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THE  
FITNESS

Of REPEALING the

SEPTENNIAL ACT

At this JUNCTURE Consider'd :

IN A

LETTER

FROM

An Elector to a Member of  
Parliament.

WITH

Some REFLECTIONS on the *Present*  
*State* of the NATION.

To which are added,

Two Remarkable SPEECHES on that Subject,  
delivered in the House of Commons: And a  
LIST of those who voted for and against the  
Repeal in the Year 1734.

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THE  
FITNESS

Of REPEALING the  
SEPTENNIAL BILL.

SIR,

**T**H O' I am not fond of *appearing* in *Print* upon any Occasion, yet I could not resist the *Importunity* of my *Friends* in this County which you represent, that I would throw out to the Public my Sentiments upon a Point that we apprehend has in its *Consequences affected our own Liberties*, and may, in the *End, destroy those of our Posterity.*

What I am now to lay before you, Sir, is the Sense of your *best Friends* in this County; and that it is not digested into the *Form of an Instruction*, is owing to the Opinion  
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they have of your Integrity; and that you will be determined by *Truth*, whether offer'd by Way of *Instruction* or *Advice*. Had the *Subject* I now touch upon, been of such a Nature, as that it could only affect the *Laws of Society*, without violating the *Rights of Nature*, you might not have been troubled with this *Address*: But I conceive, Sir, that every *People*, nay every *Individual of a People*, has a Right of remonstrating to the Guardians of their Properties and Liberties, against Measures that evidently tend to weaken the one, and to subvert the other. Give me leave farther to say, that, as the *Rights of Nature* never can be extinguished in the *Laws of Society*, if the former are violated by the latter, the People have a Right to recur to other Remedies besides *Instructions*. I have thought it necessary, to premise this much in general, Sir, because I know a Doctrine has of late been broached, as if a Parliament, were they at one Vote to tear up by the Roots every Foundation on which the *Liberties and Properties of the Nation* are built, had a Right to expect from the People an *absolute*, nay an *unrepining Compliance*.

Tho' I am sensible, Sir, with how much *Tenderness for the natural Rights* of the People, the present Parliament has exerted the great Trust devolved on them; yet their *Purity and Disinterestedness* is no Security to the  
People

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People that all *future Parliaments* will be equally virtuous. Besides, I dare say the present Parliament will willingly give up any Power or Advantages which the former Exigencies of the Times made expedient to intrust them or their immediate Predecessors with, as soon as the Reasons for that Trust cease. This is what a good Parliament will be fond of doing, especially as they cannot answer for the Virtue of their Successors.

The *Alterations*, Sir, which extraordinary Reasons of State have rendered either *expedient* or *necessary* in the *Constitution*, have, I am afraid, rather *diminished* its *Majesty*, than *added to its Security*: They may have given *Power to the Government*, but I am convinced they have given *no Strength to the Nation*. Upon this Conviction it is, that I take the Liberty to lay before you my Sentiments with regard to one, give me leave to call it, *Innovation* in our *Constitution*, which a temporary *Exigency of Government* perhaps once render'd tolerable to the Subject, but the ingrafting it upon the Constitution may render dangerous to his Liberty. You will easily guess that I mean the *Case of Septennial Parliaments*.

Here, Sir, I must lay it down as a Maxim, that is confirmed by the Experience of all Ages and Countries, that a frequent Reversion to first Principles, is necessary to the right Preservation of any Constitution; for this plain

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Reason, because it is from the Fountain alone that the Streams which create the *Vigour* and *Bloom* of *Liberty* can be supplied. Every other Sustenance it receives, however it may impose upon Mankind for a Time, is forced and *unnatural*. Now, Sir, if there is in the whole System of the *British* Constitution, a first Principle that gave *Life*, *Dignity* and *Strength* to all its other Parts, it was a frequent Rotation of the Legislative Power, or to speak more properly, a frequent Return of that Power into the Hands of those from whom it was derived. At the Conquest, the Constitution of *England* received no Alteration in this Respect, any farther than that the Representative Body began then to be called by the *Norman* Word *Parliament*, instead of the *Saxon* WITTENAGEMOTE, or what, according to Sir *Henry Spelman*, is almost the very same, FOLKMOTE: And it is plain from the universal Consent of Historians and Lawyers, from the Conquest to the Time of *Henry VIII.* that new Parliaments were held every Year. At first indeed they were held twice a Year; but the Distractions occasioned by the Civil Wars prevented their meeting so often. The first Instance which we have that a Parliament may be held but once a Year, is in the Reign of \**Edward* the Second,

\* Rot. p. 9. Ed. II.

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where we find, *Que Parliament sera tenu un ou deux fois per An. i. e. That a Parliament shall be held once or twice every Year.*

In the 36th of *Edward* the Third, we find, *That for Maintenance of the said Articles and Statutes, and Redress of divers Mischiefs that daily happen, a Parliament shall be holden every Year.*

In the Reign of *Richard* the Second, we find one of the Demands of the Subjects to be, "That a Parliament may be yearly holden in a convenient Place, to redress Delays in Suits, and to end such Cases as the Judges doubt of."

To multiply Quotations of this Nature, would be both unnecessary and tedious. I shall only observe that the first Instance which we have of the Parliament's being prorogued, was under one of the most arbitrary violent Princes that ever this or any other Nation beheld, I mean *Henry* the Eighth: This Stretch of Power was perhaps the strongest Evidence of the Effects which the Alteration of Property under his Father, *Henry* the Seventh, was attended with. But the Scale of Property, which before that Time had always and unalterably remained with the Barons, beginning now to incline to the Commons (who were by that Time sensible of the great Advantages which the making the Properties of the Barons *alienable*, gave them,) prevented their giving any Disgust to that capricious Prince, the Weight of

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of whose Power and Authority might soon have reduced the Ballance to its former Poize. On this Account the Crown was sure of meeting with no Check from the Commons in all the arbitrary Measures then pursued, therefore its Interests led it to continue their Power beyond the limited Time.

On the other hand, the Barons were too fond of what they at first vainly imagined was a Relief, and a Kind of an *Emancipation* from Law; they were too much immerfed in the Luxury which the vast Sums they raised by alienating their Lands supplied, to retain the same Jealousy of the Power of the Crown, and the same Vigilance over their own Independancy and the Liberties of the People, perhaps they were too weak, to dispute this Innovation. However that may be, it is certain, that this Power which the King then assumed, was till that Time unknown to the Constitution; and had not the Circumstances of his immediate Successors rendered it both unsafe and unpracticable for them to make so bad a Use of that Innovation as it would have admitted of, the Crown might by this Time have claimed the Nomination of Members of Parliament, as a Right inherent to itself.

But a *weak unactive* Minority, *Differences* about *Religion*, a *disputed Title* to the *Crown*, and the *Ignorance* of a *Foreign* or an *upstart* Ministry, saved the Nation from being saddled with a perpetual Parliament in the four succeeding

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ceeding Reigns. Every one of the Princes that reigned during that Period, had a new Scheme of Religion or Government to execute, a new System of Power to erect, that absolutely required a *Rotation* of the *Legislative* Power. The Views of one Party during the Reign of *Edward* the Sixth could not be accomplished while the Parliament, that had served the other, sat. The favourite Project which *Queen Mary* had of establishing Popery, could never be brought about by Means of a House of Commons whereof the Majority was Protestant: The same medley Parliament that recognized the Title of *Queen Elizabeth* at the Beginning of her Reign, was not to be trusted towards the Middle of it; and *King James* was uneasy with all Parliaments. It was not therefore in all that Period the Interest of the Crown to perpetuate a Sitting Parliament. *Queen Elizabeth* indeed, had she been willing, might have got a Parliament to her own Liking; and in case she had entertained any arbitrary Views, might have prorogued it to a Perpetuity; but the Maxims by which she governed, rendered it impossible, that either a disloyal or a servile Parliament could be returned. As she never governed by a Faction, the Interests of the *Government* and the *Subject* were the same in the *Election*; and the *Authority* of the *Sovereign* was united with the *Power* of the *Parliament* in the *Representation*.  
Charles

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*Charles* the First, by a fatal Train of Politicks, began with thinking Parliaments troublesome; then unnecessary; then dangerous; and last of all rebellious. This led him to stretch his Prerogative to the utmost, till he found it like a broken Reed in his Hand, unable either to skreen his Ministers, or defend himself: For the Parliament knew its own Strength; it knew what a Pageant of State a King is, unless he has some Interest either in the Purse or Affections of the Public. They knew that *Charles* never could command the one without their Assistance; and that the very Methods he fell upon to command it, lost him the other.

It was in vain therefore that he discontinued his Parliaments for twelve Years together; for the Nation at last found the Means of wresting from him an Assent to an Act, that tho' it was not perfectly consistent with the Constitution, yet brought it a little nearer to its first Principles, I mean the Act for a triennial Parliament.

And here, Sir, give me Leave to suggest to your own Reason, one or two Considerations that may have some Weight with regard to the Part you may act on this important Head.

Had the Reign of King *Charles* the First been distinguished by a Series of misfortunate Conduct of one Minister, skreened by a Parliament whom he found Means to corrupt; had this Minister obtained the Disposal of a Revenue

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Revenue greater than ever any King of *England* before possessed: Had he been backed by an Army whose Numbers were formidable even to the united Strength of the Nation, whose Officers he placed and displaced, and whose Pay was dropt or continued at his Pleasure: I say, Sir, would the Nation at that Time have thought its Liberties safe even for three Years in the Hands of a Parliament that supported the Power, or skreened the Crimes of such a Minister? Would it not have expressed the same Resentment against the Influence of Corruption, that it did against the Abuse of Prerogative? Would *Pym* or *Hampden* have thought a triennial Parliament a sufficient Barrier against the Encroachments of Power upon the natural Rights of their Fellow Subjects? No, Sir, they would not; had it depended on their Voice, annual Parliaments must have again taken Place; the Legislative Power must have revolved more frequently: And thus, if the Channels of the Constitution had contracted any Impurity, they must have been clean'd as often as this Rotation took Place.

But let us consider, Sir, what they did as Things then stood: They had an Act passed which executed itself, and rendered the Meeting of Parliaments, at least once in three Years, independant of the Sovereign, if he should neglect to call them. This Act, specious as it was at that Juncture, was but the Prelude of an Extension of the parliamentary

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Power, to a Degree that intirely ruined the Constitution: For it is certain, that if the Parliament, when they found the *Independants* and the Army beginning to assume *Dictatorial Powers*, had had the *Virtue to have dissolved itself*, or to have suffered the King to do it, and thus to have returned to the People the Exercise of their Rights; they must have prevented all the Miseries that afterwards followed: But Power, like *Circe's Cup*, has a Charm that changes *Patriots*, into *Tyrants*, *Freemen* into *Slaves*, and *Heroes* into *Monsters*. Its intoxicating Qualities, Sir, ought therefore always to be distrusted; they ought to be withheld even from those who we have Reason to believe are most Proof against them.

It would be extremely impertinent in me, Sir, to retale all that has been wrote with regard to the fatal Consequences which this Craft of Proroguing, or, which is the same Thing, of continuing Parliaments, was attended with in the Reign of *Charles* the Second, under whom the Triennial Act was repealed. I cannot however help making some Remarks on the Conduct of that Prince and his Parliaments.

Being sensible how impossible it was to gain his arbitrary Ends, without the Countenance of a Parliament, the very Name and Nature of which he hated; he did not, as his Father's mistaken Policy led him to do, attempt at first to rule without Parliaments, but to corrupt them.

them. But give me leave to say, Sir, that this was a more effectual Way to enslave the Nation than his Father had taken. While a designing Prince or Ministry works without a Parliament, they work upon their own Bottom; but all their Shifts and Arts to raise Money are soon exhausted, and the Exigencies of Government must at last force them to have recourse to the Parliament. But when they *work* with a corrupted Parliament, they make the Nation, in some Sense, a Party in their Guilt, and the Constitution accessary to its own Violation. *Charles* the Second was sensible of this; but his Revenues could not afford such a plentiful Supply of Corruption as to be sure of a Majority upon every Election: Therefore he took care to have as few Elections as possible, and lumped the Affair with his own Pensioners in the mean Time: But their Behaviour is a Proof that the Degrees of Corruption are in proportion to its Means. The Sums that *Charles* lavished, were but poultry, when compared with those that others have expended to the same Purposes. His Pensioners ventured indeed a little in the Pool; but they shivered, and turned back from the dirty Plunge. *Charles*, therefore, was mistaken in not having an enterprising Minister, who knew the Secret of making them soufe over Head and Ears. Had he got such a Minister, the Nation would have been soon weary of Parliaments,

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and the Court would have beheld them *without Jealousy*, nay *with Fondness*. It is true, that on the one Hand, he might still have found Inconveniencies in frequent Elections; and on the other, his Minister might have not thought it quite convenient to deprive the People of all their Rights of Election, as *Charles* did. The first Measure would have required a great deal more Money than he had to bestow, to have answered his Ends; and had he followed the same Course which *Charles* took, it had been impossible for them to have raised Money enough to have kept them firm to his Interest in every low Job, of which all first Ministers, in a free Country, must necessarily have a great Number.

We may therefore reasonably conclude, that had *Charles* thoroughly understood the Method of managing Parliaments, he would neither have ruled by short ones, nor have suspended the People's Right of Election entirely, but have fallen upon the Project of Septennial ones; which might have effectually ruined the Nation: For, besides the Considerations I have already mentioned, a Septennial Parliament is the Means of keeping every Slave of a Court to his Duty, more effectually than perpetual Parliaments: For if he knows that he cannot be turned out of his Seat, he will be a great deal more refractory; he will treat his Paymaster more *de haut en bas*, than he will do when he knows that it depends on his own

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own Zeal for the Interest of the Minister, that he shall sit when the seven Years are expired.

After the Revolution was effected, it is well known, that Triennial Parliaments were then looked upon as the great Touchstone of the New Establishment, by all who acted on the Principles of Liberty, and understood the Interest of the Nation, or had seen the terrible Consequences with which long Parliaments were attended. Nothing therefore in King *William's* Reign was more agreeable than *restoring Triennial Parliaments*; and the great Things they did were sufficient Proofs of their Expediency. Notwithstanding the Hopes of the *Jacobites* were strong; their Faction numerous; the King without Issue; and two different Parties perpetually opposing and undermining one another, both in the Court and Senate; yet we find that a vigorous War was entered into against the overgrown Power of *France*: The Protestant Succession was established in the House of *Hanover*; the Money of the Nation was re-coined; our Faith with our Allies preserved; the Honour of the Nation asserted; an honourable Peace concluded; the Debts of the Public laid upon sure Funds, the \* Prince established firmly on the Throne, and all by a Triennial Parliament. Let us look into the succeeding Reign, we shall

\* See Bishop Burnet, Vol. P. 218.

find



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find the Nation united at Home, respected and triumphant Abroad, the Credit of the Public high, the Union undertaken and completed, the Machinations of Faction defeated, and the Power of *France* reduced to the last Ebb, by Triennial Parliaments. Can it be imagined, Sir, that the Nation, under Queen *Anne*, would have so cheerfully contributed to the immense Expences of the War, if they had thought that their Taxes had been laid by a Parliament that was visibly under the Influence of a Minister? Can you imagine, that if the Ministry, uncorrupted and zealous as it then was, had had to do with Septennial Parliaments, they would not have found the Means of gaining a Majority over to their Interests. Besides, Sir, I believe it will be found by Experience, that a Parliament of the same Men who meet every Year for seven Years, would, if left to themselves, without the least ministerial Influence, split into Parties, that must inevitably be of vast Detriment to the Service of their Country. We have, I think, but one Instance of a Parliament before the present one, that was absolutely without any undue Influence from Ministers, and that was the Parliament which so vigorously opposed King *Charles* the First; yet by the noble Historian's Account, and by the Accounts of those who fate in it, there never was a more miserably divided Set of Men in the World. I am therefore convinced, that had the great War

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War with *France* been carried on under a Septennial Parliament, even though it had been quite pure from Corruption, the Nation never could have made such Efforts as it did: Interest indeed unites Men; but if it is a destructive Interest, the Union must be destructive too, and the longer it lasts the more destructive.

In the succeeding Reign, which was that of *George* the First, the Protestant Establishment took Place, and a formidable Rebellion was suppressed under a triennial Parliament; For I call it *Triennial* Sir, because when these Things happened, it had not yet made itself *Septennial*: But the Nation's being still in a Ferment, the Enemies of the Government active and zealous, and the Prince a Stranger to the Manners of the People, it was thought convenient not to venture another Election in so short a Period, and for the Parliament to continue itself for seven Years longer. Besides, it was strongly urged, that in the then uncertain and unsettled State of the Nation, no Foreign Power would chuse to enter into any Alliance with us, if they did not see the same Parliament that had given so many Instances of its Zeal for his Majesty's Person and Government continued. It was then objected by many, that it carried an Insinuation of the worst Sort along with it, for the Parliament in a Manner to declare, that the

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Share which his Majesty had in the Affections of his Subjects was so little, that they were not to be trusted with the Election of their own Representatives: That instead of making the Ferment which the Nation was then in subside, it would increase it, should the Ministry push a Thing that was so extremely unpopular and unconstitutional. It was farther said, that those Allies ought neither to be courted nor to be trusted, who would not enter into Treaties with us, unless we gave up our Constitution: Nay some, who were averse to this Measure, went so far as to say, *That King, Lords, and Commons could no more continue a Parliament beyond its natural Duration, than they can make one.*

I shall not pretend to enter into all the Facts and Reasonings that each Party offered in Support of its own Opinion; I shall only take the Liberty to say, that all the Arguments which prevailed with the Legislature for repealing the Triennial Act, and passing the Septennial one, were merely temporary and determined with the Exigency of that particular Juncture: Therefore Sir, I must take the Liberty to examine whether the same Reasons that might have swayed with the Parliament in the Year 1716, or if Reasons equally strong for a Septennial Parliament still exist. This cannot but be looked upon by all impartial Persons as a fair Way of arguing, especially

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ally as it is allowed on all hands, that frequent Parliaments were the undoubted Privileges of the People in their Original Constitution, and that the Continuance of Parliaments beyond their natural Duration, came in under a tyrannical Reign, and was adopted by weak or designing Princes.

But before I enter into this Part of what I propose, I must beg leave to take Notice of an Argument which I knew, at the Time of enacting the Septennial Bill, was urged against Triennial Parliaments; and this was, *That three Years was too short a Time for a Parliament to effect any great Thing that is for the Interest of the Nation.* Sir, if we examine this Proposition by a Comparison of Facts, I believe it will be found that, at least, as great Things have been done by *Triennial*, nay by *Annual* Parliaments, as have been done since they were refused. We have already mentioned some of the great Things done by *Triennial* Parliaments in the Reigns of King *William* and Queen *Anne*. Let us see what great Things for the Interest of the Nation have been done since their Days. Can our *peaceful Negotiations with Spain*, stand in Competition with our *glorious War with France*? Will the frequent Votes of Credit, that have been since granted, eclipse the Merit of *recoining our Silver*? Can the *Convention* be compared to the Peace of *Ryswick*, the Treaty of *Hanover* to the Conferences of

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*Gertruydenberg*, or the Riot *Act* to the Establishment of the Protestant Succession? Give me leave to say, Sir, that Posterity will look upon this Comparison with a very different Eye from what we do; and that some stronger Proofs for the Objection must be brought before the World can swallow it.

If we consult Reason on this Head, there never was any Thing more ridiculous; for if a Parliament does any Thing, *they must do it in one Session*; if it is put off to another, all their Proceedings must re-commence, if they are by Way of Bill. As for the Approbation which the Parliament gives to the Proceedings of a Minister, which they do not give by Way of *Act*, and which perhaps another Parliament might refuse, it might deserve a little Consideration, whether some late Sanctions, which certain Transactions have received, or seemed to receive, has entirely tended to the Interest and Satisfaction of the Nation.

I now proceed, Sir, to what I proposed; I mean, to consider whether or not the same general Reasons for continuing Triennial Parliaments still exist, as they did when the Septennial Act took place.

In the first Place, his late Majesty was a personal Stranger to the Inclinations, Manners, and Principles of a great Number of his Subjects when he came over: A strong Prejudice lay with one Party against a Protestant Prince,

Prince, with another against a foreign one, and with some against all Princes: Another Interest, incompatible with his, had been encouraged, and received Countenance at Court during the last Years of his immediate Predecessor's Reign; and had acquired Strength enough to break out into *open Rebellion*. The *French* were at the Time of that Rebellion, watching to improve every Opportunity which our Divisions afforded: The Distractions in the *North* prevented our expecting any Assistance from that Quarter: The Emperor, our then firm and natural Ally, was recovering from a long expensive War, and was engaged afresh in another with the *Turk*; so that all our foreign Dependance was on the *Dutch*. These Considerations gave some Colour to insist upon Unanimity at Home; and Unanimity at Home, it was pretended, never could be obtained but by continuing the Parliament. These were the Arguments insisted upon at that Time for continuing the Parliament; but I conceive, Sir, that every one of these Reasons have either been found false in Fact, or that they no longer exist.

His late Majesty did not owe the quiet Possession of his Crown, during the remaining Part of his Reign, to the Continuance of the Parliament; he did not owe it to any Accession of foreign Alliance, which that Parli-

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ment encouraged ; he owed it, next to his own wise Government, to the *Alliance of France*, under the Regent, whose Interest led him to cultivate a strict Friendship with *Britain* ; but no Man of Common Sense will pretend that this Alliance was in the smallest Degree owing to Septennial Parliaments. The Rebellion was suppressed before the Parliament was declared Septennial, and the Act which declared it, was so far from producing *Unanimity at Home*, that every Body who lived then may remember, it produced nothing but *Divisions and Animosities*.

His present Majesty succeeded to the Throne with all the Advantages which the Affection that the Nation retained for the Memory of his Father, joined to his own Royal Virtues, could give. The *Disaffection* that troubled the first Part of his late Majesty's Reign, is now vanished. There is scarce such a Person now in the Kingdom, as a *genuine old Jacobite* ; nay I will venture to say, that they who were most distinguished for their Adherence to that Party, and even acted with Vigour and Zeal to bring in the Pretender, are now the surest and most thorough-paced Friends that the Government has in that Part of the Island : Nay it is notorious, that the Families of that Party, which were at the Time of the late Rebellion in *Scotland* distinguished for their *Jacobitism*, are now increased one third in *Riches, in Influence, and Power* ;  
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and there is not above four of those Estates that were forfeited, which are not now in a better Condition than they were at the Time of the Forfeiture, and in the same Hands, or their Descendants. If we look through *England*, the very Name of *Jacobitism* seems to be *forgot* ; and if it is ever mentioned, it is with *Ridicule and Contempt*.

But all the Writers in favour of the Ministry and Septennial Parliaments, have still industriously endeavoured to confound the two Terms of *Disaffection* and *Dissatisfaction* together ; though nothing in Nature can be more different. *Disaffection* arises from *Principle* or *Prejudice* ; it prevails alike under all Governments that has not the ridiculous Stamp of the Faction to recommend it ; it equally abhors a *good* as a *bad* Administration, if not established on its own absurd Principles ; nay, nothing gives those few who may happen still to be tainted with it, so much Uneasiness and Disquiet, as a firm, vigorous, and successful Government ; nothing affords them so much Pleasure, as *public Misfortune* or *national Calumity*.

*Dissatisfaction*, on the other hand, is founded on the Abuse of Power, as the other is on the Exercise of it, by those to whom it is intrusted : It proceeds often from Zeal, and often from a Jealousy lest the Honour of the Nation may suffer in weak or wicked Hands. The *Dissatisfaction* that has prevailed of late,  
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has not proceeded from Persons, but Measures, and has always been justified by the Event: They who are at present dissatisfied, have given the most eminent Proofs of their Attachment to the Principles upon which his Majesty's Title to the Throne is founded. It was with Grief they saw the Contempt the Nation has fallen into abroad; and they saw with Concern the same Measures pursued, and the same Persons employed that had occasioned it. If on that Account they gave some Proofs of their Dissatisfaction, that has put the Nation on its Guard, they acted as dutiful Subjects, more zealous for the *Honour of the Crown* than *the Interest of the Minister*. But as soon as the Measures were altered, they joined in giving their Voices to more honourable Measures; they even out-did the Ministry itself in their Zeal to support his Majesty; and it is to be hoped their Zeal will meet with suitable Success.

Upon the whole, therefore, Sir, I think it is undeniable, that none of that Disaffection, which served at least for a Pretext to repeal the Triennial Act, now remains; and that not one of the Reasons that were then given for enacting the Septennial Bill, can be pleaded for its Continuance; but many Reasons may be given why it ought at this Juncture to be repealed.

One of these Reasons, Sir, is, that we have as yet seen no good Effects which has attended the

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the Parliament's sitting seven Years; on the contrary, it may be hereafter in the Power of a Minister, who has *Posts, Places, and Pensions* at his Disposal, to secure a Majority of a Septennial Parliament, so as to approve of all his destructive Measures: Whereas, if the same Parliament were Triennial, the People would have the Means of setting aside those Members with whom they have Reason to be dissatisfied seven Times in one and twenty Years, instead of three Times. The Proportion therefore of the Chance, which the People has for the Preservation of their Liberties under Triennial Parliaments, and under *Septennial*, is as *twenty-one to seven*.

Another Reason, Sir, why we conceive you ought to vote for the Repeal of that Act, if it should come before you, is the Success which a late Measure proposed to secure the Independency of Parliaments met with. Had that Bill, Sir, taken Effect, the Necessity of restoring Triennial Parliaments would not have been near so great as it is; but as it seems to be determined that Placemen and Pensioners may compose the Majority of one House, it is but natural to wish that the Temptation of their enjoying their Seats and Emoluments at the same Time, for so long a Term as seven Years, were removed: And to conclude, that if it is not removed, the Dissatisfaction that now prevails, will still continue, and the Suspicions

picians of the Representatives of the People being under an undue Influence, must increase.

Two Circumstances, Sir, that are but of Yesterday, convince me of the Expediency of repealing this Act: The first is the Success of the Excise Scheme. That Scheme, destructive as it was, must have certainly taken Place, had it not been for the approaching Elections: But they who were most zealous in speaking and writing in its Favour, were so indiscreet as to own that they were afraid if they should carry it thro', it might influence the Elections of their Friends in the next Parliament, and therefore it was more expedient to set it aside.

The other Circumstance I mean, Sir, is what happened on the late Occasion I have just mentioned: It is certain, that the Majority on that Occasion was less than ever was known upon so important a Question. But to what do the Dependants on a certain Gentleman attribute this in all public Places and Companies? To that Gentleman (to use their own Words) *giving Leave* to his Friends to vote against him: Why should he give them this Leave Sir? To be sure, lest they disoblige their Constituents, and lose their Places in the approaching Elections.

From these two Circumstances, Sir, it appears, that the more near an Election is, the more cautious is a Ministry; and if the Elections were twice as frequent as they are, the Ministry would be twice as tender of the Interests

terests of the Public, and consequently that the Public would receive double Advantages.

The restoring the Constitution to its original Privilege of frequent Elections, must be attended with the best Consequences with regard to the foreign Interests of the Nation, and the Figure which she makes abroad. That this Kingdom has vast intrinsic Strength, the present Efforts against the common Enemies of all Parties amongst us, is an evident Proof: And nothing can defeat the good Effects which the Terror of this Strength must always produce, but the Opinion that our Neighbours may entertain that the Parliament is under the Influence of a weak timorous Ministry. The restoring to the People their antient Right of frequent Elections would go far to cure them of this Mistake; and they would soon find the Difference betwixt the Resolutions of a free Parliament, and the Trifling of an interested Minister. Let us reflect, Sir, on our late Treatment from *Spain*: Can it be imagined that she would have dared to treat us in the insolent inhuman Manner she has done, if she had thought that the Voice of the People had retained the smallest Influence on the Affairs of the Government. It was, Sir, their Opinion that our Ministry durst not go to War; their Opinion that the Parliament never would force them to act against their Inclinations, which produced the infamous Treatment we received. Their Pretences about the Cry of the People, and the Violence of the Opposition to the Government, is weak and ridiculous: If they had thought that the  
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People, or the Opposition had been of any Consequence, they would never have presumed to push Affairs to the Extremities they did.

We are now entered into a War, the Support and Management of which must depend in a great Measure upon the Affections of the People towards the Government. The restoring them to all their antient Privileges, is the best Means of securing their Affections, and never can create the least Uneasiness in the Breast of any well-meaning Man in the Nation. If Ministers design well, and act honestly, frequent Elections, instead of hurting, will preserve them, and the Government will be built on the strongest of all Foundations, the Affections of the People.

But the true Test of the Merit of this Measure is to examine by the Constitution of *Great-Britain* in particular. The provoking Steps which King *James* had taken to destroy the Constitution of the Nation made the Revolution necessary; but it was amazing to see, that for several Years after the Revolution was effected, the Bill for Triennial Parliaments had not passed: This gave great Concern to all who wished well to the Constitution, and is a farther Proof that nothing is so bewitching as Power; for if there was a Grievance, the Continuation of which made the Revolution necessary, it was the depriving the People of their Rights of frequent Elections. The Claim of Right indeed asserts *the Freedom of Elections*; but to what Purpose was it to assert the Freedom of a Thing that might not happen once in a Man's Life-time. It likewise asserts  
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*the Freedom of Debate*; but unless the People have a Right of frequently electing their own Representatives, a Prince or a Minister may fall upon a Way to prevent all Debate in Parliament, by gaining over a Majority that may pursue Measures which shall force all the honest uninfluenced Part from their Assembly, and leave none but those whose Interests lead them to be *all of one Mind*. It likewise says that *Parliaments ought to be held frequently*; but here Ministers have a ready Answer: *All that is meant by that*, say they, is, *That the Parliament in Being shall meet frequently, that is, once a Year*. Thus it appears, that the Claim of Right did not sufficiently provide for this important Privilege of the People: And it was owing to the Instances of the Country Party that the Triennial Bill passed at all; for it had once been refused the Royal Assent in King *William's* Reign: But the Friends of the Constitution went so far, as to declare, that according to the Principles upon which King *William* came in, and the Obligations he lay under to the People, they expected that even *annual Parliaments would be restored*. Thus it is plain, that the Sense of the Patriots who brought about the Revolution, was for the frequent Elections of Members of Parliament; and that if they were not expressly provided for by Claim of Rights, it was owing to a Presumption, that they were so inseparable from the Ends for which the Revolution was brought about, that they were always to be understood as a Fundamental of Government.

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This leads me, Sir, to one Consideration that unanswerably proves the Necessity of frequent Elections; which is, that if they are not fully provided for by the Constitution since the Revolution, it is miserably defective; because, in that Case, the People can have no Controul upon the Abuse of *Parliamentary Trust*. For if a Parliament is always to sit, how can we suppose that the People can have any Redress of those Grievances which that Parliament may create. Give me leave to say, Sir, that however distant the *Probability* may be, that there is a *Possibility* of a Parliament's entering into Measures that may overthrow the Constitution. Now as this is possible, can we imagine there is no Remedy for this in the Constitution? And yet there can be none but frequent Elections by the People. For the last Resort of Justice being in a King and Parliament, the Parliament alone can check a *King*; but if a King, or rather his Minister, shall find Means to gain over the Parliament, none can check them but the People: Yet the People cannot legally do it while they continue a Parliament. Therefore it is absolutely necessary, that the People should have it, at least, in their Power to set those Representatives aside, whom they imagine have betrayed their Trust; and not to wear the Yoke not only about their own Necks, but those of their Posterity.

I must take the Liberty farther to observe, Sir, that the Doctrine of an *unaccountable, uncontrollable* Parliament, is supported by the same Arguments with that of an *absolute ar-*  
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*bitrary* Prince. The Constitution has effectually provided against the one, and if the other it not so effectually guarded against, it is to be hoped that it soon will. For my own Part, I think that seven Years is a sufficient Time for any Ministry, if they find it convenient or necessary, to create a corrupt Dependance of a Majority of Parliament upon themselves; and that tho' they do not do it, yet the People will still be uneasy and apprehensive, lest while they part with their Power for so long a Time as seven Years, a bad Use may be made of it in the mean Time. And indeed this Jealousy is but too well founded on Experience; for if we look into the History of past Ages, we shall there find that the Extension of the Duration of Power, was always attended with the Loss of Liberty; and that the shorter the Term was for which it was granted, the Liberties of the People were more safe. It would be endless to multiply Instances of this Kind; you need but dip into the Histories of *Greece* and *Rome*, to see it verified almost in every Page. I am sensible that Inconveniencies did arise from the short Time in which their Magistrates enjoy'd their Powers; but the People wisely overlooked these Inconveniencies, because of the greater ones which might have attended such an Innovation in the Constitution, as the prolonging those Powers must have been attended with.

In short, Sir, as I am zealous for the Honour of his Majesty, and the Freedom of the People; and as the one, if rightly considered, must be built upon the other, I could wish that his Majesty's Reign were distinguish-

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ed by restoring to the People this fundamental Charter of their Liberty. I cannot see the least dangerous Consequences it can possibly be attended with. I can foresee many glorious Advantages, not only to his Majesty, but to the Nation must arise from it; as such I have taken the Liberty to recommend the Consideration of this Measure; and no Man shall more sincerely share in the Pleasure which the Honour of contributing to it must give to you, than myself. But if, contrary to the Hopes and Expectations of your Electors, you should refuse to concur with the Instances of the worthy Patriots who shall push this in your House; you will suffer as much in your Interest among your Constituents, as you will do in the Esteem of your Friends.

I might add a great deal more, Sir, upon this Subject, did I not think that it is so self-evident, that it requires very little Proof. If I have omitted any Thing material, the Omission will be more agreeably supplied by the two following Speeches of two Gentlemen who always distinguished themselves by their Zeal for the present happy Establishment, which did not prevent their doing their utmost for obtaining a Repeal of this Act. These Speeches were delivered at a Time when this Measure was proposed; but the Reasons for it were not near so strong as they are at present; and I hope you will remember the Advice of the Poet:

*Animo repentem exempla tuorum,  
Et pater Æneas & avunculus excitat Hector.*

*I am, Sir, your Friend and Servant, as you  
behave on this Occasion.*

A COMPLETE

L I S T  
OF THE  
M E M B E R S

W H O

Voted FOR and AGAINST

T H E

BILL for Repealing the SEPTENNIAL  
ACT, and for the more frequent Meet-  
ing and Calling of Parliaments:

W I T H T H E

S P E E C H E S

O F T H E

TWO GENTLEMEN who *Moved* and  
*Seconded* the QUESTION, Mar. 13, 1733-4.

L O N D O N :

Printed in the Year 1740.



Mr SPEAKER,



THE Call of the House being ad-  
journed to a very remote Day,  
upon a general Opinion, (which I  
hope is well founded,) That no  
Vote of Credit will be proposed, I  
believe we can scarce expect to see a  
fuller House than this Day produces. There can-  
not therefore be a better Opportunity of making  
a Motion, which, I apprehend to be of such  
National Concernment, that I have long wish'd  
it undertaken by some Person, better able to  
support it than my self: But I have this Satisfa-  
ction, that what I am going to offer, will so  
far speak itself, as may supply any Defects in my  
Manner of laying it before you, and I cannot  
doubt the Concurrence of this House, when it  
comes to be maturely consider'd.

I believe we are none of us unappriz'd of the  
Dislike the People in general have always had to  
Long Parliaments: A Dislike justly founded; on

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Reason and Experience; LONG PARLIAMENTS IN FORMER REIGNS HAVING PROV'D THE UNHAPPY CAUSE OF GREAT CALAMITIES TO THIS NATION, and having been at all times declar'd, AN INNOVATION UPON OUR CONSTITUTION. I am convinc'd there is no one that hears me, who does not believe, the People thought themselves highly aggriev'd by the *Septennial Bill*: That they even look'd upon it as a dangerous Infringement of their Liberties, notwithstanding the Cause alledg'd in the Preamble to the Act, which seem'd, at that time, to carry some weight with it.

That Cause being happily remov'd, they desire to revert, as near as may be, to their ancient Constitution: and surely there can never be a more favourable Opportunity to effectuate it than at this Juncture, when His Majesty, *to the great Joy of the Kingdom*, has been graciously pleas'd to declare his Satisfaction, That the People are soon to have an Opportunity of chusing a New Representative. The present Parliament draws near it's Dissolution: What can it do more for it's own Honour? How can it crown it's many meritorious Acts better, than by redressing a Grievance a SUCCEEDING PARLIAMENT MAY POSSIBLY HAVE IT'S REASONS FOR NOT ENTERING INTO.

Frequent Parliaments were early declar'd a Fundamental Part of our Constitution. In the 4th of *Edw. III.* an Act pass'd for holding them once a Year, or oftner if there should be Occasion. In the 36th Year of the same Reign that Statute was confirmed. In that Parliament *Magna Charta* and *Charta de Foresta* were confirm'd, and several

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several new Privileges granted to the Subject. Then comes the Clause relating to Parliaments, which sufficiently shews the Intention and Original Institution of them was for the Redress of Grievances: For the Bill enacts, *That for the Maintenance of the said Articles and Statutes* (that is, the Privileges beforemention'd) *and for Redress of divers Mischiefs and Grievances, which daily happen, a new Parliament shall be held once every Year, as another time was ordain'd.* The 16th of *Car. II.* recites, *That by the antient Laws and Statutes, Parliaments are to be held very often,* and therefore enacts, *That the Sitting and Holding of Parliaments shall not be intermitted or discontinued for more than Three Years.*

In the early Days when this prudent Care was taken for frequent Meeting of Parliaments, the Crown was possess'd of Revenues, which made Applications to the People for Money, unless upon extraordinary Emergencies, unnecessary. It therefore plainly appears, *That Redress of Grievances, making salutary Laws for the Good of the Community, and Preserving the Liberties of the People, by supporting a due Ballance between the Power of the Crown and the Rights of the Subject, were the main Ends of calling Parliaments.* The Power of calling them being the undoubted Prerogative of the Crown, it became necessary, for the Safety of the Subject, to oblige the Crown to call them frequently. I must confess, Sir, a Caution of this kind is no longer necessary, nor can it ever be so long as we preserve to our selves the Power of granting Money. The Crown Revenues being sunk, or wantonly granted away, the annual Call for a Supply must necessarily produce an annual Meeting

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Meeting of Parliament. But give me leave to observe, the Grievance now complain'd of is of a very different Nature: It is not founded on Discontinuance of Parliaments, but on a *too long and dangerous Continuance of one and the same Parliament*: A Practice unheard of in former Times, when Prorogations were not known: For, when a Parliament was annually call'd for the Redress of Grievances, as soon as the Business of the Session was over, it was dissolv'd, and a new one call'd the next Year for the same Purpose; by which Means the Country had a *proper Check upon their Representatives, and those who had appear'd to be too much under the Influence of the Crown; those who were too much attached to the Minister, had less Opportunity of injuring their Country; the People had it more frequently in their Power to shew a proper Resentment, and remedy the Evil, by sending others the next Year in their Places.*

This Matter seems fully explain'd by 16 Car. II. which does not only prevent Discontinuance of Parliaments, but *wisely provides against the too long Continuance of one and the same Parliament*, by Enacting it into a Law, *That a new Parliament shall be called once in Three Years, or oftner if there be Occasion.* The Bill of Rights in the Second Session of *William and Mary*, among many other Privileges which we now enjoy, Enacts, That for Redress of Grievances, amending, strengthening and preserving Laws, Parliaments ought to be *frequently held*; and the Sixth of the same Reign explains the true Meaning of the Clause, when it declares, *That frequent and new Parliaments tend very much to the happy Union and good*  
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*Agreement between the King and the People*; it confirms the 16 Car. II. that Parliaments shall be held once in Three Years at least, and adds, *That no Parliament shall continue more than three Years at farthest.* Between That and the First of the late King, several Parliaments were held, and none continued longer than three Years; some held only for one Session; *which seems to be the Original Constitution, and best calculated for the Good of the Nation.* That Year the *Septennial Bill* pass'd; the Repeal of which I am now going to move, but believe it more agreeable to the Rules of the House, that the Act itself should be first read.

[ Act Read. ]

The Preamble to the Bill, which is the Foundation of it, will, I think, Sir, admit a very easy Answer: As to the first Point, *That Triennial Parliaments have proved more Grievous, Burthenfome, and Expensive, than they were ever known before that Law pass'd*, I readily agree: But let us consider the Cause, *The Lengthening the Term occasioned the Expence.* I fear I might add, *the Multiplicity of Places* enjoy'd by Members of this House, may be too justly alledg'd another Cause. But I would willingly confine my self to the particular Point, how far the Term or Duration of Parliaments might increase or lessen the Expence, might add to or diminish the Grievance complain'd of. And I will consider it only in this Light, by submitting it to every Gentleman that hears me, whether he would not give more for an Annuity of Three Years than for a Grant determinable at the end of One: and by the same Parity of Reasoning whether *Septennial Parliaments*

ments must not prove more Grievous, Burthen-  
some, and Expensive then Triennial, at least  
in such a Degree, as an Annuity for Seven Years  
deserves a better Consideration than one for  
Three.

But supposing, Sir, I should be out in this  
Point, which I can never give up without due  
Conviction; this Argument in the Preamble  
is, I hope, entirely at an end. The Act against  
Bribery and Corruption (*which must ever redound  
to the Honour of this Parliament*) will necessarily  
remedy this Evil. *That Glorious Act will pre-  
vent Corruption in the Electors: Nothing but fre-  
quent new Parliaments can remedy it in the Ele-  
cted.*

The other Reason upon which that Act was  
founded, namely, a Suspicion, that Designs were  
carrying on to renew the Rebellion and Invasion  
from abroad, was in my humble Opinion, the  
only *justifiable Pretence* for enacting it into a  
Law; and might possibly have induc'd some Gen-  
tlemen of very great Honour and Integrity to give  
their Votes for the Bill at that Juncture, whose  
Assistance I flatter my self I shall now have in  
repealing it: For those, Sir, who voted for it  
from that View, could never intend it should be  
made perpetual, or that it should continue longer  
than that Misfortune subsisted.

I must beg pardon of you, Sir, and of the  
House, for the Trouble I have given you. The  
Nature of the Motion, I am going to make you,  
has unavoidably drawn me into a Length as dis-  
agreeable to my self, as it must have been to  
those

those that hear me. Numberless Arguments will  
occur to every Gentleman in favour of it; I will  
therefore conclude with this Motion.

*That leave be given to bring in a Bill for Re-  
pealing the Septennial Act, and for the more frequent  
Meeting and Calling Parliaments.*

In this, Sir, I hope I shall be justified, as it  
cannot proceed from any indirect or private Views,  
but from a real Conviction, that the Happiness  
and Safety of this Nation depends upon it: in  
which I am supported by the common Voice of  
the People, and have it particularly recommend-  
ed to me by a great Majority of those I have the  
Honour to represent in Parliament, as well as from  
my Neighbours of the City of *Coventry*, for whose  
Recommendation I shall always have a due Re-  
gard, though I have not the Honour to Represent  
them.




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Mr SPEAKER,



THE Honourable Gentleman, who made you this Motion, has supported the Necessity of it by so many strong and forcible Arguments, that there is hardly any thing new to be offered. I am very sensible therefore of the Disadvantages I must lie under, in attempting to speak after him : and I should content myself with barely Seconding him ; if the Subject Matter of this Debate was not of such Importance, that I should be ashamed to return to my Electors, without endeavouring, in the best manner I am able, to declare publickly the Reasons which induced me to give my most ready Assent to this Question.

'Tis evident from what has been said, That the People have an unquestionable Right to frequent new Parliaments by antient Usage ; and That this Usage has been confirmed by several Laws, which have been progressively made by our

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our Ancestors, as often as they found it necessary to insist on this **ESSENTIAL PRIVILEGE**.

Parliaments were generally annual, but never continued longer than three Years, till the remarkable Reign of *Henry VIII.* — He, Sir, was a Prince of unruly Appetites, and of an Arbitrary Will ; He was impatient of every Restraint ; the Laws of God and Man fell equally a Sacrifice as they stood in the way of his Avarice, or disappointed his Ambition : He therefore introduced **LONG PARLIAMENTS**, because he very well knew that they would become the proper Instruments of both ; and what a Slavish Obedience they paid to all his Measures is sufficiently known.

If we come to the Reign of King *Charles* the First, we must acknowledge him to be a Prince of a contrary Temper ; he had certainly an innate Love for Religion, and Vertue, and of consequence for the Liberty of his Country. — But here lay the Misfortune — He was led from his natural Disposition by Sycophants and Flatterers ; they advised him to neglect the Calling of frequent New Parliaments, and therefore by not taking the constant Sense of his People in what he did, he was worked up into so high a Notion of Prerogative, that the Commons (in order to restrain it) obtained that Independant Fatal Power, which at last unhappily brought him to his most Tragical End, and at the same time subverted the whole Constitution. And I hope we shall learn this Lesson from it, never to compliment the Crown with any New or Extravagant Powers, nor to deny the People those Rights which

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by antient Usage they are entituled to; but to preserve that just and equal Balance, from which they will Both derive mutual Security, and which, if duly observed, will render our Constitution the Envy and Admiration of all the World.

King Charles the Second naturally took a Surfeit of Parliaments in his Father's time, and was therefore extremely desirous to lay them aside. But this was a Scheme impracticable. However in effect he did so, For he obtained a Parliament, which by its long Duration, like an Army of Veterans, became so exactly disciplined to his own Measures, that they knew no other Command but from that Person who gave them their Pay.

This was a Safe and a most Ingenious Way of Enslaving a Nation. — It was very well known that Arbitrary Power, if it was open and avow'd, would never prevail here. — The People were therefore amused with the Specious Form of their Antient Constitution: It existed, indeed, in their Fancy; but, like a mere Phantom, had no Substance nor Reality in it; for the Power, the Authority, the Dignity of Parliaments were wholly lost. — This was that remarkable Parliament which so justly obtained the opprobrious Name of the PENSION PARLIAMENT, and was the Model from which, I believe, some LATER PARLIAMENTS have been exactly copied.

At the Time of the Revolution the People made a fresh Claim of their Antient Privileges, and as they had so lately experienced the Misfortune of long and servile Parliaments, it was then

then DECLARED, That they should be held frequently. — But it seems their full Meaning was not understood by this Declaration, and therefore, as in every New Settlement the Intention of all Parties should be specifically manifested, the Parliament never ceased struggling with the Crown till the TRIENNIAL LAW was obtained; The Preamble of it, which the Honourable Gentleman has recited, is extremely Full and Strong, and in the Body of the Bill you will find the Word DECLARED before ENACTED, by which I apprehend, That tho' this Law did not immediately take Place at the Time of the Revolution, it was certainly intended as Declaratory of their first Meaning, and therefore stands as Part of that Original Contract under which the Constitution was then settled — His Majesty's Title to the Crown is primarily derived from that Contract; and, if upon a Review, there shall appear to be any Deviations from it, we ought to treat them as so many Injuries done to that Title. And I dare say, That this House, which has gone through so long a Series of Services to His Majesty, will at last be willing to revert to those Original Stated Measures of Government, to renew and strengthen that Title.

But, Sir, I think the Manner with which the SEPTENNIAL LAW was first introduced, is a very strong Reason why it should be Repealed. — People in their Fears have very often recourse to desperate Expedients, which if not cancell'd in season, will themselves prove fatal to that Constitution which they were meant to secure. — Such is the Nature of the SEPTENNIAL LAW: it was intended only as a Preservative against a Temporary

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Temporary Inconveniency: The Inconveniency is removed, but the mischievous Effects still continue; for it not only altered the *Constitution of Parliaments*, but it extended that same Parliament beyond its *Natural Duration*; and therefore carries this most unjust Implication with it, That you may at any time usurp the most Indubitable, the most Essential Privilege of the People, — I mean that of chusing their own Representative. A Precedent of such a dangerous Consequence, of so fatal a Tendency, that I think it would be a Reproach to our Statute-Book if that Law was any longer to subsist, which might record it to Posterity.

This is a Season of Vertue and Publick Spirit. Let us take advantage of it, to Repeal those Laws which infringe on our Liberties, and introduce such as may restore the Vigour of our antient Constitution.

Human Nature is so very corrupt, that all Obligations lose their Force, unless they are frequently renewed. — Long Parliaments become therefore Independant of the People, and when they do so, there always happens a most Dangerous Dependance elsewhere.

It has of late been denied, that the People have a Right of remonstrating to us. — It has been called an unjustifiable Controul upon the Freedom of our Proceedings. — But then, let them have more frequent opportunities of varying the Choice of their Representatives, that they may dismiss such, who have UNFAITHFULLY withdrawn their Attention from them.

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The Influencing Powers of the Crown at daily encreasing, and it is highly requisite that Parliaments should be frequently responsible to their Constituents; That they should be kept under the constant Awe of acting contrary to their Interests. — Modern History, I believe, will inform us, that some very dangerous Attempts upon our Liberties have been disappointed. — Not so much from the Virtue of many in this HOUSE, as from the Apprehensions they may have had of an Approaching ELECTION.

It is true, there is a Provision against such whose Places vacate their Seats here, but this is no Guard against *Secret Pensioners*, and *Place-holders*. Give me leave to say, that the Laws, with respect to them are very insufficient, and as we were not allowed to make them effectual, the People have no other Remedy but a new Election.

I think that long Parliaments are a great Hardship upon those who may be excluded out of this House, and ought reasonably to take their turn. — But seven Years is the Purchase of a Man's Life. It is equally hard upon such whose private Fortunes won't admit them to engage in so long and painful a Service. — It must be so to those who mean no view nor advantage by it.

I think too, that nothing can be of greater use to his Majesty than frequent new Parliaments. — That he may often take the fresh Sense of the Nation, and not be partially advised. For his Measures will always have a greater Weight both at Home and Abroad, the more generally he refers himself to the Opinion of his People.

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A farther Mischief of long Parliaments is, that a Minister has Time and Opportunities of getting acquaintance with Members, of practising his several Arts to win them into his Schemes.— But this must be the Work of Time. — Corruption is of so base a Nature, that at first sight it is extremely shocking, — hardly any one has submitted to it all at once. — His Disposition must be previously understood, the particular Bait must be found out with which he is to be allured, and after all it is not without many Struggles, that he surrenders his Virtue. — Indeed there are some who will at once plunge themselves over Head and Ears into any base Action, but the generality of Mankind are of a more cautious Nature, and will proceed only by leisurely Degrees. — One or two perhaps have deserted their Colours the first Campaign, some have done it a Second. — But, a great many, who have not that eager Disposition to Vice, will wait till a Third.

For this Reason, Short Parliaments have been less Corrupt than Long Ones; they are observed, like Streams of Water, always to grow more impure the greater Distance they run from the Fountain-head.

I am aware it may be said, That frequent new Parliaments will produce frequent new Expences, but I think quite the contrary; I am really of opinion, that it will be a proper Remedy against the Evil of Bribery at Elections, especially as you have provided so wholesome a Law to co-operate upon these Occasions.

Bribery at Elections, whence did it arise? not from

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from Country Gentlemen, for they are sure of being chose without it; It was, Sir, the Invention of wicked and corrupt Ministers, who have from time to time led weak Princes into such destructive Measures, that they did not dare to rely upon the natural Representation of the People.— Long Parliaments, Sir, first introduced Bribery, because they were worth purchasing at any Rate;— Country-Gentlemen who have only their Private Fortunes to rely upon, and have no mercenary Ends to serve, are unable to oppose it, especially if at any time the publick Treasure shall be unfaithfully squandered away to corrupt their Boroughs.— Country Gentlemen, indeed, may make some weak Efforts, but as they generally prove unsuccessful, and the time of a fresh Struggle is at so great a Distance, they at last grow faint in the Dispute, give up their Country for lost, and retire in Despair.— Despair naturally produces Indolence, and *That* is the proper Disposition for Slavery.— Ministers of State understand this very well, and are therefore unwilling to awaken the Nation out of its Lethargy by frequent Elections.— They know that the Spirit of Liberty, like every other Virtue of the Mind, is to be kept alive only by Constant Action, That it is impossible to enslave this Nation whilst it is perpetually upon it's Guard.— Let Country Gentlemen then, by having frequent opportunities of exerting themselves, be kept warm and active in there Contention for the Publick Good; This will raise that Zeal and Indignation which will at last get the better of those undue Influences, by which the Officers of the Crown, though unknown to the several Boroughs, have been able to supplant Country Gentlemen

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lemen of great Characters and Fortune, who live in their Neighbourhood. — I don't say this upon idle Speculation only. — I live in a Country where it is too well known, and I'll appeal to many Gentlemen in the House, to More out of it, (*and who are so for this very Reason,*) for the Truth of my Assertion. Sir, It is a Sore which has been long eating into the most vital Part of our Constitution, and I hope the Time will come when you will probe it to the Bottom. — For if a Minister should ever gain a Corrupt Familiarity with our Boroughs, if he should keep a REGISTER OF THEM IN HIS CLOSET, and, by sending down his Treasury-Mandates, should procure a *Spurious* Representative of the People, the Offspring of his Corruption, who will be at all times ready to reconcile and justify the most contradictory Measures of his Administration, and even to vote every crude indigested Dream of their Patron into a Law; If the Maintenance of his power should become the sole Object of their Attention, and they should be guilty of the most violent Breach of Parliamentary Trust, by giving the King a Discretionary Liberty of Taxing the People without Limitation or Controul: the last fatal Compliment they can pay to the Crown. — If this should ever be the unhappy Circumstance of this Nation: The People indeed may complain; but the Doors of that Place where their Complaints should be heard, will for ever be shut against them.

The Power of the Crown is very justly apprehended to be growing to a Monstrous, I should have said, too Great a Size, and several  
Method

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Methods have been unsuccessfully proposed for restraining it within its proper Bounds.

But our Disease, I fear, is of a complicated nature, and I think that this Motion is wisely intended to remove the first and principal Disorder. — Give the People their Antient Right of Frequent New Elections; That will restore the decay'd Authority of Parliaments, and will put our Constitution into a natural Condition of working out her own Cure.

Sir, upon the whole, I am of opinion, That I can't express a greater Zeal for his Majesty, for the Liberties of the People, or the Honour and Dignity of this House, than by Seconding the Motion which the Honourable Gentleman has made you.



A COMPLETE  
**L I S T**  
 OF THE  
**M E M B E R S**  
 W H O  
 Voted FOR and AGAINST  
 The BILL for Repealing the  
**SEPTENNIAL ACT.**

*Those marked thus || are in the present Parliament.*

*Those marked thus \* spoke in the DEBATE.*

**FOR.**

*Bedfordshire.*  
 Charles Leigh, Esq;  
 Sir Jer. Vanacker Sambrook ||  
*Berks.*  
 Wincomb Packer, Esq; ||  
 — Archer, Esq;  
 George Lewen, Esq;  
  
*Bucks.*  
 Sir William Stanhope ||  
 Sir Thomas Lee ||

**AGAINST.**

*Bedfordshire.*  
 Sir Rowland Alton ||  
 John Orlebar, Esq;  
*Berks.*  
 Lord Vere Beauclerc, || Com<sup>d</sup> —  
*missioner of the Navy*  
 William Hucks, Esq; || Brewer —  
*to the King's Household*  
 Robert Hucks, Esq; || His Son  
*Bucks.*  
 Thomas Ingoldesby, Esq;

Harry

FOR: AGAINST:

Harry Waller, Esq; ||  
 Sir Charles Vernon ||  
 Marmaduke Allington, Esq;  
 Thomas Lutwich, Esq;  
 Lord Viscount Limerick ||  
 Edmund Waller, Esq; ||  
 Sir Thomas Hobby ||  
*Cambridgeshire.*  
 \* Sir John Hynde Cotton || Thomas Townshend, Esq; ||  
 Thomas Sclater Bacon, Esq; || Teller of the Exchequer  
*Cheshire.*  
 \* Charles Cholmondeley Esq; ||  
 Sir Robert Grosvenor ||  
 Sir Charles Bunbury ||  
*Cornwall.*  
 \* Sir John St Aubin ||  
 Sir William Carew ||  
 Arthur Tremaine, Esq;  
 Hugh Boscawen, Esq;  
 Sidney Meadows, Esq; ||  
 Philip Hawkias, Esq;  
 Sir Cecil Bishop  
 Jonathan Rashleigh, Esq; ||  
 Sir William Morrice ||  
 Henry Vane, Esq; ||

*Cambridgeshire.*  
 Thomas Townshend, Esq; ||  
 Teller of the Exchequer  
*Cheshire.*

*Cornwall.*  
 Thomas Clutterbuck, Esq; ||  
 Commissioner of the Admiralty  
 Colonel Cope, || Colonel of a  
 Regiment  
 Edward Walpole, Esq; || Joint-  
 Secretary of the Treasury and  
 Collector Inward of the Cust.  
 Sir J. Heathcote ||  
 John Evelyn, Esq; || Groom of the  
 Bed-Chamber to the Prince  
 John Harris, Esq; ||  
 Lord Glenorchy ||  
 Corbet, Esq; || Under Se-  
 cretary of the Admiralty  
 Thomas Hales, Esq; || Clerk of  
 the Greencloth  
 \* John Willés, Esq; || Attorney  
 General  
 Thomas Walker, Esq; || Sur-  
 veyor General of his Majesty's  
 Land Revenues  
 Isaac Leheup, Esq; ||  
 Charles Longueville, Esq; ||  
 Auditor to the Queen  
 Matthew Ducie Moreton, Esq;  
 John Goddard, Esq; Commis-  
 sioner to settle the Merchants  
 Losses by the Spaniards  
 John Hedges, Esq; Treasurer  
 to the Prince.

FOR: AGAINST:

*Cornwall.*  
 Major Cholmondely, Esq; || Go-  
 vernor of Chester Castle  
 Sir Robert Rich, || Colonel of  
 Horse and Groom of the Bed-  
 Chamber to the King  
 Henry Knollys Esq;  
 Richard Elliot, Esq; || Auditor  
 to the Prince  
 Dudley Ryder, Esq; || Sol. Gen.  
 Henry Kelsal, Esq; Clerk of the  
 Treasury  
 Thomas Farrington, Esq; Re-  
 ceiver of the Revenue in Wales  
 Thomas Herbert, Esq;  
 William East, Esq;  
 Thomas Copleston, Esq; || a  
 Place in Ireland  
*Cumberland.*  
 Colonel Howard, || Colonel of  
 the Guards  
*Derbyshire*  
 Lord James Cavendish ||  
 Charles Stanhope, Esq;  
*Devonshire.*  
 Sir William Courtney ||  
 Henry Rolle, Esq; ||  
 Francis Drew, Esq;  
 Theophilus Fortescue, Esq; ||  
 John Fuller, Esq;  
 Sir Humphry Monoux ||  
 Richard Reynell, Esq;  
 Richard Coffin, Esq;

*Cornwall.*  
 Major Cholmondely, Esq; || Go-  
 vernor of Chester Castle  
 Sir Robert Rich, || Colonel of  
 Horse and Groom of the Bed-  
 Chamber to the King  
 Henry Knollys Esq;  
 Richard Elliot, Esq; || Auditor  
 to the Prince  
 Dudley Ryder, Esq; || Sol. Gen.  
 Henry Kelsal, Esq; Clerk of the  
 Treasury  
 Thomas Farrington, Esq; Re-  
 ceiver of the Revenue in Wales  
 Thomas Herbert, Esq;  
 William East, Esq;  
 Thomas Copleston, Esq; || a  
 Place in Ireland  
*Cumberland.*  
 Colonel Howard, || Colonel of  
 the Guards  
*Derbyshire*

*Devonshire*  
 Sir Charles Wills, || Colonel of  
 the Guards and Lieutenant  
 General of the Ordnance  
 Sir Henry Gough, ||  
 Robert Byng, Esq; Commis-  
 sioner of the Navy  
 Arthur Stert, Esq; || Commis-  
 sioner to settle the Merchants  
 Losses by the Spaniards  
 Richard Edgcomb, Esq; || Vice-  
 Treasurer of Ireland.  
 \* Sir William Yonge, || Com-  
 missioner of the Treasury  
 George Treby, Esq; || Master  
 of the Household  
 Sir Archer Croft, Commissioner  
 of Trade  
 Colonel Morden ||  
 Sir Francis Drake

( 24 )

FOR. AGAINST.

*Dorsetshire*  
George Chaffin, Esq; ||  
Edmund Moreton Pleydel,  
Esq; ||  
John Brown, Esq; ||  
Sir Edward Desbouverie  
John Banks, Esq; ||

*Durham*  
George Bowes, Esq; ||  
Robert Shaftoe, Esq; ||  
*Essex*  
Sir Robert Abdy ||  
Thomas Brampton, Esq; ||

*Gloucestershire.*  
Benjamin Bathurst, Esq; ||  
Thomas Mathers, Esq; ||  
Peter Bathurst, Esq; ||

*Herefordshire*  
\* Edward Harley, Esq; ||  
Velters Cornwall, Esq; ||  
Thomas Winford, Esq; ||  
Lord Bateman

*Hertfordshire*  
Sir Thomas Seabright  
Charles Caesar, Esq; ||  
John Merril, Esq;

*Huntingtonshire*  
John Bigg, Esq;  
Edward Worsley Esq; ||

*Dorsetshire.*  
Gorge Trenchard, Esq; ||  
Thomas Windham, Esq; ||  
Holt Henley, Esq; || *Cl. of the*  
*Pipe*  
Thomas Pearse, || *Commissioner*  
*the Navy*  
George Doddington, Esq;  
John Jewkes, Esq; ||  
William Bowles, Esq; ||  
Stephen Fox, Esq; ||  
Nathaniel Gould, Esq;  
John Bond, Esq;  
Edward Tucker, Esq;  
*Durham*

*Essex.*  
Stamp Brooksbank, Esq;  
Samuel Tufnel, Esq; *Commis-*  
*ioner for settling Commerce*  
Henry Parsons, Esq; *Commis-*  
*ioner of the Victualing*  
Lord Egmont  
Sir Philip Parker

*Gloucestershire*  
Colonel Berkly  
Sir J. Dutton,  
Charles Selwyn, Esq; *Equerry to*  
*the Queen*  
George Read, Esq; *Major of*  
*the Guards*

*Herefordshire*  
Lord Carnarvon, || *Lord of the*  
*Bed-Chamber to the Prince.*  
Sir George Caswall, ||  
Uvedal Price, Esq;  
*Hertfordshire*  
Lord Grimstone  
Sir Thomas Clark, ||  
George Harrison, Esq;  
*Huntingtonshire*  
Robert Pigot, Esq; ||

( 25 )

FOR. AGAINST.

*Kent.*  
Sir Roger Meredith  
Sir Edward Deering ||  
John Finch, Esq; ||

*Lancashire.*  
\* Sir Edward Stanley  
Richard Shuttleworth, Esq; ||  
Nicholas Fazakerly, Esq; ||  
Sir Thomas Lowther ||  
\* William Shippen, Esq; ||  
Lekh Masters, Esq; ||  
Peter Bold, Esq; ||  
Thomas Litter, Esq; ||  
Sir Thomas Aston ||

*Leicestershire.*  
Ambrose Phillips, Esq;  
Sir George Beaumont  
George Wright, Esq; ||

*Lincolnshire.*  
Sir Thomas Saunderson  
Robert Viner, Esq; ||  
Charles Hall, Esq;  
Lord Colerain  
John Page, Esq;  
Robert Shirley, Esq;  
Sir Michael Newton ||

*Middlesex.*  
Sir Francis Child ||  
\* Sir John Bernard ||  
Micajah Perry, Esq; ||  
Humphry Parsons, Esq; ||

*Monmouthshire.*  
\* Lord Noel Somerset ||  
*Norfolk.*  
Sir Edmund Bacon ||

*Knt.*  
Sir John Jennings, *Governor*  
*of Greenwich Hospital*  
Thomas Hope, Esq;  
Sir George Saunders, *Commis-*  
*sioner of the Admiralty*  
Richard Evans, Esq; || *Deputy*  
*Governor of Sheerness and*  
*Captain of Dragoons*  
*Lancashire.*  
Christopher Towers, Esq; *Re-*  
*versinary Auditor of the Im-*  
*prests*  
Sir Roger Bradshaigh ||  
Lord Galway ||  
Sir Harry Houghton ||

*Leicestershire.*  
Lord William Mannors, || *Lord*  
*of the Bed-Chamb. to the King*

*Lincolnshire.*  
George Monson, Esq;

*Middlesex.*  
William Clayton, Esq; || *Com-*  
*missioner of the Treasury*  
Sir John Eyles

*Monmouthshire.*

*Norfolk.*  
Walter Bacon, Esq;  
\* Sir Robert Walpole, || *Chan-*  
*cellor of the Exchequer, and*  
*Lord of the Treasury*  
D

FOR AGAINST.

*Norfolk.*  
 Sir Charles Turner, Teller of the Exchequer  
 Will. Townshend, Esq; Groom of the Bed-Chamb. to the Pr.  
 Horatio Walpole, Esq; || Cofferer  
 Sir Edmund Bacon, who hath a Grant of Crown Lands at Chatham  
 Charles Fitzroy, Esq; Cornet and Master of the Tennis Court  
 Charles Churchill, Esq; || Colonel of Dragoons and Governour of Plymouth  
*Northamptonshire.*  
 Sir Justinian Isham  
 Thomas Cartwright, Esq. ||  
 Jo. Banks, Esq.  
 Armistead Parker, Esq. ||  
 George Compton, Esq. ||  
 Dr Lee ||  
 John Fynch, Esq. ||  
*Northumberland.*  
 Ralph Jenison, Esq. ||  
 Nicolas Fenwick, Esq. ||  
 Lord Morpeth  
*Nottinghamshire.*  
 William Levinz, Esq. ||  
  
*Oxon.*  
 Sir William Stapleton  
 Henry Perrott, Esq.  
 Lord Cornbury ||  
 George Clark, Esq.  
 Thomas Rowney, Esq. ||  
 John Spencer, Esq. ||

*Norfolk.*  
 Sir Charles Turner, Teller of the Exchequer  
 Will. Townshend, Esq; Groom of the Bed-Chamb. to the Pr.  
 Horatio Walpole, Esq; || Cofferer  
 Sir Edmund Bacon, who hath a Grant of Crown Lands at Chatham  
 Charles Fitzroy, Esq; Cornet and Master of the Tennis Court  
 Charles Churchill, Esq; || Colonel of Dragoons and Governour of Plymouth  
*Northamptonshire.*  
 Colonel Montagu, Colonel of a Regiment and Governour of Hull  
  
*Northumberland.*  
 Sir William Middleton ||  
 William Carr, Esq;  
 \* Sir Thomas Robinson  
 George Liddell, Esq; ||  
*Nottinghamshire.*  
 Thomas Bennet, Esq.  
 Sir Robert Clifton ||  
 John White, Esq. ||  
 Brigadier Sutton, Governour of Guernsey  
 James Pelham, Esq. || Secretary to the Prince, and to the Lord Chamberlain  
*Oxon.*

FOR AGAINST.

*Rutlandshire*  
  
*Salop*  
 John Walcot, Esq;  
 William Lacon Child, Esq;  
 Sir John Astley ||  
 Richard Lytster, Esq;  
 Sir John Charleton  
  
*Somersetshire*  
 \* Sir William Wyndham ||  
 Thomas Horner, Esq; ||  
 Robert Gay, Esq;  
 Thomas Edwards, Esq;  
 Thomas Palmer, Esq;  
 Alexander Lutterel, Esq;  
 Thomas Crisp, Esq;  
 Michael Harvey, Esq; ||  
  
*Southampton*  
 Anthony Henley, Esq;  
 Joseph Taylor, Esq;  
 John Chetwynd, Esq;  
 Sir John Barington;  
 William Pawlett, Esq;  
  
*Rutlandshire*  
 William Burton, Esq;  
 Thomas Noel, Esq. ||  
*Salop*  
 Henry Arthur Herbert, Esq; ||  
 Samuel Edwards, Esq; Under Teller of the Exchequer  
 Robert Moore, Esq;  
 John Plumtree, Esq; || Treasurer of the Ordnance  
*Somersetshire*  
 John Scrope, Esq; || Secretary of the Treasury  
 General Wade, || Governour of Fort William  
 William Piers, Esq; ||  
 George Speke, Esq; ||  
 George Dodington, Esq; || Commissioner of the Treasury  
 Francis Whitworth; Esq; || Surveyor of his Majesty's Woods  
 Charles Lockyer, Esq; ||  
 Thomas Medicot, Esq; Commissioner of the Revenue in land  
  
*Southampton*  
 Lord Harry Pawlet, || Commissioner of the Admiralty  
 Sir John Cope, ||  
 Norton Pawlett, Esq;  
 George Bridges, Esq; ||  
 Sir Charles Wager || Commissioner of the Admiralty  
 Paul Burrard, Esq;  
 Maurice Bockland, Esq; ||  
 George Huxley, Esq; || Master Master General  
 \* Martin Bladen, Esq; || Commissioner of Trade  
 Charles Armand Powlett, Esq;  
 Lieutenant Colonel of Horse Grenadiers  
 Philip Lloyd, Esq; Captain of Dragoons D 2

FOR. AGAINST.

*Southampton*  
 Joseph Hinxman, Esq; || *Woodward of New Forest*  
 \* John Conduit, Esq; *Master of the Mint*  
 John Selwyn, Esq; || *Treasurer to the Queen*  
 James Brudenell, Esq; || *Commissioner of Trade, and Groom of the Bed-Chamber*  
*Staffordshire*  
 William Levison Gower, Esq; ||  
 Sir Walter Baggott ||  
 George Venables Vernon, Esq; ||  
 Lord Chetwynd ||  
 Joseph Nightingale, Esq;  
 Baptist Levison Gower, Esq; ||  
 John Ward, Esq;  
 Lord Inhequin  
*Suffolk*  
 Sir Robert Kemp  
 Sir Jermyn Davers ||  
 Philip Brooke, Esq;  
 Thomas Wyndham, Esq; ||  
 William Aston, Esq;  
 Robert Kemp, Esq;  
 Sir John Williams  
*Suffolk*  
 William Woollaston, Esq; ||  
 Sir George Downing  
 Captain Purvis ||  
 — Jackson, Esq;  
 Carteret Leathes, Esq; ||  
 Colonel Cornwallis ||  
 \* John Cornwallis, Esq; || *Equerry to the Prince*  
 Thomas Hervey, Esq; *Equerry his Majesty*  
 Thomas Norton, Esq; || *Lieutenant Governor of Chelsea Hospital*  
*Surry*  
 Sir Joseph Eyles  
 Sir Orlando Bridgmn, *Commissioner of Trade*  
 Sir William Clayton ||  
 Colonel Onslow ||  
 Henry Vincent, Esq;  
 Paul Docminique, Esq; *Commissioner of Trade*  
*Suffex.*  
 \* Henry Pelham, Esq; || *Paymaster of the Army*  
*Surry*  
 Thomas Sc. wen, Esq. ||  
 Thomas Inwen, Esq. ||  
 Ja. Cocks, Esq. ||  
 William Newland, Esq.  
*Suffex*  
 Samuel Ongley, Esq. ||  
 Lord Vane

FOR. AGAINST.

*Suffex.*  
 James Butler, Esq; ||  
 James Lumley, Esq;  
 Henry Ingram, Esq; *Commissary of the Stores at Gibraltar.*  
 Charles Eversfield, Esq; ||  
 Sir Richard Mill ||  
 Thomas Pelham, Esq; *of Lewes* ||  
 Tho. Pelham, Esq; *of Stanmer* ||  
 John Gould, Esq;  
 James Hofte, Esq;  
 Joseph Danvers, Esq; ||  
 Thomas Bladen, Esq; ||  
 Lord Shannon, *Capt. of a Troop of Guards.*  
*Warwickshire.*  
 Sir Adolphus Oughton  
*Westmoreland.*  
 Anthony Lowther, Esq; ||  
 Daniel Wilson, Esq; ||  
 John Ramsden, Esq; ||  
*Wiltshire.*  
 Thomas Lewis, Esq; ||  
 Robert Herbert, Esq; *Commissioner in Ireland* ||  
 Thomas Martin, Esq;  
 Townshend Andrews, Esq; *Deputy Paymaster*  
 Horatio Townshend, Esq;  
 Edward Ashe, Esq; *Commissioner of Trade* ||  
 William Duckett, Esq; *Major of the Horse-Grenadiers* ||  
 William Wardour, Esq; ||  
 Francis Eyles, Esq; *Capt. in the Army* ||  
 Gabriel Roberts, Esq;  
 Giles Earle, Esq; *Clerk of the Green-Cloth* ||  
 Rawlinson Earle, Esq; *Clerk of the Ordnance* ||  
 Christopher Tillon, Esq; *Clerk of the Treasury*

( 30 )

FOR. AGAINST.

*Wiltshire.*  
 Sir Thomas Read, Clerk of the Green Cloth ||  
 William Sloper, Esq; Deputy Cofferer ||  
 Matthew St Quintin, Esq;  
 John St John, Esq;  
 John Crofs, Esq; ||  
 Thomas Gibfon, Esq; ||

*Worcestershire.*  
 Sir R. Lane  
 Thomas Winnington, Esq; Commissioner of the Admiralty ||  
 John Rudge, Esq;  
 Crew Offley, Esq; Gentleman of the Privy Chamber

*Yorkshire.*  
 Sir George Saville  
 Cholmondeley Turner, Esq; ||  
 Sir William Milner  
 Edward Thompson, Esq; Commissioner of the Victualling ||  
 Maitter, Esq;  
 George Crowle, Esq; Commissioner of the Victualling ||  
 Richard Arundel, Esq; Surveyor General of the Works ||  
 William Thompson, Esq; ||  
 Sir Conyers Darcy, Comptroller of the Household ||  
 Colonel Pultney, Equerry to the King ||

*Yorkshire.*  
 James Tyrrel, Esq; Colonel of a Regiment ||  
 George Gregory, Esq; Store Keeper of the Ordnance ||  
 Henry Finch, Esq; ||  
 Sir William Wentworth  
 Sir Thomas Frankland, Commissioner of the Admiralty ||  
 Charles Stanhope, Esq; ||  
 Willaw Jessop, Esq; Justice Judge of Chester

*Worcestershire.*  
 Samuel Sandys, Esq; ||  
 Edward Foley, Esq; ||  
 Sir John Rushout ||

*Yorkshire.*  
 Sir Henry Slingsby ||  
 William Aislaby, Esq; ||  
 John York, Esq; ||  
 \* William Pultney, Esq; ||

( 31 )

FOR. AGAINST.

*Yorkshire*  
 Sir Charles Hotham, Colonel of a Regiment and Groom of the Bed-Chamber  
 Leonard Smelt, Esq; || Clerk of the Ordnance  
 Henry Pierce, Esq;  
 \* Sir William Lowther ||  
 Colonel Mordaunt ||

*Cinque Ports*  
 Thomas Pelham, Esq; ||  
 Josiah Burchet, Esq; || Secretary to the Admiralty  
 William Glanville, Esq; ||  
 Captain Hercules Baker ||  
 Robert Bristow, Esq; || Clerk of the Green Cloth  
 Peter Walter, Esq;  
 Sir William Gage ||  
 — Hay, Esq; ||

*Wales*  
 Lord Bulkley  
 William Gwyn Vaughan, Esq; ||  
 Richard Lloyd, Esq; ||  
 \* Watkin Williams Wynn Esq; ||  
 John Myddleton, Esq; ||  
 Sir Roger Mostyn  
 Buffy Mansel, Esq; ||  
 Price Devereux, Esq; ||  
 Erasmus Philips, Esq; ||

*Scotland*  
 John Cockburn, Esq. ||  
 Robert Dundas, Esq.  
 Thomas Ereskine, Esq. Captain in the Army  
 Sir George Mackenzie  
 Sir James Dalrymple  
 Captain Dalrymple  
 Colonel Dalrymple.

*Yorkshire*  
 Hugh Williams, Esq;  
 Lord Lisburne  
 Sir Nicholas Williams ||  
 Arthur Bevan, Esq; ||  
 Captain John Griffith ||  
 Thomas Wynne, Esq; || Clerk of the Green Cloth  
 Salisbury Lloyd, Esq;  
 John Campbell, Esq; ||  
 William Owen, Esq; ||  
 Sir Humphry Howarth ||  
 Thomas Lewis, Esq; || Clerk of the Bills of the Customs

*Scotland*  
 Sir James Campbell ||  
 Colonel John Campbell ||  
 Charles Ereskine, Esq; Solicitor General for Scotland  
 Alexander Brodie, Esq; || Lyon King at Arms  
 Sir James Grant ||  
 Colonel J. Scott



FOR.

AGAINST.

*Scotland.*  
William Duff, Esq.  
John Murray, Esq. ||  
Sir John Bruce

*Scotland.*  
Lord Archibal Hamilton, ||  
*Comm. ff. of the Admiralty*  
Alexander H. milton, Esq. ||  
Robert Douglas, Esq.  
James Rutherford, Esq.  
H. Cunnin-ham, Esq. *Com-*  
*missary of the Musters in*  
*Scotland.*  
Sir J. Ferguson  
Colonel Middleton ||  
William Stewart, Esq. || *Pay-*  
*master of the Pensions*  
Colonel Anstruther, || *Deputy*  
*Governor of Minorca*  
Major Sinclair ||  
Peter Campbell, Esq. ||  
John Drummond, Esq. || *Com-*  
*missary for settling Commerci*  
Duncan Forbes, Esq. *Adv-*  
*ocate of Scotland*  
Daniel Campbell, Esq.  
Sir Robert Monro ||  
Sir J. Nasmyth. ||

