Second, Henry the Sixth.* By all which Instances it will appear, that the Kingly Power hath actually been according to the Circumstances of the Kingdom, or the Prudence and Discretion of the Prince; and not according to any established Laws, or Customs, or to any Excellency in the Frame or Nature of the Constitution; none of which were so composed, as to continue it in any one certain and unaltered State. And it is not unlikely, but that these Vicissitudes in our Government, have occasioned our ancient Historians to use such Expressions in their Writings, that have misled several ingenuous Men in their Opinions concerning the Nature of our Constitution; for their Expressions, to denote the Accession of several of our Princes to the *English Throne*, have been so very different, that some have argued from them, that the Succession to the Crown hath been Elective, because they find the Word *Electus*; or, *Capessit regnum consensu Baronum*; or that, *Comites & Barones Elegerunt*; or such like Phrases. Whilst others, by the same man-

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ner of reasoning, have concluded the Crown Hereditary, because they observe the Eldest Sons have succeeded the Fathers, and there hath been no mention of any Election or Approbation of the great Men. Whereas it is most certain, by Fact, that no particular Form or Method was observed; neither, when once a Prince was in Possession of the Throne, was the manner of his Accession canvassed, or his Right disputed. For the First and most Ancient Civil Wars, since the Conquest, which were called the Barons Wars, altho' some of them commenced in the Reigns of those who had but little Title, yet the Princes Right to the Crown was never made the Foundation of the Dispute; but the Princes Endeavours to violate or invade the Rights or Liberties of the Barons, or People. It is true, there were some Disputes, but of no great Continuance, that seem to look otherwise; as that made in the pretended behalf of the Right of Robert Curtais, in Henry the First's Time; or those by the Empress Maud, or her Son Henry, in Stephens Reign: Yet whoever will be pleased to consider these Cases, will easily perceive that Henry and Stephen being advanced but by a Party, the other Party, who did not approve their Succession, remained their Enemies; but these having no Pretence of Publick Grievance, for these Princes conceded everything to oblige the People, they used that in Henry's Time of Robert Curtais, and in Stephen's of Maud, as some-

somewhat to unite their Party, and justify their Proceedings. And when they had obtained their own Ends, they peaceably yielded, and obeyed the Princes they had opposed: By which it is plain, it was Power in those Times that legitimated the Title; and the Alterations in the Succession were as the Interest or Power of Prince, or Barons, prevailed: For if the Prince, in Possession, had by his Conduct, or Courage, tempered and obliged the Great Men, they usually submitted to his Disposal of the Crown, or at least permitted his Eldest Son to succeed. But on the Contrary, if Disputes, or Broils, had been between the King, and his Barons, and they had been prevalent; or where the Absence, or Minority, of the next Heir, had administered an Occasion for them to exert their Authority; or where the unpromising Temper of him, or an universal Inclination and Favour to some one more remote Blood; or some other Motives have occurred, the great Men then interposing, have filled the vacant Throne as they liked; for so little of Regularity hath been observed in the former Succession of our Kings, that I think it never then continued more than three Reigns successively in any one Method.

V. But to confirm what I have thus intimated, and to prove, that Power in Government will be inseparable from Wealth, I will briefly

briefly run down the Descent of the Crown, from the *Norman Conquest*, until the great Change of the Constitution, made by a Law in *Henry the Seventh's Time*; and then I will observe from that Reign, that altho' the Succession hath been perhaps as different as before, yet the Methods used in altering it, have not been the same as were practised before that Change: And in the performing this, I shall not only shew the different Methods that were in Fact observed in the Succession, but shall also hint at the Reasons and Inducements that occasioned them: By which it will appear, that the Commonality of *England* having but little share, comparatively speaking, in the Lands, before that Change, (altho', as it shall be shewed, they had gradually got upon the Nobility, from the End of the Barons Wars, yet that was not considerable) and Personal Wealth bearing no Proportion to Land in those Times, by reason Foreign Trade was not in so much Use, or Esteem, whereby to encrease it; nay, that little Trade that was then managed in *England*, was by Foreigners: So that the Commons having but little of Real or Personal Wealth, seem likewise to have then had but a small Share in the Government: For it is plain, the several Changes, Disputes, and Turns, that then happened, were all made by the Earls and Barons; the Majority of the People being but as Tenants, or Vassals, to the great Men, and so were easily governed by

by them; *the very House of Commons*, when established, being sometimes composed of such as were of their Retinue, I had almost said, wore their *Livery or Badge*.

But since that great Change, projected by *Henry the Seventh*, to depress the exorbitant Power of the Nobility, by which Lands were made alienable, Estates have not continued in one Family, but have continually been broke and sold; and what hath contributed to the shattering and dividing them, hath been the Encouragement and Application to Trade: For Trade naturally procuring Wealth, and Wealth Luxury, the Trader, who grows Rich by his Industry, becomes capable of supplying the Nobleman with wherewithal to supply his Luxury, and so gradually of purchasing his Estate; by which means, the Land hath become shattered and divided amongst the People, which before was in the Nobles. Add likewise to this, that the old Tenures having been altered, and Services abolished, whereby the present Proprietors are in a manner independent: From these, and some other Reasons, *the Commons* have gradually acquired so great a Share in the Government, that the several Alterations that have been made in the Descent of the Crown, since that time, have been for the most part at the Instigation of that Body. It is true, the manner of performing this, hath been by an *Act of the Collective Body of the Legislature*, in the Form of a Law: A Method

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very different from what was formerly practised, when the great Men declared the Successor, who were sometimes divided, and used Violence in the effecting it; whereas since it hath been done by a Law, in the Life of the Prince in possession. The Reason of which is evident; for since that time, the Power of the Barons being declined and lessened, the ancient Method becomes unpracticable; for that Power that was in them, being now divided into a multitude of People, it is impossible for them so readily to assemble upon the Death of the Prince, as the Suddenness or Exigency of such an Affair may require. And if it should be attempted to be effected by the former Method, the very Numbers must breed Confusion. Besides, the present Usage of the Kingdom being so very different to what the ancient was, for now the Law supposes the King never dies, the Prince next in Blood is owned King, before Homage or Fealty is performed, (if not otherwise excluded) whereas formerly the Performance of that made the Prince: Wherefore the Method now of altering or settling the Succession, is suited to the present Constitution, and is therefore done by a Law in the Life of the Regnant Prince. Besides, the very Nature of our *Polity* is now altered; for it is not now, as formerly, founded upon Tenure, and therefore does not seem, in its self, immediately to require a Chief, or Head: For altho' all our Laws imply a Prince, all Proceedings being

being in his Name, and People usually love and like that Form of Government that they have been bred and lived under, and are ordinarily prone to ridicule and despise what they have not tried: As is most evident by the Opinions of People under different Forms; for the *French* scold at the *British* Model, and the *English* deride that of *Holland*, and so on: And for that Reason, Changes or Alterations in Forms are not to be attempted; for such always occasion Disorders and Confusions: And it is Impolittick, and indeed Unchristian, to endanger the Peace and Repose of a People for a Novelty, when it is to be preserved without it. Yet, I say, it is obvious, the very Nature of our present *Polity* does not so essentially require a King, or Head, as the ancient did; and this, I think, the Experience of our late unhappy Times will abundantly evince; for by them we are plainly, and in Fact, taught, that a Government might now subsist without such a Head: I would not be misunderstood in this Nice Point; for I do not recommend such an Attempt, or such a Government, but on the contrary, heartily and sincerely wish our present Form may remain. I only averr, that the Nature of our *present Polity* does not so directly require the filling the vacant Throne, as the former did. And I only produce this Instance to confirm my Opinion: For in this Case, the Throne was vacant for some Years, whereas anciently it was always immediately filled;

it being impracticable for that Old Constitution, as being founded upon a *Subordination of Tenure*, to have subsisted without a Head. It is true, in this very Instance I have quoted, all things, after a time, reverted into their former Order, which shewed the unfitness of the Constitution to remain in that State; and during its very Continuance, it laboured under perpetual Convulsions and Strugglings, which were all cured by *recalling the Exiled Prince, and restoring the Government*. But notwithstanding this, whoever will consider the Circumstances of those Times, will plainly see, that these happy Alterations did not proceed from any unfitness in that Form of Government to the Nature of things; but in that it was acquired and maintained by Force, (for the Nation never run into it) whereby it was only continued and supported by That: And the then governing Authority, whether for want of Foresight, or whether such was then their unhappy Circumstances, that they could not avoid it, or such their Fate that they would not, by a wretched and unparalleled Vanity, permitted that very Army, by which they were supported, to be by its own Officers so modeled, as thereby to be ruined by it: Which very Army afterwards laying Chimerical Models of Government, that were in their very Natures inconsistent with the National Interest, did successively break and shatter; by which means the People became wearied with these perpetual

tual Changes, and dissatisfied with the severe Proceedings, and wretched Measures, that such repeated Alterations in Government, must by Turns bring upon several sorts of Men; so that the Natives, nettled with these frequent Revolutions, and tired with such Uncertainties, became disposed to return to their former Form, and accordingly recalled their exiled Prince, as the only Expedient to put an End to these Misfortunes.

VI. But to return: *William* the Second having happily put an End to those Commotions, began by his *Norman Barons*, was afterwards unfortunately killed: To whom succeeded *Henry*, his Younger Brother; for he being in *England*, seizes his Brother's Treasure, as an Expedient to gain Friends, and takes such measures to sooth and ingratiate himself with the great Men, and to cajole and please all sorts of People, by promising to govern according to their ancient Laws, and to amend all the Irregularities committed in the former Reign, that he was immediately declared King. It is true, this wise Prince, notwithstanding his fair Promises, and obliging Carriage, was not able to win all the *Norman Barons* to his side; for several of them were too far embarqued in the Interest of *Robert*, his Eldest Brother, (who being possessed of *Normandy*, where many of these Persons had large Estates, could not be without some Friends) whereby some of the

Barons adhering to *Robert*, gave him some Disturbances; but these being happily overcome, and his unfortunate Brother made his Prisoner, he reigned for the future undisturbed: But having lost his only Son, the remaining Hopes of the *Norman* Race, he labours, with all imaginable diligence, to secure the Inheritance of the Crown to his own Female Posterity; but this he foresaw would not be effected, without great Difficulty, (notwithstanding there was no one remaining of the direct Line of *William* the First, who could make any Claim to it) for it seems not to have been consonant to the Usage of those Times, or those People, to permit Women to inherit Crowns: Besides, she was married to a Stranger, who had large Possessions, whereby it would be difficult to reconcile the Nobility, who would be apt to be envious and jealous of a Foreigner; and then she not living amongst them, had not an Opportunity to endear herself; neither does her Temper seem to be much befitted for such a Purpose. However, be these things as they will, it is certain, King *Henry* was extremely desirous to leave the Crown to his Daughter; but how to perform this, was a marvelous Difficulty: For the Force and Strength of the Kingdom was in the great Men, who therefore must be reconciled to her Interest, or otherwise her Succession would be uncertain; and how to encline them to consent to this his Design, was no easie Undertaking: For should he endeavour to

to gain them by new Grants, or farther Privileges, he must endanger the Royal Authority, since their Strength and Power was already too great; so then to encrease it, was to make them his Equals, or, in effect, so many Sovereigns, who would be quickly independant of the Throne; and to attempt to lessen their Authority, or break their Power, might endanger his present Peace. To oblige all, was impracticable; and to please but a few, was only to form a Party; which could not be consistent with the Safety of the Prince, or Peace of the Nation; for that was only to entail a War, if not a Ruine, upon his Successor, who being a Woman, and in effect a Stranger, as living Abroad, was not well qualified to wrestle with such Difficulties. He therefore resolves upon new Measures, whereby he proposes to unite them all in his Interest, and to oblige them to consent to his Daughter's Succession; and this was in his own Life, to prevail upon them to take an Oath, wherein they bind themselves to acknowledge, own, and submit to his Daughter *Maria*, as their Prince and Sovereign, after his Decease. But the better to effect, and the more solemnly to perform this, he summons a great Council of the Nobility; and having prepared his Friends and Creatures for the Purpose, he makes an unpremeditated Oration to them, in which he sets forth his great Zeal, and Princely Care of their future Peace and Welfare; and tells them how far

far they may be endangered, by reason of Disputes that may arise concerning the Succession after his Decease; and that the only Method to prevent such future Mischiefs, was for them now, in his Life-time, to take an Oath to his Daughter, in which they should swear Faith and Allegiance to her, as their Lawful Prince, after his Death: Which they then solemnly performed. And afterwards, whether the King perceived any Wavering in any of them, or whether he imagined that repeated Oaths would not be so readily forgot, or whether any other Reasons, or Jealousies, induced him to it; for it is certain, after some time, he so ordered Matters, that this Oath was again in the same solemn manner repeated; and, as it is said, the King seemed marvelously pleased, when he observed *Stephen* Earl of *Bologne*, his Kinsman, a Person of great Wealth and Reputation in those Days, so readily to take it: Which, if true, it is probable the King had some secret Jealousies of *Stephen's* future Designs; and therefore it seems wonderful, why this Cautious Prince should heap such large Possessions upon this Kinsman, whom he seems to have dreaded, and such Preferments upon his Brother, who were both Foreigners, and who, being so nearly related to the Conqueror, were the only Persons that could make any Pretences or Bustles about the Succession, seeing he appeared so very solicitous in securing the Throne to his Daughter; and by thus wan-

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only accumulating such mighty Favours upon these, they were enabled afterwards to be Competitors with his Daughter for it.

VII. However, *Henry* being dead, and his Daughter absent, maugre all his former Precaution, *Stephen* Earl of *Bologne*, unmindful of his former Oaths, (for, alas, how little Oaths avail, when Empire is to be acquired!) boldly ascends the Throne: What contributed to his Elevation, was the powerful and joint Endeavours of his Brother, then Bishop of *Winchester*, and Legate, and of *Roger* Bishop of *Salisbury*, the two greatest Personages in Estates and Council, at that time, in the Kingdom; and these so far prevailed with a Party of the Barons, that *Stephen* is declared King. What seems to have facilitated *Stephen's* Advancement, was his Personal Reputation, and an early and solemn Promise he made to restore all ancient Rights and Privileges to Holy Church, which had been thought to have been violated in the former Reigns; particularly by the Princes keeping Bishopricks and Abbies, for many Years, vacant, and applying the Temporalities to their own use, and committing some other Violences upon the Liberties of Churchmen: All which Abuses *Stephen* wisely promises to reform, and his Brother the Legate undertakes, between God and the King, for the Performance of it; by which means the Religious heartily espoused his Cause, which

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in those Days was no small Advantage. And *Stephen* being Crowned, faithfully performs his Promises; for having assembled a great Council, he solemnly restores all Privileges and Immunities to the Church; and likewise, to please the Laity, he remits all Exactions, and Relievements, wherewith the former Princes had oppressed them. And the more to ingratiate himself to the Nobility, he, by strange and unheard-of Councils, permits Noblemen to build Castles, and raise Fortified Places upon their own Lands: Which Concession was so readily entertain'd by the Barons, that above Eleven hundred Places of Strength were in a short time erected. And what seems most surprizing in these Councils, is, that this King, who was advanc'd to the Throne but by a Party of the great Men, should thus advisedly give an Authority to all of them, some of which were his known Enemies, to build these Places of Strength, whereby they were in a Condition, whenever they were disposed, to renounce their Obedience; for having these Strong Holds for their Retreat, they could either defend themselves, or keep them for the Use of his Enemies: All which he could not but expect, by reason the Empress *Maud* was living, and who was known to have a very powerful Party in the Kingdom; so that should a War break out, altho' he should be so successful as to be Victorious, yet could it not be suddenly extinguish'd, by reason these Strong Places would require

require great Strength, Time, and Expence, to reduce, and perhaps at last might necessitate him to give Terms advantageous to his Enemies: For which Reason, altho' they might be thought a wise Expedient against a sudden and foreign Conquest, and perhaps he might expect that the Emperors would invade him with a Foreign Force, yet they could be only Encouragement to Inturrections and Disobedience, (which the great Men were abundantly prone to) and Nurseries for Seditions and Rebellions. However, these gracious, altho' impoltick Concessions, which were either designed as Bulwarks against sudden Conquests, by Invasion; or as Methods whereby to endear the Barons; did prove the unhappy Occasion (altho' not directly) of much disturbance, and threatened his entire Ruine. For the Bishops, upon this Permission of building Castles upon their own Lands, having then vast Revenues, and great Wealth, so far exceeded the Temporal Barons in the Number and Magnificence of their Buildings, that they occasioned great Envy and Hatred: For some Persons about the King, insinuated to his Majesty, that the strong and stupendious Fabricks raised by the Bishop of *Salisbury*, were designed, by that Prelate, as Fortresses for the Empress. These Insinuations, corroborated by other Circumstances, did not look improbable, and so were readily credited by a Prince who had Reason to be suspicious: However they raised such

such Jealousies in the Mind of the King, that put him upon those severe Proceedings against that great Prelate, that produced Troubles to himself, and Calamities to the Kingdom: For his own Brother, the Bishop of *Winchester*, and Legate, and the whole Clergy, became so alarmed at the Prosecution of this Bishop, that they abandoned the Royal Interest, that before they had supported, and united with the Empress against him. By which great Turn of the Clergy, King *Stephen* was reduced to the last Extremity. It is true, the Death of the wife Earl of *Gloucester*, the Soul of the Empress's Party, and the Haughty and Woman-like Carriage of *Maud*, gave some little Life to his declining Fortune: But notwithstanding that, had not the Death of his only Son administr'd a Means of an Accommodation between him and his Competitor, *Henry* the Son of the Empress, (for *Maud* seems to have declined any farther Prosecution of the *English* Affairs, leaving them wholly to her Son) in all likelihood, a continued Civil War must have been the Fate of his Reign, if it had not shortned that, and his Life too. But now his Son being dead, he submits to an Agreement with *Henry*, who was to be his Successor; whereby he had the good Fortune to die in Peace, leaving the Crown to be quietly enjoyed by *Henry*, the Empress's Son.

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VIII. *Henry* of *Anjou*, the Son of *Maud* the Empress, (who was then living) and Grandson to *Henry* the First, was immediately, according to Agreement, upon the Death of *Stephen*, declared King: For the Barons having been torn and divided by Factions, and wearied and injured by Civil Wars, were convinced, by sad Experience, that the only Expedient to establish a Peace, was to reconcile the differing Parties, and unanimously to receive *Henry*, according to the former Agreement, (altho' at that time absent) to be their King. For had not the Sense of the late Calamities been, as yet, fresh and green, it may be a Doubt, whether *Henry* had been so peaceably admitted; for being a Stranger, and a Prince of large Possessions, where he had been educated, it was a Question whether he would endeavour to annex *England* to his other Dominions, and so make it a dependant and subordinate Country; or whether he would unite the other Provinces to this Kingdom. But *Henry* was no sooner placed in the Throne, but he labours to remove these and all other Fears; for he highly caresses his new Subjects, and seems to repose an entire Confidence in the *English*; and as a full Proof of his Sincerity in these things, he convenes a great Council, wherein he formally passes an Act for the Banishment and Expulsion of all Strangers, which seem to have grown numerous, during the tumultuous Reign of his Predecessor: And that he

he might more perfectly endear himself to his People, he resolves to take such Measures, that the Crown might not be burdensome to them, but might subsist upon his own Revenues, without other Exactions, which were become somewhat grievous. To this Purpose, he projects a Re-assumption of Crown-Lands, which the Necessities or Vanities of former Reigns had alienated: But this was not to be done without the greatest Shew of Necessity and Justice; he therefore makes use of both. Necessity, in that the Dignity of the Crown was not to be maintained without proportionable Revenues; and it was fitter to take these Lands out of the Hands of a few particular Men, than to oppress the whole People by other Taxations: Justice, in that his Predecessors had no Legal Right to make Alienations of the Inheritances of the Crown; and that therefore he might re-assume such. But these, in truth, were only specious Pretences; for what chiefly induced him to these Proceedings, was that now under the Colour of Necessity and Justice; he had an Opportunity of punishing, and indeed lessening his Enemies: For these Lands had been disposed of mostly among the Creatures of King *Stephen*, several of which being Foreigners, rendered these Measures more acceptable to the *English*; in that such were stripped of their Estates, and they eased of their Exactions.

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And now *Henry* having settled his Affairs Abroad, and established a Quiet and Repose at Home, begins, like an Affectionate Father, to consider how to secure the Crown to his own Posterity. He had learnt by his Mother's and his own Experience, what vast Power and Authority the Clergy had in the Nation: How that they were able to place *Stephen* in the Throne, maugre all the Precaution and Politick Measures of his wise and cautious Grandfather, in favour of the Empress *Maud* his Mother: He had learnt, how afterwards the Throne of *Stephen* was shook by the very Clergy that raised him; for no sooner had that Prince shew'd a Dislike to one of their Body, by an impolitick Prosecution of the Bishop of *Salisbury*, but they became his Enemies, and endangered his Ruine. He every Day learnt, how the exorbitant Immunities of Churchmen, often thwarted and lessened the Royal Authority; and how that great part of the Wealth of the Kingdom was in the Hands of the Clergy, which they would dispose of to what Uses they pleased, some of which was sent Abroad to his and the Nation's Disadvantage: He plainly perceived the Ecclesiastical Jurisdictions were too many, and too great; and that the Persons of the Religious were in some measure exempt from his Authority, by which means enormous Crimes were frequently left unpunished. He therefore concludes it highly necessary, that these Inconveniences, and indeed

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Grievances, should be redressed ; and that he being now the greatest Potentate in *Europe*, might therefore securely perform it. But what seems principally to have spurred him on to a Resolution in this great Affair, was the ascertaining the Succession to his Son, for that seems to have been the great Business of his Reign ; for he plainly saw, notwithstanding all his other Care and Caution, that must remain very uncertain and precarious, if the present immoderate Wealth, Power, and Authority, continued in the Church ; by reason the Clergy would be able, in spite of his Endeavours, to dispose of it as they pleased : And what abundantly confirmed him in these anxious Thoughts, was the Exclusion of his Mother, effected by the Power of the Clergy, notwithstanding all the Precaution taken by his wise Grandfather.

This Prince then, in peaceful Circumstances, resolves upon the Regulating Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, thereby gradually to lessen their Exorbitant Power : And to second these his Intentions, a very favourable Opportunity seems to offer it self ; for *the Archbishop of Canterbury dying, he prefers Thomas Becket, a Creature of his own, to that vacant See* ; not in the least doubting of his Compliance in every thing, as being a Person wholly raised by his Favour : And then the Metropolitan shewing so ready a Disposition to comply with the Prince, would be a means to allure the inferior Clergy to do
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the same. But this Prelate, once invested in the Archiepiscopal Dignity, soon became forgetful of Royal Favours ; or at least his Temper, or Opinions, were changed with his Preferment ; for now his humble Complaisance is vanished, and instead of that, he spurns at his Prince, and kicks against his Maker ; being indeed the warmest Champion, and stoutest Maintainer of *Ecclesiastical Immunities*, that ever the Nation as yet produced. So much Mens Minds alter with Greatness, or so much Mens Opinions are suited to their Interests, that this Man, who in meaner Circumstances, was a Favourer of the Royal Authority, as a Means perhaps by which he intended to make his Fortunes ; but being once possessed of the Archiepiscopal Dignity, he became the boldest Oppugner of it ; for his Prince now could raise him no higher. The King then being thus unluckily deceived in his Instrument, his Proceedings became so unfortunate, that he was necessitated to sink under them : For this *stiff and haughty Prelate* (such were the Circumstances of those Times) was able so to embarrass the Affairs of this great King, that even he, that before was the Terror of *Europe*, as being able to give Laws to his Neighbours, was now so streightned, that he was forced poorly to complain, that his Quiet and Repose was disturbed by an *Imperious Priest*, and then meanly wish for a Friend that durst deliver him from this Trouble. Which Unkingly Ex-

pression occasioned the Fatal Murder of that *Unquiet Prelate*; which afterwards made the Prince to become a Penitent, and the Bishop to be Canonized for a Saint: So much this Proud Prelate prevailed over Crowned Heads, as to despise them when living, and to be worshipped by them when dead. For this *Henry*, the greatest Potentate that ever filled the *English* Throne; Greatest, I understand, not so much in relation to the Vastness of his Dominions, as in Comparison to his Neighbours, being then the mightiest Prince in *Europe*: And yet this Prince, by aiming to retrench the Pride and Privileges of the Clergy, which were become dangerous to the State, was compelled, by the means of that very Person whom he had raised, to appear at a Foreign Tribunal, there by Proxy to plead his Cause, and to justify his Innocence: And all this was transacted at that very Court, whose Authority he was endeavouring to lessen. Nay, such was the Power of the Church at that time, that he was necessitated to condescend meanly to do Penance, for the Expiation of a Crime that he had neither commanded nor committed: So Terrible was the Ecclesiastical Authority, and so Dangerous were all Disputes with the Clergy, that even the greatest Princes were always losers in such Quarrels. But to return: Such was this great *Henry's* Zeal for the securing the Succession to his Son, that having learnt, from his Mother's Misfortunes,

tunes, how little present Oaths contribute to future Security, when there is no other Tye to oblige; he resolves upon an unprecedented Method, whereby he proposes effectually to do it: For he, not satisfied with his Grandfather's Measures, in swearing the Nobility to admit his Son King, after his Decease; but will have him actually crowned in his own Lifetime, that so the great Men may do Homage, and swear Fidelity to him, as their present Sovereign: And as if a single Coronation was not sufficient to oblige the Barons to an Obedience, he hath him crowned a second time, with the usual Formalities. But these his over-indulgent Proceedings towards his Son, seem to have began those Disturbances amongst his Children, that were not ended but with his Life. But notwithstanding his Darling Son, that had been twice Crowned in his Life, never lived to enjoy the Crown after his Death: Yet one of his Posterity did; for *Richard*, altho' in Disobedience when his Father died, yet succeeded him without any Opposition.

IX. What seems to have facilitated *Richard's* Accession to the Crown, was his Extraordinary Zeal for a Holy War; a Design that was began in the Declension of his Father's Reign, between that Prince and the *French* King: For notwithstanding this Prince's most undutiful Behaviour to his Father, that occasioned those dreadful Passions, that are recorded, at his

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Death; yet *Richard's* marvelous Zeal for renewing that Project of a Holy War, that had for a time been laid aside, was a Design so very agreeable to the Humour or Religion of that Age, and so highly esteemed by the Clergy, (as contributing perhaps to their Authority) that it entirely riveted the Churchmen in his Interest: And such was their Influence upon the People, that they espousing his Cause, all other Difficulties or Objections would soon remove; that his fierce and Lyon-like Nature, his Disobedience to his Father, his Confederating with the *French King*, or any other of his disorderly Actions might have created; so that his Father being dead, he was declared King: And as he was advanced to the Throne by the Churchmens Power, so he seems by their Favour and Councils to have been continued in it. For his Vanity in the undertaking a Holy War, and his going in Person in it, by which he remained some Years in *Palestine*, squandering away much Blood, and Treasure, to the no small Loss of the Kingdom, which might have proved of Fatal Consequence to his Authority, the People being dissatisfied, by the means of grievous Exactions raised in order to support that War; and he having a Brother great in Wealth and Power, sufficiently Ambitious, and thirsting after Empire, and of course, prepared to have undertaken any thing whereby to have advanced himself, and excluded him; one who never failed to improve

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Discontents, to raise himself to the Throne: So that had not the Government of the Realm, in *Richard's* tedious Absence, been committed to the Management of Churchmen, who were zealous for him, upon the account of that Holy War he was then prosecuting; and who were besides experienced to be the fittest Instruments to squeeze vast Treasures out of the miserable People, and yet retain them in Obedience; it may be a Question whether his Brother had not supplanted him: For it seems to have been by the Influence and Authority of the Clergy, that the Phrensies of this Fighting King were supported, for the Continuing of this Blessed War. For this War promising no Advantage to the Nation, (being only made for a Religious End, and so might perhaps raise an Heroick Reputation of a Glorious Piety in this Prince, in that he was thought to fight the Lord's Battel, in endeavouring to recover the Holy Lands out of the Hands of Infidels) yet the People could never have been brought so far to approve it, as to lavish away their Blood and Treasure, unless it had been recommended as Pious and Meritorious by the Clergy, (whose Authorities, in those early Times, seem to have been very great) for by their Promises and Perswasions it was both undertaken and continued: They representing this War, as a Work of great Devotion: promising plenary Remission of their Sins to such who would enter into it. So that the Church having as-
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red the Soldiers, list'd in that Service, of future and eternal Happiness, they seem'd only to want the Divine Passport of being knocked on the Head, to let them into the present Possession of such promised Bliss; for to die, or to be killed in this Expedition, was only to change a wretched and temporary Life, for a happy and eternal One. A Change esteem'd, without doubt, very Advantageous; by reason the Self-denying Clergy were so zealous to engage others in what they would not often undertake themselves; They, good Men! Charitably leaving such remote Blessings, that were to be acquired with Fatigue and Danger, (and therefore with Honour) to the Laity; being content themselves, poor, humble, self-denying Souls! with their present Conditions, not extending their Ambition to such distant Glories, but rest mealy satisfied with the Possession of contemptible and troublesome Worldly Wealth, that was here accompanied with the Bitterness of Authority, and Anxiety of Power, freely permitting such Glorious Advantages, as they preach'd up, to such as would deserve them. But not to speak of the Misfortunes of this Fighting King, as his being made a Prisoner in his Return from this Glorious Expedition, and for his Subjects heavily oppress'd with Taxations for his Enlargement, over and above the grievous Exactions for his former Extravagancies; (from *delinquent Reges* *plectantur* *Achivi*.) But however, this Prince not

not having Issue of his own, do's not appear to have been very solicitous about the Succession: For his Brother *John*, who in his Absence had endeavour'd to have supplanted him, and perhaps had effected it, had not the Clergy been steady to him, being reconcil'd somewhat before his Death to him, was, after his Decease, declared King; notwithstanding *Arthur*, the Son of the Elder Brother, was then living.

X. What seem'd principally to contribute to *John's* Advancement to the Throne, was, That *Arthur* his Nephew was Young, and not bred up in *England*, and his Mother a Stranger, and so unacquainted with the Nobility, and had not many Friends to espouse his Interest; whereas his Unkle *John* had mighty Possessions, the Assistance of his Mother, an active Woman, who had lived in *England*, and had acted a Part in all Affairs, and had many and great Friends; besides these, he had gain'd the Archbishop of *Canterbury*, a Cunning and Designing Prelate, who was able to influence the Clergy, and by his Authority and Reason, to prevail upon the Nobility: For it is not improbable but there might be great Suspicion of *John's* Temper, and Objections against his Succession; by reason the Archbishop promis'd to stand engag'd, that *John* should reform all Grievances, and should govern the People according to the ancient known Laws.

Laws of the Land : Which Reasons and Arguments so far prevailed, that *John* was declared King. But he being once settled in the Throne, soon became unmindful of his own Oaths, and the Archbishop's Promises ; for in the very Beginning of his Reign, he began somewhat to oppress both Clergy and Laity, by imposing some Exactions, which were submitted to in the Province of *Canterbury*, because they were countenanced by that Archbishop ; but in the Province of *York* they were opposed, that Archbishop, altho' the King's Natural Brother, condemning them : Which Act so exasperates King *John* against that Prelate, that he seizes his Temporalities for his Disobedience. However, this Difference between the two Brothers, was after a time reconciled ; King *John* promising a Reformation, by which all things seem again quieted. But notwithstanding this Accommodation, these Proceedings of the Archbishop so startled the King, that he resolves upon a second Coronation, that so the Great Men, by that Ceremony, might renew their Homage and Fidelity to him ; proposing, that by this repeating their Allegiance, they might be more strongly confirmed in their Obedience. His second Coronation being performed, as if now he was secured in his Throne, he summons his Barons, according to their Tenure, to attend him, with Men and Arms, to pass the Seas ; but they refuse the Service, unless he will first ratifie and confirm

confirm their ancient Rights and Privileges, which he had sworn to perform. This Stubbornness of the Nobility, so far enrages the King, that he requires Hostages for their Fidelity, and the surrendring their Castles into his hands ; but they resolutely deny him both : For the King's Circumstances were at that time so unhappy, as he durst not proceed to Violence, whereby he was necessitated to temporize ; by reason his Nephew, *Arthur*, his Rival for Empire, was then living ; the *French* King then his Enemy, who openly favoured *Arthur* in his Attempts upon the Foreign Territories ; neither were the *English* Clergy entirely in his Interest. But King *John* had no sooner overcame these Difficulties, by the fortunate taking and murdering his Nephew, and so quieting his Foreign Troubles ; but, imagining himself secure, he began to shew the latent Venom of his former Resentments upon his Disobedient *English* Subjects : But the Barbarous Murder of Prince *Arthur*, and the Cruel Usage of the Prisoners taken in his last Foreign Expedition, and likewise of the very Hostages that were delivered to him as Pledges for their future Fidelity, occasioned some Interruptions to his Domestick Designs against his Barons ; for these his Inhuman Proceedings had so enraged the Nobility of *Anjou*, *Poitou*, and his other Foreign Dominions, that they unanimously renounce their Allegiance, take up Arms, put themselves under the Protection of the *French* King,

King, whereby King *John* is at once dispossessed of those large Countries. Exasperated then with these Misfortunes, he reproaches the Barons, as if their Disobedience had occasioned them; and then, under Pretence of a Neglect in their Services and Duty, he extorts grievous Fines from them. And whether emboldened by this Success, or whether the Sums thus collected were not sufficient for his Purpose, he again, under the Colour of Recovering his Ancient Inheritances, which had been unrighteously forced from him, imposes farther Exactions upon both Clergy and Laity. The Clergy in the Province of *Canterbury* submitted to them, by the means of the Archbishop, who was a Principal Instrument in these Taxations: But in the Province of *York* they were opposed; and the very Receivers, or Collectors, solemnly accursed by the stout Prelate of that Archbishoprick: And the Temporal Barons being sorely oppressed, became disposed to unite with the Discontented Clergy, to oppose these Tyrannical Proceedings. This was the dissatisfied State of the Nation, when an Accident broke out, that gave Fire to all these Discontents, which continued, to the almost Ruine of the Kingdom, the long and remaining part of this King's Reign.

Hubert Archbishop of *Canterbury*, the King's Favourite and Creature, who had always, by his Authority, retained the Clergy in that Province in the Royal Interest, being now dead; after

after much Strugglings between the King and the Monks, about a Successor to that See, (as being a Point of wonderful Moment at that time) the Pope, in order to determine that Controversie, interposes in the Quarrel, and appoints *Stephen de Lancton*, a Third Person, Archbishop: But he not being acceptable to the King, was the Occasion of great Contentions between the Regal and Papal Authority; by the means of which Dispute, the Clergy divided from the King, and by that, extremely weakned the Royal Cause: For soon after this, the Scene of Affairs begin to change, the Royal Authority declining; for the King persisting in his Severity against the Barons, had entirely made them his Enemies, so that they only wanted an Opportunity to unite their Forces, that they might openly declare themselves so. But King *John*, before this Dispute, what by virtue of his own Wealth and Power, for he had vast Possessions, and what by the Umbrage of the Archbishop, and Assistance of the Clergy, had been an Overmatch for them; so that altho' they complained of the King, yet they were not able to withstand his Tyranny. But now the Archbishop dead, and the Papal Dispute having withdrawn the Clergy from his side, the Barons take Arms to defend themselves, and withstand the King. It is true, this wilful Prince made some notable Strugglings against the United Force of Clergy and Laity, but was not in a Condition to continue them,

them, for he gradually sunk, and was necessitated to submit to Terms: And now, to satisfy all Parties, he solemnly swears, upon the Holy Evangelist, for the future, to maintain Holy Church Rights, and to rule his People according to the Ancient Laws of the Kingdom; and not only so, but to gratify the Roman Pontiff, with whom he had thus dared to contest, he submitted to lay his Crown at the Legate's Feet, and to receive it again under some Conditions that did not suit his Royalty. But this King having, by these Condescensions, obtained what he desired, which was, a Deliverance from his present Dangers, he soon became forgetful of his Oaths; for now being persuaded, by the present Tranquility, that the powerful Barons were lulled into Security, he neglects the Performance of what he had promised, and sworn to do: But perceiving afterwards, that his Enemies were awakened, and that he was again threatened by an impending Storm, composed of an united Force of Clergy and Laity, which he was unable to withstand; he basely resolves upon the most Unkingly Action that ever, as yet, was practised. For rather than comply with the Desires of his Barons, which he had sworn to perform, he chooses to offer himself a Tributary Prince to a Foreign and Unchristian King; (altho' perhaps he as little designed the Performance of that, as he did the other to his own Subjects.) But this Irreligious Attempt not succeeding, he changes his Measures,

Measures, and applies himself to Rome, hoping by *Sums, Promises, Submissions, and what not*, so to mollify his Holiness, as thereby to procure an Absolution from his Oath, (a thing in Conscience he did not want) but in Interest he did; for by that he bought his Peace, and engaged the Clergy on his side. For the Pope, being now reconciled to the King, removes the Interdiction which had been continued in this Kingdom for Six Years: But in the granting this, that he might not seem only to regard the Advantages of the Holy Chair, but that also of the whole Sacred Tribe, he makes it a Condition to the Absolution, That the King should make a Plenary Restitution of what he had seized from the Religious, and a Satisfaction to them for all the Damages they had sustained during that unhappy Time. Altho' the King readily consented to these Conditions, yet it is plain he never intended to perform that part that related to the General Satisfaction of the Clergy, by reason he was not in a Condition to do it; for his ill-gotten Treasure, which he had sacrilegiously wrested from them, was spent, and his present Revenues were not sufficient for it. The Clergy then being disappointed in receiving the Satisfaction they expected, again abandon the Royal Cause, and unite with the Barons. By which Confederacy, the King was so greatly alarmed, nay even affrighted, (for having quieted the *Holy Father*, he did not question the

the Duty and Obedience of his Sons) that he condescends to treat with his Barons at Runymead, where all Differences are agreed, and their Ancient Liberties confirmed in a most Religious and Solemn manner. But this Uncertain and Irreligious Prince, having dispelled these Storms of Danger that thus threatened him, by those his Concessions at Runymead, begins to meditate how to untye this Gordian Knot, that had thus bound up his Sovereign Authority: But this (his former Misfortunes had plainly taught him) was not to be done, unless he could divide the Clergy from the Barons. The better then to perform this, he secretly withdraws into the Isle of Wight, there to remain in Security, until such time as he could effect his Designs at Rome, in procuring the Pope again to his side: For if his Holiness would but absolve him from his Oath, and thunder out his Excommunications against the Great Men, for their Disobedience, if they did not submit to him their Prince; he plainly foresaw, that the Clergy would be of course separated from that Interest. All these things, by his former Arguments, *viz.* Money, and Submission, he obtains from the Holy Father, and likewise a Pious Sentence, wherein the Infallible Old Man nullifies whatever the King had agreed or transacted with his Subjects.

All things thus succeeding at Rome to his Content, he sends several of his Trusty Creatures, in which Number some of the Bishops are

are now to be reckoned, into Foreign Parts; to hire and list Soldiers for his Service, for to enable him to put the Pope's Sentence in Execution against the Barons; and the better to allure Men into this Undertaking, he promises to divide all the Estates of the Excommunicated Lords amongst them. By these, and such-like Measures, he acquired such a numerous Force, that had not the Almighty fought the Kingdom's Battel, by destroying Thousands in their Passage, by a Tempest, this Prince might have made a second Conquest, far more Calamitous than the first. For with that Number he landed, he over-run the Kingdom; and had not the Barons renounced their Allegiance, and called in the French for their Protection, they had in all likelihood soon felt how unable they were to withstand the united Force of King and Church. It is true, it was a desperate Council, thus to call in so powerful Foreigners, by reason, if successful, they might have enslaved the Nation; but the Condition of the Kingdom was desperate, and did not admit of common Remedies. The Coming then of the French soon gave a Check to the Stream of the King's Fortunes; for his Foreigners having been loaded and enriched with Plunder, seem unwilling, by fighting, to hazard what they had so easily gained; and the Nations Hatred, and the little Hopes of securing a Possession here, enclined them either to desert, or return home. But in the midst of

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these Calamities, when the Kingdom must have inevitably been ruined, which ever Party prevailed, (for it was now the Seat of War for two Foreign Armies, and the People divided) King *John*, to the great Happiness of the Nation, dies: So propitious was the Almighty, by Death, to remove this Prince who had brought in these Miseries, which during his Life, in Human Reason, could not have been reconciled, and that at the very time when nothing but Ruine was expected.

XI. King *John*, by his unsteady and violent Conduct, having miserably embroiled the Kingdom, and so dissatisfied his Barons, that several of them had entirely withdrawn their Allegiance, and had called in *Lewis*, the Prince of *France*, to their Assistance, intending to make him King, was not, at his Death in a Condition to dispose of the Crown to his Son; for such was his unhappy Circumstances, that he was in some danger of losing of it himself: However, dying amidst these Troubles, the Malecontent Barons, whether uneasy under the *French* Councils, or whether jealous of their Proceedings, or whether considering the unhappy Consequences that must ensue upon the placing a *French* Prince upon the *English* Throne, by which the Kingdom might become a Province, and they themselves but Vassals; or whether considering the King's Son was but Young, and so could not, as yet, partake in his

his Father's Vices; and the great Men, to whose Protection he was committed, were known to be well enclined to the Publick Liberty; or whether considering him as a Minor, they might conclude, that Opportunities, during a Minority, would of course be offered, which, if improved, they might establish, if not enlarge, those Rights and Laws they had so long contended for, or from what other Reasons it might proceed, but certain it is, upon King *John's* Death, several of them appeared inclined to abandon the *French* Prince; and the Royal Party were equally disposed to bring things to an Accord: So that the young *Henry*, the Son of King *John*, was crowned in a very great Assembly, the Pope's Legate shewing a wonderful Zeal for the young King, and threatening Excommunication to all such as should oppose his Accession. Several then of the great Men thus abandoning the *French* Interest, and Prince *Lewis's* Forces being extremely weakened by two unfortunate Battels, he was easily prevailed upon to accept Terms, and depart the Kingdom; whereby the Wounds of the Nation are again healed, and the People enjoy a Happy Peace, which continued, without any great Interruption, during the Minority of this young King. For the *Protectors* of this Prince, to whose Care the Government was committed, were Persons of great Wisdom and wonderful Integrity, who industriously laboured to unite the People, and to preserve

Peace; for having lately tasted the bitter Calamities of a Civil War, which had been occasioned and continued by the headstrong Measures of their late *Sovereign*, in that, being of a wilful and haughty Temper, he would not be satisfied with such Prerogatives the Laws gave him, but was incessantly labouring to encrease the Royal Authority to a Degree beyond what the very Nature of the Constitution would admit; by which violent and unnatural Measures, he endangered that very Authority he was endeavouring to enlarge, and involved himself and Kingdom in dismal and bloody Troubles: For the Barons, who had, as hath been observed, so great a Share in the Lands, and so great a Part in the Force of the Kingdom, would no more, without Violence, depart from their Ancient Rights, than that wilful Prince would be content with such Prerogatives as the Law had gave him: By which means, such Discords arose between Prince and People, that threatned an universal Ruine, if the Almighty had not interposed, and by a timely Death removed that unfortunate King; for without that, it seemed improbable that these National Differences could have then been amicably reconciled. But He, the unhappy Cause of these Misfortunes, being removed, who was detested and hated by his People, Expedients were found whereby to continue the Crown in the Royal Family, and yet preserve the Rights and Liberties of the Subject. For

For during the Minority of young *Henry*, his Son, the Guardianship of the King's Person, and Kingdom, were entrusted in the Hands of Persons of great Worth, and ample Fortunes, whose Interest it was to support the Constitution in its Primitive Purity; for should they labour to advance the Royal Authority beyond its due Limits, they would by that have lessened and endangered the Publick, and so their own Rights; or should they have endeavoured to depress the Sovereign Power, they must have broke the Constitution, and let in Anarchy and Confusion: Which had not been consistent with their own Advantage, or Safety; by reason, having great Estates, they had, by the very *Nature of the Polity*, a great Share in the Government, which, by fomenting Divisions, might have been endangered, if not lost. The Protectors then observing a steady and equal Justice, preserved an entire Peace during their Administration; which indeed seemed no easie Matter to perform, by reason of those Heats and Divisions that those bloody and unnatural Wars must have produced; besides, at the *Treaty of Pacification* with the *French Prince*, (by which the young King was settled in the Throne) the Malecontent Barons, who had called in that Foreign Power, had made Terms for their own Security; which, if the Protectors had not literally observed, might have revived a Civil War, as Fatal as the former.

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But young *Henry*, arrived at Years of Discretion, assumes the Government into his own hands, and then quickly swerving from the former Measures pursued by his Governors, he soon makes a Change in the Face of Publick Affairs: For being now at full Age, he was pressed to ratifie and confirm the Ancient Laws, which by the *Treaty of Pacification* he was obliged to perform; which he seems unwilling to do, by which he discovered that he did not deviate from his Father's Temper. However, being advised by some of his Creatures, that things not being as yet ripe for his future Designs, it was much safer for him to temporize, than obstinately to deny; for, as yet, his Fortunes were not sufficient to obtain a Force powerful enough to withstand the united Power of the Clergy and Laity; (for both Estates vehemently urged him to the Performance of what the Protectors, at the aforesaid *Pacification*, had sworn, in his behalf, should be done.) He therefore seems willing to comply with their joint Desires, and declares his Readiness to Confirm their Ancient Laws; but then says, *It was but reasonable, that he should be first informed what those Ancient Rights or Laws were*; for he perceived that was not entirely agreed: He therefore proposes, that a Commission be first issued out, and directed to a certain Number of Men in each County, that might be impowered to enquire after them, and to make a Return, that thereby it might

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might be known what they are; by which means, he gained Time: For, as the Sequel of his Reign proves, he seems never to have intended to Ratifie them; but having, by this specious Pretence, obtained his End, which was the deferring the Ratification, he begins to apply himself to Methods, whereby he might be enabled to withstand the Insults of his Barons, in case they should continue to press him to a Performance. But this not being to be done without a Treasure, or Revenues, whereby to raise Men, that being dependant on him, would be at his Discretion: And to obtain this, was no easie Matter; for the Extravagances and Troubles of the last Reigns, and his own Minority, had made great Alienations from the Crown, the present Revenue being extremely lessened, and the Number of his Tenants and Vassals diminished: Neither was it seasonable to begin with Violence, when he had not a Force to support it. Besides, during his Minority, the greatest Personages had enjoyed the principal Trusts and Offices, who not being to be brought to comply with violent Measures, would be a marvellous Obstruction to his Proceedings; for these having great Estates, would not be proper Instruments to be used in the depressing and trampling upon Civil Rights: So that embarrassed in these Difficulties, he was necessitated to have recourse to soft and gentle Methods, as the most promising way to relieve

his Wants. He therefore summons a Parliament, and there solemnly ratifies their Charters, which before he had deferred; which being acceptable to the States, they consent to a Re-assumption of Crown-Lands. The King, as an Inducement to this Act, had cunningly varnish'd his Designs with the Pretence of his Desire of being relieved this way, as least burdensome to his People, by reason the Regal Dignity might by this means be for the future supported by its own Revenue.

Having succeeded so well, he resolves, after some time, to try another Parliament; and that he might not want some Colour to countenance his Demand for Supplies, he communicates to them a Resolution of Recovering the Foreign Dominions, that had been unjustly wrested from the Crown of *England* in his Father's Time. This he was sure would be a Proposition very acceptable to the great Men, by reason several of them had large Estates in those Countries: But notwithstanding that, they would not consent to Supplies, but with a Condition, that the King should again confirm their Charters, which he, induced by his Necessities, readily performed.

So that now the Kingdom enjoys an Universal Repose: But this Happiness was too great to be of any long Continuance; for this King's Ambition, or Necessity, soon disposed him to pursue such Measures, as quickly clouded the Nation's Quiet: For having ineffectually tried another

another Parliament, for more Supplies, which were denied him, in that the last they gave were not applied to the Uses they were intended; he now begins to unmask himself, and attempts to supply his Necessity by illegal Methods. But that he might not alarm the Nation, by openly violating the Laws which he had but lately sworn to observe, he endeavours to varnish his unjustifiable Proceedings with some Shew of Justice; for he begins his Tyranny with the Cancelling and Annulling all Grants that were made in his Nonage; alledging, in his Justification, that such being obtained in his Minority, could not now oblige him; and therefore declares, all those who have such Grants, if they expect to continue in them, should have them renewed; for the Ratification of which, he demands exorbitant Sums. These Proceedings not being approved by his Barons, nor countenanced by his own Brother, made him apprehensive of some Danger, which he hopes by Severity to prevent: And to this Purpose, he resolves to begin with his Brother; thinking, perhaps, by crushing him, to terrifie others. But these Methods of raising Money not being sufficient to answer his Ambitious Designs, he proceeds farther, and now cancels the Charter of the Forests; by which grievous and vexatious Action, he proposes to raise great Sums. But these his Tyranical and Arbitrary Proceedings soon occasion a Confederacy of the Nobility, who

who threaten to depose him, unless he desists from these violent Courses; terrified by which Message, he submits to an Accommodation.

And now things being quiet, to amuse the People, he undertakes an Expedition into France, to recover, as he pretends, his Patrimony; but having, by his imprudent Conduct, spent his Treasure, and lost his Men, he returns without any Success: And as if the Misfortunes of his Voyage had flowed from the Obstinacy of his Subjects, in not having supplied his Excessive Wants, he, upon his Return, vents his Rage upon the *Londoners*, and *Jews*, extorting vast Sums by way of Fine. But these not being sufficient to answer his Extravagant Wants, and being as yet unwilling to try a Parliament, by reason the People being so disobliged, he could expect no Supplies from that Assembly; he falls severely upon his own Officers, amercing and fining them at Pleasure, under the Pretence of having received Bribes, oppressed the Subject, and cheated him; and so having squeezed and punished them, he fills their Places with Strangers, as fitter Instruments for his future Purposes. And not content with this, (as if he laboured to perfect his own Ruine) even in the very height of Discontents, he marries, contrary to the Genius of the Nation, into a numerous and declining Family, whereby he becomes encompassed with a Swarm of his Queen's needy Relations, who are to be provided for out of the

the Publick Treasury. By these impolitic Measures, his Necessities encrease, and his giddy Temper suggests nothing but violent Methods to supply them; whereby the great Men are exasperated, and having learn'd from his former Proceeding, how little regard is to be had to his Faith, they confederate, and raise Forces to oppose his illegal Methods. And so begins that Calamitous Civil War, between this Prince and his Barons, that continued, altho' with some short Intermiſſions, the greatest part of his long and unfortunate Reign.

This King appears to have been a Prince of a wilful and forward Temper, one who hated Opposition, and therefore thirsted after arbitrary and unbounded Power; but not having Treasure, Revenues, or Force, sufficient to accomplish that his great Design, which he perpetually pursued, he became embarrassed in continual Troubles. For his Passion, Ambition, or Will, exceeding his Judgment, (which doth not appear to have been great or steady) he still pursues what he wanted Means to obtain; for such was his Obstinacy, or Weakness, that he will not, or cannot discern, that his Misfortunes, or Miscarriages, proceed from the very Nature of his Designs, which were perfectly inconsistent with the then *Polity, Times, or People*: But still seems to imagine, that they are occasioned by some Errors in his Measures; and therefore will not desist from pursuing his End, but only shifts and changes his Methods, by

by which he proposes to attain it, as often as he experiences the former unsuccessful. Thus we find him sometimes haughty, menacing and threatenng his People; and when that will not do, he falls into violent Methods; and then taught by the Difficulty or Danger of such, he leaves them; and in an Instant flags in his Fury, sinks in his Courage, is terrified, becomes humble, tame, and moderate; sends to his Barons, acknowledges his former Errors, promises Amendment, ratifies the Charters, and do's every thing they desire; presently he starts back, revokes what he had done, huffs, threatens, and falls again into Violence. And thus he interchangeably acted, until by this unsteady Conduct he reduced his Affairs to so low an Ebb, that his Barons not only maniced the Royal Authority, but stripped him of Royalty, and made themselves Regents of his Person and Kingdom. And this they continued, until their Ambitions, (for each would be greatest) produced Divisions, which brought forth Cruelty: For these pretended Patrons of Liberty, that took up Arms to defend the Kingdom from the Tyranny of an unhappy Prince, having once obtained his Power, fell themselves into Factions, and became as unjust and tyranical in the use of Authority, as the King they had opposed; and the Nation was so far from being bettered by this Change, that instead of one, they now had many Tyrants. A full Evidence what Man

Man will be, when exalted above Laws, and so left to his own Will; and how apt Men are to practise themselves, what they will often condemn in others: For these Great Men, when in private Capacities, reproached the Tyranny of their King; but yet no sooner were they become Kings, by usurping the Royal Authority, but they also become Tyrants.

For the severe Proceedings of the Regents, soon made it evident, that the Subjects Condition was not bettered by this Change; for the People, groaning under this new Tyranny, soon begin to wish for the Restoration of their Old Master; (the present Sufferings being always esteemed heaviest) so that the King had no sooner erected his Standard, to oppose the Regents, but the People flock to it: Strange Fate of Human Affairs! That the very Prince, that was but lately reproached as a Tyrant and Oppressor, is now looked upon as a Saviour, and sought after as a Deliverer: For such a Multitude resort to him, that his Army in Number soon exceeds the Barons: But notwithstanding that Advantage, the Fatal Battel of *Lewes* made the King and Prince his Son Prisoners, whereby the Kingly Power was again in the hands of the Barons: But Divisions soon arose amongst the Victors, for the great *Leicester* would not admit of an Equal, nor *Gloucester* of a Superior, who therefore become the Heads of two opposite Factions: And

And the young Prince making an Escape from his Imprisonment, soon appeared at the Head of another Army; and the Misunderstandings encreasing amongst the great Men, occasioned their Ruine. For *Gloucester* dissatisfied, withdraws from the Confederacy, and unites with the Prince; and by that, *Leicester's* Army was so weakened, that in the Battel of *Evesham* his Forces were routed, and he slain.

There were several things worthy remarking, that contributed to this strange Turn in the King's Affairs; as,

The first, In that the Barons did not, after their Victory, stop at what they had assigned as the Reason of taking up Arms, *viz.* the Ratifying their Ancient Charters; but continued an Usurped and Lawless Authority in themselves, which they had pretended to condemn in the King; Besides, in the continuing this Power in their own hands, they committed Violence upon the very Nature of the Constitution, which could not subsist under divided Heads: For nothing but Divisions and Factions, could ensue upon such a Model, which must naturally usher in Ruine; as the Misunderstandings between *Leicester* and *Gloucester* immediately did. For in Civil Dissentions, where there are two opposite Parties, if a third springs up, it naturally falls in with one side; as in this very Instance: *Gloucester's* Party soon united with that of the King's, which was now headed by the Prince.

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The Second was, In that the King had now gained the Pope's Legate to his side, as is most evident from the Endeavours that Minister used to procure Assistance from the Clergy; by which, several of that Body favoured the Royal Party.

The Third was, That the King, now taught by a long and sad Experience, how impracticable his Designs were, of acquiring Arbitrary Power, did seriously apply himself to remedy Grievances, as appears, in that he was not elated by his Victory, nor did not fall into his former Violences, but permitted the People to enjoy quietly what they had so long contended for. It is true, there might be some present Reasons for that; for the adverse Party, as yet, possessed some Strong Holds, and could not be prevailed upon to submit to the King's Mercy, without being restored to their Estates; which was violently opposed by those who had the Grants of them, by which means the Publick Peace was again endangered: For *Gloucester* insists, that they may be restored; which being denied, he retires and arms. But the Legate interposing, things are accommodated without Blows; whereby the Malecontents being forsaken, were obliged to surrender to the Prince who was marched against them. Thus all things are again quieted; and the King, to gratifie the Legate, and please the Religious, consents, that the Prince may undertake a Holy War; which he performed, to his

his own Glory, but the Nation's Loss. However, his Father dying when he was in that Expedition, he was, altho' absent, unanimously declared King.

XII. The different Fates of the two last turbulent Reigns, do prove how difficult, if not impossible, it is for Princes to acquire an Arbitrary and Unbounded Power over a People, where the very Nature of the Constitution is not besitted for it; as it is certain the Ancient English one was not, by reason the Prince had not the Milice so entirely dependant upon him; neither had he a Revenue whereby to hire one, that might enable him to overballance the Power of the People: Neither could the Prince easily obtain a Foreign or Mercenary Army, sufficient to wrest the Wealth and Lands out of the hands of the Subject, by reason the Constitution permitted no Milice to the Prince, but what was annexed as a Service to the Land; so that the Land and Force was in those Days inseparable: And whenever the Prince hath attempted to violate this Fundamental, he hath been opposed. Nay, should an *English* King have been so inhumanly barbarous, as to have intended the Destruction of his own People, rather than not obtain his Arbitrary End, (as we want not an Instance in *King John*) yet such a Prince must probably have been disappointed at last in his Designs; by reason he must then have established a
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new Government, by sharing or dividing the Lands amongst his Followers; there not being, in those early Times, any other Methods of rewarding them: And then *such* fighting only for their Pay, would likewise partake in the Conquest; as we find was always done by these Nations in those Times. The Followers, or Soldiers, then being possessed of the Land, would in time become as zealous to maintain their own Rights against future Encroachments, as their former Possessors had been to defend theirs: As may be instanced in the *Norman* Conquest; for the very Followers of the Conqueror, who were invested in the *English* Estates, soon became as earnest Assertors of the Ancient Liberties, as the *Saxons* themselves could have been, had they not been dispossessed.

And notwithstanding *King John* had once that Fate, as by the Help of Foreigners to over-run this Kingdom, yet he durst not begin, or plant a new Government upon them; by which means he became unable to keep what he had by their Assistance violently obtained; for they not being immediately rewarded with the Lands, as they expected, soon grew cool in the Quarrel, and gradually deserted him. And then his own People being convinced of their desperate Circumstances, and of the King's base Intentions, choose rather to incur the contingent Hazard of Oppression from a Foreign Prince, whom they had
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called in to their Assistance, than a certain and real one from their own Sovereign: Which hazardous Measures of the Barons, soon effected what they intended, which was, to give a Check to the Career of that Prince's Fortunes. It is true, had not the timely Death of that unfortunate King, administred an Opportunity of putting an End to the Calamities of those Times, it is not unlikely but those dangerous Measures might have brought not only a Ruine upon the King, and his Posterity, but also upon the Barons themselves, and theirs: So much had the violent Proceedings of this wilful Prince, alienated the Hearts of his People from him, that they choose that desperate Course of imploring Assistance from a potent Foreign Power, rather than submit to his Tyranny.

But *Henry*, his Son and Successor, had quite the Reverse of his Father's Fate; for altho' his Aims after Arbitrary Power seem to be equal to his Father's, and altho' his Measures, in the Prosecution of it, were as unsteady and uncertain as his; yet the Fortunes of his Reign were extremely different: For *Henry* grasping at the Peoples Rights, actually lost his own, being compelled to commit himself to the Guardianship of his Subjects, and by that, to acknowledge his own unfitness to reign: And when these his Guardians had so oppressed the People, that they grew weary of their Government; the very People that before had suffer'd

fer'd by the Prince, now flock to his Standard, to be by his Conduct delivered from their present Oppression. And *Henry* wisely improving this Opportunity, gathered such a Force that outnumbered his Adversaries; but precipitating a Battel, his Army was routed, and himself and Son taken Prisoners: But Divisions arising amongst the Victors, for Success often ushers in Ruine, where Armies are commanded by Equals, (for the Danger being removed that induced their Union, Disputes naturally arise amongst themselves) and Prince *Edward*, King *Henry's* stout and prudent Son, making his Escape, gathered such Forces that turned the Fortune of the War to the Royal side, and in the end, entirely subdued the opposite Party.

Yet notwithstanding this great Success of *Henry*, by the Conduct of Prince *Edward* his Son, in the last Period of his Life, yet he was not by that enabled to alter the Constitution, or to trample upon the Liberties of the People; for had he attempted it, that very Party, it is probable, that raised him, would have been his Enemies: For after a long and tedious War, that ended to the Advantage of the Prince, the Crown really gained nothing; as appears, in that Prerogative and Liberty remained in the same state as they were in before the War: So impracticable an Undertaking it was, in that Constitution, for a Prince to establish an Arbitrary Power; or for Subjects to tram-

ple upon Sovereignty: For in these two Instances of *John* and *Henry*, as the Misfortunes of the First, in the last Period of his Life, did not enlarge Liberty; so the Success of the Last, did not suppress it: A clear Proof of the Vanity of Attempts to alter the present Forms of Government, when the Nature of the Constitution is not befitted for such a Change.

XIII. *Edward*, the Son of *Henry*, succeeds his Father in the Throne; a Prince of great Courage, and happy Conduct, ripe in Years, and mature in Judgment; having learnt by his Grandfather's and Father's Misfortunes, and in truth by his own Experience, (he having largely shared in the late Civil Troubles) how dangerous it was for an *English* Prince, to prosecute unbounded Power, when the very Nature of the Constitution did not favour such an Attempt; seems perfectly to have laid aside all such Designs, for he pursues Measures extremely different from what had been practised by either Father, or Grandfather: For he appears careful to avoid all Disputes with his Subjects, voluntarily confirming their Charters, that had cost so much Blood: And his People, in Return, gratefully present him with Subsidies and Supplies, being ready to comply with their Prince in every thing, who had gave them such proofs of his Justice and Affection. By this means, this Great Prince was enabled, (notwithstanding the Miseries and Deva-

Devastations that were occasioned by a direful Civil War, during the two last Reigns) to raise his own and Kingdom's Reputation; which had sunk to the lowest degree, in the time of his Predecessors, to a heighth equal, if not exceeding, what it ever attained at in the time of any of his Ancestors, altho' they were possessed of many and great foreign Territories, which were now in a manner lost. For this Wise Prince, altho' of a Mind as great and aspiring, as any of our former Kings, yet having a Judgment equal to his Ambition, He foresaw Glory was not safely to be acquired by sheathing his Sword in his own Bowels; that is, by wounding and injuring his own Subjects, since by such an Act, he himself, as the Soul and Life of that Body, must be weakned, and in the End suffer by the very Wound he had made: He therefore, like a Father of his People, tenders their Welfare, and makes his *Subjects Rights*, as much his Care, as *his own Prerogatives*; never attempting to violate the One, or to enlarge the Other; but turned his mighty Designs upon other Countries; Proposing rather to eternalize his Name by Foreign Conquests, then to aggrandize his Power, by oppressing his own People. And having accordingly settled a Peace and Repose in his own Kingdom, the blessed Effects of his Wisdom and Goodness, he became the Dread and Terror to his Neighbours. He had even in his Youth, acquired a Renown for his Valour, in our own unhappy

Civil Wars, which had been enlarged by his wonderful Performances in the Holy War: And now he farther confirms that his Glorious Character, by his Reducing *Wales*, Conquering *Scotland*, Relieving *Flanders*, and Obliging *France* to a Peace: Such mighty things this great Prince performed, being thus beloved, and so entrusted by his own Subjects; whereas his Predecessors, who aimed at Arbitrary Rule, and meanly laboured to oppress and enslave their own People, had the Fate of being scorned of their Neighbours, of being outed and dispossessed of their Ancient Territories, hated and despised by their Subjects, derided and deserted by their Friends, and at last died unpitied and unlamented by All. It is true, this Great Prince had some small Heat with his Barons, occasion'd by his *Gascoigne* Expedition: But he soon compos'd these Misunderstandings; prudently considering, that to dispute with his Subjects, was to lessen his Authority; and that National Differences are better accommodated by Complaisance and Kindness, than by Force and Arms: For he too well knew, that altho' Civil Quarrels should end to the Prince's Advantage, yet that by such he loses his own Strength, in that his Subjects are destroyed, as if they were his Enemies. Thus this Great Prince lived, honoured and beloved by his Subjects, admired and dreaded by his Enemies, and died pitied and lamented by All,

All, leaving his Crown, but not his Vertues, to be inherited by his Son and Successor.

XIV. And now *Edward* the Second ascends the Throne, whose Reign, altho' as unfortunate as any of the former, yet the Motives to these Misfortunes were extremely different from what had occasioned those tedious Troubles that happened in King *John*, or *Henry's* Time: For this unfortunate King does not seem to have imitated them in any of his Proceedings, being of a Temper very unlike Either; for he does not appear to be of a wilful or aspiring Mind, nor to thirst after Arbitrary Rule; for he neither infringes the Ancient Rights, nor violates the so much contested for Charters: His Own, and the Kingdom's Misfortunes, seeming not so much to have been occasioned by any Ambition, Wilfulness, or Vices of his own, as by his Weakness and Easiness in tamely submitting and giving himself up to the Guidance and Government of Others; he being of so very complying a Nature, that he would always be governed: For whosoever had the Ascendant in his Affections, (and he could not live without a Favourite) perfectly guided him; for (from what may be collected, of what is recorded of him) he seems to have had no Resolutions of his own, but to have received all from his Favourite: His very Nature seems to have been so passive, and so very complying, that he seems not to have been only

governed, but even actuated by his Minion, who always directed and carried him as he pleased; his Favourites governing both his Person and Kingdom, making only use of his Name, to colour and countenance their own Villanies. For this *Poor Prince* was not, like the former, ruined by his own violent and headstrong Will, by grasping at more Power than was his Legal Right; but was merely undone by meanly subjecting himself to the Will and Guidance of Others, who used his Name to justify their own Wickedness: For as Pride, Obstinacy, Ambition, and Thirst after Rule, were the Vices that embroiled the former Reigns; so Easiness, Complacency, Submission, or rather Subjection, were what ruined this: Which cannot be called so much Vices in themselves, as they became so, in being unfortunately placed.

Edward, during his Father's Life, had committed some riotous and dissolute Actions, which were not so much imputed to the Warmth of his Youth, (for his Nature was known to be too tender and innocent for such Practises) as they were esteemed the unhappy Effects of of the corrupt Counsels of his Companion and Favourite *Gavestone*, who being bred up with the Prince, was always dear to him; for *Gavestone* was known to have influenced him to commit several Outrages and Disorders, that seemed contrary to his easie and flexible Temper, and to have induced him to appear some-
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what froward and disobedient to his Father: Which being observed by that wise King, he thought it but time to remove this his Companion, by a Banishment, from his Son's Presence; and strictly to enjoin the young Prince never to recall him after his Death: And as a farther Expedient to prevent his Return, the King, upon his Death-Bed, enjoins the Barons to see this his Will and Desire performed. But the young Prince, once possessed of the Throne, soon became unmindful of his dying Father's Will, for he immediately recalls his Favourite: *Gavestone* returned, is plumed with Honours, and entrusted with the Management of all Affairs of State; the fond King thinking all too little for his Minion. But *Gavestone's* haughty and imperious Mind is not content with these Dignities, but will despise the Nobility, and disgorge his Wit and Venom in scoffing and ridiculing them. The Great Men, provoked and enraged by these Insolencies, confederate, and then demand of the King the Removal of his Favourite, that his Father's Will might be performed, which they had promised to see done; and they themselves restored to their proper Rights, that were now usurped by *Gavestone*. The King, terrified with their Threats, consents to his Banishment; but the Storm being blown over, (for the Barons were appeased by their Sovereign's Condescension) he is again recalled. The Barons finding their Councils neglected, and their Prince's Promises violated,

violated, for the shining Favourite now again governs all, resolve by Violence to pull this Minion from their Sovereign's Breasts, and sacrifice him to their own Revenge: Which they effected, to the Grief and Indignation of the King, who was so passionately in love with this Man, that he left his big-bellied Queen in Tears, begging his Stay, to accompany *Gavestone* to a Place of Security, when the Lords were in pursuit of him.

But such was this King's Temper, that he would not live without a Favourite; and such the easiness of his Mind, that he could be govern'd by him: And such was the then State of the Kingdom, that it did not well permit of the One or the Other. For the Barons having great Authority, would not willingly admit of a single Ministry, which a Favourite would advance: By which, Clashings were occasioned between the Prince and Barons, which gave beginning to all those Misfortunes, that afterwards ended in the Ruine of this King.

What is very Remarkable in this Reign, is, That the Pretences for the Disputes that were between this King and his Barons, were not grounded upon the Violation of the Charters, or upon any Infringements of the Ancient Rights, but from the Advancement of new Favourites, and the Kings being guided by the unfortunate Councils of their Ministry. It is true, these Minions, that governed all, did sometimes, and by some indirect Methods, grieve

grieve or oppress some one or more of the Great Men, whose Power or Authority they dreaded, as may be particularly instanced in the Earl of *LANCASTER*, by which Discontents were encreased: Yet these Violences being only particular, and not directly affecting the whole Body of the Nobility, were not sufficient (altho' a Party was formed, and headed by some of the most popular Persons) to shake the Throne, until such time as the Ignominious Misfortunes and Insuccesses attending the *Scottish* Affairs, which were National, and therefore affecting the whole People, were charged upon, and imputed to the base and villainous Conduct and Councils of the Favourites; which so marvellously alienated the Hearts of the People, that they were, after that, easily disposed to withdraw their Obedience from the Throne, which they believed was supported only by a Company of Miscreants, and Vermin, that only aimed at the establishing their own Power, altho' it was to the Ruine of the Kingdom. For after the Misfortunes that attended this *Scottish* War, Discontents run high, and the Nation seems prepared for a Revolution, wanting only a favourable Opportunity whereby to effect it: which is always soon offered, by the Proceedings of a warm and revengeful Ministry; For now the Queen is thought an Enemy to the Favourites, by reason she had interposed, and by her good Offices composed some Differences between

between the King and the Great Men; which was a thing not acceptable to the Minions: And therefore the Queen's Revenues are to be lessened, as a Punishment for such an Offence. By this Proceeding against the Queen, they had a farther Aim; for knowing her to be a Lady of a high Spirit, and one that would resent such an Act, it was concluded it might be a means of entirely separating her from her Duty and Affection to the King, when he should consent to such an Usage of her: So that she being removed, who had some Influence upon the King, there then would be no body that durst to calm or oppose their Councils. But this their Project proved their Ruine; for the King's unfortunate Circumstances at Home, gave the *French* King an Opportunity of seizing his Territories Abroad: The Queen then is sent, or else desires a Permission, to go to that King, her Brother, that by her Mediation all Differences and Disputes between the two Kings might peaceably be adjusted: And being got into *France*, she cunningly, under a Pretence of a Match for her Son, obtains Leave for the *Young Prince* to be brought to her: And now having gained her Point, and strengthened her Interest, by the Presence of her Son, she becomes unmindful of her Husband's Bed, and places her Affections upon *Mortimer, her beloved Gallant*. All things being ripe in *England* for a Change, she returns fraught with Revenge, and

and full of Rancour, erects her Banner, publishes her own Injuries, and declares for the Punishment of Evil Councillors, and the Removal of Favourites, that had brought Ruine upon the King and Kingdom: The Nobility flock to her Standards, and the Clergy join in the Cause; for the Favourites had lately disobligened that Body, by their severe Prosecution of the Bishop of *Hereford* in the Civil Courts, which was esteemed a Violation of the Rights of Holy Church. This unfortunate King is soon forsok by all, as having, in truth, himself formerly forsok all but his Minions, and is forced to fly to seek Safety in Obscurity, but in doing that is unfortunately seized by his Enemies; and being now made a Prisoner, a Parliament is assembled, and this poor Prince is stripped of Royal Authority, being obliged to make a formal Resignation of his Crown and Dignity, *Edward*, his Son, being declared King.

XV. *Edward* the second deposed, and *Edward* the third, his Son, a Minor, crowned King, the Tutelage of his Person and Government of the Kindom, is speciously conferred upon Twelve Persons, as Governours; but is really usurped by the Queen, and her *Mortimer*: For a Parliament being called, when this Lady was in the heigth of her Fortunes, the King her Husband being her Prisoner, and the People pleased with a Revolution effected by

by her means, by which they were freed from the Tyranny of the Favourites, which was by the Misfortunes of the late Reign become extremely odious; were then so marvellously fond of this Princess, their Deliverer, that they denyed no Honours, that could be heaped upon her: the Parliament enlarge her Jointure to the Prejudice of the King, settling three fourths of the Royal Revenues upon her: And the Governours of the King's Person and Kingdom, have that Opinion and Confidence of her Wisdom and Goodness, that they permit all things to her Management. This Lady thus flowing in Wealth, and abounding in Authority, showers down her Favours upon her beloved *Mortimer*, and they both employ their Thoughts how to continue that Power they have fortunately obtained: To do this, an Expedient is necessary, whereby the Minds of the People may be amused, that so they may not too nearly enquire into the Secrets of the present Administrations. An Expedition then against *Scotland* is resolved, which if successful, would confirm them in their new Authority: However, it was a perfect Balm to quiet the Minds of the People, and to appease the Disorders proceeding from intestine Discord and Faction; for the People by that means, amused with the Apprehension of Foreign and Common Danger, would not be so prone to examine into the present Miscarriages, nor to find fault with the Conduct of these in
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the Administration: For that Person that shall dare (during Foreign Danger) to do these things, will be condemned as disaffected, and will be thought to intend and foment Divisions, and so will be Branded with the Name of an Incendiary, and an Enemy to his Contry. It is for this Reason, that a War, after a Revolution, (which is always the Effect of great Discontents, Divisions, and Factions in a Nation) seems as necessary in a Body Politick, to quiet and still the People, as Opium is to compose the Rage of the Spirits in the Body Natural, after it hath been griped and disordered by the discharging of peccant and noxious Humours. Besides, a War gives an Opportunity to a new and rapacious Ministry, (and such usually succeed Revolutions) or to the Favourites of the Prince in Possession, to demand vast Sums, which then are readily granted; which are never to be appropriated, but the Ministers will have a share in them: And the Zeal of the People being always warm, whilst the Sense of a Deliverance is fresh, Abuses that concern the Government, are rarely much examined, or in truth enquir'd into: For this Reason it is, that we may usually observe the Creatures of a Prince, after a Revolution, soon become egregiously Rich. But this Queen had a farther Design in this War, for she had brought over some Foreign Troops, which she seems very desirous to retain; which not being then consistent with the Constitution,
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nor agreeable to the People, she could not safely continue, but by pretending to employ them in this War. But this *Scottish* Expedition proving unfortunate, and that, as it was generally believed, occasioned by *Mortimer*, who was thought, (by permitting the *Scots* to make a dishonourable Escape, when it was in the Power of the *English* to have destroyed them) to make great Advantages to himself: The Nobility become so exasperated, that they press the Queen to send her mercenary Strangers home; alledging, that they were dangerous, and had been useless in the War: With which Demands the Queen then complies, being engaged in a Treaty with *Scotland*, which might be of more Advantage to her and her Minion, than the detaining her Foreign Troops: For by that Treaty, it was plain she had more regard to her own Safety, than to the King or Kingdom's Advantage; for she consented to most dishonourable Conditions to gain the Peace. But the Great Men being grown dissatisfied at these Mismanagements, and Jealous at her Proceedings, begin to withdraw from her Interest, and form Parties to remedy these Miscarriages: The *Queen* and her *Mortimer* are publicly reviled, as the Occasions of the Nation's Misfortunes; the late Ministry, or rather Reigns, of *Gavestone* and the *Spensors*, are represented as more tolerable, than the present of the *Queen* and her *Mortimer*. These Publick Complaints, and the Secret Whispers

Whispers of some of the Nobility, roused up a sleeping Lion in the young King's Breast, so that he grew jealous of the Proceedings of this shining Favourite; for such was *Mortimer's* Extravagancies, that he eclipsed the Royal Youth in outward Pomp and Magnificence: His Person being encircled with a greater Number of Attendance; and his Authority so great, that he raised Men with his Smiles, and ruined them with his Frowns; all things of moment being transacted by his Councils: Add to this, He was become Insolent and Revengeful, and had imprudently appear'd an Instrument in the Death of the King's Unkle. The young King, awakened by these Proceedings, thinks it but time to humble the Pride of this Favourite, whose immoderate Authority threatened Him and the State; and accordingly so orders Matters, that he should be privately seized; which being effected, he was arraigned, convicted, and executed; for there seldom is wanting Crimes, Evidences, or Judges, to ruine an imperious Favourite: But *Mortimer* must not suffer alone, but the Queen likewise must undergo some Punishment; for being accused of Lewdness and Misgovernment, she is condemned to perpetual Imprisonment; her Estate is confiscated to the King's use, and a small Pension only allowed for her Maintenance.

This Instance may confirm to us, how inconsistent a Juncto, or a single Ministry, was

to the Old *English* Constitution; for altho' in this very Case the Nation readily united with the Queen, in her Pretence for the removing Favourites in her Husband's Time, and as an Acknowledgment for these Services, heaped unparalied Honours upon her; yet those Favours would not protect her, when she was acting the same Measures, that were condemn'd in the former Reign.

And now the young King having taken the Government into his own hands, resolves, like a wise Prince, to make his People his Favourites; for having learnt, by his Father's Misfortunes, the Dangers that attend a separate Ministry, he prudently avoids that Shelve, and consults his People in all his most difficult Affairs; and thus guided by their Councils, he makes one Common Interest between Prince and People: By which prudent Course, he became enabled to perform such Glorious Achievements, as silenced the bravest Actions of his Ancestors: For he gave Laws to *Scotland*, and carried his Laurels into the very Bowels of *France*; and had, at one time, the two Kings of those mighty Kingdoms, his Captives and Prisoners. Thus this Great Prince reigned beloved of his People, and successful in his Enterprizes, rarely meeting with any Check to his good Fortunes; until such time, as declining in Years, and encreasing in Infirmities, he unhappily committed the Management of Affairs to his Son, *John of Gant*, Duke of *Lancaster*,

caster, who pursuing sinister Purposes of his own, occasioned Jealousies and Factions in the State; which so perplexed all National Concerns, that the latter part of this King's Reign was somewhat clouded and unsuccessful.

The Beginning of these Domestick Divisions, that so much eclipsed the Glory in the latter part of this Illustrious Reign, proceeded from the Ambition and Insolence of the Duke of *Lancaster*, the King's now Favourite Son, who governed all; For the Prince of *Wales*, known by the Name of the *Black Prince*, the Darling of the People, and Mirrour of *English* Virtue, after a long and languishing Sicknes, which had withdrew him from Publick Business, dying, left one only Son, who was afterwards King *Richard*. The Duke of *Lancaster* (in the Life-time of the Prince of *Wales*, who, by reason of his Weakness, had not been able for some time to attend Councils) had, by the Assistance of *Alice Percy*, the King's Concubine, so insinuated into the Affection of the infirm King, that he had gained the Administration into his own Hands; and under the Colour of that Authority, was labouring to raise a Party to enable him to exclude the young Prince *Richard*, and to secure the Succession to himself. These his Designs were not so secretly managed, but they were observed by his weak and dying Brother, the Prince of *Wales*, who wisely endeavoured in his Life-time to raise a Party, that might ballance that

of the aspiring Duke ; which he easily effected, for the People generally favoured him ; and the Parliament so far espoused his Cause, that they addressed the King for the removing the Duke and his Creatures from his Presence and Councils. But the Prince of *Wales* being dead, and the King's Infirmities encreasing, the Duke returns, and is again entrusted with the Regency : But before this was done, it was thought advisable to do somewhat in favour of the young Prince *Richard*, thereby to quiet the People, who hating the Duke, murmured at these Proceedings: *Richard* therefore is created *Prince of Wales, Duke of Cornwall, and Earl of Chester* ; and that there might remain no Jealousies of any secret Designs of the Duke of *Lancaster*, the King in Parliament solemnly declares *Richard* his Successor: Which things had so far the desired Effects, that the Duke is now permitted to continue in the Regency.

But the Duke, established in his Government, calls a new Parliament, which he endeavours, by all manner of Practises, to gain to his Interest; but things not succeeding in that Assembly to his Wishes, for instead of granting Subsidies, which he laboured to obtain, the Parliament fell upon Grievances, which produced Disputes and Complaints, but no Money: And the Clergy also proving Refractory, entirely disappointed him; for that Body refuse to treat of any Business, by reason the Bishop of *Winchester*, a Prelate hated and feared

feared by that Duke, was not admitted into that Assembly. These unhappy and unexpected Proceedings extremely mortifie the Duke; but his Brother, the late Prince of *Wales*, being dead, he thought himself able to overcome all Difficulties, and accordingly forms Projects to humble his Enemies: He begins with the Clergy, as imagining he had a favourable Opportunity of humbling them, by the means of *Wigliffe*, and his Adherents; he therefore publickly favours that Doctrine, and countenanced all its Followers: This he believed would be acceptable to the People, by reason those Opinions were manifestly levelled at Churchmen, who he thought were now envied by the Nobility, for their immense Wealth, and immoderate Authority, and hated by the People for their Pride and Cruelty. But the Duke, by too hastily espousing a Sect that had not Numbers, or Strength, to defend it self, was endangered of being buried in its Ruines: For the *Londoners* not being pleased with these Novelties, publickly exclaim against the Duke, as the Abettor of them, and openly reproach him as an Obstracter of Justice, in his hindering and discountenancing the punishing of these Hereticks; which Discontents improve to such a degree, that they rise in Numbers, and tumultuously rife his House, and threaten Violence to his Person; to avoid whose Fury, he takes Sanctuary in the House of the *Princess his Sister-in-law*, whose innocent Son he had plotted

plotted to have disinherited; under whose Roof he was secure from the Rage of the Multitude, for that Lady was always beloved and admired by the People. Altho' these Tumults, and the general Hatred of the Nation, gave some Check to the ambitious and aspiring Designs of *Lancaster*; yet his intriguing Conduct in his Regency, being always suspected, had occasioned such Fears and Jealousies in the Minds of the People, that they seemed backward and unwilling to assist and relieve the Crown. By these Divisions, in the last Years of this King's Reign, were unhappily lost all those large Provinces, and mighty Conquests, that He, in the Prime of his Age, when Publick Affairs were manag'd by his own Conduct, had gloriously obtained; and there remained nothing of all his wonderful Atchievements, to his Posterity, but the single Town of *Calais*: So suddenly did an intriguing Regency beget National Factions, which withered the Laurels of a most flourishing Reign.

XVI. But *Edward* being dead, maugre all the Regent's Designs, *Richard* his Grandson succeeded, who being young, the Guardianship of his Person and Kingdom is committed to a certain Number of Lords and Bishops, and amongst these, his Uncle the Duke of *Lancaster* is one, who soon, by the Greatness of his Birth, and his former Authority, found means to obtain the principal Power into his own

own Hands, which he doth not omit to improve to his own Advantage: For having miscarried in his former Designs upon the Succession, he now labours by an After-game to retrieve what he had lost in his Father's Life, by the Prevalency of a too powerful Faction raised in the behalf of his Nephew. For not finding himself in a Capacity openly to oppose the Royal Party, he cunningly seems to close with it; and by a pretended affectionate Fondness, indulges the young King in Pleasures, that so having but a loose Education, his Mind might be early corrupted with Vice and Licentiousness, which would render him odious to his People, and thereby open an Opportunity of his slipping into the Throne. The young King thus left in a manner to his own Tutelage, (for his Governours took little Care of his Education, contrived, as may be reasonably concluded, from what was afterwards practised, by the Duke of *Lancaster*, who had engrossed the Authority into his own hands) soon fell, according to the corrupt Nature of ungoverned Youth, into all sorts of Vanities, Vices, and Debaucheries, and of course becomes pleased and delighted with all such Persons, whose Tempers or Inclinations led them into the same Immoralities, or whose Wickedness or Designs induced them to approve and commend such in him: By which means his Court becomes a School of Licentiousness, and his Attendants a Company of

Debauchees; Men of the most profligate Lives, and loosest Manners, resorting thither; as if Vice and Wickedness were to be the only Qualifications for Preferment. Thus stood things at Court; but, as yet, the King's Vices were not dangerous to his Peace, as being interpreted but the Sallies or Over-boilings of Youth, which Age and Experience would remedy: But that farther Occasions of Discontent might not be wanting in this Reign, a Parliament is called, wherein a Subsidy is granted by a Poll, which was to be collected by the King's Officers; a thing in it self most grievous to the People, and which became much more so, by the manner of collecting of it: For this Duke, who as yet govern'd all, caused it to be levied with the greatest Severity; which had the designed Effect, for it produced that great Insurrection began by *Watt Tyler*. But that Rebellion turned to *Lancaster's* Disadvantage; for the Multitude, convinced that he as yet directed all, looked upon him as the Instrument of this Oppression, and bitterly exclaimed against him; and to manifest their Hatred to his Person, obliged themselves by an Oath, never to admit of a King whose Name was *John*.

The Miscarriages in the Administration, and Neglects in the Education of the young King, being after some Years observed by the Parliament, that August Body thought it time to remove the Prince out of their Care, who had

took so little Care of him, and committed him in Government to the Earl of *Warwick*, hoping that the more careful Conduct of that prudent Peer, might as yet reclaim him: But Licentiousness, by too long a Continuance, was too deeply rooted to be now amended; for Virtuous Precepts were but the young King's Sport, and Good Examples but the Subject of Ridicule; Men of scandalous Lives, wicked Designs, and profligate Fortunes, who laboured to oblige their Prince, by admiring his Debaucheries, were his only Favourites.

And certain it is, that Personal Immoralities in a Prince, will not continue long unaccompanied with Publick Calamities; for that Prince that makes lewd Miscreants his only Favourites and Councillors, must naturally fall himself, or bring his People into some Misfortunes; by reason the Safety, as well as the Inclinations, of such profligate Persons, will induce them to *debauch the Politicks, as well as the Morals, of their Prince*: For if they cannot persuade him to advance his Authority above Law, they themselves can never be secure; for without such a Power to protect them, they must in time be most certainly overwhelmed by the Weight of the Laws, or the Prevalency of the State. And for this Reason, such Ministers do always labour to buoy up the Ambition of their Masters, with such dangerous Vanities, as often involve them in Ruine: And so it succeeded with this unfortunate King, who

by hearkening to such Councils, was led into such Troubles, that ended in the Loss first of his Kingdom, and then of his Life.

The Duke of *Lancaster* observing how happily his Designs had succeeded, the young King being delighted with Debaucheries, and pleased with Vice, begins secretly to whisper his future Fears of the Publick Calamities that must accompany the Reign of so Debauched a Prince: But these Suspicions could not be so privately insinuated, but that some of the King's Creatures, who had always a Jealousie of this Duke, either really discovered, or at least suspected such a thing, for they resolve upon his Destruction; but their Councils being someways discovered to the Duke, he retires, and arms: But by the good Offices of the Princess, the young King's Mother, who dreaded the Consequence of this Affair, in the present disordered Circumstances of the Kingdom, a Reconciliation was effected. *Lancaster* having overcome this Difficulty, seems not discouraged, but again pursues his former Designs; altho' now awakened by his former Danger, it is now managed with the greatest Caution, as may be reasonably concluded, in that it was some Years before his treasonable Practises are discovered, and then he is accused by an *Irish* Fryer: But the Duke so managed Matters against his Evidence, that the poor Fryer is kept under Custody, under Pretence that he might not fly, but be obliged to make good

good his Proof, where such Care was taken to suppress his Discovery, that he was murdered before he was examined. But however, this so terrified the Duke, that he retires in a manner from all Publick Business, and seems from that time to have laid aside all farther Thoughts of his Nephew's Crown, but not his Ambition of being a King: For now he pleases himself with the *empty Title of King Castile and Leon*; leaving his Designs upon the *English Throne*, to be more happily prosecuted by *Henry*, his more prudent Son, who afterwards fortunately effected that which his Father had so unsuccessfully attempted: For this Duke seems to have been always too precipitate in his Councils, immaturely pushing, before the People were prepared, for a Revolution; whereas his wiser Son pursued gentler Measures, and made no Attempts until the Nation was ripe for a Change.

King *Richard* wantoning in Debauchery, and revelling in Voluptuousness, had squandered away the Publick Treasure, which the Parliament had gave for other uses; by which means the National Discontents became very great: And yet the King's Necessities, occasioned by his Excesses, were so very pressing, that he was obliged to call a new Parliament, to have them supplied: But that Assembly would grant no Subsidies, unless the King would banish his Favourites, and submit to such Conditions as they then required for their future Security: All

All which his then Circumstances obliged him to consent to. But these Troubles being quieted, the King recalls his Favourites; and they having felt the Displeasure of a Parliament for their illegal Methods, resolve for the future to act with more Caution; and the better to secure themselves against future Punishment, to varnish all their unjustifiable Proceedings with the specious Pretext of Law: And for this purpose, they formally consult the Judges about the Legality of several Points lately transacted; that so having the Countenance of their Opinions, (which they were assured, as being Men of their own Kidneys, would be favourable for their Purposes) they might insist, that what they had done, or intended to do, was what the Laws of the Kingdom would warrant them in: The Judges, according to what they expected, give it as Law, that the Proceedings of the last Parliament, in several Particulars, were unjust and unlawful, in that they were Deregatory to the Royal Authority: And that those Persons who advised the King to consent to them, deserved Death, unless His Majesty would in his Mercy spare them. The King now, by his Judges Opinions, having the Colour of Law to warrant his intended Designs, declares the popular Lords, who were the Instruments in wresting those hard Conditions from him, *Traitors*, and as such, seizes and divides their Estates amongst his own Creatures. But the Lords, awakened at these severe

severe Proceedings, confederate, raise Forces, and stand upon their own Defence: This Opposition produced a Treaty; but nothing could be effected, until such time as the King's Army, commanded by the Duke of *Ireland*, is beaten, and the Forces of the Confederated Lords encrease every where. The King reduced to such Streights, complies with the Lords, and consents to call a Parliament, to remedy all Grievances: In this Parliament, several of his Ministers and Favourites are punished, some with Death, others with Banishment, &c. And as some Return for these Royal Concessions, they give him a Subsidy. All Disputes between the King and Lords are now accorded, altho' with some Disadvantage to the Prince; for he is constrained to submit to a kind of Regency, in which the *Lords* had the *Authority*, but the *King* the *Name*. But this Partition of Sovereignty amongst the Lords, soon ushered in Division, which admitted an Opportunity to the King, to reassume the Government; and having again obtain'd his former Power, he begins again to shew his former Resentment. But having learnt, by his former Misfortune, how dangerous it was to fall upon the Great Lords, he begins to punish such whom he imagined he could securely crush. The City of *London* must feel the first Effects of his heavy Displeasure, whose Liberties and Privileges he seizes and keeps, until the Citizens redeem them with a Present of Ten thousand

thousand Pound : Encouraged by this Success, he begins to think he hath Strength to perform every thing that his Ambition or Revenge can suggest ; for now he resolves upon the Destruction of the three popular Lords, viz. his Unkle the Duke of *Gloucester*, and the Earls of *Arundel* and *Warwick*, (for the Earl of *Darby*, the Duke of *Lancaster*'s Son, had lately withdrawn from the Party, acting as it were a Neutral part) expecting, that by cutting off these three Great Men, that the adverse Party must be broke, as not having a Head to unite them. But being taught, by the Insuccess of his former Attempt, how dangerous it would be, to proceed in a publick way, by reason of their immoderate Power amongst the People, he contrives to have them secretly apprehended, and so ordered his Matters, that all Three, altho' at several and distinct Places, should be seized at the same time, that so neither might escape to raise a Force to redeem the other : Which was accordingly effected ; and his Unkle, the Duke of *Gloucester*, was immediately hurried away for *Calais*, where he was murdered ; the King not daring to have that perpetrated in *England*, so dear was that *Great Man* to the People : But the other Two were condemned and executed for Crimes which this King had before pardoned. These cruel Proceedings so enrage the Nation, that they want only an Opportunity to throw off their Obedience ; and that will not be long wanting,

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as the Sequel proved, in such a disordered State. For the Earl of *Darby*, who, as a Reward for his withdrawing from the popular Lords, was lately made Duke of *Hereford*, had not so far forgot his former Friendship with those Great Men, but that he had whispered his Dislike of the present State of Affairs to the Duke of *Norfolk*, who accuses him of this to the King : *Hereford* is summoned to answer the Accusation, who denies what *Norfolk* had charg'd him with saying. A Tryal by Combat is demanded, and granted ; but before they fight, the King interposes, and banishes them both. During *Hereford*'s Exile, the Duke of *Lancaster*, his Father, dies ; and the King, contrary to his Promise made to the Duke of *Hereford*, seizes that Dutchy into his own hands, and prolongs the Time of the Duke's Banishment, which extremely provokes him. *Hereford*, in his Exile, had kept a Correspondence with several Great Men, his Friends, who constantly informed him of the State of things, and continually sollicitd him to return. The Archbishop of *Canterbury*, and several others, who had left the Kingdom, as dreading the King's Displeasure, likewise earnestly desire the Duke to be the happy Instrument in delivering his Native Country from the present Ruine and Oppession.

The Duke thus assured of the general good Disposition of the People towards him, embarks with a small Number for *England*, where the

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People flock in Multitudes to him, and they so general a Dislike of King *Richard*, as made it evident he should meet with little Opposition: For King *Richard* being himself in *Ireland*, his Ministers were so universally hated, that they could procure little or no Force to oppose the Duke: So that King *Richard*, at his Return, found so general a Defection, that he perfectly despaired of his good Fortune; and laying by all Thoughts of struggling for the Throne, meanly begs for Security, and a Private Life: And the better to obtain that, makes a formal Resignation of the Crown.

Thus ended the Reign of *Richard*, but not, as yet, his Life; (but that is not to continue long) a Prince, as it is probable, that became unfortunate by the Ambition of others, for having the Misfortune to have the Care of his Youth, committed to those who designed his Ruine, (and who had actually endeavoured it in his Grandfather's Time) had so loose an Education, that he became early poisoned with such Vices, as rendered him hateful to the People. His Reign, in some respects, was like that of *Edward*, the Second, his Great Grandfather; for both adhered to the Advices of Minions and Favourites, and both equally despised or neglected the Councils of the ancient Nobility; but with this difference, that *Edward* was passionately fond of the Person of his Favourite, and would endanger his Crown to preserve him; whereas *Richard* so little regarded

regarded the Person of his Minion, that he would not hazard his Throne in his Defence. *Edward* seems to have been of the more easie and flexible Temper, being always governed by them he loved; but *Richard* of a more dissolute and wilful one, ever loving those whom he could best rule; so that such only were his Favourites, as would be subservient to his Will. *Edward* was ruined by the Faults of Others, but *Richard* immediately by his Own: *Edward* might truly be pitied, but *Richard* justly blamed.

XVII. *Richard* thus stripped of Royalty, *Henry* Duke of *Hereford*, by Consent of Parliament, is declared King; a Person truly worthy of a Crown: For if Princes are to be esteemed more for the Blessings they bring upon Mankind, than for their Butcheries, Slaughters, and Conquests, by which they spill the Blood and waste the Treasure of their own People; this King may justly deserve to be numbred amongst the best of our Princes, if not to be placed the first in that Catalogue: For he, through the whole Course of his Reign, seems truly to have pursued the Nations Good; whereas few of his Ancestors, but have sometimes deviated from that Rule, either by their own Misfortunes, or by the Faults of others. *Henry*, by the Consent of the States, possessed once of the Throne, pursues no Revengeful Methods upon his Enemies, but allures the People

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into a Liking of his Governments, by all Acts of Mercy, Kindness, Gentleness, and Goodness; calmly interposing, and meekly perswading his Friends, who had suffered under the last Reign, to forget and forgive former Injuries, as he had heartily done to all those who had wronged him. But so much Gentleness and Goodness could not prevent the Machinations of some Malecontents, who (having received Honours, or Preferments, in the last Reign, or who were disappointed in this) conspire his Destruction; but not having Numbers to support their Treason, were quickly suppressed: For Treasons seldom succeed in the dethroning of Princes, unless the People are first dissatisfied. However, this untimely Struggling of *Richard's* Friends, drew on the Murder of that unfortunate Prince; for *Henry*, awakened at these Conspiracies, found his Person or Government was not safe, so long as *Richard* lived, and so secretly doomed his Death.

King *Henry* having observed the great Authority of the Clergy in his own Elevation, and likewise having learnt what Troubles had attended his Father, in his Grandfather's Time, by his hasty countenancing *Wickliffe*, and his Followers, in Opposition to that powerful Body; he prudently resolves, in the very Beginning of his Reign, to unite the Churchmen to his Interest: For this Purpose, he sends to the Convocation, to let that Assembly know, that he

he expects not Supplies, but desires Prayers from that Religious Body; and then gives them Assurance, That he will always be ready to defend, but never to invade, the Rights and Immunities of Holy Church: And as a full Proof of his sincere Affection to them, he procures a Law to punish Hereticks with Death; which was a thing most agreeable to Churchmen, in that it was thought the best Expedient to suppress the Doctrine of *Wickliffe*. And afterwards, when the Commons, who were now become emulous and envious at the Greatness and Authority of the Clergy, endeavour the repealing the Statute against *Lollards*; and humbly petition the King to seize the vast Estates of the Religious; setting forth the great Advantages that would accrew to the Crown and Nation by that Act. This Prince was so far from countenancing those Motions, that he dissuades the Commons from intermeddling in those Matters: By which it is plain, the King believed the Clergy then to have been of greater Power and Authority than the Commons, since he denied their Petition that offered such Advantages to him; and chose rather to oblige the former, than to endanger the Publick Peace, by countenancing the latter.

By such prudent Measures did this wise Prince govern his People, that he never had any Disputes or Troubles with his Barons; for always using their Councils, he never pretended to separate his own from theirs and the

Publick Interests: By which Methods, altho' he ascended the Throne by a kind of Violence, and was to rule a People torn and divided by Faction, yet he so tempered the Minds of his Subjects by his Wisdom, that after a few Years they were entirely united; and this Prince lived in a settled Repose and Peace, and dying, left his Crown to his Son.

XVIII. *Henry* the Fourth being dead, *Henry* the Fifth was unanimously received King; and not withstanding his youthful Extravagancies in his Father's Life, yet so well had that wise Prince tempered the Minds of the People, that there appeared no Symptoms of Faction or Discontent. For the Great Men, to manifest their Zeal and Esteem to the Son of that wise King, perform their Homages and Services to him before he is crown'd, a thing not having been done by any of their Ancestors. And this Prince, once settled in the Throne, soon convinced his Subjects that he would not swerve from the Virtues of his Father; for he immediately banish'd from his Presence all the wild Companions of his Youth, and diligently applies himself to Business of State. A Parliament being called, the Commons revive their former Project of relieving the Necessities of the Crown out of the Lands of the Religious, that so the useless Wealth of the Clergy may be applied for the Publick Benefit, and their exorbitant Power be somewhat lessened, which was

was now esteem'd a Grievance. For since the Commons had increased their Authority in the Government, by acquiring considerable Land and Wealth in their own hands; Which seems to have been gradually occasioned, since the Conquest, by these Accidents; First, In that the Barons Wars, and several Insurrections and Treasons, had produced Forfeitures of some of the vast Estates of the Ancient Nobility; some of which were afterwards broke and divided, being by new Grants disposed of to several Persons, which were never permitted to the Privileges of the Ancient Baronage; So that being excluded that Dignity, they fell of course into the Interest of the Commons, as being another Body. Secondly, In that our Laws permitted the dividing Estates amongst Daughters, by which several came to be broken. Thirdly, and more especially, by the Politick Measures of *Edward* the Third; for that Prince observing the immense Wealth the *Flemings* gain'd, in that their Towns were the Staples for our Wool, prudently prohibits the Exportation of it, and encourages the making all Woolen Manufactures here; and appoints the Marts for Wool in several of the great Towns in his own Kingdom: By which means, Trade began more to flourish amongst his own People, which of course brings Wealth amongst the Commonality, since they are the only Persons who pursue it. And Trade being always the Business of great Towns, and those Towns being

being enriched by it, were then in a Condition to contribute to the support of the Government: For altho' the Conquerour settled the Force, or Milice, entirely upon Land, by way of Service, and those Lands were in the hands of the Barons; and the then Scarcity of Money, admitted of small or no Impositions, the very Farms, or Rents, being paid in Provision; for which reason, it is probable the great Men only, who had the Land, were for some time after the Conquest, only consulted, as being the only Persons that then contributed to the Publick, by their Services. But afterwards as Personal Wealth or Money encreased, Others likewise, as being able to contribute, altho' they had but little or no Lands, were likewise consulted; for our Princes having Foreign Territories, which often embroiled them in Foreign Wars, the maintaining, or continuing these Wars, which were very frequent, became marvellously burdensome to the Barons, who were the only Proprietors of these Lands, and so bound to attend the King in his Wars. For which Reason, it is but reasonable to think, that they would be desirous to have the Commonalty called to be consulted, that so they might be brought to consent to bear a part in the Charge, (for we may observe, after some Reigns from the Conquest, that a mercenary Milice was sometimes, or in part used.) And from these, or such like Reasons, it is probable the Towns were first invited or summoned to the great Councils,

Councils, to consult about the Common Affairs, and to give their Assistance to the Publick Charge. And perhaps from the same Reason, the sole Right of giving Money came gradually into the hands of the Commons; for the great Men being in Possession of the Lands, performed their Personal Services, which were annexed to the Tenures; and so it is probable, in those early Times, contributed nothing in Money, (unless they compounded with the King for that Service) whereas the Commoners having but little Land, or no Services, contributed Money. And as the Wealth and Power of the Commonality encreased, and so the Nature of the Government gradually changing, they became the sole Givers, as they were the first, of all Money; for all *Private Persons* having a *Property* in this Constitution, (excepting such as held in Villanage of the great Men) what was theirs, was not to be disposed of without their Consent: For which Reason, whoever was taxed, was someway consulted. And from the same Reasons, the Representatives of the Towns, in process of Time, came to be so multiplied, as to make about Four Fifths of the House of Commons; for the Barons, which were the greatest Proprietors in the Land, were a distinct Body: And altho' the Number of the Members of the Commons, might not always then be the same, yet the Majority of them being of the Towns, and the Inhabitants of the

great Towns sometimes suffering by the Ecclesiastical Courts, or by the Means of Churchmen, upon the account of Religion. (for *Wickliffe's* Doctrines had poisoned several People, and Persons living in great Towns are ever most prone to Novelties in Religion.) the Commons thus composed, envying the Clergy, were urgent to have the Exigencies of the State supplied out of the Revenues of the Religious. The Clergy knowing the Spirit of the Commons, were alarmed at these Proceedings, and dreading the Consequence, by reason the People were quiet, the Nation pleased, the Prince young, daring, and beloved, and themselves envied and hated, consult of Methods which way to ward a Blow that threatened their Ruine. They consider, the best Expedient to divert this young and aspiring Prince, from listening to the Advices of the Commons, would be to engage him in a Foreign War; and the better to encline him to it, they enflame his youthful Mind, with his just and undoubted Right and Title to the Crown of *France*, and the Feasibility at this time of obtaining it; and as a farther Mouve, offered him an immense Sum, to enable him to carry on the War. The young King, extremely pleased with the Proposition, resolves upon a War, which he prosecuted, during the whole course of his Life, with so much Glory and Success, that he compelled his Enemies to capitulate, and to declare him Heir to the Crown of *France*, and

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and to continue him Regent of that Kingdom during the Life of their present King, his Father-in-law. But he dying, the *English* Laurels soon faded, yet his unfortunate Son and Successor, whom he left an Infant, was solemnly crowned at *Paris*.

XIX. *Henry* the Fifth dying, *Henry* the Sixth, his only Son, an Infant, is crowned King; but Factions, the natural Off-springs of a Minority, succeeded in the *English* Government, which so weakened the Kingdom, that *France* was lost. It is true, the wise Conduct, and great Authority of the Dukes of *Exeter* and *Bedford*, the first of which had the Guardianship of the King's Person, and the latter the Regency of *France*, who in conjunction with the Duke of *Gloucester*, who was Protector of the Kingdom, did, during their Lives, preserve things in some Peace and Oeconomy. But that happy Triumvirate, dissolved by the Death of the two former, soon made way for Divisions and Confusion, for now *Gloucester's* single Authority is not sufficient to keep down the Misfortunes of growing Factions. For *Bedford* dead, the Dukes of *Tork* and *Somerset*, both of the Royal Blood, contend for the *French* Regency: *Tork* carries it, but the revengeful Potency of *Somerset* so embarralles all Affairs, that *Tork* is incapable of supporting the declining *English* Interest in *France*. Yet notwithstanding that, such a Reputation had he acquired

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quired by his Conduct and Behaviour in that Regency, that after the Earl of *Warwick* is returned, he is again nominated to that high Dignity, altho' *Somerset*, his professed Enemy, vehemently opposed it. But altho' *York* thus carries the Regency, yet the King, being once come to Years, is then so far prevailed upon by the Earl of *Suffolk*, his only Favourite, as to recall *York*, and place *Somerset* in that Dignity: For *Henry* being but a weak and easie Prince, was no sooner arrived at that Age, by which, by the Usage of the Kingdom, he was judged capable of taking the Government into his own hands, but he became entirely to be governed by *Suffolk*, who, the better to secure himself in his Prince's Favour, had cunningly insinuated into that weak Prince such Jealousies concerning the Desigs of his Unkles, that he would listen to no Councils suggested by them, as apprehending they designed his Ruine; whereby the wholesome and honest Advices of *Gloucester*, and the great Services of *York*, are not only slighted, but their very Persons are hated and endangered; and no Persons are admitted into Places, Offices, or Dignities, but such as are Creatures of this new Favourite: Nay, such was his Care and Cunning, to preserve his own Grandeur, that knowing what an Influence a Queen, who would always be in the Bosom of her Husband, might have upon the Councils and Proceedings of this easie King, he resolves to hinder the intended Marriage

Marriage with the Earl of *Arminack's* Daughter, which was advised and treated by *Gloucester*, and that Party, as a Match that would be of great Advantage to the King and Kingdom; and to marry his Sovereign to a Lady of his choosing, who having neither Fortune, nor Friends, to recommend her, should always be in his Interest, being brought into the Royal Bed solely by his Authority; so that being supported by the Queen, he could not be easily removed from the King's Affections, and would then be in a Capacity to overthrow the Advices of the Unkles, who would be hated of the Queen, in that they, by espousing the former Match, had opposed her Marriage. This *Suffolk* effected; and now strengthened by the Friendship and Affection of the Queen, he is not content to have raised Jealousies concerning *Gloucester*, whereby his Councils are not regarded; and to have removed *York* out of the *French* Regency, and to have placed *Somerset*, his Enemy, in it; but also aims at the Destruction of them Both. But the better to accomplish his wicked Purposes, he first begins with the Ruine of *Gloucester*, by reason the Queen would be easily prevailed to join with him in that, because that good Duke was known to have been an Enemy to her Match: To effect this, all the Councils and Actions of *Gloucester* are so maliciously represented to the easie and good-natur'd King, that he, upon their Credit, believes him as wicked and dangerous

gerous as they make him, and accordingly consents to his Imprisonment, which was in effect to sign his Death; for he was no sooner bereft of his Liberty, but he was likewise of his Life. But this execrable Murder could not be interpreted, but it was quickly known; whereby so universal were the Exclamations against the Queen, and *Suffolk*, that deterred them from any farther Attempts, at present, against *York*; and these are increased by the continued Successes of *Somerset*, their Creature, in *France*. For since his being in the Regency, the *English* Affairs more wisely decline, than they did in the time of *York*, his Enemy. *Suffolk*, to whose ill Conduct, or sinister Practices, as being the only Favourite, all Misfortunes were charged, became so alarmed by these general Complaints, that he now fears the Consequences of an approaching Parliament, which the present Exigencies of Affairs absolutely required; he endeavours therefore to soften, or at least to remove *York*, who was the Head of the Contrary and Discontented Party, by sending of him into *Ireland*, with an Honourable Command; and yet to place him in such a Station, whereby he might not become dangerous; for being sent to suppress an Insurrection, which he happily effected, he was notwithstanding that was performed, continued there. But this Removal of *York*, did not prevent the Parliament from prosecuting *Suffolk* to a Banishment; in his Passage

to which, he was inhumanly murdered. But these Proceedings against *Suffolk*, did not hinder *Somerset*, his Creature, newly returned with Infamy from his Regency, and generally hated by the People, of succeeding him in the Prince's Favour: At which Advancement of *Somerset*, his most inveterate Enemy, *York* became so enraged, that he returns without Leave into *England*, grievously complaining of the unhappy State of the Kingdom, imputing all Publick Misfortunes to the Evil Councils of *Somerset*; requires of the King the removing and punishing his new Favourite, as the Author of the Kingdom's Miseries; and immediately arms, under pretence of rescuing the King from those Persons who had ruined both Prince and State. The King likewise, at the Instigation of *Somerset*, arms. But these Differences were at length peaceably accommodated by the Mediation of the Bishop of *Winchester*, and other Great Men; with this Advantage to the Duke of *York*, that *Somerset* should submit to be tried for his alleged Crimes in the succeeding Parliament.

Things being thus agreed, the Duke of *York* dismisseth his Army, and comes in Person to pay his Duty to his Prince, in whose Presence he meets *Somerset*, which provokes him into some Warmth; but *Somerset* so influenced the King, that *York* is apprehended, and imprisoned, for pretended Designs against the King's Person, Crown, and Dignity. This being known,

known, *Edward*, the Duke of *York's* Son, arms, and marches with a mighty Force towards *London*: The Report of which so terrified the Royal Councils, that they thought it safer to extort a new Oath of *Fidelity* from *York*, and to give him his Liberty, than at that time to punish him. *York*, again at his Liberty, fortifies himself with such Alliances as may enable him by Force to remove *Somerset*; for now he makes most strict Friendship with the Earls of *Warwick* and *Salisbury*, two the greatest Personages in those Times: And thus strengthened, (the King being sick, which was thought would have been fatal) he causes *Somerset* to be arrested, and committed to the *Tower*: But the King recovering, he is again set at Liberty. Upon which, *York* and the Confederate Lords arm, and demand Justice against *Somerset*: The King does not answer their Demands; but instead of that, requires them, upon their Obedience, to disband their Forces; which they refuse. The King marches against them, a Battel is fought, in which *Somerset* is killed, the King made a Prisoner, and his Forces routed. A Parliament is called, which approves these Proceedings: And now the Duke of *York* is declared Protector of the King and Kingdom; *Salisbury* is made Chancellour, and *Warwick* Admiral and Governor of *Calais*. But the Queen, an active and imperious Woman, was highly dissatisfied with these Proceedings, by reason she was displaced from that Authority which

which she had enjoyed, of governing all things: She therefore labours to ruine this Triumvirate; and to compass this, she consults the Lords of her own Party, represents to them the exorbitant Authority of *York*, and his Adherents, their common Enemies; how that they had injured their King, and her Husband, having stripped him of all Authority, made him a Child, put him under the Guardianship of *York*, who wanted now nothing but the Name of a King; and that it was manifest he would not be long without that, since the Authority and Title would not subsist separate; for his own Security, if not his Ambition, would induce him to assume that, which could not be effected, but by the Murder of the King, the Ruine of her Self, and the Persecution of them All. Moved with these Considerations, it is concluded to remove *York* from the Protectorship: But this was not to be suddenly effected, by reason of the Strength of the Party, and the Favour and Affection of the People; wherefore it was thought more advisable to yield to Time, and at present to bespatter and revile their Persons, reflect upon the Unjustness of their Proceeding, to insinuate their private Ambition and thirsting after Power, to misconstrue all their Actions, misinterpret their Words, secretly whisper their certain Intentions of deposing and murdering the King, and their Designs to establish themselves upon the Ruine of Others; by which Methods, the People would gradually

gradually fall into new Factions and Divisions: And to continue and heighten these, Names of Distinction are invented and used. Discontents thus daily encreasing, Reconciliations are attempted, and seemingly effected: But amicable Composures of such Differences, are rarely of longer Continuance, than they are serviceable to the farther Designs of either Party; for Plots, and several Contrivances, are underhand carried on, wherein each Party labours to strengthen himself, and weaken his Enemy, which gradually ripening, at length break out into open Acts of Hostility: For both Parties arm; the Queen is at first successful, and York is forced to leave the Kingdom, and to retire into Ireland. The Queen, flushed with Success, calls a Parliament, wherein York and his Adherents are attainted: But notwithstanding this, his Son Edward, Earl of March, continues the War, fights and routs the Queen's Army, and takes the poor unfortunat King Prisoner. Upon which good Fortune, the Duke of York returns out of Ireland, and another Parliament is summoned, in which he, viz. the Duke of York, that was attainted by the last, is now made Regent during Henry's Life, and declared his Successor after his Death, with some other Advantageous Conditions, in case of any future Disturbance: For it is very remarkable, which soever Party prevailed, during these unhappy Troubles, had always a Parliament to legitimate their Proceedings. But this Expedient of

of a Regency, gave but short Peace, for the Person, and the Authority, being separated, Difficulties soon arise concerning Obedience, whereby new Factions are occasioned, or old ones revived, by which means, Heats and Troubles are excited, and new Civil Wars produced: for now the Cause is to be again decided by a Battle, in which York is slain: But notwithstanding this does not put an End to the War; for his Son Edward continues it, marches, fights, and defeats the King's Forces, and takes his Person, who being thus again a Prisoner, a new Parliament is summoned, in which Edward is declared King: and thus Edward the Fourth thus got into the Throne, begins like a wise Prince to pursue such Methods as are proper to establish himself in the quiet Possession of it, which seemed to be no esteem'd at that time, considering the divided and distracted State of the Kingdom: However, wisely considering the greatest Security to the Throne, was the Love and Affection of the People, he prudently applies himself to a Reformation of such Abuses and Corruptions as had been exclaim'd against in the last Reign; and then considering, that nothing more recommends a Prince to the Affections of his Subjects, than his shewing an Early Care and Impartiality in the administering Justice, he solemnly inspects the Courts of Westminster; and then his Diligence and Zeal for Common Justice

Justice might appear the more conspicuous there, he sits personally in the *King's Bench*, to observe and to be acquainted with the Proceedings of that Court, that so, by his Presence, Justice might be the more impartially administered. But these Popular Acts were not esteemed sufficient to ward him from Publick Censure, (since by his Accession he had injured a harmless and pious Prince) unless likewise some specious Pretences could be invented and published, which might in some measure justify his violent Proceedings against his Sovereign, to whom both He and his Father had sworn Fidelity: For the Universality of the People had a marvelous Opinion of King *Henry's* Exemplary Piety, strict Devotion, personal Chastity, and unparalleled Innocence and Goodness; whereby his Misfortunes were really pitied, the Miscalriages of his Government not being charged upon him, but upon his Queen and her Partisans, who were known to govern all. The Imprisonment and hard Usage of *Henry*, increased the Peoples Esteem of his Virtues, and gave them a deeper Relish of his Sufferings; for which Reason, *Edward* thought it advisable to varnish his severe Proceedings with some colour of Justice, hoping by that means to quiet and somewhat appease the Murmurs of the People, which were great, upon the account of this innocent and inoffensive King. To which Purpose he endeavours to make it appear, that his Measures to obtain the Crown, which were attended with

with so much Blood and Slaughter, and which ended in the Imprisonment of the innocent *Henry*, were really in themselves just and unblameable; and did not proceed from any Ambition in him after a Crown that was the Right of another, but merely from the Desire of recovering one, that was unjustly detained from him, to whom, by the Right of God and Nature it justly belonged: And that this might be the more solemnly performed, he procures an Act to pass in the Parliament, (which was composed of such Persons as were of his Party, and so were willing to comply with him, thereby the better to countenance their own Proceedings) wherein *the three Henrys* are declared *de facto Kings*, the Right having always been in his Family. Yet notwithstanding this Declaratory Law, this same *Edward* was again pulled from the Throne, and the innocent *Henry* again placed in it: It is true, that weak and unfortunate Prince did not long continue in the Possession of it; and *Edward* having once again dethroned *Henry*, took such measures with the *Lancastrian* Family, and Party, as effectually ruined it, and then he peaceably enjoyed the Crown the remaining part of his Life.

XXI. *Edward* the Fifth, a Child, succeeds his Father, but his Reign is but short; and now the Established Right, by the late Declaratory Law, is again broke and forgot; for *Richard* the Third, his Uncle, in that young Prince's

Prince's Life-time, is declared King. It is true, that barbarous Monster did not suffer that innocent Child much to outlive his Reign: Yet notwithstanding *Richard's* thus butchering his Nephews, he had not by their Deaths any Lineal Right, there being then Others of that Family, whose Claim, by that Title, were before his. However, such was the Fortune of this bloody King, that having slighted the Duke of *Buckingham*, who was the principal Instrument in his Usurpation, and by Cruelties raised a general Hatred amongst the People, he was soon tumbled from the Throne he had unrighteously obtained; for in a Battel with *Henry* Earl of *Richmond*, of the House of *Lancaster*, his Forces were routed, and himself slain.

XXII. *Henry* Earl of *Richmond*, having slain *Richard*, is immediately declared King, being the Seventh of that Name; and by that, the Lineal Right is again interrupted: But altho' *Henry's* Victory gave him Possession of *Richard's* Throne, yet wisely considering the Difficulty to preserve himself in it, amidst a People long divided by Factions, and those embittered by a strange Variety of Fortunes, readily consents to an Expedient that had been proposed and agreed to, before his Expedition against *Richard*, viz. to espouse *Elizabeth* the Eldest Daughter of *Edward* the Fourth, that so the eldest Branches of the two Royal Houses of *York* and *Lancaster* being thus united by

by Marriage, all Pretences of future Discords might be silenced upon Account of the Rights of either of the contending Families. But altho' this Marriage had so far the desired Effect, as to heal the present Wounds of a factious and embittered People, yet this cunning Prince thought this not sufficient to secure the future Peace of the Crown; in that he had observed, that the former Civil Wars, wherewith this Kingdom had been miserably harrassed, had not proceeded from the same, but were often grounded upon very different Pretences; as for Instance, those in the Reigns of King *John* and *Henry* the Third, upon the Account of those Princes violating the Rights and Liberties of the Subject; those under *Edward* the Second, and *Richard* the Second, upon the exorbitant Power of Favourites; those under *Henry* the Sixth, and *Edward* the Fourth, upon the Claim of Right between the two Houses of *York* and *Lancaster*; that under *Richard* the Third, upon the inhuman Barbarity practised upon his own Family: He therefore concluded that these Wars, that were founded upon such different Pretences, did really proceed from some intrinsic Flaw, or Fault, in the Nature of the Constitution, that had not as yet been discovered, or at least had never received a proper Remedy. Wherefore weighing the several Fates, and different Reasons, of former Civil Wars, and how, and by what Persons they were begun and managed, he plainly discovered

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discovered that they proceeded from the immoderate Power of the Barons; and that the Reasons, or Pretences, commonly assigned for these Wars, were only made use of to justify the Authors against Calumny, or to invite the People to side with them: For the Barons being the greatest Proprietors in the Lands, the Commonality being but Tenants, and holding for the most part their Estates from the Lords, were obliged, according to the Usage of those Times, in Services to them; for which Reason, being thus obliged, under such Conditions, they were always at their Devotion: Whenever therefore these Great Men, who had such an Influence upon such Numbers of People, became displeas'd or dissatisfied with their Prince, the Crown became endangered. For these Barons then confederating, could soon raise their Tenants and Vassals, and so be in a Condition to dispute their Quarrels with the Prince: For the King in those early Times having no established or standing Milice, (that, as I have proved, being annexed to the Land, and so was compos'd by these very Persons who now oppose him) was but upon equal Terms with the Barons, they being able as suddenly to raise their Tenants and Vassals to defend themselves, as the Prince could to obtain a Force to oppress them. From which Reason, unless the Prince by a wise and steady Conduct so managed the State, as thereby to obtain the Love and Esteem

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of these Great Men, (for in that consist'd his then greatest Security, by reason he had no considerable Force, but what was centred in them) the Peace of the Kingdom would be endangered: For the Continuation of the Publick Peace was then more owing to the Wisdom of the Prince, than to any Excellency in the Constitution.

Henry then diligently applies himself to the mending this Flaw, or Fault, without which it was plain the Kingdom could never continue in any long Repose: But how to effect this, was the Difficulty, for it must either be done by Force, or Policy: The unsuccessful Attempts of several of his Ancestors, upon the Rights of the Barons, point out to him the Hazard and Danger of the First; he therefore declines that, and pursues the Latter, which it is evident was only to be done under the Form of Law, and so would require the Consent of those Persons whose Authorities are to be lessened. But the Circumstances of the Kingdom being now somewhat changed from what they were, are become better befitted for his Purposes than ever they had been in the Time of any of his Ancestors; in that Wealth now flows more plentifully amongst the Commons, than formerly it had done; and in that the Designs of Conquests of some of the former Kings, had introduced the use of a Stipendiary Milice in Foreign Expeditions, which being to be paid with Money, had induced the

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Prince and Barons to consult the Commonality in their Councils, that so they might consent and join in the raising Money for the Payment of these Troops, and contribute to the General Charge of the Government: For the Commons having marvelously encreased in Wealth, (comparatively speaking) to what they enjoyed immediately after the *Norman* Conquest, seem therefore to have been admitted into the Legislature, in that they were in a Condition to contribute to the Common Charge of the Kingdom; whereas for some time after the Conquest, before Trade, which gradually encreases in rising Governments, had brought in a Wealth amongst the Commons, the Milice or Force of the Kingdom being solely maintained, or rather annexed as a Service upon the Land, the Barons, who were the Proprietors of *That*, had the Commons who held from them, and so were their Vassals, entirely at their Devotion. But now the Commons having gained a Wealth, are not so dependant upon the Lords as formerly, and therefore may be more easily won to favour the Prince in his Design of lessening the Authority of the Barons, under whose Tyranny they had for a long time groaned. Strengthened therefore with this happy Advantage, and favoured with a present Peace; and the sad Misfortunes of the last Wars being as yet fresh and green in the Minds of Men; and several of the Ancient Families being almost ruined, or indebted, by the last

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Calamitous Civil Troubles, and so not in a Condition to make their former Opposition to the Proceedings of the Prince; this Cunning King accomplishes his intended Alteration: For now he procures three several Laws, (which were readily embraced by the Commons, as being for their Advantage) by which he effectually set Bounds to the future Pride and immoderate Power of the Barons; for by one of these, Lands are made alienable; by which means large Estates can never continue long undivided, but will necessarily (such is the Corruption of Human Nature) break and be parted: By another, he encourages Husbandry, ascertaining Proportions of Land for Tillage; by which means the Country Farmers, living more plentifully, would not be so readily seduced by their Lords to disturb the Publick Peace: By another, Retainers are lopped off; by which the Barons are stripped of their mighty Retinues, and so could not so readily compose a Cavalry, which was usually made up of these Followers: By these Laws this wise Prince evidently and effectually broke the exorbitant Authority of the Nobility: It is true, it was somewhat declined before this, from what it was once at after the Conquest; in that Trade, as I have observed, introducing Wealth amongst the Commons, had brought them into the Legislature, as being now in a Condition to contribute to the Publick Charge, and thereby ease the Land that was so burdened with Services:

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For it is most certain the Authority of the Commons had increased in the Government before these Laws, altho' not in that degree as since; for what Power was by these Laws taken from the Nobility, was not united or lodged in the Crown, for the Prince really gained nothing by them; but it devolved upon the Commons; for Wealth having increased amongst them, they were, by virtue of these Laws, let into a great part of the Land; whereas before, the Main of their Wealth was only Personal. And this methinks affords us a Hint, how it came to pass that in our Government the Number of the Representatives of the great Towns so far exceed those of the Land, or Counties, in the House of Commons: For the Wealth of the Commons being in those early Times for the most part Personal, which was possessed by those Persons who Traded, and so lived in such Towns, and these being to contribute to the Publick Charge, were therefore consulted: Whereas the greatest part of the Land being in the hands of the Barons, who appeared in their own Persons in these Assemblies, and who were obliged by their Tenure to Services, there then seemed not to have been required many Representatives for that, viz. the Land. And what further contributed to the Advantage of the Commons, in the thus translating the Power from the Barons to them, has been the Discovery of the *American* Treasure; for by that a new Fountain

tain of Wealth was opened, that hath furnished *Europe* with such vast Quantities of Gold and Silver, that Personal Estates have bore some Proportion to Real Ones: And the *English*, favoured by their Constitution, or by their Scituation, as being an Island, or encouraged by the Advantage of their Native Commodities, or from some other Reason or Accident, applying themselves to Trade, became, by that, the Gainers of some part of this Wealth: And this Trade being managed by the Commons, this Wealth came to be divided amongst them, by which means they gradually became Purchasers of the Estates of the Nobles, who are now impowered to sell or divide them, so that the Lands likewise came into the hands of the Commonality.

From this Reason, altho' that wise Prince delivered his Posterity from the dangerous and exorbitant Power of the Great Men, yet he did not settle the Government upon such a Foundation, as thereby to secure its future Peace; by reason the Commons being let into so great Authority, the Power of the Nation continues as much divided as before; whereby the Discords and Disputes that have since arose in this Kingdom, have not been, as anciently, between the King and the Barons, but between the Prince and the Commons: So that by these Laws, the real Disease in the Body Politick was not cured, but only translated to another Part.

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This then, I think, may be inferred from these Measures of this Politick Prince; Either that he only regarded his present Safety, and so did not extend his Care for Futurity, but left future Times to be regulated by future Councils; Or that his wonderful Zeal to lessen the Power of the Barons, was so great, that it even blinded his Judgment, that he could not foresee the Fatal Calamities that must attend his Posterity upon this Change; Or else, that he did presume, that this present Evil once removed, he should be able to find some Expedient whereby to over-balance the future Mischiefs that otherwise must arise from this Alteration. And this, I think, seems most probable, from what may be collected from his succeeding Measures. For, First, he establishes a small Band of Stipendiary Soldiers for his Guard, which being paid by him, were entirely at his Service. Secondly, In that he was labouring, by the most cunning Methods, to amass a stupendious Treasure. By which Methods it is likely this subtle Prince proposed to over-balance the rising Power in the Commons. For no Man can be so vain to imagine that this Designing King intended the bettering the Conditions of the Commonality, by thus lessening the Authority of the Nobility, (when he himself oppressed them, viz. the Commons, in the basest Methods, to squeeze Money from them) but that he purposed to support the Regal Authority by some other Methods, than

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by the Barons, as formerly. And what renders this most probable, was his establishing a Guard, and his Endeavours of accumulating such a Treasure that might enable him to stand in need of no other Assistance. It is true, the Number of his Guard was but small, for his present Security would not permit of a large one; but wisely beginning with such a Number, as would not create Jealousies, he could afterwards (this first Difficulty overcome) gradually encrease them, as he found his Circumstances required, or as the Nation would permit of them. And then having heaped a vast Treasure, which altho' obtained by indirect Measures, yet in doing of this he so cunningly oppressed the People, that he seemed to use no Force or Violence; for he takes such Methods, and employs such Instruments, as would effectually perform what he expected, and yet seem to justify their Proceedings with the Colour of Law; as might be instanced in the Cases of *Empson* and *Dudly*, &c. So that strengthened with a Guard, and enriched with a Treasure, whereby his Necessities would not oblige him to throw himself upon the People, he was at liberty to prosecute any farther Designs for the Advantage and Security of the Crown. But notwithstanding the Cunning of this subtle Prince, the Crown seems to have gained nothing by this Change; for altho' formerly the Barons would sometimes depose or dethrone their Prince, yet the Crown by such Disputes lost nothing; for the very Nature

ture of that Constitution requiring a King, or Head, the Throne was always immediately filled, and the Royal Prerogatives not lessened; whereas, since that great Change, an *English* Government hath subsisted without any such Person or Dignity: So fatal to the Regal Authority hath been the translating of Power from a few, into the hands of a multitude; which this wise King could not but foresee, and therefore cannot be supposed to have pursued so hazardous a Method, but that he believed he should have been able to have prevented those Dangers. But his Life being too short, and new Circumstances occurring, he could not perfect his vast Designs, which he had so successfully began: And his Son and Successor pursuing other Measures, soon unravell'd all that he had been doing.

It is certain several of our former Kings had aimed at an Alteration in the Government, as well as this our *Henry*, but then they attempted it by Violence, by which they were not able to effect it; by reason the Force was so lodged, as could not be employed for such an End: Whereas this subtle Prince proceeds in different Methods; for he projects a Change, by altering the Foundations, that so the Great Men might quietly consent to the lessening their own Authority. It is true, this did not succeed perhaps as he intended it; but then that may be imputed to the false Steps of his Son and Successor; his own Life being too short to perfect

perfect such a *Political Change*: For such, if safe, are always of slow Progression, and therefore rarely to be begun and finished by the same Person: And it being somewhat unusual to have a Succession of wise Princes, who will pursue the same Councils their Predecessors began, hath been what preserved this Kingdom from being swallowed up in an absolute Monarchy. For it is very rare that a lasting Tyranny can be established upon a free People by Violence; because altho' a Force may prevail for a time, yet a Tyranny cannot be lastingly settled; but where the People and Constitution are first besetted for it, which is always the Work of Time: By reason Changes gained by Violence, are unnatural, because they are effected against the Genius of the People; and a Government raised by such, not being besetted to the Nature of the former Constitution, must naturally moulder and drop, unless the Tyrant can support his new-gotten Authority by a Force of his own, too powerful for the People; which will be difficult to perform, or at least continue; since in time, Marriages, Friendships, and Familiarity, will insensibly bring that very Force into the Peoples Interest. However, he cannot secure himself by that Force, unless he hath Treasure, or Lands, to reward them; and neither of these can be acquired amongst a free People, unless he strips them of Property; or at least only permits them to enjoy a precarious one, he imposing Tributes, Gabells,

Gabels, or Taxes, as he pleases; for without that, his very Milice will grow corrupt, and soon become the Cause of his Overthrow.

If we consider the several unsuccessful Attempts of our former Kings, to trample upon the English Liberty, we may plainly see how impracticable it was to effect that by Violence in a Constitution that was not prepared or be-fitted to remain under Tyranny: And if we consider how this wise Henry effected a Change, by altering the Foundations, that might have ended in an absolute Monarchy, had not the future Measures of his Successor spoiled his Designs; we may learn, that a Change in Government will readily succeed, when once a Constitution is befitted for it. But the effecting these Political Changes, requiring such Steadiness of Councils, and so much time for their Operations, that Ambitious Princes, that eagerly thirst after unbounden Power, have rarely Patience to attend their Success; (but rashly fall into violent Courses, by which they generally miscarry, and usually perish; and if they succeed, there are few Instances in which a lasting Tyranny hath been established by Violence) hath been one means of preserving our English Liberties.

CHAP. VIII.

- 1. Henry the Eighth, his Vanities; angry with the Church; complies with the Commons; Discontents; Clergy not so powerful as formerly, and why; Church made dependant on the Prince.
- 2. Edward the Sixth a Minor; Great Men seize Church-Lands, change Religion; the Reasons. Two Factions; King makes a Will.
- 3. Mary succeeds; a Bigot to the old Religion, and why; cannot restore the Lands to the Religious.
- 4. Elizabeth succeeds; Papists excluded from Offices, become her Enemies, assert the Queen of Scots Title: A Change in Religion in several Parts of Europe; the Reasons: Means by which the Church had acquired so great Authority. Emperor Charles's Designs; what produced in Germany. State of Scotland. Queen's Reasons for Severities against the Queen of Scots: Her Government; adhered to those of the new Religion. A Parallel between Henry 4. and She.
- 5. King James's different Measures: His Designs, disliked by the Nation; governs by a Party; his Project improved, and ruined by his Successor: The Difference between this, and the late Queen's Reign; depresses the Nobility.
- 6. King Charles the First, his Measures; Impolitick Civil War; what remarkable.
- 7. Charles the Second, a Government without a King; Ruined by the Army; why. Cromwell Protector; reduced to the last Extremity. The Constitution,

stitution, how restored; Inferences. 8. The First Parliament zealous for Kingly Authority; Reasons; their Measures; Penal Laws; King's Profusiveness; Nation dissatisfied; Reasons. Suspends the Penal Laws; why. Popish Plot perplexes the King; unites the two different Parties; Reasons. King intends a War, and why: Parliaments called, and dissolved. The Parties again divided; New Plots; Whigs depressed. 9. King James the Second came to the Crown with great Advantages; Parliament called, will not prefer Supplies to Grievances; raises an Army, contributes to his Ruine, and why. 10. King William the Third: Nation moderate in their Zeal to the Crown, and why; Reigning by a Party began by James the First.

I. **H**AD Henry the Eighth, the Son and Successor of the wise Henry the Seventh, enjoyed but the Virtues or Craft of his Father, yet may remain a Question, whether *English* Liberties had not been long since swallowed up by the Crown? But that young and profusive Prince happily swerving from his Father's Measures, soon unravelled what he had designed: For he was no sooner possessed of the Crown, but he squanders away in youthful pompous Vanities, *viz.* Masks, Balls, Shews, Opera's, and all other voluptuous Profusiveness, those immense Treasures which his frugal Father had amassed for other Ends: And having Luxuriously wasted that
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Wealth, he became so necessitated, that he was obliged to throw himself upon his People, to have his Wants supplied in a Parliamentary way. It is true, so many Persons had tasted his Bounty, by the means of his Extravagant Vanities, that he never wanted such a Number of his own Creatures in the House of Commons, as were found sufficient to sway that Assembly into a ready Compliance of granting what Supplies this Prince demanded; which he never failed as wantonly to consume, as they profusively gave.

The Commons, by the Methods already intimated, being now become a considerable Party in the Government, begin to shew their Strength, and exert their Authority, in renewing their former Complaints against the immoderate Wealth, and exorbitant Greatness of the Clergy, and boldly pursue their Resolutions of lessening them. The present Times seem to favour their Purposes; for the King being highly displeas'd with the Church, in that he had met with Delays, Opposition, and Disappointments, in a case of a Divorce from his then Queen, wherein he had Reason (according to the usual Methods of Proceedings in such Cases) to expect to have had none, began now in good earnest to hearken to the Complaints of the Commons, and seems resolv'd to comply with them in the humbling Churchmen, and lessening the Jurisdictions and Authority of the Ecclesiasticks: Accordingly divers Laws

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are passed, some to retrench their mighty Jurisdictions and immoderate Authorities, and afterwards others; whereby the King is empowered to seize the Lands and Goods of the Religious, which were of so great a value, that had King *Henry* as wisely applied them, as the People willingly gave them, he need not for the future have had recourse to his Parliament for Supplies: And having by this means a Wealth sufficient to have reigned without their Assistance, what could have induced him to have made use of their Councils. It is true, a multitude of Discontents must naturally arise by the Dissolution of Monasteries, and annulling the Papal Authority, which made it necessary and safe for the Prince to oblige the Nobility, by that means to prevent any Tumults or Insurrections that might be occasioned by these Proceedings; and that was not, in those Circumstances, securely to be done by any other Methods, than by sharing and dividing these Estates amongst them: For by doing that, they would be so entirely interess'd in these Alterations, that they would not readily comply to the Restoring the Religious. But yet this Prince might have secured this Point, by retaining such Services, or Rents, or by passing the Grants under such Conditions, as should always have kept the Grantees in a Dependency of the Crown; and then the Throne, thus strengthened by such an Addition of Wealth and Power, might have gradually swallowed the

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the Peoples Rights, as they had done the Clergies. But this resolute and haughty Prince seems not to have looked much farther, than to have the present Satisfaction of gratifying his Revenge, or of pleasing his imperious Temper, in not being thwarted in any of his present Designs, (for *Henry* could not bear Opposition) which these Estates gave him an Opportunity of effecting, by reason so many considerable Persons were enriched with these Grants, and thereby made his Creatures, that he was enabled in his Parliaments to carry what he pleased: But *Henry* not having in these Grants reserved such Service, or such Conditions, that might secure the Possessors to the Crown, his Posterity, or future Princes, could not receive much Advantage by them.

The severe Proceedings against the Religious, produced infinite Murmurings, sad Complaints, and some Insurrections, which were happily suppressed: For notwithstanding the Clergy had not before these Laws been deprived of much of their vast Wealth, and mighty Estates, nor was their Authority much lessened; yet the Commons, by the Methods formerly recited, being now grown comparatively rich, the Clergy had not now the same Influence upon the People, nor were not so considerable in the State, as formerly: The Reason of this is so manifest, it requires no Explanation; and the Fact appears evident, in that, in most Disputes in the former Reigns, to which side

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foever the Church enclined, that Party prevailed; whereas now the State of things are quite altered: For the Power of the Barons being broke, or lessened, and that of the Commonality encreased, the Commons now uniting with the Prince, are able to humble the Pride, and lower the Greatness of the Ecclesiastical Body, that was heretofore so much dreaded; whereas formerly it was directly otherwise. For altho' in some of the preceding Reigns, as hath been already observed, from the time the Commons began to flourish in Wealth, and so to bear a part in the Government, they had been complaining of the immoderate Wealth, and dangerous Authority of Churchmen; yet were they not arrived, until this time, to be a Match or Balance to the Clergy; which appears in that they were not able to prevail upon our former Princes to hearken to their Councils; for they still united with the Clergy, as the most powerful Body. But now the Commons being Masters of a Wealth, equal, if not superior, to the Clergy, the Prince boldly joins with them, and consents to strip the Religious of most of their Estates, and Jurisdictions: From which time, the Authority of Churchmen hath so declined, that in all Civil Disputes they have availed but little; being, in truth, by those means, so divested of Authority, that they are not in Civil Matters a separate Body, being absolutely and entirely dependant upon the Throne. For Henry Having procured

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procured a Law to deprive the Papacy of all Authority and Jurisdiction in *England*, and to have himself declared Head of the Church; and having all Dignities and Preferments at his Disposal, hath thereby rivetted the Clergy to the Crown.

And what is farther remarkable in this King's Reign, is, that now, since this great Change in the Nature of our Government, several Acts of Parliament are passed, by which the Succession to the Crown of *England* hath been diversly limited, restrained, and altered; whereas formerly it was performed by different Methods, as hath been already proved.

II. *Henry* the Eighth dying, left *Edward*, the Sixth of that Name, his Son, a Minor, his Successor; during whose Reign the Kingdom was rent into Factions, the common Fate of Minorities: However, altho' those in Authority disagreed amongst themselves, yet they agreed to share the small remaining part of the Estates of Churchmen, and to reduce that Body a Notch lower, that so it might be more subservient to the Civil Power. And the better to secure the Estates of the Church they had rapaciously seized, they zealously pursue a Reformation in Religion, (a thing which the former Abuses and Debaucheries of the Clergy had made very agreeable to the People) foreseeing, unless that was effected, they should not quietly enjoy their new-gotten Possessions.

Having then settled an *Ecclesiastical Polity*, agreeable to their Purposes, that is, made it entirely dependant upon the Civil Authority, (which was at that time possessed by them) for they, to secure Churchmen to their Cause, even obliged the Mitred Prelates to take their Bishopricks by Commission; by which they were bound up in an entire Obedience: They then begin to turn their Thoughts to other Designs, which was to supplant and ruine each other; each Party endeavouring to have no Competitors in Authority. But the better to comprehend what follows, we must consider, there was at that time two powerful Factions, which were headed by the two Dukes of *Somerset* and *Northumberland*, the latter of which was a crafty and designing Man, who envied and hated the former, and contrived his Destruction: For *Somerset* being Uncle to the young King, was Protector of his Person and Kingdom; and who, being thus superior to *Northumberland*, somewhat clouded him, or at least was a hinderance to him, in executing his ambitious Designs. *Somerset* therefore must be removed, that so the Management of King and Kingdom might fall into his hands; which having wickedly and craftily effected, he so ordered Matters with the young King, (who soon declines in his Health, after once he is under the entire Care of *Northumberland*) that when the King visibly approaches near his Death, he prevailed upon to subscribe a Will, wherein he preter-

pretermits his two Sisters, and bequeaths the Crown to the Lady *Jane Grey*, who was married to *Northumberland's* younger Son.

III. *Edward* being dead, the very Protestant Nobility (so little did the Consideration of Religion avail) being jealous of *Northumberland's* Power, desert the Lady *Jane*, altho' they had in Council promised and subscribed the contrary; by which Proceedings the Duke of *Northumberland* falls a Victim to that Princess he had purposed to put by: For Lady *Mary*, King *Edward's* Sister, succeeds in the Throne. This Queen was a marvelous Bigot to the old Religion, having in truth great Reason for her Zeal; for the Church and Papacy, for not complying with her Father's Designs, in his intended Divorce from her Mother, had suffered extremely. It is true, this their Obstinacy in that Affair, did not seem to proceed from any Religious Consideration, but that the Pope was terrified from passing the Divorce, by the dreadful Arms of the Emperor *Charles the Fifth*, who favoured her Mother's Cause. *Mary* then was no sooner settled in the Throne, but she endeavours the Restoration of the old Religion, (altho' she had solemnly promised the contrary, before her Accession to it) and having called a Parliament, Matters were so dexterously managed, that a Reconciliation with the See of *Rome* was agreed to: But yet notwithstanding the Parliament so far complied with

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with the Queen, as to depart from their Religion at her Desire; yet they would not complement that Princess with the surrendering back to the Religious their own Church-Lands, neither durst that Queen attempt it by any other violent Measures: However, that she might shew a good Example to Others, she voluntarily restored such Lands that formerly belonged to the Clergy, that were in her own Possession, hoping to allure her Subjects to the like Performance, but all in vain; for the People were too true to their Interest, to depart from their Estates, altho' they did their Religion. However, it is not improbable but that these over-forward Proceedings of this Queen, did really alarm those who were in Possession of Church-Lands, which might facilitate her Sister *Elizabeth's* Accession to the Throne; for otherwise it is not likely that those of the old Religion, who were restored into Places and Authority, and who wanted not Numbers to have supported them, would have so readily complied (in the declaring Queen *Elizabeth*, whose Principles were abundantly known) upon the Death of that Queen: For they could not but foresee what naturally must ensue, as to Religion, upon the Advancement of that Princess to the Throne.

IV. *Mary* being dead, her Sister, the Princess *Elizabeth*, is unanimously declared Queen; those of the old Religion appearing as forward in

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in her Promotion, as those of the new. But the former soon cool in their Loyalty; for no sooner had that Princess displaced those of the old Religion from their Dignities, Trusts, and Preferments, and thereby entrusted the Governments in those Persons who were of her own Opinion; but the Papists are plotting and contriving how to ruine her Person and Government: For when the old Clergy are again dispossessed, by a Law, of their Livings, Preferments, or Dignities; and the ancient, and lately restored Privileges of the Papacy, again annulled and vacated; all Payments and Appeals to *Rome*, being under the severest Penalties prohibited; and all those of that Religion excluded from Civil Employments, and so being, as it were, turned out, were looked upon as no part, or rather as Enemies to the present Government: Then that Party, believing themselves oppressed, contrive to undermine that Princess and her Government. And after all our Outcries against that Party, they seem in this to have done no more than what is natural to Man, and what, I doubt, hath been practised by other Sects of Christians: For History will give us but few Instances, where Men have lived under what they esteemed Hardship, (and that will be the Case of all such as the Laws punishes) but will endeavour, by some ways, or other, to deliver themselves from it: And I am very well assured, our own Experience will give us Instances wherein

wherein it hath been practised, by other Christians, in very unjustifiable Methods. It is true, the then unhappy Circumstances of this Kingdom, and indeed of all *Europe*, obliged this wise Princess, even for her own Security, to these Severities against the Papists, which therefore are not to be condemned. But to return: That they of the old Religion might not want some specious Pretence to varnish their Treasons, (for such their Plots were, as being now contrary to Law) the Pope thunders out his Excommunication against this Princess, and absolves her Subjects from their Obedience: So that the Papists, now warranted by the Holy Chair, believe it no Crime to plot her Destruction; for being fully convinced that the Queen was too deeply rivetted in the Protestant Party, (she having entirely planted her Government upon that Bottom) to be removed, there remained no ways whereby to free themselves from what they thought an Oppression, (as being liable to be punished by the Laws) but by pursuing the Destruction of that incomparable Princess. But this was not to be easily effected, in an Age when Religion was often used to justify the most villainous Attempts of designing Men; unless likewise they could make use of some specious Reason, whereby to warrant their intended Villanies, in the dethroning and murdering that Queen. They therefore now boast of an Illegitimacy in Queen *Elizabeth*, and frame a Title

Title of Right to *Mary Queen of Scotland*; and having adjusted a Model of Government, they zealously labour to advance that Princess to the *English* Throne; by which their Terrible Practises and Villanous Contrivances, they occasioned severe Laws against themselves, and involved that unfortunate Princess, the Queen of *Scots*, in Trouble, and at last Ruine; and really strengthened that Queen and Government they had laboured to subvert: For it is certain, all unsuccessful Attempts in a State, really fortifie what they would destroy.

But that we may come to a clearer understanding of these Matters, we must look farther, and consider, that somewhat before this time there had happened marvelous Alterations, and some Revolutions, in several Countries of *Europe*, and that upon a Pretence of Reformation in Religion; altho' the Reasons of those things had a deeper Root than is ordinarily imagined: For perhaps a sincere Concern for Religion might not be the first Motive to those Changes, but in truth the exorbitant Power and Greatness of the Papacy and Clergy; for that Body was grown so immoderate in Wealth and Authority, that it was uneasy and dangerous to the Civil Power, whereby Princes were inclined to lessen it; and the Ignorance, Immoralities, and severe Proceedings of the Clergy, had prepared the People to be ready to join in throwing off their Yoke: The Pope, the Head of that Ecclesiastical Body, being

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being become, in some measure, the Arbitrator, if not Law-giver, to *Europe*; Crowned Heads being frequently obliged to humble themselves to his Decrees. This immoderate Authority of the Church seems to have been gradually acquired upon the Declension and Ruine of the Roman Empire; for when that overgrown Body came to divide and to shatter into a multitude of small Kingdoms, and petty Principalities, the Church did so happily improve those Opportunities, that she came in for a Share in the Spoils; and she afterwards so wisely managed her Affairs, by the Divisions amongst these separate and petty States, that she continually enlarged her Authority: For those small Powers were singly too weak to abate her Greatness; and her Authority, in that Age, was too diffusive to permit many to unite against her.

The Truth of this Observation, I think, appears evident by these two remarkable Instances; First, In that the Church continued dependant and subordinate to the Civil Power, so long as the Roman Empire preserved it self. And, Secondly, that as soon as *Europe* became again gradually united under fewer Princes, the Power of the Papacy sensibly declined, and was once in danger of being totally eclipsed; for no sooner were the petty Kingdoms, that constitute what we now call *Spain*, united under the Government of one Prince, and that Prince made Head of the *German* Empire; and

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and the Kingdom of *France* become one formidable Body, by the Union of several of her formerly separated Provinces; and *England* had pulled down the dangerous Power of the Baronage; but these Princes began to set Bounds to the Papacy, and to slight the Authority of Church-men, being now too big to be terrified by the Ecclesiastical Thunderbolts. Thus the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth, instead of receiving Laws from the Holy See, is ready to impose some upon That; and the Pope himself, who had formerly Power enough to depose Emperors, is now himself a Prisoner to this Emperor; and whensoever there is a Vacancy in the Holy Chair, the Emperor is ready to interpose his Authority in the filling it.

This Emperor *Charles* was a Prince of vast Designs, for he seems to have proposed the reducing *Italy* and *Germany* to his Obedience. In the First of these, the *Popes* were secretly his Enemies, as being unwilling to permit that aspiring Prince to have too much footing in *Italy*; but not being in a Condition to dispute with so powerful a Monarch, they dare not shew any Dislike of his Proceedings, until strengthened by an Alliance with *France*. In the Second, the Holy See is ready to unite with the Emperor; by reason his Arms being employed in *Germany*, would be diverted from his *Italian* Designs; and not only so, but the Reformed Churches, which had renounced the Papal Authority, might be there ruined.

But

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But *Charles*, altho' a Prince of a Daring and Heroick Mind, yet not always pursuing steady Councils, left his vast Designs unperfected; for neither was the Papacy much lessened by his Power, nor the Liberties of *Germans* lost by his Arms; for he sometimes uniting with the Papacy, seems resolved to ruin *Germany*; and at another time, by making Concessions to those Princes, threatens *France*, *Rome*, or *Italy*; and by thus changing his Designs, he effected nothing: Yet the Emperor's Proceedings, in respect of *Germany*, so alarmed the Princes of the Empire, that they confederate for their Common Defence. For if the Emperor (who thirsted after their Liberties) should be permitted to encrease in Power, the Papacy would be so awed, as soon to become subordinate to him; and of consequence the Clergy, as Members of that Body, of which the Pope is the Head, would be in his, *viz.* Emperor's Interest: For which Reason it became entirely necessary for those Princes to give way to a Reformation, as the only Expedient to dissolve that dangerous Hierarchy in *Germany*; the Continuance of which, at this time, must have endangered their Liberty. And what conduced to the more easie effecting this Change in Religion, was that general Hatred and Dislike of the Clergy, occasioned by their dissolute Lives, and their base and unrighteous Proceedings; making use of Religion to advance their Gain, to the great Oppression and Scandal of the People.

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People. By which means these Princes wisely improving these Opportunities, so intermixed their Reasons for the Necessity of a Reformation in Religion, with their Civil or Political Disputes, that thereby they formed a Party that durst dispute it with that mighty Emperor; and altho' he, at first, by craftily dividing them, prevailed; yet, after some Variety of Fortune, and some Distance of Time, they obliged him to leave *Germany*, and resign his Empire.

But these Troubles, upon the account of Religion, were not confined to *Germany*, but extended to most of the Countries of *Europe*; for even *Scotland* was become sick of the same Disease, which broke out under the most violent Symptoms: For King *James* of *Scotland* dying, left an only Daughter, an Infant, his Successor, who was afterwards married to the *French* King, and was there educated under the Care of the House of *Guise*, which was then the head of a powerful Faction in *France*; and the young King her Husband dying, she returns for *Scotland*, where the Advantage of a long Minority had gave occasion to the forming two powerful Factions; the one of which espoused the New, and the other adhered to the Old Religion. The Queen being returned, and of Age, and being her self strictly educated in the Old, unites with that Party: But those of the New Religion, who had always opposed the *French* Match, intending to have

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married their young Queen to *Edward* King of *England*, became too powerful for the Other, and so forced the Queen out of that Kingdom, who was obliged, or inclined to come into *England*, to avoid the Fury of her own Subjects; but being arrived here, she is put under Guard, and continued a Prisoner for many Years, and is at last executed.

What induced Queen *Elizabeth* to these severe Proceedings against that unfortunate Princess, was only her own Preservation; for such were then the unhappy Circumstances of the Kingdom, that her own Safety required these Severities upon her Kinswoman. For the Nation was divided into powerful Factions, and they distinguished by Religious Denominations, and these were in all their Interests and Designs directly opposite; by the One, the Queen and the then Government was supported, by the Other it was continually undermined. For altho' the Government was entrusted in the hands of those of the New Religion; yet the Papists, or those of the Old, must necessarily remain a very powerful Party. For how many Persons must be disoblged, as being displaced out of Offices, Dignities, or Preferments, in Church and State? Add to this, the then Greatness of the House of *Austria*, the Authority of the Papacy, which were both ready to countenance and abett this Faction; besides the real Zeal of some Persons, meerly upon the score of Religion; there being, for these, and some other

Reasons,

Reasons, so great a Number of her own Subjects that were her Enemies, that had not the pursued the steadiest and wisest Councils, in only promoting and entrusting those of her own Party; discountenancing the Others; and making her own, and those her Peoples Interest and Safety to appear as one; never endeavouring to advance her own Authority, to the Oppression of their Rights, but always consulting them in all Difficulties, she could never have preserved the Crown peaceably upon her own Head. But by these her prudent Proceedings, she was so entirely beloved by her People, that she was enabled not only to grapple, but to overcome all her Enemies, and to entirely break and depress the opposite Party. But notwithstanding her wise Conduct, during the Life of the Queen of *Scots*, the Head and Soul of her Domestic Enemies, she could not be exempt from some Troubles, and continued Fears. For the Papists still flattering themselves with Hopes of advancing that Queen, were perpetually plotting and contriving her Ruine; wherefore, to secure her own and the Kingdom's Peace, it was thought necessary to take away the Life of that Princess, that so, she being removed, there might remain neither Life nor Hopes in that Party, to encourage them to any future Attempts; Laws therefore are prepared for that Purpose; by which that Queen is condemned, and afterwards executed, and thereby that Faction extinguished; for before the

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End

End of Queen *Elizabeth's* Reign, it seems in a manner worn out.

But that we may the better understand, and indeed the more justly admire the most excellent Conduct of this Female Reign, that began in the founding a Government upon a Party only, but was afterwards managed with so much Goodness and Prudence, that it gradually gained almost the whole People; it will be necessary to look a little back, that thereby we may comprehend the real Cause of these her Measures.

Henry the Eighth, this Queen's Father, had made some Alterations, by starting, in Religion; but these did not seem to proceed from any Aversion or Dislike he had for the Doctrines, or Modes of Worship, of the Old; but were chiefly intended as a Means to throw off the Power of the Papacy, which had not done him common Justice, in the Case of his intended Divorce; and to humble the Clergy, that they being lopped off from the Holy Chair, might be made dependant upon the Crown. And in order to effect these his Designs, he had procured a Law for the Suppression of Religious Houses, and seizing their Estates. *Edward*, his Son, a Minor, succeeding, the Guardianship of whose Person and Kingdom being in the hands of the Nobility, they encouraged by the Successes of the former Reign, make rapacious Seizure of most other Lands that did in any wise appertain to the Clergy. And as a pro-
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per Method to confirm their Titles, and assure the Possessions of these Estates, they give place to the establishing a Church, (much more agreeable to Holy Writ) but widely different in Doctrine and Discipline from that they had departed from, and whose Revenues they had seized; for unless they had performed this, they could not have secured their new-gotten Estates. But that young King dying, and *Mary* his Sister succeeding, who was a Bigot to the Old Religion, she soon unravelled the Religion that was established in her Brother's Reign, but yet had not time, or opportunity, to reinvest the Religious in their former Possessions; and this Queen blindly permitting so many Cruelties to be exercised upon her Subjects, only upon the score of Religion, rendered her Person and Government so hateful, that she was never able to effect any thing farther for the Advantage of the Religious. By which means, Queen *Elizabeth* succeeding, more securely annulled what Queen *Mary*, in her short Reign, had done in favour of the Old Religion. For Queen *Elizabeth* having been educated, and throughly principled, in the New or Reformed Religion; King *Henry*, her Father, having married her Mother, in the Life-time of *Catharine* his first Queen; and the Pope not having consented to that Divorce; she, by the Principles of the Roman Church, was illegitimate; and it being for her Mother's sake, that King *Henry* so warmly pur-
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 fied that Divorce, that proved so fatal to the Roman See, by occasioning the entire Exclusion of the Papal Authority in England: Wherefore, as Queen Mary's Interest, Judgment, Temper, or Education, induced her to be a Zealot for the Old Religion; so on the contrary, from the very same Reasons, Queen Elizabeth was entirely for the Reformed or New. Besides, this Queen's Mother was in her Lifetime the principal Support of the beginning Reformation, her Marriage being opposed by the Papacy, by denying the King's Divorce; which was managed in the Foreign Universities, and afterward pronounced by the Reformers.

For these Reasons, (for I pretend not to intermeddle with Religious ones.) Queen Elizabeth is no sooner settled in the Throne, but she endeavours to secure her self in the Possession of it, by those of the New Religion; and this must necessarily lead her to endeavour the Suppression of the Old, because those of that must naturally be her Enemies: And this in time she so prudently effected, that modestly speaking, altho' she entered the Throne when the People were divided, yet when Nature called her out of it, she left them united, having brought the Nation to be of one Mind, (I intend in respect of Government.) for hers was at last generally liked. For she never being observed, in the whole Course of her long Reign, to have carried on any ambitious or separate

separate Desigus, either to oppress her Subjects, or to enlarge her own Authority, she raised no Fears or Jealousies in the Minds of her People; so that they having an entire Confidence in her Wisdom, she lived beloved, and died lamented. And her Subjects thus entirely satisfied with her Government, and their Industries always encouraged by her Favours, they wonderfully apply themselves to Trade; by which the Wealth of the Nation was abundantly encreased; which was as readily granted to this Queen, as she demanded, or indeed as the Necessity of the Publick required: By which means this Princess was enabled to shake the Spanish Monarchy, which then threatened to over-run Europe; and in spite of its Greatness, to defend an oppressed People, that have since raised themselves to a mighty Commonwealth, to support the injured Protestants in France; to reduce the Rebellious Irish; and in effect, to govern and give Laws to Scotland; and, after all, to leave to her Successor, a People Rich, United, and Flourishing.

This, perhaps, if the Excellency and Goodness of Reigns, are to be measured by the Happiness the People enjoy under them, may be justly esteemed one of the most Glorious that are yet extant in our Annals: For altho' Henry the Fourth may be said, in some Particulars, to have equalled it; yet it was but short, in respect of this, and not encompassed with so many Difficulties. Both these Princesses ascended
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the Throne when the Nation was divided, and both left it united; both having, altho' by different Methods, worn out the opposite Factions: *Henry* effected it by Gentleness, and Acts of Mercy; but *Elizabeth*, such was the Difference in the Circumstances and Times, was necessitated sometimes to intermix Severities. Both equally did interweave their own and the Peoples Interests. *Henry* was not embarrassed in Foreign Wars, *Elizabeth's* Reign was almost a continued one; *Henry's* was but a short and happy time, *Elizabeth's* a long and fortunate one. *Henry* had no Difficulties to grapple with Foreign Princes, no one Prince at that time being grown too big; whereas *Elizabeth* had continued ones, the House of *Austria* being become so formidable as to threaten the Liberties of *Europe*. Neither of them created any National Misfortunes by themselves; neither did Either permit others to do it. Both lived generally beloved, and both died universally lamented.

But *James* King of *Scotland*, succeeding the Wife and Glorious Queen *Elizabeth*, and not pursuing the same Councils, soon ruined that goodly Fabrick, of Union, that she had with so much Wisdom raised: For he was no sooner admitted into the *English* Throne, but, by a strange and dangerous Policy, he breaks and divides that People that she had with so much Care and Goodness united. For he begins

gins his Reign with an Endeavour to settle his Government only upon a Party of his People; whereas the great Business of her Reign was to comprehend all; which, modestly speaking, she effected: For notwithstanding there were Religious Disputes, and different Sects, amongst those of the New Religion; yet none but the Papists being excluded the Civil Government, all others being capable of Offices, Trusts, or Employments, and were indifferently by that Princess preferred, they were equally jealous for her Person and Government. So that altho' sometimes they differed amongst themselves, yet they always united for the Publick Good. For this Princess having no Designs of acquiring Arbitrary Power, was never observed to entirely to favour any one Religious Party, as if by that she intended to make them Instruments, first to oppress others, and afterwards to enslave all.

Whereas King *James* first beginning, and his Posterity pursuing, contrary Methods, viz. Of governing only by a Party; hath been the unhappy Occasion of gradually bringing on those known Calamities, that ended in the Murder of his Son, and Banishment of his Grandchildren: For by these his Measures, altho' he found the People united and contented, he governed them, and left them, divided and dissatisfied. It is true, during his Reign, the Kingdom continued in Peace; but that was more to be attributed to his cowardly and pusillanimous Temper,

Temper, than to his Wisdom or Craft; for altho' Troubles, did not in his Time actually begin, yet Discontents and Murmurings boiled high; which gradually ripening, impostumated, and broke out with Fury, in his Son and Successor's Time.

But that we may be let into the Reasons of these Measures of King James, we must consider, how that Queen Elizabeth, during the greatest part of her Reign, had by her Agents so managed the Affairs of Scotland, that King James had sometimes been perplexed, by the great Interest she had in that Kingdom; and that she had executed his Mother, and entirely suppressed that Faction, that would have advanced her to the English Throne: For which Reason, it is very probable that King James really disliked that Queen's Proceedings, and hated those Persons, whom he believed to be Authors or Favourers of those Councils. And what renders this the more likely, is the immediate Resentment he shewed to such Persons as were of that Queen's Council, and who had not made their Peace by an early Application to him: For in his very Journey for England, he sent to Rawleigh, Cobham, and that Party, to let them know, they might spare their Complement in coming to meet him. For Cecil, in the declining Age of Queen Elizabeth, had kept a secret Correspondence with that King, and had fully informed him of the Temper of her Court, and who they were that were not

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for admitting him, without some previous Conditions, into the English Throne; for some there were, who were for making Terms with him, that the English Government might be preserved entire. These Proceedings, thus discovered to that Prince, it is probable, might occasion that Medley of a Plot, that being composed by Persons of so different Kidneys, appeared so very monstrous, that its Reality in that Age was somewhat doubted; however it was so managed that it ruined several, viz. Cobham, Grey, Rawleigh, and Others. But King James not only discountenanced those who were Lovers of the late Reign, but also openly favoured all such, altho' of differing Principles, that had been Enemies to it, or had been any ways disobliged by it, for not only those who were thought to have been Friends to his Mother, but even Southampton, and others, were received into his Grace. And that he might make it appear, that he entirely would swerve from her Measures, he not only makes a Peace, but enters into a Friendship, and entire Confidence with Spain. But these Proceedings were not approved by the People, whereby Discontents are formed, and Fears created, the People entering into a Mistrust of his Majesty's Intentions; which gradually encreased to such a Degree, as to perplex his Reign, and ruine his Sons.

For the Commons (between whom and the Crown the Contest now lies) being perfectly reconciled

reconciled to the Reformed Established Religion, and being satisfied under the late Government, in that they were always consulted in it; and now observing a Change in this Prince's Measures, from what was practised in the late Reign, grew jealous of some intended Innovations; and therefore were not so ready to comply with the Desires of this King, as they had been to the late Queen: For altho' this King does not seem directly to have aimed at the introducing Popery; neither had he a Heart, a Purse, or a Force, to set up for Arbitrary Rule, (which are the two things that are generally dreaded by the People) yet his trifling Purposes of pursuing an Unity in Religion, and an Union with *Scotland*, gave the Nation Occasion to suspect both: For this Prince having obtained some moderate Knowledge in Learning, beyond indeed what is usual with Crowned Heads, became so puffed up with an Opinion of his own Parts, that he believes himself able to perform Wonders; and accordingly he chalks out two mighty Designs, that were to be effected by the Strength of his own Brains, *viz.* a Reconciliation in Religion, by moderating the Difference between *Rome* and us; and an Union with *Scotland*. The latter he began early, by using but one common Name for both Kingdoms: However he was so flattered by the Ministers and Creatures of *Spain*, (who had more Policy, altho' less Learning) that he really was perswaded of the

the Feasibility of the First. For the House of *Austria*, at this time, had farther Designs than this Bookish King discovered; for which Reason their Ministers indefatigably laboured to amuse this Prince; and that they might appear to act with Sincerity in these Matters, that were so much desired by this King, (it being, if it succeeded, what he imagined would immortalize his Name) they craftily tickle him into a Belief of a Match between the Infanta and the Prince his Son, (by which he is to be empowered to do mighty things in the *Palatinate*) and yet at the same time the Arms of *Spain* assist in excluding his Son-in-law from his Inheritance, and in weakening the Protestant Interest in *Germany*; and by that means advance the Grandeur of the House of *Austria*, and gave an Occasion here for the King to be more suspected and disliked by his own People: For King *James*, to carry on these Designs, (that are not to be entrusted in the hands of many, by reason they were not favoured by the Nation) uses a Publick Minister of *Spain* in his most Secret Councils, indulges the Roman Catholics, and makes such Concessions to the Papacy, that gave a Scandal to the Reformation; and all this before the Church of *Rome* had made one Step to a Reconciliation. By these strange Proceedings, he gave occasion of such further Fears and Jealousies, that produced more Complaints than Supplies from the Parliaments, and so of course brought

brought on untimely Dissolutions, by which Murmurings and Discontents, are increased. Disappointed therefore of Supplies, which his Necessities required, in a Parliamentary way, he projects to raise a Third or Neutral Party in Religion, which by lessening the Differences between the Church of *Rome* and the Reformation, might be the better disposed for an Accommodation, (whereas the Business of the former Reign was to widen them) and upon this Party he builds his Government, all Offices, Places, Trusts, Employments, and Preferments, being to be disposed of to such as were Favourers of this healing Doctrine; and by this Party he proposes to support the Crown, relieve his Wants, and to do Wonders: And the better to effect this, all those called Puritans in Religion are to be discountenanced, and all such who seem to favour the last Reign are to be neglected, or else, like Papists, excluded the Government; for the Laws as yet remaining against the Papists, they could not be publicly admitted: So that neither Party, viz. neither Puritan, nor Papist were pleased. It is true, the Papists were inclined to the Prince, by reason it was only his Favour that protected them from the Penalties of the Law; whereas it was only the King's Authority that excluded the Others, there being no Law to do it. But by thus narrowing his Government, in the Exclusion of so great a part of his People out of it, he so weakened himself, that he

he became contemptible Abroad, as being hated and despised at Home.

He attempted first an Union with *Scotland*, in a Parliamentary way; but that being then incumbered with so many Difficulties, in relation to *England*, few or no Advantages being likely to accrew by such an Union, it did not succeed. The King therefore intends to effect one, in some measure, by another way; or at least, so far to unite, as to let his Countrymen partake of some *English* Privileges: For this Purpose, a feigned Case is to be solemnly argued before the Judges, under the Name of *Calvins*, that so having their Opinions in some Particulars, he might have the Colour of Law to warrant his Favour to that Nation. But however, this not fully answering what was principally intended, that his Project remains as yet imperfect; altho' now perhaps, the State of *Europe* being much altered, the present Securities of both Kingdoms may induce them to perform what they formerly disliked.

By the eager Pursuit of these his trifling Designs, (trifling I term them, in that had they succeeded, which the very Nature of things rendered the first impracticable, his own Power had not been enlarged) he became so suspected, that Parliaments would not supply his Wants, which were the more craving, by the perpetual begging of his needy Countrymen: So that he was obliged to have recourse to Loans,

Loans, and Benevolences, by which Discon-
 tents are ever multiplied:
 By these Measures, that happy Harmony,
 Agreement, and Confidence, between the Prince
 and People, that was in the last Reign, was en-
 tirely dissolved; for the Prince neglecting to
 be advised by his People, the People being to
 supply their Prince, by which, the Glory of
 the Nation sinks into a miserable Contempt.
 As some Remedy for these Misfortunes, the
 King attempts another Change, not so much
 in the Nature, as in the Mode of Government;
 for he doth not endeavour, by a Law, direct-
 ly, to alter the Constitution, as the Se-
 venth did, but proposes, by dividing the Com-
 mons, (in whom now the Wealth and Power
 mostly centres) so to order Matters, as by the
 Help of one part of that Body, to govern the
 other. For by planting his Government en-
 tirely upon a Party, that is, by admitting none
 into Places, Offices, Trusts, Dignities, or Pre-
 ferments, but what were in such a particular
 manner qualified, he proposes to raise so pow-
 erful a Party, as to be able by their Assistance
 to do as he pleases, and then they being abso-
 lutely dependant upon him, could not depart
 from his Cause; for being placed in Power, on-
 ly by his Authority, they must naturally be in
 his Interest, since it is by him alone they enjoy
 these Advantages, exclusive to Others. To
 effect this, he craveth Unity of Religion, and Po-
 licy, and this seems to be the greatest Matter-
 piece

piece of his Reign) for by admitting or pre-
 ferring only Persons of particular Tenets in
 Religion, (when the Laws of the Kingdom
 excluded none but Papists) was a Reason to
 induce all of that Party (that thus only tasted
 of the King's Favour) to preach up, and had
 Argument for the enlarging the Sovereign
 Power, to the endangering the Subjects Li-
 berty; And the Prince, reciprocally, for the
 better upholding this his Party, to countenance
 such Doctrines or Opinions that were for this
 his Churches Advantage. For this Reason,
 Royal Prerogatives, and Kingly Authority, are
 preached up, and magnified by the Clergy;
 and the Rights and Liberties of the People are
 proved to be but gracious Concessions of the
 Crown; the established Hierarchy of the then
 Church, is declared of Divine Institution; an
 outward and pompous Worship is encouraged,
 and the Authority of Churchmen is enlarged:
 By these and such like Methods, did this King
 begin to form a new Party, which was after-
 wards, in his Son and Successor's Reign, ri-
 pined, perfected, and at last ruined.
 And herein methinks appears the mighty
 Difference between this and the last Reign:
 Queen Elizabeth found a People divided into
 two Parties, in their very Natures so opposite,
 as to admit of no Reconciliation; and there-
 fore it was as well Wisdom, as it was her In-
 clination, to espouse One of them, that by
 their Help she might be enabled to suppress the
 Other;

Other ; without which, neither her Person nor Government could be secure : Which she happily effected, and left the Kingdom united. To do this, she always used her Subjects Councils in Parliament ; by which Method, her own, and those her Peoples Interest, became One ; For being All consulted, they became All interested in the Publick Proceedings ; so that there was no Ground for Jealousies, or Fears, when nothing is transacted but they know.

Whereas King James enters the Kingdom, when the People were united, and he industriously divides them ; for having Aims of his own, that were not agreeable to the Nation, he was unwilling to let his Parliaments into the Secrets of his Councils ; for which Reason, the People not being consulted, would not assist him in the Prosecution of what they did not know.

As a Remedy then, for these Difficulties, this King begins to form a Party, (that depending upon his Favour, might be at his Devotion) proposing to govern by their Assistance ; but his darling Purposes, or his Measures, not being approved by the Nation, (as hath been already shew'd) he could never gain such a Number to enable him to perfect his Designs : For the People being jealous of his Proceedings, there were not many that could be induced to second his Purposes, unless such as could be won by the means of Offices, Places, Trusts, Honours, Dignities, Preferments, or some other Advan-

Advantages ; for which Reason, not being able to gain to his side a sufficient Number of the People, he always miscarried in his Aims. Which evidently appears, in that, with all his King-craft, (that he vainly boasted of) he never could compass a Parliament that would comply with him.

But King James did not only divide the People, but he likewise endeavours to depress the Ancient Nobility ; for notwithstanding Henry the Seventh had gave the fatal Blow to the Power of the Baronage, so that from his time it hath sunk from being a Principal, to be only a kind of accessory part in the Constitution, it naturally in all intestine Disputes falling into one of the two powerful Extrems, viz. King, or Commons ; yet King James farther depresses it, by discountenancing the Ancient Peerage, and by conferring numerous Honours, where there was not Estates to answer them. It is true, by this Course he might secure a Party in the House of Lords ; but his Difficulties were not with the Peers, which made this a useless Remedy.

The governing by a Party, and the multiplying Honours, where there was not answerable Estates, were two Usages first introduced by King James, altho' since continued by his Posterity. It is true, he did not live to see the Miseries his wretched King-craft began ; for his timorous and pusillanimous Soul would not permit of hot Councils ; and by slow ones,

Discontents would not hastily ripen: for perhaps it was more his Fears, or the want of Time, than his Wisdom, or Foresight, that kept back the Calamities from breaking out in his Time, that afterwards so fatally overwhelmed his Son.

VI. Charles, his Son and Successor, a Prince of a more wilful and less cautious Spirit, altho' of inconstant Resolutions, pursues the Measures his Father had began, of supporting his Government upon a Party; but being of somewhat a more impatient Nature, seems to have been more precipitate in the Prosecution of his Designs, which perhaps were somewhat different from his Father's; for he seems to have had stronger Desires to advance Sovereignty, and to aggrandize the Church, that now doth not comprehend such Numbers as formerly, (her Foundations being narrowed) and the Terms of Communion multiplied, by making or ordaining Conditions for the Admission of its Members, as had not been heretofore required; which being introduced under the Countenance of Regal Authority, more firmly rivetted all its Members to the Royal Interest: For which Reason, Churchmen and their Partisans are only used in this Prince's future Councils, who being better skilled in Religion than Politicks, seem to have put this Prince upon such Measures, as brought on his Destruction: For this King is periwaded that the

the Interest of the present Church and the Crown are inseparable, and that neither can subsist but by the Help of the Other; that they must go hand in hand, the Authority of the Church to be enlarged, as the Sovereignty of the Prince is encreased. And that therefore, to perform this, it was necessary that such Care should be taken, that no Person should be admitted into Holy Orders, or into Dignities, or Preferments, but such as were principled for this End: And that such Persons might be the better known, and so only admitted, or preferred, some *Shiboleths*, some *Novelties* in Doctrine, or Opinion, are to be introduced, or at least, are to be so used, as Men may be distinguished by them: Thus some of the Nine and thirty Articles are now explained in a Sense somewhat different from the Letter, that so Men may be distinguished under the Names of *Calvinists*, and *Arminians*; the Doctrines of Obedience, contained in the Homilies, is now improved to the Divine Right of Kings: Disputes are created concerning the Altar and Communion-Table, and about Kneeling or Standing at the Eucharist, the Morality of the Sabbath questioned, and its Contrary defended; Sports and Pastimes permitted, and justified upon that Day, Postures and Gestures in Worship performed, that were not enjoined; Theatrical Consecrations of New Places of Divine Worship, that had neither been seen or known since the Reformation, are now used.

By

By these and suchlike Methods are advanced Differences, which produce Names of Distinction, which are used by way of Reproach to each other; whereby the People became divided into Factions, vehemently embittered against one another, which at length terminate in a Civil War: For the Nation thus divided, and the greater Number of the People dissatisfied, there only wanted an Opportunity to come to Violence, that being, as then, imagined the only Remedy to redress these their Grievances: And this cannot be long wanting, for the King's Necessities oblige him to call a Parliament, which remonstrate, and complain of Innovations, and will not grant Money without Preliminaries for their own Security. This exasperates the Prince, and enrages that Party who were in the Government, who rail at these Proceedings, and seem publicly to admire their Prince's Goodness, in thus consulting his People, when he may, by his Sovereign Authority, justly relieve his own or the Publick Wants, without their Consents; and therefore, since his Subjects have insolently denied Supplies, when he so graciously asked them, he ought to raise such by his Royal Power. King Charles, encouraged by such Sacred Doctrines, pursues some violent and uncommon Measures; for he questions and imprisons Persons for Crimes that were thought to be only answerable in Parliament, imposes exorbitant Fines; violates the Rights of Magna Charta, by

by detaining Men in Prison, when the Law allowed Bail; raises Money upon the Subject, under the Pretence of old and obsolete Laws, or rather Usages, without Consent of Parliament: In the mean time the Clergy justify these Proceedings, the Pulpits found out the Divine Right of Kings, and their undoubted Power, in Cases of Necessity, to raise Money, of which they are only Judges; condemning, as Factious and Seditious, all contrary Opinions. And not content with these Proceedings in England, this unfortunate Prince, as if he would precipitate his own Ruine, by a strange and unheard-of Sollicitum in Politicks, at the very same time pursues such Measures in Scotland, as raised the same Commotions and Discontents there, when he had not a Purse, a Force, or Authority, to quiet those in England: For this King, altho' he did not renew the unsuccessful Attempt of his Father, for a Civil Union between the two Kingdoms; yet he zealously pursues a Religious one, endeavouring, contrary to the very Genius of that People, to bring the Scottish Kirk to an Uniformity with that of England; by which that Kingdom is immediately put into a Flame. By which means this King is so encompassed with Misfortunes, that he is again necessitated to call a Parliament, and to throw himself into the Arms of his English Subjects: For the Scots arm, and being invited, or encouraged, by the dissatisfied English, march for England.

The King, threatened by this Northern Army, and dreading the Consequences, should they advance farther, complies with the Councils of those who advise a Parliament; as the only Expedient to remedy these Evils.

The Parliament being met, and being composed of such Persons who had suffered by, or at least dreaded, the Royal Authority, for the Prince's Circumstances being, at this time, at a low Ebb, Elections could not be to his Advantage; they remonstrate, and complain of Grievances, and are for punishing some of the King's Creatures, who were believed to be the Instruments, Promoters, or Advisers of these irregular Methods, which the King's Exigencies, at that time, obliged him to consent to: But the Parliament are not content with this, but insist upon a farther Security; which was, in effect, to strip their Prince, for some time, of his Regal Authority, that so it might not be in his Power to renew his former Violations of the Subjects Rights.

The King, passionately resenting these Proceedings, retires from his Parliament, sets up his Standard, and raises Forces; the Parliament does the same; and so begins a most Calamitous Civil War, dangerous to the People, but fatal to the Prince, for it ended in his Murder, and a tedious Banishment of all his Posterity. What is Remarkable in this War, was its Beginning and Ending, which were both different from what Civil Wars had formerly

mainly been, before the Change in the Constitution. Not now the War not being, as anciently, between the King and the Barons, but between the Prince and the Commons, the Pretence of Religion is used as the principal Motive to the War; by reason, by that, the People would be best divided; and the People in the present Constitution, must be divided, before a War, or a Change, can be effected.

Neither did this War end as the former always did; for now, upon the Death of the King, the Throne is not filled, but the Commons continue a Government without such a Head; whereas formerly, to which side so ever the Advantage of the War ended, yet still the Throne was filled, the very Nature of that Constitution requiring a Head.

King Charles, and the Royal Party, vanquished; there was a certain Set, or Club of Men, who had craftily got into Authority; for the War had removed the Kingly Power, and the Weakness, or Divisions, of the Peers could not support the Authority of their own House; so that the entire Legislature, in these confused Times, was absolutely gained into the Hands of the Commons; and their House being composed of a Multitude of Members, which were not of united Council, in that Juncture, the prevalent Party gradually grew ed out, and excluded all such that were not of their Opinions; by which means, having obtained

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obtained the Legislature to themselves, they keep and support that Authority by the help of that Army with which they had dethroned the King, and conquered the Royal Party. But having excluded so many of their own Members, and having carried things to a greater Extremity, than perhaps was at first intended; and still endeavouring, altho' the War was ended, to retain their Authority, the Nation grew dissatisfied with their Proceedings; and then the War being finished, and so common Dangers, that kept them united, removed, they themselves gradually fell into divided Councils, which occasioned their Ruine; for by that means they gave an occasion, impolitickly, to permit that very Army, by which they maintained themselves in Authority, to be divided, (different Sects in Religion encreasing amongst them) and afterwards to be so modelled by its own Officers, that even an End was put to their Authority, by that very Army that had supported it: Which being thus effected, the Officers of the Army slip into the Government themselves. But they not having the Pretence of Authority to raise Money for their own subsistence, and not daring to come to Violence, a Number of Men are convened, by their Authority, which are to be called a Parliament, as a Method whereby to do it: And altho' all previous Caution was taken in Elections, (for somewhat of a Form was to be observed, the better to amuse the

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the People) that none but such Persons should be chosen, or admitted into this Assembly, but such as were known to be well affected to the Purpose; yet this Convention, or Parliament, being met, engaged in such Measures as would have infallibly overturned their Project. But during these Transactions, *Cromwell*, who commands the Forces, had so prepared the Army, that this pretended Parliament is turned out of doors, and *Cromwell*, their General, is declared their Protector; who, after a great Variety of Endeavours, and much Craft, to establish himself in his new-gotten Authority, was notwithstanding reduced, before his Death, to the last Extremity. For not being able, by all his Cunning, to comprehend the Majority of the People in his Government, (for he had founded it upon the Army, which notwithstanding he durst not use to violate the Peoples Rights) he was encompassed with the greatest Difficulties, as having neither Money, nor Means whereby to raise it, to pay his Army, and so to support his Power: However, Death was so kind to this Hero, as to remove him before he was dispossessed of his Dignity: and then that Babel of Government, which only was kept united by his Courage and Craft, immediately shattered, and fell into Confusion. For *Cromwell*, altho' he had really outwitted his Masters, and had thus got into the Government himself, and had continued himself in it, by craftily removing the

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Faction and Disaffected Part of his Army; yet such being the State of the Nation, that he could not plant a settled and a regular Policy upon this Army, in Opposition to the People; neither durst he admit the People into the Legislature, for that had been in effect to dethrone himself, he being only supported by the Army who had placed him in that Authority: For which Reasons, not daring to consult the People in a Free Parliament, in order to obtain Money for the Support of his Army and Government, and having no other Means whereby to do it, for the Sequestrations upon the Malignants were worn out, and his American Expedition had failed him, and not daring to supply his Necessities by an open and direct Violence upon the other Subjects, by reason the Army, by which alone it was to be done, being composed of Natives, who had taken up Arms for the Defence of Liberties and Religion, would not be readily brought to be the cruel Instruments of Violence and Oppression, upon those who were of their own Opinion, but would, as it is evident, they afterwards did, run into the Interests of the Nation. For which Reason, had Cromwell lived, altho' he might have prolonged his Authority to a Period beyond what it continued, by reason of his Death, yet it must have shattered and fell. For the People having the Wealth, or Purses, which they would not part with, unless consulted

ted in a Free Parliament, and his Power being so abstracted, and so supported, as would not admit of that, it is plain it must have dropt for Want of Money to uphold it. The great Variety of Changes, that has successively happened in the English Government, from the Expulsion of King Charles out of the Kingdom, was the Author of the Restoration of his Son, and with him, the former Constitution; for those intermediate Governments being in their Natures monstrous, and in their Productions violent and confused, were of course in their Administrations loose, by which means the People spawned into different Religious Sects, and of course into different Political Factions. And that Sect, or Party, that had the good hap to get uppermost, always endeavoured to secure itself in Authority, and in order to that, laboured in discountenance and oppress Others. This the Presbyterians did by the Independants, and the Independants returned it upon the Presbyterians, and the Anabaptists levelled at both. The same may be said of the Commonwealth Party, upon those that were for a single Person, and they again upon them, and the Levellers, and Fifth-Monarchy-Men, that differed from, and hated Both. From which great Variety of Changes from one Party to another, in Government, it happened that there were but few Persons, of any Note, but who had, either directly by themselves, or indirectly, by

by their Friends or Relations, suffered under some of these tumultuous and short-lived Governments; whereby the whole Nation grew sick and weary of this unquiet and unsettled State; and having found no lasting Peace in any of these new-modelled *Polities*, they seem generally inclinable to return to their former Constitution, as the only Expedient for a lasting Settlement: All which was abundantly evidenced in the Peoples unanimous Desires for a full and free Parliament, which would of course restore the whole Constitution.

And here methinks it is worth observing, how that very Milice, or Army, by which the Nation had been so long enthralled, and its Government so often changed, after once the People became generally dissatisfied, and so prepared and ripe for a Revolution, did of themselves insensibly vanish, permitting the Restoration of the Old Constitution, which they had disliked and destroyed, and that without Bloodshed, or Opposition; altho' it was evident, by their Suffering that, they must be excluded from that Authority they had usurped. A full Proof how naturally Revolutions will come to pass in an ill-built Government, when the People are befitted for it; and this is farther confirmed by a later Instance, under King *James* the Second.

And we may farther learn, from the many Miscarriages in the several Attempts of the oppressed Royal Party, how little Plots or Conspiracies

spiracies avail for the effecting immature Revolutions by Violence; for all such, during the Continuance of these confused Governments, had no other effect, but for a time, fortified and strengthened what they would have destroyed; for they brought Ruine and Destruction to themselves, Suspicion and Danger to the Party, and an Abhorrence and Dislike to the Cause.

It is true, such is the Nature of Man, as to be impatient under what he esteems Oppression, and is therefore too ready to engage in violent Measures, in hopes to redeem himself from such that way, by which he most usually involves himself in Ruine; whereas, if his Purposes are feasible, that is, if the Nation approved what he aims at, Time will securely bring things to effect; and if not, his Contrivances will be but to little purpose, unless to destroy himself: For in all Plots, the Majority of the People must be supposed to favour what they design to effect, or not, (I only speak now of Government in *Hypothesis*) if the first, the Revolution will naturally happen, and is only hindered or prolonged by Precipitation; as appears plainly by two differing Instances, *viz.* that we have been now treating, and that more lately, under the Conduct of our late Sovereign. If the last, should the Conspiracy in its first Attempt succeed, yet the Publick Revolution could never be effected, or at least it could never be established, as might

might be shewed by a multitude of Instances, by reason the People not approving it, would not join in it.

VIII. But to return: A Free Parliament being, at the pressing Desires of the Nation, convened, Charles the Second is recalled; and the whole Constitution, as composed of King, Lords, and Commons, restored; and the People appear so unanimously pleased with this Revolution, as expecting it to have put an End to their late Confusions, that they will think or hear of nothing, but of securing their restored Prince and Throne, against all future Attempts of Popular Authority; no Man daring to be so hardy, as to speak of fencing the Publick Liberty.

For the Sense of the late Confusions, which were now fresh in Mens Minds, had so prejudiced the People, that they would not think of any Danger, but what might proceed from the Prevalency of Popular Faction, under which they had so lately suffered; which appears, in that the whole Legislature, in the Beginning of this Reign, seems to have been chiefly employed in fencing the Crown, and fortifying the Regal Authority, each Person being emulous to manifest his Loyalty, in aggrandizing his new-restored Prince: By which Methods, the Bias, for a time, drew so powerfully to the Crown, that English Liberties were endangered

dangered (by the Subjects Zeal for the Prince's Prerogative) to have been lost.

For now the King's Person is to be secured by Guards, and his Authority strengthened by a standing Stipendiary Milice, which would most certainly wear out the Trained Bands, that were settled upon Land, let the Parliament make what Provisions they can to the contrary: For the Prince encouraging the first, *Regis ad Exemplum*, the People would in time despise the last, which then will gradually be dissolved; and an ample and improving Revenue must be settled upon the Crown, far exceeding what was ever enjoyed by former Kings, which proved sufficient, if it had been frugally managed, to have supported the Crown without any farther Assistance: Oaths are devised, that may exclude all Persons out of the Government, that will not run into the separate Interest of the Prince: New Securities are gave to the Crown, that it may be out of the Subjects Power to oppose any future Proceedings from thence. And not content with all this, Penal Laws are enacted, by which all Persons are to be compelled to comply in Worship with the Established Church, which being entirely dependant upon the Crown, its Members had appeared zealous Assertors of Royal Authority in the late times, and were that very Party by which his Grandfather and Father had endeavoured to use in the advancing Prerogative.

By these Measures, the People in effect seem- ed to have surrendred their Liberty; for they placed by Law so ample an Authority in the Prince, that it was in his Power to have ruled as he pleased; and had not King Charles's Plea- sures (which he seems entirely to have pursued) been attended with so much Profusiveness, he might in all probability have effected it.

For this King had a Revenue settled, suffi- cient to have supported the Crown without any farther Assistance from the People. He had a Guard to defend his Person, and support his Government; he had the Militia entirely put into his hands; he had Mens Con- sciences shackled with Oaths for their Fidelity, in Cases where formerly were required none; he had a Law to exclude all Persons out of the Government, who did not conform to the Worship of that Church of which he was the Head; he had Penal Laws to oblige Dissenters either to come to Church, and so to be of that Party that were for advancing Prerogatives, or else they must suffer the Penalties of the Laws, which were severe. And the Execu- tive part of the Laws being perfectly in the Crown, it was in the Prince's Power either to execute these Laws, or not, that is, either to prosecute Dissenters, or not prosecute them, ac- cordingly as they should merit, or not merit the Prince's Favour; for now by these Laws they are laid at the Prince's Mercy; for if he causes them to be executed, they must be ruined;

if he doth not, it is his Grace and Goodness only that protects them. By which, it is pro- bable, this unhappy *Dilemma* was projected, in the procuring those Laws, viz. That either by the Means of these Laws the Dissenters should be necessitated to close with the Crown, and so the King being strengthened by that Party might be enabled to rule arbitrarily; Or if they refused that, then these Laws to be so ex- ecuted upon them, that they might be so im- powered, discountenanced, and oppressed, as thereby to become useless, and so in no Ca- pacity to hinder the Prince in his Designs: For by these Laws the Dissenters were under the same Circumstances as the Papists; and therefore it was but reasonable to expect, that like them, they would be always ready to close with the Crown, by reason if the Ten- derness of their Consciences would not per- mit them to conform to the Church, it was only the Prince's Mercy that could protect them against the Penalties of the Laws, which must ruin them, if strictly executed.

But King Charles profusively consuming his vast Revenues in his Pleasures, was necessita- ted to have frequent recourse to his Parliament for Supplies; which being called soon after this King's Restoration, was composed of such Per- sons as seemed most ready to oblige their Prince; and notwithstanding this Parliament was continued, yet the King's secret Friend- ship with France, and his Measures in conjun-

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 ction with that Crown, to over-run *Holland*,
 had so alarmed the Nation, and dissatisfied
 this Parliament, that the *Commons* begin to
 grow jealous of the Prince's Designs, and ad-
 dress to him to alter his Measures; besides the
 Court had secretly connived at the *Papists*, at
 the same time that Dissenters were prosecuted.
 These Proceedings enclined the Commons to be
 more favourably disposed towards Dissenters,
 who having suffered by the Laws, expected
 little Favour from the Crown, by reason the
 Government was continued in the hands of the
 Church-Party, who were for rooting out these
 Sects: For this Reason, the Dissenting Party,
 notwithstanding the Penal Laws, apply them-
 selves to the Commons, and perfectly uniting
 with the Popular or Country Party, (which
 now grow strongest in the Parliament) they
 oppose Prerogatives: And the Generality of
 the Nation, either moved by their Suffering,
 or liking their Cause, or perceiving their for-
 mer Errors, and the Danger of their Prosecu-
 tions, begin likewise to be more mercifully
 enclined to them; whereby the Execution of
 these Religious Laws were somewhat remitted,
 and they enjoy more Quiet.

But King *Charles*, at length, perceiving the
 Mistakes in his former Proceedings against Dis-
 senters; for the Nation greatly favouring them,
 his Prosecutions only encreased his Enemies,
 and made his Designs the more suspected; be-
 gins to alter his Measures, and on a sudden in-
 dulges

dulges them, and that not meerly by remit-
 ting the Execution of the Laws, but by sus-
 pending them by his Prerogative Royal. But
 what seems to have induced the King to this
 marvelous and illegal Tenderness, was the
 War with the *Dutch*, under which Pretence
 he had raised an Army; and by this Royal In-
 dulgence to Dissenters, it was presumed he
 might have reconciled them to favour his Pro-
 ceedings: However, this Army being raised
 by Persons of Quality, and being composed of
 Natives, could not be so suddenly modelled
 for the Prince's Purposes; (for it never was
 sent out of *England*) but that his craving Exi-
 gencies necessitate him to meet his Parliament,
 which was expected would have complied
 with the King: (for no Endeavours had been
 wanting to prepare them for that Purpose)
 But on the Contrary, the Commons are dissa-
 tisfied with the Measures the King had con-
 concerted with *France*, to ruine *Holland*, as be-
 lieving them to be levelled at the weakening
 the Protestant Interest Abroad, the aggrandi-
 zing the *French* Monarchy, and the advancing
 his own Authority at Home. The King thus
 disappointed, condescends to a Peace with *Hol-
 land*, complies with his Parliament, and after
 much Difficulty, having gotten Money twice
 for that Purpose, consents to disband the Ar-
 my: And the Parliament making their Ad-
 vantage of the then Circumstances, declared
 the Illegality of the King's Proceeding in his

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Toleration of tender Consciences, by virtue of his Prerogative Royal, and prevailed upon him to vacate his own Act, and to disown his pretended Authority in such Cases.

But the Parliament being up, the King after some time re-assumes his former Measures, not by openly assisting *France*, but by secret and under-hand Dealings so favoured the Designs of that Monarch, that he enlarges his Dominions, to the Dread and Terror of *Europe*; whereby the Nation renews its Complaints against the Court, and exclaim against the Conduct of this Prince, imagining that *French* Gold had softened our *English* Councils. Yet notwithstanding the General Murmurings, Complaints, and Jealousies, of a great part of the Nation, King *Charles*, what by the Advantage of Laws made since his Restoration, in favour of the Crown, and what by the Assistance of the high Church-Party, and some Foreign and other Domestick Helps, might perhaps have weathered all Difficulties with his People, and ruled for a time arbitrarily, had not the seasonable Discovery of a Popish Plot embarrassed his Affairs, and thereby put a Stop to his Measures.

For altho' King *Charles* was a Prince of Pleasures, and seems not to have delighted in Business, or to have affected Danger; and altho' he seems not to have thirsted after Enlargement of Dominions; for he assisted, or at least permitted *France* to take Towns in the *Netherlands*,

lands, without having any Share in such Conquest, nay he himself having sold *Dunkirk*; yet his pleasurable Desires naturally lead him to affect unbounded Power in his own Kingdom, by reason the People in Parliament would never consent to the raising such mighty Sums as were daily lavished in his Sensualities; and his constant Necessities, occasioned by his profuse Expences, leading him to take unwarantable Methods, these his Purposes were discovered and disliked: But notwithstanding this, had not the Popish Plot perplexed his Designs, he might for a time have seized the Nations Liberties; as he had done their Money, by shutting up his Exchequer.

For by this Plot, Popery was to be introduced, which Religion being equally destructive to the Church, as well as to the Dissenting Party, there being, by the Principles of that Religion, not much Mercy or Favour to be shewed to either, was a Means to induce *those two opposite Parties to unite*, in order to withstand the common Enemy that now threatened them both, the Church being now more favourably inclined to the Dissenters, and the Dissenters have more Charity for the Church; and both join in their Zeal in prosecuting the Plot. By this unexpected Union, the King and his Court are terrified, and think it necessary, for the present, to countenance the Peoples Hears, and to shew a marvelous Zeal for the Prosecution of the Plot, as if he believed

his Own and the Common Safety was equally concerned in it.

For upon the first Discovery of this dreadful Plot, the Discontents run with so impetuous a Current, that the King was obliged to close with the Nations Fears; which appears, in that he never pretends to stem its Violence, until time had somewhat lessened them: For the Bloody Designs of this Execrable Plot being to murder the King, and then to place a Popish Successor upon the Throne, to ruine the Established Church, and to burn its Members as Hereticks, or to massacre and butcher them, and all other Protestants, and then to introduce Popery and Tyranny, in a Kingdom where there was not People to suffer under Either; were things so dreadful, that raised a Horror and Detestation, not only of Papists, but of all Others that seemed but to countenance or favour them.

And what seemed to magnifie the Nation's Fears, was a Belief, that some Great Persons, who influenced the Royal Councils, were concerned in these horrid Designs; whereby the People will not be satisfied they are in Safety, unless a Parliament is permitted to meet and sit, to enquire into these hidden and not as yet discovered Mysteries, which the Fatal Circumstances of these Times obliged the King to suffer.

And now the King apprehending the Consequences of a Sessions of Parliament, whilst the

the whole Nation is under such a ferment, seems resolved to shew his Readiness to comply with that Assembly in every thing; and in order to that, appears in good earnest disposed to change his Measures, in respect of Foreign Affairs, *viz.* To unite and close with *Holland* and the Confederates, to oppose *France*, for by thus entering into a War, that was desired and approved by the Nation, he might ward those Dangers, and remove those Jealousies, that his former Measures, and the Discovery of the Plot, had at this time occasioned: For indeed the tumultuous Circumstances the Kingdom was at this Juncture under, absolutely required some immediate Proof of the King's Sincerity, (which was wonderfully suspected) to quiet the Peoples Jealousies.

But the Parliament pursuing such Methods as were not agreeable to the Court, is after some time dissolved: But so great were the then Confusions in the Kingdom, as absolutely required the immediate calling a new one; but that proving as refractory, and as displeasing in their Proceedings, as the former, is likewise dissolved: And thus alternately were Parliaments called and dissolved; for their Measures being incompatible with the Designs of the Court, the King would not permit their long sitting; and so violent were the intestine Disorders of the Kingdom, as perfectly required their Calling: For if the People, during the Violence of these Ferments, had not been amused

amused with a continued Expectation of having their present Grievances removed by a Parliament, they might have fallen into such violent Measures, as to have endangered the King's Person, and hazarded his Government; whereas by thus immediately calling a new Parliament, upon the Dissolution of the former, he still shewed a ready Disposition to comply with his People, in all reasonable Measures, for their Safety; and then, upon a Dissolution, he took such Care to represent the Unreasonableness of their Proceedings, in such Colours, as might justly blacken them, and so render them odious and hateful to the Nation. For in his Declarations, he quaintly sets out the Sincerity of his Intentions, and the dangerous Designs of a Republican Party, who would be satisfied with nothing but what he could not in Honour or Conscience grant.

And in the mean time, that he might give some actual Proof of his good Intentions, he banishes his Brothers, and appears very zealous in the Prosecution of the Plot, several Conspirators being executed upon that very Account; and his Judges and Publick Ministers countenancing and commending his Subjects Zeal in all such Proceedings.

And now the great Business of the Court is to separate and divide the united Parties, *viz.* that of Church, and Dissenters; for without that, the strong Tide of the Nation's Jealousies is not to be stemmed. The better to per-

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form this, the King takes all Occasions to manifest his Concern and Care of the Established Church, and his Ministers and Creatures industriously insinuate Fears and Jealousies, concerning the Methods and Designs of the Popular or Dissenting Party. In short, all Industry is used to divide the two Parties, that so the Throne being defended by the One, the Other might be more safely oppressed.

By these and such like Measures, the Heat and Zeal of the Church Party did gradually lessen; for they are at length persuaded that there is more Danger from the Dissenters, than from the Papists; for they seem convinced that the former had farther Aims than was at first pretended, in that they would not be satisfied (as they believe) with any just and moderate Concessions from the Prince, for their Security; but were for extending their Designs to the lessening the Royal Authority, and the altering the Succession; which were Points, according to the late received Doctrine of the *Divine Rights of Kings*, Sacred, and therefore ought to be unalterable. And as a Confirmation of the unrighteous Aims of the Dissenting Party, it was craftily insinuated, that they had impeached some, and addressed for the Removal of others, of the present Ministry, for no other Reasons, but that they were for the Interest of the Established Church; which appeared, in that they had not accused them of any immediate Crimes, that so having terrified or removed

removed

removed all Persons that were true Sons of the Church, they might get the Government into their own hands.

In short, a great Variety of Methods are pursued, to create or widen these Differences; the Proceedings of Parliament are publicly libelled, censured, and ridiculed; Names of Distinction of *Whig* and *Tory*, are invented and used; and the very Nature of the Dispute between the two Parties is gradually changed: For now it is not, as formerly, so much upon the Score of Religion, (altho' that is continued, or rather revived) as it is upon Points of Government. The *Tory Party*, who are only entrusted in the present Administration, are for magnifying and enlarging the Kingly Power, for they only have the Prince's Favour; whilst the *Whiggish* are for narrowing and bounding it, as being indeed not entrusted in it.

Thus the face of Publick Affairs, in a few Years, becomes again entirely changed; the most zealous Prosecutors of the *Papish Plot*, who seemed formerly to have been favoured, (now the Church and Dissenting Parties are again divided) are entangled themselves in a *Presbyterian Plot*; and the very Witnesses that had hanged *Papists*, are now used for the same Purpose to *Dissenters*; and the very Persons, strange Turn! that formerly justified the Credit of these Evidences, now vilifie and reproach them; and on the contrary, those that before condemned

condemned them as *Villains*, now endeavour to represent them as *Saints*: So much Mens Minds change with the Times! But these Prosecutions being too early, before things were well prepared, they did not succeed. But afterwards new *Popular Conspiracies* are discovered, and more authentick Evidences produced, which causes the Current to run so impetuously on the *Tory* side, that the *Whigs* are perfectly bore down: The greatest Patriots of that Party, that escape Punishment, being for their Safety either obliged to withdraw, or else to humble themselves to their Prince; Petitions that were lately used for the calling Parliaments, as the only Expedient for the Redress of Grievances, are now turned into Addresses and Abhorrences; and Parliaments themselves are now become Matter of Ridicule and Reproach: In short, the *Popular* or *Whiggish Party* is entirely for the present quashed.

But notwithstanding the Magistracy was entrusted in such hands as were for enlarging the Sovereign Authority, there being no Person admitted into Offices, or Places of Trust, but such as had manifested a good Disposition to this Cause: And notwithstanding King *Charles* had lately so husbanded his Affairs, that his Necessities did not induce him to convene a Parliament for Money; so that the *Whiggish* or Oppressed Party had no manner of Opportunity to procure a Redress for these their Grievances in a legal and justifiable way: Yet the Prince

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Prince was not able, by all these Methods, either to unite the Majority of the Nation in his Interest, or perfectly to suppress or root out this refractory Party. For altho' the Magistracy, by discountenancing and punishing all the Favourers of the Popular Interest, did for a time oblige the People to submit to, and to be quiet under these Proceedings, yet the Majority of the Nation having no real Interest in them, could never be brought to approve them. Which evidently appears, in that altho' King Charles, under the Pretence of Judgments and Surrenders, had seized most of the Charters of *England*, in Expectation, by regulating Corporations, and by perswading Boroughs to incorporate, to have obtained a *House of Commons* for his Purpose; yet, after all his Craft, he found such a Deadness and Aversion in the People, that he durst not try a Parliament.

From which we may learn, that when a Prince makes his own a separate Interest from the Publick, and so is necessitated to reign by a Party only of his People, let his Pretences be never so specious, or his Methods so crafty; yet the Publick or General Good of the Community, not being included in that he pursues, (which is to aggrandize his own Authority) he can never prevail upon the Majority of his Subjects, either to unite with this Party, or to approve his Designs. For which Reason (by this Method) he must always miscarry in

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in them; or at least, if they do succeed for a time, yet they can never continue.

IX. King Charles dying, James, his Brother, succeeds, with all the Advantages that usually attend a Prince that hath but lately had the good Fortune to triumph over his Enemies: For the *Whiggs*, his Oppressors, were not only excluded the Magistracy, by his Brother, but were rendered odious to the People, by the late discovered Conspiracies, and the Heads of some of their Chiefs lopped off, for real or pretended Treasons. King James, immediately, upon his Accession to the Crown, whilst the Spirits of Men are warm for his Cause, summons a Parliament; when considering the then State of things, it might have been presumed few of his Adversaries would dare to appear Candidates for the Elections. Yet notwithstanding these Advantages, and the Prudence of this King, immediately upon the Death of his Brother, in cajoling the Nation, by a solemn Declaration, in Council, of his intended Purposes, to treat all his Subjects with Tenderness and Affection, and to govern according to Law; yet, I say, even in this Juncture, could not this Prince prevail upon the Parliament that was called, when all things were so prepared to his Purpose, to prefer Supplies to Grievances. Nay farther, altho' that untimely and precipitate Invasion, or rather tumultuous Insurrection, that was made by the Duke

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Duke of Monmouth, gave him the most fortunate Pretence to raise a Standing Army, whereby he might have been enabled to have established a more Sovereign Power; yet that very Army being composed of Natives, soon became corrupt, that is, disliked the Prince's Proceedings, and would not be Instruments in carrying on his Purposes, when once he demonstrated, by his precipitate Measures, his Intentions of altering Religion, and invading the Civil Rights of his People: That very Army, that should have been his Support, proving instrumental in his Ruine; and the very *Tory* or *Church Party*, that had raised him to the Throne, were no sooner convinced, by his violent Proceedings, of his intended Purposes of pulling down the present Church, altering the Magistracy, (that is, taking it out of their hands) and changing the Constitution; by which they must be involved in the same Sufferings with Others; but they renounce their former Principles, or Opinions, and become as zealous in opposing the Proceedings of this Prince, as the *Whiggs*, whom they had formerly, for the very same Reasons, called *Rebels*; and the *Tory* or *Church Party*, appear now willing to unite with the Dissenters: Which being perceived by the King, and the fatal Consequences of such an Union foreseen, he politickly endeavours to divide them, by indulging, cajoling, and entrusting Dissenters, in opposition to the *Church Party*; for now
Dissenters

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Dissenters are admitted into the Magistracy, and Churchmen excluded: But the Violence of his Proceedings in so many Particulars, had so alarmed the whole Nation, that his Endeavours proved ineffectual; for the wise and more moderate of the Dissenters, perceiving the King's Aims, would not close with him; whereby *Whig* and *Tory* again uniting, they conjointly oppose the King, or at least will not meddle in his Defence. So that, forsook by all, he abandons the Throne, and leaves the Kingdom for Safety; by whose Reception, a wonderful Revolution is effected. It is true, there was at this time a Concurrence of several other Causes, that contributed to this great Change in *England*: As First, A Confederacy of divers Princes and States, in order to reduce the House of *Bourbon* to some Moderation. Secondly, The landing of an Army here, under the Command of the Prince of *Orange*: Which gave such a Countenance to the People, and Terror to the Prince, as was the immediate Cause of so strange and sudden an Alteration. But it not being my Business to write History, I have only mentioned these things; For had not the Nation been dissatisfied, and so prepared for a Revolution, so marvelous a Success could not have attended these Attempts; nay, it had not been practicable for that Prince to have pursued these Measures.

X. The Nation now convinced, by the sad Experience of the last Reigns, of their great Error, in the enlarging the Regal Authority; because by that the Crown had lately endangered the Religious and Civil Rights of the People: appear more moderate in their Settlements after this Revolution, to the great *Magna Charta*, (the happy Instrument ordained by the Almighty for the Nation's present Deliverance) than they had been to King *Charles* the Second after the Restoration: For having so lately experienced that the Constitution might be endangered by the Crown, they were not, even in the very Height of their Zeal, solicitous to enlarge Prerogative, but seem rather to set Bounds to it. Whereas, upon the Restoration of King *Charles*, the Nation having then so sadly suffered by a Popular Faction, more regard was had in all Laws to fence the Throne, than to secure the Subjects Liberties; by that means to prevent the Return of such Mischiefs, or Confusions, the Kingdom had felt, as being then perswaded all Danger was from that side.

Whereas, upon this Revolution, the Parliament solemnly declare the *English* Rights, and ground the Justification of their late Proceedings against King *James*, upon his Violation of them; and humbly address to the Prince of *Orange*, to accept the Crown under the same Conditions that the Constitution gave it; and under

under which former Kings had always worn it; and so appear more solicitous to secure the Peoples Liberties, than to enlarge the Prince's Prerogatives; as being convinced, by the late Measures, that the Danger was had been from that side. Whereas, after the Restoration of *Charles* the Second, the great Business of the Legislature was to fence the Throne from the Insults of the People. And now the Royal Line of the Ancient *Scottish* Race, in which the *English* Crown had continued for four Reigns, suffers for a Time some Interruption. *James*, the First of those four Kings, laid the Foundation of those unhappy Differences between King and People, that have, since his Time, so often infested the Nation: For that Prince pursuing Ends, not agreeable to the Genius of the People, could not bring his Parliaments to countenance or approve his Designs, and therefore he disliked those Assemblies, whereby the Prince's or the Royal Interest was looked upon as separate and distinct from the Publick; and that King, notwithstanding the Nation's Dislike, persisting in his Purposes, and not having a Revenue, Army, or any other Methods to support himself, began that Policy of dividing the People: that so, having gained a Party of them to his side, he might by their Assistance be enabled to govern: Which Policy, thus begun by King *James*, altho' it hath been attended with so much Trouble, and so many Misfortunes, yet it hath been successively followed

by his Successors, altho' in somewhat different Methods. By which means, these Princes not being so entirely beloved of their Subjects, were rendered weak, and became despised by their Neighbours; the former Glory of the English Nation being then sunk into some Contempt.

But by the more just and prudent Measures of the late Great Nassau, which are continued by our present most Gracious Sovereign Lady Queen Anne, that trifling Policy, of governing by a Party, is disused: For these just Princes having no separate Ends distinct from the Publick Good, have disdained that pitiful and dangerous Method; for they, by wisely making but one common Interest to Prince and People, and therefore consulting and advising with them in Parliament, have thereby gloriously restored that happy Harmony that was anciently between King and Kingdom: For these Princes having no crafty Designs of advancing Prerogative, have permitted all Persons into the Magistracy, such only excepted, that the Laws of the Kingdom exclude. By which, the Nation being satisfied, the Parliament appears always ready to join with the Prince, and the Prince disposed to consult the Parliament. By which happy Agreement, the English Glory, in the Esteem of Europe, is again advanced to a Height exceeding what it ever arrived at in the Time of any of their Ancestors.

CHAP. IX.

- 1. European Governments changeable. 2. Clergy in France, used to enslave the People: Pragmatick instituted; the Contordate how obtained.
- 3. A Reformation in Religion desired, propagated in France; State of that Kingdom; Factions; Princes of the Blood. 4. Queen Mother in the Regency; her Measures. Massacre, why. Religionaries preserved by a Third Party, Henry the Third, his Measures. Power of the Guis's dangerous; their Murder: Civil War.
- 5. Henry the Fourth a Friend to the Religionaries; ends the Civil War, and how his Designs. 6. Lewis the Thirteenth, his Designs different from his Father's. Religious Sects in disorder'd States; the Reasons. 7. Lewis's Measures; his Pretences. What contributed to the reducing France under an Arbitrary Power. Extirpation of Hugonots, and why. The Present State of France, much the same as the Eastern Monarchy. 8. How Spain came not to entertain the Reformation; the Inquisition. The Indian and Italian Revenues. Philip the Second his Project.

IF we reflect upon the present State of the several European Governments, they will give us a lively Image of the great Instability of Human Affairs; and plainly teach us, that Bodies Politick are mutable, being incident

to Changes as Bodies Natural. And that all the Wisdom and Policy of Man can avail but little for the preserving them long in one and the same continued State; but that they will insensibly decline from their first Institutions, and alter and change their Models, according to the Ages, Times, or Circumstances of the People; which being changeable, Government will be so; that being but the natural Effect of the former.

For notwithstanding the Barbarous Nation erected upon the Ruines of the Roman Empire several distinct Governments, separate Kingdoms, or petty Principalities, and seem to have agreed in one common Model in the forming of them, (there being then but little differences in the Manners and Usages of these several Nations) which were so contrived, as plainly shews that those People had more respect to their common Defence against Foreign Enemies, than their own Inward or Domestick Peace. For being established upon Tenure, under certain and reserved Conditions, which purely regarded Common and Publick Defence, as soon as Wealth, Luxury, and Ambition entered, they became obnoxious to perpetual intestine Discords; for they gradually fell into as many and as different Forms of Polity, as there were separate States or Kingdoms. The Truth of this is evident from the several Changes and Variety of Forms to be observed in our present *European* Governments; which, if

if we but heedfully compare with what History will teach us they formerly were, we shall easily discern that they do more resemble their Ancient States, than at present they are like each other. For I think there are but slender Remains of the Primitive and Ancient Gothic Model to be met with in any of our Modern Polities, excepting that of Poland, and even that seems very unlike it, in a multitude of Instances.

However, the *European* Governments gradually declining from their Ancient Forms, have acquired Models extremely unlike to each other; there being now so little of Likeness or Agreement between any of them, that I am perswaded there is not at present any two that are precisely the same. I intend as to their Manner of Legislature, or Method of Administration. From whence, and from the frequent Disorders that have happened in most, if not in all of them, I think it may be concluded, that they are not the Contrivance of any one single Man, or of any one Assembly of Men, that made or fashioned them at the same time, or at once, but that they have become gradually altered by unforeseen Accidents, and were afterwards modeled and shaped, according to the Circumstances of Times, Men and Things, their several Amendments, and Alterations, being suited to their then Natures, or Occasions.

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 all. In *England*, after an Affluence of Wealth
 had gradually worn out that marvelous De-
 pendency of the Commonality from the Ba-
 ronage, that the Power of the Nobility decli-
 ned, as hath been already shew'd, the Prince
 sided with the *Commons*, in order to pull down
 the Peise, Wealth, and Authority of the
 Clergy. Whereas, on the contrary, in *France*,
 the Clergy being in some measure dependant
 upon the Crown, the Prince joined with that
 Body in the oppressing and enslaving the Com-
 monality. For the Kings of *France*, under the
 specious Pretences of asserting and defending
 the Rights and Immunities of the *Gallian*
 Church, have in a manner lopped that Body
 from the Dependance and Rule of the Papacy;
 altho they have not made any Alteration either
 in Doctrine, or Modes of Worship. Whereby
 the *French* Clergy, being at the Prince's Devot-
 ion, were there used as Instruments to keep
 down the *Commons*. For the Ancient Nobi-
 lity, and their Peers, were worn out, or de-
 pressed.

But that we may comprehend the Reasons
 of these Differences in the *French* Proceedings,
 from what was done in *England*, and the Me-
 thods by which they were effected, it will be
 necessary to look a little back into the former
 Circumstances of that Kingdom. But that I
 may not appear too tedious in the perform-
 ing of this, I shall begin, and only take notice
 of

of such things as are necessary for the proving
 of what I intend. A *Levis* the Ninth, a Wise
 and Religious Prince, having by his Virtues
 and Prudence settled a general Peace and Quiet
 in his Kingdom, had Leisure, and a reasonable
 Opportunity, to inspect into the Proceedings
 of the *Church* and *Papacy*, which were then
 growing to be a Grievance to the State. To
 prevent then farther Mischiefs that might arise
 from that Body, he institutes what was called
 the *Pragmatic*, which put some present Re-
 straint to the growing Greariness of the Reli-
 gious Authority. But such a part of his Time
 were the unhappy Circumstances of that King-
 dom, and such the succeeding Power of the
 Papacy, that some of his Successors would
 not, or durst not, execute this his wife *San-
 ction*. For notwithstanding this Law remained,
 yet the Execution of it being in the Power of
 the Prince, it was either used, or not, accord-
 ing as the Exigencies or Designs of the reign-
 ing Prince required, his cajoling or opposing
 the Clergy. As may be inferred by but ob-
 serving the different Proceedings of the several
 intermediate Kings, between this *Levis* and
Charles the Seventh.

This *Charles* having expelled the *English*, that
 had for so many Years harrassed and perplexed
France, and having united by that means several
 of the dismembered Provinces to the Crown,
 and having quieted his Kingdom, and settled
 things in Peace, believed himself now to be
 in

in a Condition to bridle the immoderate Power of the Papacy; and to effect this, ordains the Second and so much Celebrated *Pragmatick*. But even this, altho' made with greater Advantages to the Crown, yet after a time underwent the Fate of the Former: For altho' the Successors of *Charles* would not directly consent to the abrogating this Law; yet such was their imprudent Conduct, or such the unhappy Fate of their Affairs, that they were often necessitated to connive at the oppressive Proceedings of the Clergy and Papacy; the Popes very often exercising the same advantageous Authority in *France*, as if there had been no *Pragmatick*. But notwithstanding this Connivance at the Papal Proceedings, yet the Holy Fathers incessantly urged the entire vacating that Law, that was so derogatory to their Sacred Authority; which at length they effected.

For *Francis* the First, a Martial and Heroick Prince, had laid great Designs upon *Italy*; and having fortunately possessed the *Milanesse*, soon perceived how difficult, if not impracticable, it would be for him to secure that Country for *France*, without the Friendship of the Papacy; and being fully resolved to keep that Dutchy, he is willing at any rate to make the Pope his Friend. *Leo* the Tenth, who then filled the Holy Chair, (like his Predecessors, had been Shagrin with *France*, upon the Account of the *Pragmatick*) and would not enter into a League and Amity with *Francis*,

unless

unless that he will consent to the abrogating that Law, which was accordingly done, and the *Concordate* was agreed to between that *King and Pope*, by which were conceded some Advantages to the *Holy See*: But notwithstanding this Agreement, the Kings of *France* have so improved what they term the *Regale*, as to oblige the Church to be dependant on the Throne: For which Reason, notwithstanding sometimes Domestick Divisions occasioned by Minorities, weak Princes, Favourites, or Foreign Wars, have induced the Crown to indulge or connive at, or even to countenance and encourage a Reformation in Religion, yet the Old Religion hath continued the National: Neither hath the Church been stripped of its vast Revenues, as it was in some other Countries, where the Reformation took place; for it being already dependant on the Throne, it was not the Interest of the Prince to permit its Subversion.

III. But, in order for the better comprehending what is intended, it is necessary to premise, how that the Ignorance, Debauchery, Pride and Cruelty of Churchmen, had occasioned a universal Dislike and Hatred of them; whereby a general Reformation was unanimously desired: And many of the Clergy themselves endeavoured after it. For the Popes had so enlarged their own Grandeur, and Authority, that it was become a Grievance to the Ecclesiasticks

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afflicts themselves; for Episcopal Jurisdiction was lessened, immoderate Sums extorted, all Ecclesiastical Authority lodged in the Holy Chair; so that the Government of the Church seemed perfectly Monarchical, the *Popes* lord- ing it over the Clergy, in almost as arbitrary a manner, as Princes do over their Vassals: For which Reason, several of the Bishops were for putting Bounds to this exorbitant Authority, as may be evidently collected, not to multiply Instances, from the Proceedings of the Councils of *Constance* and *Basle*. These things having occasioned so general a Disposition in all Places, for a Reformation, it is no marvel it so wonderfully multiplied. But besides these General Reasons, there were other things that in a more particular manner contributed to its mighty Propagation in *France*: For the Wars that *Francis*, and *Henry* his Son, Kings of *France*, had with *Charles* the Fifth, Emperor of *Germany*, was a Reason to induce those Princes to enter into Confederacy and Friendship with the Protestant Princes of the Empire; and then, at the Request or Instigation of those Princes, to countenance or connive at the *Religionaries*; altho' at another time perhaps different Politicks would oblige them to prosecute or discountenance them: For it is most evident these Princes governed themselves in these Matters, as their then Exigencies or Circumstances required.

But

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But what chiefly contributed to the propagating the Reformed Religion in that Kingdom, were the succeeding Minorities; but that we may the better comprehend the reason of that, it will be proper to make a brief Enquiry into the then state of that Country. *Francis* the first, a warlike and aspiring Prince, had received into his Service and Favour, a younger Branch of the House of *Lorraine*, and had dignified him with the Title of the *Count of Guise*; who likewise continued a Favourite to *Henry* the second his Son: This *Henry* was a martial Prince, but naturally very *Voluptuous*, which probably inclined him to entrust all Matters of State to the Management of Favourites. There were two that seemed principally to share his Affections, and these being each jealous of the others Greatness, became the Heads of two opposite Parties; the One of these was *this Count*, who is now made *Duke of Guise*, and the Other is the *Constable Montmorency*. The *Constable* seems to have had the Advantage in the Affections of the Prince, but the *Duke* in that of the People; the *Constable* in his Military Commands, had been attended with Misfortunes, whereas the *Duke* had always been blessed with Success; by which means the *Duke* is beloved, and the *Constable* envied. The *Constable* endeavours to strengthen himself, by a Friendship with the *Duchess of Valentinois*, the *King's Mistress*, a Woman haughty, designing, and imperious, but passionately

tionately beloved by the King: The Duke had corroborated his Interest, by the Marriage of his Niece the Queen of Scots, to the Dauphine the King's eldest Son: The Duke, by this Match, is rivetted as it were to the Crown; and there being at that time two Cardinals of his Family, who were able by their Qualities, Birth, and Fortunes, to influence the Clergy; and the French Clergy, being (as hath been already intimated) very much dependant upon the Throne: The Duke, for these Reasons, more strictly unites with that Body, and becomes the Champion in all future Disputes, for the Defence of the Old Religion. Whereas the Constable not having these Advantages, and being perhaps a little influenced by the Colignies, his Kinsmen, joins with the opposite Party, and so seems to countenance and favour the Religionaries. But Henry, in the bloom of his Years, being unfortunately killed, Francis the second, his Son, a young and weak Prince, succeeded him; who having married the Niece of the Guises, is wholly possessed by them: Whereby the Constable, and opposite Faction, are for a time depressed.

But the Princes of the Blood observing the Guises to govern all; and they who had the Right, during a Minority, excluded, begin to confederate and form a Party, that they may be enabled to put some Stop to the growing Power of that House, that now eclipsed them; And to this Purpose, they join with the Religionaries,

gionaries, who being thus countenanced by the Princes of the Blood, take Spirit. The Guises being in Authority, and suspecting the Danger that may arise from this Party, prudently endeavour to strengthen themselves, by weakening them. But the uncertainty of the Life of an infant Prince, as this young Francis was, and the many national Discontents and Divisions, deterred them from using Violence upon a Party, that had not as yet been blackened for any treasonable Practises; wherefore they apply themselves to such Methods, as may render them odious, by charging them with pretended Treasons, Murders, and secret Conspiracies, for the Subversion of the present Government: Plots therefore, and treasonable Practises, are either invented, or discovered against the Religionaries, which produce Severities and Sufferings; which being carried on with bitterness, occasions them to arm in their own Defence.

The Queen-Mother, a Crafty and Aspiring Woman, designing to get the Government into her own hands, is really uneasy at the immoderate Authority and Greatness of the Guises, and altho' she hated the Princes of the Blood, yet she secretly now favours and countenances that Party, which is openly headed by the Prince of Conde, as being the only Expedient to weaken the Guises.

IV. In the mean time, Francis dies, and Charles his Brother, a Minor, succeeds; and

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now the Queen-Mother is placed in the Regency, who dreading the immoderate Greatness of the *Guises*, labours to balance it, by openly favouring the *Religionaries*, or *Hugonots*: By which means, having now the Countenance of Authority, they soon become a formidable Body, who dare, by Force and Arms contend for the Exercise of their Religion.

The Court, Nobles, and whole Kingdom, becomes divided into Parties and Factions: The Princes of the Blood, and some great Men, favouring the New: The *Guises*, the Clergy, and divers great Men, the Old Religion. The Queen Regent, a crafty Lady, plays a neutral Part, as not being desirous to depress Either Party, imagining her own Security consisted in the balancing them: Wherefore she will not engage in their Disputes; but after, by Battels and Sieges, they have somewhat wasted their Money and Blood, she then meditates to bring them to some Accord: In which she takes Care that such Conditions are granted, as may preserve the Weakest from being oppressed.

But the Duke of *Guise*, the Life and Head of the Catholick Party, being killed, the Hugonots so far strengthened, as to obtain more advantageous Conditions; and afterwards became so formidable, that the Queen Regent, either having now new Designs, or really dreading the Authority of Admiral *Coligny*, the Head of that Faction, conceals secret Measures

Measures for his and their Destruction; which was not difficult to effect at that time, by reason the Clergy, and those of the Old Religion, were mightily provoked, to observe the Religionaries to have lately acquired such an Authority in the Government.

Charles, a young and choleric Prince, impatient of Opposition, is easily persuaded that the Power of the Hugonots will be a great Check upon the Royal Authority, by reason that People, not having the direct Favour of the Government, would always be Friends to the Subjects Rights, and so of course Oppugners of Sovereign Power: By such Insinuations, that young Prince is prevailed upon to consent to their Extirpation, which is to be performed by a sudden and bloody Massacre; it being thought dangerous to attempt it by any other Methods, by reason of the Number and Strength of the Party.

After the acting of this most barbarous Tragedy, the crafty Queen more closely unites with the *Guisean* Party, and earnestly solicits a War for the entire Extirpation of the remaining Hereticks. But these bloody Proceedings had raised such Abhorrence in the Minds of the People against the Government; and some Foreign Leagues, and late Domestick Measures, had created such Fears and Jealousies concerning the farther Designs of the Court, that the Nation not favouring the War, it had not the expected Success: For now a Third Party is formed,

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formed, called the *Politicks*, who pretend only to aim at Redress of Grievances, and securing their Civil Rights; and these not having the Favour of the Court, join with the *Hugonots*; by which means that Party is preserved.

In the mean time, the young King, who had but lately taken the Administration into his own hands, dies; but the crafty Queen, his Mother, during his Sickness, had so cunningly ordered Affairs, by imprisoning some Persons, who she apprehended were able to oppose her, and by cajoling and sweetening others, that she, upon his Death, is declared Regent, during the Absence of *Henry* her beloved Son, who was elected King of *Poland*. But that Prince, upon the News of his Brother's Death, having secretly made his Escape out of that Kingdom, arrived in *France*, where he began his Reign with all the Signs of a voluptuous Pomp, and a luxurious and affected Vanity; being flattered into an Opinion that it was below the Dignity of a Crowned Head to intermeddle with Affairs of State, that being the proper Business of his Ministers: He therefore dedicates his Life to Ease and Pleasure, committing the Government of his Kingdom into the hands of his Favourites. The Queen-Mother, at first, seemed not to dislike these Measures, in that she was able for a time to govern those Minions, and so was in effect in the Regency, since all things were transacted by her Councils; so that the War is continued and

and prosecuted against the *Religionaries*. But after some time, these new Ministers pursuing Councils different from the Queen's, these Civil Wars are accommodated to the Advantage of the *Hugonots*: And it is probable, Terms were more easily granted, in that this King or his Ministers had some Uneasiness from the encreasing Greatness of the House of *Guise*. However a Peace being effected, a General Assembly of the States is agreed upon, as the best Expedient to put an End to all other Civil Discords: But that Assembly insisting upon Points not agreeable to the Expectations of the King, it was insinuated, that was occasioned by the immoderate Popularity of the *Guises*, who were able to influence that August Body in all their Measures: And that therefore, if they were thus able to direct and govern the States of *France*, they would in a little time be able to give Laws to the King, and usurp the Government of the whole Kingdom; or at best, the King must reign but very precariously, when the Potency of a Subject is become so great, as that he can thwart his Prince's Designs.

These Jealousies, thus insilled into the Prince's Head, pulls down a hasty Vengeance upon that House: For the King, dreading their Power, commands the Murder of the Duke and Cardinal; the Perpetration of which bloody Fact, marvelously enrages the whole Party, which now openly league and confederate, and

soon break out into an actual War, which continued the remaining part of this King's Reign, and was at last ended with great Difficulty by Henry the Fourth his Successor.

V. Henry the Fourth being bred a Hugonot, was vehemently opposed by the *Catholick* or *Guisean* Party, which being numerous, and powerful, it was thought more advisable for that Prince to change his Religion, than to continue a doubtful War, to secure the Throne by Violence. But notwithstanding Henry turned *Catholick*, yet he continued secretly to favour, and always to repose a Confidence in those who were of his former Opinion; for some of that Party are employ'd in his greatest Trusts, and are made of his innermost Councils; besides, he indulges their Worship, grants them new Privileges, and solemnly ratifies their present and former ones, by the celebrated Edict of *Nantes*: And as a farther Proof of his Sincerity, he concedes them Towns for a time, as Pledges for their Safety, which Time he afterwards enlarges.

For the Reconciliation of this Prince to the Church of *Rome*, do's not seem to have proceeded so much from his Judgment, as from Necessity; and therefore he never appears to have repos'd any great Confidence in the Faith of that Party, but through the whole Course of his Reign, continued secretly to countenance his former Friends; and seems to have

have propos'd to secure himself in the Throne, by as it were balancing or equally favouring the two Factions. By these gentle and reconciling Measures, the Civil Wars were compos'd, the Factions for a time quieted, and the Kingdom settled in Peace: Which being performed, this great Prince turns his Thoughts upon lessening the Greatness of the House of *Austria*; but in the midst of his great Designs, is murdered by the bloody Hands of *Ravillac*.

But as this great Henry's former Friendship, or really his Religious Opinions, inclined him to favour the Religionaries, who by their Armies had supported him against the Leaguers; so from the same Reason, his own and their Security dispos'd him to grant them Royal Privileges, and to deliver them Towns and fortified Places, to hold for a time as Conditions for their Safety: Which his Fears of the great Power of the Leaguers at Home, and his vast Designs Abroad of modelling *Europe*, induced him to permit the Continuance of those fortified Towns in the hands of the Hugonots, for a longer time than was at first conceded: For this King laboured to unite his divided Subjects; or if that was not to be done, so to balance them, that the Weakest should not be oppress'd: He preferring the Advancement of his Glory by Foreign Conquests, before the Vanity of trampling upon his own People; and his Laurels could not be planted, or at least

flourish in distant Soils, unless Peace was preserved amongst his own Subjects, which he endeavours to continue by all gentle Ways. But as this Prince's Judgment, vast Designs, or then Circumstances, inclined him to favour the Hugonots, and to grant them Towns of Security; So *Lewis*, his Son and Successor, pursuing other Ends, endeavoured to strip them of such Places, as believing them to be a Hindrance to his Aims in enslaving the Kingdom.

VI. But that we may comprehend the Method by which *Lewis* the Thirteenth enslaved *France*, we must look a little back, and consider how that Trade, as hath been already proved, naturally brings Wealth into the great Towns; and how that the People, that inhabit in such Towns, are more inclined, either by their manner of Living, or from some other Reason, to receive and entertain Novel Doctrines in Religion; and how that such Doctrines are usually propagated in a loose and distracted Government; and how that *France*, by reason of Minorities, weak Princes, or some other Reasons, had often been in that State: For when Factions, the natural Offspring of a distemper'd Government, are produced, Differences and Disputes in Religion readily creep in; by reason Civil Factions will not enough interest the People, without Religious Pretences, to keep up Divisions. This I think is evident, not only by Reason, but is also approved

proved by Fact; not only by what may be observed in modern Proceedings, but what was anciently practised in the Roman Empire. For in the distracted Times of that mighty State, when her Emperors were often dethroned and butchered, Religious Disputes, Church Schisms, or Abominable Heresies, continually multiplied or revived: For the Successor often ascending the Throne, upon the Ruine of his Predecessor, seemed willing to cherish an Interest different from his; and therefore would ordinarily encourage or countenance some Opinions that had been persecuted, or at least not favoured by him he had supplanted. The Roman Story will afford us several Instances of this kind, from the Time the Emperors became Christians, to the Destruction of that Empire.

However the very Nature of the Things proves it self; for every Person placed in a Throne, will naturally endeavour to continue himself in it; (for, as for a particular Instance or two, where Men have resigned Empire, I take to be of no Weight) which in distemper'd Governments will require the alluring the People, or at least a part of them, into the immediate Interest of the Prince, that they may really have a Concern in his Safety; Because Men will not readily be prevailed upon to join in Changes, or assist or support Revolutions, that will be attended with Danger, and perhaps Ruine, if they do not succeed; unless they can

be perswaded that some Advantages, either Religious or Civil, will be obtained by such.

The Pretence of Civil Rights are not observed so readily to affect the Mass of People, as those of Religious ones; by reason in all Governments there are greater Numbers of Men of scanty and needy Fortunes, than of such as have plentiful ones: And the former of these are not much concerned about Civil Rights, because they having but little or no Property, Wealth, or Estates, have no Advantage by them; for having little of their own to lose, they are not so very solicitous about the Defence of what doth not appertain to them. Whereas the Business of Religion being what immediately relates to the Happiness and Salvation of all Mankind; the Rich there having no Preference to the Poor, both are equally concerned in it.

And it being natural to Man to judge for himself, as well in Religious as in all other Disputes, he will therefore always desire to be in such a State, as that he may pursue what he is perswaded is required from him to believe, and do, in order for his eternal Salvation; and will be zealous for his own Opinions, as being perswaded that they are true, and so the Pursuit of them the proper Method by which his Salvation is to be obtained.

For whether his Opinions are in themselves true or not, is not the Enquiry, since it is most certain that every Man believes his own

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to be so; (for otherwise it is evident he would not or could not entertain them.) For altho' a Man may be so much a Hypocrite, as to affirm he really believes, when he doth not; yet it is certain, if his Mind is really convinced, it is upon a Presumption of its being a Truth. And this seems to be the Reason why now in Europe, since the Commonality are not so dependant, as formerly, upon the Nobility, that Religion is always made one of the Pretences for the effecting Changes and Alterations in Government; Whereas before, when the Nobility could govern the People, it was only the Invasion of Civil Rights.

In France, Minorities, or voluptuous and weak Princes, who were governed by Favourites, had gave Birth to Factions; and the Heads of these endeavouring to support themselves, sought all Methods to encrease their Party; Religion was found the best Expedient to effect it, that therefore was to be used as the Groundwork of their Discontent. One Faction would countenance the Religionaries, whilst the Other appeared zealous in the Behalf of the Established Church. The several Turns in Government, and the different Aspects of Foreign Affairs, did sometimes encline the Regal Authority to persecute, and at another time to favour the Reformers; by which means, altho' they sometimes suffer, yet are never extirpated.

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These Religionaries, or Hugonots, had usually the Government against them; for they only contended with Authority, (the Laws of France, at first, not favouring them) so that they only extorted some Concessions by Necessity or Force; until such time as *Henry the Fourth* ascended the Throne, who being bred a Hugonot, and supported by that Sect, whilst only King of *Navarre*, continued his whole Reign to favour and indulge that Party: For notwithstanding he renounced that Religion, that he might preserve his Crown, yet he still had that Affection and Tenderness to that Party, that he granted them Towns of Security, and fenced their Religion by the Edict of *Nantes*; and afterwards enlarged the Time for the Continuance of these fortified Places in their Possessions: By which means they form a sort of Government, which was not, during his Reign, thought any ways derogatory to the Sovereign Authority. For this King seems to have had greater Suspicions of the Designs of some Great Men, and the Catholick Party, than of the Hugonots, or these Towns, as may be concluded by his Proceedings against the Marshal *Biron*, and his after Designs upon the House of *Austria*.

These Towns thus left, by this Prince's Favour, as it were, to their own Government, did so advantageously apply themselves to Industry and Trade, that in the next Reign *Rochel* alone did dispute the Sovereignty of the

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the Seas, with a Royal Navy; so wonderfully had Trade flourished, and Wealth encreased in these Towns, where the People were left in a manner to govern themselves.

VII. But *Lewis*, his Son and Successor, observing these Towns in a manner Cantoned from his Kingdom, and extremely flourishing, resolves upon the Subversion of them; apprehending that these, thus encreasing in Wealth and People, would be Places of Retreat to his injured Subjects, and Obstacles to his ambitious Designs of enslaving the whole Nation: For *Lewis*, by the Councils of *Rich-lieu*, was now aiming at arbitrary and uncontrollable Power. The more securely to effect these his Purposes, he first divides the Party of the Hugonots, by craftily insinuating, that he doth not intend to invade any of the Civil or Religious Rights of his People, but only to reduce these Towns to his Obedience, who had almost Cantoned themselves, without any lawful Authority, from his Subjection: For the present Privileges they enjoyed, were only conceded under Conditions, and for a certain Time, by his Father; the Reasons of which being now ceased, and the Time expired, he might justly bring them to their former States.

But *Lewis*, notwithstanding his Pretences, having accomplished this Work of reducing these Towns to his Obedience, and so break-

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ing the Strength and Power of this Party; and had also lessened the Authority of the Princes of the Blood, and the Ancient Nobility, by lopping off the Heads of the most Popular, and ruining Others; but he also insensibly gained his desired Point, which was the obtaining an entire and absolute Authority of raising Money, and giving Laws at pleasure.

But what contributed to the Destruction of the Civil Rights of *France*, and the thus lodging a Sovereign and Uncontrolable Power in the hands of the Prince, was,

First, The Advantage of a Mercenary and Regular Milice; and,

Secondly, A Readiness in the Clergy to support the Prince: For they being perswaded that the King only intended the rooting out Hereticks, their inveterate Enemies, most readily complied with him in all his Purposes.

The First of these Two became gradually obtained, by the means of the continual Wars of that Kingdom with the bordering Nations, especially the *English*, which had continued for many Years; and afterwards by the Ambition of some of their Princes, to extend their Dominions; or from a Necessity of defending themselves from some of their powerful Neighbours.

For the Nobility, who were anciently obliged by their Tenures to attend the Prince in his Wars, being wearied and impoverished by these continual Services, became disposed, in order

order to ease themselves, to consent to a Stipendiary Milice; for unless they had admitted that, the Commonality, who now had acquired Wealth, could not be well brought to contribute to the Common Charge, the Burden only falling upon them, by reason of their Lands: Whereas towards the maintaining a Mercenary Milice, Gabels, Tailles, Excises, and Impositions, would be levied, which would affect the People. Besides *France*, being in a manner surrounded with other Nations, required constant Garisons to be kept in her Frontiers for Security; which could not be conveniently managed without a Mercenary and Standing Soldiery: And then Impositions being granted for the Maintenance of this Force, which for the Reasons assigned were mostly kept up, these insensibly became a lasting and standing Revenue. And this this established Force being entirely dependant upon the Crown, as being commissioned, raised, kept up, and paid, by that, became in time the unhappy Instruments to empower the Prince to trample upon the Civil Liberties of the People, which they were first raised to defend. For the *French* Government, by these means, hath entirely changed; it being now founded and supported by this very Milice, the Prince governing the People by this very Force; the People not being really admitted into any Part of the Government, but as they are Members of this Force, upon which it is ultimately and virtually established.

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For notwithstanding *France* hath at present her Civil Courts, which actually exercise a Jurisdiction in the determining Civil, or perhaps Ecclesiastical Matters, and so seem *prima facie*, to be separated, nothing relating, and indeed superior to this standing Milice, whose very Officers are often accountable there. But these Courts not being fenced by any Law, but the Prince's Pleasure, nor having no Authority but what is immediately derived from him, the King being now in that Kingdom sole Legislator; these very Courts having in reality no standing or certain Laws, beyond their Sovereign's Pleasure; which is most manifest, in that altho' sometimes, *pro forma*, they are used to ratifie and confirm his Edicts, yet they cannot, or dare not, deny the Ratification of what the Prince commands. So then the King of *France* having now the Legislative and Supreme Authority in himself, and his Government being supported by this Milice, (the People not being really admitted into any part of it) it is obvious the present *French* Government is really and ultimately founded upon that: And that the Subjects of *France* are now governed as a Conquered Nation; there being no real Difference in the intrinsic Nature of the present *French* Government, from that of Conquered Provinces; altho' there seems to be some in outward Appearance, which only proceeds from this small, and in truth, (to the People) insignificant Difference: That in *France*, the King,

King, or the Supreme Power, or Lawgiver, lives and resides in the same Country with the Governed or Conquered People; whereas in Conquered Provinces the Power that gives Laws, seldom resides amongst them.

The second thing that contributed to the lodging an Absolute and Arbitrary Power in the Kings of *France*, was the Wealth, Authority, and Grandeur of the Clergy, which being, by the Methods already assigned, made dependant upon the Prince, became in this last Age to be used as Instruments in the subverting all Civil Rights.

For the Milice, by which the present *French* Government is supported, being for the most part composed of Natives of *France*, would naturally have fell into the Interest of the People, had not the Expedient of Religion been used to make or keep up a Difference amongst the People, and thereby give some Colour of Necessity to these Proceedings of the King, in that the Hereticks could not be suppressed without such Methods. For this Milice being gradually modelled, as in time to be composed of such Persons only as were of the National Religion, became well disposed to punish such as the Church condemned; and the Church is ready enough to condemn all those of different Doctrines as Hereticks.

Thus we may remember the *French* King excluded all Persons of the Reformed Religion, from any Posts, Offices, or Commands, in his Army;

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Army; and afterwards used this Army to dragoon his own Subjects, that were not of the National Church; and his Clergy approved and applauded these his Cruel Proceedings.

The Hugonots, or rather Hereticks, being by these means gradually weakened, and at last entirely oppressed, their Cautionary Towns being first seized under Pretence of Non-subjection, the great and popular Nobility extinguished, their Edicts recalled, and all their former Concessions violated, and they themselves, by Persecutions and Cruelties, either obliged to renounce their Religion, or at least perish for it; there remains in *France* no Bulwarks to Civil Rights, no Party of Men to oppose the violent Proceedings of the Crown: And by this very Means were the Soldiery of *France*, altho' composed of mostly *French* Men, preserved from running into the National Interest; for being by Profession *Papists*, they were befitted to persecute and root out Hereticks; the Clergy, and those of that Perswasion, countenancing them in such Proceedings: Which being effected, the Civil Rights were entirely destroyed, there being no Party to be Champions for such. For the Soldiery being first brought, by a Zeal for Religion, to live at Discretion upon Hereticks, after a time became gradually to approve the same thing upon those of their own Opinion, who should dare to murmur at their Master's Proceedings; whereby

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whereby the King became empowered to command or do what he pleased.

For which Reason, altho' the Subjects of *France* may in appearance have a real Property in their Lands or Goods, the King having not by any Edict declared the Contrary; yet in truth they have at present but a very precarious one, he commanding or requiring what he pleases from them; which if they deny, he will take. So that altho' the *French Nation* have so far a Property as to know what is this Man's, and what another's; yet they have none exclusive to the King, who may at pleasure take Part, or All.

By which it is evident the present Condition of *France* is, in effect, much the same as that of the Oriental Nations, where the Law plainly speaks, that *all is the Prince's*; for here, altho' the Law doth not declare it, yet it is really and virtually so.

These Misfortunes to the People of *France* seem principally to have been occasioned, in that the Temporals, and in truth, Preferments of the Clergy, were in the Power of the Crown, which are in that Kingdom many and great; by which the Ecclesiastical Body was perfectly rivetted to the Royal Interest: And the King wisely pretending a Zeal for the extinguishing the Hugonots, the Enemies to that Faith, who were both hated and dreaded by that Body; the Clergy, as being marvelously desirous to have those Hereticks rooted out

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became the most zealous Asserters of Regal Authority; and were instrumental in perswading and prevailing upon the Catholicks to like and approve these Proceedings: By which means the Soldiery would not run into any National Interest, by reason the Majority of the People being Papists, approved, and the Clergy applauded what they did; by which Methods the Hugonots were extirpated, and with them the Civil Rights of the People in France subverted, and that by their own Consent. For they complying with the King in the Extirpation of the Hugonots, did by that very means prevent the Soldiery from running into the Interest of the People; and the Soldiers being first used to execute the Prince's illegal Commands upon these People of a contrary Faith, would after wards do the same thing upon those of their own: And so the Government became perfectly Arbitrary; the Soldiers and the Clergy being in effect the only Persons entrusted in it, and they both being dependant upon the Prince, are prepared to do whatsoever he commands; whereby the People are governed as Vassals or Slaves.

That these Observations are true, not only of the Soldiery, but also of the French Clergy, I think are farther proved, by some late Proceedings of the Clergy in that Kingdom, (which I presume may be as yet fresh in most Mens Memories:) For their Panegyricks upon their King's Proceedings, in relation to the Hugonots,

Hugonots, abundantly confirms their own Zeal for such Cruelties; and their ready Compliance with the King's Demands for Assistance from them, whether comprehended under the soft Terms of Free Gifts, Benevolences, &c. as also in the Disputes that Monarch had with the Papacy; in which the Majority of the Clergy so little regarded the Holy Chair, that they seemed inclined to a *Patriarchate*; however they adhered to, and stoutly defended the Interest of their Prince, against the *Pope himself*: A clear Proof of their present Dependancy upon the Crown, when they durst to oppose the infallible Chair, in the Defence of their own Monarch.

VIII. I might likewise shew the Reasons and Methods of the several Changes in other European Governments, and the different Steps by which they gradually fell into their present Forms; by the Consideration of which, we may be led into some probable Guesses of their Fates and Durances.

As why *Spain*, altho' at present so much declined from its former Greatness, yet hath not been incident to any internal Convulsions; not having, like its Neighbouring Countries, been rent by Factions, nor suffered by Civil Wars; which seems to have proceeded, in that the Provinces, or petty and separate Kingdoms, that constitute *Spain*, being united under *Ferdinand*; and the In-

quisition being permitted to be there established, as the properest Method, by its severe Proceedings, to root out the Relicks of *Judaism* and *Mahometism*, which were deeply rooted in some of its Provinces. (the *Moors* having been in Possession of one of its Kingdoms, and the *Jews* living in great Numbers through all *Spain*.) For which Reason, either the Zeal of the Clergy, or the Interest and Safety of the State, required some Methods to oblige these People to conform to Christianity; for otherwise, if permitted to continue in their own Worship, they might have remained a dangerous Party, ready to have united to ruine that Government, which they must be supposed to have hated, in that not being admitted as Members into it, they must necessarily suffer under it, the very Laws of the Country restraining them in several Particulars.

The Inquisition, for these or some other Reasons, being established in *Spain*, and that Court being in the hands of Ecclesiastics, (who had mighty Possessions, and so great Authority in that Kingdom) and they rigidly executing what they had in Command; the very Severities of the Proceedings of the Inquisition, which was now used to punish all such, that were not, altho' Christians, of the Established Church, prevented the Growth of *Lutheranism* in this Country, which had infected most other People

People in *Europe*. For the Nobility, (who in *Spain* have preserved an Authority somewhat exceeding what is at present in most other Countries of *Europe*) if they really had any Inclination, yet could have no Opportunity of fomenting or encreasing Factions, upon Pretences of Abuses in Religion, by reason the Dread of that severe Court would deter the Commonality from joining with them in any such Undertaking.

Besides, the Discovery, Conquest, and Trade to *America*, did for a time bring great Wealth into the hands of the Commonality; and notwithstanding they were not admitted into any part of the Lands of *Spain*, yet by that they became less dependant upon the Nobility; and the Addition of *America*, and the *Italian* Provinces, to that Crown, brought so mighty a Revenue into the Royal Treasury, that the Prince, for a time, stood in little need of any Assistance from the *States*, or *Cortes*; wherefore he rarely convened them; or, if sometimes he did, he had no Occasion of Disputes with them, for he wanted not their Money, and so could send them Home without Danger: And then the Kings of *Spain*, grown thus mighty in Revenues, turned their Thoughts upon Foreign Matters; (grasping at Universal Monarchy) and in the Pursuit of such their Ambitious Designs, using their Native Subjects, it was not safe to displease or dissatisfie

dissatisfie them: Neither would the Clergy have joined with the Prince, in the direct Oppression of his other Subjects; because not being here, as in *France*, made dependant upon the Throne, they would not have endangered their own Power by thus encreasing the Princes

Besides, the Nobility retaining their vast Estates, which are by the Laws of *Spain* unalienable, keeps the Peasantry, such I mean as live in the open Country, and not in great Towns, in a continued Dependance upon them; which, God knows, considering the vast Extent of *Spain*, are but few; (the Expulsion of the *Moors*, and *Jews*, and their *American* Plantations, having drained them) And *Philip* the Second, to oblige his Nobles at Home, when his Affairs Abroad were embarrassed, settled such a certain Form and Manner of Government for all his vast Dominions, by erecting particular Courts and Councils, which were to be composed of such Numbers of his Nobility, through which all the Affairs of this over-grown Monarchy were in Form to pass; by which he rivetted the Nobility to the Crown, by reason the whole Government of all his Dominions were to pass through their hands. But this Policy of *Philip's*, altho' it secured the inward Peace of *Spain*, yet it hath been one Occasion of sinking it to the lowest Degrees in the Balance of *Europe*: For the Forms of passing things

things through these Councils, admitted of so many Delays, and of so many Abuses, that all Publick Business suffered: And then the Nobility, who are only Members of these Courts, Councils, or Publick Employments, who have thus all the Forms of Authority in their own hands, not being always solicitous about the Good of the Commonality, have never took much Care to preserve or encourage a Trade, that might have been advantageous to the People.

And this seems to be one of the Reasons why the Commonality of *Spain*, I intend only such as inhabit the great Towns, and so apply themselves to Trade, (for the Peasantry depend upon the Nobles) do not flourish as they do in some other European Countries: For they not being admitted into any Part of this Formal Government, (that moves like Clock-work) Trade, and the Advantages made by it, have not there been much regarded. So that altho' the *Spaniards* possess the Sovereignty of the *Indies*, and mozt of the Silver in *Europe* is dug out of their Mines; yet all those mighty Treasures brought from thence, make but a short Stay in *Spain*, but move on to other Nations, who are blest with happier Constitutions; whereby, altho' *Spain* hath by this her formal Policy preserved her own Peace, yet she hath lost both her People and her Treasure.

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IX. I might likewise demonstrate why *Germany*, altho' environed with her Enemies, and so her Princes, in their several Territories, have been obliged to keep up a Standing and Mercenary Force, hath as yet preserved her Civil Liberties; which seems in the main to have proceeded, in that Body being but an Aggregate of several separate Principalities and States, that are united for mutual Defence, and their Revenues being but small, and their Territories intermixed, they remain a Check upon each other from oppressing their own Subjects.

F I N I S