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THE
I N T E R E S T
 Of these United Provinces.
 BEING
 A Defence of the
Zeelanders Choice.

Wherein is shewne,

- I. *That we ought unanimously to defend our selves.*
- II. *That if we cannot, it is better to be under England than France, in regard of Religion, Liberty, Estates, and Trade.*
- III. *That we are not yet come to that extremity, but we may remaine a Republick. And that our Compliance with England is the onely meanes for this.*

TOGETHER WITH

12

Severall Remarkes upon the present, and
 Conjectures on the future State of affaires in Europe,
 especially as relating to this Republick.

By a wellwisher to the Reformed Religion, and
 the wellfare of these Countries.



M I D D E L B U R G,

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A Summary of the ensuing treatise.

THe PREFACE. *Wherein, the occasion and reason of this worke. The Authors feares ballanced with others hopes. The necessity of unanimity for, and duty of selfe defence.*

SECTION I.

The rise and State of that great Question, (viz:) whether upon supposal of inability to defend our selves, it is our INTREST to be under England or France, and the Zeelanders choice of the former.

2. *Arguments to prove this choice to be agreeable to our true Intrest. The first whereof is from our Religious concernements. Wherein is shewne how great a support Religion is to a State, and how greatly it concernes us to secure our Religion.*

3. *The plea of France's granting us the liberty of our Religion, considered.*

4. *Objections from the danger of losing our Religion under England; from the Kings being a Papist, designing to set up Popery; the increase, countenance, and tolleration of Papists, as allso from his joyning with France against us, and Church Governement by Bishops, all answered.*

5. *A 2^d Argument, taken from Liberty. Wherein the different Kinds, and degrees of Liberty under all sorts of Governement, are declared; and the probability of enjoying greater freedome under England than France, argued.*

6. *The 3^d Argument is the preservation of our Estates: in regard of soldjers violence, Governors impositions, publique debts by obligation, and revenues of the Romish Church.*

7. *The 4th Argument from Trade. This (viz: merchandise and navigation) our chiefe secular Intrest. And friendship with England to secure the same. England and we competitors herein, what implied thereby in point of Intrest, and inference. The probability of getting more, as allso enjoying the same with greater Peace under France, with other Arguments, largely debated; and the contrary evinced under England.*

8. *Severall other Arguments and enducements to incline us rather for England, briefly mentioned. With an inference from the whole preceding discourse, that the friendship of England is to be preferd before that of France.*

9. *That we are not yet come to that extremity, but we may still remaine a Republick: in regard of our owne strength, and our neighbors Intrest; Englands Especially, that they had better lose Scotland or Ireland, then let the French have these Provinces. This war a game at hazard. Being engaged will goe through, and Parliament probably assist therein.*

10. *Compliance with England the onely meanes of the common-wealths continuation.*

11. *Conjectures of future affaires. The motions of the ensuing summer likely to be quick and great. As to this Republick, probably England may get a bridle to curb us, France the sadle to ride us, Colen a supernumerary girth, Munster a bos off the crupper. Our condition deplored and conso- lated. A necessary caution for England, another for the Orange family. The Authors feares of what will at last befall us. The Spanish Netherlands a dying. The friendship of England and France sick at heart and cannot live long. That of Spaine and England sound at heart, and will recover. &c.*

12. *France's ambition. Growing greatnes. The causes thereof. We and England in the fault. The common Intrest of Europe to oppose France. Particularly declared of the Empire, Spaine, England, Denmarke, and this Republick and Hanse Townes. Yea of Sweden, Savoy, and Switzer- land. The ballance of Europe to be held even, and by whom.*

13. *The Conclusion of the whole discourse.*

Arrived to the end of this discourse, I have to thank you for your patience, and to desire that you will be so good as to give me your opinion of it. I am, Sir, your most Obedient Servant,

To

To the impartial Reader.



Although in so small a Tractate, it may be thought needles to give an account of the occasion thereof; yet I thinke my selfe obliged for your further satisfaction, to doe it briefly. The Author having been lately in *Holland*, found what the *Zeelanders* had done in the late Revolutions, misunderstood by some, and variously censured by others; and therefore thought it worth his paines, fairely and modestly to vindicate the same. And the rather because he forsees, various pretexts will be deduced thence, and divers interpretations be made thereof, which the Author hopes by his declaring the true intent and meaning, to free it from. That so all those, whose curiosity or intrest leads them to inquire, might be acquainted with the true grounds and reasons thereof; and that neither the propensity of some to the *French*, nor the prejudice and passion of others against the *English*, might make us run blindfold upon our ruine; but that we may discern our true *Intrest*, and persue it as occasion shall require. For as all affection to that which is not our real intrest, so all avervation from that which is, is madnes and folly; which clouds reason, precipitates Counsells, runs us upon extreames, and drives us into inevitable destruction, many times before we are aware.

I know some will be apt to say, what need of this now? The Storme is over, and the supposition of inability to defend our selves out of doores. If I thought so, I assure you I should neither trouble my selfe, nor others any further. But whether it be my love to the Country, and desire of the welfare thereof; or my jealousy over the Factions of the Rulers, and tumultuousnes of the people therein; or my comparing and estimating our owne strength, fidelity, and courage with our enemies; or my observing that our former Military Discipline (which made us renoued, and our Countrey accounted the Schoole of War,) is in a great measure, if not utterly decayed and lost. Or my hearing how old Officers, and Forreign Forces have been slighted; and such preferd, as are unexperienced for conduct, and untried for courage. Or the difference I have observed in the valour of a poore and rich people; poverty allwayes stirring up and whetting valour, out of hopes to better their condition; whereas riches makes men fearfull of looseing what they have, and so falling into a worse. As may be observed not onely in different people, as betweene the *Northerne* and *Southerne* Nations, but also in the same, yea in our selves. For when poore in our Wars with *Spaine*, we made good the old Character *De mor.* which *Tacitus* gives us, *Optimum harum gentium virtute precipui Batavi, &c.* of *Germ. S. 29.*

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all the *German* Nations or people the *Bavarians* were chief for valour; but now that we are grown rich, we are afraid to adventure either our Persons or Estates, and readier to open our gates, then shut them against our Enemies. Or whether it be my Melancholy temper onely; or my feares, and cowardise if you please to call it so; or my fancy from my observation that the third War (as this is with *England*) hath ever proved fatal to the one side, as is apparent by many examples; or what ever other cause it is, I must profess freely that I am of another sentiment; this War having so black a visage to mine appearance, that I fear we are rather in the midst of a tempestuous Sea of troubles, then discovering of Land, much less a safe Harbour of rest.

I am not ignorant upon how many pins men hang their hopes. Some upon the advancement of his Highnes the *Prince of Orange*, hope all will be redrest and well at home; and that his relation to the Crowne of *England*, and the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, will capacitate him to remedy all abroad. Others upon conjectures of his marrying with the *Duke of Yorks* Daughter, or some nearly related to the Crowne of *England* or *France*; which hath been an usuall way I confes, especially among absolute Princes, of accomodating differences. Some upon our sufficient numbers of men and moneys to defend our selves. Other some upon the Assistance of the *Emperor*, and the *German Princes*, *Brandenburgh* especially. And others upon their opinion that now the *Pensionary de Witt* and his party are broken, so that *England* can confide more in our friendship, that the King will breake with *France*, and afford his Nephew and these Netherlands assistance: especially because they judge, that tis the intrest of *England* and *Germany* as well as *Spaine*, not to see us fall into the *French* hands, for feare they have onely *Polyphemus* his courtesy, to be last devoured. But yet all these grounds, and divers others which are variously discoursed of, prevaile not so far with me, as that my hopes can ballance my feares.

For although I grant the strength of the remaining Provinces to be considerable both by Sea and Land; and the greatest foundation to build our hopes upon, next under God allmightie's Protection: yet if we duly consider the State and condition we are in, there is not that just ground of confidence, which may free us from feares; as many are apt to imagine. He is very short-sighted that observes not; 1. That there are two different parties amongst us, and that a Commonwealth, much less then a Kingdome, divided cannot stand. 2. That we might doe much more then we doe, or (for any thing I yet see) will or shall doe for our owne defence. 3. That we are destitute of succors from abroad for the present, except from *Spaine*: which we may happily pay deare enough for, if we should be drawne into a league offensive and defensive with them in a long and tedious war. And 4. that we are full of tumults and distractions at home, which is to me a greater presage of approaching ruine, then all our enemies weapons of war; and makes me feare that as tumults was the occasion

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of our rising, so they will be of our ruine. And that *Priols* observation, *Hist. Gall.* of two onely Nations that have stood firme by defection, the *Helvetians* at the rise; and the *Hollanders* at the fall of the *Rhijne*; those founding and defending their liberty by the mountains, their poverty, and equality; these by the waters, their riches, and the States with a Captain Generall; may shortly be contradicted in the latter, if we be not more unanimous, and perhaps ere long in the former also.

I grant likewise that it is very considerable to have so wise a Conductor as the *Prince of Orange* is for his yeares, and one of such neere relation to two such great Potentates as his Unkles of *England* and *Brandenburg*. But yet if we rightly consider, we cannot but conclude. 1. That it must be power as well as policy that can relieve us; and that in the affaires of the world, *intrest* is preferd above all relations; the whole world turning upon the hinge of *selfe intrest*; and all Princes, States, families and persons eagerly persuing that which they apprehend their *intrest*, although often mistaking it, and oftner the meanes to obtaine it, no wonder if they miss therof. 2. And that his civil dignities come rather to him by popular tumults, than regular proceedings: which is found an easy way to rise by, but a hard way to stand by, yea morally impossible if not backt by power. For as it is with sick persons so with sick States, if all things be not quickly redressed that is grievous to them, they presently cry *turne me againe*, and think they have power to undoe, that which they themselves have formerly done. It being a true character which *Livie* gives the common people *Plebs aut humiliter servit, aut superbe dominatur.* 3. And that though the *de Witts* be dead, their partie lives, and if things succeed not well under his *Highnes*; will have no small advantage, not onely from the horrid murder of those two pillars of their party; but from the declining of affaires, to cry him downe with the people, and make him an insignificant cypher of State. 4. And lastly, There are so many Papiests, and other Sects of Religion and malecontents, who watch for opportunities to fly-blow the common people, and set them upon sedition; that I much question, whether that fresh gale of affection to the Prince, which hath blowne so briskly through all these remaining Provinces, will last long. For if they see that his *Highnes* cannot make peace, as they expected; and they feele more miserable effects of a stubborn and cruel war; and be forced to greater taxes (the common people being allwaies covetous what ever the cause or necessity be) and find their trade still obstructed and land drowned; to the impoverishing both of Cities and Country: I feare we shall find the people so restless and unquiet, that they will neither know what to doe themselves, nor be willing to be guided by their Governors that doe; but when extremities press upon us, bring all into confusion, and consequently ruine.

For besides the jealousies which many have of his *Highnes*, which *Bentivoglio* long since foresaw, and foretold that these jealousies betwixt the State, and their Stadt-holder, would become the cause of our ruine; the needie multitude

1. 2.

Lib. 24.

multitude (which are alwaies enemies to good order and Governement) when distressed; will seeke occasion to prey upon the richer; whom they constantly envie. And the middle sort, which are the true Basis of a State, whose principall aime is Liberty and Plenty, when they see these indangered; grow jealous of their Governours (upon whom all misfortunes are constantly laid) and seeke to pull them downe and set up themselves one after another, to the ruine of all. For the pompe of Governement so dasses the eyes of those that know not the weight of it; that when there is any seeming access thereto, all are apt to contend for it; and every one to thinke himselfe as capable as his neighbor, and vy with one another without end: till they that were formerly good passengers, now turning Pilots in a Storme; through their continuall contentions and unskilfulness, shipwrack the Common-wealth, whilst they sincerely desire and endeavour to save it. I shall therefore conclude, that although we have a good Head, yet except the members be at unity, and unanimously resolved to give assistance to their Head and Governours; it is in vaine to thinke, we can be secured from such potent enemies, (except any be so mad as to expect miracles) or that the Princes name or waying of his Flag upon our Towers can defend us. For his marrying his Highnes the Duke of Yorks Daughter, we may speake of it here, and those in England of the King of Sweden, and both be mistaken. I can see litle certainty thereof, and therefore can say les therein; but this I can say, that if a Relation would effect our desires, there is that which is very near already; yea which many perhaps will thinke too neer, if it conduce not more to the procuring our Peace.

For our assistance from the Emperor and German Princes, which is so much talkt of, the Brandenburgs especially; If I were assured they designed to serve us, and not themselves of us; I should have more hopes then I have. I know the Germans are a great and warlike Nation, and that none almost have warrd with them, that have not repented it. And when we see them warr with France, though they directly assist us not further, such a diversion to our enemy will be a considerable advantage to us. But at present, we see no more of their intentions, than to defend themselves. The Emperor is not onely continually kept waking by the Turk; but at present diverted also by the distractions of Hungary. And the feares of Poland, will necessitate Brandenburg to have an eye to Prussia. The Princes of the Empire are many, and diided, (severall of them declaring for France, others wavering and waiting opportunity to close with the prevailing side) which makes their Councils slow, and more subject to be discovered, the raising men and bringing them together more difficult, the commanding of them more lyable to discord (which hath often proved fatall in their Armies) and the providing for them very uncertaine. And I might ad hereunto (for it is well knowne) that some of the German Princes have so run out their revenues; that though they have men far more then their proportion, yet have not money to pay the halfe of their rate. So that it is well, if

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what was said of old of the Britains, prove not true of the Germans, *Dum Tacitus in singuli pugnant, omnes vincuntur.*

As for the intrest of England, which we thinke should incline them to hinder rather than further Frances growing greatness, and consequently to Peace with us; I shall onely say this, that as we allow all men liberty to judge of their owne intrests, so must we much more to Kings and Rulers. And it is but reasonable to thinke, that they understand their owne intrest better then we, that are strangers to their designs; except we thinke of our selves as the Persians, who say that they have two eyes, and others but one. I may thinke, that the same reason of State should pervaile now, that did formerly with the English, in the first War, to humble us, but not ruin us; and shall make it apparent, that they cannot rationally have a thought of our ruine, without thinking to follow after; yet circumstances are so different, and the passions of men so various, that I am not certain to what extent and degree of humiliation they measure their intrest, or how far England is ingaged with France for effecting of this. We may thinke, and the English Nation may be jealous (as I know they are) that France will cosen them at last, and serve them now as *Comines* tells us they have formerly, when usually they beate the French in their Wars, but then what they had got by their swords, they lost by their Treaties; (even as *Bodin* tells us the French were served by the Spaniards) but if they will adventure that, who can hinder them?

Should I speake my private apprehension, tis briefly this, England hath been long jealous of the growing greatness of this State by Sea; and find it an error of pollicy in former Governours, to suffer us to arrive at this height of contesting with them. From whence they have met with severall inconveniences in regard of Trade, and also been put to vast expences to maintaine constantly a fleet to cope with us. These things they would willingly ease themselves of, which they know cannot be done but by the sword. The first war which was occasionally begun, was no time to effect their designs, in regard the Kingdome was harrast and exhausted by a long civil war; and *Oliver* the Protector's chiefe designe was to settle himselfe, and therefore made peace. The second warre advantaged them nothing; for the French countenancing us (though secretly in league with them before the war was ended) they were not able to effect what they designed; having lost their opportunity which they had after the first battell in their hands. That being often verified of the English; which was said of *Hannibal*, (by whom matters not, for the learned Historians *Livy* and *Plutarch* differ therein,) *Vincere scis Hannibal; victoria non nescis.* A peace is concluded at *Breda*, but the war had a sting in the tale of it, the worke at *Chartram*, *manet illa mente repostum*, and makes them more eagerly waite for an opportunity, both to revenge themselves, and persue their former designs. And now France taking occasion to quarrel with us, they take the opportunity to oppress us, and bring us under: that they may free themselves from those present inconveniences in Trade and expences, and will see how they can make it with France for

Tacitus in vita Agricola.

l. 3. c. 8. & l. 4. c. 9. Bodin de rep. l. 5. c. 1.

for the future. They know well that if we be broken, there is no Nation else is able to match them at Sea, and being in an Island feare not invasion by land forces. I might paralel this, with the Peloponnesian war, the cause whereof was the Athenians growing greatnes, and particularly in power at Sea, upon whom therefore the Lacedemonians made war, as Thucydides tells us, who hath accurately writ the history thereof. And yet though intrest be the moving cause of most wars, what ever the pretext be, (for Polybius hath long since taught us, to distinguish these two by sundry examples) yet I am far from asserting it alone a justifiable cause of any war. If any desire satisfaction what is, I refer them to Grotius de Jure belli & pac. lib. 2. c. 1. & 22. & seqq. for my designe permits me not such a digression. These thoughts of the present intrest of England leads me to conclude.

1. That in their league with France they have made provision for these; so that if the French prevaile they shall have such Maritime places, as may be a real security to them in these particulars. 2. That they will never suffer France (if they can possibly hinder it) to have all these Maritime Provinces entirely. For if our might alone be such an eye-sore to them, how much more if it should be joyned with that of France. 3. That they will not desist, till they have tryed their utmost, to obtaine these ends which they account their intrest; having now the advantage of alliance with France, their joynt power and prevalence, and our present weakenes and distractions. So that I cannot flatter my selfe so much as to hope, that either the Princes relation to his Majesty can procure, or money purchase our peace with them; so long as they see any probability of effecting their designes.

But if any hath more certaine grounds of hope, which are not yet discovered to the World, he needs not lose his time in perusing this Treatise. It is but my losing a few spare houres in composing, and the Printer a small sum in publishing this amongst those many Pamphlets, which daily fly abroad, through all corners of the Country. For I profess this once for all, that I pretend not to know (or if I did should I discover) any intreagues or mysteries of State; nor desire to pry into the Arcana Imperii, but let them silently rest in the bosome of those who sit at the Helme of Government; or to make any unworthy reflections upon any, friends or enemies, French or English. But onely as one standing upon lower ground, to take the height of the Tower of Intrest, which is gaied upon by all, but through passion and prejudice rightly measured by few. Whether I have mistaken it with the multitude, time will discover; and let others judge by the following Discourse; which I foresee will mete with as many censures, as I have haire on my head, though I value them all les than the least of them; my Conscience bearing me witness, that I have published the same, with a sincere affection to the Reformed Religion, and welfare of these Countries.

L. I.
Hist. l. 3.
c. 6.

Nov. 30. 1672.
H. I.

Sect. 1. The rise and state of the Question, viz. whether upon supposal of inability to defend our selves, it is our intrest to be under England or France, and the Zeelanders choice of the former.

HE is a Stranger to us and our affaires, who knowes not, that the late Revolutions among us, and particularly at Utrecht's betaking themselves to the French for protection, were attended both with great consternation, and various delibrations, as is usuall in such disasters. When therefore misery and destruction was approaching, as a violent torrent, that bears down all before it; selfe preservation being the fundamentall Law of Nature, every Province, Citié, and almost Village began to consider, what they should doe to preserve themselves, from being drowned in the overflowing deluge.

Some were of opinion that the remaining Provinces were of sufficient strength to defend themselves, and therefore lookt no further. Others were of a contrary judgement; and therefore thought it better, upon reasonable termes, to put our selves under a Forreigne Power, as Utrecht had done; then to be conquered by the Sword. And herein also mens judgements were divided, some thinking it better to be under the French, others to be under the English. Those of Holland (as was commonly reported) were more inclinable to the former, in regard of their neer approach to them in Utrecht; and especially out of an opinion, which many have entertained, that the intrest of Holland, being principally that of Trade by Sea, was more competible with that of France than England. In so much that many believe, if the advice of Monsr. Pomponne of the Kings sending charte blanche had been followed; the Cities of Holland had at that time, severall of them imitated the example of Utrecht. Those of Zeeland were generally inclined to the English. But as opinions are usually both bred and brought up by passions; so here it was manifest, that the excessive hopes of the former, made them for absolute defence; and the excessive feares of the latter for absolute resignation. In such cases there are two wayes have allwayes be found safest and best for accommodation, viz. a due examination of the grounds of those passions, and a just temperament or comprehension of the diversity of opinions. Which here so happily fell out, that it was resolved upon and declared by many in Zeeland, first, That they would use their best endeavours to defend themselves; and secondly, if they found themselves unable, they would then resigne to the English. Hereby shewing that they neither did through vaine feares, wholly despond of their owne strength; nor through flattering hopes were wholly fearless of their enemies. They would trye and use the best means they could, to stand of themselves according to their hopes; and yet also provide against the worst of their feares, which was their fall by absolute conquest.

For the manner of doing this, I shall neither accuse, nor defend it; though

Plut. l. de
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though the Magistrate led not the Van of consent, according to his place and dignity; yet he followed close in the Rere. And though it was done hastily; yet why may not a hasty pen sometimes be as happy as Apelles his pencill, which in passion being throwne on the Picture, better portrayed the horses foaming, then all his premeditated counsel and art.

It is enough to me and to my purpose, that what was done is agreeable to the true intrest of the country; which I hope to make apparent in the following discourse. But before I doe that, give me leave to premise a few things, which tend to the clearing of the matters in question.

1. That we onely suppose this inability for the present, to satisfy the curiosity of the world; which never think their telescope long enough, to see to the utmost end of intrest. For we shall afterwards make it apparent, that we neither are as yet come to that extremity (through Gods mercy,) nor need to feare we shall be reduced to it, if we be not awanting to our selves.

2. It is above all to be understood, that this resolution is absolute for selfe defence; and conditionall only for resignation. It is an approved maxim, which every wise man lives by; *Alterius ne sis, si unus esse possis.* Which holds good in societies, whether lesser of families, or greater of Cities, and Provinces, as well as private persons. If any can be free, it is folly to thinke, they will be subject to another.

3. This resolution being conditionall, upon the supposall of evident inability to defend our selves; it is not to be imagin'd that it should take place upon every danger or Allarme of war. Especially so long as *Holland* and *Friesland* are able to defend themselves. States as well as persons may be dangerously sick, and yet recover. Differences may be accommodated with our enemies, or assistance may be afforded us from our friends: the scene of war may change, the water and weather may be our walls of defence, difficulties, dissentions and distractions may befall our enemies; one thing or other may fall out so far to our advantage, that we may retrench our selves in safety, though we should not recover our former greatnes.

4. Nor can it reasonably be thought, that any will give themselves over to another, so as to part with their religious and civil intrests; and be in no better a capacity then a conquered people; who though they are not made absolute slaves, yet are usually sore oppressed by the Conqueror. But onely to part with their *Supremacy*, and the appendixes thereunto, under which they may live as free Protestant Subjects.

If any object this is not practicable, in regard of the Treaty betwixt the two Crownes of *England* and *France*.

I Answer: 1. Who knowes that, except a few of their Cabinet Counsell? 2. This supposes that they have divided the Lions Skin before he be slaine, which to me is very doubtfull. For although two such mighty Potentates, might upon rationally grounds thinke themselves able to master this Common-wealth, before they begun the War; yet so many are the unex-

unexpected accidents, and the events of War so doubtfull, that few have bene knowne to divide the spoile, before they had won the battell, or the Country before they had triumphed in the War: lest they being frustrated of their hoped succes, should become a scorne and contempt to the world. We have sufficient reason to thinke, that neither *England* will permit *France*, nor *France* *England*, to have these Countries entirely; and can we then thinke that they should agree upon this before hand? If others will ghues, I have the same liberty, whereby I thinke that when time (which is the revealer of secrets) brings that Treaty to light; it will appeare that the *French* should hold us in by Land, and the *English* by Sea, till they had brought us to their owne termes; of *France* keeping such places above as may be thought most conducive, to the enlarging his Conquests and keeping us under, and *England* by Sea, as may secure his desired Trade, and Navall expences; and that neither of them should have these Maritime Provinces entirely (for that was for the one to make the other his Master, and absolute Sovereigne at Sea, by such an accession of strength) nor yet divided; for that would be a continuall bone of contention betwixt them.

3. Those that suppose this repetition, generally say, that *Zeeland* is to be *English*; and if so, the objection is answered. For if each must conquer their part by their owne Armes, as many imagine; who can thinke that any will be at the expence of so much blood and treasure, besides the hazard of succes, for that which they can have upon honourable termes? Or if they proceed joyntly with their Armes, to obtaine their designes; we cannot thinke the one will obstruct the other, in that which is agreed upon by them both. And this way I suppose they take; because in a joynt War the succes is common to both, and the advantage redounds to each according to their former accord; and was it otherwise here, *England* attacking us onely by Sea, might get nothing by Land, and *France* all. Which I cannot imagine to be so agreed upon, whatsoever the issue may be. For I cannot thinke the *English* such fooles to fight onely for blowes, and to set up the *French* to their owne destruction.

But let their agreement be what it will for the places they conquer, yet it cannot bind or determine us how to dispose of our selves before we are conquered. All free States, and Cities, may upon what Conditions they please, yeeld the Sovereignty over them, and their owne subjection to whom they please. And although such proffers have sometimes been refused, in regard of Wars and other evill consequences which might attend them; yet here the acceptance is not to be doubted of, seeing this is the *Helena* for which they fight.

If any shall aske how this is to be effected. I answer, *Non est deliberandum de modo, priusquam constet de re.* If any grant that it is to be done, it is as much as I undertake. If God in his all-wise and righteous Providence, suffer us to be brought so low, that we cannot longer withstand our enemies: let those in Supreme authority take care

v. Grot. de
jure bel. &
pac. l. 1. c. 3.
§. 8. l. 2.
c. 6. & l. 3.
c. 20. §. 5.

care for the manner of performance, as to the time in which, treating whereby, and conditions whereupon they will yeeld their *Supremacy* and Government. It being my worke onely to shew, that tis our Interest in such a case, to make choyce of *England* rather then *France*, or any other Potentate whatsoever.

Sect. 2. Arguments to prove the Hypothesis, the first whereof is from our religious concernments: wherein is shewn how great a support Religion is to a State, and how greatly it concerns us to secure our Religion.

HAVING now truly related matter of fact, and clearly stated the Question, I shall proceed to prove the same, viz. That in case of inability to defend our selves, it is our Intrest to be under the English rather than the French.

First in regard of Religion. Which as it is of chiefest concernement, so deserves to have the precedence of all other considerations. The very Heathens accounted this their chief Intrest, and therefore above all to be secured and defended. The Romans saying was *pro aris & focis*, therein giving Religion, the preference of all their civill concernements. And if we Christians doe not, the more is our sin, and the greater our shame. It is so well knowne how the Heathens of old, and Turkes of later times have valued their severall false Religions; how their first Founders, Legislators, and Magistrates have made Religion, both the Basis upon which they founded their Kingdoms and Common-wealths, and the chiefe Pillars to support them; and how zealous the common people have been for their Superstitions: that I cannot but wonder that Christians should be such Gallio's for the true Religion and Gospel of Christ, and feare that Turkes and Heathens will rise up in judgement against us, and condemne us for our indifferency herein. But if examples would either sway us or shame us, I need not goe so far for them: our owne Ancestors are abundantly sufficient. I am sure (if the History of former times deceive me not) Religion was the chiefe inducement to them, to begin that hazardous War with *Spaine*. And had such an impression upon them, that they freely ventured their lives and estates for this especially; although I know there were many other grievances insisted on, to justifie that Warr. Had they thought that their posterity should have made so light of Religion, and Liberty which cost them so deare (as many we see in those places over, who have so lightly parted with both in a great measure,) I perswade my selfe they would never have commenced such a War; but the sincerer part of them would have fled with their families abroad, rather then have endured those miseries at home. Could they now stand up out of their graves, how would they condemne this unfaithfull generation! And how will our Children have occasion to curse us, for betraying the trust reposed in us by our Ancestors,

and selling the pretious Truths of Religion at so cheape a rate, which they bought so deare.

If the true Religion which we profes, be not the Polar Star, by which those that sit at the Helme steere the Ship of the Common-wealth; what can we expect, except we be Atheists, and shut out God and his safeguard, but to suffer shipwrack? Nay if this be not the Pearle of price to us all, which we prefer above all worldly pebles, it will be no wonder, if our enemies spoile us both of this and them. If any be of another judgement, and prefer the Reason of State above Religion (although in this case they are conjoynd, as I shall shew hereafter) I wish such would oberve from Lewis the 11, who first opend the pack of fraudulent policies to the Princes of Europe; what dismall ends have befallen him, and the Atheisticall Politicians since, those of Italy especially; and what disappoyntments their designes have met withall, and see if they have any reason to treade in their steps. I am jealous (I confesse) that the atheisme and irreligion of the present age is great, which makes me larger herein then otherwise I should be: yet I hope not so great amongst us, that we should prefer Popish superstition before the true reformed Religion, Belial before Christ: If so, we are fitter to be our enemies asses, to be laden with their trumperies, and lasht at their pleasure, than to be dealt withall by arguments to convince our Consciences.

If we duly consider that true Religion is 1. The Fountaine of all true Piety and Vertue here, and of eternall Felicity hereafter. 2. That which rightly teaches every one their duty, not onely in reference to their particular practise, but publique concerns, Magistrates how to governe, and people how to obey. 3. That which furnisheth us with the strongest Arguments, for mutuall affection and assistance to one another, courage in dangers, hope in extremities, patience in adversitie, and perseverance in our duty. And 4. That which onely can assure a people of Gods favour and being propitious to them; and the contempt thereof on the contrary, of his displeasure and malediction: We must needs conclude, that the Magistrate in the first place as Gods Vice-gerent in Government, and all others in their severall Stations, ought to endeavour above all things, by all lawfull means to preserve, defend, and secure the same; as they tender the honour of God, the welfare of his Church, the prosperity of the Common-wealth, and their owne and posterities temporall and eternall happines. I shall not need to enlarge these things, in regard they are so well knowne, and approvedly verified by so many examples, out of Sacred and profane Histories: and none that I know have ever had the impudence to deny them in Thesis, though they dispute in Hypothesis which is the true Religion. Even Machiavel, as wicked as his writings are in many things, yet asserts (as a Politician) that true Religion must above all things be regarded by those that desire to preserve themselves, and that there is no *causam indicium de reip. r. r. r.* than the contempt of Religion.

Sever. in Lewis 11. Buffieres Hist. Franc. l. 13. s. 9. & 24. Comin. l. 6. c. 7. & 12. Anti-Machiavel. &c.

Dispo. de Rep. l. 1. c. 12.

And

And for fuller conviction let me ad, that tis not onely an acknowledged truth, but that which all ages of the world have experienced, *that Religion is the greatest bond and tye of humaine society*, and therefore must needs be the maine pillar of support to a State, and the best walls of defence to a people. Hoping therefore what is said in the generall to be sufficient, I shall now descend to particulars briefly.

And heerein it is well known, that the *English* and we (I speake of the generallity of both Nations, Rulers and People) symbolise; being both of the Reformed Religion. Whereas the *French* are for the greatest part Papiſts, to be sure all in power whether civill or military: it being the practise now of *France*, to imploy none but such in the management of affaires; so that if we be either Governed or Garrisoned by the *French*, we cannot expect to be so by any, but Papiſts and professed enemies of our Religion.

But something here will be pleaded for the *French*, and something allso objected against the *English*.

Sect. 3. *The plea of France's granting us the liberty of our Religion, considered.*

First for the *French* it may be argued, that the King will grant us the liberty of our Religion.

To which I reply by way of concession, that I verily believe he will; but desire it may be further considered.

1. If he grants this liberty according to the custome of *France*, it will be onely to those of the reformed Religion. Now besides these, there are many others amongst us, Jewes, Lutherans, Anabaptists, &c. The common-wealth consisting both of severall sorts of people, and severall sorts of Religions: and what shall become of those, which the common-wealth tollerates, though not of the professed Religion of the Land?

2. But let it be further supposed, that provision be made for the liberty, of those allso that dissent from the reformed Religion, or for all, and that by Articles, Edicts, or whatsoever way you please: yet we know how slightly these are usually observed, by those that have the execution of them, and how litle Governors and soldjers regard these. For they well know, that most cannot, many dare not, others will not complaine of them; and if any doe, it will be a wearisome worke, and the remedy many times worse than the disease. So that a patient suffering is the onely solace to the sufferer and oppressed.

3. I might add, that it is a maxim with many Papiſts (although not all I confesse*) *that no faith is to be kept with hereticks*, Now all Papiſts accounting us such, if those that Govern be of that perswasion; how litle account will they make of what conditions soever are made with us; but as

* Molanus de fide hereticis servanda.

occa

occasion serves, if they dare not openly breake, yet will they secretly evade, all such as serve for our support, and thinke they doe God good service. As allso their tenet of the Popes power of dispensation with all oaths, Articles, Promises and Obligations though never so solemn and sacred: or if you please (for it is all one) a power to abrogate Gods laws, nul all the faith and bonds of man-kind, subvert all humaine Society, and in short *ex injustitia facere Iustitiam* as the *Canonists* tell us. Now suppose we have Governors that measures consciences by ells rather than inches; who matters no more engagements dispensed with by his *Holines*, than we doe our Almanacks out of date: I should be glad to be informed what we could doe in the case, more then cry and complaine to God Almighty. For I doubt they will Seldome doe that, which *Maximilian* the frist did frequently, *Deus aterne, nisi vigilares, quam male esset mundo, quem regimus nos, ego miser venator, & ebriosus ille ac sceleratus Julius!* Nay if Governors thinke themselves obliged in conscience and honour to keepe conditions; yet it is well knowne how generally they are influenced by their Clergy: so that in all dubious cases, and the application of generall rules to particular practises; it cannot be expected but judgment should be given on the Papiſts side, and that the Grandees of the Church should beare them out in it, and *Jesuites* and others Zelots applaude their practises.

4. The Papiſts must have publique places for their Worship, not only in all Cities but villages, as we may see in the Articles propounded by the *French*. Now there being by far too few *Churches* or places for publique Worship, in most of our populous and enlarged Cities already; it will not be possible for a great part of our Religion, to enjoy the publique Ordinances of God; but many will run into profane courses, most grow ignorant and careles what Religion they are of, and their posterity absolute *Papiſts*. By which meanes the number of the Reformed decreasing, and Papiſts increasing; where at first there was but only one *Church* for popery; they shall then take more, and so continue to enlarge themselves and straten us. Nor let any judge these, as onely jealousies and feares. For if they begin already to incroach (as it is credibly reported from severall places they command) and breake Articles heerein, when not onely the commands of superiors, but common policy requires a most religious observance thereof; what shall we thinke they will doe hereafter? If they will not now out of hopes to win those to them, which yet stand out: much les will they, when there is no more hope of gaining thereby.

5. When popery is the Religion of our Governors, who have the disposall of preferments and profits, to allure men to their Religion: We shall find by wofull experience, what by education, converse, marriages, dignities and other worldly advantages; many of the ignorant and looser sort of protestants, will change their profession (I say not Religion for that such never had) and turne Papiſts. Who is such a stranger in the world as knowes not, that by such artifices they have more weakened the Pro-

De translat. Episcop. c. quanto in glossa.

Morn. Myster. Iniquit.



estants

restants in France, than by all their wars and contests with them. In so much that of late yeares, some wise men of the Reformed Religion there, have bene so fearefull of its being utterly supplanted; that they have required their children by their last will and Testament, to leave that Kingdome, and setle themselves in these Countries.

6. Let the best be supposed that any rationall man can imagine, yet will it be bad enough. For if the Papists have the Civill power to back them, although the wiser and better sort, it is not to be doubted will be civill; yet the ruder sort will be intolerable insolent. And this begins to appear in some places allready, where the Popish Inhabitants are more insufferably insulting, spightfull, and injurious than the French themselves. And if they doe this so early, while things are doubtfull, and the issue of the War dubious; what may we expect when they are in their high meridian of succes and glory?

7. And lastly, if any one thinks that these are onely needles feares and groundles surmises, I shall desire them to peruse the French Embassadors Speech to the Emperors Council, where he will find this Argument of Religion insisted on to divert the Emperor from our assistance (which is well retorted by the ingenious Answerer thereof.) And inform themselves how fast the Jesuites and other Zealots for the Romish Religion, fall off from the House of Austria and Spaine, to France; in regard of their inability to carry on their designes of the Univerfall Popish Monarchy, and the hopes they have of France's potency to effect it. And then let them judge, if there be not sufficient ground, for all that I have said, and much more that might be said upon this Subject.

Cremonville.

Sect. 4. Objections from the danger of losing our Religion under England; from the Kings being a Papist, designing to set up Popery; the increase, continuance, and tolleration of Papists, as also from his joyning with France against us, and Church Government by Bishops; all answered.

But now on the other hand it is by some objected against the English. I. That the King is a Papist in heart, and designes to set up the Popish Religion.

First what the King is in his heart, and what he designes, is onely knowne to God Almighty; who is the searcher of hearts. That he is a profest Protestant, is well knowne. And although I will not swear for him nor any man alive, that he will not change his Religion; yet to me it seemes very improbable, upon the following grounds.

K. Charles I. Letters.

I. He that would not in his minority, when under his Mothers education in France; but followed his Fathers instructions, of being obedient to her in all things; excepting the matter of her Religion; I cannot thinke will now in his maturity. 2. His

2. His withstanding so many temptations wherewith he was environed so long a time together; during those many yeares of his exile; wherein neither the friendship of Papists; nor unkindnes and hard measure he met withall from Protestants could move him; makes me thinke him much more immovable, now he is free from those. Who that knowes those times knowes not, what designes the Papists had upon him? What perswasions and arguments they used both by word and writing? What promises they made him of assistance to recover his Kingdome? What arguments of intrest they prest him with; which are usually more prevalent with Princes, than the intrinsic arguments of Religion? And if he stood unshaken in all these boysterous blasts, shall we thinke he will fall in a calme?

Millitiere's Victory of the truth, and Bp. Bramhall's Answer.

3. His rescuing his youngest Brother the Duke of Gloucester out of his Mothers hands, when her designes appeared for perverting him in his Religion; is an evident prooffe of the realty of his Profession. If any one say it was his Intrest for regaining his Kingdome, I say.

4. And is it not his Intrest also for keeping them? Did he gaine them so quickly, or are his three Kingdome so litle worth, that he should easily hazard them? Kings are wiser then to venture their Crownes upon every idle Priests pratles. If there were any stronger arguments now then formerly, either for the Popish Religion, or from his Interest; we had some reason to be jealous that he might change.

But 5. It is apparently against his Intrest; not onely in regard of the dainger he might incur of losing his Crownes, but the great los which would inevitably accrew to him by this change.

The danger we cannot imagin to be small; if we rightly consider those Kingdome. I have had an accompt (having been a litle curious in those enquiries) of 1100000 of his Subjects; that by intrest and inclination were carried counter to the Court. Under these five Heads. 1. The Purchasers of Crowne and Church Lands that are now restored, and they outed. 2. Soldiers and Seamen, that had fought against him by Sea and Land. 3. Magistrates and Ministers, that were removed and turned out of their places. 4. Common-wealths men that were Anti-monarchicall in their judgements. 5. Fanaticks properly so called; as Anabaptists, Fifth Monarchie-men, Quakers, &c. And though I could perhaps give as good a ghues as another, at the rest of the Substantiall Protestants that are of the Episcopall perswasion, yet that needs not now. These you must thinke however divided in their intrests, judgements, and affections; and many of them no doubt very loyall to his Majesty; yet without all doubt would joyne against Popery, and never willingly submit themselves to that yoke of bondage. Nay some perhaps would be glad of such an argument, and plea to the people, and the Demagogues gaine thereby no small number of Profelytes to their party; if his Majesty was once a declared Papist.

And as his danger, you see is great, so his los I am sure could not be small.

Vid. Bodin. de Rep. l. i. c. 9.

small. 1. Of his Honour, not onely in changing that Religion he hath now so long profest, and blurring the faire copy which his Father hath set him; but in admitting the Popes Supremacy: which hath beene so injurious to the dignities of Emperors, Kings, and Princes; that their complaints how they have beene plagued by the Popes are infinite. 2. Of his profit and revenues, in regard that the Peter-pence or Tenths of Livings, and other Contributions paid formerly to the Pope, are by Law annexed so the Crowne, and paid accordingly, to the King. 3. Of his Subjects affections, wherein his safety especially consists. For a Prince that hath the hearts of his people, hath their purses and persons at his service; and raignes more happily by their love, then all his owne power though never to great. If we therefore consider his education in, and his long profession of the protestant Religion, his honour and intrest ingaging him to persevere therein: I should thinke no man need feare his changing it for the Popish, the fopperies whereof he hath so fully both seene and knowne.

I might ad to these, that which further satisfies me, that having been at Brnxels, Colen, and most of those places, where his Majesty during his exile did reside; I can say bona fide that in all the variety of companies and converse I was ever in, I never heard any probable grounds, from any one intelligent person, that toucht, much les stain'd his Majesties reputation in this particular. But I will not impose this upon others, though it moves me to say the more; because I am not willing to annex my name to what I have written. Not that I am ashamed to owne what I conceive to be the reall truth, which I have published in this treatise to the world, and can make good much more largely: but because I know who I am, and that my name can ad no estimation to this politicall discourse; but rather perhaps prejudice some who knows me not, and are used to judge of writings by their authors; whereas those that will impartially search after truth, must have regard to things, not persons, and to what is written, and not the writers thereof.

As for his setting up popery, I neither thinke that he will, for the foregoing reasons; nor if he would, that he can, for these following especially.

1. The Protestant Religion is settled in all his Kingdomes by their fundamentall lawes, which the King cannot repeale. It is true he hath the executive power of the lawes, and so can suspend the execution of penalties; but cannot rescind any one law, much lesse make new ones, without the consent of Parliament in his respective Kingdomes. And absolute Sovereignty is not there in use. For power paramount to all lawes, carries too great a top-saile for an English bottom; wherein the Subjects liberties are shipt, as well as Caesar and his fortunes.

2. The lands and revenues formerly supporting the Romish Religion, which are many and great, are in the possession of the nobility and gentry for the most part; and have beene bought by them of the Crowne at the dis-



diffolution of Abbies, Monasteries &c. And the purchases confirmed by law. And can we thinke that they will be ever induced to part with them againe? or enact any such lawes as shall tend to their owne ruine, and the utter undoing of their families? If there was so much danger and difficulty to wrest them out of the hands of the poore Votaries, (as the Histories of those times tell us) what will there be to recover them from the powerfull Nobility and Gentry? who legally possessing them will doubtles defend them, so that none shall deprive them thereof, that have not better courage and sharper swords then they.

3. The great disparity in the number of Protestants and Papists. There being not one family of a hundred in England and Scotland Popish, and in many and great Parishes not a Papist. Now what greater madnes can we imagine, than that his Majesty should adventure to rely upon the Papists alone, against all the Protestants of the three Nations. Though their numbers are greater then formerly, yet are they comparatively small (as we have said) to those that profes the Reformed Religion. So that it can never enter into my braine, that such folly should enter into any Princes brest, much les one who hath suffered so much, by the former divisions of his Kingdoms.

4. The vast difference between a people enlightned by the Gospel, and well grounded in their Religion; and an ignorant and unprincipled people. For the generality of the common people brought up in ignorance, (as they usually are under Popery) are more subject to receive impressions from their Teachers, and so by degrees change their Profession. Whereas those who are assured from the Word of God, that they are in the right; will by no means be induced to the same. And usually the more force is used, the more obstinate they are. For a settled Conscience despises danger, and defies all the terrors and torments, that their cruellst adversaries can invent. If in lesser differences of Church-governement, the King hath found it so difficult, that after all the coercive Lawes, and other means he hath used, he tells the world, tis evident by the sad experience of twelve yeares, that there is very litle fruit of all those forceable courses; what shall we thinke he is likely to gaine in the greater and essentiall differences of Religion, should he attempt any change therein? Surely not much from the Pious and sober party of Protestants; for I neither matter nor mention the ruder sort, and ignorant rable. Nay universall experience hath taught the World, that where any kind of Religion is powerfull, all force against it is weake and contemptible: and much more against the true Reformed Religion; as that wise and excellent Historian Thuanus shews in the Preface to his History, which is one of those three admirable Dedications, to the Crowne of France, that are worthy to be read by all the Kings and Princes of Europe.

I might add to these, the genius of the English Nation, which I know to be zealous in what way of Religion soever they take, as hath been observed by severall Authors. In times of Popery so addicted thereto, that they had given

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The other two are Calv. to his Instit. & Casfab. to Polybins.

Anno 7.
Edo. 1.
18. Edo. 3.
15. Rich 2.
Polydor.
Virgil. l. 17.

Surplice,
Cros, and
kneeling
at St.
Bromwig.

given most of their meanes to the Church; if the Statute of *Morimaine* had not prohibited them. In the times of Libertinisme when a Republick, the Fanaticks were so intoxicated, that it was not enough for them to push down the Pope, but they would breake off all Governement; for being his hornes, and make every thing Antichristian that was not to their humor. When the King return'd and Episcopacy with him, that Party would not abate the three controverted Ceremonies (as a wise and moderate Bishop both foretold and lamented) for the universall Peace of the three Kingdoms. Nay the very common rable would overflow both in drinke and devotion; kneel at a pillar, and reele at a post. Though I know there are as pious, sober, and serious Christians of severall persuasions (Episcopall Presbyterial and Independants) as any are in the Christian World: but I say this to shew, that what way soever they take, they are not easily diverted.

But as groundles jealousie, is both uncharitableness and folly; so where there is just ground; not to be jealous is stupidity. It may therefore not be amiss for our further satisfaction, to enquire into these Objectors grounds. And they are these 1. The increase of Papists, at Court especially. 2. The Kings countenancing and intrusting them with power. 3. His tollerating their Religion. 4. Joyning with *France* against us. For the 1 and 2^a I can say little of my own knowledge, it being many yeares since I saw either *England* or *France*. But I shall take reports upon the Publique faith of *England* and *Holland* for this once, though it be none of the best security. 1. Therefore that Papists increase, through the Queens Court, the extraordinary correspondence with *France*; the dissentions of the Protestants, the Atheisme and irreligion of the Age, and other wayes and meanes which might be mentioned, is not to be wondred at; but rather that there are no more. Although I am well assured, that their number is comparatively small, and their Intrest in *England* and *Scotland* inconsiderable to effect any change. And were they more this will not infer the King is one.

2. And much les his countenancing and intrusting them. For who ever concluded that the *French* Kings for their kindnes to Protestants, (who have served them most faithfully heretofore in their wars) were Protestants? Or the States Papists; for employing the *French* and others in their Armies? A Papist may be a loyall subject; a wise Statesman, a fit Embassador, a good Soldjer, and merit his Princes favor, though of a different Religion.

3. Nor will the Kings indulgence of liberty to those of that Religion conclude more against our assertion, then for the States of *Holland*s being of all the Religions they tollerate, or for *Amsterdam*s being Jewes. There may be reasons of State, sometimes to connive, and some times to tollerate that, which we neither approve, nor would willingly allow: even as *Moses* did divorce to the Jewes. Or there may be Articles, promises and other engagements upon us; whereby we are forced to doe that, which we would not if free; as *Joshua* to the *Gibeonites*; and our Ancestors

to Papists, Anabaptists &c. who assisted them in the defence of the Countrey against *Spaine*.

There are two things doe wonders in the world, and are the ordinary pretexts and best apologies for the greatest exorbitances, viz: *danger and necessity*. And yet where these are reall and not feigned, they are considered both by God and good men. Nature dictates, that we should hazard the hand rather then the head, and lose a part, rather then venture the whole. I have for above 20 yeares observed, both where I have lived and where I have travelled; that *Moderation* is rather a speculative notion, than matter of practise: like a vertuous and beautifull poore lady, that all will commend, but none will marry. Parties that are under, call for it eagerly; but when they are upmost, neglect it shamefully. Seing then the passions of men, and iniquities of the age are so great; that I expect nothing in Religion, but either an *inquisition* or *tolleration*; I am more for the latter, and would rather reside at *Amsterdam* or *Constantinople*, then at *Rome* or *Madrid*.

But to come closer to the particular case. If his Majesty therefore had no obligation upon him to doe this, or were it a liberty to Papists only, or a liberty for their worship in publique; I should grant the objection was very weighty; but it is the quite contrary. For he tells the world he was obliged in point of gratitude to the Papists, for their service to his Father; and to the Presbyterians (who had been so instrumentall in his restoration) in point of promise also, severall ways made to them both before and after his returne to his Crowne; severall times declaring that he would grant indulgence to them and others of tender consciences. And we know that if his Majesty had followed his owne inclinations, they had been better performed. And now that he gives a concession of liberty, it is neither soly nor principally to those of the Romish Religion, but to all others as well as they, and that with this manifest difference that it is to the Protestants *publicly, and to Papists in their private houses only*, and this revocable at pleasure. Although some wise men are of opinion, that the King and Rulers will not onely find such ease and safety therein; but such eminent advantages many wayes, and the people generally such content, that it will scarce be revoked.

4. His joyning with *France* against us, is matter of *Intrest*, and not *Religion*. And if we judge impartially, will no more conclude him a Papist, then the *Emperor* and King of *Spaine* Protestants because they joyne with us. Herein let us eye and owne the Providence of God, who changes times and seasons, and makes friends become enemies, and enemies Friends. Would not this have been thought incredible to our Ancestors, that *France* and *England* who raised us, should endeavour our ruine? And that *Spaine* and *Austria* who sought our destruction, should ever seeke our preservation? And all this out of Intrest, (as I shall shew hereafter) those formerly to ballance *Spaine*s, and these now *France*s greatnes; and neither Religion or affection. For whosoever thinks that *Spaine* and *Austria* have any kindnes for

v. Grot. de
Jure bel. &
pac. l. 1. c. 4.
§. 7. l. 2.
c. 2. §. 6.

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for us more than themselves, hath a faith far larger than my fancy.

There is another Objection against our closing with England for Religions-sake, from their Episcopall Church; Governement; which if it were not mentioned by some to the prejudice of my assertion, I should have passed over as inconsiderable. For.

1. This is onely an accidentall difference in the same Religion, and not a different kinde of Religion, as Popery is. And a difference in the externall forme of Governement onely; not in the substantialls and vitalls of Religion. For we both agree in the same Confession of Faith, and in all the essentialls of the Reformed Religion.

2. A very great part of the King of England's Subjects are Presbyterians, as is well knowne.

3. Although Episcopacy be the Church Governement, settled by Law in the three Kingdoms, yet his Majesty indulges publique liberty to Presbyterians, and other Non-conformists. So that we need not doubt but he will much more to us, that Church Governement which is settled amongst us.

4. New-England, and severall other Plantations belonging to his Majesty of great Brittain, have allwayes enjoyed, and still doe their owne Church-Governement freely; and therefore we need not feare that ours should be denied us.

5. Although the Church Governement of these Provinces be Presbyterian, yet as to its vitall power and administration in severall places, it hath for sundry yeares last past rather been *Erastian*. The Magistrates frequently assuming that power here, which the Bishops doe there. In so much that I question whether the Presbyterians may not have more hopes, that their discipline should be raised; then feares that it should be ruined under England. What crying up the Magistrates power *circa sacra*, and what decrying the Ministers, both by word and writing. *Amstius* tells us in the frontispiece of his booke, that what ever right divine or humane is attributed to the Ministers or they assume to themselves, is either falsely and impiously ascribed to them, or is onely from the Rulers of the Republique or city where they are settled. What applauding of *Hobs's Leviathan*, now translated into *Latin* and *Dutch*. What frequent interposing in Ecclesiasticall affaires, and how miserably the honest Minister in the *Hague* was handled, may be seen in *Aitzma*. Many were afraid of a storme falling upon the Ministers, if our enemies had not fallen upon us. What crossing the Churches in the Election of their Pastors, and exercise of their Governement hath been at *Rotterdam*, and other places, is too well knowne, and being reformed, I wish whats past might be buried in oblivion. And thus I have vindicated my first Argument from Religion, and shall endeavour to compensate my prolixity heerein, with more brevity in the rest. Concluding, that if we cannot defend the true reformed Religion we profess, nor will not secure it the best we can, we may call our Country *Ichabod*, for the glory is departed from these *Netherlands*.

Gralla contra Apollonium 1646. Lucii Antistii de Jure Ecclesiasticor. l. 1. 1665. Politike discoursen l. 4. over Kerlike Saaken.

SeCt. 5. The second Argument taken from Liberty. Wherin the different kinds, and degrees of Liberty under all sorts of Governement, are declared; and the probability of our enjoying greater freedome under England than France, argued.

IT will further appeare our intrest, to be under England rather than France, in regard of our Liberty. Which next to true Religion and life, is the greatest blessing bestowed on man-kind. Now for our clearer proceeding herein, we must 1. Shew what kind of Liberty is here meant; 2. Wherin it consists, and the measures thereof. 3. Accomodate these to the matter in hand.

For the first. We meane not here *Personall Liberty*; either morally considered in opposition to *coaction*; or *criminally*; either in opposition to *confinement*, as we usually take it; or to *slavery*, as the *Civilians*. 2. Nor *Civil Institut. l. 1. tit. 3.* Liberty, as opposed to *Monarchie*; as the Greeke and Latin Historians frequently: with which *Tacitus* begins his Annals, *Urben Romanam a principio Reges habuere, libertatem & consulatum L. Brutus instituit.* For I well know, that to whomsoever we submit, this liberty is lost. Much les; For *licentiousness*. For subjection to Lawes and Governement, is so far from being inconsistent with liberty; that it is the onely means of its preservation. For without this; what are Kingdoms and States, but great *butcheries of men*; and *publick robberies of propriety*, where the strongest arme and longest sword sweeps away all? So boundless is mans villany, and his lusts so ragingly restles: that we have no other choyce left us, but either be subject to Law, or slaves to licentiousness. As *Tully* sayes well, *Legum idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.* But 4. That *publick liberty* which a people have under their Governement, (of what kind soever it is) as it is taken in opposition to *publick oppression*. Which is of divers sorts, and different degrees, in regard of our persons, priviledges, and proprieties. When a people are neither oppressed by usurpation, without colour of Law; nor by *extortion*, under pretext thereof. Which is an invaluable mercy to those that enjoy it: though rightly valued by few, except those that want it. And hath been so highly praised by all sorts of writers: that it is better to be silent, then brieve in its commendations.

Now Secondly wherein this consists, and how to measure the same, is harder to discover and determine; in regard we can meet with no guides, that have gone this way. For the *Civil Law*, which is copious concerning all other Dominions, is silent in this of *Soverainety*; and being calculated for the Meridian of *Monarchs*, leaves them free to make their Subjects so, more or less at their pleasure. Historians onely relate what freedom such and such people had under such and such Rulers: and the Writers of Policy, and particular Republicks, compare the peoples liberty under the severall forms of Governement, and commend this or that State for the same. And these are all the helps we have: which are in the next degree to nothing.

We

We will therefore pass them all by, and freely follow our owne judgment; in shewing joyntly both the nature of liberty, and the measures thereof. But we must necessarily here premise.

Politic. 1.6. c.2. V. Aristotens de rep. 1.2.c.7. §. 2. n. 75.

1. That though all ought to pay the homage of subjection, to that lawfull government under which they live; yet none ought so to be wedded to any forme, as to thinke the subjects of all others not free. Which Aristotle long since observed, to be the vulgar error in Democracy. For though it wel becoms a vertuous wife, to esteem her owne husband; the best head she can have; and accordingly to be guided by him: yet if she will censure all other wives, for meer slaves; all her neighbours round about her, will ring her a peale of indignation.

2. That the best way to judge of peoples liberty is by considering it in reference to Sovereignty. For all subjection and government being relatives; and Subjects liberty consisting, in such a manner of subjection to the Supreme Powers, as is free and not slavish; the one is easily knowne by the other. So that if we duly consider Supremacy, and the degrees of their freedom, by the measure of their subjection.

3. That we must distinguish between actual liberty, or freedom from oppression; and legall liberty by constitution. For freedom may be considered either in regard of morall power, or government which is the exercise thereof; and that both severally, and joyntly. For a people free by Law, may be oppressed by their Rulers; and a people not legally free, may be actually so by their Governours grace. So that actual liberty alone, is onely under absolute Powers, legal under limited and mixed, and both under Governments which proceed regularly, in the Sphere of Power wherein they are placed; and are not planetary in their motions. Having premised these things; we shall now proceed to lay downe certaine rules, whereby every vulgar capacity may judge, of the nature of liberty and the degrees thereof, under any kind of Sovereignty whatsoever. Whether it reside in a single person, or in a plurality; either absolute, or limited in regard of its measure; or for the manner simple or mixed; either of two or three estates, equally or unequally; and from whatever priority or predominant part denominated, Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy, according to the constitution of every Nation.

And the generall rule is this. *The greater power in the Sovereignty, the lesser liberty in the Subjects; and the less power in the Sovereignty, the more liberty in the Subjects.* It is not my present work to determine, whether of these is better for the whole. The Politicians pens have sufficiently ventilated that question; usually ascribing more strength and stability to the former, and more comon prosperity to the latter; though often concluding, either through favour or feare and flattery, that that Government under which they live, deserves above all to weare the garland. I shall therefore onely say this, that seeing extreames are allwayes dangerous; a golden meane is that

that, which makes a golden age, both to Sovereigns and Subjects.

Now although I judge this rule alone, sufficient for our present purpose; yet in regard some perhaps, may be pleased with so large a prospect, as the liberty of all Nations in all ages of the world; we shall take a fuller view thereof; and the rather, because it will be of use to us hereafter, not onely in this but the following Sections. And for this end will begin at the bottom, that so ascending by degrees, we may behold both it and them the better.

1. A people under absolute power, are not truly and legally free, but onely permissively and precariously. Because their liberty is not from Law, but onely founded in their Governours favor. So that they are liable to all oppression, although they are often as actually free; and little oppressed, as those that live under other Governements.

And this liberty, as to the certainty thereof, is more or les according to the degrees of absolute power. Where the Rulers will, is the peoples Law; freedom is an *Embryo*, rather than formed: when they make Laws, whereby Subjects are at more certainty; it then becomes a *foetus*: and when they oblige themselves, to rule by those Laws; the *child* is borne, and may cry out of violence and oppression. This liberty, how small soever, and uncertaine of life, hath yet many witnesses to avouch its name; which we find also registred in Antiquity. So that whosoever denies the same; must call all those *slaves*, who lived under the Easterne and Roman Empires of old, and the Turks and Persians at this day.

2. Under limited power, the people have a legall liberty, which is greater or les, according to the Laws, constitutions, or contracts, whereby the power is limited. Whether originally and antecedently; or by after condescent, betwixt those in Supremacy and them in subjection; is not much materiall. This liberty being supported by Law, not voluntarily made by the Governours themselves, and alterable at their pleasure (as in absolute power) but necessarily condescended to by them that will governe, makes the subjection of a people tollerable. And if the Fathers in power please to foster them, they want not for necessaries, though they abound not in superfluities. But I confes, if this freedom meet with a churlish stepfather, and hath neither guardian nor friends to maintaine its right; then its forced to keepe private at home, and dare scarce appeare in publicke; which makes their present condition miserable. For liberty once lamed by power, is not unlike to a labouring man, that hath his leg broken; who till it be sound, is thereby confined to his owne cottage, or cralls but abroad to beg with his crutches.

3. Those that live under a mixed power, have more or les liberty according to the temperament thereof.

If mixt of Monarchie and Aristocracy onely, the comon peoples liberty is according to their Laws. And is more secured by this composition, than in a simple government, though limited; because one is a check to the exorbi-

exorbitancy of the other. For though every mixt power be limited, yet every limited power is not mixt. In this Governement, though the Nobility, should as Cedars shelter the undershrubs, from the storms of the superior order; yet both Historie and experience shews us, that often times (I say not allwayes) the Peeres care not to be their Princes Vassalls, that so the rest of the people may be theirs.

If mixed so that the comon people have a share in the Supreme Power, they are *absolutely free*; and their liberty is more or les, according as their share is. Whether it be mixed of all the three kinds of Governement, viz. Monarchie, Aristocracy, and Democracy; or onely of the two latter; for I never read or heard of a State compounded of the two extremes.

Now the Supreme Power consists especially (I say not onely) 1. In enacting, interpreting, and repealing of Laws. 2. In electing and appointing subordinate Magistrates and Ministers of State for Governement. 3. In judging and determining all crimes and controversies amongst their Subjects, ultimately without appeale. 4. In leavying of taxes to defray publick expences. 5. In the power of Armes for defence of the whole. 6. In making War and Peace with others. Sothen as a people partake in these, their freedom is accordingly to be accounted of. And here liberty is come to maturity; and if she be modest, and keepe within her bounds, and fall not into wanton licentiousnes; ravishes the eyes of all spectators, filling their mouthes with her praises, and their minds with admiration.

But it is high time that we hasten unto the third particular proposed, which is the accommodation of these, to the subject matter we have in hand. First then, it is wel known, that there is a very vast difference in the liberty of the Subjects of these two Crowns. The comon people under the King of England have 1. A part in the legislative power; which is the chief authority in all Governements. For the Commons make a third State in all the three Kingdoms; and have their representatives freely chosen by themselves in all Parliaments; which are the true Conservatories of publique liberty and particular propriety. Whereas the common people in France either never had this priviledge; or if they had, have long since lost it. That they had it formerly, *Hottoman* endeavours to prove, which *Arniseus* denies, (and answers his reasons;) nor that only, but all mixture in the French Monarchy either with Princes of the Blood, Peers, or any other State whatsoever. But whatever was the Governement, under the two first lines of the Kings of France; it is generally agreed, that in the beginning of the third under *Hugh Capet*, (who cantond ont France about the yeare 990) the peoples liberty was devoured by the Dukes and Earles of the Provinces, and the Monarchie almost turned into a Toparchie, by reason of their hereditary right. Which the after Kings soone perceiving, to be too great a ballance to the Crowne, broke down by degrees; and so became the only *Atlas's*, that have ever since sustan'd that Governement. For the Assembly of the three Estates, which were the only bulwark of the pub-

Franco-gal-
li.c.c. 10.
II. 15.
De republ.
l.2.c.6.§.6.

publique liberty, that was left undemolished by despotical powers; if they ever had any share in the legislative, lost it long before *Capets* time, (for from *Charles* the great the Kings Edicts have past for Laws;) and being discontinued in their Wars with England, and their remaning power (whatever it was) broke down by the policy of *Lewis* the eleventh; they were finally laid aside by *Lewis* the last. And although *Philip* the fourth fixed that Court of Judicature at *Paris*, that was formerly ambulatory and usually accompanied the Kings Court, which became a patterne to the rest of their Provincial Parliaments; yet both that and these have onely the name and shadow; not the nature and power of the Parliaments under the Crowne of England. The Members being neither chosen by the people, nor representing them; but Lawjers, that usually either purchase these places of the Crowne, or pay an annual pension for the same; having no legislative power, nor indeed any other but derivative from the King, and alterable at his pleasure. They tell the *Academie* of *Paris*; *se à Rege jussos promulgare leges, quas ipsi visum fuerit ferre. Apud illam auctoritatem esse, &c.* But these things are so well knowne, that I will not stand to alledge authorities to prove them; although, if it were necessary, I could bring as many as would fill the page even to ostentation. But let us briefly run over the rest. Those 2. under the Crowne of *England* have the election of Magistrates generally in Corporations, and some under Officers in the Country, which cannot be removed without due proces of Law. 3. Have a share in the Judicature, by the Juries (in *England*) for matter of fact, together with the Kings Judges for matter of Law, and their last appeale to Parliaments. 4. The original power of raising Taxes. For the proposal and grant must come from the Commons, and the other two States onely consent. 5. The liberty of bearing armes. Whereas in *France*, all promotions, governements, judicatures and taxes, are in the Kings power; who permits not the vulgar use of armes, or a standing *Militia* in his Kingdom; but only such as are in his pay, and thereby entirely at his devotion. So that there is no Communalty that lives more happily than that of *England*; nor none more miserably than the poor pesantry of *France*.

2. Hence we may infer a fare probability, of enjoying more liberty under the crowne of *England* than *France*. I know our freedom will not necessarily follow from the premises; for that which is *legal*, will depend upon, such conditions, as shall be either previously agreed upon, or after consented unto: yet I leave every one to judge, which is likeliest to grant us the best; not onely for our Religion, but liberty in our Persons, Priviledges and Estates; as also whose governement is most likely to defend the same, and make us thereby also *actually free*. If it be argued, that the *French King* may give us more liberty than his other subjects; and the *King of England* les. The reply is easy; that we reason not from the power of either, or what they can and may doe; but what in all appearance they will doe. Although those that hold it for a fun-

Guaguin.
in Ludovic.
12.

fundamental in the French Government, that whatever is conquered by them or acquired, must be incorporated with the Kingdom of France; and that this is as indispensable for the body politick, as the *Salick Law* is for the head; scruple much, whether the King *de jure*, can make us freer than the rest of his subjects. But we neither desire to dispute the prerogative of Princes, much les of such a mighty Monarch; nor indeed are we of their opinion herein; and therefore take it for granted, that he as well as the King of England, may grant us as full and ample liberty, as he shall thinke fit in his royal pleasure. We onely profes our fears what he will doe, and such as are rational and becoming men; not groundles fancies, or frivolous reports, which are the usual *bugbeares*, that affright onely fearful women and children.

1. We cannot flatter our selves into hopes, that our condition should be better, than either of those two Kings (which soever we submit unto) natural Subjects. If it be equal, it is well; and all that we can rationally expect. And therefore we judge, that England will easilier be induced to this, which is ordinary under that Government; than France, to indulge us of extraordinary favour; unles we had merited such a priviledge, as to be made an exception from the general rule. And that Governours under them will willingly and readily maintaine, that which they are accustomed unto; but very hardly such immunities, as transcend the bounds which are set to others.

2. The many examples we have before us, of such Countries as France hath gained, keeps our fears continually waking. For by whatever title they have been acquired, we find them all generally in the same condition. Whether by right of donation, as *Daulphinie* and *Provence*, or purchase as *Berry*, *Montpelien*, &c. or marriage, as *Bourbon*, *Languedock*, *Bretaigny*, &c. or by conquest and powerful seizure, as *Normandy*, *Aquitane*, *Anjou*, and whatsoever held on England by *Charles* the seventh, and *Burgundy* with those that depended thereon, by his son *Lewis* the eleventh; all these being incorporated with France, (what ever their former immunities were, and whatever lesser they still enjoy) are all equally subject to all Laws, Governements, and Impositions from the Crowne, without dispute and contradiction. And can we then be such fooles, as to thinke, that though we come under France, yet we shall be free? But now on the contrary we know, that whatsoever accession hath been made to the Crowne of England, either by marriage as *Scotland*, or conquest as *Ireland*, that they have all their Lawes, Priviledges, Governements, and Immunities remaining entirely, as inviolable from the Crowne, and unalterable without their owne consent. Nor doe they onely enjoy these; but make Lawes for supporting them, according to their particular intrests; yea cross and opposite to the other; which yet are ratified by his Majesty, or at least by his Royal authority and pleasure.

3. If any have neither list nor leisure, to looke into the Histories of former times; the present age will furnish them sufficiently, with examples both

both forreign and domestick. Let them enquire of *Lorraine* and *Flanders*, how they fare with their new Masters. Or let them but pass into the adjacent Provinces, and informe themselves of the French Governement; and then they may see as in a glass, the face of their own future condition. And if any be resolutely blind, that they will not see, except they be deafe also, or stop their eares; they may heare enough, (if the tenth part of reports be but true) to warn them sufficiently to looke to themselves. But if they remaine so incredulous, that all the beacons that are fired about them, makes them not feare; and that they will beleve nothing, which they themselves do not feele: I wish that experience (which wisemen call the *Mistres of fooles*) convince them not of their folly, when it is too late; and their condition become so miserable, that its fitter to be drawne covered with a sorrowfull veile, by some *Timambes*'s pencil, than to be lively set forth in its sad colours, or described by the pen of an impartial Historian. For my part I profes that none honours the worth and gallantry of the French Nation more than my selfe, yet I would loth come under its power: for the reason which the Fox gives the Lion in the Fable,

— *quia me vestigia terrent, Omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum.* Horat. Epist. l. I. Ep. 1.

4. We thinke we have reason to be affraid not onely for our persons, and purses; but even for our lives, and all those things which may make us miserable; not onely in regard of the French, but our selves. For we know that a people accustomed to liberty, who have had enough given them and taken much more, when once they come to be restrained, and strictly held in by the raines of Governement; are very apt to breake out into mutinies and mischiefs; and like wild colts in their first managing, rush desperately into ruin, that they may throw their riders. Yea when Conquerors thinke they have so harnessed the multitude, that they dare not but draw their triumphant Chariots; and doubt not but they themselves sit so fast, that they may drive them out of breath, and so tame them at their pleasure: they usually *Phaeton* like, set all on fire; and if they escape the popular fury by running away in the smoake, meet with his fate, to be struck with the thunderbolt of their Sovereigns justice. Innumerable are the examples for the confirmation of this; but we will confine our selves to our owne Country; and content our selves with two onely. When *Philip* the fourth had beate the *Flemmings*, united *Flanders* to France, and set Governours over them; who erected Cittadels in their severall Townes, Garrisoned their Cities to keepe them in aw, and arbitrarily charged them with great contributions; the people that were used to Freedome, would not be brought into this yoke of bondage; but desperately revolt, massacred the French, and involve all in confusion and miserie. Nor is this all; for, (though the baser sort begin, yet great men usually end such quarrels) a war followed, which cost both France and Flanders deare, in the vast expence both of blood and treasure. And when *Duke d'Alva* attempted the like upon our Ancestors in these Provinces, who were a free people and not used to such

Serres in Phil. 4.

such severity; how did the sparkes of mutiny in the beginning, breake out into greate flames at last, which set the whole Country on fire? No pen is able to expres the miseries of those times; nor Tragedie represent the things that were perpetrated. How were most mens hearts filled with feare, many with horror, and some with despaire; to see their Country become an *Aceldama*; and so many thousands forced through a red sea of blood, to find their passage to the Land of *Canaan*! I conclude therefore, that if they who enjoyed les liberty than we, could so little endure Servitude; we shall be much les able to endure it, who have enjoyed far more freedom then they. So that we may aefily foresee, without any prophetick spirit, what a flood of calamities is likely to breake in upon us; when ever any shall breake downe the banks of our liberty.

Sect. 6. The third Argument which preponderates for England, is the preservation of our Estates: in regard of Soldiers violence, Governors Impositions, Publique Debts by Obligation, and Revenues of the Romish Church.

WE proceed now to shew, that its better to be under England in regard of our Estates. Both in respect of getting them, (as I shall shew in the following Section) and the keeping those we have gotten already, or by the blessing of God may get hereafter. And to this I give the precedencie, because the enjoyment of Riches is the end for which, and Trade onely the meanes by which, we labour to obtaine them. Now if it can be made apparent, that we can neithet get, nor keepe such Estates under France, as we can under England: there are none so regardles herein (whatever they are of Religion and Liberty) but will easily grant the truth of our Conclusion.

I. Then let us consider that except we can keepe that which is our owne, we are never the better for it, but a great deale the worse. Had we a grant of *Midas's* wish, that all we touched should be turned into gold; or were we insured that all our adventures, should bring us returns as rich as the *East-Indie* Companie's; what should it profit us, if we could not keepe them? Nay were we not a great deale worse than without them? What toyle and anxiety is there in getting! What fears and troubles are there in keeping! and what sorrow and vexation in the parting with riches! Not that I think any civil authority, will ever take away our Estates, except we forfeit them through misdemeanors; but when the *Sword* brings such a Commission, I would gladly know who dare denie it? And whether the poor man then, that hath all his money in his purse-pocket; be not both safer in his person, and more secure of his Estate; than the rich Merchant, whose bags and warehouses are filled with his wealth? *Craesus* was rich even to a Proverb, yet shewing to *Solon* all his Treasures, *Solon* told him, that if any came with better iron than he wore, they would be master of all that gold. Now in

in regard of plundering, depredations, and all manner of violence by Soldiers both to our persons and estates; I thinke we are far more secure from the English, than French. And for this, I shall appeale to the Common experience, of all ages and places where their Armies have come; which beare witness, to the great exorbitances of the latter, more than the other; in the violation both of womens chastity and mens estates, and frequent desolations by fire and sword. Yea I will make their own Historian *Comines* judge of the controversy, who having showne, how unjustly great ones governe, and the innocent people are opprest, both by them and the Soldiers, whose flagitious lives, petulant carriage, and violent rapines are intollerable; professes that he mentions these things for France's sake, which of all the Principalities he had knowne, was most afflicted with them. Whereas on the contrary, he saies England exceld them all, in these three particulars; respect to the common good, the peoples freedom from injurie, and the lute spoile their Soldiers and Armies made in their wars; the last whereof he repeates, and enlarges a little after in the same Chapter.

Lib. 5. c. 18.

2. But we will suppose the best in all uncertainties, and therefore hope we shall escape all plundering, and violence from the Soldiers in a time of confusion; and make no doubt thereof, in a settled condition. But yet we know we shall not escape paying such Taxes, as indeed justly deter us, both in regard of their greatnes, and also the arbitrarines of their imposition. In both which we know no people in Europe more miserable than France, nor none happier in the contrarie, than the Subjects of the Crowne of England. Which partly occasioned that knowne Saying of the Emperor *Maximilian* the first, that he was *Rex regum*, the King of Spaine *Rex hominum*, the King of France *Rex asinorum*, and the King of England *Rex diabolorum*. For he could have nothing but what the *German Princes* consented to; Spaine only what the Lawes allowed him; France all that he pleased; and England nothing that pleased not the people.

As touching their greatnes. 1. I willingly grant that Subjects must afford their Sovereigns assistance; and in times of extremity, and utmost dangers, it is hard to determine, how far their power may not lawfully be extended. Secondly I know that the grandeur of the French Court is great, which is lately shown us in our own Language. That their Armies are often numerous; and some allwayes necessary, both for defence of the Government from domestique enemies, and of the Frontiers from forreigne, in the adjacent Countries. And that these require vast sums to support them. Yet notwithstanding thirdly, Moderation ought to be used, so that the common people may enjoy the fruit of their labours. But to shew how far the Government of France hath been from this, would be an endles worke. We should but tire our selves to read, what their own Historians have related; and be weary with the rehearfall, of the many tumults and rebellions that have arisen from their gabels. It would fill any one with sorrow to hear, of the great complaints and out-cries, that the people have made in former

Politijcke Weeg-schaal, l. 3. c. 3.4. & 5.

Ages;

Ages; and fright us to heare those of the present: which yet their Governours are so used to, that they count them but the old *faifa* of France, and oppression the sin of the old World. What remorse of Conscience several of their Kings have had for their extortion, is well known to those that have read their Histories. Some in their life time as *Charles* the eighth; some at their death as *Philip* the fourth, who remitted the Taxes he had unjustly required; and commanded his Sons to ease the people. But above all *Lewis* the eleventh, who resolved to reforme, but it was too late; and therefore charged the *Dauphin* against that oppression he had practised. And indeed it was highly necessary; for he had reduced the common people to such poverty, that many of the Farmers were forced, with halters about their necks to draw their owne Plowes; except they would steale, and once for all, stretch both themselves and ropes on the Gallows. But I should not once mention any of these things, if I thought it not better for us, both to know and believe them before hand, than experience them afterwards to our cost. For I feare if we come once under the *French*, there will be no end of paying contributions; untill we be brought into the condition of the *Andrians* of old, who when *Themistocles* demanded money, telling them he had brought two *Goddes* to require it, *perswasion* and *power*; answered that they had two great *Goddes* also who taught them to deny it, which were *poverty* and *impossibility*. And then the *Hollanders* may do that living, which *Saladinus* the Emperor of *Asia* did dying; shew their winding sheets and say, *These are all the rich Hollanders have left*.

Plut. in vita Themistocli. ex Herodoro. Procopius decad. 6. lib. 6.

But should we part with some of our Estates, though it were a good share; so we were sure to enjoy the rest, it was les matter: but when we are always obnoxious to an arbitrary power, still to be squeased like Spunges at the pleasure of others; we can scarce call any thing our owne, and are rather *procuratores* than *Domini divitiarum*. I know well, that some of the *French* Kings, have like good Shepherds, fleeced not flead their flocks, (according to *Tiberius* his saying, *Boni pastoris est pecus tondere, non deglubere*) especially *Lewis* the twelfth: who therefore (as the *Jesuite* well observes) had no rebellion in all his raigne, which is a rare blessing (as he sayes) and extraordinary in that *Realme*. And the great wisdom and generosity of his present *Majesty*, puts me out of all doubt of his *clemency*; but a good, a great, a wise *Solomon*, may have a *Rehoboam* to his son and successor, whose *litle finger may be heavier than his fathers loyns*. By which example in Sacred History, we are showne, that what ever Prince will force his Subjects to open their purses to his pleasure, shall quickly find their hearts shut; and though for the present they may supplicate, and outwardly seem to adore him (as the *Indians* their dieties *ne noceant*,) yet they hate him worse than the Devil himselfe; and upon the first occasion tumultuously cry, *every man to your tents*; whence open divisions, lawles rapines, bloody wars, and all the miserable effects that follow them, breake in upon a Nation beyond controll. But let us be frank in conceding (as it becomes us when we speake

Sueton. in vita Tib. Buffieres Hist. Franc. l. 15.

of Kings) that there shall never arise a *Rehoboam* out of *Lewis*'s race; yea that this is as impossible, as for a Vulture to rise out of the Phoenix ashes: yet we know the best of Kings may have bad Governours vnder them; and that they must often, both see with other eyes, and heare with other eares than their owne. Yea let us suppose, that we shall never pay more Tribute to the faire *Lilies of France*, then we have done to the *Belgick Lion*; except that of respect, which we acknowledge his due: yet there still remains a vast difference, betwixt a *legall* and a *permissive exemption*, and of the same payments made by *publick consent*; and those that are commanded by absolute power; though not in regard of the money, yet in regard both of the authority that requires it, which if absolute and arbitrary is alterable, although it should not be altered; and the different impressions which they make, and effects that follow in the minds and affections of men. For when a people know the necessities of State, and freely vote their owne Contributions, they account themselves free and uninjured though the Taxations be never so great, (according to the rule, that *volenti non fit injuria*;) and looke upon them as a gift rather than a debt, and therefore pay them willingly, and generously beare their parting with their share. Whereas on the contrary, when they are ignorant of the grounds of such impositions, they are allways jealous, that they are not so great as is pretended; and when they have no suffrage therein, looke upon themselves as wronged and oppressed; and though they pay them, yet it is with reluctancy; and because they must and cannot withstand it, their minds are dejected, and their spirit and courage strangely deprest, as I could shew by many examples. The difference of these two authorities, and their various and different effects, is well observed by two Noble Lords, *Bacon* of *Verulam*, and *Comines* of *Argenton*; both of them famous for their wisdom, one in the Theory and the other in the Practice thereof; so that if the former had had the latters *Prudence*, and the latter the formers *Learning*, no Age could have paraleld them. That of publique consent the learned *Bacon* observes, doth not so dispirit a people and diminish their *Marriall* courage, and instances in these very *Provinces*, shewing how cheerfully they have born the great burthen of *Excise*; because it came from themselves and their own authority. And that of arbitrary power, is shewne of *France*, by that great States-man *Comines* Counselor to *Lewis* the eleventh; whose History is so much esteemed by the *French*, (as *Buffieres* the *Jesuite* tells us) that they neither envie the *Greeks* their *Thucydides*, nor the *Romans* their *Livy* or *Tacitus*. Wherein he so frequently inveys against these impositions, and complaints of the peoples miseries thereby; so freely expostulates with the *Kings* and *Governours*, and is so honest an *Advocate* for their Subjects; that I wish all *Princes*, would make this excellent Historian, as familiar to them, as did *Charles* the fifth, that great and wise *Emperour*. In the 18. Chapter of his *History*, he saith, that neither the King of *France*, nor any other, hath power to exact of their Subjects without their own consents;

Essay (or Sermo fidelis) 29.

Histor. Franc. l. 13.

Et Bodin de rep. l. 6. c. 2.

except

except they will tyrannically use their power contrary to all right both divine and humane. And chapter the seventh l. 6. that Charles the seventh, who in the English wars had introduced; this imperious way of taxing the people, without the consent of the States; had burdened both his owne Conscience, and the successive Kings with great guilt, and most cruelly wounded the Kingdom, of which it was like a long-time to bleed. Nor doth he only thus declame against the unlawfulness thereof, but also shews how ungratefull it is to the people, as well as injurious. And on the contrary how readily and unanimously without tumult or contradiction even in the Kingdoms greatest poverty, the States consented and people paid to Charles the eighth. But if Princes will forget, the good advise this Historian there gives them; yet I wish they would remember at least old Pythagoras's Symbol, *Sudorem ferro abstergere, tetrum facinus*. Which Plutarch (as a learned man tells us) expounds, *That none should take away that with the sword, which others have earned with the sweat of their brows*. If they will only use their owne absolute power, yet let it be so attempered with equity and moderation; that the cries of the poore, and the curses of the people, may never bring Gods vengeance upon them. But if we should speake the sense of our Soules, we must needs (alas!) say, that moderation is so rare a jewel in the Crowne of absolute Monarchs; and the Governors under them so used to hunt, and hawke at all game to enrich themselves: that though we may all hope to escape, yet we have more reason to feare; that if the fate of the other Provinces befall us, we shall all (as the beasts said in the fable) *meete at last at the Furriers shop*. If any can flatter themselves with fancies, that our *Common-wealth* shall under France, become like *Plato's Republique*, wherein violence and oppression shall not be knowne; and that their Governors will be like those in *Utopia*, fathers to our fortunes as much as their owne: I must confes that I am not so *Mercurially* made; and doe no more expect to see the world so happy, than to see the great *Platonick yeare*. But on the contrary, that great impositions will be added, to the great Excise that is upon us already; whereby the number of the poore will certainly increase, and the provisions for them daily decrease. Yea it is well, if the mantaining the Land against the water, be not neglected; and so our *Eden* be laid waite: and that our rich and pompous Cities, returne not in time to their old condition, of poore and despicable Fishers Villages. However, seeing the blessing of *Judah* and *Issachar*, can never befall the same people, as *Bacon* observes in the forementioned place, if we and our Estates shall come under arbitrary power; then let us deface the *Lion rampant*, that was the Armes of *generous Judah*, which our Ancestors and we have hitherto borne: and set up *stygish Issachar's* of an *Ass couchant* between two burdens, that is to say the *Popes trumperies*, and *France's tribute*.

Gyrald.
Symb. Py-
thagor.

3. There is another consideration, which is of great importance to the Inhabitants of these Countries, and that is concerning their debts. For mentioning Estates, we meane not onely that in our owne, but also that in

other

other mens hands. As for *Private debts*, we know they must needs be very many and great in places of such Merchandise; seeing the greatest part of trade is all over, and here especially, driven upon credit. Now how these will be gotten, if bad times come on, for that many remove, and more be impoverished; I leave those to consider, whose concernment it is. Concerning *Publique debts*, (which are yet more desperate, whatever change happens) they are such as are contracted, either for *Service* to the *Common-wealth*, and *Commodities* delivered for publick uses; or for *Moneys* upon obligation; all which ways many thousands are greatly concerned, especially the last. There being very many, who have lent, some a good part, and others the greatest part of their Estates, upon the *publique faith* of the *Land*, *Cities* and *Lombards* of these Provinces. So that if this *publique faith* prove *faibbles* like the *Punick* of old, a great number of Families, and (which is most deplorable) *Widdows* and *Orphans*, (who being incapable to imploy their Estates thus intrusted them) will be wholly ruined and undone. Herein I thinke all that have any sense of justice and equity, will conclude with me.

1. That it is very unreasonable and unjust, that if the present Governement cannot discharge these debts, or a change happen; that those who have credited the Republick, should sit downe with all the loss, and others not beare their proportion. 2. That seeing they were lent to the Publique, and Obligation accordingly given; and that for publique uses, and so imployed, (or if other-ways converted, yet without the Creditors fault:) it is all the reason in the world, that the Publique should faithfully pay the same. 3. That if the Republick stand, care ought to be taken to satisfy these Creditors: and that if a change of Governement happen, the people remaining the same, are both in Law and equity liable to pay these debts. For though it is a great question how far Subjects are obliged to pay their Sovereigns; yet it was never questioned by any, but that such as are made for the Publique, by the peoples tacit, and much more expresse consent; must be paid by the people, what ever change be made in the Governement. Whether from a Monarchy to a Republick, as the *Communality of Athens* paid the 100 Talents which their 30 Tyrants had borrowed of the *Lacedemonians*; and these very Provinces, that which the King of Spaine was indebted to the people: Or from a Republick to a Monarchy; *Non desunt debere pecuniam populus rege sibi imposta, quam liber debet; est enim idem populus, & dominium retinet eorum qua populi fuerant; imo imperium in se retinet, quamquam jam non exercendum a corpore sed a capite* &c. *Grotius de jure belli & pacis, l. 2. c. 9. s. 8.* See also *Armenius de rep. lib. 1. c. 5. s. 4. Quatenus acta Reip. obligent civitatem*, and the *Civilians de rebus creditis, Digest. lib. 11. tit. 1. l. 27.*

Demothen.
adv. Lep-
tin.
V. Disqui-
sit. politic.
53.

All the difficulty therefore will be if a change come, how the payment of these just debts may be procured. And here we need no other Counselors advice, then our owne reason, which will inform us, that the freer any people are and

and the more they participate of power; the more probable it is; and also the more facile for them to obtaine their rights. Now that we are likely to have more freedom under *England* than *France*, I have shewne sufficiently in the former Section. Yea common experience as well as reason hath learnt the world this lesson; that when inferiors can onely pray and petition, they may daily get faire promises, and perhaps be sprinkled with some *Court holy-water*; but performances and payments are still the worke of to morrow, and continually kept as *reserves* in the *reere*. Nor can they bring more arguments for their expedition, than Superiors have excuses for their delaying: and if at last their patience be worne as thread-bare, as their clothes with attendance; so that they become importune in requesting; then *Grandeess* grow deafe in hearing, and resolutely peremptory in denying: whence both sides frequently fall to irregular proceedings; the one for recovering, and the other for defrauding them of their rights. Whereas those that can, not onely request, but also legally require, that justice be done; have ground to hope, that when the touchines of times is over, and the boisterous passions of great-ones are laid; some happy conjuncture of affaires may prove, a prosperous gale to bring them at last, their hazardous adventures home in safety.

4. And lastly, (that I may draw this arrow to the head,) I shall desire that we may consider a litle of the Lands and Revenues, formerly belonging to the *Romish Church*. Which to defend our selves in our wars with *Spaine*, were sold to severall, and are since parcelled out into many more hands. Now the very mentioning of this I should thinke sufficient; the difference between *France* and *England* herein, being so well knowne. Doe we heare what the former hath already done, in all those places subject to him, and how they have set up all the *Romish rable*; and can we thinke that they will not in time recover (what ever promises they pas for the present) that which not onely they themselves, but all of their Religion account their right? Can we imagine that their *Bishops*, *Abbois*, *Priors*, and other Superior Orders, will live like *Parochials* or *Mendicant Friers*? Who is so ignorant as knows not, that where ever the old *Gentleman of Rome* comes to rule, he brings with him many attendants to beare up his traine; and that their pomp must be supported, though many *Gentlemen* thereby be ruined. Whereas on the contrary, *England* is by them, in the same condemnation with our selves; neither permitting his headship and dominion over them, nor his members and followers any demaines among them. So that we may safely conclude, that all those that posses such Estates, as the Church of *Rome* doth challenge; can neither rationally hope to keepe them under *France*, nor feare to lose them under *England*.

SECT. 7. *The fourth Argument from Trade. This (viz. Merchandise and Navigation) our chief secular intrest: and friendship with England to secure the same. England and we Corrivals herein; the probability of getting more, as also enjoying the same with greater Peace under France, with other Arguments: largely debated; and the contrary evinced under England.*

WE are now come to the *Acropolis* of the cause; *Trade* being the great *Tower of Strength*, to which the Adversaries of our opinion, having deserted the former outworks, usually fly unto for refuge. We shall therefore persue them; but orderly, first making our *approaches* by degrees; and then raising such *batteries*, and planting such *reasons*, as are forcible, either to beate this downe; or at least make such breaches therein, as shall render it untenable for their defence; and so compel the most pertinacious of our enemies, either to submit, or to fall before us.

But before we begin this worke, we must acquaint you, that when we mention *Trade*, we meane not every particular kind of negotiation, wherein the severall sorts of Artificers and Shop-keepers are imployed: to speake of which would be both an endles, an a bootles worke. Herein perhaps some might fare better with the *French*, the *Mercers* and *Tailers* especially; for the *à la mode Monsieurs* when they have money, affect to change their fashion as often as the *Moone* doth her face; and to weare as many ribbands on their breeches, as ordinary Pedlers bear on their backs; as if all the fortunes of *France* hung at their ends, and all their owne happines followed their heeles. And happily *Butchers* and *Cooks* would fare better with the *English*, for a *piece of good Beef* or a *Shoulder of mutton*. And we might instance in many others with merriment; but we have no minde to be pleasant upon so serious a Subject. In short therefore, we meane *Maritime Trade* (as our Adversaries doe) this being the great *Diana* of the *Netherlands*, which brings them in their Silver Shrines.

1. Then we shall lay down this as a fundamental and undoubted *Maxim*, (which all I thinke will take for granted) that *Trade by Sea is the great secular intrest of these Provinces, the Maritime especially, by which they most flourish, and without which they cannot subsist*. Let *Amsterdam* and the other Cities be as rich, or richer then they are imagined; yet will they in a few yeares, if their Trade be obstructed, become as poore as their neighbours at *Gant*, or *Antwerp*. For who will build at such excessive charges (where the foundation sometimes is halfe to the superstructure) or pay such rents for their habitation, and live in such expensive places, if there be not freedom of Trade? But those that can, will remove; some hither and some thither, as their intrest and affection shall incline them; rather then spend their *Capitalls* here. If ever Merchants were, or are in any place of the world, the *vena porta* (as *Bacon* stiles them) of any publick body; it is certainly the


Essay (or
Sermo fide-
lis) 19.
Belgick.

Belgick. If they freight not their Ships, whereby the Marriners may be employed; if they furnish not the Trades-mens shops, whereby they may follow their Vocations; if they lade not the poore mens backs, whereby their families may fill their bellies; finally, if they distribute not their Merchandise through the various Seas and Rivers of the Universe: we may linger a while, but it is as impossible we should live long, as for a body deprived of food, whose parts languish for want of nourishment, which should be brought them in the veines, by the bloods regular circulation.

2. Merchandise being our chief concernment, it will necessarily follow that that Nation that can most obstruct the same, can doe us most injury. Now that England can doe this more than France, or any other whatsoever, I thinke none will denie; if any doe, there is enough said hereafter, that will make it sufficiently apparent.

3. Of all our neighbouring Nations, England being most potent by Sea, and France by Land, it will clearly follow, that a Peace with these two above all others, is our great concernment; With the former for getting, and with the latter for keeping and enjoying our Estates. But if we cannot have this from them both, which of them is to be preferred comes next in consideration.

4. This Common-wealth consisting of Maritime and Inland Provinces, the former being by far the most considerable, the friendship of England is more to be valued than that of France. And this the wisest men that this Republick ever had, formerly never doubted of. Prince WILLIAM the First founder of this Common-wealth, laid downe these three principal maxims of State, which were approved by all, as found and rational beyond contradiction. 1. To doe Justice to Strangers. For great Nations may be upheld by Power, but small territories must be mantaind by Justice. 2. To hold a faire correspondence with France. For Spaine being then the grand Monarchie of Europe, and our dreadful enemy; the assistance of France was greatly necessary for our supportation. 3. To preserve an inviolable Peace with England. In regard that this is absolutely requisite for our freedom of Commerce by Sea; and the English were our friends in affection as well as Intrest, whereas the French onely upon the latter account. For the greatest obstacle that stood in the way of France's greatnes, was the Spanish power in these Netherlands; which being once broke downe, they well knew they could dilate their Empire at their pleasure, as we see it now to our sorrow. It is true of later times, the Lovesteiners to free themselves, from the Headship of the Orange family; which sought (as they imagined) either an absolutenes, or at least to infringe the liberty of the Common-wealth; have been rather inclined to France than England: but they were not so blinded with passion, but that having a Peace with Spaine, and being sensible of France's prevalency, and raising their Fortunes upon the Spanish ruines, it was their Intrest to comply with England rather than France. Which planely appeares, in that no sooner was those unhappy differences between us and England composed



posed at Breda, but immediately the Triple Alliance was designed and concluded upon by that great States-man de Witt the Head of their party, and Sr. William Temple, on purpose to put boundaries to the boundles ambition of the French Nation.

5. To the reason of State already mentioned, together with the judgement of our greatest Politicians both in former and later times, let me add; that Terrestrial war hath allwayes been accounted more eligible than a Naval; yea by some our absolute intrest, as the Duke of Rhoan observes. In so much that Zeeland never to this day consented unto, but absolutely protested against, these Provinces making peace with Spaine. And here it is observable, how our Adversaries prevaricate; in granting this Assertion, and yet preferring France. I foresee their evasion, of conceding a land-war with a lesser Potentate, and denying it with France. But this is both easily obviated and outed; for as I am well assured, that if England had not assaulted us by sea, France had never done it by land; so I have reason to believe, that if he had, we should have found him sufficient worke. If we had the sea free for our inferior Provinces, the charges of a land-war for the superior, were easily borne. And we should not want men now for our money, to fight for them with France, or any other whatsoever, so long as we should thinke them worth the fighting for. Nor let any wonder that I insert such a conditionall; for I shall afterwards make it appeare, how the Common-wealth may be well secured, though these Provinces should be let goe or lost. And as for the inferior, they are so situated in the water, and thereby so inaccessible; that we need not feare, what all the force of France can doe, if we be resolved to defend them. It being therefore apparent that traffique is our principal concernment, and England of all others most able to obstruct it; we may conclude in point of intrest, as Prince Maurice (I have heard) used to say, that were the English Devils we must have peace with them.

L'Intrest des Princ. & Est. discour. 6.

These being the Approaches, which (I thinke) no sallies of our Adversaries can prevent; we shall now, being got nearer them, take a better view of their strength. Were we free and had our choice, whether we should war with France or England, you see our intrest should carry us against France. But the case (alas!) is far otherwise with us, for they both make war upon us: by what error of policy one of them, which could best, was not taken off and diverted, if it had beene possible; or whether it was impossible, and so no error or omission in us, is not now our Enquiry. But seeing they both threaten us with destruction, upon supposition that we are unable any longer to resist them both, whether of them we should choose to be under in regard of our Trade.

This then being the Question; our Adversaries give their suffrage for France; and thinke themselves impregnable in this point of intrest. Let us therefore impartially represent the strength of their reasons, and weigh them duly in the true ballance of intrest, and then we shall find them you shall see, not onely many graines but ounces too light.

1. It is

1. It is better for us say they to be under *France*, because *England* and we are Competitors for Trade.

It is very true, *England* and these Countries by their situation, genius, and intrest are set for Trade: and this naturally begets an enmity between us, and a vying with one another for the same. But this was allwayes, and will be so whilest men are men: and what will follow hence? Surely one of these things; either that we must willingly yeeld to them, or they to us, which is madnes to imagin; or that we must fight with them for the whole, which if they meane of our selves, is the next degree to dotage, seeing we are about matches, and Peate in their trade is always the intrest of a trading people; if they meane joyntly with *France*, we shall speake to that in the following Argument, and shew what a hazard even that will be, and much more singly: or that we must compound with them for our share, that so each Nation may have, what Gods blessing may give, and their owne industry may procure them. And this in my opinion will have the vote, not onely of all the Cowards, but all the wise men of both Nations. But because this Argument is much insisted on, both in former times and this juncture of affaires; we will more particularly consider the same, in reference to this Common-wealth as to *England* absolutely without respect to *France*. And thereby we shall see what corrivals in Trade implies in point of Intrest, whether the power be about equall, (as we shall here suppose *England* and this Common-wealths) or unequal, and in point of inference. Now in regard of Intrest, we shall find in my judgement, that tis clearly this for us as equall in power.

1. That we must vigorously defend our Trade, as that on which our temporall wellfare depends.

2. That we must for this purpose, maintaine a navall power, equall at least to theirs. That so we may hold them up, to the just and due termes, and bounds, of Commerce and Navigation.

3. That for this end the league of the maritime Provinces be kept inviolable. If the band of the bunch of arrowes be either cut or broken, so that they fall out of the Lions paw; he will soone have his skin puld over his eares. So that to make severall Common-wealths of them, is but to make them so many morsells to be the easilier devoured by their enemies. And therefore I wonder at the Author of the *Intrest of Holland* herein, who c. 41. 42. &c. asserts the power of that Province sufficient by Sea, and joyntly with *Vtrecht* by Land, to wage war with all other Potentates. Seeing these maritime Provinces entirely considered, are but the match at Sea for *England*. And the reasons that he gives c. 37. are now refuted by experience. I acknowledge it also an error in policy, for *Zeeland* to breake this bond of amity, if possibly they can helpe it. But if their enemies sword cuts this assunder, what shall they doe? And this is the case onely that I defend.

4. That we should rather yeeld to them in *Punctilloes* of honour; that being

being a *Crowne*, this onely a Common-wealth. Such I meane as the *Flag*; although I reckon not that any dishonour to us; seeing they have not onely allwayes challenged it; but our Ancestors also given it; and other Nations as well as we, pay the same acknowledgement to that *Crowne*. The first time that we have ever refused it, was in the time of King *James*; the circumstances whereof *St Anthony Welden* in his *Court* relates, and the effects both their and our Historians. It is not my designe to speake of this particular, which would swell to a discourse larger then this whole treatise; but onely instance therein, as a knowne exemple; concluding that if they will war for it, it is our wisdom to yeeld it, and except we were far stronger than they, folly to fight for it.

5. Rather to dissemble lesser injuries than seeke to revenge them. Which holds in all equalities of power whatsoever.

6. But if they will unjustly inroach upon us to ruine our commerce, then to warre with them. For 1. our traffiek being our subsistence, who ever would spoile us thereof, necessitates us to defend it, and gives us a just cause of contest. 2. We being a match for them in power, may in point of wisdom as well as justice, try it out with them, and leave the issue to Gods Providence; wars being the last appeal to Heaven, when justice cannot be had on earth. 3. If succes attends our Armes, we secure our selves at least, if we better not our condition; and if the contrary, we doe but drowne and die a litle the sooner. A destructive peace and unsuccessfull war are both fatal in the issue; the former being a *Chronicall* the later an *acute* disease of State. It is not so materiall, whether by a lingring consumption of peace, or by the hectick feavor of war, the gray haire of Government, be brought with sorrow to the grave.

7. Yet if we can enjoy the freedome of commerce, and fruit of our labours, upon reasonable termes; it is better to sit downe contented with our share, then to warr for the whole. For 1. what wise man ever doubted, but that peace is the Intrest of a rich and trading peole; if it can be had upon tollerable conditions. 2. Is not a competent certainty preferable to a greater good that is wholly hazardous and uncertaine? for how often doth that happen to men, which did to the greedy and covetous dog in the fible; who let goe that he had, to catch at the shaddow thereof in the water, and so lost all!

I know some that have more of *Mars* then *Merowrie*'s temper, are all for fighting; and therefore I shall desire them calmly to consider, these few particulars following.

1. What either we or *England* have gotten by our former wars, when matcht in power. I partly know what it hath cost us both, in treasure and blood: and can demonstrate that if either hath gotten, tis *England*, though not to countervail the cost. Lets but reckon (as we must if we goe rightly to worke) the *lucrum cessans*, and *damnum emergens*, and what we have got, we may put in our eye, and not see much the worse.

But

But if any one say who can reckon that, or how?

I shall freely acknowledge that to pounds and persons we cannot, nor no man alive; yet in the generall we may, so far as to make a judgement. I have done it for my owne satisfaction; and shall tell you how; that so those that are curious may satisfy themselves therein, and not take it upon my credit. By the publick Customs; the Number of ships; the Capital where-with Trade is driven; and by the riches of the merchants. Of these, the two former are more easy and certaine, wherein *England* hath increased: the two latter more conjecturall, wherein this Republick hath the superiority. But hath not gotten it by the wars, but arises from severall other causes, (which I could mention) and especially from these two following, which I thinke will satisfy any intelligent man. As to the Capital, ours coms to be greater, in regard that as the merchants grow rich in *England*, they buy land, and breed up their sons to be Country gentle men; whereas we, especially in *Holland*, continue the stock and our children in the Trade. Land being here at 35 and 40 yeares purchase, and in *England* at 15 or 20 ordinarily. And that the merchants here should be richer than there, is no wonder to me; who know so well the frugality of the one, and the prodigality of the other.

2. Let it be considered how difficult and hazardous it is for equall powers, to destroy one another; and therefore how litle likelihood there is, of any thing to be gotten by contesting. Nay there are severall circumstances in our situations, imployments, and people, that render absolute conquest almost impossible. We may like cocks fight, and breath, and fight againe, and crow over one another for some victories, but far from a conquest. And this we might both have seene long since in the glas of policy: which clearly shows, that such equall powers fighting for profit, is but fishing with a golden hooke, wherein more is adventured, than ever is likely to be gotten. We have had a Comick-tragedy, and a tragick-comedy of two wars, and *England* the contrary; wherein our enemies indeed have been pleasant spectators, and satisfied their envious eyes, but what have either of us got, but blows? Passion and prejudice are so prevalent in the World, and so blind the eyes of men, that often they will not see the truth; till deare-bought experience makes them even to feele. And this we now both see, and therefore *England* takes this opportunity of breaking downe the equality of power, and bringing us lower, that so we may truckle under them; and they be at rest in the bed of security.

3. Those that are so much for *Mars*, might doe well to consider, the advantages and disadvantages of both Nations, for carrying on, and subsisting under long wars. In some things we may happily have the advantage, as in bearing the charges, number of shipping, Caping by Letters of Marque &c. And in others *England*, for they have a great and rich Inland Country, an Iland that cannot be easily diverted by a Land-war, so that as the *Duke of Rhovan* saith right, *L'Angleterre est un grand animal, qui ne peut jamais*

L'Intrest des Princes. Discours 7.

jamais mourir, s'il ne se tue lui-mesme. We subsist wholly on trade, and fetch all things from abroad; they have sufficiency of necessaries from their own growth at home. When Trade stands still, they have cloths for the back, and meate for the belly, better cheap for the poorer people: here not onely such accommodations are far dearer than there, which can well be born when Trade flourisheth; but when that is stopt, and it can worst be endured, then are they dearest of all. Our Seamen which come most from the Northerne quarters about the *Baltick* Sea, to serve us in Navigation; when they see no hopes of gaine, but onely venturing their lives for the pay of the Wars, will remove and serve other Nations: whereas the King of *England* hath three Kingdoms to pres out of for his assistance, according to the custome of the Crowne there, which is not practised nor indeed practicable in this Free State. And although at the first such as are prest be averse to the Wars; yet we find and feel by experience, that what through the Officers and Gentlemen's carressing and encouraging them, what through company and conversing with others beforehand; this restines is worne off by degrees; and through the principles of selfe defence, and some sparkes of the honour of their Country, they fight well enough, what ever the cause or the quarrel be.

4. I wish both Nations would well consider, whether whilst we two are so eagerly contesting for Trade, others may not carry it away. I have reasonably considered what Nation can bid the fairest for this, in regard of their *Situation, Havens, Genions &c.* the advantages of the *Mediterranean* and *Baltick* Seas, and let my thoughts stretch themselves as far as both the *Indies*: have observed the *French* Fleet, the darling of the King and Kingdome, their hopes with the grounds of them, and the probable succes thereof, as also the communication of *Spainne* with *America*; and finde no one Nation alone capacitated to carry away our Commerce; but severall to have greater shares then they have at present. Yea, to speake my mind freely, I have had far further contemplations, and of a far different kind from these upon this Subject, in respect to future times. And indeed such as have often made me both very sorrowfull to see the Christian world so mad and quarrelsome about their Commerce, and very fearfull that God would either blast it to us, by taking it away and giving it to *Turks* and *Heathens*; or not bles us with it, giving us herein our hearts desire in his wrath, and them the Gospell in exchange thereof. As I clearly see he hath done to the *Jews*, the generallest and greatest Merchants of the World: and as I thinke he threatens us Christians in severall places of *holy scripture*, if they be duly considered. But because I love not dogmatizing, or to be positive in things I am not so fully satisfied in; I shall at present say no more of this, but leave it to every good Christians consideration.

Having thus declared what corivalship implies as to equall powers, we shall now see it in unequall. And here *Intrest* shews us, That if we decline and become inferior in strength, if they were so injurious

riours

Luc. 14.
31.

rious to us, that we had a just cause of War, yet must we not adventure it at fighting, but use policy to procure a Peace. And in my opinion this piety and wisdom is taught us by our Saviour Christ in the Gospel; for where Soldiers are alike, and no advantage of ground &c. what is it but tempting of God and mere folly, for *ten thousand to encounter twenty thousand?* Yea though the disparity was not so great; Wars being allways hazardous to the weaker side, though they often be victorious: it being frequently found (as *Pyrrhus* said of his warring with the *Romans*) that their very Victories doe undoe them. In such cases, old mens heads are better helpes then young mens hands. To shew the refuges of weaker powers when threatned with Wars, would be a large discourse. I shall therefore onely hint some few generalls, of many which I have observed: 1. To gaine all time possible. 2. Therein to breake downe the strongers designs, and weaken them at home as much as may be. 3. To raise them up enemies abroad by making them jealous of their power. 4. By alliance with others to ballance their might. 5. To prepare for a divertive rather than a direct War. 6. By proposal of Marriages &c. to make up the breach. 7. By procuring forreign Potentates mediation, and appealing to their Arbitration. 8. To make the best Peace they can, when best provided with power for War. For otherwise nothing is to be expected, but either an unsafe or a short Peace, litle better then a Truce or holy-day of War.

Allen.

*Best is that Peace, whose articles are made
Under a Shield, and written with a blade.*

Now all these have many particulars contained in them. For example in the first to gaine time, by sending Embassadors, and so still that as one is returning another may be sent: whereby a fair pretence of ignorance of transactions may be pleaded, and time spun out in further debates. By conceding one thing after another by degrees, still reserving the priucipall point of Intrest entire. &c. And so of the rest within the bounds of honest Policy. The reason of the case is so clear, that were it not for mens passions, inferiors in power would not be so ready to fight. For let them either be beaten or beate, it will redound at last to their owne destruction. If the former, why should they spend their blood and treasure to make themselves more miserable? And if the latter, they doe but enrage their enemies the more, who being more powerfull will not for two or three Bartells end the War, and come to a Peace to their great dishonour. So that we may lay downe this as a generall rule for the weaker side, *That selfe defence must be first for preparation, but last for execution.* Of all the Princes of Europe in our age, the Duke of *Lorraine* hath been the cunningest gamester, but the foulest player with stronger powers. But oh, how is he caught in his owne craftines! Allthough I confes I could not see him and his Court (as I have done since his disaster) without great commiseration; to thinke that one of the ancientest Families and greatliest allyed of all Europe, should

should fall into that condition. Of the former age the *Veronians*, who being opprest by their neighbours the *Venetians*, that were more powerfull, would notwithstanding needs war with them; wherein though they were often victorious, yet it proved their ruine at last, for which they are stigmatized for fooles to all succeeding generations. And many other examples might be produced, but I thinke them needles in so plaine a case.

And thus you see what our being competitors for Trade implies as to Intrest in regard of war and peace. Which I have bene the larger upon, because I know what work fooles make wise men in both Nations. I have many times been put to it for patience, and sometimes into a paroxisme of passion, to heare the senseles clamors of men. We are competitors for Trade! It is our Intrest! Our Intrest! Downe with the *Dutch*! Downe with the *English*! Let us but consider who these are, and we shall find them. Men that have a pound of passion, for one ounce of reason. Men that never saw, or at least not well observed both Nations. Men that never bestowed one calme houre to ballance their powers. For wise men that knew both well, was but grieved to heare, or pleasantly merry with such madnes. I publiquely decried such folly in the first wars, and had severly chastised such fooles in the second, if I had not been severall wayes hindered. Let me say it freely (I thinke I have some reason, for I believe there are few men that have better viewed both Nations with their eye to that end which I have had, nor ballanced their power with greater accuracy) that if either the King of great *Britain*, or the *States*, or both, require it: I am ready to demonstrate, that for these 20 or 30 yeares last past, there was nothing of advantage rationally to be expected on either side, that can countervaile a war: nor as both might manage their power, likely to be, so long as both continued in that condition. And because I see what worke is made in the world, if I live to see the ballance come so even againe, (though I thinke I never shall) I doe here engage, for the publick peace of Protestants, and good of both Nations, to satisfy all rationally men heerein, I hope even to curiosity. And shall, if God spares me life and health, defend the same, against all the State-tinkers of both Nations; allthough I well know, they have great store of small tooles, with which they make a ratling in their budgets.

Let us now proceed to such inferences as our Adversaries make from this competition in Trade.

Some argue thus; the *English* minding Trade more than the *French*, they may come and live among us and carry away our Commerce.

In my apprehension there's more feare of their soldjers coming hither then their merchants. But suppose more merchants did come, would that be any worse for us? I have heard severall of the greatest merchants of both Nations say, the more in a place and better, though I confes it is not so for shopkeepers. But for this they may rest secure, those that know the cheapnes of living in *England*, in comparison of these countries, will abundantly

abundantly satisfy them that feare this. Yea I shall shew hereafter that the *English* would have more reason to feare, that we should come thither, and deprive them of their Trades. Yet to say the truth, I see not that either need feare, were we under the *English*, that either Nation should suffer heereby; seeing all have had freedom that will to remove formerly, and that hath made so small an alteration as to the ballance of Trade, that it is inconsiderable. For if I make my calculation right, there is not much difference, of the *English* here, and the *Dutch* in *England*.

Others argue we are corrivals for Trade, and therefore one must marry it. But this is but a toyish sophisme, when men will compare Commerce to a Mistres, that one onely can marry. For 1. The world is wide enough, and the Sea large enough for both Nations to exercise their skill and industry. 2. If we thinke to betroth all Trade, and ingros it to our selves alone; other Nations will come in and forbid the banes, as well as *England*, as I shall shew hereafter. 3. If we two could so happily agree, and so settle Commerce as it might perhaps be settled; we might bid faire for carrying it, or at least for retaining it betwixt us. And so far, as my short sight can reach, this seems to me the marke aimed at on both sides, by those who have the direction of affaires, which I doe not despare to see effected.

Seeing then we are in as much danger, that I say not more, to lose that part of Trade we have, as to gaine more by our contesting; I hope all ratioll men will grant it our Intrest, that *England* and we so compound for it, that each of us may have, what Gods blessing and justice and equity gives to eithers industry. And this I am sure was the wisdome of former times. I have shewne it already in part on our side, and could much more largely both for us and the *English*. In Quene *Elisabeths* time we were not growne up to our present greatnes. In King *James's* time, who all the world knows was no Martiall man, but in his temper as well as motto truly pacifick, the cautionary Towns that *England* posselt in these Countries, were A. 1616. ransomed, and we grew up to that greatnes of being an equall match for them in power at Sea. And this the *English* account the great error of politicall Intrest; although they must needs acknowledge it but fair and honest dealing. King *Charles* the first, that Prince of blessed and immortall memory, seeing how we grew up, not onely kept a faire correspondency with us, but having experience how cros Parliaments were to the Court, so that no War could be carried on; did by a faire correspondance keep friendship with us; and not onely so, but marryed his eldest Daughter to the *Prince of Orange* for this reason of State amongst others. For being jealous of this Common-wealth's favouring that party in his Kingdoms, which was then called by the Court *Puritans*, and seeing the growing greatnes of this State by Sea, did for these two reasons of State, engage the Prince and this Common-wealth by that Marriage. And this was also the reason of State in *Oliver's* time when Peace was made, that we must

accord

accord for our mutuall Trade. How it hath been since we all know, and therefore I need not mention it. And this is the first weapon our enemies use, which you see if we measure rightly, is too short to touch, much less mortally to wound, the truth of that cause that we mantaine.

Yet we must doe our Adversaries right: the wiser sort of them upon the supposal of equall powers, (as we have formerly been, and which is that I have hitherto spoke of) are for peace, and judge it the Intrest of both Nations; but they thinke our comeing under *France* will render *England* so unequall and inferior a match for us, that we cannot in all humane appearance mis, of marrying our beloved Lady Trade, and cleerly carrying her from our Corrivall. And I confes ingeniously if there be any thing of moment to be said for *France*, tis this.

2. Therefore our Adversaries are for *France*, because thereby we should be able to beat *England* out of their Trade, and so become masters of the whole, or the greatest part at least of the Sea-negotiation.

Now because they so much triumph in this, though before the victory; we will examine it thorowly, and see what probability there is of obtaining the greatest part of Trade by this meanes.

1. We grant that *England* and this *Republick* being about an equall match at Sea; the accession of *France* would cleerly make us an overmatch for *England*, if all was true which they suppose.

2. But herein is their mistake, that they take these two things for granted, which are both false. First that these Maritime Provinces should entirely become *French*. And secondly that all other Nations will stand neutrall; so that we shall have no more to doe, but *France* and we entirely to deale with *England* alone.

Now how far this is from truth, we shall make abundantly apparent, and by ballancing of powers how litle probability there is, of these their designs becoming practicable, and such as will effect their desires.

1. Hereby they suppose a War, and such a long and tedious one, as perhaps we may not live to see ended. For we cannot rationally imagine the *English* such tame animals, that they will easily part with their Trade: but must suppose they will set all at stake, before that jewel of the Land be lost. Now let us but calmly consider, how destructive such a War will be to our Trade, and what advantages they have above us of subsisting under a long War, some of which we have before mentioned; and I doe believe no wise man will thinke this our Intrest, except there was a greater likelihood of a sudden subduing them, then is ratiollally to be expected, as we shall presently make apparent. Now on the contrary, if we come under *England*, there is no feare of a War with *France* at Sea; that Kingdom being so much inferior in maritime power to either of us, and much more to both. And should we have a Land-war with *France*, yet that is more eligible for us than one by Sea, in the opinion of all wise men, as we have formerly shewne, and shall have occasion heereafter more fully.

2 A War

2. A War with *England* being supposed, as it must, (for we must either say we can and will have the Trade alone or the greatest part thereof *invisis Anglis*, or we say nothing to the purpose) the readiest way to see what probability there is for conquering them, and consequently carrying the Trade; will be first by ballancing of powers, and then by some other Considerations. The former of these we shall doe with respect to *Zeeland*, and then with respect to other Nations.

For the first it must be considered that *Zeeland* hath expressly declared that they will not come under *France*, but that if they cannot defend themselves, they will then submit to *England*. It is true (as I have said) it is the intrest of these maritime Provinces to keep their League; but if their enemies sword cuts it affunder, and they will not venture the los of their Religion and Liberty under *France*, who shall hinder them? They are free surely to dispose of themselves as well as *Utrecht*, or the other Provinces. For in coordinate Powers, when their confederacy is broken, either by themselves or their enemies; each are at liberty, and in their former freedome, to dispose of themselves, as they shall thinke fit. And though *Friesland* hath not declared, so that if they should come to the utmost extremity, we know not but they might happily incline to *England* allso; yet because that is uncertaine, we will be liberall in granting our Adversaries even that which they cannot prove, and take to our selves onely that we can, and so proceed upon infallible grounds.

Nor let any one here stop me, and say that in taking it for granted that *Zeeland* will be *English*, I may be mistaken, for they may beat off their enemies and defend themselves. I grant it, although by the way let me say it, I see but litle likelihood of that; for of above 100 Companies they pay, there is as yet not one in their principallest Islands (though how it comes so, becoms not me to enquire) but the thing is to me matter of admiration. But I will shew you how I reason; not from the War, that *England* will conquer *Zeeland*, nor from the Agreement betwixt the two Crownes, which yet is generally said brings us under that: but upon supposal that we are tired out with the War, and come to treat with our enemies (for I hope no man is so mad, as to think these Provinces will as *Utrecht*, call them in, and after make what termes we can get, but treat with them with our weapons in our hands) *Zeelands* not onely Declaration, but Inclination carries them for *England*. So that which way soever we take, conquest by our enemies, their disposing of us, or our owne dispossall of our selves, *Zeeland* is still *English*. So that upon the supposition of inability to defend our selves, we are morally certaine that *Zeeland* will fall to *England*; and our Adversaries uncertaine, that *Holland* and *Friesland* will choose *France*. But we will grant them all they can reasonably desire, viz. that these two Provinces make such a choice, and thereupon proceed to the ballancing of Powers.

Now in Navall strength, *Zeeland* hath the proportion of a sixth part in this

this Republick; There being 5 Admiralties, wherein *Amsterdam* hath a double rate, we will suppose any number for a Fleet greater or les to be set out by them. For example the States equip a Fleet of 72 Saile herein.

The Admiralty of	{	<i>Rotterdam</i> and the <i>Mase</i> is	12
		<i>Amsterdam</i>	24
		<i>North-Holland</i>	12
		<i>Zeeland</i>	12
		<i>Vriesland</i>	12

72

Yea in the last War I find in the List A. 1666 (which by the way, I wonder any Admiralties should publish, and perceiv there is none now) that *Zeeland*, was a greater share than *Friesland* both in Ships and Men.

<i>Zeeland</i>	15	Ships.	676	Canon.	2268	Seamen.	807	Soldiers.
<i>Friesland</i>	11	—	638	—	2748	—	260	—

Although I know in the *quota* or Tax to the Publick, *Friesland* is more: but that is because of their greater share in Land, which is a certaine revenue, and trade onely a contingency. In strength then at Sea we see, that *Zeeland* at least ballances *Friesland* if not more, should that Province prove *French*, and this is sufficient for my present purpose.

Now let us looke abroad, and we shall as clearly find, that *Spaine* comes into the *English* scale. For which way soever *France* takes, *Spaine* must take the contrary. Nay in this case, *Spaine* is as much concerned as *England*. For if *France* have these Provinces entirely, how shall they alone be able to bring home their *American* treasure? They know to their sorrow, what they have lost formerly by the *Dutch* taking their plate-fleets; and what an extraordinary charge and hazard they had to defend them. And shall we not then thinke, that they will rather venture to the utmost with the *English*; then let us intercept their treasure, and after some yeares be master of their mines? It is true, if I was led as the world is usually, to judge by news, which hath been for some months that *Spaine* and *England* are breaking, all this was frivolous; but I make my measures from reasons of State, which tells me, that they will not, because they must not; and they must not, because it is their mutuall Intrest. So then you see clearly, that upon supposition that *Holland* be *French*, it will be *England* and *Spaine*, against *France* and *Holland*, and so we are againe ballanced.

We are thus far upon sure grounds, we shall now proceed to that which is not much les certaine, if we rightly consider. And that is that *Denmarke* in all probability will become allso our enimies, if we take *France* so far for our friends, as to make him our master. Let us but well observe a few fundamentall *Maxims of State*, which every Nation according to their Intrest frame for their Governement, and it will much helpe us to make a right

right judgement in all such cases. Now this is one of that Kingdoms, *Not to suffer any one to be absolute Sovereign of Trade and Navigation, if they can possibly prevent it.* For the revenues of that Crowne mostly consisting of toll in the *Sound*; we cannot imagine the *Danes* such dullards, but they know who ever is so, will soone open that passage, and make it as free as the water it selfe between the *North* and *Baltick seas*. And then the King may sit in his house at *Gluckstadt*, and take toll of boates that pas in the *Elbe*; in Stead of *Copenhagen*, and his castle of *Croneberg*, where now he takes toll of all ships in the *Sound*.

I foresee it will be said, that *Sweden* will ballance *Denmarke*, if that should be so. But see then what worke this *Trade* will make in the world. And this is wholly uncertaine; nay intrest will rather incline to the contrary. For though *Sweden* be none of the richest in Trade, yet have they their share to lose as well as the rest. And the revenues of that Crowne consisting much in Copper, (which hath occasioned their Armies spoiling all the Mines of that Metall in *Germany*, and wheresoever they could, on purpose to enhance their owne) they know very well that paines might have been spared, if Commerce should have an absolute Monarch; and that with all the *Chymistry* that they can use, they shall not be able to extract silver and gold out of that Metall, when one onely Chapman comes to the market. Besides their *Bremish* and other Territories on this side the *Baltick*, will soone ly a bleeding, they know; if *France's* Sword comes to wound the Roman Eagle, and his race. It may be some may say the *Dane* dares not for feare of losing that we are indebted to him. But who knows not that it is better to lose a part, then the whole. And if blows be a way of paying of debts, we may happily have *Portugall* so to pay us.

3. Having thus ballanced the apparent strength of both sides, we shall proceed to some other considerations, concerning the same. For it is not enough to consider power absolutely, but also the management thereof. And herein are many things, which in my judgement, were we an over-match for them, which you see is not so, would render our ruining their Navall power, and consequently their traffique impracticable. As 1. supposing we are under *France*, shall their whole fleet constantly be here, and leave the *French* coast naked, or shall they from thence come to joyne with us for our Sea expeditions? If the former, *France* is subject continually to be molested and diverted from *England*; and if the latter to be intercepted, by reason of their situation. 2. Who shall have the direction of navall affaires, is to me very considerable. Whether the *French* alone, or conjoynly with the *Dutch*; for that the latter onely should be intrusted, is not to be imagined. The former way is liable to miscarry through unskilfulness, the latter through jealousies and dissentions. 3. Where shall Mariners be had for our fleets? shall the *French* pres here as in their owne Kingdome? If so, I foresee, we shall soone lose our Sea-men. Or shall they onely use voluntieres? Then their number will be small, because the *French* pay is not

not great. I might mention other particulars, as the *French* and *Dutch* Officers discord. The manner of payments, and from whence, &c. But these are enow to shew us, that which way soever we looke there's nothing but difficulty and danger stares us in the face.

4. But we have yet that which is more momentous, and that is the situation of great *Britaine*. For could we knock their men in the head, as easily as our *Borinne's* their eggs; and sinke their ships, as if they were shels; yet we cannot possibly remove the Iland. Which is 1. Not onely nigh unto us, but over against us, so that we cannot looke out, but we are upon them. 2. So situated, that should we beate them and their Associates, (which is not easy in equall powers) they can still manage a war destructive to us. And what good will it doe any but the envious, to ruin others, if they be ruined themselves? For with a few ships in the Channel, wherein they have harbors all along, to go in and out at pleasure; they will force us continually to saile with great convoys, or we shall be forced to fall into their hands. And the like may be said of the Northerne passage by the *Orcades*, where a few ships will obstruct our Trade. Now how great a prejudice this is to traffique, I leave all knowing men to judge. For by this meanes. No single ships, nor small numbers can saile. Restraint will be laid upon going out but in great fleets, and with sufficient Convoys, Many will be necessitated to ly idle, and at great expences to waite for their Company, whilst they could sometimes have performed their voyage. And merchants lose particular designs, which are usually the greatest profit, to such as are able rightly to manage them. 3. In storms and tempests we shall be frequently forced into their harbours, and so fall as a prey into their mouths.

5. *Britaine* and *Ireland* being Ilands, are not easily invaded, and so diverted by a Land War; but that they may soly attend to a Maritime, when they are once engaged therein. Whereas *France* being on the Continent is subject to invasion from *Spaine* on several sides. Which was one reason, why our Ancestors preferred the guardianship of *England*, before that of *France*.

6. *Tanger* in the mouth of the *Straits*, will be no small prejudice to our *Mediterranean* Trade. Which if the mould or harbour can be made firme, will prove of great concernement to the *English* Crowne, and a strong curb to all their enemies traffique. And here I might add, *Cadiz*, and all the Coast of *Spaine*; for if we be *French*, no wise man (I thinke) will doubt, but we shall have *Spaine* our enemies againe.

And these things I thinke are abundantly sufficient to dismount our Adversaries confidence, of carrying away the Trade from *England*, if we should come under the power of *France*.

3. Another grand Argument against us is, that we are more likely to enjoy Peace under *France* than *England*.

Peace (I confes) is an invaluable blessing. How many and great miseries

ries doth it free us from! Bloodshed, violence to our persons and estates, unquietnes, and almost all manner of troubles. How many and great mercies doth Peace bring along with it! It is both the mother that beares, and the nurse that brings up, all our temporall blessings. It gives us mercies, the freedom of enjoying them, and sweetens their enjoyment. It containes liberty, plenty, equity, tranquility, pleasure, and safety. So that he was a mad man that should not choose Peace. But I feare our coming under *France*, is neither the way to procure Peace, nor the meanes to preserve it. And that we by so doing shall but have *Ixions* fate in the fable, embrace a cloudy and tempestuous War, instead of the faire and beloved *Juno* of Peace.

1. Let it be considered; that if we have Peace by Land, we have War by Sea: which is to leap out of the frying-pan into the fire. It is an old and a good political axiom *Ex duobus malis minus est eligendum*; theologically it was never, for in Divinity, *Nullum malum est eligendum*. Now if we rightly measure our Intrest, we shall find a Land War much more eligible for us, upon many accounts, which I need not here to mention, they being easily imagined by all wise men. For should it be granted, that for the present the two Crownes accord and we have Peace: it will either be such a one as will ruin us, or cannot be lasting to be sure; but in a very few yeares will necessarily come to the ballance I have mentioned of *Spaine* and *England* against *France* and *Holland*.

2. Let us therefore examine their grounds; that so we may see before us, and not run our selves blindfold into destruction. Which so far as I can discern are these foure. *The power and prevalency of his Armes. His treasure to maintaine them. His neernes to us. And his Allies.*

First for the *power and prevalency of his Armes*. 1. It is true his numbers are great, both in armes and in the Kingdome of *France*. The great advantages he hath, by the largenes, compactnes, situation, and soile of his Dominions; the infinite number of Nobility and Gentry for Cavalry, and the populousnes of his Cities and Provinces for Infantry, which capacitate him, above all the Princes of Europe, to enlarge his Empire; I well know, and willingly grant.

Sect. 5.

But what relates to the Kingdom of *France* concerns not us *Netherlanders* in this case further then as to his Armes and power to defend us. Now in my reason the greater power in the *Sovereign*, the les liberty in the *Subject*, as we have already showne. So that the more numerous his Armies, and so much the worse. Doth not *France* groane under this burden, and shall we desire to do so; or help to ease them by bearing part thereof on our backs? If we be so kind, I dare engage we may have it all, and a thousand thanks from that Kingdom. Which is so wearied with it, that above one halfe of them (if my intelligence greatly decieve me not) would rejoyce to see it lessend, though it were with some los to the honour of the Nation. But because I write not to be knowne, but to better the world, and with my

my bucket of water to helpe to quench the Flames, that threaten destruction to the Protestant Intrest; I shall desire all intelligent persons to enquire of those that understand *France*, or have come lately thence; and then let them consider if their condition be desirable. If a numerous Armie lies quarterd upon us, shall we not both be kept under by them, and eaten up of them? And although they be paid in the Kings name, yet must not we find our share of the money? I never yet red or heard of any wise people, that desired their Prince so potent, for feare he should oppres them. A due mediocritie hath allwayes been counted best. Let any one read the *Greeke* and *Roman* Historians, or any others that are wisely writ: and he shall find, if he duly observe, that the *Princes Potency* hath allwayes been the peoples jealousy.

2. It is also true, that he hath been succesfull in his Armes against us, beyond most mens imaginations, and perhaps even his owne hopes and expectations. But if all things be rightly considered, it is no such wonder as the world makes it. Our Wars by Sea; our intestine divisions; the cowardise of some; the corruption of many; and our multiplicity of garrisons, whereby our Forces were so parceld, that fighting severally they were easily vanquished; together with severall other causes which concurd under the hand of *Divine Justice*, makes it no wonderment to wise and considerate men. Nor is it any new thing in the world, but that which hath befallen most of the Nations in *Europe*, as all their Histories abundantly witnes.

3. Nor will this evince our defence. For it hath often been experimented, that those that have won much in a litle time, hath lost it againe in les. How did the same *French* Nation under *Charles* the 8, overrun most part of *Italy* in a litle time, and quickly lost it, as the many Historians of both Nations relate! And in our dayes, how did the *Swede* like lightning pass through *Poland*; which was quickly extinct and came to nothing! And so may this (if it please God, and we manage our worke wisely) like a thunderclap and suddain flash of lightning, affright and astonish us, more than hurt us, as I shall shew hereafter.

4. If *France* goes on, the world grows so jealous of their greatnes, that they may possible have worke enough; when their hand is against every one, and every one against them; and then where shall be our peace and defence? It is knowne by all that know former times, how in the *Roman* Monarchy when they were distressed at home, they still called their forces from abroad, and left their conquered Provinces to shift for themselves, as I might instance in *Spaine*, *France*, *England*, and many others both Easterne and Westerne. And indeed it allways is thus; so that should *France* be fallen into by *Spaine*, or *England*, or the *Empire*, or *Italy*; or rather severall of these joyntly; or should they fall into civill Wars, which are more frequent there then any, yea I think I may say all the Kingdoms in *Europe*; in what condition should we then be? Truly I will tell you, I think fighting with

with the *French*, and more eager to be rid of them, then many are now to receive them. If any one say, but would you have us entertaine the *English*? I say no, but preserve our owne freedome by complying with them, as I shall shew hereafter.

5. If we will espouse all the quarrels of *France* we may possibly have more then enow; and such as may prove our ruin, rather then safety and security. Our Marriners have their Wars by Sea, our citizens and Soldjers by Land. Our Merchants Trade to pay their money, and all to raise *France* to the universall *Monarchy*, to the ruin of the Reformed Religion, and allso the greatest part of Christendom. And though now his friends be many, yet if he once coms to receive a check his enemies will be more.

6. I see no need we have to feare all his power and prevalency, if we will but doe our duty, and quit our selves as men for our Country. And if we doe, upon our friendship with the Crowne of *England*, we may have Soldjers enow out of those 3 Kingdoms, which are as good Infantry surely as *French*, by their owne *Historians* Confession, and it is *Foot* we want (if any) for the defence of our Garrisons. And besides that they are not so likely to be remanded, as those of *France*; those Kingdoms being Ilands, les liable to invasion, and les likely to be engaged in forreign, or to be involved in Domestique Wars.

Secondly for his treasure, it cannot be denied to be very great. But this is rather against, then for our Adversaries. For the richer the Sovereign the poorer the subject. And I never knew any people yet, that desired to have their Prince so rich, especially when it comes out of their owne pockets. I will not medle with the dispute of the *Greeks* *Ostracisme*, nor that of Politicians, whether poverty or riches in the Sovereign be better for the subject. A due meane wise men have allwayes accounted best. When neither the Prince may be jealous of his people for their *Riches*, nor they of him for his *Treasures*; but that they may mutually depend on each other, for the good of the whole. For as it is difficult to determin, what the Magistrate may not demand, in case of necessity; so is it easy to conclude, that he ought not to impoverish his people when there is none, and make himselfe rich by their ruins. That being tollerable, but this intollerable oppression.

Nor is it imaginable, that he will make *France* poore, to make us rich. Nor is it credible that if they remaine poore, we shall remaine rich. For in all Princes there remaines some jealousies of a conquered people, that they may upon some revolution of affaires or other, revolt. And therefore it is their usuall practise, by all ways possible to drane them, and draw their riches home; as the *Romans* into *Italy*, and other Conquerors their owne Kingdoms; either by bringing it into their owne Treasuries, or Native subjects purses, or rather both, that so they may command it upon all occasions.

Thirdly for their nearenes unto us, we know it too well. And if the

subdued

Provinces remaine in their hands, shall find what it is to have such neighbors. But otherwise *England* is nearer us then *France*, and can easilier come to our assistance. For the *French* have not onely a long march, but through part of the Empire, which is their enemy, and so liable to obstruction. As to the Prince of Liege (or Archbishop of *Colen*) Duke of *Newburg* and others that have permitted this passage, they may pay deare enough for it hereafter; as their subjects are paying for it at present, even to the *French* themselves. Who are so weary of their Company, that I perswade my selfe, they will be the first that will endeavour, to drive them out, when they shall find an opportunity.

But we are not afraid of all our Adversaries weapons, and therefore will enforce their Argument, by supposing all they can desire; That *France* will keepe these conquered Provinces, and in all probability make new conquests, by subduing of the *Spanish* *Netherlands*. So that if we be not subject to him, we shall never be at quiet, but they will continually be as thornes in our sides.

1. And why may we not as well suppose, that if we be under him, we shall never be at rest for others? For no Potentate in Christendom hath more jealous eyes upon him, nor likelier to be continually employed in Wars. Now what will changing help us, if we better not our condition? For we may easily foresee, that if we come under *France*, we shall have *England* and *Spain* against us by Sea (as we have said) and the *Germans* and *Spanish* Provinces by Land, and so shall be in the same condition, though not by the same enemies, that we are now; ground like corne betwixt the mil-stones. Yea it is more then probable, that knowing the ticklish condition and mutinous temper of the *French* Nation, he will bring his Wars into these Countries and their confines, and so we shall againe become, the Cock-pit of War for all *Europe*.

2. I doubt not but he will attacque the *Spanish* Provinces, and seeke to connect them with his conquests, and then incorporate all with *France*. But it is uncertaine what time this may require before they be all under his power. We know not the Articles between the two Crownes, nor are we sure that *England* and *Austria* will see this worke. Many things may fall out, which no mans eye can foresee. The King of *France* is mortall and may dye, and the *Dauphin* young and so incapable to carry on such mighty designs. Or he may meet with a check in his enterprises, and be stopt in his further progres of glory. *France* is harrastr, and weary of Wars, may fall to their former mutinies. The King of *Spain* may grow more potent. *England*, *Sweden* and the Cantons of *Switzerland* may thinke themselves concerned, as well as the *Empire* and *Spain*, to stop the growing greatnes of *France*. The *Spanish* may divert him in *Catalonia* and else where. Sicknes and mortality may seaze upon his Armies. Factious in his court, discontents in the Country, tumults in his Kingdom, and many other Accidents may happen, to call him off us, or at least necessitate him to give us reasonable

sonable conditions, and confine him to his owne Kingdom. So that tis madnes to avoid a present mischiefe, to run our selves upon certaine ruine.

3. If we had the friendship of *England*, we might soone be in a capacity to defend our selves against *France*, and need not feare the power of their Armes. I doe not say that we alone are able to recover at present what we have lost, without the assistance of others: But that these remaining Provinces are able to defend themselves, and either let goe the other, or in time possibly regaine them, as we shall shew hereafter.

Fourthly For his *Allies*, they need not fright us. For all friendship of the World, and especially publick, proves often times like winter brooks, which runs freely when we have least need of them, but failes us in drought when we want their water. If the fortunes of *France* should once decline, we should see those that now adore them, readily renounce this their idolatry, and not onely confes their former fault, but help to turne the *whele* about, and bring them under whom they now exalt.

And thus we see what small grounds there are of enjoying such great Peace under *France*, as our Adversaries flatter themselves withall, and would perswade the World of; which will never finde credit with wise men, who are used to judge by Reasons of State, and not by the vaine arguments of fancy.

4. The fourth argument for *France* is, their having the *upper Provinces* already, which are of such concernement to the *Nether*, that they affirme we cannot want them, and therefore we must call in *France* that he may have them all, that so they may be joynd under one *Head*.

We cannot want them say they. 1. For our *Security*, and 2^{ly} for our *Commerce*.

Let us therefore examine these things, and having so done, we shall give a releafe to your patience in this great Argument of our Adversaries concerning *Trade*.

First that we cannot want them for our *Security*, is apparently false. Nay upon a *Politick account* we had better part with them, though not in poynt of *Honour and Religion*.

1. They were a continuall charge to these inferior *Provinces*, which yet was willingly borne, in regard of their being an out Sconse to us, which many supposed sufficiently strong for our defence. Which yet others have allwayes doubted of, and now we find they had sufficient reason. Seeing then some of them willingly deserted us, and others slightly defended themselves, and us consequently, and thus laid us open to the invasion of our enemies: if we let them goe, and they suffer thereby, they may thank themselves, and we must otherwise secure our Country.

2. I wonder men should think they can secure us, when we see the contrary by our experience. Nay indeed this was the great mistake that had like to have ruind us all. For we relying on them, was unprepared for our owne defence, whereby the whole was greatly endangerd. Yea so greatly,

greatly, that if the *French* had fallen into *Holland*, when they came to *Vtrecht*; I tremble to thinke, what worke they might have made amongst us.

3. It was apparent that the boundaries of the Common-wealth, was too great, and our Garrisons too many, to defend against such powerfull Armies. Which at the same time are not onely Masters of the field, but able to assault what Places they please. This War being far different from our former with *Spaine* (or les Potentates) wherein we had an Army to balance theirs, for reliefe of such Garrisons as were at any time attacqt by them. And this the *Author* of the *Intrest of Holland*, hath long since well observed, and experience now shews us. Wherein I dare be his second, against any combatants that dare encounter him.

4. Let any man but recount our Garrisons with their greatnes, and compute what number of men is requisite for their defence; and he will soone see, whether I have not cleare reason on my side. I shall not now stand to doe that, though if any be obstinate, I can doe it sufficiently to convince him: that though the *States* in times of peace mantaine 60000, and in this War above 100000 men by land; yet were they not halfe enow to defend all our Garrisons, and keepe an Army in the field to relieve them. And therefore I never expected any better success of the War, then now we see; though my judgement was entertaind, by many with merriment, and of others with feares it might prove Propheticall. For we must either have dismantled most of the weakest, and supplied a few of most consequence for a strong resistance; or it was never likely it should be otherwise then it is; it being allwayes found true by experience, that *multiplicity of weake powers prove none against strong; for dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur*. And therefore we see our enemies, had the wisedome to wave *Maestricht*, that was provided with men to give them worke; and fell upon such places, as they either knew their money had, or their swords could most easily conquer.

5. Many of our outmost Garrisons lying in a champaigne Country, cannot be relieved, without a powerfull Army of Cavalry. And these Countries are very uncapable many ways both for keeping and marching great numbers of Horse. In these lower Provinces land being so deare, and more profitable for Cows then horses; and so many great Rivers, which cannot be past with bridges, except we make them of boats continually, is sufficient demonstration that they cannot be here. And in the upper Provinces there is not forrage for such a body of Horse, as we must have if we will relieve our outmost Garrisons. And this those that knows them knows. Let us from *Bergen op Zoom* pass along the coast of *Brabant* by *Breda* and our other Garrisons even as far as *Maestricht*, and from thence back to the *Buys* which is the greatest part of the open Country we have (for *Gelderland*, *Vtrecht* and *Overissel* are full of Rivers) and we shall find that which belongs to us, inconsiderable for this purpose; the greatest part of that Country being heath, and barren ground.

I know

I know well that most of the Cities lie upon Rivers, but I know also and so doe all of ordinary understanding, that a fort on either side commands them, and so bars our passage by water to them.

But let us instance in one for all. I wish mine Adversaries would shew us any way to relieve *Maestricht* if it should be assaulted and distressed by the *French*. I meane that is practicable, for we are not now discourfing of *Mathematicall powers*, which demonstrate motions as swift as the sun's, and the plucking up Oakes with a single haire, and such like curiosities that can never be done; but of *Martiall powers*, which are not for speculative notions, but practicall performances.

6. Let us but consider who hath paid those great Armies we have constantly kept, and must pay many more both foot, and horse (which are much more chargeable) that we must keep, if we will defend these out-Provinces against powerfull enemies; and we shall soone see that we must pay very dear for their uncertaine and weake defence of vs. For this purpose I shall satisfie the curious with inserting the proportion of Taxes which each Province payes to the Publick for the Armies and other expences: whereby it will appear that the *quota* of these superior Provinces, *Gelderland*, *Over-Iffel*, and *Utrecht* (which the *French* now posses) is very inconsiderable, wherein also they have often been behind, and will be much les able now to pay it, being so much impoverished.

<i>Gelderland</i>	5	12	3
<i>Utrecht</i>	5	16	7½
<i>Over-Iffel</i>	3	11	5
<i>Holland</i>	58	6	2½
<i>Zeeland</i>	9	3	8
<i>Friesland</i>	11	13	2½
<i>Groening</i>	5	16	7½

7. If they be regained, we must pay for it, they being now under our enemies. And what an infinite of blood and treasure that will cost, if our enemy will not quit them on reasonable termes in treaty, I leave any man to judge.

8. If we rightly consider, great Territories are for Kings, small onely fit for Common-wealths. This we may observe in the Histories of former times, in the Grecian Republicks and their neighbour Kingdoms. For the *Roman* was mixt of *Monarchy* and *Aristocracy*, by the great power of their *Consuls* ruling as Monarchs by their turnes, and especially in dangers by *Dictators*. Yea our owne experience hath showne us this in the neighbouring Kingdoms. But what shall I say, many men are like the Judges Statues at *Thebes*; have their eyes blinded and hands lamed, though not for Justice, but for judgement, they can neither see nor feele before them. In 59 being then in *England*, in some Gentlemens Company, where there were some zealous Republicans, and I from History and observation

shewing

shewing them, that in great dominions especially where there are many Nobility, a Common-wealth could never stand long; that if there, it must be from the City of *London* managing it as *Rome* had done, and not as they went to worke, and severall other things, shewing the impracticableness of their notions, (which I have reason to remember, for I was complained of to *Lambert*, and was in danger of being called before the *Council of State*) In the year 60 some of them tooke me for halfe a Prophet, and so perhaps may some hereafter, for what I shall now say: *That if we affect great Territories by Land we shall loose all.* It is our Sea affaires, that we are set for by our Country, made for by our genius, and fit for especially, by our employment. And we may as well thinke to turne our Rivers, as change these things, nay indeed if we could it would quickly turne to our destruction: Traffique by Sea, as I formerly have showne being our chiefe secular intrest.

But I foresee what will here be said, that a weake defence is better then none, and how shall these *inferior Provinces* be otherwise secured.

It is very true indeed, *better a weake wall, then none at all.* And if we could not build a stronger, and at les charges, and with far les cost for reparation and defence against the violent stormes of our enemies, (for none can secure us against Heaven) we should be ashamed to have throwne downe the old, which (in my judgement) is by the former Considerations levelled with the ground. For as it is folly to pull downe before we consider how to build better, so we must take heed that therein we commit not those errors which many wise men, (though that was none of their wisdom) have frequently (as I have often observed) fallen into in their building, *To bestow as much in piecing and patching an old house, as would build a new one far stronger and better: and when they have built either old or new, to find severall inconveniences therein, which a provident foresight might have prevented.* As the ingenious Mathematician Doctor *Wren* hath demonstrated (as I heare) in *England*, that they had better build *S. Paul's* in *London* a new, then repare the old. So I thinke I am able to demonstrate, that we had better make a new defence for these *inferior Provinces* then that of the superior. But it must be well considered of, lest we finde inconveniences therein afterwards. And as in *Architecture* I pleasantly play with dice and cardes alone (which others doe in company) making my walls of the former, and floores and covering of the latter, to see the conveniences and inconveniences therein, better than in plane figures; and especially to demonstrate the same to others that will advise with me therein, and are no Mathematicians: so here I must confes I have seriously pulled downe and set up severall defences for us, which are too long to relate. But I will briefly touch of some things, which are sufficient (I thinke) to silence mine Adversaries.

There are 5 or 6 wayes of Natural Fortification and defence of a Country. Seas for Ilands, which are the best. For though they are thereby incapacitated, to enlarge their empire abroad, being by the Sea as it were confined to home; yet have they great advantages thereby, not onely of maritime

maritime negotiation, but also security from invasion. So that they are at small charges for maintaining Armies; which those that live on Continents, must constantly doe for their defence: otherwise the doore stands open for the first that comes, to enter in and take possession.

Great mountaines that are unpassible for Armies, or such passes as the famous *Thermopyles*, which are easily defended, and these are next to Seas the best defence.

Vast Wilderneses where Armies can have no provision to march, but what they carry along with them, as in *Africa*.

Peninsular Countries, which are easily retrencht within lines of security, as the famous Wall in the North of *England*, first made by *Agricola*, *Nero's* Generall there, repared by *Hadrian*, and after by *Severus* against the *Picts*, the ruins whereof are still apparent. And *Scotland* often also against *England* hath thus retrencht themselves, even in our dayes with great safety against the *English* Army; which if they had had the wisdom to have kept within, they had saved themselves and the Kingdome: but their adventurous folly in forsaking them, was dearly paid for by the los of both.

Great Rivers which cannot easily be past. As *Euphrates* in the *East*, and the *Rhyme* in the *West*, defended those Nations beyond them, from the great power of the *Romans*.

And lastly inundations by water, marish and boggy grounds, &c.

I might be large in examples of all these in severall Kingdoms of the World; and also in the wonderfull Providence of God, who hereby sets bounds and limits to the mighty *Nimrod's* of the World, saying unto them by the voyce of Nature as to the great Seas and waters, *hitherto shall ye goe and no further*: but I will confine my selfe to our owne Country.

Now these Provinces if we consider them aright, are naturally fortified most of these wayes. Not by mountaines, for we live in a level Country; nor by desarts and barren wilderneses, for we have a fruitfull Land, like *Canan* flowing with milk and honey. But all the other wayes we are defensible; so that if we can but defend our selves by Sea, and keep that for our Commerce; we need not fear all our enemies by land. We have the Sea to gard us below, mighty Rivers not onely within but on both sides these Provinces to defend us: we are either Ilands as *Zeeland*; or Peninsular as *Friesland* and *Groningen* together, and *Holland* and *Utrecht*, by reason of the Sea and great Rivers that almost surround them. And let it come to the utmost extremity, we can by water drowne our enemies and save our selves in our Cities. So that they that talke of conquering us, must either be fooles, or ignorant of the Country: and those that fear to be conquered, pusillanimous and frighted with vaine bravadoes.

But we will be a litle more particular, in running over briefly the severall Provinces.

Zeeland consisting wholly of Ilands, is thereby well fortified, and the Inhabi-

Inhabitants so used to the water, that they are not easily masterd therein.

Friesland and *Groningen* together, are almost surrounded with the *North* and *South Seas* together with the River *Emes*, and scarce accessible by Land in regard of the marish or boggy grounds, if *Coeverden* and some other strong places on the passes be kept.

Holland will prove the greatest difficulty, and of most consequence; that Province being the Head and Heart of this Republick. For this end I must suppose that we must have part of the Province of *Utrecht*, which we must either regaine by treaty, or by strength, let it cost what it will, both for our communication, and future safety. And then we have these two againe almost environed with the *North* and *South Seas* and severall branches of the *Rhijne* and *Maes*. Onely one neck of ground between the *Leck* and *South Sea* of 5 or 6 miles, where a River might be cut to carry water from the former, as something higher, into the latter: from between *Viana* and *Twael*, from whence downwards the River is deep, and hath the Tyde flowing up, by *Houten*, *Heer Melis waert*, *Melaeten*, and so along the low grounds to *Pynenborch* into the River *Eem* to the *South Sea*. Which will make the whole adjacent Country being low stagnate with water, and so defend these two Provinces from their enemies incursions. And the rest are done to our hands, by the severall foldings of the Armes of those two great Rivers the *Rhijne* and the *Mase*, whose severall denominations, I need not mention, nor the places where, these being sufficiently knowne to those that know these Countries.

But oh *Utrecht!* *Utrecht!* I foresee there will so much depend upon that one city, that I feare the greatest affaires of *Europe* will hang, and turne upon that single hinge. I know we flatter our selves they will part with it, and I wish we may not be deceived; but I feare far other things, not so much from what I have said, as from other reasons of State. But if any will aske what those are: I say *Ho-la*, I am so far from publishing them, that if the shirt on my back knew the thoughts of my heart herein, it should be my first worke to burne it.

But our Adversaries will fight it out to the stumps both of their strength and weapons. They say the *French* in the superior Provinces have the command of our Rivers, and so will be able to ruin our Trade.

Truly I am tired with this long discourse of Trade, and therefore for a divertisement I will tell you a short and pleasant story. Upon a time King *James* of great Britaine, was angry with the city of *London*, and sent for some of the Aldermen and common Council, whom he first chid and then threatned, that he would take away their *Charters*, spoile them of their Priviledges, and ruin the city; that he would. An old fox that stood behind, perceiving the King in a passion, and the rest of the *Ruffs* in a silent fright, pretended deafnes; and industriously that his Majesty might observe him, enquired first of one and then of another; *What saies his Majesty? what? Doth he say he will turne the River of Thames?*

Thames? The King perceiving it, would needs know what he said, and being told, burst out into laughter, and swore in his Scottish dialect he was a *fause lounie*, and packt them away. So let me merrily aske mine Adversaries one after another; what? will the King of *France* turn the *Rhine*? will he turne the *Maes*? Will he cut off the armes of those mighty Rivers? Or will he riveletise them into more hundred furrows then Historians tell us *Cyrus* did *Gyndes* when he went to take *Babylon*? Will he chastise the South Sea, and fetter it, as *Xerxes* did the *Hellepont*, makeing *Harderwijck* and *Hoorne* as *Sestus* and *Abydus* of old, now the strong Castles the *Turks* have made in the *Dardanelis*? Let the old rich Merchants that have more money to lose then I, feare that, I doe not. And except he can, so long as we keepe the mouth of the Rivers where they exonorate themselves into the Sea; let the *French* keep them above, and see what they can make of them.

But to be serious. I had thought our trading had been in ships at Sea especially, and not with boats in Rivers. And that it is these inferior Provinces, and our Sea Traffique that *France* aims at; though in regard of our Navall strength, he comes downe upon us by Land; thinking that way to carry the Country. For his stopping the boates passing up and downe the *Rhine* and *Maes*, there is no feare if we rightly consider, that that will ruine the *French* themselves more then us. In regard we can subsist without this, and they cannot. We have Corne in abundance from *Dantsick* and other places, with which we supply others in want: but they must have theirs from above, by these Rivers. How can we thiuke that he should stop the Commerce betwixt *Germany* and these Countries by the *Rhine*; and they not stop his provisions at *Colen*, and other places? Or that he intercept the Traffique by the *Maes*; and *Liege*; or at least *Namurs* under the *Spanish*, should not prohibit his supplies from *France*? There are two wayes of dealing with enemies. If small to beat them, if great to pine them. They dare not but leave a considerable Army in those Provinces, for feare of the former; and they must be supplied from abroad, for feare of the latter. Now if they be not from us beneath, they must be by these from above; for those Provinces alone are not able to provide for them; and why then should we trouble our selves with such fantastical feares? Were it not that I thought these things sufficient, and that I have been already so prolix in this Argument; I would shew at large that those above depend on us for our money and commodities, more then we on them for theirs. But to doe this satisfactorily, would be a large discourse, and therefore I dismis it, at least for the present.

Our adversaries having thus spent their Canon upon us ineffectually, will needs try a volly of small shot: That we must have these out Provinces, for the quartering our Armie, that so our Cities may be free from their disturbance in Trade.

But this reaches us not. For we have our Garrisons enow, upon the confines of these inferior Provinces, as *Sluys*, *Bergen op Zoom*, *Breda*, *Buffs &c.*

Buffs &c. well knowne, that are of les Trade, and capable to quarter 100000 men if need was, as I can easily make apparent. Nor doe I imagine Soldiers prejudiciall to any trading City, if they be not too numerous; but rather helpfull, by the Excise they pay, the worke when off the watch they cheaply performe, the spending their money with the poorer sort, and severall other wayes which might be mentioned.

And thus you see in point of profit, or worldly Intrest, that we can want the superior Provinces, (excepting the Citie of *Utrecht*, and a litle of the Circumjacent Country) yea had better quit them upon severall accounts; and though our boundaries be les, yet if we be more compact and stronger, that will abundantly compensate our greatnes: besides the vast expence which is spared thereby, not onely of blood, but treasure, in mantaining constantly so great an Army as we must, if we will recover and defend them. The onely advantage that I can foresee by them is, to have bad neighbors further off: but whether that will Countervale the cost, may be a question to others, but is none to me.

But if we valew our honour at so high a rate, and will pay so deare for it, that if the *French* will not part with them upon faire terms, we will wage war for them; I heartily wish we never repent it. For I have observed that *Common-wealths* are fitter for selfe defence, and *Kingdoms* for conquests. Wich is shadowed out by the *Venitian* Statue, holding a shield in the right hand: that some unskilfull Travelers condemn, as an error in the Statuarie. Whose yet ambitious swerving from this *Common-wealths* maxim, cost them very deare: and seeing it is the neereft paralel to our case I know, I shall briefly relate it, because I thinke it may be usefull for us. The *Venetians* having long warred with the *Genovese* at Sea, afterwards cast an ambitious eye on the Continent of *Italy*, and by one means or other (too long to relate) became Masters of many considerable places. This made them envied by their neighbouring Monarchs, who entred at *Cambray* A. 1508. into a league to war against them. *Maximilian* the Emperor, first of that name, recovered *Padua*, *Vincenia*, *Verona*, &c. belonging to the Empire: the Pope *Ravenna*, *Cernia*, *Ariminum* and *Faventia*: Lewis the 12 then posselt of *Millaine* in right thereof, *Bergamum*, *Crema*, *Cremona* and *Brixia*; *Ferdinand* the King of *Spaine* in right of *Naples*, *Mansfredonia*, *Trano*, *Barlet* and *Monopoli*, all of them havens on the *Adriatick*: the Duke of *Ferrara*, *Rovigo*: and the Duke of *Manua*, *Asula*: in so much that the *Venetians* were forced to betake themselves to the *Ilands* and marishes of their City. And yet in a short time by compliance with the Pope, they broke the confederacy, and by one meanes or other regained the rest, except those belonging to the Realm of *Naples*. The question is debated in the Senate, whether they should war for these or no? And wisely concluded in the negative, that although they were commodious havens for them, yet better to part with them, then war with such a potent Prince as *Spaine*. And let me say it freely of our selves, that had we served God, followed our Trade, and kept our selves more

more off the Stage of *Honour*, as our Ancestors did: We had les occasiond our neighbours envie, and not beene reduced to those Strates we are in.

But if our Senators be of *Nasica's* judgement, and would have this foile for our *Martiall valour*, and this exercise to rub off the rust, our Armes have contracted by their long rest. If our Cavalry are ambitious to have the trumpet of Fame sound their praises, and the Infantry to have their marches beaten, through succeeding Ages and Generations. I wish that the Eccho of Fame may follow them, with a clearer sound then the hoarse clamour of the People; and hope that the imbellick Bores that are ready to start at the report of a gun, and stoope at the whistling of a bullet, may, by having daingers familiarised to them, become (as the Fox did with the Lion) undaunted at last, and under their brave Generall and Commanders regaine our reputation; and shall heartily pray both for our Senators prosperity, and Soldiers succes.

The onely consideration that swayes with me for contesting for them, if we cannot have them otherwise, is that of *Religion*. If therefore this policy, I have pleaded, should prove Apocryphall; and that our League and alliance with them, obliges us for their recovery; or that the rules of Christian Charity require us, to adventure our owne los for their safety: God forbid that I, or any man else should be against it; and I hope there are none so degenerate, but will contribute their best assistance both in purse and person to so good a worke. If the *Turkes* will redeem the caged birds to set them at liberty, let us much more willingly our Christian Brethren, and so committing our cause to God, pass thorow the *Temple of Vertue*, that we may happily come to that of *Honour*.

Having thus shewne the impregnableness of the truth of our cause, against the assaults of its Adversaries; and fought it out with them, in their representing the *Advantages of being under France, and disadvantages of being under England*, and our Replying: It coms now to our turne to be *Assailants*, wherein we hope to obtain an absolute conquest, by shewing them the quite contrary.

Now herein we might be very large, if we would argue from all the *suasorie* and *dissuasorie* topicks; as the *Honesty* of being under *England* rather than *France* for the common Intrest of the Protestant Religion; the *Honorableness* thereof for the common good of Christendome, whose Intrest it is to oppose the greatnes of *France*, as we shall shew hereafter: the *Equity* of this for assisting our *Allies* against *France*: the *Possibility* or practicableness of this onely, now that his *Highnes* is both *Generall* and *Stadtholder*: and also from the contrary of these if we seeke to come under *France*. But we shall onely insist upon that of *Utility*, because that is most perswasive; and that with respect to our selves onely, the most part of men being so selfish, that they prefer their *particular*, before the *publick good*.

The disadvantages of being under France, and advantages of being under England.

1. Our being under *France* brings us infallibly unto a war with *England* and *Spaine*, in some short time at least, if not presently, as we have already shewne. Now how destructive such a war is to our maritime Negotiation, I leave all wise men to judge, and merchants especially who have the experience thereof.

Whereas on the contrary our being under *England*, gives us *Peace* and freedome of Trade *by Sea*; at least inconsiderable disturbance in comparison; yea very probably by *Land* also; in regard we can spoile *France's* Trade, disturb his coasts, divert his designes, and ballance his power. For *France* cannot fight with all Europe. If we be under *England*, we have *Spaine*, the Empire &c. with us: and if *France* will fight, we need not feare him. But if that which is said be not sufficient (as I suppose it is) I am ready to make it apparent, that a Land War is more eligible for this Republick, then one by Sea with such potent enemies, and take the utmost interruption *France* can make of our Sea-trafficke into the ballance.

2. If we come under *France* we shall either do it *entirely*, or *partially*.

If the former we are ruind in a great measure in our Commerce; for supposing that the *Spanish Netherlands* fall under *France* also, as in all probability they will, and that speedily, as even our Adversaries themselves take it for granted; the *Scheld* will be open and free, and so *Antwerp*, *Bruxels*, *Mechlin*, *Loven*, *Lier* and the other Cities of *Brabant*, by this means recover part of their former Commerce; which now we deprive them of by *Vlissing* and *Rammekens* below, and *Lillo* above on that River: and *Ghant*, *Cortrick*, *Rissel* and other Cities of *Flanders* a part, by the former River being free, and by opening the other passage to them, which is now obstructed at the *Sas van Ghant*.

Now of how great consequence this is to us, especially in regard of *Amsterdam*, which beares now a double proportion in the Admiralties, and almost the halfe of the burden of the taxes of *Holland*, which is almost the halfe of the whole Republick, I leave any one to judge, and especially those that know the principles of Intrest for that great and flourishing Citie. I could be very large upon this, in shewing how the fall of *Antwerp* was the rise of *Amsterdam*; how this Citie prevailed that the other should not be taken by the Armes of this Republick; as also what some say it cost them to prevent it; that this was a great inducement to the States, not to enlarge the Republick on the side of *Flanders* and *Brabant*; and what a great motive it was to make peace with *Spaine*, that so they might prevent so Potent a Prince as *France*, from coming so nigh them upon that quarter, and doing it by power; and how *Holland* gave security for mantaning the peace, when *Zeeland* protested against the same: But these are so well knowne in *Holland*, and the objections against it so answered, *Schookius* that I need not lanch into this Ocean. Now who is so purblind but he may foresee
de Pace.

foresee, that if we come under *France*, the *Flemish* Merchants especially *Papists*, will returne and carry their Trade to *Antwerp*, and many *French* also settle themselves there; the River being much better, the Citie fit for traffique every way, and having the Popish Religion publicly profest, so that it will soone contest with *Amsterdam* for Trade, and carry it ere long; and then *Amsterdam* may say of *Antwerpe*, as the ice of the water, *Mater me genuit, mater mox gignitur ex me*. For we must thinke those Cities, and particularly *Antwerp*, are nearer the Confines of *France* than *Holland*; and will be more confided in, being *Papists*; so that they will become both the care and Crowne of that King and Kingdome, for their Trade in these Northerne parts of the World. Yea let me say it, for I know it to be true, this is that the Trading *Flamens* long for, seeke for, and should above all things be glad to see: so that in stead of hindring, they shall help, all they dare, *Frances* conquest for this their Intrest.

And if some of these Provinces onely come under *France*, and othersome under *England*; what a miserable condition shall we be in; by having two such potent Princes continually contesting in the midst of us, so that by such strong fits of Cholick in our bowels, and Convulsions in the whole body, our disease must needs become mortall, and our wounds incurable. Let us suppose that which is likeliest, both by the best intelligence, inclination of the people (as we have said formerly) and intrest as we shall shew hereafter, that *Zeeland* become *English*, and *Holland* should chuse *France*; and consider the situation of *Zeeland*, neere the Sea, and almost right over the River of *Thames*, and both between *France* and *Holland*, and betwixt *Holland* and the Channel; the Harbours of *Vlissing* and *Ter Vere*, into which, the latter especially, all Winter long, notwithstanding the Ice, is safe arrival; their genius as well as commodiousnes to Cape: and then judge in what a perilous condition the Trade of *Holland* will be under *France*, and what miserable worke will be made amongst us. Or let it be supposed that there is friendship between *France* and *England* in the enjoying their severall shares (for we will grant all possibilities, and much more probabilities, our Adversaries can reasonably desire) and how will our mutuall traffique be spoiled, by the impositions of both Crownes upon commodities; if we should pay to the one in *Holland* and the other in *Zeeland*, as undoubtedly we must. For it is a certaine truth, that multiplicity of impositions, especially when great, spoiles merchandise. And will it not be in *Englands* power, to open the River, and make it free for *Antwerp* &c. as we have said? and in that case, where will the vast Commerce of *Holland* then be?

Whereas on the contrary were we either of these wayes under *England*, we exclude *France* and *Flanders*, and preserve our Trade to our selves.

If we be entirely under *England*; we may save the *Spanish* Netherlands, whose Governours are contented with what Commerce they have, rather than lose all; we may preserve our selves from the *French* neighbour-

bourhood; and thereby also our Trade from them both.

Or if we be but in part so; we preserve the friendship of these Provinces, the Trade betwixt us, secure our intrest both at home and abroad, and command the Commerce of *Europe* at our pleasure.

3. If we come under *France*, we have not onely *Spaine* our enimie by Sea and Land (as we have shewne) but the los of our *Spanish* Trade, and the hazarding of our whole *Levant* Traffick: And if we rightly calculate, that amounts to no small part of our Commerce. The *Spanish* Netherlands, *Spaine*, and their Dominions in *Italy*, taking off much of our *East* *Indy* and *Westerne-wares*. For as *Muscovy* and the other *Northerne Nations* consume much of our *Pepper*, and some hotter Spices, so the *Southerne*, and *Easterne* in the *Mediterranean*, much of our other commodities. Now with what security can we either carry them through that Sea, or bring our *Silks*, *Camels-haire*, and other of the richest commodities we have, from *Aleppo*, *Egypt*, and our other *Factories* for the *Turkie* Trade, and maintaine our Traffique with *Venice*, *Leghorne*, and other places in *Italie*: Seing the *Spaniards* besides the ports of *Spaine*, have so many *Havens* and some *Ilands* in the *Adriatick*; *Sicilia*, *Sardinia*, *Majorca* and *Minorca* in the *Midland* *Sea*; and *Cadiz* so commodiously situated at the mouth of the *Straits*; some of which have been famous in all ages for the *Archeft* *Pirates* in the whole World. Betwixt these therefore and the *Turks*, we are certaine of nothing, but of bad Trading, and they good *Caping*. So that I may conclude with the *Poeticall* *Proverbe*, that he that desires to fly from *England* and fall under *France* for traffique, *Incidit in Scyllam, cupiens vitare Charybdam*.

Whereas on the contrary, if we come under *England*; we certainly secure our Commerce with *Spaine*, and all the *Territories* belonging to that Crowne. And not onely so, but against the *Turkish* *Pyrats* which infest those Seas, which would be of no small advantage to us. For besides that *England* is at peace with some of those places on the *African* coast, and is in friendship with the *Turkish* *Empire*; how easy a thing was it for us joyntly, to bring the rest to our owne termes? Yea so to subdue them all and keepe them under, that they should never be able to disturbe us, no nor *Christendom* more by their *Caping*? And how generous a designe this is, and how destructive to that great and common enimie of all *Christians*; I leave all wise men, and well-wishers to *Christianity* to consider and judge.

4. Our *East* *Indie* Trade, the richest jewel of this Republick, which hath occasioned us so much envie, and caused so many quarrels and contests; if we come under *France*, will run a great *Risko* to be ruined. Hath not this been their great designe of late yeares? Have they not for this end erected a *Compagnie*? And now got footing there, and follow it further, even this last yeare, as we heare, with their greatest endeavours? Nay is not this the principall motive, which induces them to make this Warr? I know we need not feare them there, nor all *Europe* if we have peace here, and can send them supplies; We are so far advanced in that Negotiation

so strong in forts, shipping, and Soldjers; our men so accustomed to the heat of those Countries; our Mariners to those coasts; and Merchants to the languages and Trade of those parts. But if we come under *France*, will not *England* and *Spaine* seeke continually to intercept our supplies thither, and our Returnes from thence? Will not this put us to vast Charges of Convoys to defend our ships going and coming in security? Will not some through storms and other accidents when seperated, unavoydably fall into their hands; as we have often experienced? And will they not allways be in one hazard or other from them for safety? Yea let us suppose that all stands well there, and none of our ships miscarie through our enemies, but safely arrive both there and here; where shall we vent those commodities from thence at the prices they now yeeld us; when we have such enemies at home, and such dangers in carrying them abroad, as we have formerly showne? Nay, can we rationally thinke otherwise, then that the Kingdome of *France* will have share with us there, and the Crowne the greatest profit here? So that our *East Indie Actions*, as high as they are now, may in a litle time come as low as those of the *West Indie Company*; which was once thought equall will the other, and are now next to nothing: and then many of us, who have most of our estates adventured in the *East Indie's Trade*, may lose that we have left, as we have formerly lost by the *West Indie's*; and no remedie but patience, for we must sit downe in a sorrowfull silence. Herein I have reason to speake feelingly of my feares, being so concernd according to the proportion of my small estate; how much, matters none but my selfe, but were it ten times more, I must tell you; that though the *Actions* at this present are considerably above three hundred, I shall the first day I see we come under *France*, sell mine willingly for two, rather than keepe them, and render many thanks to the buyer into the bargaine.

Whereas on the other hand if we come under *England*, they have formerly had, and still have a considerable share in the *East Indie Trade*. Their *Company* and ours accord well, and frequently accommodate each others correspondence. His Majesty in the former War in his Declaration, and the Papers past between the *States Generall*, and his Envoy Sr. *George Downing*, A.D. 1664. insists upon *Polexon* one of the *Banda* Islands, satisfaction for injuries past A.D. 1665. with deduction of what we had suffered, and regulation of Trade for the future: and his Majesty in his Declaration of this present War onely mentions the last, *the Regulation of Trade in the East-Indies*. Now I perswade my selfe, that neither the *States* nor *East-Indie Company* will stick upon these. For *Polexon*, if they have it, it can now neither be any great profit to them, nor prejudice to us: For a just accompting with them, what just man can be against it? Or against a due and equall Regulation of Trade? that so all occasions of contests between the two Nations may be cut off, and wholly prevented for the future. It is true, that reaches not the supposal of our being under them, but onely standing upon equall termes with

with them for Trade: and therefore we will come close up to the supposition in hand.

And herein we shall proceed with such frankenes, that we shall grant more then our Adversaries can reasonably be jealous of; and that is, that the *English* should have halfe of that Trade with us; and yet shew that it is better for us then to take in *France*. For 1. The *English* have a considerable part allready, and *France* but an inconsiderable: so that we must in all probability part with much more to the latter, and need part with les to the former. Our first capital of the *East-Indy Company*, is 64 Tun of Gold, and the *English* 40. It is true we have traded both longer and more, and so have a greater improvement: suppose 70 Tun of Gold there, which ordinarily is reckond about three times the valew when returned hither; and suppose as much or more here, in goods and money; which vastly exceeds the *English*: yet it must be considered that we are at greater expences there severall ways, then they; that we have money at Intrest, though inconsiderable to what formerly, having payd off the last yeare above 50 some say 60 Tun of Gold. I must here ingenuously confesse, that I have but the forementioned calculations from the curiosity of discourse, and the credit of others; not upon the authentick authority of the bookes of both Companies; which I have nor leisure now, nor indeed pleasure to enquire into; and yet I think I am neer the truth, having had these things from very good hands. I will therefore proceed, and here we are certaine that besides a great sum of money, our Company hath lent the States to carry on this War, which I reckon as an honourable gift, we are like to part with a far greater to purchase our peace. And though our *Actions* be far more worth then theirs, for example a capitall *Action* that gives right to a suffrage, in the election of the Directors of that Trade being originally 100 l. *Vlambish* (or 600 gilders) is now in these bad times worth above 300 l. *Vlamb.* (or 1800 g.) and in times of peace 400 l. *Vl.* (or 2400 g.) and sometimes 500 l. *Vl.* (or 3000 g.) and with them not worth two, or twelve: yet this arises not so much from the great emolument, that the Participants here receive more then there; as from the plenty of money here, which severall have and know not how otherwise to improve, the small Intrest (usually under 4 per Cento to those of good credit) and the dearthnes of Land; all which are contrary in *England*. So that I leave it to any competent and impartiall man to judge, (should it be so, which yet, I thinke, none need to feare) whether it is better for us to supply the *English* with a les part, or the *French* with a greater of that our Trade. For I dare say, that if *England* hath a fourth of ours, *France* hath not an eighth part thereof.

2. How easy is it for us and *England* to beate *France* out of the *East-Indie Traffique*? if we have Wars, or if the *French* seeke to incroach upon us.

3. Under *England* we keepe our owne *Chambers of Trade*; whereby thousands of families subsist in our *Cities*. All manner of Trades for shipping and

and navigation, Carpenters, Smiths, Sale-makers, &c. All manner of Tradesmen for victuals, Bakers, Brewers, Butchers, &c. by their labour at least. All manner of shopkeepers for selling them Provisions that are sent, and buy commodities that returne. Besides the poorer sort, as Boats-folk, Labourers, &c. which are exceeding many that wholly depend on the Company for their livelihood. Whereas if we come under France, and the Spanish Provinces also, as we may reasonably suppose; a great share will be removed to Antwerp, there being so large and magnificent an East-Indy house, and that being nearer France by far. Wherby our Trade being taken from us, our Cities will be impoverished beyond imagination.

4. The impositions of the Crowne of England is with consent of the people in Parliament; the rates both inward and outward being set by law: and so would be here with consent of the States. Those of France arbitrary, and inhanfible at pleasure. And how great an alteration Customs make in Commerce, I leave all knowing Merchants to judge.

I foresee it will be said, that were we under France we should beat England out of the East Indy Trade, and so have it wholly to our selves.

If they could make either the Antecedent or Consequent good, the Argument deserved consideration; but I know they cannot; for they are both impracticable.

First we cannot beat them out there, till we have conquered them here: for how shall we in Wars with them, spare ships soldjers, &c. to doe that? Now what probability there is of conquering them, is formerly declared. The English are reasonably fortified and provided, and will doubtles be better, if they see danger approaching. And not only so, but being in good amity (as I have heard) with those Nations where they reside, they would never suffer our enmity to prevaile so far against them. Nor those Nations with whom we both Trade: for knowing how low one chapman makes the market, they will assist the weaker, rather than lose their advantage by them.

Nor if we should conquer them there, will all the spoiles fall to our selves; as some may possibly thinke, whose hopes are postilion to the sun, and therefore fancy things beyond the moone; and bring such booties from East to West upon the wings of their windy imaginations. For in stead of hoping to have halfe, we have reason to feare, should it be so, that France will have all the parts of the prey.

5. If we be under France; what shall become of our Fisherie upon the coast of England, and those multitudes of families that depend thereon? I might be large heerein from my owne Observations, having had the humor or curiosity (call it what you please) to view all the Rivers, harbors, and almost Creakes on both the opposite Coasts, from Thames to Tinmouth, and from the Elve to Oostend. And particularly Yarmouth and Flamborough-bead, as the greatest Promontories of England, and whereabouts there is the best fishing. But I will onely speake to those things which concerne the

the present Argument. A diligent person calculated in the Yeare 62 the dependants on the fishing-trade (I meane not Fishers onely, but also all employed about their shipping, nets, caske, salt, &c. with their Attendants at Sea) and reckond them above 400000. Yea some have made their number far greater; particularly that learned, wise, and valiant Knight Sr. Walter Rawleigh (whom I paralel with Sr. Philip Sidney) in his information of King James, reckons our vessels that fish on the coasts of great Britaine 3000 and every 20 buffes to maintaine 8000, which will amount to 1200000. But this is incredible. He must either be mistaken in the number of ships, or the proportion he allots them, or both. For upon diligent enquiry I cannot find half that number either of Ships or men in some years last past. If he meane of the 3 severall seasons of fishing; in Autumn for Herrings, Spring for Cod-fish, and summer for Salmon; we shall not contest with him; nor concerning the Number he sayes attends them, viz: 9000 other vessels, and 150000 men. It is sufficient for my present purpose, that I shew, that our Fisherie is very considerable, and the friendship of England for the same, of far more consequence to us then that of France.

Guicciardine, A very diligent Writer, A. D. 1587 reckons the Hering-buffes, that fish on the Brittish Coasts at least 700, and some said many more; and though he include Flanders, yet not the other Fisheries, as Rawleigh doth, and doubtles of all the maritime Provinces of this Republick; which the Author of the Interest of Holland c. 5. erroneously appropriates to that Province alone, through inadvertency, that Forreigners frequently call all these united Provinces Hollanders, that being the principal, and all the Spanish, yea formerly all the 17 by the name of Flamens. And not onely so, but tells us the Fisherie is increased since a third part, which I cannot credit, not onely in regard that the English, but French and Flemish whom we used to supply for the greatest part, now fish themselves. Yea I rather thinke, that since our Merchandise hath so much increased, our Fisherie hath decreased.

Descript. generalis Belgij.

And what considerable profit redounds to us thereby, appears by the computation which Guicciardine makes very particularly, that those 700 Buffes take annually 490000 last of Hering, which he reckons at 10 l. Vl. or 60 guldens the last; which amounts yearly together with the other Fisheries to the following sums.

		1. Vlam.		Sterl.
Herrings	_____	490000.	or _____	294000.
Cod-fish	_____	166666.	or _____	100000.
Salmon	_____	66666.	or _____	40000.

The usuall reckoning of salt Fish that is yearely taken, and either spent or sold by Hollanders, if you will believe the Interest of Holland c. 5. is 300000 Last. So that the families that are maintaind, the money that is gotten, and food that is eaten from Fishing is almost incredible.

Now

Now that it will be in *Englands* power and not in *France's* to spoile us of this *Fisherie*, or at least the greatest part thereof, I thinke no rationall man will deny, that considers the onely fishing for *Hering* in these parts or perhaps in the whole world, is upon the *Brittish* Coast; and most allso for Cod-fish northward of *Scotland* and on the *Dogger-sands*, and other places where they can easily interrupt us. Those therefore that are so forward for *France*, might doe well to consider, what they will doe with all these families, or how they shall be mantained when they are deprived of their Trades.

Other Arguments which might here be added I shall not now bring into open view, but keepe them as a Reserve, in case our Adversaries should rally and make head against us, having sufficiently rooted them (we thinke) by these five, wherewith we have already fought them.

But yet there remaine some Advantages under *England*, which we cannot expect under *France*, some of them more generall for the Republick, and other some more particular for Provinces and Persons. In the handling whereof, we shall desire to use, now that we are got within our enimie, the short and pungent dagger of *Demosthenes*, rather then *Cicero's* long sworded eloquence.

Advantages under England, not to be expected under France.

1. By being under *England*, we reteine and encrease our friendship with the *Empire*, *German Princes*, and *free Cities*: which are not jealous of *Englands* affecting the *Imperiall Crowne*, as they are of *France*: and therefore will not prejudice us under the former, as they will certainly in a litle time under the latter. Nay I doubt not, but were we under *England*, they would take courage, and generally appeare against *France*. So that we should hereby greatly promote the common Intrest of *Europe*.

2. Under *England* we might have the freedome of the *West-Indie* Trade, which would be of great profit to us, many wayes. Now how great a share *England* hath in the *West-Indies*, and how small and inconsiderable *France*, is well knowne. These having onely, the Iland *Terre Neuf*, for fishing, and some of the most Northerly Continent, unpeopled, not cultivated, and improfitable, as may be seene in *de Laet*, by those that know it not: part of *St. Christophors*, and some other places of small concernment, in comparison to what the *English* profitably posses.

3. By being under *England*, we might share at least with the *English* those plantations we have in the *W. Indies*; *Holland* in their *New Netherland*, and *Zeeland* in *Surinam*, &c. Which would be of eminent advantage for Colonies, either there or to be sent thither; besides the profit we might have from those Plantations; as *Zeeland* (or some at least therein) even in these first yeares and beginning thereof, have pretty well experienced, and know how greatly it is further improvable. Now what a singular benefit it is for a full and populous Common-wealth, now and then like the sedulous bees,

Descript.
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to cast a swarme of their poorest and most laborious people, is apparent from the Histories of all Ages. And though I confes the *Dutch* are not so good Planters, as the *English*, being more used to the water, and the other to Land: yet in regard all those *Plantations* are upon the Sea Coasts and Rivers, the *Dutch* might be used for building of ships or boats, houses &c. and especially for fishing, carrying and recarrying goods by water on the Rivers, and to and from the ships, and in navigation; and the *English* for planting and working in the ground; and so, in mine opinion, would make an excellent temperament, and very profitable for both Nations.

4. Expences might be saved in severall Convoys, and particularly of the *East Indie* Companies. I know very well they will have them returne round about, on the back of *Ireland*, lest they should touch at any of these Northerne places, especially in the Channel, and so Trade; and will send out ships with fresh men, and take out the Mariners that returne, to prevent their trading for themselves: but yet the extraordinary Charges of our men of War might be spared. Nay the *States Generall* bring in these, to be deducted in the Accompt with *England*, as the occasion thereof, in their *List of damages Article the 5. before the last War* A. D. 1664.

5. Such as are Rich, and weary of Trade, or love their ease, honour, or pleasure; may, if we were under *England*, more easily remove thither, and be made *liege* subjects, and free *Denizens* of *England* by the *Crowne*; or be *naturalized* by the *Parliament*; and so buy, posses, and inherit lands and revenues at halfe the price here; and live upon their Rents as Country Gentlemen, in a cheape and pleasant Land, enjoying as great civil Liberty as any where in *Christendom*, and allso the freedom of their Religion. Or let out their money not onely at far greater intrest, but allso upon *hypothec* or reall security. I have often thought this 20 yeares, whether it might not be better for *England*, to give this Liberty by law to strangers, especially those of the Reformed Religion, and of these Countries; and of which side the intrest lay betwixt us for this: Now that *England* hath so many and great Plantations in the *West Indies* for their poorer people, now that money is so plentifull, now that this Common-wealth was so increased upon them, now that the Number of Merchants is every where so multiplied, and now that Trade is beaten so low, almost in all the knowne parts of the world. But this would be both a large, and unnecessary digression; and I am very sensible that I have been already too long in this Argument. Yet industriously I confes, because I foresee, that many will diligently peruse this, who perhaps will negligently pass by the rest: and mine Opposites so much glorying herein, I thought best to give them full measure, and rather abound to curiositie, then be deficient in satisfying the least nicity; Trade being the *Crowne* both of that *Kingdome* and this *Common-wealth*.

Sect. 8. *Severall other Arguments and enducements to incline us rather for England, briefly mentioned. With an inference from the whole preceding discourse, that the friendship of England is to be preferd before that of France.*

Although what is said of *Religion, Liberty, Estates, and Trade*, be sufficient to prove this hypothericall problem; yet I shall give as over-measure some other enducements for *England* briefly.

1. The different humor and genius of the *French* and *Dutch*: which is well knowne to those that know them both, to be far greater then between us and the *English*. Which makes not onely a strangenes, but alienation of affection; begets a disgust and nauseating of each other; brings forth many contests and quarrels; and nourishes a continuall discontent, uneasiness, and unquietnes of life.

2. The affection which the generality of the *English* and *Dutch* Nation have for each other. So that if the Controversies of late yeares, and at this present betweene us, had beene or were referd to the body of the people in both Nations (although I well know what both their *Representatives* have done) I dare say, upon reasonable satisfaction for the mutuall miscarriages, which cannot but some times happen towards each other; there never had been, nor would be War betwixt us more. And that his *Majesty*, and the *Prince of Orange* would have more Voluntiers in one day to fight the *French*, then they have in twenty to fight each other.

3. The way of *France* is onely *Gentry* and *Paisantry*, the former lording it over the latter; which have allwayes lived more miserably, then any common people in *Europe*. In *Casars* time there was *nihil plebe contemptius*, as he tells us, and hath continued so as *Bodin* acknowledges, and is so at this day we all know. Whereas in *England* and these *Countreys*, there is a midle sort of people, that live freely and indepently, on their owne lands and farmes, that will never endure the insolencie of such Lords, much les to be their slaves, and least of all to be ruind by them.

4. Now that the *Prince of Orange* is advanced, and his party upmost, so that the Crowne of *England* may confide more in our friendship; it is not to be doubted but through his *Highbnes* intrest in his Unkles, we shall better accord hereafter, when these unhappy differences are once ended.

And thus I have done with this great *Question* of the times. Sufficiently, I thinke, to satisfy any rationall man; though nothing is sufficient, nor will satisfy I know, such as are either so resolutely prejudiced against the *English* or *Princes* intrest, that if they can but ruin them, they matter not though they ruin both themselves and the Nation; or so partially passionate for the *French*, that they desire them, though it be to their owne destruction. For all the Arguments in the world, will never prevaile against passion and prejudice: It is onely experience that can convince such of their error, and make them with *Damocles*, when the drawne sword is over them, desire

to depart, finding they were deceived in their opinion of *Happines*.

I shall therefore conclude, with a briefe reflection upon some of these Arguments, and the Corollary which naturally flows from them.

That seeing *England* and We are of the same Religion; Both free people and affectionated to each other; Both imbarqued in the same Intrest of Trade, though in different bottoms; It not onely becoms us, but is our mutual concernement, that we take heed, we dash not one another to pieces, but fairly and Christianly comply with each other, for the safegard of our Religion, preservation of the Protestant Intrest, our owne and others also Liberties, and the just and equitable course of Commerce; that so each Nation may happily enjoy their *Religion, Liberty, Estates, and Trade*, with Gods blessing on them all.

Sect. 9. *That we are not yet come to that extremity, but we may still remaine a Republick: in regard of our owne strength, and our neighbors intrest; Englands especially, that they had better lose Scotland or Ireland, then let the French have these Provinces. This War a game at hazard. Being engaged will goe through, and Parliament probably assist therein.*

WE have hitherto discoursed upon the supposal of *inability to defend our selves*; because it becoms wise men allwayes, to suppose the worst condition that may probably befall them; with the consequences thereof; and accordingly to make provision; and in regard of the endles curiosity of mens minds, which are allwayes restles under *miseries*, and still inquisitive after *futurities*. We shall now proceed to shew, that we are not yet (through Gods mercy towards us) come to the extremity supposed; nor reduced to those straits, that we are necessitated to take either *French* or *English* for our Masters; but that we may still remaine a Republick, if we be not awanting to our selves, or through passion or precipitancy betray our owne intrest, and cast our selves into irrecoverable destruction. And this we shall make apparent; by shewing there is no sufficient ground for us to despaire, if we either *Consider our owne strength, or our Neighbors Intrest*. Let us therefore observe the good rule in policy, which the Poet gives,

Senec. Thyest. *Nemo confidat nimium secundis,
Nemo desperet meliora lapsis.*

First lets take a view of *our owne strength*, and see what grounds of encouragement, that will yeeld us. Which though sufficiently knowne to many, yet not so well to the multitude. Now the strength of a Nation consists especially in these things following, which I shall briefly recite, and accommodate to our owne *Country*.

1. The great strength of a people consists in the *situation of their Country*.

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Sect. 7. Now concerning this both in the generall, and this Land in particular, I have already spoken sufficiently for my purpose; and shewne that all these Maritime Provinces, are either Ilands, or peninsular, and very defensible thereby; and also upon extremity liable to inundation, either from the Sea, or Rivers that surrounds them, or both.

2. In the Artificiall fortification of particular places; *Cities, Castles, Forts, Passes, &c.* And herein these Countries may contend with any Nation whatsoever, Kingdome, or Common-wealth that is of no greater circumference. For the Number of their Cities, and their regular fortification, Art herein vying with nature, is not to be paraleld in the world. I need not descend to particulars, Those that desire satisfaction herein, may consult *Guicciardine's* description of these Netherlands.

3. In means of defence. As shipping for those Nations or Cities that lie upon the Sea, or great navigable Rivers, and Lakes, as these Provinces doe, to defend their Coasts from invasion. And herein we are rather redundant than defective; the Number of shipping in *Holland* alone, being usually accounted 20000. And warlike provision of Armes and Ammunition. Wherein also we abound: these Countries ever since they were a Commonwealth, having been the greatest Magazine of warlike provisions, as is well knowne, of any in the World.

4. In men; in regard of their Number, Courage, Skill, and Unanimity.

As to our Numbers, they are abundantly sufficient for our defence. The *Intrest of Holland* c. 8. from particulars, reckons the sum of that Province alone 2400000. But if there be so many in them all, it is enow. Just how many is impossible to say, or neer how many in such a multitude is very difficult to ghues, and harder with us then any other people, I thinke, in the World; in regard of the uncertainty of seamen, the Number of strangers and travellers in peaceable times, and the diversity of Religions, Jews, Papiests, Anabaptists, &c. which baptise not their Children with us. But I know the Number of our men must needs be great; by the great Number of our Cities, these severall Provinces being as it were nothing but nests of Cities, so many being no where to be found in so small a circumference in any parts of the habitable World; by their largenes, and multitude of houses, which imply the inhabitants to be many; by the greatnes of their Trade, which is the lure that drawes multitudes to them; and by the knowne Christnings and burialls of those onely of the Reformed Religion.

As to our courage, which at present suffers an eclipse, there is more to be said then the World is aware of. And indeed I wonder none of our Historie Professors, have given other Nations some satisfaction heerein. I have not been without some thoughts of doing it my selfe, having been a diligent observer how things have gon, but I want Authentick materialls for such a worke. I could produce very many and very honourable testimonies.

monies; both ancient and moderne of their valour, out of such writers as give the Characters of Nations, Republicks, Geographers, and especially Historians *Dion, Casar, Tacius, Suetonius, Florus, Orosius, &c.* of old, the famous *Italians, Guicciardine, Bentivoglio* and *Strada*, with *Spanish, French, English* and the neighbouring Nations; even so many and such as are sufficient either to shame, or to inflame the veriest cowards, one should thinke, of the world into courage. But this would be too large to insert here, and may possibly be done in another dres hereafter. Nor is the succes of *France* against us such a wonder, as many make it, as I have formerly shewne. I will at present onely add, that which is proper for this place, and that is that the *French* Armies were not onely so numerous, but also trained up in the schoole of *Mars*, and ours for the most part raw and unexperienced in War. As the fox in the fable, the first time he saw the lion and heard him roare, trembled; the second time, was les affraid; and the third growne wholly feareles of him: So it is with men, by being accustomed to dangers either at Sea or Land, they converse with them familiarly, and account them nothing at last. And therefore wise Commanders have allways endeavoured to unlearne their Soldjers feare, by shewing them their enimies at Walls, Trenches, Passes, Rivers or others places, where they could not be com upon by them, and so harden and flesh them by degrees, before they have adventured to fight them against old and experienced enimies. And I doubt not, but through Gods blessing, in a litle time if the Wars continue, our Belgick lion, will not be found such a tame lamb, and so easily torne in pieces, as our enimies may hope, and others possibly may imagin.

As for our skill superadded to courage, there is no want, for the manner of defence we are to make. For besides our able Commanders and Soldjers to defend the posts, and Passes abroad, all our Cities abound with seamen, and such as are skild to traverse their Ordnance, and desperate for sallies, if need should require.

Our unanimity, I confes, is that I most feare: and that when our Cities are threatned with danger, the Citifens should grow mutinous, and fall together by the eares, and so let in their enimies to part the fray. And yet I have reason to thinke they will grow wiser, by their hearing and knowing how their friends are used by their enimies.

5. In money and food to mantaine their men. And in neither of these, through Gods mercy, is there any want amongst us: If we will lay out our selves, as we ought, for the publick. *Aitsma's Liawe* reckons the publick incoms of *Holland* alone A. 1643 at eleven Millions of our money, which is eleven hundred thousand pounds Sterling: we calling every ten thousand pound Sterling a tun of gold, and every hundred thousand a million *i. e.* of gilders. And besides the publick incoms of every Province, every Citie hath their peculiar, which in some is very considerable. But if our Common Treasuries are exhausted in severall places, it is no wonder: Yet if we consider

Sect. 7.

consider the Riches of particular persons, we have enough to hold out the War, to weary our enimies out at the last, as much as they doe us at the present. I will not now stand to shew the calculation of this, though if necessary, I thinke I can doe it satisfactorily, comprehending the disadvantages our enimies are under. But the late Project printed so often, of the *Capitals* of this Country, for raising and mantaining so numerous an army, though the manner prescribed prove not practicable, hath in part spared my paines herein.

And for food, our Cities are generally so well furnished, that if our enimies steale not supplies from us, it is well; we need neither seeke to them, nor fight with them for supplying our selves. We have bread corne fish and oyle, butter and cheefe in abundance. And if our liquorish Dames, want their delicacies a while, no great matter: they will vallow peace, and pay their soldjers the better.

Now what can be added for the sufficient defence of any Nation, to the particulars mentioned, I cannot imagin; and if my enumeration be insufficient, I wish any wise man would shew wherein, and then I shall thanke them. And therefore let us take courage to our selves, and not be frighted with vaine feares; or scared with any vaunting bravadoes; like that great *Rhodomontadoe* of the grand *Turke*, who when he heard of the long War such a great Prince as *Spaine*, made about this small Country; said, *that before he would have kept such a pottering, about a few petty Provinces, he would have taken them, and hurled them into the Sea at once*: though his success for kept no small pottering about the single Citie of *Candia* many yeares together; to which some of our Cities, all things considered, seem not much inferior for strength: although I well know what a difference there is, betwixt the defence of one Citie alone without a Country, and many at once contained therein.

But though this *internall strength* be so considerable, and with us of greatest consequence; yet this is not all; we have also an *externall and accidentall strength*, by the Intrest of our Neighbors. For this end it must be well considered, that some Countries and Cities, of small strength comparatively in themselves, are yet very strong by their situation among, and well secured by the intrest of other circumjacent Princes and States: who will not suffer, if they can possibly prevent it, accession of strength to one another, lest their owne scale in the ballance of powers should become light and soone borne downe. What is it but this under the shadow of the Almighty's Protection, that secures the smaller Republicks in *Italy* and the *Empire*? What *Geneva*, *Strasbourg*, *Colen*, *Hamburg* and the rest of the free Cities, and *Hans Towns*, but this? God governing the World usually, as both *Comines* and *Cardan* well observe, by the passions of men, in the ballancing of Powers; that when any one will breake out into rage and Wars, others will oppose them with the like fury, and so keepe the World a litle quiet; otherwise the great *Nimrods*, and hunters after Domi-

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nion would soone, if let alone, destroy and devoure all before them.

Now if we looke about us, and see amongst whom our Land lies, and well consider their intrest; this will be very apparent in our selves, notwithstanding this War that is made against us, that we are not devoted by any to destruction, but onely the *French*, as I shall shew hereafter.

For *Spaine* our next Neighbors on one hand, in the rest of the Provinces, they know this so well, and are so sensible of their intrest herein; that they not onely assist us what they can; but I dare say were it not for *England*; would rather breake with *France* then see us endangerd. But those two Crowns as I have already hinted, and shall more fully shew hereafter, must not, and therefore will not breake.

For the Empire above us, they also are frighted with our feares; and if the Princes thereof had money to their might, would willingly, I doubt not, assist the *Emperor*: lest the *Lillies* of *France* should mount above the *Roman Eagle*. In the yeare 1584, when the States upon the death of Prince *Willjam*, were a looking towards *France* for Protection, the Princes of the Empire sent *Malroy* to admonish them, *ut à consilio Gallici patrocini implorandi desisterent, alioqui fore, ut Germani Principes tantam domui Austriaca & origine & fœdere arctis adeo cum Imperio vinculis conjuncta factam injuriam non negligant*, as *Thuanus* tells us, l. 80. And if they were then jealous of *France*, what shall we thinke they are now? And if then zealous for the concernements of *Spaine*, shall we thinke they will now be wholly negligent both of theirs and their owne?

And *France* to be sure will never see us entirely *English*: for so, he knows, he should never be able, to ballance *Englands* power at Sea; which he doubtles both hopes and aimes at, by the accession of strength from these *Netherlands*.

Nor *England* suffer us, if they can hinder it, to be wholly *French*; for this they know would clearely tend, in a litle time to their destruction. This very Reason of State moved *Q. Elizabeth* at first to support us against *Spaine*, rather then to have us fall into the armes of *France*, by their becoming our Protectors. Which that wise Historian *Thuanus* faithfully relates in severall places. A. 1575. she told *Campaniach*, *ne molestè ferat Philippus, si ipsa securitatis suae causâ Hollandiæ & Zelandiæ patrociniûm suscipiat, antequam Galli perpetui Anglorum hostes eis potiantur*. L. 60. A. 1576. *Elizabetha verita ne aliorum ope destituti Belgæ, ex desperatione fœdus nobiscum icerent, seque & res suas Francis committerent, eos pecunia adjuvit, &c.* L. 62. A. 1577. she excuses her defence of us to *Philip the 2^d* with this very Reason; *ne Belgæ ex desperatione perniciosum non solum sibi, sed vicinis, consiliûm caperent, externi Principis patrociniû saluæ commissâ*. meaning the *French* L. 64. And A. 1584. shews the emulation between the *French* and *English* herein. *Ipsi sibi invicem suspecti erant. Nam Rex veterem hostem Belgij accessione Gallie imminentem reformidabat; & Angli nostros Belgij potentes minus aquos fœderi, quod Angliæ cum Burgundica domo intercedit; atque adeo commercio futuros verebantur*. L. 80. And

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is angry with the Ministers of State in *France*, for neglecting this singular occasion, of enlarging their Empire by taking these Provinces into the *French* protection. And to say the truth, this was the greatest error in Policy by way of omission, and that of *Charles* the 8. concerning the Kingdom of *Napels* of commission, that I thinke the Crowne of *France* was ever guilty of. And indeed there were many of the *English* Nation, that judged it one of the greatest oversights that that wise Princessse ever made, not to take into her hands, as she was offered, the absolute protection of these Provinces. But that is not so cleer to me, nor will be so I thinke to others, who rightly consider the circumstances of those times; for we must not judge by the following, wherein this Common-wealth grew up beyond all expectation, under such Wars, as many feared would have been our destruction. But yet though she refused for severall reasons both of Conscience and State (mentioned by *Cambden* in her *Annals* A. D. 1575) yet it plainly appears by the forementioned places in *Thuanus*, that rather then *France* should, she would have done it. And could she have foreseen, what we have known, I am apt to thinke she would have adventured it; although I must tell you it would have been a great venture: *Spaine* being both so potent at that time, and spightfull against her, as was quickly after perceived, by the *Spanish Armado* in 88, and besides the enmity of *Spaine*, she had thereby incurd the envy of *France* infallibly, and was uncertaine not onely of succes in the War, but of what support of men, and money especially the Dutch should be able to contribute, for the carrying on the War, which was easily foreseen would be long and bloody.

Nor can any one thinke, that *England* is not sensible, of the danger they are in, if we be under *France*; that either considers the Reasons of State, or observed that which was obvious to every eye: and that is how the *English* was startled at the progres of *France*. What posting was made too & againe? Was not the *Lord* *Vicount* of *Hallifax* hasted over, when they feared their approach to *Virechi*? And hearing it was over, was not his *Grace* the *Duke* of *Buckingham*, the *Lord* *Arlington*, with severall other Commissioners, posted after? At which time having the honour to waite on my *Lord* of *Hallifax*, and telling him the Towne talk of the *D.* of *Buckingham*, &c. coming through the fleet, and being gon to the *Hagne*; he could scarce credit it, having not had the least notice thereof; they coming away in such hast, for feare the *French* should overrun all.

And no wonder, if we consider the Consequences thereof for *England*, which are so great that they had better lose either *Scotland*, or *Ireland*. And if any *English* thinke I overlash, I shall desire them first carefully to compute these severall particulars, and then censure.

1. The los that the King will have in his Customs, and the Kingdome in their Trade; which neither of those Nations can compensate.
2. The constant charges of mantaining a navy, which that Kingdom must be at to mantaine their traffique, far greater then will secure them against either of those Kingdoms.
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3. The great injuries they are allwayes liable unto, from such potent enimies by Sea as the *French* and *Dutch* conjoind: more then from the other by Sea and Land.

4. The Wars that are likely to fall upon them in a few yeares both by Sea and perhaps Land allso; which would prove far heavier, then either of those Kingdoms can make with them.

5. The hazard they run of being baffled and beat out of their Trade by such a War. It is true, this is not so easy as many of the *Dutch* imagine, as I have allready proved; nor yet so difficult, much les impossible, as perhaps some of the *English* may fancy.

I shall not now stand to draw these out of their close order into an open, yet if any of the *English* think me weake in this, I have a Reserve, which, I thinke, will sufficiently secure me from being routed.

It will be said to me why then should *England* commence this War.

Truly let me say it freely, for I know it, that the scale of War very bardly cast that of peace, and the difference was so small, that it came upon two or three granes onely. I have weighed this as exactly, as I possibly could: first distinguishing pretexts from reall causes, and then distinctly considering these one by one. There were these 5 variously discourfed of. His Majesties designing to introduce the Popish Religion; to alter the government of those Kingdoms; to Revenge himselfe upon us; to advance the *Prince* of *Orange*; and the Intrest of the Kingdome of *England*.

For the two first which made the loudest noise in some mens mouths, I soone found them frivolous; and onely calumnies cast out by his enemies at home and abroad, to make the King odious, and his people jealous. As to that of changing Religion I have formerly shewne, and I thinke sufficiently, that he neither will, nor can if he would effect it.

As for the 2^d I considered the Kings yeares, as being past any such youthfull and vaine ambition; his being destitute of a child that can challenge the Crowne; his former miseries and sufferings by War; and his wisdom too great, to set upon a designe, so wholly impracticable, especially in *England* and *Scotland*. For by the Constitution of his Kingdoms, though he have the *Militia* for the execution of the Laws; authority without power, being a vaine scare-crow, and insufficient to suppress the audacious exorbitances of the multitude: yet the people have the purse to ballance that power, and whence then would he pay his Armies? Nor let any one stop me with saying, the long Parliament contested with his Father for the *Militia*; for that was onely temporary, they challenging it onely for that time of the danger they apprehended in the Kingdom, and not as their constant right, and not belonging to the Crowne; as may be seen by those, who will rightly reade their Declarations, which they published to the world concerning that War, collected and printed together by *Husbands* at *London*, 1642. And besides this, a Parliament in being though not fitting, which hath some

some kind of radical power, though not to be exerted; but when legally congregated. But suppose them dissolved, it being in the Kings power, to doe it at his pleasure; yet hath he not the City of *London* on his back, and both Kingdoms about him to oppose him? especially considering that the jealousy of Popery would be taken into the quarrel. And what Ministers of State durst suggest such designs? They know well the maxim of the *Commons* and their practice: (as the great meanes of preserving their freedom) is to ruine such as would infringe their Liberty. And that they are so jealous of, and zealous for their rights herein, that some of them still have the courage, and resolution to venture their owne heads, to breake the necks of such men and such designs, as would prejudice their Priviledges. I have observed in the Histories of former times, and in my owne time also, that there was seldom any of the noblest Stags of State, how much soever imparked in the Kings favour, and how strongly soever impaled with power; but if the *Commons* of *England* singled him out and set upon him, though he might hold them at an abay for some time, yet they still hunted him downe at last. And for the King to thinke of making himselfe absolute, and governe onely by an Army (like the *French* Kings) by an Army of *French* men; is so ridiculous, that I thought it not worthy of consideration. Can any man in his wits, imagine his Majesty of *England* so senseles, as to give his Crowne and Kingdoms to the *French* King? For that is all one with this in effect.

As for that of *Revenge*, either for *Chatam*, or the affronts mentioned in his Declaration of this War, or both: I considered his *Temper*, which hath so much *Clemency*, that it rather inclines him to lenity than cruelty and revenge. As is abundantly apparent, not onely by his passing, but even forcing (as I know he did, against some addicted to the latter extreme) the *Act of Indemnity* or *Oblivion*, for those many and great injuries, he had suffered from his Subjects. And his government since, in conniving at the violation of such Laws; as are thought severe in matters of Religion, and indulging liberty therein: which hath made some, that have sufficiently heertofore cried up Parliaments, now run into the other extreme and cry them downe as fast; and in stead of the Parliament's formerly, now magnify the Kings favour and Clemency. And yet Kings and Princes are men, and men subject to like passions with others, liable to suggestions from those about them, and tender of their honour as the aple of their eye. And therefore I will grant this might come in consideration, but not so much, I dare say, as alone to make a War.

For the *Prince of Orange*, there was not onely near Relation and Affection, but Intrest also to be considered. For the *Lovesteyns* party having been so cross to *England* upon his account, and the correspondant friendship between us so uncertaine, without his Headship; I verily believe, that if what is now done therein, had been done timously, it had wholly prevented this unhappy War. Yea besides the extraordinary Affection which

the people have for the Prince, our very Bore had this Policy, and were more then ordinary zealous for his promotion, as the best meanes to procure their peace.

As to the further intrest of the Kingdome of *England*, in regard of their Trade, and Naval expences, I have expressed my thoughts before in the *Preface*.

It is true, this War was allwayes intricate, and hath proved a game at hazard for *England*, beyond not onely theirs, I believe, but all the worlds expectation. But yet if it be still not withstanding cautiously played, as they may, and so far as I can possibly discern, meane to play it; they can many ways come to save their stakes, at the least, if not to win more then we imagine by the War: and was far farer at first then *France* for winning by the game in all humane appearance, as I could manifest by many Arguments. But because that concerns them two onely, and us not at all further then our sufferings, I shall wave them (at least for the present) and proceed. For I will not hearken to the curious enquiries of those who would here be asking, how I thinke *England* will play their game? for that, let them looke to it whom it concerns on all sides, as doubtles they will; for me to expres my private thoughts; might doe more hurt their good; which is the onely thing I aime at: and what I thinke the issue will be, I shall declare heereafter in my *Conjectures*.

But here it will be asked, seeing it is *Englands* intrest that we fall not into the hands of *France*, and that the Prince is now promoted, will they not make peace with us this winter?

I must needs say, I feare they will not, except we should give them such termes, as I see we shall not; we thinking our condition far better, and they thinking it far worse, then really it is. For the cause of this, as of most Wars, is complex, as I have shewne; so that though two of those I assigned may be past, yet the 3^d of the Kingdoms intrest, not. They are already too far engaged in the War, and with *France*. The Kings Honour is at the stake, and the Kingdoms expectation of another issue then the last War. And besides all these, how can any wise man imagine, now that they are engaged with *France*, and have an advantage against us, as well as a Hazard from *France*; that if they know how to secure themselves against the latter (as I suppose they doe) they will let goe the former? For we must needs think they will be at a certainty on one side or the other; and not part with *France's* friendship, till they be sure of our satisfaction. What it is they demand, or how rightly, is not now our designe to discourse, but onely matter of Intrest all along. And yet I can easily foresee that the danger of our becoming *French*, will be a singular advantage to us, as an inducement to them, for a more easy compliance with us. But at present I see no probability of peace, but that they will goe through with the War: or continue it so long, till they have tryed their utmost to obtaine their ends.

I know there are many wise men amongst us, that thinke the King cannot

not carry on this War: as there was that thought he could not begin it. The former they find themselves deceived in, and will be so in the latter also. I have discoursed this with severall in Governement, who argue that the King hath not money of himselfe to goe through with the War, and that he will not convene the Parliament, or if he doe they will not supply him. I grant the first, but deny the others. For if we rightly consider their designe, the Parliament must meet; and the representation that will be made thereof, and the constitution of the Parliament, they will grant him supplies; though perhaps not with that facility, that they did it with in the former War. And therefore let us neither flatter, nor deceive our selves with vaine hopes herein; but rather seeke timely to accommodate differences, before their preparations in the spring; for I feare the longer we delay, and the worfe it will be with us.

Sec. 10. *Compliance with England the onely meanes of the Commonwealths continuation.*

HAVING thus declared the condition that we are in, and that there is no probability of peace; we come now to shew the consequences thereof; and what is to be done by us, to preserve our selves from ruine and destruction. And here to my understanding one of these 3 things must necessarily follow: That we must either continue the War against them both; or comply with them both; or with one of them alone if possibly we can. We shall first declare our thoughts concerning these briefly, and then shew with which we both may and must comply.

1. Then whether we should continue the War against them both. And herein would we doe, as we might and should; it may be this were better, then to comply with either of them, especially if they will impose upon us unreasonable condicions, and much better then to comply with them both. We have strength enough, through Gods blessing; to withstand them, (as I have already manifested) if we have but courage, and unanimity; and the former of these will be got by degrees, as I have said, and our owne intrest, and preservation should perswade us into the latter. But truly let me say it freely, I see such a wearines in many of the War; such an unwillingnes to lay out our selves, as our Ancestors did formerly, for the good of the publique; such a selfish temper, every one seeking to preserve his particular intrest, and neglecting the good of the Community; and such a lothnes to adventure our lives and estates in a War; that I see litle probability of preserving our selves, and much les of prevalency against our enimies. So that if this War continue I feare these Provinces will become a prey to them both. For though neither France will suffer England, nor England France to have them all, as I have shewne; yet they will part and share them betwixt them, except we prevent it by a compliance

pliance. And what a miserable condition we shall then be in; even worfe then if we were under either of them, I have formerly declared. Seeing then we are so degenerate, and become like *Issachar*; which his Father stiles a *Strong ass*, and saies of him, that *He saw that rest was good, and the land that it was pleasant; and bowed his shoulder to beare, and became a servant unto tribute*: we must either take courage and be unanimous, valiantly fighting it out with our enimies; or for the present be contented with this character and condition. Will we then fight, for our Religion, Libertie, Country, Families, Estates, Trade? or will we not? If the former, let me encourage all in the words of *Joab* that great Generall and brave soldjer wherewith he encouraged the *Israelites*, when he had his enimies before and behind him, *Be of good courage, and let us play the men for our people and for the Cities of our God: and the Lord doe that which seemeth him good.* But if rest be so good, and the Land so pleasant to us, that we will rather bow our shoulders, and become servants, then shew our faces in the field to fight with our enimies; let us see what Master we should chuse, and agree with him upon the best termes we can.

2. Therefore, shall we comply with both our enimies? surely if reason, and what we can give, will satisfy them; every wise man will say *Yes*, that we may enjoy the many blessings God hath given us in peace. But if they will have such Cities, such vast sums of money, and such Conditions, as we cannot give them, except we be ruind thereby; who will not say, *No*. We must therefore consider if there be no other way practicable, to save our selves, from the devouring sword of our enimies.

3. There is no way therefore left us, but to comply with one of our enimies, if we can possibly; that so we may ballance the others power, and either compel him to a peace, or be enabled to continue the War. If any one know any other way, I heartily wish he would shew it, as I thinke he is bound to do one way or other; for every one ought to contribute his best assistance, even by the principles of selfe-preservation. And *Solomon* tells us, *There was a poore wise man, who by his wisdom delivered the City, though no man remembered him, and infers thence, that wisdom is better then strength, though the poore mans wisdom is despised, and his words are not heard.* Yet surely notwithstanding that poore man did but doe his duty; though he was but poorly requited for his paines.

But I believe most will grant the way is good, but impracticable, in regard of the League betwixt the two Crownes, and that they will not treat a sunder, &c. Well then, let us proceed to consider these things a litle, and see whether we cannot level these mountaines of difficulties that are before us, and make our way become plaine and passible.

1. With which of these our enimies we should chuse to comply, I thinke I have made sufficiently apparent; in shewing it our Intrest rather to be under England then France, and to have peace and correspondent friendship for our Sea-trafficke, with the former rather then with the latter; if we cannot

Gen. 49.
14, 15.

2 Sam. 10.
12.

Eccles. 9.
15, 16.

Cambden
Annales
Elisabethæ.
A. 1575.
Thuanus
l. 60.
Casus 20.

cannot have it from them both. And I am sure this was the wisdom of our Ancestors, who in their low condition A. D. 1575 deliberating into whose Protection they should give themselves over; first declined the Empire, and the competition coming between the Crownes of England and France, preferred the former upon many and weighty considerations, related by their Historians; and very many of our owne, which are so well knowne I need not mention them; and Boxtormius the Author of the *Disquisitiones Politicæ*. The civil Wars of France; the inveterate feude betwixt French and Dutch, those especially that live upon the Confines of both Countries; the hard yoke of the French Governement; the levity of that Nation; its liablnes to be invaded by the Spanish; the incommodiousnes of their Ports for our Ships and Navigation; made them averse to France. And on the contrary, The reformed Religion of the English; their greater likenes with us in genius and language; the nearnes of the Country; the multitude of their Ports; their commodiousnes for our Commerce; the multiplicity of the English Manufactures and Commodities; the Country not easily invaded; strong and potent by Sea and Land; not frequently imbroyled in civil Wars; a free People; the Governement temperate, and not burdenson with exactions; and the Intrest of the English Nation, which if these Countries were conquered, would scarce be able to resist the Conqueror; clearly enclined them for England. You see then that reasons of State, direct us to the same choye, which our Ancestors heretofore wisely made.

2. Seeing then we must chuse England, not onely for the Common Intrest of the Protestant Religion, but for our owne greatest both religious, and civil concernements. We shall now remove those obstructions that seeme to block up our way to Compliance.

It is objected that the two Crownes are in a League, that neither will treat without the other, and how can we then comply with England alone?

I confes if all Statesmen were Aristides's, the Argument might be strong. For he having heard by command of the Athenian Senate, Themistocles's designe of burning their enemies Fleet, made report, that it was very profitable, but no wayes honest, upon which it was rejected. Or if they were all Stoicks, and held that honesty, equity, and utility were all one, and with good old Socrates cursed those that first separated these, as learned men tell us.

But we see it is far otherwise now in the World; and that the Peripateticks doctrine that *honestum* and *utile* are really distinguished, is every where prevalent, and no where more, then amongst Politicians; which hath occasioned that knowne saying, that all States are Atheists. I do not approve any, and much les so high uncharitablenes; but this I will say, that as the world goes now, all States must be considered as Gamesters. And what if I should say, that neither of the Courts are so trait laced in their Consciences, but were they assured from us of such conditions as they require, they would let the other goe and get theirs as they could? Nay what if I should say, there may be none iniquitie in this? If I should, I thinke I can prove it, for if in mutuall covenants, either side doe that, which is a breach; it is folly

Plutarch in
vita
Aristid.

Plutarch.
l. 4.
Sympos.
Cicer. 3.
Offic. & 1.
de Leg.

to thinke, that the innocent should be bound, and the peccant party free, which they may know, though others doe not, as it is clear in the strongest covenant, that is in the World, I meane that of wedlock. I doe not say that this is so betwixt them, but I say it may be so though we doe not know it, so that either of them in such case, may conclude with us. And I am sure it is no dishonesty on our part.

But it will here be said; they will not.

Doe not tell me that, I know they either of them will. And if any one askes me, how? and if I be of their Cabinet Council? I shall onely smile, perceiving they doe not know me. I am far from that, or having ever to doe with Kings or States in that kind, or pragmatically trinketing with State affaires, it being a Rule which I live by, never to aske great men mercy. Common favour and justice I desire of men, but mercy onely of my God. And yet I know this very well, and I will tell you how, and that is from their Intrest; which is the compasse, by which all Statesmen stee their course, and may be discerned by a skilfull passenger, although he sit not at the helme. If any man be so ignorant of the affaires of the World, as to thinke that Statesmen trouble their heads with the Schoole-mens quiddities, and haecities, or their consciences with Casuisticall nicities, as a late German Divine that puts the case, whether we should pray, *Vader onse*, or *Onse Vader*, and learnedly concludes that custome must carry it; let him enjoy his opinion, it is very charitable, and can doe no hurt. But yet I may say, that for above 20 yeares I have observed, that the custome of the World carries it with them, and have knowne few, I had almost said none, of the strictest sect of the Pharisees; though I have some, and my charity obliges me to hope there are many, that seriously mind the weightier things of the law; justice, righteousness, temperance, and the World to come.

Now that this is the Intrest of both the Kings, rather to deale with us apart, then jointly, as well as ours, I could many wayes make apparent. But seeing it is our intrest to chuse England we shall prove onely that it is theirs to comply with us; omitting that of France, as superfluous to our purpose.

1. They know they cannot wholly conquer us themselves. Not onely in regard of our owne strength, of which I have spoken before, but the French, which are in the Country already; and if they were not, would never permit it, as I have formerly shewne sufficiently. Nay I dare say, they never designed any such thing, because they know it is impracticable: that being always true of the Greeks; *ἀδύνατον ἐπιβλεῖν*. or things impossible come not into consideration. I doubt not but they both intend and hope to have their share; what ever it is that is agreed upon between the two Crownes, in case of Conquest; but that they should have the whole, could never so much as be dreamt of by them.

2. They know also that it is their intrest, never to suffer France to have all, no nor any of these Maritime Provinces. If he have some of the superior,

perior, that is the utmost their intrest can permit. Nay indeed he is neerer these inferior, then that will allow, if they could help it, but thats now past. What vast disadvantage it will be to the *Engliss*, to let *France* have footing upon our Coasts, and so come to cope with them at Sea; I have formerly shewne: and I know they are very sensible of it; and therefore may well infer a willingnes on their parts to a compliance.

3. The *Prince of Orange* his intrest being also theirs, cannot but sway something with them. For if it had beene Gods will, those Kingdoms had continued in peace, and the succession of the Royall reigne uninterrupted there, and the *Orange* family continued alive and in power here, I perswade my selfe we should never have warred with one another; so I doubt not, if it please God to preserve his Highnes, that they may confide more in our friendship, then they could formerly, he will be a happy Instrument of a better understanding betweene the Nations; when these unhappy quarrels come once to be composed; because this is their intrest as well as ours, and it is intrest that rules and reigns in the World.

And thus I have shewne you that we may, I shall now shew briefly that we must comply with them, or without a miracle of mercy we are ruined.

1. Because if the War continues, and we be too weake to make strong resistance, so that our Enemies prevaile; they will share the Country betwixt them, and then we fall into the worst condition, that can possibly befall us. It is true, I foresee that severall particular Persons may save themselves and their estates, by friends on the one side or the other; but I speake of the community; and it is well if the hopes many have of that, make them not more negligent for this. There are two famous Republicks in *Italy*, *Venice* and *Genoa*; and what is the cause of the formers flourishing so much more then the latter, which was anciently both their better and their Master? but this, that the *Venetians* are more intent upon the Publick, and the *Genoese* upon their private concernements: whereby they become obnoxious, not onely to many factions among themselves, but also to oppressions from their Neighbors. I could say more herein of our selves, then I shall at present, in regard it might create more jealousies (which are already too many) of those that are, or at least have been, in Governement amongst us. But though I will accuse none, yet I must needs say, that I ascribe a great part of our present miseries to this *Genoan* practise; and heartily wish, this prove not fatal to us at last.

2. Because if we be not sensible we may clearly see, that *France's* designe is absolutely to conquer us: whereas *England* seeks onely (to use their expression) their owne security. And therefore in my Logick the inference is plaine, that we had better part with something, than lose all, as we are like to doe, if we come not to a compliance with *England*. To make these apparent to any wise man, would be but the lighting a torch to the sun. Although I know the quite contrary is cast out among us by the friends of *France*, who would perswade us, that the *French* seeke onely to humble us,

us, and the *Engliss* to conquer us. But we know the minding of men, is but shooting at random, and that he that means to come neer the truth, must have his eye upon the marke of intrest; which cannot lye, as men doe frequently for it. If any be so foolish, as to be enchanted with such *Sirens* songs, as are daily sung amongst us; and have more regard to publick news, then the intrest of Nations; they may goe on, I cannot hinder them: but let me tell them, that I feare they will find at last, the Poets fiction a reall truth; and if they stere their owne course, meet with the seamens fate in the fable, be sung a sleepe for a time, that so they may be afterwards, with greater facility drownd and devourd.

3. Because there is no other way or humane means left us (so far as I can discern) of the Common-wealths continuation. And this is the conclusion that follows clearely from the premises. For if we be unable to withstand them both, or satisfy them both, we must either breake their confederacy, and have the helpe of one of them, or the Republick will be ruind.

It will here be demanded, seeing it is both *Englands* intrest and our owne to accord, why doe we not then come to a compliance.

I will tell you why. Because we judge our Condition better, and they judge it worse, then really it is; and therefore stand upon greater terms, then we will give them. We thinke things will goe better with us in time, and they thinke they will grow worse. We flatter our selves with vaine hopes, and rely upon *Brandenburgs* Assistance, *Spaines* breaking with our enemies, the *Parliament of Englands* not supplying that King to carry on the War, and the like, when they know the quite contrary in all humane appearance. Or perhaps we are afraid to irritate *France*, if we should make overtures to *England*; and *England* will not give such an umbrage of jealousy to *France*, as to tamper with us, except they be first assured from us of satisfaction. But cannot the effecting this be put into the hands of his Highnes and a few others as it was lately, to be privately transacted by them? Here then it is that the shoe pinches, We are a popular state, the people still thinke, till an enimie come, they can defend themselves, and therefore our Governours dare not adventure to tender *England* such satisfaction, as (for ought I see) they will have, lest they either should not be able to performe it, or if they doe, should lose themselves with the people. And therefore I foresee, the War will be continued, till we be reduced to that condition, that we shall be necessitated to give them both their demands, by publick transaction, or at least that way breake with one of them. And on this foundation, I shall now proceed, to ghuefs at that which I thinke is most likely to befall us.

SECT. II. *Conjectures of future affaires. The motions of the ensuing summer likely to be quick and great. As to this Republick, probably England may get a bridle to curb us; France the Saddle to ride us, Colen a supernumerary girth, Munster a bos off the crupper. Our condition deplored and consoled. A caution for England, and the Orange family. The Authors feares of what will at last befall us. The Spanish Netherlands a dying. The friendship of England and France sick at heart, and cannot live long. That of Spaine and England sound at heart, and will recover.*

Although I have sometimes spent almost whole nights at gazing on the stars; and could perhaps erect an Astrological scheme as well as another; yet I never used that way; nor never shall for ghuessing at futurities; because I know it is vaine to thinke, we can spell Gods providence, by their mysticall hieroglyphicks. Yet let me say it without vanity, I doe believe I have made as many conjectures, concerning Kingdomes, States, and particular places; as any man of my quality in Europe: not by any enthusiastick spirit of prophecy, or by Astrology from the stars; but reasons of State; their intrest, and the fundamentall maxims of their Governement; sometimes out of curiosity onely, and sometimes for other ends, but such as are honest I assure you, for none are either better or worse by it, but onely my brothers and my selfe. The reason why I adventure to doe this publickly now, is that I may awaken us out of our security; and that we may looke about us; and see if possibly we can prevent those things, which it is very probable are coming upon us. Onely I desire to doe it modestly, as it becoms every Christian; and neither on the one hand to pretend to that certainty, as if we were of Gods Council; nor on the other hand to fall under Christs rebuke for not discerning the signes of the times; which are both theologiall and politicall, but I am now onely treating of the latter, and to that I shall confine my discourse.

Math. 16.

Now that we may be quickned to defend our selves, comply with England, and free the Spanish Netherlands from their feares, and our selves from the neighborhood of the French there, (this being one Reason of State, why we formerly made peace with Spaine, lest we should be in continuall danger of annoyance from France) and allso render their mantaining their Conquests among us more difficult, by their being kept unconnected with that Kingdome: I shall now proceed to the Conjectures I have made, not with an Astrological confidence, but a Christian allowance of divine providence, which strangely alters times and seasons, puls downe one and sets up another, confounds the wisdome of the wise, brings to nought the counsels of Achitophels, and turnes the great designs and preparations for War, into a happy compliance, and peace as he pleases; and all in infinite wisdome, though we cannot discern it, the knowledge of Gods

provi-

providence even when past or present, and much more when future, being to David and therefore far more to us, too wonderfull for us, so high that we cannot attaine unto it; and so deepe in the great waters, that the footsteps thereof are not to be traced and knowne. So that we may well say, as of old, *Dei sapientia, & hominum stultitia requit mundum.* Ps. 139. Ps. 77. First then if we awake out of our security, and looke up in the morning of the yeare, we must needs conclude of foule weather the ensuing summer, *the skie is so red*, that we may easily perceiue it portends blood, and the lowest region is so lowring, that we may easily discern that a tempestuous storme is a gathering: except we be so besotted, as the foolish Jewes of old, with security, that we cannot discern, as Christ tells them, *the signes of the times.* Can all Europe almost be arming, and we a sleepe in the bed of security dreaming of peace? Besides the incredible preparations of France, is not England, Sweadland and all our Neighbors almost up and at worke, and can we thinke they would be at that cost for a comedy of peace? have we not all the reason in the World, to thinke it will be to us, a tragedy of War? Let others enjoy their opinion, and not take the alarme, till they see *Hanibal ad portas*; for my part I must needs profes I cannot, from what I observe, but conclude, that the affaires of the ensuing summer are like to be great, and the motions thereof quick, and such as will highly concerne us in these Countries.

As to this Republick, which hath at this time, these 4 declared Enemies, England, France, Colen, and Munster: I shall briefly speake my thoughts, with reference to them all.

England probably will get, *a bridle to curb us.* I have shewne in the Preface, what they account the Intrest of the Kingdome; We see notwithstanding the Prince of Orange his promotion, they still pursue the War; and must we not then conclude, that they seeke some thing further? Whether they will by Sea attacque our Coasts; or by marching their Armie about over Land, is not for me to determine; much les what particular places below they may fall upon, or what success they may have. Yet I conclude they will have some hanke or other upon our Navall power, one way or other, before they make peace with us; otherwise they will continue the War the following summer, to try their utmost to get, that which we will not give them.

France that is allready got into the saddle, will there fit and ride us; though we flatter our selves, we shall by one meanes or other, shake him out of it, and off our backs. Truly I cannot but wonder often times, to heare what vaine hopes men expres, and there's no contradicting them; (although some times I cannot containe my selfe from smiling, or shakeing my head) that France must be content with one or two of our Cities which we can best spare; and with a confidence almost as large, as if they was ready to run away, or resolved to march out and quit those Cities they have, at our pleasure. As if the French were such fooles, to be at that vast expence, great paines even the King himselfe personally, and have such

such advantage upon us, and quit the same for a thing of nothing? For my part, I am affraid they will rather get more, then lose that they have gotten allready. And I know, their designe is, to get all at last. It is true, if we comply with *England*, and so strengthen our selves by them and *Spaine*, we may thereby hope either to obtaine better conditions by treaty, or compel them thereunto by force. But I am speaking of the state of the War, as now it stands.

Colen, that pretends to some of those Cities which we held about the *Rhyne*, that are now in the power and possession of the *French*, may possibly for his paines, and permission of their passage, &c. get some *supernumerary girth*, one place or other that may be of no great concernement to *France*, either for their designes upon us or the *Empire*, and must be contented therewith. And perhaps for some time his Counselors may have their pensions continued from *France*.

Munster, that is mercenary and fights for money, will get a bos off the crupper: *French Lewis's* made and minted of *Dutch ducats*. For elective *Princes*, as *Bishops*, that are onely for life, seeke more to enrich themselves; then to enlarge their Territories, as those doe that are hereditary.

And this is likely, so far as I can see, to prove our condition; except *Gods* $\delta\pi\omicron\upsilon\ \mu\eta\chi\alpha\nu\iota\varsigma$ appeare in the tragedy, or God Almighty by some wonderfull providence, make a change in the scene of this War. Which I confesse is very deplorable, which way soever we looke; and we are not so sensible of it now, as we shall be hereafter. I had thought here to have sit downe a litle with a lamentation, but I have beene so large allready, that I shall wholly wave it for the present.

And yet it is a bad wind that blowes no good, we may make this advantage of our miseries, so long as we remaine amidst our enimies, when a peace is once concluded; that we may hold them both faire to us, and so secure our selves a litle more in quiet then we perhaps thinke, by being ready to close with either, to the great prejudice of the other.

And therefore let me freely insert this important and necessary Caution for *England*, that they take heed they doe not overdoe their worke; and so far irritate this Republick, that out of a present prejudice, and passion, and also desperation of their future quietnes from them, they call in the *French*, to be revenged of them, though it be to their owne ruine.

I know many are jealous, that this whole War is onely to make the *Prince of Orange* a *Monarch*, and the two Crownes will have no more to doe with the States; although I profes, I am far from thinking, that those two Kings and Kingdoms would be at all this expence of blood and treasure for that end onely; and doe believe that if that would set us in our former condition, it would soon be assented unto, not onely by the multitude, but the wisest men amongst us, who know the extraordinary abilities and great capacities of his *Highnes*. Therefore let me say it freely without offence, either of Him or his Enimies, that I perceive many lay this for a funda-

fundamentall maxim; *Better a Prince that hath power to defend us, then one whom we must onely defend*. And except my eye sight faile me, some are fast at worke in preparing materials, to build thereon. A word is enough to the wife, and therefore I will say no more.

Nay I will not dissemble my further feares, that if *France* keeps those places on the South Sea, and should get others lower either in *Holland* or *Frieslands*, as may capacitate him to incommodate their Trade, though we should have a peace for some time with him, we shall fall into his hands at last. For the *French* are allready so nere us on every side, that they hover over us, as a hawke over the prey, watching onely an opportunity, how they may grasp us in their talons.

If any shall here aske me, why may we not then as well now become *French*?

I also shall aske such one Question, which when they satisfy me in, I also shall them. You know certainly you must dye at last, (whereas here is onely uncertaine feares) and yet when you are sick why doe you take Physick and use meanes for recovery? Is it not because you desire to live as long as you can? Doe you not account him a mad man, that will cast away his life, although he must lose it at the last? And rightly; because who knows what God may doe, and whether he may not recover him, though the disease be desperate?

Having spoke our thoughts concerning these united, we shall now speake of the *Spanish* Provinces. I have as much smattering skill in Physick, I confesse, as would serve me to make *Charon* a freight of old wives; yet am I far from being arrived at the confidence, which I have observed in *Urinal-Doctors*. And yet for once, I will adventure to try the little skill I have, with those *State-Mountebanks*, that are so secure concerning the *Spanish* Netherlands. For my part, I have snakt their water againe and againe, and can find nothing but symptoms of death. I shall only premise that I shall not with an Empericall confidence tell you the time: Kingdoms and States, as well as private persons, sometimes languish out rather then live their last. But that they are so sick, that I see no hopes of their recovery if this War continues. And I will tell you my feares for the ensuing summer.

1. The incredible preparations that *France* makes this winter, both of men and money as if they would set all at stake for carrying on the following summers Wars.

2. The *Empire's* army is overmatcht with *Turens*. They know, that we are not in a capacity to recover the Cities we have lost, and that they cannot conquer those that remaine; so that their Armies cannot be designed either for strengthening their owne garrisons, or forcing of ours. Except they will spend a summers expedition upon some inconsiderable out Garrisons, which I cannot imagin.

3. I have looked round about in Europe, where this storme should fall, and

and can see no place it hovers over, except those Provinces, and our selves.

4. I consider the eminent advantage *France* hath at present by their friendship with *England*; which I feare he will take.

5. Although I doe not thinke *France* will prevaile by all his endeavors with *England* to breake with *Spaine*: yet I thinke *England* will either be employed in doing their owne worke, or not so quickly breake with *France* to stop his carriere in overrunning those *Netherlands*.

6. We shall either have the Wars continue, or a peace, if the former as they are, though *England* helps not therein, (for they profes in their declaration to maintaine the treaty at *Aken*) yea though they would hinder it, yet I doe not see how they can practically, if they have not prevented it before hand by their treaty: nor we to be sure the Wars continuing. If a peace be concluded, we shall be forced to forsake them: this being the maine ground of the quarrel. For if we would have helped *France* to have ruind them, we might have been quiet for some time at least: but because we had rather quench, then set our neighbors house on fire, lest ours follow in the flames; *France* hath fallen upon us; and shall we not then thinke that he will cudgell us into such conditions? It is true indeed, if *England* and we come to understand one another, and our joint intrest better; we may succor them for some time; but thats not my supposal, of the Wars continuing as they are, which in that case implies a strange complication of diseases, which to me, who knows not their treatie; seems incurable.

7. And where else they should have assistance to save them, if *France* will fall upon them I see not. For the Empire cannot, it is well if they can save themselves. *Spaine* is at a great distance. May make perhaps some diversion in *Catalonia*, or some small from *Milan*, &c. but whats that to save those Provinces?

8. We must therefore consider if they can stand on their owne legs, so as to withstand their enimies power, and not to be throwne downe therby. And here we shall find, the Number of *Spanish* inconsiderable. The *Dutch* very wavering and uncertaine: some Popish Zealots thinke *France* can best carry on their designs: Others betwixt hopes and feares, wishing they might see an issue: and others plainly despairing of resistance, desiring they were over. Their Cities great and untenable, severall of them requiring almost as many to man them well, as they have *Spanish* in the Country. If they can make good *Bruxels*, *Antwerp*, *Namur* and *Oostend* for some time, to see if the affaires of Europe may not alter, it is all I expect. But what shall become of the whole Country, and the rest of the Cities, *Bruges*, *Meclin*, *Gant*, *Lovaine*, &c. some of them as large as most Cities in Europe. Three Noble men A. 1427. (as *Guicciardine* tells us) with great charges had 5. of the greatest Cities on this side the Alpes measured, and found but 18 rods or perches difference. Of which *Lovaine* and *Gant*, the greatest, *Paris* (within the walls) and *Liege* alike, *Colen* the least. But neglecting to mention the just measure, *Guicciardine* tells us they

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Lovani.

are 6 *Italian* miles within, and above 8 without the walls. And though this be enough, yet I must needs thinke them more. For having had the curiosity to measure one of them for all, I found it upon a warme walking within the walls, three full houres by my watch. And besides this, *Paris* and *Liege* are most populous, *Colen* next, but these of the *Netherlands* least; so that I leave any rationally man to judge what number of men they require to maintaine them, for I will not now stand to make that calculation. Now if he takes these two great Cities, he is in the heart of *Brabant* and *Flanders*, so that all the rest will fall of them selves. I conclude therefore, that except the treaty between *France* and *England* secure them, which is unknowne to me; or that God in his all-wise Providence, make some wonderfull change in the scene of affaires in Europe, the *Spanish Netherlands* are lost. Having therefore thus tolled their passing bell, we will leave them to Gods mercy, and the King of *France's* clemency, and hast us out of them to *France* and *England*.

And here many perhaps will thinke me litle better then madd, to cross the current opinion of Christendom; when I say that the *Friendship of France and England is sick at heart, and cannot live long*; and the contrary of that betwene *England* and *Spaine*. But I matter not that, other men have their way of making their measures, and I have mine. And indeed I had thought to have communicated it, but this worke having already exceeded my intentions, and that would be a great digression, I will onely tell you my grounds or reasons for the present why I thinke so, and may happily make a particular discourse of the other hereafter.

How *France* and *England* came to be so great friends, as to agree to commence, and carry on a War thus far against us, is not now mine enquiry; but to shew there is no such ground to despare of compliance with *England*, notwithstanding their present league with *France*, is my designe. And for this end I shall first shew that though this friendship is faire outwardly, each for their owne ends; yet that it is not so cordiall and firme, as many amongst us feare it is. And to say the truth, the consideration hereof, was the first dawning of hopes I had, for the Protestant Intrest, and the good of these Countries. Now although I could mention some more private exostulations, and perhaps some of their Articles, although I could by no meanes, ever procure from either side, the knowledge of them all: yet I thinke it not fit to mention these, but such things onely as are publick, and others as well as my selfe may know, if they use their eye sight, and observation.

Let us then omitting all secrets and mysteries of State; which yet are the best grounds to make a judgement, when certainly knowne; we will onely mention such things as are publickly apparent, but being not considered in subordination to Reasons of State, were unusefull to the most, for the end I have observed them.

When all *Europe* stood in doubt what *England* would doe, and all men on their

their tiptoes with expectation; to see whether War or Peace, betwixt that Kingdome and these Countries: upon the *Smyrna's* Fleet returne, the doubts of many were then decided. The Saturday morning early after the fight, the *Fiscale* sent his footman to tell me they had fought, with some generalls thereof, and that the Fleet was before the Land: I must confesse, I stood amazed at *Holmes's* furious folly, who had orders onely to bring them up, not to commence a War, the Declaration thereof being not published; although to those that would not submit to such orders, it was all one in effect, though not in formalities, which are the greatest plea, that I know of, that the *English* have for that Action. Upon this I began to consider the Reasons of State as to *England*, both domestick and foreign; For I reasond thus, if this friendship be so firme that *England* will goe through with *France* in all their great designs, I must make other measures then I had formerly done. But still finding all Reasons of State against this, and those jealousies of changing Religion and the Governement in those Kingdoms frivolous, (as I have demonstrated.) I found also thereby stronger grounds of hope for the Protestant Religion and the common Intrest of *Europe*; and that this was onely a temporary friendship, out of some particular peake, or designe against these Provinces, which would have an end when satisfaction therein was given to that Crowne. Whilst I am busy in ballancing all the Reasons of State for those Kingdoms, and likewise for their Intrest abroad as comprehensively as I could, the Protestants Intrest, the Triple Alliance, the greatnes of *France*, the danger of *England &c.* comes the *English* Declaration of War to mine hands, but without a particular date, contrary to practise, but wisely to colour what *Holmes* had done. Which having diligently perused, what I desired first to see, I found last to my great satisfaction, and that is that they would support the Peace made at *Aix la Chapelle*, (or *Aken*) and notwithstanding the prosecution of this War, will maintaine the true intent and scope of the said Treaty, and that in all their Alliances which they have or shall make in the progres of this War, they have and will take care, to preserve the ends thereof inviolable, unless provoked to the contrary. Whereby I was fully confirmed in my former opinion, so that I will now proceed to relate such things which have publickly past in the management of this War, that are sufficient I thinke to induce those that are unprejudiced, though perhaps not to convince the obstinate, to be of the same opinion with my selfe, and that the friendship of *England* and *France* is not so firme as they have feared. Premising that though all States as Gamesters must and will be cautious in their playing their parts; yet there appeared still more then ordinary jealousies of each others friendship all along, in the management of this War.

1. It is observable that though *France* is the Principall in the War, yet they were so diffident of *England*, that they would have them first to begin it, that so they might see them certainly engaged against us.

2. When they are both engaged, they trust not one another, without great

great Hostages as it were on both sides; the *French* Squadron of Ships with the *English*, and the *Duke of Monmouth* with the body of an Army with the *French*.

3. That body of the *English*, which doubtles should have remained together under their owne General Officers conjoynd with the *French* Armie; we know was not trusted by the *French* so to doe, but were mingled here and there, under the principall command of the *French* Generalls.

4. The Fleet wherein the *English* had the principall share of power and command, onely faced ours at first in point of Honour; yet attacqued them not, though they had the wind, whereby they might easily have done it at their pleasure, and also to their Advantage; but stood over againe to the *English* coast. Which fooles thought was want of valour, but wise men will judge it reason of State, that they might stay and observe what success the *French* had by Land. And had not we fallen upon them, for Reasons of State in those circumstances and Governement of these Provinces, that are well knowne, I thinke they would have done, as little as they could for *France*, to have fought us to this day.

5. After that fight, though they knew severall of our Ships were laid up, and some thousands of men called out of the Fleet, yet notwithstanding all the Summer after for many weeks, they attempted nothing against us with their Fleet. Intending doubtles to doe their owne worke, as they then saw *France* did theirs.

6. How the *English* were startled, at the *French's* coming to *Direcht* was very apparent, which we have formerly mentioned.

7. Why might not *England*, as well as the rest of the World, thinke that *Wesel*, *Rynberg*, *Skenker-sonse*, and the rest of our strong our Garrisons might give the *French* sufficient worke? And the *French* on the contrary, who had laid their traines before hand, know that when they came to fire them, there was no feare they would mis, and they should faile of having those places? Yea why may they not designe by this meanes to breake both our powers so by Sea, that they may rise up to contend with either of us? I am sure these things are very usuall with Princes and States, and examples of this kinde are infinite. Why may we not then thinke that *England* might hereby designe to breake *France's* power by Land; and *France* *England's* power and ours also by Sea? How often these two Crowns have played such like games with one another formerly, when *England* had footing in *France*, is apparent from the Histories of both Nations. But we will speake of that which more nearly concerns our selves, and within our own knowledge. In our first War with *England* I observed, what influence *Don Alonzo*, the Resident for *Spaine* at *London*, had, to foment those jealousies that that Common-wealth had of this, that it was the Kings cause, which this Republick by meanes of the *Orange* Family had espoused, and what assistance *Spaine*, (which first publickly acknowledged that Common-wealth) would afford them, &c. And when we were both engaged,

gaged, how the *Spanish* drew their Forces towards our Frontiers, as if they also would fall upon us; and when we declined, withdrew them againe, to encourage us both to continue the War. And in our 2^d War, if *France* had not a great hand both in contriving and continuing it, wise men are much deceived, and the *French* misrepresented to the World. By what inducements they perswaded both sides to a willingnes to that War, I list not mention, nor is there much necessity thereof, they being so well knowne to severall of both Nations. What a hand they had in its continuation, we may easily perceive, if we recollect but, what passed therein. When the *English* in the first Battell had beaten us, *France* being onely a *Spectator*, to ballance *England* becomes our Second; and *Monsieur* the Kings onely Brother, and his Lady *Englands* onely Sister, were not permitted to use any publick expressions of joy by Bonfires, or otherwise for their Brother the Duke of *Torks* Victory over *Opdam*. Their Fleet under de Duke of *Bausford* shall come to our assistance, which occasioned the dividing of the *Englishes*, by which meanes and *Monks* precipitancy (who would needs fight contrary to the advice of the chief and best Commanders in the Fleet, as *Ascough* told us in the *Hage*), the *English* are beaten by us. And to boye up *England* againe, a private League is made betweene the two Crownes, as I have formerly declared from an honourable Author. So that these tricks of State are usuall, though not discerned by every eye. Nor dare I censure them allwayes for sinfull, except I see manifestly foule play, because I know not the Reasons of State, which are the grounds of their proceedings.

Having thus shewne, and I thinke sufficiently, that the friendship of *England* and *France* is sick at heart; I shall now proceed to shew, that it cannot live long, but if *France* goes on, will and must dye quickly.

1. *Englands* intrest will perswade them to this, which they cannot but discern cleerly prompts them, to put a stop to *France's* progres. If any think that they are so blinded with passion, that to be revenged of us they will ruin themselves: I am not of their opinion, for many reasons, which I think I am cleare in; although I shall not mention them now, but onely appeale to the issue, whether they or I be in the darke and deceived.

2. The many tricks that *France* playes them, some whereof I have hinted; and severall others might be mentioned, that I know they have attempted, but been disappointed in; cannot but alienate the *English* from them.

3. A Treaty beeing the game (as I have said) we shall play at, (which the sooner and better for us) I foresee plainly, that such cards will be played, as will make it apparent, that the pack was neither fairely shuffled nor dealt; and that the *French* meane to play at *la bete* with us both, and if we continue to play, shall come to losing *loadam* at last: so that though the *French* have more of *Clubs* and *Spades* in their hands, by which they hope to win the *Diamonds*; we shall have more of the hearts between us, and so perhaps save some of our stock at the stake.

4. If *England* come to receive satisfaction, the spirit of the Nation will

turne the scales. For suppose that should be now, that *Comines* tells us was heretofore, (which yet is sooner said than proved) yet we must needs thinke that if *France* deales unfairely with them; they will not onely have a faire occasion to desert them, but the King and his Court, the Parliament and people will be more irritated against them, then they are now against us, (as is usuall in such cases) and be readier to joyne with us and fall upon them, then they were to joyne with them against us, for the conservation both of their Religious and Civil concernements.

5. The Necessity of keeping up the ballance between *France* and *Spaine*, will necessitate *England* to breake with *France*, or at least hold them to keepe more within their bounds; as we shall more fully shew hereafter.

6. Nay the very defence of these Countries, which we thinke they seeke to ruine, will cause them either to bring *France* to a peace with us, or themselves to help to defend us against them. For they will never suffer *France* to have them all, no nor the greatest part of these maritime Provinces, nor the strongest as *Holland*, if they can possibly hinder it, though they may permit them some part of the superior, for having themselves a share of the inferior, as I have formerly shewne. So that our intrest is so far *Englands*, and is the greatest security we have, next to Gods protection and our owne strength, that we shall not be wholly overrun and brought under the *French*. Yea this is so highly their concernement, that I perswade my selfe, if all the strength of the 3 Kingdoms under the Crowne of *England*, and all the power of *Spaine* with them, can hinder it, *France* shall never gaine them; or if he doe, never quietly posses them.

And these things I thinke are sufficient, to free us from our foolish feares of *England*; and to perswade us to a compliance with them, seeing we are both so greatly concerned to comply.

We shall now proceed to shew the quite contrary of the friendship between *Spaine* and *England*, that it is found at heart, and will recover. Wherein we need not be so large, because that which shews that the friendship of *France* and *England* must dye, proves that of *England* and *Spaine* will live.

That this friendship is found on the side of *Spaine*, none questions; this being the great motive, (though not the onely I confesse) that hath kept them from breaking with *France*.

And that it is allso so on the side of *England*, I thinke is as cleare to those that considers.

1. Their declared intention of mantaining the Treaty at *Aix la Chapelle* (or *Aken*) in their declaration of this War.

2. Although a provisionall clause, unless provoked to the contrary, in the close thereof, gives them a latitude of breaking with *Spaine*; yet notwithstanding they have been provoked severall wayes by them, as all know that have observed the War, yet they will not breake with them we see; which is a cleare demonstration their friendship is firmer then we imagine.

3. The importunities of *France*, which we know have been great, that

England

England would engage with them against Spaine also, hitherto we see, have prevailed nothing therein.

4. The assurance we know England hath given the Court of Spaine, both there and at *Bruxels*, concerning the *Spanish Netherlands*, makes us not doubt of their intentions: Although we doe of *France's*, by reason both of their preparations and opportunities, as we have formerly shewne. But if *France* should fall upon them, as we have reason to feare; that will prove both our Assertions the stronglier, making the friendship of *England* and *France* dye immediately, and that of *Spaine* and *England* quickly recover. And if this save not those Provinces for the present, there's nothing (so far as I see) under Heaven that can, as I have formerly said.

We perceive then the pulse of this friendship beates both strong and orderly enough, to secure us from all feares of its dying: lets visit the patient once more, and we shall find no further need of such *Physicians* advise, as the Author of *la France Politique*, in his *Avis important a l'Angle-terre* Pag. 471. and that the distemper was onely a fit or two of an Ague the last spring, and therefore so far from being dangerous, that it may prove rather physick according to the proverb, *An Ague in the spring is Physick for a King*: And that the body politick of *Spaine* in their friendship with *England* is recovering, as well as the King of *Spaine* personally is recovered.

* Jan. 23. 1668.

1. If we consider the Common intrest of *Europe* wherein the *English* not onely are, but also profes themselves concerned. And for this I need not any other prooffe, but the *Triple Alliance**, and the *Declaration of this War*, both which whosoever reads, must needs acknowledge this for truth.

2. The great Intrest of Trade which the *English* have in the *Spanish Dominions*. The very effects the *Merchants* had standing out there, were computed at the beginning of this War, at sixteen Millions. And can we thinke the King will easily forgoe his customs, and the Kingdome their Commerce, with those Dominions? which in my calculation is equall with that they have with all *Europe* besides.

3. We know that they have lately made a peace in the *West-Indies*, and how peremptory they are in the observance thereof: so that the Governor of *Jamaica* upon complaints of him, was sent prisoner to *London*, clapt up in the Tower &c. And shall we thinke then, that they will breake into war at home?

4. *England* cannot but be sensible of the greatnes of *France*, and cannot be so senseles but they must needs thinke, that it is their concernement that he grow not so great, that he become their Master also at last? And the whole world knowes that *Spaine* not onely hath been now for many yeares the ballance for them; but still must be so upon the Continent, or none: The Princes of the Empire being now so divided, between the *Imperiall* and *French Crowne*. What wise man therefore can thinke now that *Spaine* declines, but that the *Empire* and *England* are highly concernd to support them? and shall we thinke then that in stead of this, either should help forwards their downfall? For my part were there no other reason of state

but

but this, I should not feare *Englands* breaking with *Spaine*; and especially now that they see, what progres *France* hath made amongst us.

5. This hath been a fundamentall maxim in the Governement of *England*, to keep the ballance even betwixt the two Crownes of *Spaine* and *France*, ever since *Lewis* the eleventh time, who seised on *Burgundy*, which was formerly the usall confederate with *England* against *France*. In place whereof *Austria* first and after *Spaine* obteining the rest of the Provinces that were under *Charles* last Duke of *Burgundy*, by marriage of his daughter; *England* after still had an eye to them in reference to *France*. And when the Civil Wars in these Provinces broke out, and *England* was jealous of *France's* being our Protector: *Q. Elisabeth* would not permit it, still having respect to the *House of Burgundy*, as *Thuanus* and *Cambden* in the forecited places shew.

And thus you have my *Conjectures*, with such Reasons of State whereon they are grounded, as are publick, and may therefore be published; I having industriously declined, all reflections on private transactions, treaties, and articles whatsoever, that so no sife may have any just occasion of being offended with my writing.

SECT. 12. *France's ambition. Growing greatnes. The causes thereof. We and England in the fault. The Common intrest of Europe to oppose France particularly declared of the Empire, Spaine, England, Denmarke, and this Republick and Hans Townes. Yea of Sweden, Savoy, and Switzerland. The ballance of Europe to be kept even, and by whom.*

TO those that know the World the ambition of *France* cannot be unknowne. Lets but looke a litle about us, and we shall see the *French Intrest* is every where driven on. To set this forth in its right colors, would require volums rather then pages. We shall therefore doe as the painter, that in stead of drawing the giant at length, drew onely his thumb; or as *Geographers*, that set forth great Countries in small maps. And for this we shall not looke far backwards to former times, but onely our owne, since *France* recovered of those strong convulsions, by the civil Wars and diffentions in *Mazarines* time, in the minority of his present *Majestie*. And we shall find sufficient, to awaken the most part of Princes and States in *Europe*, to looke to themselves. The invasion of the *Spanish Netherlands*; the taking the *French comte*, (though after restored to the *Spanish*) and *Lorraine*, which they still keepe; the engaging a strong party of the *Electors* and Princes of the *Empire* for their intrest; the worke they have made in *Poland* and *Hungarie*, that that Crowne might be at their disposal, and this diverted; their taking the *Swede* off the *Triple Alliance*, and obliging him to give the Emperor worke in *Germanie*, and *Brandenburg* in *Prussia*, with a great sum of money, some say and print also 60 tun of gold or 600000 l. sterling;

ling; the endeavours they have used with *Portugal* to give *Spaine* a diversion, though that Kingdom is not in a capacity, to serve their designs: the worke also they have made in *Italy*: their intresting themselves in all Treaties almost in *Europe*: the pensions they allow to Ministers of State in most Princes Courts, and many other wayes they take to enlarge their Empire. Those that are desirous to see their designs, may consult the late Author of *La France Politique ou ses desseins executez & à executer*. And especially the ingenious discours of the *Baron of Isola*, in's *Bouclier d'Etat & de Justice* Article 6. where he shows *France's* aspiring to the *Univiersall Monarchie*, and by what maxims and means, they advance apace towards it. And as their ambition is great, so their pretentions are boundles. Who knows not how they pretend, not onely to the *Spanish Netherlands*, but the whole *Empire*? *Des justes pretentions du Roy sur l'Empire, par le Sieur Aubery Advocat au Parlement, & aux conseils du Roy*. Printed at *Paris* 1667. And there are *Aubery's* or at least *Advocates* enow in *Paris*, to draw up pretensions to the Crowne of *England*, and so of one Kingdome and State after another, according as their swords shall be able to pursue them.

And indeed such is the growing greatnes of that Kingdome, that it is become formidable to all *Europe*. I need not insift on this, the World is sufficiently sensible of it: but it may be worth our paines, to enquire into the causes thereof.

France formerly had severall boundaries to their ambition, which by degrees they have broken downe. Severall *Dukes*, on the one side that of *Normandie*, and the *Englifo* after who for 400 years together late dominati sunt in *Gallia*; till *Charles* the 7. his time: and that of *Bretaigne*, till *Charles* the 8 gained it to the Crowne of *France*, by the marriage of *Anne* Daughter of *Francis* the 2. the last Duke thereof: and on the other side the *Dukes* of *Burgundie*, till *Lewis* the 11. who after the death of *Charles* the last Duke flaine at the battell of *Nancey*, seized thereon, and united it to the Crowne of *France*. These three Potentates kept the French Kings continually under by their confederations and Wars against that Kingdome. Which bands they having once broke, they became at liberty to get more elbow room in the World: and become the largest, compactest, and strongest Kingdome of *Europe*; were it not that their owne intestine Divisions, and frequent Civil Wars bath often weakned them.

After *France* had arrived at this greatnes, the following Kings *Charles* the 8. *Lewis* the 12. and *Francis* the first, fruitlessly spent the Kingdoms strength in their Wars in *Italy*: till *Francis* and *Charles* the 5. became competitors for the *Empire*, and *Spaine* and *France* a fit match for each other in power. Since which time such mighty contests have been betwixt those two Kingdoms, as have filled all *Europe* with terror and amazement, and all Historians with their Actions. But how *France* hath so far prevailed, as we see at present; is partly by our owne, and partly by the *Englifo* fault; we by commission, and they by omission, as we shall (with what brevity

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vity we can) make apparent, in regard it may be usefull to us both.

During the reigne of *Charles* the 5. and *Francis* aforesaid, the Reformation of Religion begun, which occasioned great alterations to the Kingdom of *France*, and to the Kings of *Spaine* in these *Low Countries*. Wherein the Crowne of *Spaine* continued to prosecute their intrest, in breaking downe the power of *France* by all means possible, and especially by joyning with the *Guisian* faction which stiled themselves the *Holy league*, under pretense of opposing the *Protestants*. Those great contests, which the severall factions in *France* clothed with the glorious mantle of Religion, are well knowne to those that are conversant in their Histories; and are particularly declared by many; but best in my judgement, on the *Protestants* side by *Beza* the Author (though not named) of those 15 Bookes, he stiles *Commentariorum de Statu Religionis & Reip. in Regno Gallia, sub Henrico. 2. Francisco 2. Carolo 9. & Henrico 3.* And on the *Papists* by *Davila* in his excellent Historie of the *Civil Wars of France*. In which Contests, in the reigns of the 4. forementioned Kings, the successors of *Francis* the 1. and in the times of *Henry* the 4. who succeeded them, the *Protestants* (called there *Hugonois*) got into their Possession, above 300 Garrisons and Forts in that Kingdome.

On the otherhand *France* was not asleep, or awanting to prosecute their intrest, in fomenting, promoting, and carrying on those divisions in these *Low Countries*: to breake downe the power of *Spaine*, into whose hands they had fallen by marriage (as we have said) and to remove the obstacle, which these Provinces constantly were, to their advancing their designs. For which end they continually assisted us, and whilst they pretended to fight our battells; at our charges they really fought their owne. And lest the House of *Austria* so neerly allied to *Spaine* should afford them further assistance; they ingage *Sweden* to invade the *Empire* and give the *Emperor* worke at home; Allowing A. D. 1631. *Gustavus Adolphus* 300000 franks for levying an army, and a million yearly for paying them, (every frank being 2 shillings sterling) as in the yeares 1625 and 1635. they fathering all the *Empire* did on *Spaine*, engaged us also in more firme and constant leagues against them. This being the true State of those times between those two Crownes; we therein thus doubly miscarried, and erred both in our civil and Religious intrest.

First in that we thought we could never bring *Spaine* low enough, nor assist *France* sufficiently against them. In this blind zeale we went a great deale too far, though nothing the length, that *France* desired: for had we listned to their suggestions, we had to this day continued our Wars with *Spaine*, and so have done their worke for them. What arts *France* used do dissuade us from peace with *Spaine*; may be seen in their Historian *Priol*, *De Rebus* as well as our owne, concerning the Treaty of *Munster*. But the States *Gallicis* seeing the succeses of *France*, of whose greatnes they now at last, and indeed too late; became jealous; to which they were the more awakened, by the *French* approaches towards us in *Flandres* and taking of *Dunkirke*; it being

being their owne proverb *Aye le Francois pour ton amy, non pas pour ton voisia*: they resolve to take the opportunity which was put into their hands by *Spain*; who despairing of peace with *France*, sought nothing more then to take off their Confederates, the *Swede*, and these united *Provinces* especially, by concluding a peace with us, and procuring one also between the *Empire* and *Sweden*. For knowing their owne weaknes, and great worke on their hands, by the revolt of *Portugall*, Rebellion in *Catalonia*, the doubtful condition of *Naples*, the frequent losses they had received, and their want of men and money to war every where; they offerd us equall conditions; and we privately without the knowledge either of the *French* Plenipotentiaries, or the Mediators (*Chigie* from the Pope, and *Comaren* from the State of *Venice*) accept them at last, and a peace is made betwixt us at *Munster*, January 30. 1648. and quickly after between the *Empire* and *Sueden* at *Osnaburg* August the 6. in the same yeare. By which meanes *Spain* was freed from our Wars, had opportunity of prosecuting theirs against *Portugall*, and of creating *France* trouble at home by joyning with the *Condean* faction, in the greatnes of *Mazarine*, and the minoritie of his present Majesty. This peace so stuck on the Cardinals stomach, that neither He nor that Kingdome have ever digested it: but because we would not war for them any longer, resolved they would war against us at last: though if we had not done that too long, they had never done this so succesfully.

Secondly we helpt forward *France's* greatnes and our owne destruction, by helping to destroy the Protestants intrest in that Kingdome. For as *France* had the power of *Spain* to keep them in on every side; so they had also a curb of the Protestants at home, to check them in their exorbitant designs. Who from the beginning of the Reformation under *Francis* the first, *Henry* the 2^d, and *Francis* the 2^d had growne to that strength and greatnes, that they grew formidable to the Crowne of *France*. And notwithstanding the Massacre of *Merindel* and *Chabries* A. D. 1545. and the 8 severall civill Wars that was made against them, (5 by *Charles* the 9, and 3 by *Henry* the 3) and the great Massacre at *Paris* 1572: yet God so blest them and multiplied them, that in the yeare 1560 there was reckoned above 1250 Churches of them, and by their severall capitulations with the two forementioned Kings at the end of their civill Wars, and the Connivance of *Henry* the 4. formerly Head of their party, they got 300 at least Garrisons and forts for their defense, which he used to call, *the Commonwealth of Rochel*, that and *Montanban* being their principall places of strength. From whom they obtained severall immunities, but especially that of the liberty of their Religion, which he confirmed to them by the ratification of the severall concessions of his Predecessors in the *Edict of Nantes*, 1598, passed in the Parliament of *Paris* February the 25 in the following yeare. Although the promulgation thereof, out of respect to *Cardinal Medices* was deferd, till March the 2. 1599. Which He then

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vehemently prest, beginning his speech with a strange prodigie that had fallen out betwixt Himselfe and the Duke of *Guise* 26. yeares before, who being about to play at tables in the presence of many Nobles, there appeared drops of blood, which though once and againe wiped off, yet new still were perceived, and none knew whence, there being not any in the roome that bled; which he then declared for a sad omen of much blood that should be shed betwixt them two, which having accordingly happend to his great grief, he desired to take away all further occasions of their civill Wars by publishing that edict &c. which may be seen in Thuanus. *Lib. 122.* This great King by name and merit, having fought 140 battells and skirmishes with his owne hands, beleaguerd 300 Cities and forts, was no sooner slaine by the dagger of that Rascally villane *Ravillac*, in the midst of his greatest glory and designs; But his son and Successor *Lewis* the 13. confirms the same, May the 22. 1610. wherein he acknowledges that, *Experience having taught the Kings his Predecessors that the fury and violence of Armes had not onely been unprofitable to draw their subjects to the Romane Church, but was rather hurtfull: which made them have recourse by a more happy Counsel, to mildnes granting them the exercise of the Reformed Religion they professed: in whose imitation his father (Henry the 4.) had made the Edict of Nantes, to reconcile all his loving subjects: the observation whereof, had settled an assured quiet amongst them, which had ever since continued without interruption.* And declares that though that *Edict* be perpetuall and irrevocable, and by that meanes hath no need to be confirmed by any new declarations; yet to the end his subjects may be assured of his love and intention to have the said *Edict* inviolably kept (being made for the good and quiet of his subjects) therfore it is ordained by him with the advise of the *Queen Regent*, Princes of the blood &c. that the same be kept inviolably; and those that shall infringe it; severely punished, as troublers of the publick peace of the Kingdome, &c. Yet notwithstanding all this, the King being provoked by them, is induced, much against his inclination, to War against them whom he declared Rebels 1621. and tooke many of their cautionary Townes from them; yet this was at last composd, and they reserved *Rochel* and severall other places still for their defence. But afterwards, at the instigation of *Cardinal Richelieu*, (not out of any zeale for his Religion being called the *Hugonot Cardinal*, but of Policy to free *France* from their feares of the Protestant party at home) with much regret the King makes War against them againe 1625. and sent to the States for twenty sayle of men of War according to the late Treaty, which was assented unto, though with great reluctancy, and they was sent under Admiral *Hambain*; which were especially instrumentall of ruining the Protestants power at Sea, and of *Rochel* afterwards, and consequently all the power that party had left under the Duke of *Roban*, with nere 50 places for their Protection: All their Cautionary Townes being dismantled, and they having no other shelter, but the shadow of the *Allmighty*, and their Kings clemency left them to fly unto for their defence. So that as I wish we had otherwise employed our power, so I pray

(as

* Imperium (as Schookius * in our first War with England, Deum rogo, filius & nepotibus non maritimum imputet, quae a parentibus facta fuerunt) that God may not lay this sin to our charge. The Protestants having thus made their last will and Testament, whereby the Crowne became sole heir and executor of all they had, Lewis the last thereby became the greatest Monarch since Charles the Great: his predecessors having reduced the many Provinces dismembred from France by Hugh Capet into one entire body, and he all the parts thereof to the entire subjection of the Crowne; and that Kingdome at liberty to looke abroad, and carry on their designs where they please, having for this end gained 3 keys to their neighbor Kingdoms, Pignerol to enter Italy, Brisack Germany, and Perpignan Spaine.

We have seene how we have gon against our intrest in overdoing our worke; lets now see how England have been no les guilty, in not doing their duty; where in they have not onely been greatly wanting to themselves, but more to the Protestant intrest in Europe.

The Protestants in France having by Armes, Treaties, Concessions, and Confirmations of severall Kings, obtained that strength which we have declared: There could be nothing more clearly the intrest of all those of the Reformed Religion, and especially their Neighbors then to support them in their just rights: Which Queen Elizabeth and her Council so well understood, that though she had assisted these Provinces both with money and men considerably, whereby she had drawne upon her a War with Spaine which was very costly to her, and also occasioned the Rebellion in Ireland, which to reduce stood Her and her Kingdom of England in 4 years time no les, if we take Morisons accompt, then 1198000 L. Sterling: yet she neglects not to supply Henry of Navar against the Guisian league and faction for the support of the Protestants, with 101560 franks for the Baron of Donna to raise an Army in Germany, A. D. 1587. for his service: and 71165 besides 20000 she spent in sending 4000 men under the conduct and command of the Lord Willoughby A. 1589. and 33333 to levy an Army under the Prince of Anhalt, for their service, and as much money she lent Navar himselfe, the following yeare 1590. and continually upon all occasions supported him and the intrest of the Reformed Religion in those Kingdoms, so that she was publickly prayed for by the Hugonots as their Protectoresse.

Camdeni
Annales
1590.

Lib. 129.

No sooner was this great Princeesse dead, whose glory yet will never dye, (being accounted by her very enemies the Guisians, the most glorious that ever swayed Scepter, gloriosissima, & omnium quae unquam sceptrum gestarunt; felicissima femina, as Thuanus tells us, adding many great elogiums of her, and concluding none ever was or will be like her of that sex:) and King James called in, to succeed in that Crowne: but the French, though they had underhand opposed the conjunction of those two Kingdoms all they could, having still made use of Scotland formerly in their Wars with England for a diversion to them, by setting them upon entring that King-

dom

dom at the back doore betwixt them; and as loth also that such an accession of power should accrew to their old enemies the English; yet now they are the first that come with a splendid Embassage, to welcome him to his new Crowne. This King if he had had as much of the Lions courage, as he had of the foxes cunning and Kingcraft as he called it; how happy had it bene both for his owne family, and his Kingdoms! But as he was the occasion of the sad disasters that happend to both, as is shewne not onely by the Historians, but particular Authors in the English Tongue, so I shall now briefly shew how he occasioned many and great irreparable losses to the Protestant intrest abroad, especially by his pusillanimity.

Rushworth
Welden.
Osburne,
&c.

How he perswaded this Republick to a 12 yeares Truce with Spaine, and how prejudiciall it was to these Provinces, is well knowne. How earnestly he was prest to assist his son the Palsgrave, both by forreigne Princes abroad, and his Parliaments at home, I need not mention: nor how he spent more in Embassies, their traines and Treaties, then would have done his worke with men of Armes and traines of Artillery. I shall onely speake of that relating to the French Protestants, as the proper subject of my discourse.

When Lewis the 13 set upon reducing the Cautionary Townes which the Protestants had in his Kingdome, by the grants of severall Kings (as we have said) and the distressed sought to the Crowne of England for Reliefe: K. James according to his usufall custom, onely employes Embassadors, the Lord Herbert once and againe; whom the French delayd with words, till they had done their worke. For knowing King James's temper too well, Luynes the High Constable of France, being appointed to give Herbert audience, first sets a Gentleman of the Reformed Religion behind the hangings, that being an eare-witnes of what past, might relate to the Reformists, what small grounds of hope they had, of having succors from the Crowne of England; and then in stead of hearkning to his Embassage, in a most insolent manner affronted both his Master and himselfe with menaces: which when he could not brooke, but roundly replied, His Master then knew what he had to doe, and offered the Constable who was chollerick thereat, the satisfaction of his sword; the French Embassador misrepresents what past to K. James, and procures Herbert to be called home, and the Earle of Carlile is sent in his place, to as litle purpose as before. Nor was this the worst, for the Duke of Guise obtained 8 English sayle of men of War to joyne with him against the Rochellers and them of the Religion to distress them by Sea, as the Count of Soissons did by Land (for which the Duke of Buckingham was after questioned in Parliament) and thus the greatest part of the Protestants power was broke downe, and had been wholly, but that the French had not then time by reason of the Spanish worke in the Valtolin; so that a peace was skind over for a small time, till they had leisure to open the wound againe, and make the poore Patients bleed their last. These things caused great complaints of England every where amongst them of the Reformed Religion, and occasioned Deodate's saying, that King James's

Howels
Hist. of
Lewis 13.
A. 1621.

James's sins of omission, were greater then all his Predecessors sins of Commission.

Though the pacification was published at *Montpellier*, yet *Richelieu* being made *Minister of State* and chief Director of affaires in *France*, A. 1624; he made it his first worke to go on with the designe of destroying the Protestants power in that Kingdome; and though the King was against it at first, yet the Cardinal carried it on at last, so that afterwards he said, *He had taken Rochel in spite of three Kings*, meaning his owne *England* and *Spaine*. For the accomplishing this worke, the Eagle-eyed *Richelieu* foreseeing that *England* and these *States* might stand in his way and obstruct him, he resolves to charme us both to a compliance. For which end *France* makes a stricter league with these *United Provinces*, affords us 1600000 franks yearly for the two next following, to be repaid the two next years after our peace with *Spaine*, agrees for ships for their service &c. And for *England*, though they knew *K. James* would not disturb their designes, yet not knowing what the *Prince of Wales* might doe, there were meanes used to ingage him, by a Match with *Henriette*, the onely Daughter then unmarried of *Henry the 4. K. James* who was desirous to match his onely son Considerably, had for 9 or 10 years beene Courting of *Spaine* to this purpose, that so with one he might have the *Palatinate* restored to the *Palsgrave*; and the *Prince of Wales*, having past through *France* incognito into *Spaine*, to make love personally to the *Infanta*, and see with his owne eyes if fame belied not her beauty; and being there still delayed, but not denyed (the *Spanish* desiring to see all the Daughters of *France* first matcht, to prevent an alliance betwixt *England* and that Kingdome) and the busines of the *Palatinate* still kept in suspence; he is commanded home by his Father *K. James*. But having seen the Lady *Henriette* at a maske, in his passage through *France*, under the notion of an *English* Gentleman, and being taken with her beauty, more then the *Infanta's*; overtures are made of a marriage with Her, and though some in the *French Council*, were rather for her matching to *Lorraine* (that so those Territories might be gained to *France*, which had been long troublesome to them) yet this reason of State, of obliging him not to interrupt their designe of ruining the Protestants, and prevent his marrying with *Spaine* prevailed, and in 9 months time a Match is concluded.

Richelieu thinking *France* secure of these two they most feared; falls to worke to reduce the *Hugonots* Cautionary Townes. Upon which *Soubze* and *Blankart* goe for *England* to implore *K. Charles* (his Father *K. James* being then dead) his assistance. This good King thinks himselfe obliged in conscience and honour, notwithstanding his marriage with the King of *France's* sister, to support them. And indeed so he was, for the Ambassadors and Agents of the Crowne of *England*, had becom Caution to those of the Religion, for the King of *France's* performance with them. He therefore sends 150 sayle of ships and an Army of 10000 men; under the Command of the *Duke of Buckingham*, to take off that odium which was upon him in *England*, for what was formerly done under *K. James*. Who published

blished a *Manifesto* in the *K. of Englands* name July the 21. 1627. declaring that though there were other grounds sufficient for a War, as the abuse of the *English* Merchants, their ships and goods seized on, and the extraordinary equipping for Sea in *France*; yet that the sole cause of the War, was the Crowne of *France's* not performing of Articles with those of the Reformed Religion. This expedition, and the causes of its miscarriage, is writ by a learned pen*, and well knowne from the moderne Histories of both Kingdoms. The *French* and *English* both proceed, the former in carrying on, the latter to prevent if possible, their designes. For which end *K. Charles* sent the Earle of *Denbigh* with another Fleet, which was able to effect nothing; and the Earle of *Linzey* with the last (*Buckingham* being assassinated by *Felton* the day before he was to embarke) But before *Linzey* came, such stupendous works were raised (of which *Bertius* hath writ a particular booke) and so pallisadoed, that the Cardinal sent to the *English* Admirall, that he should have a passport with 6 of his ablest Commanders, to come a shore and view the works, and if they thought *Rochel* relievable, he would raise the siege, without fighting a stroake. The *English* thus coming too late lost *Rochel*, upon which followed the Duke of *Rohan* and the rest of the Reformists compliance, the dismantling of their remaining Garrisons (above 40 whereof *Mantauban* was the last) and a peace with *England*, and those of the Reformed Religion in *France*.

*Expedition in Ream Insulam. aurbere Edovardo Herbert Barone de Cherbury.

Since which time what mighty designes have been contrived, and carried on by the two Cardinals, *Richelieu* and *Mazarine*, for that Kingdome abroad, whose plots they are still pursuing; is not unknowne to those that are curiously inquisitive. How the former wrought the revolt of *Portugal*, the Rebellion in *Catalonia*, the carrying on the Wars in these Countries, to bring downe *Spaine*; set on foot and fomented the distractions of Great *Britaigne*, first by the *Scots*, and afterwards by other means, to give *England* worke at home: tamperd with *Wallesteyne* for betraying the Imperiall Army, for whose death he most passionately wept, failing thereby of his hopes, of *France's* speedy coming to the Empire: engaged *Sweden* to serve their ends in *Germany*; tooke *Pignerol* to keepe *Italy* in aw: *Lorraine* is taken; the *Dukes of Savoy, Mantua, and Modena* are wholly at *France's* service: and the Princes Electors, especially the Ecclesiasticall, rather courting the favour of that Crowne, then the Imperiall. This was the true State of *France*, at the death of *Richelieu* in 42. and the King his Master, who quickly followed him, May 14. 1643. the same day of the yeare his father died, and wherein he was Crowned. Which I have beene the larger in, first because tis for the most part the same now, and in severall things greater than then, especially by their alliance with *England*, and success against these and the *Spanish* *Netherlands*: and 2. that it might appeare, how far they have overgrowne *Spaine* in power, that so the world may be awakend, and see to lop off their superfluous bowes, lest they grow in time like *Nebuchadnezzars* tree, so great that they overshadow us all.

For

For *Mazarine* succeeding *Richelieu* as Minister of State, who was his onely Scholler that proved his paralel, to which two Clergy-men let me say it, for it is a truth (though I know the Laity may stomach it) *France* owes their present greatnes; the first 5 years after till 48 that tumultuous Nation was never wiselier governed in the non-age of their Sovereigne: and though in the next lustre or five yeares following till 53, they had some aguish fits that shaked them in their civill wars, yet they soone recovered thereof, and have ever since growne stronger and stronger. So that it was high time for the Neighbour Nations no longer to dance after the fidle of *France*. And the States saw this, and therefore made peace, as I have said; but *England* herein offended againe, and prevaricated in the common intrest of *Europe*. Let me shew how briefly, because it may satisfie perhaps the curiosity of some that have wondred at it, as much as my selfe, in regard they have been ignorant of the true grounds thereof.

When *Cromwel* the *Hanibal* of the *English* Common-wealth, and immortall enemie and Terror to *Rome*, came to have the power of those three Kingdoms in his hands; he saw it necessary to engage those Nations and imploy his Armies in a forreigne War; for without an Army he could not maintaine the power he had got, and without imploying them he could not quietly enjoy it (Armies being like raised spirits, that must be employed, or else they fall foule upon him that raised them) and besides this necessity of intrest, his owne inclination strongly carried him, and perhaps some extravagant hopes, to pull downe the *Pope*; for he once said to *Lambert*, were I as young as you, I should not doubt to knock at the gates of *Rome* before I died. *Spaine* and *France* both courted him, knowing what mettall his sword was made of, and his *Iron-sides* wore; of which competition he made his advantage, obtaining such conditions of *France*, as were a wonder to all, that understood the maxims of their Governement. That which most inclined him to the *French*, was that he judged *Spaine* and *Austria* the two strongest Hornes of *Anti-Christ*, whose fall was come as one of his Prophets, (whom I could name) inspired him, and that *France* might be brought to renounce *Rome*; intending withall to get such places in *Flanders* and over against the coast of *England*, that he might keepe the *Dutch* in aw, and with a few of his Ships command a toll for the passage in the Channel, as the *Dane* did in the *Sound*. A League therefore is made with *France*, March 23. 1657 for a yeare, and renewed the next, by *Lockard* his Ambassador, who for his parts and sagacity was so acceptable to *Mazarine*, that he had more acces to him, and busines with him, then all the Ambassadors at *Paris* besides. These two *Cromwel*, and the *Cardinal* the stronglier to carry on their designes, take in the King of *Sweden* for a third into their confederacy (*Christina* having resigned that Crowne, and wandring about like a blazing Comet) and these three Leagued together made the *Triumvirate* of those times.

Sweden was to pluck the plumes of the *Roman Eagle*, when he had clipt the wings of his Neighbours, that they might not fly upon the prey he left behind.

behind. Wherein *Oliver* so concernd himselfe, that when the *Dane* had got the *Dutch* for his second, he sent *Montague* to boye up *Swedens* sinking intrest in the *Sound*: and they were so neere an engagement, that they had certainly fought, had not the *English* espied an Advice - Yacht coming towards them, which bringing them news of the *Protectors* death, they hoyst up sailes, and returnd home.

France was to pull downe *Spaine* by Land, with his owne forces, and such as the *Protector* could spare. Which *Lockard* the Embassador there commanded. Who having beene more used to fight in the field, then play the pioneers with their spades, were not so much esteemed at first by the *French*: till the fight with *Don Iohn* of *Austria's* Army which came to relieve *Dunkerke*, wherein they behaved themselves with that gallantry, that *Don Iohn* cryed out he was beat by raging wild beasts rather then men; and that great soldier the *Prince of Conde* hath often said since, that he never saw the like action, as was that day performed by the *English*. Shortly after *Dunkerke* yielded, and was put into the *English* hands.

The *Protector* was to bring downe *Spaine* by Sea, which he said he would doe, or he and his should live on bread and water. Intending also to carrie on the designe, which *Sidney*, *Rawleigh* and severall of the wisest men of those times under *Q. Elizabeth* prest, and that was to beat the *Spanish* out of the *Indies*; but as she had too many irons in the fire to carry on that worke, so how he miscarried in it, is sufficiently knowne. And indeed he had broke *Spaines* naval power much more then he did, although he did a great deale at *Tenerif* and else where, had it not been for a small accident that happend, which was this. *Admirall Blake*, who still principled his seamen in those Confusions and frequent Revolutions of Governement, that the Fleet served no Parties nor Persons, but the *English* Nation; having brought some of his great ships before *Tunis*, batterd downe the Castle and compeld them to his termes; for which extraordinary service he expected the reward of gratitude at least: In stead thereof, by his next Advice from *England* he hath a pardon sent him, for endangering the Fleet in such an attempt without order &c. Which so stuck on the stomach of that stout and sturdy *Stoick*, that afterwards the *Spanish* Fleet coming on the maine Ocean off *Cadiz*; He reading his Commission, and finding it onely for fighting them in the *Mediterranean*, would not fall on them, though the Commanders sollicitd him, promised to answer it for him &c. onely was willing to fight if the *Spaniards* begun; but though the *English* provoked them to it, and affronted them all they could; yet the wary *Spaniard* was wiser then to ingage, and so saved themselves; at which *Oliver* stormd not a litle; but *Blake* cared not much, the *Admirall* heereby crying quits with the *Generall*.

Thus you see what great things a litle blind zeale may doe. And indeed it is not so much to be admired at in him, he having had such an *enthusiastical* heat, as all know, that knew him well; nor can we wonder so much, if his head some times run round, who was so continually wrapt up in such

* Grotius de jure bel. & pac. l. 2. c. 22. voluntatem implendi vaticinia, sine Dei mandato, non esse causam belli.

such whirlepooles of affaires, as he was perpetually plunged in: though to miscarry in so great a concernment for the Protestant interest, was a capitall crime in him above all others; who designing to pul downe the Pope, by bringing downe Spaine, set up France to ruin the Protestants throughout Christendome. Thus *Ludii in humanis divina potentia rebus!*

But these three lived not long to goe on with these designes, and indeed it was well for the world they did not. Oliver went first, at which *Mazarine*, was secretly glad, saying when the newes was brought him as he was at play, *there's then a fortunate foole gon.* But this was but to trample upon a dead lion, whom he so ridiculously feared before, that his greatest Confidents made themselves privately merry therewith. Knowing how uncivily for this, he put the King of England out of France; and the Duke of *Yorke* allso notwithstanding his service, and the Cavalries acclamations of *vive's* to him, and curses of the Cardinal: Yea how after his death he feared his shadow, for in the *Ile of Fesant* 59 at the interview of the two Kings and their Courts, where the marriage was made, and peace concluded betwixt them, (which *Mazarine* had reserved for his owne glory) and the King of great Britaine being there received by *Lewis de Haro* at first with the height of a *Spanish* complement in the depth of the mire, and treated after with all civility: yet the Cardinal, though courted by the *Duke of Ormond*, durst not speake with him, for feare of *Lockard* that was present at the Treatie. But though the crafty Cardinal was no coward, yet thus fearefull, and timorously was he cautious for Him, whom I know he hated above all Mortals, and that Common-wealth above all people in the world; as I can many wayes make apparent, if it was of any importance to the publick.

But to be briefe, *Olivers* other two *Consorts* followed after him quickly, and these three Conquerors, being cut off by death, who kept all Christendome in aw whilst they lived, the world had a litle quiet, till France got a horse back againe in *Flanders*.

But betwixt and that time was that great change in England by the wonderfull providence of God in the restoration of his Majesty; by which meanes the French got *Dunkirke* again into their hands, and were therby capacitated, the better to carry on their worke against these Countries. At which the French made themselves merry, and some say abusively, by having *Dunkirke* drawne with a purse hanging over it: The English stormed, and some swore *Oliver would have sold his great nose, rather then Dunkirke.* Yea this still sticks on many of their stomachs; I remember at my last being in England in 66, and seeing *Clarendon House*; and wondring a litle why it was situated so neer the roade, which made it both unfree, and molested with dust; and critising upon some other things, the Oratory especially; that the Chancelor that was the eldest son of the Church of England, should make his Chappel, as a wag writ of *Emanuel Colledge's*, so awry: *Just North and South, yea verily:* when I came above on the leads I was so pleased with the

the pleasantnes of the prospect, that I thought for that it might compare with any House I had seen; knowing no place in England except above *Greenwich*, that I thought comparable to it, upon which the domestick had the confidence, perceiving me a stranger, to tell me I could not thence see *Dunkirke*: for the Commonality had Christened it, and made *Dunkirke* the Godfather, calling the House after its name. But though I confesse it was against the Common interest of Europe, that it should fall to the French againe; yet whether it was against the interest of the King of England and that Kingdome, is not so cleare to me. I will onely say this, that I know a person hath weighed that so well, that I shall carrie this challenge for him, that if any Gentleman English or French, pleases fairely to State this Question in hypothesis, according to the circumstances of those times, let him take which side thereof he pleases, and use what weapons he will (and I think thats very faire) and he shall not want an Antagonist; that shall fight him fairely, whether he pleases to appeare in *Roman bus*, or in his halfe shirt made of his owne mothers language, upon the publick theater of the world. And truly his designe is so honest, I dare be his Compurgator, and being a litle acquainted with it, I shall tell you briefly: It is to let men see, how hard it is sometimes to discern on which side the true interest of State lies; (there being so many circumstances considerable, which often in the scale of policy weigh heavier, then that which bystanders think the maine) and therby allso to check the sawcines of every shopkeeper, who like the litle *Spanish Dons*, will be censuring Princes counsels, and condemning Ministers of State, though they are ignorant of the grounds of their Actions, and much more of that which is true policy.

Having thus shewne the true State of France, and its continuall growing greatnes downe to the times of his present Majesty, who hath not onely got *Dunkirke*, regained *Lorraine*, conquered a great part of *Flanders* from the *Spanish*, but 3 Provinces allso entirely from the States: It wil clearely follow to be the Common interest of Europe to oppose France in their future progress, except they meane to follow our fate.

I had thought to have been larger heerein then I shall, in regard my paines is heerein in part prevented, by the Author of *la France Politique* from page 470 to 525, or the end: And having been so long already, I may happily hereafter, discourse this more largely in another language. I shall therefore be brief in that which remains.

The Empire though greatly concerned, (the French being not onely nigh them, but among them, and having got such places of the *Rhijne*, capacitated to pas over all at their pleasure) yet seeme a sleepe, and are therefore to be roused; and if no words will doe it, yet let the alarmes of War raise them, and the strength of their enemies make them combine, lest fighting singly, they be all foiled. I shall not stand to particularize, but surely the *Duke of Newburg* and *Prince of Liege* that have been most guilty in letting

ting the French have passage through, and quarter in their Countries; will have the first cause to repent, except they meane to sell them to the Crowne of France; which yet may happily beat them downe in price, now they are so impoverished by them. For though Gulick belonging to Newburg be strong, the Castle especially (which was the Patterne to that of Antwerp) yet it is on dry ground, easily approachable, and in a champaigne Country, and not relievable from a siege. And if that small City once be taken, all that pleasant corne Country may cry out,

*Impius hac tam culta novalia miles habebit,
Barbarus has segetes!*

And though Liege (or Luyke) be great and populous, and the desperatest people in all times, that I know in Europe; yet *vana est sine viribus ira*, the Citie hath such hills overhanging it, that it is neither strong by its situation, nor can hope of relief if they should be distressed, except it be by a confederacy from others; and if this single City be lost, all their Country will be so quickly.

Yea not onely those on this side the Rhijne, but even all the rest will quickly find, that if the wings of the Roman Eagle be clipt, and prove too short to shadow her young Ones; they will soone become a prey to the power of France, and will be throwne out of their nests as spurious, if they cannot stedfastly behold the rising sun, and will not receive their warmth from his beames.

Spaine is sensible enough of their concernements, knowing that not onely their Netherlands, but their Indies and Italy lie at the stake: for if France be Master of all these Provinces, they will soone be so of the Indies also; and the Dutch fetch thence, the Spanishe gold for the French Crowne; and the Lilies of France, be the Royall flower, in all their gardens both in Italia and Sicilia.

England, though now their Confederate, cannot but know what danger they are in for their Trade; which is the best jewel in that Crowne, and the greatest darling of that Kingdome. And therefore it is high time surely, that the Sovereigne straiten not his intrest at home, by espousing any particular party; nor the subjects quarrel about Ceremonies, when the substance of Religion is so endangered; that so they may timously looke abroad, before it be too late and all be lost; and his Majesty in due time retire from France, and make himselfe and successors (as is much desired) the Head of all the Protestant party in Europe.

Denmarke surely knows, that if the Empire fall they cannot stand: but must lose both their toll in the Sound, and what by Land the French pleases.

This Republick of all others is most immediately concerned, for he is blind that sees not, whatever some may flatter themselves, that the French intend nothing les then reducing of us to their obedience.

And when this is done, and they advance upwards in the Empire; what are Stratsburg, Colen, Aken, Breme, Hamburg, and the rest of the Hanse Townes,

Townes, and free Cities, but as so many morsels, easily eaten up and devoured?

Yea their Constant friends and Allies may looke to themselves.

Sweden how they will save their Bishoprick of Breme, Pomeran, and what lies on this side the Baltick: and how they will sell their Copper, which is the Staple commodity of their owne Countrey. And in stead of the French Crownes, which is now their usuall money amongst them; when that Kingdome hath no more neede of their service; they may carry their owne Copper coyne on their backs to pay a collation, or laden a horse when they travel, to pay for 2 or 3 good nights lodging.

Savoy knows he is at France's mercy, and therefore dances after their pipe, endeavouring to save himselfe by his devotion. But they may remember the Lamb in the Fable, who when the Wolf above quarrel'd him; because he troubled the water; answered that could not be so, in regard it descended to him, not from him; the Wolf then said, he had reviled him 6 months before, to which the Lamb replying, he was not then borne. But thy Father then did saith He, and that's cause enough for the sons suffering.

For Switzerland, though their mountaines and Poverty may secure perhaps their Country: yet what shall secure their liberty, which consists in an equality amongst them? or what shall secure the Religion of the Protestant Cantons? Or the good pay which the Popish have long had, for their service in the Wars of France? They must then be content with what they can get, or be turned to graze on their owne mountaines.

And thus you see what necessity there is that the French be kept within bounds: and consequently that the ballance of Europe, be both brought and held in a greater equality. For intrests changing continually with the revolution of times; and Kingdoms and Commonwealths, Cities and places, having their youth strength and old age, as well as particular persons: If lesser Powers combine not together, they singly become like the smaller fishes, easily swallowed up and devoured by the greater. Thus the league between the King of Naples, Duke of Millain and Florence A. D. 1480. secured Italy against the power of the Venetians; and the Confederacy of the Italians at Venice in 95, preserved them from being all ruind by the French under Charles the 8, who had in a small time conquered severall, and got the Kingdome of Naples he came for: as that wise Historian Guicciardine shews, in his excellent Historie of the Wars of Italie.

Nor let any thinke to obstruct my passage with saying, that Wars to bring downe the growing greatnes of others are unlawfull.

For though very many both Lawyers and Historians are of the opinion they are, as may be seene in Gentilis; and some Divines also, yea the whole Colledge of Sorbon gave their determination for this, and the Learned Bacon saies plainly that the contrary opinion is not to be received, and many other moderne Authors concur heerein, besides the many Precedents of States that have made preventive Wars, as the Lacedemonians against the Athenians

*De jure belli l. 1. c. 14. * Essay (or sermo fide- lis) 19.*

De jure belli & pac. l. 2. c. 1. §. 17. & c. 22. §. 5

Albemians of old, and many especially of later times; and the Arguments for it are not contemptible: yet notwithstanding I am rather of Grotius's opinion, that neither our owne feares and jealousies, nor the growing greatnes of others, are sufficient causes of warring against them.

But indeed neither of these is the cause we plead, but the following, which we will maintaine *jure gentium* or by the law of Nations to be just and equitable.

1. Let any Kingdome or Common-wealth grow as great, as they can by Gods blessing; yet so long as they keep themselves, within the bounds of justice and equity with others; there is no just cause of breaking downe their power by War. For jealousy that we may thereby suffer, is no sufficient ground for us to fight them. It being with publick as wel as private safety, as Physitians say it is with our health, tollerably well, but never absolute and perfect. And therefore against such force as we may feare, we must trust the Providence of God, and use lawfull meanes cautiously to prevent dangers; our Savior having taught all Christians to use the wisdom of the Serpent with the innocencie of the dove, and cursed be they that seperates, what Christ hath joyned together.

Guicciar-dine's Hist. of Ital. l. 1.

2. When Neighbor Nations see the growing power of any, whence they have just cause of jealousy: they ought to combine together, that so they may prevent the dangers they feare. And if any of the Confederates be unjustly invaded, they have all a just cause of War against the Aggressor. As the *Italians* being jealous of the *Venetians* Power, leagued themselves for their owne defence, so that though the Republick of Venice was too strong for any of them singly, yet being far too weake for them all, was kept within bounds, and they thereby wisely secured themselves.

3. When any Potentate that is stronger then his Neighbors aggresses any of them, the rest ought to Confederate; and if his cause be just compell him to accept of due satisfaction, and if he will not, his cause then becoming unjust, and much more if it was so originally, to make War against him. As the *Italians* did against the *French*, when they under *Charles* the 8 were invaded. And the *Triple Alliance* of late, when the same nation had taken the *County of Burgundie*, commonly called the *French comté*, and invaded *Flanders*, both which belong to the Crowne of *Spaine*. Thus our Neighbors allso should now allie with us, in point of honest intrest; that so we may reduce *France* to keepe within bounds, lest we should all be ruind by them.

I shall make these things plaine by a familiar example. The ballancing of Nations is like to that of boats: they that by an even poize, might all sit safe in a boate on a rough Sea, by the rising up of some are all in danger to be drowned. In such case therefore the company perceiving, a quarrell likely to arise amongst some of them, must either agree before hand to keepe them quiet, or if the contest come suddenly, afterwards resolve together, to compel those that are injurious, to keepe their place, and if they

they will not, throw them over-board. And this ballancing of powers, I shall defend by the fundamentall law of Nature *setse-preservation*, and from the law of Nations, as well as from the word of God, and back the same by many approved examples; if any one hath a mind to contest with me heerein.

Lets see a litle how and by whom, stronger powers must be ballanced, and I shall give a release to your patience.

1. By the Confederacy of weaker Nations that are their Neighbors, and are in danger thereby of being overcome, as we have allready shewne.

2. Or by a Neutrall Nation that reserve themselves free, to league with the weaker, when they see them injured by the stronger powers. And this was the Ancient policy of *England*, since *France* and *Spaine* became the two great ballances in *Europe*. Which (as I have said) begun to be so under *Charles* the 5 and *Francis* the first, whom *Henry* the 8 of *England* still kept even, as the many Histories of those times shew, as well as other writers of State affaires, engraving this motto upon his gold, *cui adhaereo, praest.* From this maxim of State *Q. Elizabeth* allso his Daughter first assisted *Henry* the 4, which *Mornay* strongly pleaded to *Walsingham*: and after when *France* was growne great, assisted these Provinces, lest they should fall into the hands of *France*; as we have before shewne out of the best Historians of those times, *Thuanus* and *Cambden*, the latter where of after his declaring this reason of State in the place formentioned A. 1575, afterwards shews how this noble Heroine sat as the honourable Arbitratrix; (holding the ballance in her hands) between *Spaine*, *France*; and these low Countries.

Memoires de Ribier. T. 1. L. 2. p. 347. Memoires de du Plessis. Momoires du Duc de Sulli T. 2. c. 4. p. 14. Ambassades du Cardinal Ossat part. 1 p. 180. Annales Eliz. A 1577.

SeCT 13. The Conclusion of the whole discourse.

I Have now done, and it is high time, having been much larger then I intended at first; although not so large by far, as I found, being once entred upon the Argment, I might be. And yet I hope it will not be tedious to the Reader. In regard of the novelty of the matter, which though daily discours of by many, yet never writ of by any. And in regard of the usefulness thereof. For though old men are apt to dote upon the brats of their brain, as well as their body: yet if I be not deceived, this discourse may through Gods blessing, prove instrumentall in begetting a better understanding between both Nations, (for which end I have published it in both Languages) by shewing them their concernments, it being the *Chariot of Intrest* which all Princes and States *Jehu-like* furiously drive: and allso serve, to cleare up some State controversies, that are not easily discerned by vulgar eyes; to discover the former and present state of affaires amongst us, and most parts of *Europe*; and give a prospect through this intricate darke and cloudy War, with what hopes we may have concerning its issue. And besides these things, I thinke the clearnes of stile, which I have used to deliver my minde in, may make it les nautious to some, who are apt to mind the swadling cloths more then the Child.

I know

I know mediation betwixt men in passion is a very thankles office; and that the freedome I have used, will both please and displease many sorts of men on all sides; but yet when mens passions are allayed, I doe not doubt but they will thinke better of the honest designs of the Author. And yet I have endeavoured to give as little offence as I could possibly to any; but if any notwithstanding count me their enimie, because I tell them the truth, I cannot helpe it: for I never accounted them worthy to write, that are byast with feare, or favour and flattery. Yea I perswade my selfe, that there is not any ingenuous man, or brave Gentleman even of the French Nation, whose designs I chiefly oppose; but they will acknowledge it lawfull for an enimie, to fight them with a pen as well as a pike, and that I am a very civil Adversarie, having both fairely fought them, and with their owne weapons, having made use of their Authors and not ours throughout my discourse.

I shall not now throw downe the gantlet and make a challenge, yet if any undertake to refute me concerning the intrest of these Countries, which I thinke worthy answering, I shall not faile to doe it. As for my *Conjectures*, I both account and call them *probable*, and therefore being not positive and dogmaticall in them, I leave them with their Reasons to the Reader to judge. But if some passionate person thinks with railing at the French, English, or the Author hereof, and carping at some particulars to refute me: I shall tell them before hand I was never bred; to give any one ill language, and shall onely answer them with silence and contempt. Or if any well meaning scholler, that hath read perhaps honest *Keckermans* or some others learned *Systema Politicum*; I shall onely smile in my sleeve; having allwayes accounted booke policy alone, mere pedantry; and although no man vales learning more then my selfe, yet he must know men as well as bookes, and the world well, that will write of these things. Yet if any will bring Reasons of State, and clearely delivered, as I thinke I have done, and fairely ventilate my opinion, I shall promise him as faire an Answer, for truth never feared a faire tryall.

P O S T S C R I P T.

IT is necessary that I tell you, this worke hath been long in the birth. I had drawne up my thoughts on this subject the last yeare, and sent my Papers into Holland to print; but my honest friends unacquainted with the artifice of government, to nourish hopes in the greatest dangers (Hope being the miserable mans God, as well as the presumptuous mans Devil) sent me word, of nothing but peace, yet kept my Papers through curiosity, till I was forced to send my servant for them. And having got them, and contracted with a Printer here; He was called out for a soldier, and goe he must, and therefore the worke must stand. In the meane time two sorts of Papers came to mine hands; The Appeal; which though his designe in reference to England be different from mine, yet in reference to France, being much the same, I let pas for the present: and the Chancelor of Englands speech, with his *Delenda est Carthago*, which whilst my Printer after his returne home is printing off this, I examined, according to the rules, of Christian charitie, Common Equity, and State Policy; but that being too large, I reserve it for an Appendix. In the meane time, though it be late before this comes forth (the month of April 72) yet I hope better late then never; and though no Printer will undertake it, because it is Paradoxical to the common opinion of peace; yet I have put it into the publick Treasury for good, at my owne charge in both languages: and though it cost me 100 l. and none consider me, or to use Salomons phrase, remember that poore man, in any kind, not so much as to enquire after him; or returne him thanks; yet it shall not repent me for the good of both Nations, for which I intend it, and to whom I wish a happy peace, and all prosperity.

F I N I S.

parturiunt Montes &c