

3-5



0001

A N

E S S A Y

On the CAUSES of the DECLINE of the

FOREIGN TRADE,

CONSEQUENTLY

Of the Value of the Lands of BRITAIN,

A N D

On the MEANS to Restore both.

*Trade has always been the best Support of all Nations, and  
the principal Care of the wisest.*  
Ld. Chesterfield's Speech, Dublin, Oct. 8. 1745.

5. EDINBURGH:

M,DCC,LVI.

T H E  
P R E F A C E.

**T**H E Merchant, the Manufacturer, and the Sailor, who at first view appear to have the greatest interest in trade, will, upon examination, be found not to be so deeply concerned in its well or ill being as the Land-holder, whose interest seems more remote, and who (with sorrow it must be said), too often, by his indifference, gives occasion to suspect, that he thinks he hath no concern in it at all.

The former are not fixed to a country; their effects are all moveables, vendible in many parts of the world; if they are oppressed in one place, they can soon pack up and fly to another, where greater freedoms invite them; they may indeed be bound by leases of lands or houses, but parchment chains seldom prevent despairing fugitives: therefore the num-

iv P R E F A C E.

ber of people in any country, as well as their well-being, depends intirely on trade.

The Land-holder hath an immoveable property, valuable only to some few of his neighbours or countrymen; the produce of which, if trade carries not off, nor brings in people to consume, but on the contrary, by its decay, drives the consumers away, his Tenants must decay, break, fly, his lands be untenanted: he may indeed sell at one price or another; but when the bulk of his neighbours are in as bad a situation as himself, and all rents declining, the value of untenanted farms and empty houses must be very low.

The Traders are indeed the first pinched; but then they have the first warning to avoid the calamity, which coming but by degrees to the ultimate, the Landholders, they are the longer lulled in a deceitful security.

Who then is the most concerned in point of interest with regard to trade; he whose property is in moveables, who hath

P R E F A C E. v

hath the first warning, and the greatest choice of purchasers; or he whose property is immoveable, who feels not the danger until it is far advanced, hath the least choice of purchasers, and those declining ones too, like himself?

As men naturally pursue their own interest, this indifference in our Landholders is monstrous. Is it pride which makes them think the subject beneath them? All foreign courts are now studying it attentively. Is it the fear that the subject is too intricate? A little attention will make it as easy to them as to Foreigners. Is it their places that engross all their time? What they think they get by these, they may doubly lose in their lands. Is it their pleasures they now make their chief business? Alas! they are paying very dear for them, and deservedly too, if that is the case. These causes may affect some few; but the general one I take to be the craft, covetousness, or false notions of interest in our ancestors, who thought to lay the burden of taxes as remote as possible from their

vi P R E F A C E.

their lands, by laying them on trade, and to buttress that up by prohibitions ; both which have had quite contrary effects, and their children's feet are caught in the traps their forefathers laid for others ; which cynical spirit, it is to be feared, is not yet quite worn out.

To remove all false prejudices with regard to trade, from our Land-holders, to point out to them their true interest, to clear a plain easy subject from the imputation of intricacy, to remove those destructive distinctions without any difference of landed and trading interests ; or, to sum up all, to prove the strong connexion, in point of interest, between land and trade, is the occasion of publishing this Essay.

An attempt is here made to shew the symptoms of our decay, the difficulties and discouragements our trade at present labours under, by which only Foreigners can rival us ; the prodigious artificial value we thereby put upon our goods, to the hindrance of their sale abroad ; the fictitious value they make in the rents the Land-holder now receives, compared with

P R E F A C E. vii

with the real, true, intrinsic value, a Free-trade would make ; the great natural advantages our country is blessed with superior to any nation in *Europe* ; the means proper to preserve these, by unburdening our trade, which will employ our poor, increase the stock of people, and increase our riches ; all which must terminate in increasing the value of lands.

As of all the methods of raising taxes on the people, the easiest and most equal must naturally raise the most money and the fewest murmurs ; a proposal is here offered to the consideration of the Public, for one tax on the voluntary Consumers of luxuries, to supply all our present, positive, and involuntary taxes, without their ill consequences, more easy, more equal, speedier raised, productive of more money ; which will at the same time restore trade, and increase the value of our lands.

The consideration of our numerous Monopolies naturally lead to an inquiry into the nature of a Free-port trade, as well as the strong prejudices now subsisting

ing



## viii P R E F A C E.

ing against it: and tho' a difference in opinion will herein be found with several great men who have wrote on this subject; yet it is not intended to cast any reflexion on their memories, or lessen that esteem which their past endeavours for their country's good justly intitles them to; but only to set the subject in that general light they seem not to have viewed it in, and put it to the strongest trial it is capable of.

Perhaps it may seem strange that no bounty should be proposed as a means to restore trade; but if a Free-port will gain us all those trades we are naturally capable of, it will appear to be itself the greatest bounty, and in endeavouring to force nature, the expence is certain, but the success doubtful.

As an impartial search after truth was the author's sole motive for writing upon this subject; so he desires the Reader to be assured that he has not published any thing but what appears to him as such; and as an earnest of his sincerity he declares, that, whatever mistakes are proved

## P R E F A C E. ix

proved to be committed, no person shall be more willing to retract, or more grateful for the favour of better information; and which he will not fail to own, whenever this Essay shall be found to deserve another edition. If the several proposals here offered for the restoring of our trade, and therewith the value of our lands, shall appear to be founded on reason and the nature of commerce, he flatters himself that there is virtue and public spirit enough left in the nation to carry them into execution; which, whether done or not, signifies no more to him than to any other person whatever, except the desire of a portion of that heart-felt joy which those obtain, whose labours are blessed with their country's good.

The Bookseller desiring a second edition, the opportunity of correcting the mistakes in the first, was a sufficient inducement to comply with his request; as to such errors which may still have  
escaped,

\* P R E F A C E.

escaped, the former promise of acknowledging is now renewed.

Considerable alterations have happened in the finances, by the late war; additional taxes and great deficiencies. What the true general produce will be, a year or two of peace cannot shew; therefore the same calculations are continued, as were in the former impression.

Our late superiority at sea has so checked the *French*, that, until they get their hands at liberty, our trade may seem to flourish for a little time: but increased causes must have increased effects; above thirty millions of new debts, and above a million of additional taxes, must be felt. Time will shew whether such advantages as might have been made by a sea war, can on the present footing be maintained by the peace.

During a confined knowledge of trade, the clamours of oppressive taxes, overloading debts, a threatening public-bankruptcy, will have weight, and distress every administration. But if a general knowledge

P R E F A C E. xi

knowledge was obtained of the extensive nature of a Free-Trade, the increase of the Revenue with a liquidation of the National Debt, would (I think) appear extremely easy; and a general prosperity stop the mouths of all gainsayers.

THE

THE  
CONTENTS.

<b>F</b> oreign Trade, <i>its definition.</i>	page 1.
<i>The means of riches.</i>	ibid.
<i>Must be advantageous if free.</i>	2
<i>The Exchange the Barometer of it between any two nations.</i>	3
<i>The Mint the Barometer of it in general.</i>	ibid.
<i>The symptoms of its decline in Britain.</i>	4
<i>Our remedies applied to stop effects, not remove causes, therefore unsuccessful.</i>	5

PART I.

<i>Of the Causes of the Decline of our Foreign Trade.</i>	6
I. <i>Our present Taxes. Some of which are unequal, and all of them fraught with oppressive consequences.</i>	ibid.
<i>The Stamp-duty.</i>	ibid.
<i>The Window-tax.</i>	7
<i>The Coal-tax.</i>	ibid.
<i>The Land-tax.</i>	8
<i>The Salt-tax.</i>	10
<i>The Excises.</i>	12
	<i>Excises</i>

xiv CONTENTS.

*Excises and Land-taxes not equal methods of raising supplies.* 16  
*Dutch Poll-tax examined.* 17  
*The Customs.* 20  
*An account shewing how Excises, Customs, and Salt-duties increase the expences of the people, consequently ruin our trade.* 35  
*General amount of our taxes and part of their consequences.* 41  
 II. Monopolies. 46  
*Britain against its other dominions.* 47  
*India, South-sea, and Turkey Companies.* *ibid.*  
*City and Corporation charters.* 52  
*Prohibition of cattle, butter, &c. from Ireland.* 54  
*Value of our land at present but nominal, proved.* 58  
*Prohibition of fish imported by Foreigners.* 59  
*The Navigation-act.* 60  
*Prohibition of exporting Woollens from Ireland.* 63  
 III. Ill-judged Laws. 65  
*That give bounties on exported corn, fish, and flesh.* *ibid.*  
*Relating to the poor.* 68  
*That create high duties and penalties.* 71  
*That fix the proportion between gold and silver coins.* *ibid.*  
*Artificial value of our goods by taxes, &c.* 77

*This*

CONTENTS. xv

*This prejudices Trade, weakens the Government, and impoverishes the people.* *ibid.*  
 IV. Our National Debt. 78  
*Makes us tributaries to Foreigners.* 79  
*That these are the true Causes of our Decline proved, by demonstrating them to be the causes of the smuggling of wool to France.* 80

PART II.

*Of the reasons why the decline of Foreign Trade sinks the value of land.* 82  
*By sinking the markets at home.* *ibid.*  
*By increasing the number of poor to burden the land.* 84  
*By decreasing the stock of people.* 85  
*By decreasing our riches.* *ibid.*

PART III.

*Of the Means to restore the Foreign Trade of Britain, consequently the Value of its Lands.* 89  
*Natural advantages of Britain enumerated.* *ibid.*  
*Five proposals offered.* 92

b 2

I. Pro-

xvi CONTENTS.

I. Propofal. *To lay one tax on the Consumers of luxuries, take off all our other taxes, excifes, and customs, and when that is done, to make all our ports free.* page 93  
*The plan of a tax on the Consumers of luxuries.* ibid.  
*The method of raifing.* 96  
*Objection, againft its being liable to fraud, answered.* 102  
*Remarks on the benefits arifing by this propofal.* 106  
*Wants no clause of credit.* ibid.  
*Is voluntary.* 107  
*Has no oppreffion.* ibid.  
*Will reform the people.* ibid.  
*Has no trade-destroying confequences.* 109  
*May fupply the prefent taxes.* ibid.  
*With refpect to the Land-holder.* 110  
*With refpect to the Trader.* 116  
*With refpect to the Stock-holder.* 117  
*Is productive of more money than the prefent taxes.* 119  
*Will leffen the expences of the Government.* 120  
*increase the Civil-list.* ibid.  
*be a political Barometer.* 121  
*increase the intereft of a Minifter.* ibid.  
*increase Trade.* 123  
*prevent the smuggling of wool.* 126  
*gain the herring-fifbery.* 127  
*employ the poor.* 128  
*Will*

CONTENTS. xvii

*Will increase the ftock of people.* page 136  
*increase our riches.* 138  
*increase the value of our lands.* 141  
*Joshua Gee's objections againft a Free-port here, answered.* 143  
*Objection. That it feems contrary to reafon to take off the duties or prohibitions on the goods of any nation that will not do the fame by ours, answered.* 158  
*Objection. That the balance againft us with France muft increase by taking off the duties on French goods, answered.* 165  
*Objections in the British Merchant againft a Free-trade with France, answered.* 172  
*All our taxes and incumbrances removed our trade to France muft be beneficial, proved.* 180  
*That this favours of French defigns, obviated.* 184  
*Britain can give laws by fea.* 186  
*Render the French trade impracticable.* 189  
*The expences in a fea war circulate back again.* ibid.  
*A compleat eafing of our trade can put us above any fear of the French.* 190  
*Former balances from Germany and Holland, gone.* 197  
*Conclusion of the Remarks on this firft article.* 200

II. Pro-

xviii CONTENTS.

II. Propofal. *To abolifh all our monopolies, unite Ireland, and put all our fellow fubjects on the fame footing in trade.* page 201  
*Will increafe trade.* *ibid.*  
*ruin all foreign East-India companies.* 202  
*benefit the woollen trade of Britain.* *ibid.*  
*leffen our taxes.* 205  
*employ our poor.* 206  
*increafe the ftock of people.* *ibid.*  
*increafe our riches.* *ibid.*  
*increafe the value of our lands.* 207

III. Propofal. *To withdraw the bounties on exported corn, and to erect public magazines of corn in every county.* 207  
*Method propofed.* 208  
*Will increafe trade.* 209  
*employ our poor.* 211  
*increafe the ftock of people.* *ibid.*  
*increafe our riches.* 212  
*increafe the value of our lands.* *ibid.*

*Prevent the price of wheat from ever finking fo low as to ruin the farmer.* 213

IV. Propofal. *To difcourage idlenefs, by well regulating our poor.* *ibid.*  
*Method propofed.* *ibid.*  
*Will increafe trade.* 216  
*employ our poor.* 217  
*increafe the ftock of people.* *ibid.*  
*increafe our riches.* 219  
*increafe the value of our lands.* *ibid.*  
 Objection.

CONTENTS. xix

Objection. *That the poor being left to fubfift on charity only will be ftarved, answered.* page 219

V. Propofal. *To pay off our debts by public bonds, bearing intereft and liquidating part of our debts yearly.* 220  
*Method propofed.* *ibid.*  
*Will increafe trade.* 222  
*employ our poor.* 225  
*increafe the ftock of people.* *ibid.*  
*increafe our riches.* *ibid.*  
*increafe the value of our lands.* *ibid.*

Conclusion. *That the giving trade the utmoft freedoms and encouragements is the greateft and moft folid improvement of the value of lands.* 226

A N

A N  
 E S S A Y  
 O N T H E  
 CAUSES *of the* DECLINE *of the*  
 F O R E I G N T R A D E .

**T**HE Foreign Trade of *Britain* may be defined to be, its Exports and Imports of commodities to and from other countries, with the navigation and intercourse of exchanges thereby caused.

The general Measures of the Trade of *Europe* at present are Gold and Silver, which, tho' they are sometimes commodities, yet are the ultimate objects of Trade ; and the more or less of these metals a nation retains, it is denominated *rich* or *poor*.

Those nations that have no mines of gold and silver, have no means to get them but by foreign trade ; and according to the degree of those metals they retain, the prices of their commodities, the numbers of their people, and

A therewith



therewith the value of their lands, rise and fall in proportion.

Therefore, if the exports of *Britain* exceed its imports, foreigners must pay us the balance in treasure, and the nation grow rich.

But if the imports of *Britain* exceed its exports, we must pay foreigners the balance in treasure, and the nation grow poor.

The imports cannot exceed the exports in any country where the trade is free, especially if the country abounds with home commodities; because these, not being raised to artificial prices by taxes, must be so cheap to the inhabitants, that foreign commodities could not answer the charges of transporting for the consumption of such a country, unless the people exported so much of their best commodities, as to want, or content themselves with a supply of inferior ones from other nations: so that the chief imports of a Free-port Trade in a fruitful country, can't be for the consumption of the people, until they make room for them with advantage to themselves; but must be either materials to be manufactured, which will afterwards be re-exported in goods improved by the people's labour at least twice, it may be ten times their first cost, increasing thereby a nation's treasure in proportion; or else goods to lay up in store-houses; for it being the interest of merchants to buy any commodities that offer in cheap times

times to sell again when the markets are advanced, part of such imports, tho' they be luxuries, as most of our *India* goods are, and purchased with treasure, do become at some time or other advantageous exports; and, besides paying for what is consumed at home, do bring in plenty of treasure, as was the case of our *East-India* trade formerly: of which *Holland* is at present an example. Tho' it affords neither corn, naval stores, nor materials of manufacture to subsist the eighth part of its people; tho' it consumes great quantities of *French* wines and brandies; yet, because its trade is almost free, its merchants bring the balance in its favour with almost all countries.

The Barometer of Trade between any two nations is the Course of the Exchange, the nation over-balanced having always its money undervalued.

The Barometer of the general Trade of a nation is its Mint; if plenty of treasure is brought in, and little carried out, part of it will be continually coining, and much new money will appear; the certain symptom of a flourishing trade.

But if much treasure be brought in, yet more be carried out, the Mint must lie idle, little new money will appear; the sure sign of a decaying trade.

That the Foreign Trade of *Britain* declines, will appear by the following symptoms.

The many petitions to Parliament complaining of the decay of the woollen manufacture.

The starving condition the poor are reduced to in the clothing countries.

The low price of wool.

The long credit Shop-keepers take.

The great numbers of bankrupts.

The Exchange being against us this *Feb. 3. 1740*, to places where formerly it was for us, *viz. Hamburgh, Holland, Venice, and Genoa.*

The Exchange being more against us with *France*, than in the times of open trade, tho' its goods are loaded with such high duties as amount almost to a prohibition.

The Exchange being less for us with *Portugal* than it was during *Queen Ann's* war, tho' we had troops and subsidies to pay there.

The great exportation of Bullion.

The Mints lying idle, little or no new coin appearing.

The present scarcity of money, especially silver.

The great arrears of rent the Tenants are in all over *England*, which the Landlords every where complain of.

The great numbers of farms thrown upon the Landlords hands.

The vast increase of the Poor's Rates.

These symptoms of the decline of our Foreign Trade being so very plain, the causes are the things to be found out, and then the remedy

remedy may be easy. It is a maxim in Philosophy, Take away the cause, and the effect will cease; but we have troubled our heads so little of late days with this good maxim, that our remedies of high taxes, prohibitions, and penal laws, have been applied to stop effects, while the causes have never been thought on; and since they have not had any success, or ever can in our present circumstances, and would appear needless were the causes understood and removed: I shall attempt to shew what are,

I. The causes of the decline of our foreign trade.

II. The reasons why the decline of foreign trade sinks the value of lands.

III. Offer some means to restore both.

## P A R T I.

**T**HE causes of the decline of our Foreign Trade will appear to be,

I. Our present taxes, some of which are unequal, and all of them fraught with oppressive consequences.

II. Monopolies, whereby the many are oppressed for the gain of a few.

III. Ill-judged laws.

IV. Our large national debt.

I. *Our present taxes*, consisting of *1st*, the stamp-duties; *2dly*, the window-tax; *3dly*, the coal-tax; *4thly*, the land-tax; *5thly*, the salt-duty; *6thly*, the excises on soap, candles, leather, &c. *7thly* and *lastly*, the customs; the oppressive consequences of which I shall endeavour to shew.

*First*, the Stamp-duty.

This seems to be a hardship on the oppressed; for if knaves defraud honest people of their property, these last are deterred from endeavouring to recover it by this excessive tax on law, and a poor man suing for 20 *l*, pays the same stamp-duties as a rich man who sues for 20,000 *l*.; which greatly prevents the poor, and oftentimes the rich from recovering their just rights.

Perhaps

Perhaps the stamps on bonds, deeds &c. at a very moderate rate, may be necessary to prevent forgeries; and those on cards and dice tend to discourage gaming: but on law-proceedings the stamp-duty is certainly a great grievance.

*Secondly*, the Window-tax.

This is an old tax new-modelled, with what equality is to be considered: the rates are according to the numbers of windows; but these are no just foundations for taxing. Mechanics work-houses, inns, lodging-houses, &c. may have as many windows as a Nobleman's seat, and the possessors pay equal sums upon very unequal fortunes: some old houses have many windows, some modern ones in the *Italian* taste but few; here the sums are unequal, let the fortunes be what they will. As in, the idle may shut out the light, the industrious can't work without; the former favour, and the latter tax themselves; for what? for working. Well may we pray, Lighten our darkness.

*Thirdly*, the Coal-tax.

*Gee on trade*, in page 103, says, "That coals brought to London pay about 10 *s*. per chaldron duty. Ditto, Water-born to other parts of the kingdom, 5 *s*. Ditto, Exported to foreigners, 3 *s*."

This favours foreigners more than our own people, more especially the inhabitants of London.

*London* and its neighbourhood, who pay about 7 s. more duty *per* chaldron than foreigners; so that we hereby encourage them to under-work the *Londoners* more immediately in iron-wares, and something likewise in all manufactures where *Coals* are used. A tax on a commodity of such general use to the poor as well as the rich, must, like our *Excises*, add to the dearth of the poor's living, raise the wages of their labour, and the price of manufactured goods, which likewise insensibly affects the rich: but who can express the hardships and miseries of the poor, when hard winters (such as that in *January 1739-40*) raise the price of coals excessively, and yet a heavy tax on them still adding to the oppression?

*Fourthly, the Land-tax.*

This being now at 4 s. in the pound, is paid by some to the full, but by many not to above 2 s. in the pound, and that without any reason, but because the estates happen to be in different Counties which were variously affected to a new King when the present assessment was made; whereby some members of the community being ever since put undeservedly in a worse condition than others, are a dead weight against even our most necessary enlarged expences; wrong policy, that increases dissension always in times of difficulty. The tediousness of the coming in of

of this tax, which is generally two years, is a great disadvantage; in times of safety, creates annual expensive loans; but in times of the greatest danger, leaves us quite in distress: 'Tis the highest impropriety to call that the aid of the present year which is to be paid in the two next ensuing. This tax has besides been attended with a very bad consequence to the nation, in having made a distinction where there is no difference, *viz.* of *Landed* and *Trading Interests*. Country Gentlemen, finding the *Land-Tax* a heavy burden on them, thought to ease themselves by loading the Trader, whom they looked upon with a jealous eye, thinking his situation easier, whereby that trade which had raised the value of their estates, and which only could support the increased value, being deprived of their protection, and cramped with duties without mercy on all occasions, has indeed been brought sufficiently low, and is bringing down with it the rents of their lands; and they may see the fatal error when it is perhaps too late, trade being like a coy dame, difficult to be brought back when slighted.

Mr. Locke, in his *Considerations of the consequences of the lowering of interest, and raising the value of money*, page 86. asserts it to be an undoubted truth, "That he (*i.e.* the landholder) is more concerned in Trade, " and ought to take a greater care that it be " well

“ well managed, than even the merchant  
 “ himself; for he will certainly find, that  
 “ when a decay has carried away one part of  
 “ our money out of the kingdom, and the  
 “ other kept in the merchants or tradesmen’s  
 “ hands, that no laws he can make, nor any  
 “ little arts of shifting property among our-  
 “ selves, will bring it back to him again;  
 “ but his rents will fall, and his income every  
 “ day lessen, till general industry and fruga-  
 “ lity, joined to a well-ordered trade, shall  
 “ restore to the kingdom the riches and  
 “ wealth it had formerly.”

*Fifthly, the Salt-tax.*

This is collected with the greatest expence  
 of any, in proportion to its amount, conse-  
 quently is more grievous to the subject, and  
 less beneficial to the Government: is attend-  
 ed with more pernicious consequences than  
 any single tax; for it has an universal influ-  
 ence on all manufactures, by laying great  
 hardships on the working poor, whose chief  
 food is bacon and salted flesh, and who in many  
 places, are forced to lay in a stock of salted  
 provisions for the winter: the same with re-  
 spect to the farmers all over the kingdom:  
 is prejudicial also to our navigation, by in-  
 hancing the expence of victualling of ships,  
 which raises the freights on *English* bottoms, to  
 the great advantage of foreigners; or forces the  
 merchant to victual abroad, to the great da-  
 mage

mage of our lands: prevents even the very  
 improvement of our lands, salt being the best  
 manure, and, on account of its easy carriage,  
 the cheapest. But the greatest prejudice of  
 all is, its preventing the improvement of our  
 Herring-fishery, that great nursery of Seamen,  
 by enhancing its expences, to the great profit  
 of the *Dutch*: for tho’ we allow a bounty on  
 exported fish, yet the home-consumption,  
 which would be a vast help to promote the  
 fishery, being taxed, has made the trade lan-  
 guish, and little is done either for the home or  
 foreign demand: and notwithstanding that  
 this article of cured herrings is so necessary  
 for the support of the working poor, yet are  
 they loaded with so heavy a duty, as makes  
 them too chargeable a morsel for the poor to  
 encourage the fishery.

The States-General, in their proclamation,  
 dated at the *Hague* 19th *July*, 1624, call the  
 great fishing and catching herrings, “ The  
 “ chiefest trade, and principal gold mine of  
 “ the united provinces, whereby many thou-  
 “ sands of households, families, handicrafts,  
 “ trades and occupations, are set on work,  
 “ well maintained, and prosper; especially  
 “ the sailing and navigation, as well within  
 “ as without these countries, is kept in great  
 “ estimation.”

Should so beneficial a trade that well main-  
 tains handicrafts, trades, &c. and keeps in  
 great

great estimation a navigation, should such a trade as this, I say, be obstructed for the sake of a paltry tax, that produces but about 150,000 *l. per annum* neat to the government: Have we lost all our senses, and shall we leave the *Dutch* unrivall'd for ever in a trade, which they declare to be a principal gold mine, and yet is the neglected product of our own Coasts?

*Sixthly, the Excises,*

Tho' the Excises on soap, candles, leather, &c. by their manner of raising, are so disagreeable to the nation in general, that any invective against them at this time would be needless, having been so largely treated on already by our greatest political authors: And as the intent of this Essay is only to set things in that single point of view which relates to trade, I shall consider them no otherwise than as taxes on commodities, but attempt to shew the augmentative faculty of all such taxes, and the great prejudice they do to trade; for whatever raises the necessaries of life, raises labour, and of course the price of every thing that is produced by labour. And it will be made appear hereafter by a calculation of the oppressive consequences of the Excises, &c. that they almost treble themselves to the people for what they raise to the Government; and it is to be feared it would appear much more, if we could go to the bottom of the oppression; for if it be considered that  
tradesmen

Tradesmen in a country, by their mutual dependence on each other, are like wheels in a machine, in which, if one is touched, the others are affected. Amidst so many trading movers, to what degree the oppression is increased is impossible to know; nor must we be startled at the largeness of such calculations as being too great for us to pay; for being circulated chiefly among ourselves, and going out by dribblets; we hardly perceive them; but yet are surpris'd to find wages and necessaries grow dearer and dearer, because few use themselves to consider the immensity of such collected advances in small sums; but if we compare the difference of the prices of necessaries between *England* and *France*, we shall find that difference plainly accounting for the vast amount of the consequences of our taxes; nor can it be a trifle that makes such a fruitful country as *England* is, so dear, and its trade decline so fast; for our working people being forced to purchase the necessaries of life dear, must work dear to live, until their willing working hands are quite tied up by Foreigners, who live less taxed, and of course work cheaper, so that they must and do undersell us at all markets for manufactured goods, where they come in competition with us, and in time must stop all such exports. And I appeal to the experience of every honest man conversant in trade, whether it does

B'

not



not decline year after year, more especially our woollen trade, which has been estimated to be as necessary to us as bread is to the life of man; for our dearer goods must lie unsold, or be sold with loss, which must stop or break our merchants; they our clothiers and weavers; these last their journeymen, who must either starve, turn beggars, thieves, or fly to our enemies, and help them to ruin us the faster; which has happened too much of late years. Oppress trade, and the generality of the common people become miserable and burdensome to the rich; every little accidental slackening of Trade increases that wretched number, as the following case will fully illustrate.

A poor man, either by hard weather, the dead time of the year in his particular trade, (for all trades have such times) sickness, or various other accidents, cannot work; but having saved ten good shillings, is determined to allow himself only bare necessaries, which, if untaxed, might cost about 4 *d.* per day; his money then will hold out thirty days.

But if necessaries are advanced by the consequences of our taxes 2 *d.* per day on his consumption, in that case 6 *d.* per day is only equal to the above 4 *d.* for his maintenance, and he can then hold out but twenty days, and is forced the earlier by ten days (in which

which possibly he might get employment) to starve, beg, or steal.

Absolute starving, we must hope, seldom or never happens amongst so humane a people as the *English*; but want of necessaries may so impair a poor man's health, that he may never recover it; and then an useful subject, part of the riches of the nation, is lost.

Begging but ten days, learns the poor man an idle way of life, that few ever get rid of; and then, instead of an useful subject, he becomes a burdensome, and oftentimes a villainous one.

Stealing, whereby he becomes the bane of society, and, not contented with injuring his neighbour in his property, is prompted sometimes to take away his life; and in both cases exposes himself to be cut off by the hand of justice. Every way a loss to the nation.

In all these cases, the poor man may have a large family of children, adding misery to misery.

Encourage but trade, by knocking off one of those fetters, its *Excise*, and the children of the poor will be trained up to labour, become useful industrious subjects, live comfortably as Journeymen, or perhaps as Masters, and contribute their assistance to add more power to the nation, and help to ease the Rich of their taxes; for the greater number of individuals there are in a country



capable of paying, the less the tax will be on each of them if equally laid. It is the interest of the Rich to let the Poor be able to get money for their assistance; for by preventing them, they bring the greater weight on their own shoulders; for these oppressions do not stop with the Poor, but extend like a plague to the Rich and the Noble, whose fortunes insensibly moulder away by them; are the chief causes of the present declining condition of their tenants, that great increase of the Poor's tax the nation now labours under, which in some places has lately been at above 8s. in the pound, and must by degrees inevitably sink the value of their estates, until one ruin involves all.

Several Authors have thought *Excises* and *Land-taxes* to be the most equal methods of raising supplies; but, if strictly attended to, they will appear far otherwise; any thing positive and involuntary cannot avoid oppression, which humanity should always make the first consideration in raising money from the people, and good policy the second, in order to prevent evasion and fraud, the children of oppression.

A working Bachelor pays the Excise, &c. on his own shoes only.

A working Married-man does the same for himself, the same for his Wife, the same for

for his five Sons, the same for his five Daughters; twelve in family.

A landed Bachelor of 1000 *l. per annum*, when the *Land-tax* is at 2 *s.* pays 100 *l.*

A landed Married-man of the same estate does the same, having a wife and ten children.

Will any one say in these cases, that the *Excise* on *Leather*, and the *Land-tax*, are equal taxations? in the first case, is not the oppression increased twelve articles to one; and in the second, at least four to one? for the landed Married-man, with such a family, cannot, should not live more comfortably on his whole estate, than the Bachelor can do on the quarter of his; and how are the landed Gentlemen that are married, oppressed, who are now in both cases?

And here it may not be improper to examine the inconveniencies of a *Poll-tax*, such as the States of *Holland* issued an ordonnance, on the 28th of *March*, 1742, for establishing: in the preamble to which it is said,

“ That the safety of the country, and its  
 “ inhabitants, requiring a greater number  
 “ of troops to be kept up than ordinary,  
 “ their Noble and High Mightinesses have  
 “ been obliged to search for the most proper  
 “ means to provide for the expences of that  
 “ augmentation, and they have not found  
 “ any more fitting than the establishment of  
 “ a poll-tax, proportioned to the abilities of  
 “ every

“ every one. The first class is of those who  
“ earn, spend, or possess an income of

600 Florins, out of which they shall pay 6 Florins			
700 Ditto	8 Florins	4000 Florins	75 Florins
800 Ditto	12 Ditto	4500 Ditto	90 Ditto
1000 Ditto	15 Ditto	5000 Ditto	120 Ditto
1200 Ditto	18 Ditto	6000 Ditto	140 Ditto
1500 Ditto	25 Ditto	7000 Ditto	160 Ditto
2000 Ditto	32 Ditto	8000 Ditto	180 Ditto
2500 Ditto	40 Ditto	9000 Ditto	200 Ditto
3000 Ditto	50 Ditto	10000 Ditto	250 Ditto
3500 Ditto	60 Ditto	12000 Ditto	300 Ditto

“ and so on, increasing on the foot of 50  
“ florins, for every 2000 florins income.”

With due respect to their Noble and High  
Mightinesses, I shall beg leave to repeat what  
I have just before asserted, *viz.* that any  
thing positive and involuntary cannot avoid  
oppression, &c. and add a few remarks on this  
*Poll-tax* to support that assertion.

1st, *It is unequal, consequently unjust and  
oppressive.*

By this tax a Married man of 600 florins  
income with six, eight or ten children, whose  
family is so numerous that his income is scarce  
sufficient to maintain them, and who at the  
year's end has hardly one florin left, is to  
pay the same as a Bachelor who hath only  
himself to maintain, and perhaps lays up  
sixty florins a-year: what injustice and op-  
pression is here? Six florins are exacted from  
one man, who has not conveniently, cannot  
have

have one to spare, and no more from another  
who can spare sixty; and yet this is not the  
worst view this tax is capable of being put  
in; for, suppose the Bachelor's 600 florins in-  
come to arise from the interest of his stocks  
in *Holland* or *England*, and the married man's  
by his labour; here is a farther shocking  
piece of injustice, whereby industry and idle-  
ness are put on the same footing.

2dly, *It injures trade, consequently impove-  
rishes a country.*

By raising the prices of labour and goods;  
for a man who earns by his trade 600 florins  
a-year, and whose numerous family consumes  
the whole, if six florins are exacted from him,  
he must raise them by advancing the prices  
of his labour or his goods; else he cannot  
live; and the dearer goods grow, the less  
vendible they are, consequently the less trade  
this man will have; so that this tax increases  
his expences, and at the same time lessens his  
income; if this is not oppression, I know not  
what is.

All taxes on necessaries or trade do the  
same.

3dly, *It tends to corrupt the manners of the  
people, consequently to make them tumultuous and  
less governable.*

For being to pay in proportion to what  
they earn, spend, or possess, the just value  
whereof is impossible to be known but by  
themselves,

themselves, and to force them to a declaration, an oath is always imposed, which makes a struggle between interest and conscience; an extreme wise law, whereby an honest man is put on a worse footing than a perjured knave: he that forswears himself, pays less than his due and saves his money; but he that is conscientious, pays to the full; which latter suspecting others to evade, is piqued at paying more than his neighbours, and wonders why a false oath should not fit as easy on him as on so many others; whereby the most solemn pledge of truth among men becomes frequently violated, is despised, disregarded, and interest rides triumphant over conscience; which latter being to men as a dike to keep out the torrent of vice, if once a thorough breach is made, a deluge of iniquity ensues, whereby all good principles are drowned: and the more vicious men grow, the readier they are to oppose authority.

*Seventhly, and lastly, The Customs.*

Customs are duties collected in Sea-port or Frontier-towns, by authority of State, on goods coming in or going out of a country.

All authors agree that low customs are one of the causes of the great trade of *Holland*.

If low customs cause great trade, it follows that high customs cause little trade; which is comparatively our case now.

If

If the lower the customs the greater the trade, no customs or Free-ports must carry trade to its utmost height; which case might be ours.

If low customs have such good effects in *Holland*, which hath the most natural disadvantages of any country; a Free-port must have the greatest and best effect in *Britain*, whose natural advantages are beyond those of any country in *Europe*, as will be proved hereafter.

That the above observations are founded in truth will appear, by shewing how customs, especially high ones, obstruct the trade of these nations.

First, *They prevent our country's being an universal Storehouse.*

Because our duties being so great an additional disbursement to the first cost of the goods, no merchant will let so much of his capital lie dead for duties here, when he can have it all circulating in commodities in other countries; nor can such goods be re-exported, because the officers fees in and out, which always remain, and the interest of the money lying dead for duties paid (tho' they be mostly drawn back) are so great a charge, (the natural interest of money being much higher with us than in *Holland*) that the goods cannot come near so cheap from us to any foreign market, as from a Free-port where

where nothing is paid in or out; therefore they prevent our country's having the best choice of goods at the cheapest prices, to tempt our customers: the great duties on *India* goods discourage foreigners buying at our sales, who pay an extraordinary charge of commission on that advanced price, and are forced to lie some months out of their money for the draw-back; besides, the strict rule of declaring goods at the *Custom-house*, makes public to every one each transaction of trade, and thereby prevents shipping for foreign ports such goods as are there prohibited, which deprives us of several beneficial branches of trade that are carried on from *Holland*, or Free-ports, to the great advantage of foreigners.

Secondly, *They prevent the increase of our navigation;*

By enhancing the expences of building and navigating our ships.

Boards, hemp, flax, sail-cloth, and iron, paying duties, those materials must be dear, and several necessaries of life paying some customs (and some excises) the Ship-builders labour must be dear; also the provision and stores put on board the ships.

The *English* Sailor paying, on his own and family's necessaries, customs, (and excises) must have, and hath higher wages than most other countries give.

So

So that a *British* vessel built and rigged with dear materials, by dear labour, supplied with dear stores, and navigated by Sailors at dear wages, must have dear freights, bring in all foreign necessaries and materials for manufacture dear, and carry out all our own products and manufactures dear to foreign markets, much to the disadvantage of their sale.

This shews the reason why we could never rival the *Dutch*, *Hamburgers*, &c. in the *Greenland* trade, the navigation of the *Baltick*, or the Herring-fishery, which being trades carried on for small profits, our dear navigation effectually excludes us from making any increase those ways.

By not having an universal Store-house, our ships, like empty houses, lie by idle in our harbours, waiting months for freights, the interest of the money they cost eating out their profits; or else are obliged to lose their time, and be at great expences in going from one port to another to endeavour to get a cargo.

Thirdly, *They prevent the increase of Sailors, the true strength of this Nation.*

This is a consequence of the two last remarks; for no trade breeds so many or so good Sailors as the Free-port and Carrying-trades, the employment being the greatest, and

and the experience the largest, as the voyages are the most various and extensive; for 'tis no less than the trade of the whole world.

As customs are inconsistent with such a trade, of course they debar us of that increase of Sailors which must be necessary to carry it on, and who would protect us from, or carry vengeance to those enemies that durst insult us.

The customs upon foreign salt, a commodity so necessary to our fishery, is likewise a great prevention to the increase of Sailors; the numbers employed in *Holland* by their fishery are prodigious, I fear ours bear no comparison.

The *British* Sailor being forced by customs and excises to live dear, must have dear wages, which excludes him from employment wherever foreigners can be legally had, to the great discouragement of our Sailors, and prevents their increase.

All this is not only destructive to our riches, but also to our security, it being difficult in time of war to man our Navy, not improperly called our Floating Castles, and occasions that hard custom of Pressing, which puts a free-born *British* Sailor on the footing of a *Turkish* Slave: the Grand Signior cannot do a more absolute act, than to order a man to be dragged away from his family, and against his will run his head before the mouth

mouth of a cannon; and if such acts should be frequent in *Turkey* upon any one set of useful men, would it not drive them away to other countries, and thin their numbers yearly? and would not the remaining few double or treble their wages? which is the case of our Sailors in time of war, to the great detriment of our trade and manufactures.

Fourthly, *They lessen the capitals of our Merchants.*

By keeping a great part of their stocks by them idle, to pay the duties of the goods they import; which is, in effect, making them not only advance their money for the service of the State, but likewise run the risk in the credit they give of ever being reimbursed, and is diverting a stream of riches that should water trade; for it often happens that when our merchants are short of cash, and they have both customs and manufactures to pay, so much money goes for the first, that nothing is left for the latter, which causes a circulation of disappointments seldom known in *Holland* on that account; and the *Dutch* merchants can carry on the same trade with much less stock than ours, sell cheaper, extend their commerce farther, and of course give better encouragement to their working-people, whereby they cause them to be more industrious than ours.

C The



The following case will shew the difficulties and discouragements our Merchants labour under more than the *Dutch* our great rivals in trade.

Suppose a merchant in *Rotterdam* to ship corn for *Bourdeaux*, and the neat produce to amount to the value of 2000 *l.* sterling; if he orders it to be invested in wines, and shipped for *Holland*, he will not pay for duties 40 *l.*

Suppose a merchant in *London* to ship corn for *Oporto*, and the neat produce to amount to the value of 2000 *l.* sterling; if he orders it to be invested in wines, and shipped for *England*, he will pay for duties above 2000 *l.*

Therefore the *Dutch* merchant's prime cost and duties of his cargo will be, *L.* 2040

The *English*, Ditto, 4000

1960 *l.* of the *English* merchant's disburse more than the *Dutch* merchant's in the amount of the duties, is imprisoned until the people he trusts pay him, which may be a year or a year and a half; whereas if the *Dutch* merchant's capital be equal, he has had 1960 *l.* to employ in buying up goods to freight another adventure, may be of woollens, giving quick employment to the navigation and manufactures of his country.

Suppose the retailers they trust break about the year's end, and make a composition amounting

amounting to 25 *per cent.* on the prime cost and duties of the wines:

The *Dutch* merchant's loss will be, *L.* 1530

The *English*, Ditto, 3000

This also makes our merchants risk in trade greater, and their losses heavier than in *Holland*.

Fifthly, *They encourage and force the consumption of foreign superfluities.*

The dearer outlandish luxuries are, the more are they esteemed by our people of taste: 'tis the expence that makes the elegance; therefore duties on them only further their sale; as Mr. *Locke* clearly proves in his *Considerations, &c.* p. 93. " For it being vanity, not use, that makes the expensive fashions of your people, the emulation is, who shall have the finest, that is, the dearest things, not the most convenient or useful? How many things do we value and buy, because they come at dear rates from *Japan* and *China*, which, if they were our own manufacture or product to be had common, and for a little money, would be contemned and neglected? Have not several of our own commodities, offered to sale at reasonable rates, been despised, and the very same eagerly bought and bragged of when sold for *French* at a double price? You must not therefore think that the raising their price will lessen the vent of fashionable

“ fashionable foreign commodities amongst  
“ you, so long as men have any way to pur-  
“ chase them, but rather increase it.”

But besides encouraging, our customs force the consumption here of most foreign superfluities that are imported: for tho' the duties be mostly drawn back on some articles, yet the interest of the money lying dead for duties and fees in and out, hinder in some degree their re-exportation, and in many articles the duties are only in part drawn back; so that what remains is such an additional load, as prevents such goods being saleable at any other market, consequently forces us to consume all such superfluities. This makes a people luxurious, who can do nothing with foreign superfluities but riot and indulge; whereas the *Dutch* having the object of gain always before their eyes, by the advance of foreign markets for those superfluities they have in their Store-houses, are checked from indulging in what appears to them common, and of no great value for the present, but may be attended with great profit hereafter; which accounts for the *Dutch* frugality, so justly celebrated by all authors.

It is the excessive consumption, not the trade of foreign superfluities that should be discouraged; and which is best done by taxing the consumers, letting the goods as objects of trade go quite free: whereas our high  
duties

duties on them do just the reverse; for they encourage the consumption and destroy the trade, to the immense loss of the nation.

Sixthly, *They encourage smuggling.*

Where the avoiding high customs makes the profit great, no risk, no danger can prevent men's attempting it; it is throwing out a bait to a greedy fish, he will snap at it tho' ruin ensues. This prejudices and discourages the Fair Trader, either tempts, or forces him to turn Smuggler, and associate himself with those many examples of depravity we have at this time among our people, living in a state of war with the Government, in defiance of laws; whereby an universal corruption of manners and contempt of authority must ensue, if not early prevented: besides, it being chiefly the articles of luxury that are smuggled, as brandy, tea, *French* wines, laces, silks, &c. it spreads their consumption among the lower class of people, who are tempted to imitate at a less expence the luxuries of their superiors; and the same Smugglers that bring us these superfluities, carry off vast quantities of raw wool, to the great prejudice of our manufactures, and the nation in general.

Seventhly, *They ruin manufactures, more especially the woollen.*

Customs prevent the bartering away our manufactures for foreign goods, not only for



our own consumption, but also for exportation, which might enlarge the vent of our goods ten times more than it now is; for if a Merchant now exports woollen goods, and would barter them for wines, the duties on them would amount to more than the cost of his woollen goods; so that he must have a double capital for such an adventure, or let it quite alone, whereby the sales of great quantities of woollen goods are lost to the nation.

As customs enhance the expences of our navigation, the freights must be raised accordingly, whereby the prices of the soap, oil, and dye-stuffs used in manufacturing our wool, are advanced to the maker, and the freights on the cloths or stuffs exported being also raised, are additional clogs upon the sales of our woollen goods.

Customs prevent the Carrying and Fishing trades, the great nurseries of Seamen; whereby our Sailors being few, and their expences raised by taxes, they have the highest wages of most people in *Europe*; which is another additional advance on the freights, to the prejudice of our woollen trade as above.

Customs taking away so great a part of our Merchants stocks, they are thereby deprived of driving that great trade, and purchasing those quantities of woollen goods they would otherwise do: besides, our Merchants risk in trade being greater than in *Holland*, and their  
losses

losses heavier by our customs, their bankruptcies must be more frequent. This sensibly affects our Manufacturers, who are generally considerable creditors; for broken merchants may be well compared to nine-pins, one of which seldom falls without beating down many others.

Customs recommend foreign manufactures of fine goods, by making them expensive; which vanity, on that account, soon renders fashionable, whilst our own are despised, tho' superior in goodness, and are a great discouragement to our manufactures.

Customs are the cause of the smuggling of wool, because the gain being great by running tea, brandy, and *French* goods, on account of the high duties, hath raised the contraband trade to a great height, and the Smugglers cannot make their returns in any commodity of so quick and certain a vent, or that gives so good a profit as our wool; for the *French* being less taxed than we, can work cheaper, and their own wool being coarse, *English* and *Irish* wools are so much in demand, that they will give great prices for them; for which reason they receive vast quantities, to the ruin of our manufactures.

Customs on ashes, bay-salt, cotton, copper, coals, drugs, foreign soap, flax, fruit, furs, hemp, iron, leather, linens, oil, paper, rice, tobacco,

tobacco, tallow, threads, tapes, silk and sugar, being necessaries of life, or materials of manufacture, must necessarily make all our commodities dear, not only to our own people, but to foreigners likewise, (tho' our workmen should have no excises to pay); and such discouragements give opportunity to foreigners to send their manufactures cheaper to foreign markets, and smuggle them, in defiance of all laws, into our own country, to the ruin of our manufactures; for all the above customs are as much taxes on our woollen manufacture, as if they were laid on the wool itself, or more; for the Workman must raise the money on the woollen goods he makes, to pay the duties of what he uses of the above articles, with the advances, in all the hands they pass through before they come to him. 'Tis by these, that we ourselves drive away our own manufactures, and prevent our ever getting more; and foreigners could not rival the people of so fruitful a country as *Britain*, if we did not furnish them with the means, by our high taxes and restraints, that are always prejudicial to trade, tho' designed to amend it, and never effect the thing intended, tho' fortified with the most rigorous penal laws, of which Mr. *Locke* gives an instance in his *Considerations, &c.* p. 116. " 'Tis death in *Spain* to export money; and yet they who furnish all the world

" world with gold and silver, have least of it  
 " among themselves; trade fetches it away  
 " from that lazy and indigent people, notwithstanding all their artificial and forced  
 " contrivances to keep it there; it follows  
 " trade against the rigour of their laws, and  
 " their want of foreign commodities makes  
 " it openly be carried out at noon-day."

This seems to be a parallel of the state we are coming to, and which some foreigner may by and by make.

'Tis felony in *England* to export wool; and yet they who furnish all the world with wool, have least of the manufacturing of it among themselves. The smuggling-trade fetches it away from that excised and custom-loaded people, notwithstanding all their artificial and forced contrivances to keep it there: it follows the smuggling-trade against the rigour of their laws, and their want of taking off the taxes on their manufactures, makes it openly be carried out at noon-day.

By this we see that neither death or banishment can force trade to an unnatural channel; and it may be compared in one respect to water which cannot be compressed within its natural dimensions; the more force is exerted, the sooner is the vessel broke that contained it, and the water let loose never to return. The great *De Wit*, in his *Memoirs, Ratisbon edit. p. 77*, asserts, " That the navigation,

“ navigation, the fishery, the trade, and ma-  
 “ nufactures, which are the four pillars of  
 “ the State, should not be weakened or en-  
 “ cumbered by any taxes; for 'tis they that  
 “ give subsistence to the most part of the in-  
 “ habitants, and which draw in all sorts of  
 “ strangers; unless the necessity was so great  
 “ that the country was threatned with an  
 “ intire destruction, and these fundamentals  
 “ should be attacked upon the hopes that these  
 “ taxes would not last long; at least haste  
 “ should be made as soon as the storm was  
 “ over, to take them off; again, this distin-  
 “ ction should be made, that manufactures  
 “ should not or cannot be taxed at all, be-  
 “ cause they are not fixed to the country,  
 “ and we must fetch from foreign countries  
 “ the stuffs and materials to work them up.”

Eightly, *They send away our specie.*

*Britain* having no mines of gold or silver,  
 has no other means of getting or preserving  
 its treasure but by foreign trade. As customs  
 confine our trade to mere importation for our  
 own necessaries or vanities, and at the same  
 time ruin our manufactures; what we want  
 in exports to balance the imports, must be  
 paid in specie, making the balance of trade  
 every year more and more against us: for as  
 we raise the prices of our goods so high by  
 taxes, that foreigners won't take them, and yet  
 continue to import their superfluities, which

we

we now chiefly, and in time must intirely  
 pay for with our gold and silver, as appears  
 by the bills of entry in every week we are be-  
 ginning to do; and our high duties encour-  
 aging Smugglers who have seldom a settled  
 habitation, or any stock of our manufactures  
 by them, they carry out vast quantities of  
 specie to purchase their cargoes; such large  
 draughts make our Mint lie idle, we see but  
 little new coined gold, and hardly any silver;  
 we find our money disappear, and grow scarcer  
 and scarcer every year; our Trade declines,  
 and our People starve.

To shew how *Excises, Customs and Salt-du-*  
*ties*, increase the expences of the people, and  
 consequently ruin our trade, the following  
 account may not be improper.

*First*, the Duties themselves.

The net produce of the taxes following, was before  
 the war computed to be, one year with another, as  
 under:

<i>Excises,</i>	about	L. 2,800,000
<i>Customs,</i>	about	1,700,000
<i>Salt,</i>	about	150,000

4,650,000

The charges of raising these }  
 duties are about ten per cent. } 465,000  
*Secondly*, The advanced price  
 of those goods the above duties  
 are laid on. ----- 5,115,000

Woful experience teaches  
 us that every small duty laid

OR

Brought over L. 5,115,000  
on commodities, raises the prices of them considerably to the Consumer, beyond the gross duty.

By the fees given to Officers, the tyrants of traders.

By Tradesmen's loss of time in attending upon Excisemen or at Custom-houses: a Trader's time is his bread.

By taking away, a quarter part of our Traders stocks for duties, and forcing them to take as great profit on  $\frac{3}{4}$  of their stocks laid out in goods, in order to live, as they would on the whole if duty-free.

By tradesmens profits on the duty and advances in all the hands, all taxed goods come through to the Consumer; as for example:

Suppose there should be no other tax but that on leather, let us see how many advances that would make on the price of our shoes.

The Grazier lays (1) on the beast he fates his advanced price of shoes; he sells to the Butcher, who (2) takes his profit on the Grazier's advanced price of the beast, and raises (3) on the hide his advanced price of shoes; he sells to the Tanner, whose journey-men raise (4) their wages on account of their advanced price of shoes; the

Tanner

Brought over L. 5,115,000  
Tanner pays (5) the tax of 2 d. per pound on leather; takes (6) his profit on the before-mentioned five advances, and raises (7) on the tann'd hide his advanced price of shoes; he sells to the Leather-cutter, who takes (8) his profit on the before-mentioned seven advances, and raises (9) on the hide he cuts his advanced price of shoes; he sells to the Shoemaker, whose journeymen raise (10) their wages on account of their advanced price of shoes; the Shoemaker takes (11) his profit on the before-mentioned ten advances, and raises (12) on the shoes he makes, the advanced price of the shoes he wears; he sells to the Consumer with all these *twelve Advances*, highly magnified beyond the bare duty.

So much for the tax on leather only: but the Grazier, Butcher, Tanner, Leather-cutter and Shoemaker use sope; that sope, like leather, is taxed, and, like that leather-tax, must be raised; but that caused twelve advances on our shoes, true; place therefore twelve advances more on shoes for the sope-tax. These tradesmen use candles, twelve advances more for the tax on them; and the same for every other tax on necessaries.

All which duly considered,  
D

might

Brought over  
 might be computed at above  
*cent. per cent.* on the gross  
 produce of the duties. But  
 though the large duties cause  
 some farther advance on all  
 the goods they are laid on,  
 charged with profit upon profit  
 through every hand they pass;  
 yet as they keep not pace with  
 the small duties, and all calcu-  
 lations appear fairest when mo-  
 derate, I choose to abate in the  
 advances, and to set them only  
 at fifty *per cent.*

L. 5,115,000

2,557,500

The amount of the advan-  
 ced price of the goods the  
 above duties are laid on

7,672,500

Let us see how this 7,672,500  
 circulates through the people,  
 advances the prices of our  
 goods, consequently ruins our  
 trade.

*First,* This dearness of all  
 necessaries which raises the first  
 cost of goods, must advance  
 the price of all labour.

The *Spectator* N<sup>o</sup> 200, com-  
 putes, that the people, without  
 property, who work for their  
 daily-bread, do consume  $\frac{2}{3}$  of  
 our Customs and Excises;  
 therefore they pay  $\frac{2}{3}$  of them  
 and their consequences. As  
 these people live but from  
 hand to mouth, whatever is  
 laid on them, they must there-

fore

fore shift off, or they can't live;  
 & since these various taxes have  
 been projected, they must earn  
 enough when they do work to  
 pay the taxes, the advanced  
 price of taxed goods, and the  
 advanced prices of all other  
 necessaries, *viz.* meat, bread,  
 cloathing, or whatever they  
 can use, not only for the con-  
 sumption of the days they are  
 employed, but for those also  
 that they are not; therefore  
 they are the cause of raising the  
 wages of the working people  
 $\frac{2}{3}$  of 7,672,500 *l.* the amount  
 of the advanced price of the  
 goods the above duties are laid  
 on, which makes

5,115,000

*Secondly,* This dearness of all  
 necessaries forces the Master-  
 tradesmen to raise on their cu-  
 stomers the taxes and advances  
 on their consumption.

The above *Spectator* allows  
 $\frac{1}{3}$  consumption of our Customs  
 and Excises to the people with  
 property; but as these may be  
 divided into two classes, *viz.*  
 in trade, and out of trade, and  
 the proportion consumed by  
 each not being ascertained by  
 any author, I shall compute  
 them at half and half. There-  
 fore the Master-tradesmen, or  
 people with property in trade,  
*viz.* Merchants, Manufacturers,  
 Mechanics, Farmers, Whole-  
 sale-dealers, and Retailing

D. 2.

Shop.



Brought over L. 5,115,000  
 Shop-keepers, must each lay on the goods they sell the advanced price of the taxed goods they consume; whether food, cloathing, or utensils: their  $\frac{1}{6}$  consumption of 7,672,500 l. the amount of the advanced price of the goods the above duties are laid on, makes

1,278,750  
 -----  
 6,393,750

*Thirdly*, Tradesmen's paying advanced prices on their goods must have advanced profits; for whether they lay out their stocks of money in goods that bear their natural value only, or goods that bear double that value by taxes, still a living profit must be obtained on the stocks they employ.

For the wages of the Manufacturer, the Mechanic, the Labourer, and the expences of the Master-tradesman, being of necessity raised, the first cost of goods must be so too; and considering the various Tradesmen's hands that goods pass through from the Workman or Labourer, to the Consumer, charged with profit upon profit by each of them, (which in the little trades must be very great, otherwise their returns being small, they could not live) the advance thereby occasioned may, at a moderate rate, be computed at 50 per cent. to the

Consumer

Brought over L. 6,393,750  
 Consumer on the above two articles, which raise the first cost of goods, and makes

3,196,875  
 -----  
 9,590,625

People with property out of trade, their  $\frac{1}{6}$  consumption of 7,672,500 l. the amount of the advanced price of the goods the above duties are laid on, makes

1,278,750

Total advance, L. 10,869,375

This is part of the amount of the consequences of raising 4,650,000 l. for the Government, by our present manner of taxing goods.

Our other taxes are, the *Land-Tax*, the gross produce, at about 4 s. in the pound is about

1,960,000

The *Stamps, Windows, Post-Office, &c.* their computed gross produce about

500,000

The *Poor's Tax* is computed, on a middling rate, to equal the *Land-Tax*, but must be much more when trade is reduced, and the price of provisions high; however, to reckon it at no more than the *Land-Tax*, or

1,960,000

General amount of all our taxes, and part of their consequences, before the war. L. 15,289,375

Let us see now the amount of our taxes, with regard to our expences: The *British Merchant*, vol. 1. p. 165.

D 3

computes

computes our people at seven millions, and their expences at 7. l. per head; but as necessaries are grown dearer since the year 1713, when he wrote, and the number of people increas'd, I shall compute the people at eight millions, and their expences at 8 l. per head, which makes our total expence annually

L. 64,000,000

Of which 64 millions the people pay for the taxes, and their consequences, as above,

15,289,375

Which being subtracted, their expences, if untaxed, would be only

L. 48,710,625

15,289,375 l. charged on 48,710,625 l. is a tax of above 31 per cent. on the expences of the people, which must add a prodigious artificial value to our goods, consequently render them less saleable, and ruin our trade.

If it is asked, whether foreigners, for what goods they take of us, do not pay on that consumption a great portion of our taxes?

The answer is, That it must be admitted they do; but if that was originally intended and expected to continue the same as at the first laying on of our taxes, it will be the strongest argument against them; for as our taxes on necessaries are proved to be so burdensom and extensive, by raising the prices of our goods, foreigners take less of them yearly; and when the demand is reduced, the people having less work, find less money to pay,

pay, and yet have their taxes proportionably increased on them as they lose their trade: for, as the Government abates neither expences or taxes, and if one method of taxing fails, another is tried; what foreigners cease to pay, we must; or, in other words, the less trade and money, the more taxes; and the more our taxes are, the less and less trade and money we know we must expect. Is not this like adding to a horse's burden, and diminishing his meat? and must we wonder if he sinks under his load? perhaps figures may explain this still clearer, by stating a similar account thro' 30 years.

Suppose that in the year 1710, all our taxes, and part of their consequences, were as they are now, viz. 15,289,375 l. that foreigners paid then  $\frac{1}{7}$  of them, and our own people  $\frac{6}{7}$ ; that foreigners going to cheaper markets since, have ceased taking goods from us yearly in proportion to one per cent. only on their former  $\frac{1}{7}$  part of our taxes and their consequences, the account every five years will stand thus:

	Foreigners paid of our Taxes, &c.	Our own People paid
Anno 1710	L. 2,184,196	L. 13,105,179
1715	2,074,987	13,214,388
1720	1,965,778	13,323,597
1725	1,856,569	13,432,806
1730	1,747,360	13,542,015
1735	1,638,151	13,651,224
1740	1,528,942	13,760,433

By



By this it plainly appears, in what manner our present taxes drive away our trade, and burden our people, who have by this account 655,254*l* more to pay in 1740, than they had in 1710, with  $\frac{3}{10}$  less trade to pay it with.

To conclude this head. Two of our greatest authors clearly foresaw, at the laying on our numerous excises, customs, &c. that these unhappy consequences must necessarily follow; and their arguments are a full proof of what has been already advanced.

Mr. *Locke*, in his *Considerations*, &c. p. 90. says, "That for raising three millions on commodities, and bringing so much into the *Exchequer*, there must go a great deal more than three millions out of the subjects pockets; for a tax of that nature cannot be levied by officers to watch every little rivulet of trade without a great charge, especially at first trial; but supposing no more charge in raising it than of a *Land-Tax*, and that there are only three millions to be paid, 'tis evident that to do this out of commodities, they must to the Consumer be raised  $\frac{1}{4}$  in their price; so that every thing to him that uses it, must be a quarter dearer. Let us see now who, at the long-run, must pay this quarter, and where it will light; 'tis plain the Merchant and Broker, neither will, nor can; for if he

" pays

" pays a quarter more for commodities than he did, he will sell them at a price proportionably raised; the poor Labourer and Handicraftsman cannot; for he just lives from hand to mouth already, and all his food, cloathing, and utensils, costing a quarter more than they did before, either his wages must rise with the price of things to make him live, or else, not being able to maintain himself and family by his labour, he comes to the parish."

And afterwards he proves, that in the home-consumption the whole burden falls on land at last.

Dr. *Davenant*, in his *Essays on Trade*, vol. 3. p. 30. asserts, that "As to manufactures, high excises in time of peace are utterly destructive to that principal part of *England's* wealth; for if malt, coals, salt, leather, and other things bear a great price, the wages of servants, workmen, and artificers, will consequently rise; for the income must bear some proportion to the expence; and if such as set the poor to work find wages for labour, or manufactures advance upon them, they must rise in the price of their commodity, or they cannot live: all which would signify little, if nothing but our own dealings among one another were thereby affected; but it has a consequence far more pernicious in relati-

" on

“ on to our foreign trade, for 'tis the ex-  
“ portation of our own product that must  
“ make *England* rich.”

And in *page 31*. “ But the consequence of  
“ such duties, in times of peace, will fall most  
“ heavily upon our woollen manufactures, of  
“ which most have more value from the  
“ workmanship than the material; and if the  
“ price of this workmanship be enhanced, it  
“ will in a short course of time put a neces-  
“ sity upon those we deal with of setting up  
“ manufactures of their own, such as they  
“ can, or of buying goods of the like kind  
“ and use from nations that can afford them  
“ cheaper.”

II. *Of Monopolies, whereby the many are op-  
pressed for the gain of a few.*

Besides the misfortunes arising from our  
taxes, we have some Monopolies very de-  
structive to a trading nation, and inconsistent  
with a free one; which encourage idleness,  
villany, and extravagant demands for wages  
or goods, whereby the many are deprived of  
their rights, without having committed any  
crime to forfeit them, and for the benefit of  
a few only; a country that suffers them, can-  
not send its goods so cheap to a foreign mar-  
ket as its neighbours; for never yet was a  
monopolized trade extended to the degree of  
a

a free one; therefore any country abounding  
in monopolies must decline in trade.

To apply this to *Britain* which hath more  
Monopolies than are generally thought on.

*First Monopoly. Britain against its other do-  
minions.*

The trade of exporting woollens, and some  
other sorts of goods, with the trade to some  
particular countries given to companies, we  
monopolize to ourselves; and, in our abun-  
dant wisdom, pay all the charges of Govern-  
ment; our fellow-subjects in *Scotland* pay but  
a trifle to the general support; in *Ireland* and  
the Plantations, nothing at all: these trade  
under the protection of fleets that cost them  
not a farthing: our generous wise land-wars,  
to maintain the balance and liberties of *Europe*  
at the risk of our own, cost them not a doit;  
all that we endeavour is to starve them with-  
out expence, and ourselves with; for that is  
the case, we drive one part of our people out  
of trade by Monopolies, and the other by  
Taxes. We bleed ourselves almost to death,  
and think to recruit our spirits by devouring  
three millions of starved *Irish* and *Americans*,  
and by excess of cunning make the ruin ge-  
neral.

*Second Monopoly. Companies with exclusive  
charters, viz. East-India, South-Sea, and Tur-  
key Companies.*

These

These Companies prevent the increasing the vent of our manufactures abroad; consequently they starve our poor; as will appear by the following reasons.

1. By being all of them confined to *London*, the prices of the woollens they export are enhanced by long land-carriages up to town, with the additional charges of commission, ware-house-rent, portorage, &c. much to the prejudice of their sale; and what materials of manufacture they import are dispersed over many parts of the kingdom by the like expensive conveyance, to the great disadvantage of the nation in general.

2. The *Turkey Company*, whose trade is almost dwindled away, can prevent dispatching their ships for one year, if they please, to raise the price of silk at home for their own advantage, though the nation thereby loses one whole year's vent and consumption of its woollen goods in *Turkey*, which it's said hath happened formerly; and if an iniquitous rise is given to silk here, we cannot manufacture it with such advantage as our neighbours. The reader will be pleased to consider the fine situation our poor employed in the woollen and silk manufactures must be in at such a time.

3. It is not the interest of the *East-India Company* to increase the quantities of the woollens they export, but rather to contract them

them (which I suppose was the reason for obliging them by their charter to export woollens to a certain value); for at all markets where there are any demands for goods, the smallness of the quantities naturally enhances the price; and if the company can gain as much on 5000 cloths as on 10000, is it not their interest to prefer the lesser quantity on account of the less disbursement and risk? tho' it's plain the nation would lose the sale of one half of the manufactures capable of being vended; whereas private traders pushing against one another, study to increase the vent of their goods by selling at moderate profits, making the quantities answer to themselves and their country.

4. The large charges the *East-India* and *South-Sea* Companies are forced to be at for the salaries of the Directors, Governors, Super-cargoes, &c. besides what may slip thro' their fingers sometimes, must make these Companies neglect all trades that will not yield extraordinary profits to defray them; which trades private Merchants would be glad of, and turn to good account for themselves and their country, were they not debarred by exclusive charters.

5. The *East-India* and *South-Sea* Companies buying at home by Directors, and selling abroad by Servants, who may have an eye to their own or friends interest, and the

E foundation

foundation of all being the Company's money, they cannot naturally be supposed to be so industrious as those who trade only on their own stocks; therefore Companies can never extend trade like private Dealers, but must decay where Interlopers are admitted; of which our *African* Company is a strong instance.

6. What confirms the whole is the prohibition of the *East-India* Company against their servants carrying out cloth; which would be needless, did they not know that their servants can undersell them; for the Company wants not money to supply all the cloth that can be vended with the usual profit. In the year 1741, a Seizer was made, in one of the out-ports, of a large quantity of cloth designed for *India*, belonging to one of the company's servants; when at the same time, by the decay of our woollen trade, the Poor's Rates were at 8 s. in the pound, in some of our clothing-towns; from whence this absurdity arose, That whilst our Clothiers were starving, the exportation of cloth was a contraband trade.

It is impossible to make any inquiry into our Companies, without taking notice of their past villanies; which, as they have been made sufficiently public, few can be ignorant of: therefore the bare mention of them is enough; such as, the fatal *South-Sea* scheme, that ruined

ed thousands of families. What need to mention former Directors receiving salaries from Companies, and, tho' contrary to law, being notwithstanding concerned in the *Ostend* trade to *India*, whereby they were cutting the throats of their benefactors; the selling goods by false samples, and buying them for their private accounts; carrying on private trade contrary to treaty, and bribing officers to wink at them with the Company's money, and charged to account by the genteel name of *resents*, subjecting thereby the Company's effects to seizures, and their country to perpetual jars. The rapaciousness of Governors abroad, who by engrossing goods, may even the necessaries of life, have oppressed the people by arbitrary prices, and drove away our trade. Supercargoes, cheating by false invoices. Captains, quitting or losing ships, to defraud Insurers and Bottomree-lenders: are not these things written in the books of their chronicles?

But the greatest mischief of all is, that the honesty of the people hath been corrupted, by having presented to their eyes roguery lightly punished, if not triumphant.

These Companies prevent the increase of our navigation.

By their exclusive charters, debarring us from a free trade to  $\frac{1}{4}$  parts of the known world. The dominions of the Grand Signior

in Europe, Asia, and Africa, are confined to the Turkey Company. All South, and part of North America, from Vera Cruz to Cartagena, from Buenos Ayres round Cape Horn to California, that vast extent of coast, is the portion of the South-sea Company. All the coasts of Africa, Asia, from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan, are the lot of the East-India Company. And what a small number of ports do they all trade to, and what a trifling navigation do they all maintain? there are a greater number of ship-tonage employed in the trade to the free port of Leghorn only, than all these three companies employ in their Monopolies to  $\frac{3}{4}$  parts of the world, like the fable of the dog in the manger, not eating themselves, but preventing those who would.

Third Monopoly. city and corporation-characters.

Where freemen exclude by charter any of the same trade from settling in their towns, have they not a Monopoly against the rest of the inhabitants? Cannot they impose extravagant prices for their goods on their Customers, and do they not do it?

Where no Journeymen but freemen can work in towns, have they not a monopoly for wages against their Masters? do not both these cases advance the first cost of goods, to the prejudice of their sale abroad, and account

count for foreigners reckoning our country so dear?

If a Journeyman, not being a freeman, gets into work in a city or town-corporate, what an outcry is there not made of a foreigner's being come among them, to eat the bread out of their mouths? How! can a free-born Briton be reckoned a foreigner in any part of his own country? what an absurdity is here! yet nevertheless true. Can one man eat the bread out of another's mouth without being more industrious than he? impossible! it must therefore be idleness and luxury they contend for, not bread.

This is one of the reasons why foreigners flock to our plantations, instead of settling here; and, by our decay of trade, many of our own people go over to live there yearly; so that many going, and few coming to supply their places, a scarcity of people will hereafter ensue, to the great damage of the mother-country.

Mr. Stanyan, in his excellent account of Switzerland, page 140, observes, "That the  
 " tradesmen citizens of Berne, are generally  
 " esteemed to be proud and lazy; which  
 " qualities proceed chiefly from two privileges they enjoy: one is their right of being chosen into the government by virtue  
 " of their burgership, which makes them  
 " proud; and the other is, that of hindering  
 " any



“ any but a citizen from exercising any trade  
 “ within the cities, which makes them lazy.  
 “ From whence two inconveniences natural-  
 “ ly flow, one that the inhabitants pay very  
 “ dear for their goods, and the other that  
 “ the workmen are bad ; for where there is  
 “ no great choice of artificers one must be  
 “ contented not only with bad work, but to  
 “ pay such a price for it as they please to im-  
 “ pose.”

Mark the dainty effects of monopolizing charters, pride, laziness, dearness of price, and bad work.

*Fourth Monopoly. Laws to prevent the importation of cattle, butter, &c. from Ireland.*

This gives a Monopoly to a few breeding counties to impose upon the rest of the people high prices for cattle, &c. to the ruin of our manufactures, forces the labourer to live dear, and of course to raise his wages : is greatly prejudicial also to our navigation ; for whatever enhances the expences of a ship, enhances its freight, and gives opportunity to foreigners to victual cheaper in *Ireland* than we can do at home.

But it will be objected to me, That this is done to raise or keep up the value of our lands?

To which I answer : That there is always a great noise made about encouraging the home-consumption ; by which is meant making necessaries bear a great price ; which  
 can

can arise only from an improper knowledge of the true nature of trade : for this is so far from being beneficial, that it has just the contrary effect. Certainly the less is consumed within, the more will be left to export ; the cheaper things are, the more of them will be exported, and it is exportation only that makes a nation rich. This Monopoly, with respect to the people, is unjust, and the benefit of it to the land-holders only imaginary ; as for instance, *A* hath a grazing estate, to raise the value of which, all cattle from *Ireland* are to be prohibited : *A* having the sole market, raises the prices of his cattle upon the rest of the people, *B, C, D*, down to *Z*, twenty three in number, and their pockets are to be emptied only to fill his ; a very equitable project indeed ! But tho' these people were as blind as puppies, yet necessity, and the natural course of things, will force them to retaliate upon him ; for as a Monopoly raises the price of cattle, their dearness raises the price of labour ; dear labour makes dear goods : so that the food, cloathing, utensils, labour, every thing *A* wants, comes dearer to him ; an imaginary value is given to every thing, so that tho' *A* should have more rent for a time (which yet the decline of foreign trade must bring down afterwards), the money he receives is of less value, not going so far, or being able to purchase so  
 much,



much, as when goods bore their natural value only : so that what he thinks he puts in with one hand, is pulled out by the other ; 'tis all a *deceptio visus*, setting people together by the ears to prey upon one another, letting foreigners in the mean while eat the bread out of their mouths ; for a nation that adds an artificial value to its commodities by Monopolies, cannot export them in such quantities to foreign ports, where they are rivalled by those that bear only their natural value ; and their home-consumption will likewise sink in price by the nation's having less money brought in by foreign trade ; such a two-edged sword are Monopolies to lands. Every home-commodity in a free trade will find its natural value ; for tho' that fluctuates, as of necessity it must, according to the plentifulness or scarcity of seasons, yet for the home-consumption, every home-commodity must have great advantage over the foreign, as being upon the spot, and free from freight, insurance, commission, and charges, which, on the produce of lands, being all bulky commodities, must in the general be about 15 per cent. and a greater advantage cannot be given without prejudice ; for 15 per cent. makes a great difference in the price of necessaries, between the nation selling and the nation buying, and is a great difficulty on the latter ; but arising from the natural course of things, cannot

cannot be helped ; tho' it's a sufficient security to the Land-holders, that foreigners can never import more necessaries than are absolutely required ; and I presume, in such cases, they have more charity than to starve the people merely for an imaginary profit, which yet would prove their ruin in the end ; for it is a fallacy and an absurdity to think to raise or keep up the value of lands by oppressions on the people that cramp their trade ; for if trade declines, the common people must either come upon the parish, or fly for business to our neighbours : in the first case, they become a heavy tax upon the rich, and, instead of buying the produce of the lands, must have it given them ; and, in the second case, when the consumers are gone, what price will the produce of land bear ? a small consumption makes a small demand, and a small demand makes a small price for any commodity ; so that when in conversation the wisdom of our laws is magnified to prevent the importation of cattle, &c. from *Ireland*, or corn from any nation, unless it first bears an immoderate price here (as keeping up the value of lands), how would a *Hollander* or *Frenchman* smile when he reflected, that in his country the poor getting provisions from any place where they can be had the cheapest, are thereby enabled to work at prices the *English* can't live on, and by working cheaper, work more, that

is,

is, run away with their trade, their money and their working-people; and when these are gone, we may as well give them the land into the bargain, for any value it will be of. Besides, the value of our land is at present but nominal. To prove which,

It won't be suspected to be an under computation to reckon the rental of <i>England</i> at	L, 20,000,000
The exports and freights at	8,000,000
In page 42, the expences of the people of <i>England</i> are computed at	64,000,000
<hr/>	
The general amount of taxes, and part of their consequences, is	L, 15,289,375
If our exports and freights make $\frac{1}{8}$ of the expences of the people, they must be computed to pay $\frac{1}{8}$ of the last article, which makes	1,911,171
<hr/>	
Which being deducted, the remainder is what falls on land.	13,378,204

Mr. *Locke*, in his *Considerations, &c.* page 95, treating of taxes on commodities says,  
 "It is in vain, in a country whose great fund is land, to hope to lay the public charge of the government on any thing else, there at last it will terminate. The merchant (do what you can), will not bear it, the labourer cannot, and therefore the land-holder must." If Foreign Trade will pay but  $\frac{1}{8}$ , Land must pay the remain-  
 ing

ing  $\frac{7}{8}$ , which amounting to 13,378,204, and falling on a rental of 20,000,000 *l.* is above 13 *s.* in the pound tax upon all the lands of *England*; so that land with the present taxes at 20 *s.* per acre, or without the present taxes at 7 *s.* per acre, are equal, and the land is more reduced by our taxes and monopolies, than by any possible free importation; and this prohibition, by us called a *remedy*, is only a forwarding our general decay of trade, and consequently our general decay of rents; which actually happened after passing this prohibitory law, as *Roger Coke* informs us in his treatise, *That the church and state of England are in equal danger with the trade*, published in 1671; in page 64. His words are, "That the ends designed by the acts against the importation of *Irish* cattle, of raising the rents of the lands of *England*, are so far from being attained, that the contrary hath ensued. And here I wish a survey were taken how many thousand farms are thrown up since this act; how many thousand farms are abated, some above  $\frac{1}{6}$ , others above  $\frac{1}{4}$ , others above  $\frac{1}{3}$ ; some I know, which after two years lying waste, are abated one half."

*Fifth Monopoly. Laws to prevent the importation of most sorts of fish by foreigners.*

This gives a Monopoly to our few fishermen and fishmongers against our own people; and

and the consequence is, that fish bears five times the price at *London* that it does at *Amsterdam*, or more; great quantities of fish being thrown away by our dealers to keep up extravagant prices, to the great grievance of our industrious poor. And it has prevented our gaining the *Scotch* fishery, by banishing from our coasts the *Dutch* fishermen, who would in time have settled with us, our own country being better than *Holland*; nothing but taxes and monopolies can keep them away; for who would pay heavy taxes to live in a bad country, when he could live free and untaxed in a good one? this obstruction hath enabled the *French* to commence fishermen on our coasts, who employ already a great number of vessels; how dangerous this may in time prove, I leave every honest *Englishman* to judge. And what a melancholy figure do we make, surrounded by fisheries, yet so bound down by taxes, monopolies, &c. that we cannot undertake them, but sit tamely idle, and see foreigners swarming upon our coasts, and carrying away our riches!

*Sixth Monopoly. The navigation act.*

Altho' this act is beneficial to us under our present diseases in trade, but would be needless were they perfectly remedied, yet is it even now not without its inconveniences: for a law that confines, in any degree, our imports or exports to particular ships or men, gives

gives a monopoly to those for whose benefit the restraint is framed, which in this case is either the navigation of the countries whose growths we import, or else our own. And this Monopoly is very prejudicial to our manufactures; for 'tis enacting that several necessaries and materials of manufacture shall not be imported by the cheapest navigation, but by a dear one, and of course that they shall pay dear freights, which must raise their price; and if the Manufacturer buys his materials dear, he must sell his manufacture in proportion. Besides it is enacted, that these necessaries, &c. shall not be brought from any country but the place of growth, or most convenient usual port of shipping; which gives a Monopoly to Foreigners, and to our Merchants, against our own people; for foreigners will always know our necessity for any sort of goods, and if our sole dependence lies upon any one nation, they will not fail to make us pay for it. Besides, this gives opportunity and security to our Merchants for engrossing; because, if they import or buy up large quantities of commodities at the usual times of shipping, they are secured in what extravagant prices they think proper to impose on our people till that time returns, all foreign nations who have laid up stocks being excluded our market, tho' they could afford

F. . . . . them

them ever so cheap. Accordingly, the Author of the *Britannia languens*, page 65. informs us, "That the *Danes*, taking the advantage of this act, raised their prices and customs upon us for pitch, tar, and timber, near double; and the *Leiflanders* the same for hemp and flax." And in page 68. he says, "That the excluding great numbers of foreign ships from our ports, must hinder the vending of great proportions of our beef, pork, corn, beer, clothing, and other necessaries. And page 69. the *Dutch* allow free commerce to all foreigners and their ships." Now, as this act makes our Navigation dear, it for that reason deprives us of the Fishing-trade, the great nursery of Seamen, which cannot be carried on but by a cheap navigation to vie with the *Dutch* and *French*, in which we make no progress worth speaking of: therefore, in this case, this act has deprived us of Seamen, instead of increasing them; and the acquisition of foreign Seamen, in any degree, being prevented by this act, gives a monopoly to our own Sailors; by which means, in war-time, or any spurt of trade, they exact near double the wages that foreign seamen are content with; which oppresses our Merchants, brings our goods dear to all markets, giving foreign manufacturers a great advantage against our own; and our Sailors lying hid in order to get greater wages

wages by their monopoly in the Merchants service, is one, amongst other reasons, of the difficulties we find in manning the King's ships. Roger Coke, in his *Discourse on Trade*, published in 1670, page 27. says, "That two years after the *Rump* making this law, the building of ships became  $\frac{1}{3}$  penny dearer, and Seamen's wages so excessive, that we have wholly lost the trades to *Muscovy* and *Greenland* thereby."

*Seventh Monopoly. Laws to prevent the exporting of woollen manufactures from Ireland.*

After the fear that the value of our lands should be lessened by the improvement of *Ireland*, had produced a destructive prohibition of *Irish* cattle, as has been proved already; the people of that country being necessitated to find out some other employment for their lands, turned their thoughts to the breeding of sheep and raising a growth of wool; no sooner was this effected, but a prohibition ensued on our part to export the manufactures made of that wool. This prohibition on the *Irish* hath ruined the woollen-trade of *Britain*, and raised that of *France*; for unless the *Irish* are suffered to export woollen goods, they must sell their raw wool to the best bidder, and that is *France*; one pack of *Irish* wool works up two packs or more of *French* wool, which is double the damage to *Britain*, that the opening the exports of woollen goods from

from *Ireland* would be; and *France*, by lessening her taxes in times of peace, enabling thereby her people to work cheap, could afford to give large prices for *Irish* wool, and became the chief market for it, having thereby raised for exportation an immense cheap saleable manufacture, which their own wool was not capable of doing: as this increas'd, that of *Britain* declined; and tho' they are now increasing and we declining, yet still this fear, or rather infatuation, about the value of our lands, makes us persist in a prohibition that not only hurts the *Irish*, ruins ourselves, but enriches the *French*: for as the case now stands, either *Ireland* or *France* must have the Woollen-manufacture; *Britain*, by reason of its heavy taxes and monopolies that make labour dear, being out of the question. The *Irish* export clandestinely some camblets to *Lisbon*, and undersell the *French*; therefore the *Irish* can recover the Woollen-trade out of their hands: And shall we compliment the *French* with a trade that we deny our own subjects? Nay, one third of what *Ireland* gets, centers here at last: and shall we refuse such a sum which the *Irish* would snatch from our enemies, and present to us?

## III. Of

## III. Of Ill-judged Laws.

*The laws which give a bounty on exported corn, fish and flesh, are very prejudicial to our manufactures.*

For wages depending on the high or low price, corn, fish and flesh bear, the bounties on their exportation serve only to feed foreigners cheaper than our own people, to run away with our trade: the pretence of encouraging tillage by a bounty on corn can have no weight now since our great improvements on husbandry, much less if we erected magazines of corn in every county against times of scarcity: Foreigners never buy provisions till they want them, and then they must have them whether we give bounties or no. The *British Merchant*, vol. 2. p. 247. says, "If we were to become a province to *France*, we should be obliged to give a bounty on wool as we do on our corn, that *France* might have it cheaper than our people." And in p. 400. "he computes the value of the manufacture in our woollen-goods in general, at three times the value of the wool." Now I appeal to all men of sense, whether it be not much more prejudicial in this case, to feed the workman cheaper, than to sell cheaper the material: the manufacture being as three to one in our woollen-trade only, a bounty on exported wool, tho' absurd and destructive, stops there; but boun-



ties on exported corn, fish, and flesh, serve to feed the *French* cheaper than our own people, to run away not only with our woollen, but also our silk, linen, and iron manufactures; every thing we can undertake, all trade, all navigation. Is not this conduct more absurd, more destructive? Could we have acted more servilely had we become a province to *France*, or rather is not this the way to make us so? All attempts to confine our wool at home must prove vain until our people are eased of Taxes, Monopolies, and Ill-judged Laws equally with or beyond foreigners: for while the *French* can underwork us so much, they can afford to give vast prices for our wool; and what effect any prohibition will have against vast profits, the reader may judge. The penalty of death hinders not bullion from being brought away from *Spain* and *Portugal*. Sir *Josiah Child* remarks upon this subject of our wool, in his *Treat of Trade*, p. 157.

“ That they that can give the best price for  
 “ a commodity, shall never fail to have it by  
 “ one means or other, notwithstanding the  
 “ opposition of any laws, or interposition of  
 “ any power by sea or land; of such force,  
 “ subtlety, and violence, is the general course  
 “ of trade.” It seems something surprizing, that such small countries as the *British* Islands should be ever supposed to grow sufficient quantities of wool, and that of peculiar sorts too,

too, to glut all the world with its manufactures; or that it should be thought a reasonable answer to the question, How comes our woollen-trade to decay? to say, The quantities made are too great for the consumption, did we not frequently meet with it in conversation. These Islands are not the 350th part of the computed superficies of the whole earth; to think that one part with only what it can spare from its own consumption, should be able to overstock with a commodity universally necessary 349 other parts, is strange. But the solution of the mystery is this, that we, by our taxes and monopolies, cannot give the manufacture the vent it formerly had, or is now capable of; for the material is so far from being a drug, that foreigners give any price for it, and we are forced to attempt the preventing its exportation by severe penal laws. 'Tis therefore the manufacture, that being raised to an extravagant price by taxes and laws, which make provisions dearer to our own people than to foreigners, we cannot give vent to near home, and are deprived doing of it in the remote trades to  $\frac{3}{4}$  parts of the world by our monopolizing companies, whereby great quantities of woollen-goods being crowded for sale into a few ports, become consequently despis'd and undervalued; whereas, was our trade quite free, we should send but small quantities



quantities of woollens to the respective numerous ports we then traded to, which would naturally increase their price; for being the best manufactured, as they grow scarce, they would become esteemed and demanded, inso-much that we might be obliged to import wools ourselves to answer the demand. 'Tis our ill management of our trade, and that only, which enables Foreigners to deprive us even of our natural advantages, of which our woollen-trade is one.

*Our laws relating to our poor are a vast encouragement to Idleness.*

By obliging Parishes to maintain their own poor, we intitle them to a certain maintenance, whether they deserve it or no; so that when provisions are cheap, they won't work above half the week, but sit or idle away half their time, laying nothing up for sickness or old age, because the Parish must provide for them then. This is one of the reasons why the wages of our servants and labourers are so excessive high, because our laws providing for the idle, none will work without being extravagantly paid; whereas, had they nothing to depend upon but their industry, or the character of it to recommend them to the charitable in their misfortunes, they would be glad of constant work at moderate prices, to support themselves; be more frugal to make a reserve against times of  
adversity,

adversity, and more studious to deserve that relief they might want.

Besides, these laws are vastly unjust; for the Poor's Rates being very high, are a heavy tax on the industrious to maintain the idle; and as every positive tax must raise the prices of labour and goods, the industrious are thereby still more oppressed, and the sale of our goods hindered abroad; for our labour is grown so excessively dear, that we lose all trades where foreigners come in competition with us.

Idleness is still more encouraged by the defects of our laws against vagabonds: a free people are always brave, and the brave always compassionate; which being a distinguishing character of our people, they are easily imposed on by the least appearance of distress; so that some beggars who can counterfeit misery well, get more money in a day than many diligent labourers, to the great discouragement of the industrious, who see idleness so well rewarded; whereby our roads and streets swarm with beggars, all the disturbance they meet with being, now and then, turned by a Beadle out of his parish into the next; which is only shifting the evil from one door to another, but works no reformation. And if an inquiry could be made into the manner that our poor now spend  
those

those alms they receive from their parishes, I believe the greatest part thereof would appear to be squandered away in drams, and that the bulk of them are maintained only to get drunk.

The suffering people to fine for parish-offices is one of the greatest defects in these laws; for the better sort of house-keepers paying to save themselves the trouble of putting our laws in force, the execution of them is left to the inferior, who have not time to spare from their callings to do it well; who are too often tempted to squander away the money raised for the poor in feasting, or turn it to their profit by furnishing work-houses with necessaries at extravagant prices; whereby the parishioners are high-rated, and the parishes brought into debt.

It is a common saying, That our laws are good, but ill executed: to which I answer, That a law not executed, is worse than no law at all; therefore cannot be good: for the weakness of a law appearing by its being evaded, makes the people have a mean opinion of the wisdom of the legislature, and brings a contempt on our laws in general; therefore must be bad. A law that, by its rewards or punishments, does not enforce obedience to its commands, is in effect no law at all; and what has no effect, does no good.

*Our*

*Our laws that create high duties and penalties are extremely cruel.*

The humane students of the art of government are desired to reflect, how like such laws are to the character the Parsons give us of the devil; the high duties make the temptations, and the penalties destroy men for falling into them. Besides, the bulk of mankind must live as they can, not as they will; if some means fail, they must try others: now to make trade criminal, when in the nature of things it is not so, is cutting off the means the people have of living, *i. e.* starving them.

*Our laws that fix and settle the proportion between our gold and silver coins, are very prejudicial.*

For as the metals themselves vary here in value weekly as the proportion changes abroad, one or other of our coins must be carried away with loss to the nation, as is often the case with our silver coins; as for example, A pound of standard silver is coined into 62 s. so that one pound and  $\frac{1}{2}$  therefore make 63 s. and exchanges for three guineas. By *Casting's* paper of *February 3. 1740.* standard silver was at 5 s. 7  $\frac{1}{2}$  d. per ounce, which makes for one pound and  $\frac{1}{2}$  68 s. 7  $\frac{1}{2}$  d. being above 5 s. 7  $\frac{1}{2}$  d. more than the currency; almost nine per cent. loss to us, and gain to foreigners who carry away our silver coin. Can we wonder

wonder at the scarcity of it when we make it so profitable an article to be carried away? Mr. Locke observes in his *Considerations, &c.* page 167. "If your law set it, *i. e.* the proportion of gold to silver at 15, when it is at the free market-rate in the neighbouring countries as 16 to 1, will they not send hither their silver to fetch away your gold at  $\frac{1}{16}$  loss to you? Or if you will keep its rate to silver as 15 to 1, when in *Holland, France, and Spain*, its market-value is but 14. will they not send hither their gold and fetch away your silver at  $\frac{1}{15}$  loss to you? this is unavoidable, if you will make money of both gold and silver at the same time, and set rates upon them by law in respect of one another."

And here it may not be improper to observe, that our expensive law-suits are destructive to trade, making traders often submit to impositions rather than seek a remedy, that by its expence often proves worse than the disease; or where justice is uncertain to be obtained through the unskilfulness of the courts of law, which seldom fully comprehend the intricacy of mercantile disputes and accounts. The council confess it in open court, and often perplex a cause by their ignorance, which they should clear up by their knowledge; and many times the Judge in summing up the evidence, will say to the Jury, that

that the dispute is a matter of trade which I don't understand, and you do; and many causes have by cautious Judges been recommended to be left to the reference of some of the Jury, ending at a great expence what might have been done without any worth mentioning. It would be just as reasonable for Lawyers to consult Merchants in points of law, as Merchants them in points of trade, cases in which they are equally ignorant. Besides, to what a vast expence are not creditors put in taking out commissions against bankrupts, which of all cases should be attended with the least, and where losses are already but too bad; is it not barbarous to make them worse by a heavy expence? for the rest, the reader is referred to Sir *Josiah Child's Discourse on Trade*, page 141. where this subject is finely treated on.

I shall now attempt to shew in some degree, the amount of our Monopolies and Ill-judged Laws.

Though it be above my capacity to point out exactly the advance in the prices of our goods, occasioned by each separate Monopoly or Ill-judged Law, that ruins our trade, or to fix the utmost degree that our taxes joined to them carry the artificial value to; yet an attempt at some amount, sufficient for our purpose,

G

pose, may be made. As our woollen-trade is our greatest concern, the example shall be drawn from that.

*De Wit* in his *Memoirs*, page 57, says, "That the making a piece of cloth in *Holland* costs 70 livres, of which the workmen pay 20 for taxes." That work then untaxed would be only 50 livres, and 20 livres charged on 50, is just 40 per cent. tax on labour. The *Dutch* taxes have been considerably raised since *De Wit's* time to support two *French* wars, which may amount to as much again for ought I know; but to make the calculation appear the fairer by being moderate, I shall suppose the increase only at 10 per cent. making in all 50 per cent. tax on *Dutch* labour.

"The war in 1672. created so large a debt, that the province of *Holland* only, paid 80 tuns of gold, which is near 800,000 l. Sterling per annum interest." vide *The View of the Taxes, &c. during Queen Anne's war*, reprinted in 1743. p. 4.

*English* wool smuggled to foreigners, sells at above 50 per cent. advance on the *English* price; they find it answers as well or better than any other foreign wools they import, otherwise they would not covet it so much as they do; or we make so many severe laws in vain, to prevent their having it.

In

In the *Observations on British wool*, p. 53, the author supposes the value of a pack of *English* combing-wool, at 6l. The weight of a pack of wool being 240 pounds, is just 6d per pound. In p. 23. he says, The price of *English* and *Irish* combing-wool at *Abbeville* was (about the year 1738) at 10d. and 10½ Sterling the pound; which last price is 10l. 10s. a pack, and just 75 per cent. advance on the *English* price; which will not be thought extraordinary, when a survey is taken of the penalties the smugglers incur by our laws, if detected, (besides the charges of shipping, &c.) for,

By the 9th and 10th of *William III.* wool found carrying towards the sea in *Kent* and *Suffex*, unless entered, and security given, is forfeited, with 3s. per pound penalty.

By the 9th and 10th of *William III.* wool laden on any ship for exportation, unless entered, and security given, is forfeited, with 3s. per pound penalty.

By the 12th of *Charles II.* master and mariners knowing thereof, and assisting, to forfeit all their goods and chattels, and suffer three months imprisonment.

By the 7th and 8th of *William III.* persons assisting in the exportation, to suffer three months imprisonment, without bail or mainprize.

By ditto, The inhabitants of a place out of, or through which the wool is carried or exported, are to forfeit 20 l. if the goods be under the value of 10 l. but if above, triple the value, and triple costs of suit.

By ditto, To be recovered by action against the owners and their assistants.

G. 2.

By

By the 5th of George II. wool seized on board any vessel without cocket or warrant, the vessel, her guns, tackle and furniture to be forfeited.

By the 4th of George I. persons not paying the sum recovered in three months, the Court may order transportation for seven years, as for felony.

The Dutch have intirely beat us out of the trade to Portugal in the middling sorts of cloth, between 8 and 11 s. per yard; and I appeal to our Clothiers, if the mixt cloths made for exportation, between those prices, are not reduced to a mere trifle in quantity, to what they were formerly; or rather, if hardly any be made. A Dutch cloth then may be fairly computed to have 50 per cent. advance upon it in the price of its wool and taxes on its labour, and yet comes cheaper to a foreign market than an English one; the latter must have a fictitious value of above that sum upon it; and as 1 per cent. is sufficient to turn the scale of a trade that is in equilibrio, I shall compute the fictitious value of an English cloth but at 51 per cent.

In page 42 the amount of our Taxes }  
on the expences of our people is above } 31 per cent.

Therefore the Monopolies and Ill-judged }  
Laws that affect this cloth may be about } 20 per cent.

Together 51 per cent.

A

A bale of English cloths now costing L. 100  
Has included in that price an artificial value arising from Taxes, Monopolies, and Ill-judged Laws, with their consequences, as above } 51

Which being substracted, the natural value of this bale of cloths, if freed from Taxes, &c. would be only } L. 49

L 51 charged by Taxes, Monopolies, Ill-judged Laws, with part of their consequences on 49 l. is above 104 per cent. and is so far an artificial value added to our goods, at a low computation.

Besides the prejudice done to trade by this artificial value we give our goods, it likewise weakens and distresses the Government, which is forced to raise above double the sums necessary on the people for every piece of service; whereby murmurs and discontents arise, the people grow sooner impoverished, and unable to raise the supplies; for above half the value of every thing we want being fictitious, we are forced to raise the same money to maintain 112,500 men, as the French do to maintain 300,000; as appears by the British Merchant, vol. 1. page 7.; and if the same difference of expence holds in the fleets, that single consideration should, I think, open our eyes to make our security greater, by throwing out all fictitious value from our labour and goods, to be able to cope with these our only dangerous enemies on more equal terms.

G 3

IV. Our



IV. *Our large National Debt.*

This is fraught with many inconveniences.

*First*, It has ruined our trade, by serving for a pretence to continue those taxes on commodities; the destructive consequences of which to trade I have before proved.

*Secondly*, It destroys private credit. The *Annals of Europe* for the year 1739, p. 444, justly remark, "That these funds first drew  
" out of private hands most of that money  
" which should, and otherwise would have  
" been lent to our Merchants and Tradesmen;  
" this made it difficult for such to borrow  
" any money upon personal security; and  
" this difficulty soon made it unsafe to lend  
" money upon such security; which of  
" course destroyed all private credit, and  
" greatly injured our trade in general.

*Thirdly*, It encourages idleness; for several people making from 3 to 4 *per cent.* of their money sleeping, are mere drones in the hive, improving no land, nor extending any trade.

*Fourthly*, It encourages luxury; idleness is the mother of vice; and a mere stock-holder being the idlest person upon earth, has nothing to study but how to kill-time by vanities and luxuries, in which this nation has of late days made a great proficiency.

*Fifthly*, It wastes the body-politic; for a great part of our National Debt (computed by some at 20 millions) belonging to Foreigners  
not

not residing here, but whose interest is remitted abroad, they are in the same state with respect to the nation as landholders-absentees, those cankers to the riches of a country, supposing the interest remitted abroad to Foreigners to be only 750,000 *l. per annum.*

If our trade prove but a little beneficial, so large a sum going out yearly will certainly keep us poor.

If our trade brings us in neither profit or loss, and the current cash of the nation is 12 millions, the interest paid Foreigners in 16 years will run away with it all.

But if the general balance of our trade comes to be against us, the sending abroad yearly money to pay that balance, joined to the above 750,000 *l. per annum* interest, must bring destruction upon us like a whirlwind. So fine a situation have our debts brought us to!

Having thus made ourselves tributaries to foreigners, poverty must be our portion; for a foreigner, who for fifty years past has received from us for his dividends in our funds 1000 *l.* yearly, computing the interest of money at 4 *per cent.* only, has drained us of 156,115 *l.* having his capital still unsatisfied. Nay this plunder, tho' monstrous, is much under-rated; for the interest of money at the beginning of this term of years was much greater than 4 *per cent.*; but not being  
able



able to learn the exact times of the reductions of interest, the reader must content or discontent himself with a modest, though shameful account,

That these Taxes, Monopolies, Ill-judged Laws and National Debts, are the true causes of the decline of our Foreign Trade, will appear by demonstrating them to be the causes of the smuggling of our wool to *France*.

It has been proved under this first head that these Taxes, &c. cause dear labour; it only now remains to prove that dearness of labour causes the smuggling.

The best bidders for wool are the buyers, and that must be these who work the cheapest. The value of the labour in the bale of cloth costing 100*l.* mentioned in page 77. according to the *British Merchant*, vol. 2. p. 400. is 75*l.* In the *Observations on British wool*, p. 21. the author asserts *French* labour to be  $\frac{1}{3}$  cheaper than *English*, that is 50*l.*; therefore an *Englishman* can afford to give but 25*l.* for the same wool for which a *Frenchman* can afford to give 50*l.* just double the *English* price; which disproportion of price, caused by these Taxes, &c. while they continue, will carry away our wool to *France*, in spite of all the penal laws we can make, hanging, that is losing our people, to save our wool.

And

And this wool smuggled to the *French* is by them manufactured and sent to foreign markets, to rival and sink our own manufactures; so that by the above causes we furnish them with the weapons wherewith they cut our own throats.

To conclude this first head.

*The Foreign Trade of every country must decline, that*

Lays unequal taxes and oppressive excises on its people.

Cramps its trade, the fountain of riches, by high customs and prohibitions.

Suffers many monopolies.

Oppresses its people by prohibiting the importation of victuals, under the pretence of raising the value of its lands.

Gives bounties to feed foreigners cheaper than its own people.

Encourages idleness by bad laws relating to its poor.

Tempts foreigners to carry away its coin for less than its intrinsic value.

Makes the obtaining justice chargeable.

Suffers a heavy national debt, contracted in time of war, to continue unpaid in time of peace.

These are the causes of the decline of our Foreign Trade, which having made appear, they naturally lead us to treat of.

P A R T

P A R T II.

**T**HE *Reasons why the decline of Foreign Trade sinks the value of land.*

First, *By sinking the markets at home.*

For the produce of land being rendered excessively dear, by the causes before-mentioned, foreigners will not take its superfluities; and labour being by the same causes rendered excessively dear too, we cannot manufacture or improve that produce, nations that can afford cheaper supplying the markets abroad: so that the produce of the lands not being carried off as usual, must become a dead stock on the farmers hands, and cause great quantities to be crowded into the markets; where being encouragement but for few buyers, the price naturally falls: as for instance, the declining demand for our woollen goods abroad, falls the price of wool at home.

Suppose that in 1699 we exported to Turkey 40,000 cloths, the value of raw wool in each being 2 <i>l.</i> amounts to	}	L. 80,000
Suppose that in 1738 we exported to Turkey 8,000 cloths, the value of raw wool in each being 1 <i>l.</i> 10 <i>s.</i> amounts to		
The difference of the value of wool exported in those two years,		L. 68,000

Wools

Wools of this value lying yearly on hand, must make a glut; the farmers push to sell at market, but in vain, unless at under-prices; for the Wool-staplers, finding the demand decrease, decrease in number themselves; some break, some leave off trade, some take to other trades; for many sellers with great stocks on hand, and few buyers, naturally fall the markets, and the Landlords pressing the Tenants for rent, and threatening to seize if payments are not made, the wool must be sold at any rate to raise money; and there being yearly 68,000*l.* less money brought into the nation to be laid out in wool than in former times, the price must be still lower on that account; the lower the produce sells, the less rent the Farmer can give for land; the worse the markets, the greater arrears of rent the Farmer runs into; and Taxes, Monopolies, &c. making labour and necessaries grow dearer, and the decay of foreign trade making the wool sell cheaper, must break him in the end, and then the farm is thrown on the Landlord's hands, who, unwilling to fall the rent, keeps it in the management of Stewards or Bailiffs, whose profit and charges seldom make it pay the old rent, but generally ends in mortgaging the land, or selling it; and as these cases grow more frequent, more estates will be at market, and consequently the less prices they will fetch.

Secondly,

Secondly, *By increasing the number of poor to burden the land.*

The poor, wanting employment, must be supported by the land; if foreigners give them work, they give them bread; but when trade cannot maintain them, land must. When the Poor's Rates are heavier than the Tenant can bear, the Landlord must pay them, either by allowance in the rent, or by taking the farm into his own hands; or else by the breaking of his Tenant, who has paid that money to the Poor's Rates his Landlord should have received.

Suppose in 1699 the labour of the above 40,000 cloths to have given employment to } 40,000 people

Suppose in 1738 the labour of the above 8,000 cloths to have given employment to } 8,000 people

The difference is } 32,000 people

Suppose these 32,000 people to have earned by their labour formerly from foreigners 6 l. per annum each, it amounts to } L. 192,000

But, wanting employment, they come on the parish at 1 s. 6. d. per week each, which for one year amounts to } 124,800

The difference to the land-holder in one year is } L. 316,800

For as the land by the decay of Foreign Trade, receives not the first sum, and is by the

the same cause saddled with the latter, it makes an annual difference of the above two sums to the landholders in this single branch of labour; and is the same in proportion for all other decayed branches of trade.

Thirdly, *By decreasing the stock of people.*

For as employment lessens, the most industrious, rather than starve here, will fly to other countries where trade can maintain them; so the consumption of these being taken away, the demand at market must grow less, and of course rents must fall; yet the Farmers charges must grow greater; for the fewer hands, the higher wages are. This must break him in the end, and produce all the consequences following that misfortune, mentioned in the first remark: Besides, 'tis men that trade, and bring in money; therefore the fewer they are, the less money will be brought in; and the less money, the less rent can be given for land.

Fourthly, *By decreasing our riches.*

This is a consequence of the above three remarks; for having fewer goods capable of being exported by reason of their dear price, and our manufactures declining, must in time be lost; therefore the importation of foreign goods must naturally increase, and more money go out to pay for them.

I have laid it down as an undoubted truth in page 1. " That nations which have no  
H " mines

“ mines of gold and silver, have no means to  
 “ get them but by foreign trade; and accord-  
 “ ing to the degree of these metals they pos-  
 “ sels, the prices of their commodities, and  
 “ therewith the value of their lands, rise and  
 “ fall in proportion; which I shall now  
 “ prove.

The *Britannia Languens*, page 12. says, “ If  
 “ there were but 500 l. in *England*, an ox  
 “ could hardly be worth a penny;” therefore  
 the rent must bear its proportion to the riches.  
 This appears by *Maitland's History of London*;  
 for he says, that in the year 961 land sold at  
 1 s. per acre. The reason that land then  
 bore so low a price, was, the low price the  
 produce sold at; for he says that in the year  
 1000, an Ox sold for 2 s. 6 d. a Cow for 2 s.  
 a Sheep for 1 s. and a Swine for 8 d. This  
 could be only owing to the little foreign trade  
 the nation then had, and consequently to the  
 little quantity of gold and silver trade had then  
 brought in.

But if it should be asked, What is the  
 reason that at present all things are naturally  
 so much advanced in price, to what they  
 were in those days? the answer is, That the  
 quantities of gold and silver brought to *Europe*,  
 since the progress made by the *Spaniards* and  
*Portuguese* in *America*, have made those metals  
 more common and of less value than former-  
 ly;

ly; so that 20 s. will hardly purchase what  
 1 s. would before the discovery of the *West-Indies*.

The *Spaniards* and *Portuguese* don't throw  
 away their gold and silver for us to pick up:  
 we have no mines of these metals, therefore  
 could not get such quantities as we have but  
 by our trade to *Spain* and *Portugal*, or to  
 those countries that had an over-balance upon  
 them, and were over-balanced by us.

So that the present natural price of land,  
 and its produce, is the proportion of gold  
 and silver that foreign trade hath brought  
 into and left in the nation. If the present  
 quantity was to be doubled by foreign trade,  
 the natural price of land, and its produce,  
 must be so too; for according to the price  
 the farmer can sell his commodity at market,  
 he can pay for the rent of land, and no other-  
 wise. If our foreign trade decays until the  
 present money in the nation be half swept  
 away, the produce of land must sell for  
 half the natural price it does now, and land  
 must let at half the rent it naturally bears  
 now; but if we should go on declining, until  
 we have no more money left in the nation  
 than there was in 961 or 1000, the prices of  
 land and its produce, can be no more than  
 they bore in those days, Taxes, &c. deducted.

Therefore if the landed-gentlemen have a  
 mind to raise or sink the value of their lands,

the encouraging or discouraging our foreign trade is the only means to do either; so closely united are land and trade; their true interests are the same; they must stand or fall together.

*The sum of all is this: that*  
What foreigners take from others instead of us,  
What the poor have given them instead of buying,  
The scarcity of people,  
The scarcity of money,  
Taxes, Monopolies, Ill-judged laws, and National Debts, are the causes of the decline of our Foreign Trade; the decline of Foreign Trade causes the above four calamities; and they sink the value of lands. The Taxes, Monopolies, Ill-judged Laws, and National Debts, are the causes of all; therefore they are the causes of the decline of the value of lands.

P A R T

P A R T III.

**O***F the means to restore the Foreign Trade of Britain, and consequently the value of its lands.*

It is a manifest instance of the great natural advantages in trade this nation enjoys, that it hath not been ruined long ago by the consequences of our own ill-management; as I shall have frequently occasion to mention the former, it will be proper here to shew what they are; and, as the *Dutch* and *French* are our great rivals in trade, to compare our natural advantages with theirs.

*First*, Our situation is the securest of any in *Europe*, not liable to the incursions of our neighbours, as the *Dutch* and *French* are; we have more good harbours than any nation on the continent, open all the year; whereas the *French* ports for ships of any burden are few, and those far asunder; and the *Dutch* ports few, dangerous, and froze up in the winter. Our country is healthy and pleasant; whereas *Holland* is cold, marshy, and unwholsom.

*Secondly*, Our government is the most mild and excellent of any in *Europe*; whereas the government in *France* is arbitrary, and in *Holland* very severe.

H 3

*Thirdly,*



*Thirdly*, Our plenty of provisions exceeds all *Europe*; no nation having that plenty of corn, flesh-meat, and fish, that we abound in; for *Holland* is deficient in the two first, and buys of us; and *France* cannot well victual ships without *Irish* beef; and its harvests being more precarious than ours, the *French* are forced to make frequent purchases of corn from us. We are surrounded by the greatest fishery in the world, which the *French* and *Dutch* are both deficient in, and seek at great hazard and expence on our coasts.

*Fourthly*, Our Islands abound in excellent wool, coals, lead, tin, leather, butter, and tallow; all which both *French* and *Dutch* are deficient in, and forced to buy of us.

We have oak for ship-building, which both *Dutch* and *French* want. In our plantations we build vast numbers of ships, which the *French* are deficient in, and forced to buy of us.

As the *Dutch* are forced to purchase every thing, they are out of the question; but the *French* have vast quantities of wines and brandies; they have silk, oil, hemp, and flax; in these, at present, we are deficient; but we have lands in our colonies for a trifle, fit to raise them all cheaper than the *French* can do; besides other commodities which they want, such as rice, tobacco, pitch, tar, and masts.

*Fifthly*,

*Fifthly*, Our Sailors are the most expert, and our ships the best built of any; so that we could have the preference in the carrying trade; no merchant but would ship his goods on an *English* vessel at equal freight preferable to one of any other country; and the former can be insured at the cheapest premium.

To all this may be added, that our people are brave, laborious, and strong; extreme neat workmen, improving to the utmost the inventions of others: and our merchants the most generous and honourable in trade, with whom all nations are fond to deal.

With all these superior natural advantages, we cannot be hurt but by ourselves; 'tis our own covetous folly only that can undo us. Had our trade been suffered to take its natural channel, foreigners could not have diverted its course, nor ever can, unless these natural advantages are annihilated; and they may as well attempt to sink our islands in the ocean, as while they remain to deprive us of the benefits resulting from their situation and produce, if we take only a resolution to open our eyes; so that tho' our wounds are deep, and have brought us somewhat low, yet are they not incurable; if they are neglected, the general decay must be compleated in our ruin, but with proper care we may rise to a more flourishing condition than we ever yet knew. And tho' all the means necessary thereto cannot



not be supposed to fall within the compass of any one man's capacity, yet is it the duty of every man, in time of need, to contribute something, though in part only, and by way of essay. As such, the following proposals are offered.

**P R O P O S A L S.**

I. *To lay one Tax on the Consumers of Luxuries, to take off all our other taxes, excises, and customs; and when that is done, to make all our ports free.*

II. *To abolish our Monopolies, unite Ireland, and put all our fellow-subjects on the same footing in trade.*

III. *To withdraw the Bounties on exported Corn, and erect public Magazines in every County.*

IV. *To discourage Idleness, by well-regulating our poor.*

V. *To pay off our Debts by public bonds, bearing interest, negotiable by indorsement, and liquidating part of our debts yearly.*

*First*

**First P R O P O S A L.**

*To lay one Tax on the Consumers of Luxuries, to take off all our other taxes, excises, and customs; and when that is done, to make all our ports free.*

*The plan of a Tax on the Consumers of Luxuries.*

It is hereby proposed, That all persons using, wearing, or drinking the following articles of luxury as particular specified, be obliged to take out a licence yearly, paying each one subsidy for each article of three halfpence in the pound only, on the computed income they should have to support the station of life they voluntarily place themselves in, by the article of luxury they use, wear, or drink, as by the example underneath.

All persons	Computed incomes	L. s. d.
1. Keeping two coaches and six for their use,	8000	} Three halfpence in the pound, {
2. Using dishes or plates of silver at their tables, commonly called Services of plate,	4000	
3. Keeping a coach and six for their use,	2000	
4. Keeping a coach and four for their use,	1000	
5. Keeping a coach and a pair for their use,	800	
N. B. Chariots, four-wheel'd chaises, &c. are included in the term Coach.		5 00 0
6. Wearing		

6. Wearing jewels for their dress, besides necklaces, folitaires, rings, or ear-rings,	} 800	} Three halfpence in the pound,	5 00 0
7. Keeping a sedan-chair for their use,			5 00 0
8. Wearing gold and silver, men on their coats, and women on their gowns,	} 500		3 2 6
9. Using silver plate for their side-boards or tables, not having services,	} 500		3 2 6
10. Using china services of dishes and plates at their tables,	} 500		3 2 6
11. Wearing necklaces or folitaires of jewels for their dress, besides rings or ear-rings,	} 250		1 11 3
12. Keeping a chair or chaise with one horse for their use,	} 250		1 11 3
13. Drinking wine in their house, lodging, or service,	} 100		0 12 6
14. Wearing gold or silver for their dress, except on coats, gowns, hats or shoes,	} 100		0 12 6
15. Wearing jewels in rings or ear-rings,	} 100		0 12 6
16. Using no silver plate but spoons,	} 50		0 6 3
17. Drinking brandy, rum, or any spirits, in house, lodging, or service,	} 50		0 6 3
18. Drinking tea, coffee, or chocolate, in house, lodging, or service,	} 25		0 3 1½

All articles of the same degree, or under the article paid for, are included in it.

Husbands to pay for their wives the  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the

the article they pay for themselves, to entitle them to use the same.

Fathers, or mothers (if no father), to pay for each child under age the  $\frac{1}{8}$  of the article they pay for themselves, to entitle them to use the same.

Bachelors to be double-taxed, if of 21 years of age.

No persons keeping public-houses to have musick, nine-pins, shuffle-boards, cock-pits, card, dice, draught-playing, or any gaming in their houses, out-houses, sheds, yards, gardens or grounds, for money or liquors, except they pay in the same manner as the persons using article 9. These people being the great encouragers of idleness, luxury, and gaming, the great corrupters of the common people, servants, labourers, and manufacturers, out of whose industry they idly live, to the ruin of many poor families, and are a great cause of the vast increase of the poor's tax.

It is not pretended that every article of luxury necessary to be taxed is here hit on, with the several rates proper to be laid on each; such things are too presumptuous for any private man, and besit only the wisdom of the legislature: all that is here attempted is only to give a specimen of one tax on the consumers of luxury only, the method of raising

...sing it, with some remarks on the benefits arising thereby to the nation.

*The method of raising this Tax.*

The Receiver-General of every county to keep an open office to receive this tax, during the months of *January* and *February*, *April* and *May*, *July* and *August*, *October* and *November*, in the most convenient town in each county; and to cause attendance to be given on such days in the week as the Commissioners shall judge necessary.

All persons to bring or send their money to the Receiver-General's office in their county, with a fair written note, containing the name of the county, town, and parish, their titles or names, places of abode, wives, and number of children under age; with the number, title, and amount of the article they pay for subsidies.

Every Receiver-General to deliver to the persons, paying their subsidies, a licence for that year, in which the above descriptions shall be specified.

All persons paying their subsidies in the months of *January* and *February*, to have 3 *per cent.* on their licences allowed them; in the months of *April* and *May*, 2 *per cent.*; in the months of *July* and *August*, 1 *per cent.*; and no allowance afterwards; whereby it will be the

the people's interest to raise the subsidies with the greatest expedition.

All persons before the end of the year must register their licences with the Church-wardens of the parish they live in; persons living in extraparochial places, to register their licences in the parish nearest to their dwellings.

Persons having houses of residence in several parishes to register their licences in each parish; lodgers, and servants, to register their licences only in one parish.

One or both Church-wardens to attend at the Vestry every *Wednesday* at ten in the morning, to register the licences of the year, during such a number of hours as the Vestry shall judge necessary; whereby needless attendance from their private affairs will be avoided.

Church-wardens not registering licences as before directed, and tendered before witnesses, to pay themselves the penalty incurred by their neglect,

Church wardens to keep a separate account of all those licences which have not the name of their parish, and are brought to be registered on account of Parish-rates, by persons having more than one house of residence.

Church-wardens to deposite in the Vestry, on the first day of *January*, the last year's register

gister of licences in their parish, for the inspection of the parishioners, and to form a judgment of the income of the parish.

After the first register, as above, is delivered in, the Vestry of every parish within fourteen days to compute their rates for the current year, and how much in the pound on the licences computed to be registered in the current year will fully defray them, and order the same to be paid to the Church-wardens in the Vestry every *Wednesday* by public notice.

No person to be liable to pay any parish-rates whatever, by any other rate.

Church-wardens after the first year not to register any person's licence, until they have received their parish-rates, on the penalty of paying themselves the fines of the delinquents.

Persons not registering their licences as aforesaid, before the end of the year, for the highest article of luxury they themselves use, their wives, or children under age, to forfeit on conviction three times the sums not paid for subsidies and parish-rates, to be divided as follows;  $\frac{2}{3}$  to their parish, to ease their rates, and  $\frac{1}{3}$  to the Receiver-General.

The Receiver-General to pay no money but into the exchequer, on the penalty of 500 *l.* to the informer.

The Receiver-General, or his Deputy, not to sue the county for a robbery, unless the persons

persons carrying the money be three in company.

The Receiver-General to send up his accounts to the exchequer, of every two months receipts as soon as possible, deducting from the sum received 100 *l.* for his salary for one year, and  $\frac{1}{2}$  *per cent.* for his charges.

The Commissioners of the Land-tax to be the Commissioners of this, for each county.

No person after the first year, who does not pay for article nine, capable to be a Commissioner.

Vestries may order any in the parishes they suspect of not having registred, or fully paid their last year's subsidies, to be apprehended by their Constable or Beadle, and carried before one of the Commissioners of the county to be examined; and such persons not producing their last year's licence, and Church-warden's receipt or receipts, and not proving that the said licence was for the highest article they used, or else that they had not any article to pay, not having used any; the said persons not clearing themselves to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, to be by him committed to the house of correction, to appear at the next Commissioners sittings, unless they deposite the penalty in the Commissioners hands, or give security to appear at the said sittings.

Persons giving security, or depositing the  
I 2. penalty,

penalty, to register their names and the names of their sureties, or the sums deposited, at the Receiver-General's office for the county, before the first day of the Commissioners sittings; otherways to be proceeded against as guilty.

Keepers of houses of correction to deliver into the Receiver-General's office, before the first day of the Commissioners sittings, a list of the persons names in their custody committed by the Commissioners.

The Receiver-General, or his Deputy, to make a register of all persons names committed, depositing, or giving security to be laid before the Commissioners at their sittings; to attend there as their Clerk, and record the proceedings.

Commissioners to sit to hear causes in the town the Receiver-General keeps his office in, during the months of *March, June, September, and December.*

Every Commissioner to take an oath in open court the first day he sits, that he will vote according to justice, without favour or partiality; otherways to have no vote.

Commissioners, every day they meet, to chuse their President, who shall collect the votes, and order the Receiver-General, or his deputy, to record the proceedings.

Three or more Commissioners to make a court, and determine causes by majority of votes:

votes: if the votes are equal, the defendant to be dismissed.

In all causes determined by a less number than seven Commissioners, there may be an appeal to seven or more, whose determination to be final.

No Commissioner to have any vote in his own cause.

Persons convicted, not paying the penalty, to be sent to the house of correction, and kept to hard labour during the space of six months.

Persons depositing, or giving security, not appearing, to be proceeded against as guilty, their deposit to be forfeited, and paid as directed, or distress-warrants issued out against them and their securities, to levy the penalty.

Any two or more Commissioners to determine differences about distress.

Persons whose causes are delayed by any neglect of the Receiver-General, or Keeper of a house of correction, to petition the Commissioners for satisfaction to be made them by the said persons for what loss they may have sustained thereby, which the Commissioners may award at their discretion.

The Receiver-General of every county within three months after the end of every year to publish his accounts, shewing the sums received the preceeding year from each parish of his county, and how he hath accounted



ed with the exchequer for the same, and to deliver when demanded at the price of 2 s. and 6 d. one of the said accounts, to every Commissioner and Church-warden in the county, on the penalty of 50 l. for each refusal: and one to be transmitted to the King's Remembrancer's office in the Exchequer.

The Receiver-General not accounting with the Exchequer for the whole money he receives, to forfeit on conviction, to every parish whose sums he hath given in short, three times the sum received in that parish and not accounted for, to ease their rates. Church-wardens to prefer their complaints against the Receiver-General before the Commissioners in open court.

Church-wardens to deposite in the Vestry one of the Receiver-General's accounts for to examine the register by.

Before making any remarks on the benefits arising by this proposal, the general prejudice against the possibility of carrying into execution, any tax on the Consumers of luxuries, arising from the supposed evasion and fraud such a tax is liable to, must be first removed: in order to effect which, I hope to convince the Reader by the following considerations, that this tax by its very nature and method of raising, is so far from being liable to the above objection, that it is on the  
contrary

contrary capable of a more exact and equal collection than any tax we have at present.

First, *By its nature:*

For what every person should pay, must be publicly known; friends, neighbours, and servants, must see whether we drink wine, tea, brandy, &c. in our houses, lodgings, services, or no; and as to our fineries, 'tis our intent they should be manifest, so that concealments are almost impossible.

Secondly, *By the method of raising.*

Which obliges all parish-rates to be raised at the same time and in the same manner; for 'tis very observable that most people are more prying into the proportion they themselves or their neighbours pay for parish-rates, than into any taxes raised for the Government; therefore, as by this method no persons can pay any parish-rates at all, until they have paid their subsidies to the Government, nor pay less than their due to the parish without making their neighbours pay more than their dues, and proving besides the disproportion paid to the Government, which must appear by a register open to the inspection of all the parish, whereby every one can, and will keep a particular eye upon his neighbours, to see not only that they pay, but that they pay fair; and the Vestry can and will keep a general  
neral

neral watch on all, in order to ease their rates by the fines of delinquents.

Which allowing no private reward to informers, no scandal can be incurred by any persons moving in the Vestry to detect the fraudulent; whereas at present the character of an informer being odious, the taxes grievous, the concern not general, and informations requiring attendance and trouble, there is the greatest remissness possible in bringing to light the frauds in the revenue; no person of credit, either out of business, or of a different business, does now inform against any Trader for defrauding the Customs or Excise; people do not care to give themselves the trouble of meddling where they think they have no concern. But, by this method of taxing, the trouble of attending the Vestry on parish-affairs serves for this, and every one is concerned in point of interest and honour to detect frauds; interest with regard to himself, and honour with regard to his neighbours, by taking care that the innocent do not suffer for the guilty.

Which directs the Receiver-General's accounts to be published, whereby every Vestry will have a check to examine its register by, and detect frauds; for if any person does not pay at all to the Government, his name will be wanting both in the Receiver-General's account

account and his parish-register; if he does not pay enough, the deficiency will appear against his name in both; if he pays to the Government but not to his parish, his name will appear in the Receiver-General's account, but be wanting in his parish-register; if a forged licence is registered, the person's name will be wanting in the Receiver-General's account; if the Receiver-General conceals any of the money, the parish-register detects it; and he incurring a penalty to that parish, it will not fail to proceed against him. The Receiver-General's account checks the registers, and they him, both in his receipts and payments. Persons of fortune, who will pay the largest sums by having houses of residence in more parishes than one, will have an additional check on them in each parish where their licences must be registered, to make them pay fair.

Which giving  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the fines of delinquents to the Receiver-General, makes it become his interest as well as duty, to make his accounts as public as possible to detect frauds.

Which laying the *onus probandi* on the suspected person, will make every one endeavour to appear fair, in order to avoid the trouble and expence that suspicion will make him liable to.

Which makes it not worth while for the lower class of people to attempt frauds; a penalty

penalty of three times the sums unpaid, is too great a risk to avoid paying a trifle; which likewise subjects them to the jealousy of their comrades, who will look out sharp to prevent others from shifting their burdens to their backs; where money is scarce, the greater care is taken in paying no more than is due: besides, these people being often quarrelling, will revenge themselves, by detecting each other's frauds; so that a few being made examples of at first, will shew the rest the improbability of escaping.

I know of no tax at present having so many checks, nor so many persons interested to detect frauds as this; consequently none so capable of an exact and equal collection: for if those who pay fair, won't detect the fraudulent, they must pay the deficiency themselves; whereby they punish themselves for their own neglect. Detect, or pay, is the case.

Remarks on the benefits arising by this proposal.

1. The Government, by this method of taxing, need never borrow any money, nor have the usual clauses of credit every year, whereby part of the expence of advanced money will be saved; for it being the interest of all to pay as soon as they can, the greatest part would be raised the first four or five months, and, by thus giving speedy vigour, add weight to our resolutions.

2. All

2. All persons tax themselves voluntarily, than which nothing can be easier or more equal; and an easy equal way of raising taxes, will always produce the most money and the fewest murmurs.

3. Those that would abate of their taxes, may abate of their luxury; as those that won't pay for a licence to keep a coach and six horses, may keep only four, or a pair, and pay for no more, or need not keep any, nor drink wine, tea, brandy, &c. in house, lodging, or service, neither wear on their garments gold or silver, nor wear jewels, nor use plate, and so not pay any thing; consequently no individual can be oppressed, an advantage that no people in Europe have at present.

4. When 'tis proposed to oblige all persons to take out a licence to drink wine, tea, brandy, &c. in services, as well as houses and lodgings, 'tis done to mend our servants manners, by curing their luxury, or making them pay for it.

5. Few that can afford to live high, will retrench; those that cannot afford it, should be obliged to it. This will be a sumptuary-law to keep all people in their proper stations, and prevent the ruin of several; it will reform, as well as raise money sufficient.

6. When it is proposed that all Bachelors of twenty-one years of age should be double-taxed,

taxed, it is done as well to proportion all payments as equally as possible to people's situations in life or circumstances, as also to encourage marriages; for tho' Bachelors are double-taxed, yet they will then not pay equal to the Married-men, who pay their wives taxes as well as their own, and may be some children's; consequently, compared with bachelors, are at least double-taxed: for these last may, if they please, always live equal to a Married-man with half the expence, and have not that anxious necessary care of saving, to provide for the present as well as future well-being of their families: add to which this political truth, that inhabitants being the riches of a country, and marriage a prevention of debauchery, all wise States have made it their care to discourage celibacy: in particular, the *Switzers* will not suffer a Bachelor to enjoy any Balliage, and the superior rank there being almost all married, makes the inferior be so too; so great is the force of example, and accounts for their country, tho' small, being so very populous. Whereas, one of the reasons why *England* is not so, is the abandoned loose lives our single people lead, whereby they get a disrelish to the married-state, and are enervated by debauchery, which, unless remedied, must render us a poor despicable depopulated nation;

'tis

'tis therefore the highest policy to make marriage fashionable by the example of the rich, since it tends so much to the public good, and the grandeur of our country.

7. But the greatest benefit of all is, that this proposal hath not those extending, pernicious, trade-destroying consequences of our present taxes; for it will not raise the value of any one commodity, but rather, by checking luxury, the bane of virtue and industry, we shall become a rich and flourishing people. In vain would the luxurious tradesman say the expences of his coach, his wine, his plate, or his laces, on the prices of his goods; his frugal neighbour, who indulged not himself in those vanities, would so much underfel him, that he could have no trade; and while the former declined, the latter would be raising an estate able to afford him all the gaieties of life independent of his business; and tradesmen should wait for vanities until they have raised estates to support them.

8. The first year or two, perhaps, will not demonstrate the exact produce this tax may give, on account of the receivers not being sufficiently versed in their business; the evasions that wicked people may make to defraud, which seldom can be intirely guarded against until they appear; or the consideration that the first year's tax being the only one that will be felt, will be the shortest: for one

K

subsidy

subsidy being laid on the first year, nothing can be taken off until that produce appears, which will not be until the second year; but then 6 d. in the pound may be taken off land, and as many of the other taxes on commodities as that subsidy hath provided for; so that until all our other taxes are supplied by this, in every year following, the people will have remitted to them in the taxes on land and necessaries, with their consequences, more than an equivalent for what they paid the foregoing year, whereby they will be enabled yearly to pay more to this tax; so that every year's subsidy must increase.

Whatever appears most burdensom should be the first taken off, such as the duties on soap, candles, salt, coals, or foreign materials of manufacture.

9. This proposal being different from the method of raising taxes now used, and designed to take off our present oppressions, every body will be gainers; the poor Manufacturer will not pay any thing, nor should he. But here then will appear a sort of paradox, the rich proportionably are to pay all the taxes, yet each of them to have besides a particular gain by it. To solve this, we may fairly divide the rich into three classes, viz. Land-holders, Traders, and Stock-holders.

1. *To begin with the Land-holders:*

Suppose

Suppose a Gentleman to have an estate of 1000 l. per annum; that the land-tax is 4 s. in the pound; but he being in an easy-rated county pays but 2 s. in the pound, which amounts to a 100 l. in lieu of which land-tax, excises, customs, &c. are allowed eight subsidies, presuming they would raise a sum equal to the amount of our present duties:

Suppose then this Gentleman to pay by this proposal,

For himself 8 subsidies for the article 4, is	} L. 50 00 00
For his wife the $\frac{1}{4}$ of what he pays,	} 12 10 00
For four children $\frac{1}{8}$ each of what he pays,	} 25 00 00
	<hr/>
	87 10 00
He remains a clear gainer	L. 12 10 00

By this it appears, that where the land-tax is but half-paid, such a Land-holder hereby saves 12 l. 10 s.

But those Gentlemen who have born the unequal burden of the land-tax for many years, paying from 2 s. even up to 4 s. in the pound, will be hereby greatly relieved, enabled to live better, and so add to the amount of this proposal.

The following great advantages arise likewise to the Land-holders.

K 2

The



The difference in the price of necessaries, when the taxes on them are taken off, must be much superior to the above subsidies; for the present taxes, and their consequences, affect the Land-holders above 13 s. in the pound. *Vide p. 59.*

The Poor's Rates, so heavy a burden on the land at present, will be hereby reduced to a mere trifle.

The rents of lands will be better paid when the Farmers are eased of their heavy taxes.

The Farmers will be likewise more able to improve the lands they rent.

Easy equal taxes increase trade, and trade increases rents.

Well-paid increased rents will augment the capitals of those that have occasion to sell their lands.

Land untaxed must yield a considerable better price than when heartily taxed, as at present.

All which duly considered, it may be asserted, That upon this proposal's being pass'd into a law, every Landholder will actually find the value of his estate at least doubled.

As the benefits arising to our Landholders have not been so fully calculated as they are capable of, the calculation above being only comparative to the land-tax, I shall with pleasure set them forth, by way of answer to the following

following objection, and to illustrate what has been already advanced on this head.

Some have thought it a fatal objection against this proposal's ever being practicable, that our nobility will think it contrary to their interest, and never come into it.

This I own would carry great weight, if it was possible for the public good not to be proportionably the undoubted good of every individual; or if our nobility were not considerable Landholders: whereas many of them are the most considerable; and as all our misfortunes center on our lands, so must our benefits; the greater the property, the greater of either; therefore as our Nobility are the greatest Landholders, so by this proposal they should and will receive the greatest benefit; of which I hope to convince them, if ever this humble Essay should have the honour of their perusal, by laying before them the state they are now in, and the state they would be in by this proposal; the difference of which they will be pleased to consider.

Suppose a Nobleman to have a nominal estate of 8000 *l. per annum*, out of which, by the various reductions in these wretched times, he hardly receives in cash 6000 *l.*; and I appeal to the whole body of Nobility if upon a medium they receive so much.

The expences of a Man of Quality generally are and should be in the richest

and best commodities that can be had, consequently the dearest; and as a common *English* cloth is proved in p. 76. to have a fictitious value superior to a *Dutch* cloth loaded with 50 per cent. the latter having beat out the former at the *Portugal* market, and only 1 per cent. allowed to turn the scale; I may safely affirm, that the expences of a Nobleman have a fictitious value included in them of 51 per cent. if not more; there being great difference between a Nobleman's buying and a Merchant's. However 51 per cent. fictitious value included in a Nobleman's expences of 6000 l. amounts to 3060 l. which being deducted, leaves only 2940 l. and is the only real, true, intrinsic value, that a Nobleman receives from a nominal estate of 8000 l. per annum in the state he is now.

What else can be the reason that our Nobility can have no taste but they are ruined; if a Nobleman has a *gout* either for building, equipage, or entertainments, we presently hear of mortgages and sales of estates; how few places or pensions come in aid to prevent them? whilst a foreign Nobleman perhaps does all with half the nominal estate, and yet keeps within bounds. Is it not hereby plain, that tho' the rental of the *English* Nobleman's estate is great, yet, the taxes and their consequences are so monstrous, that the intrinsic

trinic value is by them reduced to a small pittance?

Whereas, by this proposal, a Nobleman with a nominal estate of 8000 l. per annum pays

For himself 8 subsidies for the first article is,	}	L. 400
For his lady $\frac{1}{4}$ of what he pays,		100
For four children, each $\frac{1}{8}$ of what he pays,	}	200
		—L. 700

700 l. being deducted from 8000 l. leaves 7300 l. of a real, true, intrinsic value; which will purchase as much, go as far, consequently be equal to 14,897 l. of our present fictitious value; and if his ordinary expences in the state he is now are but 2940 l. of real value, he would have by this proposal 4360 l. of the same real value remaining, for building, equipage, entertainments, &c. equal to 8897 l. of our present fictitious value.

So that by the state he is now in, he is reduced either to his ordinary expences, or to ruin his estate, if he launches out in any taste; whereas, by the state he would be in by this proposal, he might live equal to what he did before, and yet have remaining for improvements a sum superior in real value to the present nominal value of his whole estate.

And

And whenever our improving trade shall advance the natural value of our commodities, so that the expences of the Nobility will be enhanced, they may rest assured that the natural value of their lands will keep pace with them, and their incomes constantly rise in proportion to bear them. The same in proportion to the value of their estates will be the case of all our Land-holders.

11. *With respect to the Trader.*

The difference in the prices of necessaries, when the taxes on them are taken off, must be much superior to the subsidies he should pay for luxuries; I say should, for he need pay no more than he pleases, or can afford, as appears by the third remark; so he cannot be oppressed.

This puts him in a better situation than any of our rivals in commerce, who all pay taxes on necessaries, always attended with some oppressions.

When those taxes that are burdens upon our trade are removed, then may we send our manufactures to foreign markets as cheap or cheaper than our neighbours, whereby lost markets may be recovered, and new ones found out.

The demand for our goods must hereby increase at those markets where at present they have some vent.

An

An increasing demand makes profitable sales and quick returns.

Quick returns are the soul of commerce, and enable the merchant to give constant employment to all our working hands.

Commissions for buying will be always sent by foreigners to the cheapest markets; and the cheaper they are, the more commissions they may expect.

A flourishing commerce will enable the Trader to live more comfortably for the present, and at the same time lay up a future provision for himself and family.

Our rival neighbours, some of whom are our natural enemies, and the best but self-interested friends, will find the scene shifted upon them from their rising and our sinking, I mean in trade, the greatest blessing that can happen to a people; for, as a late Patriot observed, "It brings food and nourishment to a nation, preserves and increases its stock, and distributes a convenient portion of maintenance to every part of it."

12. *In regard to the Stockholder.*

His gain will appear by considering that this proposal being calculated to raise as large or larger fund, in a more easy and equal manner than all our other taxes.

He will be more certain than he is now, in any time of war, of his interest being duly paid.

He

He will be better secured in the value or reimbursement of his capital.

He will rest assured that the Government will never be driven to lay a tax on the funds, which would not only lessen his income, but considerably diminish the price of his capital.

By this proposal he will gain security; no small consideration.

Even the difference in the price of necessaries, when the taxes on them are taken off, must be more advantage than any mere Stockholder will or need pay for luxuries.

13. As by this proposal the rich will pay all with advantage even to themselves, so the poor will receive great benefit.

They will be able to work as cheap as foreigners at least, consequently monopolize the manufacturing of their own wool.

They will have lesser wages, but of more value, 4d per day untaxed being more than 6d. charged with 3d. for taxes.

They will have more constant employment by working cheaper, consequently a better maintenance.

They will have foreigners settling here continually, to teach them new branches of trade.

They will not be drove by necessity to fly their country, to starve, beg, or steal.

They will find better support in their misfortunes,

fortunes, when their superiors are in a more flourishing way.

They will have more opportunities of rising to be masters, or seeing their children become such.

14. If it should be asked, How, by this proposal, a larger fund than our present taxes can be more easily raised?

The answers are, That no extension of subsidies for any sum of money equal to what the Government now annually raises, can be so grievous to the subjects, as the consequential extending burden of our present taxes on commodities only, exclusive of the Land-tax.

Therefore, if the subjects can save by raising larger sums for the service of the Government, there can be no doubt of their doing it.

It is remarked, with great humour as well as truth, "that a Prince who draws his revenues from the vanities of his subjects, will be richer than another who hath mines of gold, because vanity is an inexhaustible mine;" to which I beg leave to add, that it is worked much the easiest, and is exactly the affair now offered to the consideration of the public.

Tho' all feel, yet as those who are oppressed more immediately by our present taxes, viz. our people in trade will be hereby revived; yea an increasing trade will bring in such a  
flow

flow of wealth, as will make our lands still more valuable, and our people rich; riches will make them gay, and gaiety will make them pay larger, if equal easy taxes: therefore this proposal must prove a growing fund, and produce every year more and more to support the King and nation in so great a figure, and raise us to such a formidable height of power that we may be the envy or dread of all our rivals, and an overmatch for any one nation in *Europe*.

15. Besides, this tax will lessen the expences of the Government by untaxing commodities, which of course makes them cheap; therefore every thing will be to be purchased with less money; all provisions, ammunition, naval stores, &c. come cheaper to the Government; sailors, soldiers, placemen and pensioners, be enabled to live upon less wages, yet as well as they now do; so that this method making the money raised go the further, the fewer subsidies will suffice, two or three millions may do as much as four or six millions now: therefore the Government can never be straitned, or the people oppressed.

16. This tax will likewise increase the civil list: for as goods grow cheap, money goes the further; therefore the present civil list of 800,000*l. per annum*, when of real, true, intrinsic value, may go as far, and be as valuable as one of 1,632,653*l.* of the present fictitious

fictitious value: and the value of the pay of Officers and of the salaries of places increase in the same proportion.

17. This tax will serve for a political barometer to know the strength of the people in any time of war: for as long as the last subsidy adds to the produce of the former, so long may they be increased; as for instance, suppose eight subsidies to have produced ten millions, which on an average is 1,250,000*l.* each, tho' on laying on an 11th it should produce but half the last sum, yet a 12th subsidy may without any danger be added, and so on until the last produces but a trifle; and that with advantage to the nation: because, many misfortunes happening in time of war, people should therefore be more frugal in their expences, to enable them to bear those the better; to effect which a tax of this sort naturally tends, and they may be taxed in this manner as long as they can or will bear, even for their good; quite contrary to the method of laying taxes on the necessaries of life, or on trade, practised in all countries, which, in proportion as they are increased, constantly bring on decay of trade, poverty and misery, not recoverable in many years, if ever.

18. But it may be objected that this tax will cause a reduction of the officers of the revenue, diminish the power of a minister, be  
L contrary



contrary to his interest, and not being to be carried into execution without his countenance, makes it become impracticable.

*Answ.* What is the interest of a Minister, but the favour of his Prince and the love of the people, to continue himself in power? Neither of these singly will always do; but both united are infallible.

The increase of the civil list, the increase of the revenue, the freedom from oppressive taxes, the increase of riches, are consequences of this tax proved in the above remarks. By all these the favour of the Prince and the love of the People are secured to a Minister. What more glorious to a Prince than a splendid court, powerful revenue, free and rich subjects? What more delightful to a People than the splendor and power of their King, their freedom and their riches? It becomes then the interest of both Prince and People to continue that Minister in power, who procures such mutual happiness. And what better foundation for the continuance of power can be desired, than that which has the general interest for its support?

How does the increase of the Officers of the revenue give power to a Minister? by influencing elections: but these Officers disgust many who know that they are locusts; consequently they cause and give weight to an opposition. Let the Minister gain the love of the

the people, he influences them himself, with more effect than this partial influence of Officers, which then becomes useless; and he likewise destroys the foundation of an opposition.

Besides, an increasing revenue furnishes means for useful public employments, whereby more Officers may be better provided for than at present; and with this difference, that a small number of Officers detrimentally employed raise clamours, whereas large numbers beneficially employed will gain the love of the people. Now he must be but a sorry politician, who cannot gain a greater interest by the prosperity than by the ruin of his country.

If then we have reasoned rightly, and the favour of the Prince with the love of the people, are the foundations of a Minister's continuance in power, and are the necessary consequences of the carrying of this tax into execution; it follows, that the doing of it is the true interest of a wise Minister, and therefore practicable.

19. *Of the benefits arising by a free-port trade.*

By which I mean, that all sorts of merchandize be imported and exported at all times without paying any customs or fees.

1. *It will increase trade.*

By increasing the number of merchants;

L. 2

for

for small stocks serve where there are no customs to pay, and there are ten people of small fortunes in trade to one of a great one; the more there are, the less liable are they to combine together to impose on the people extravagant prices for their goods, to support themselves in luxuries.

By increasing the capitals of our merchants; for if they pay  $\frac{1}{4}$  or  $\frac{1}{2}$  of their capitals for customs, they can trade but for the  $\frac{1}{2}$  or  $\frac{3}{4}$  left; but when they have no customs to pay, they can carry on a greater trade with the same stock, sell their imports cheaper, have more money to buy up the superfluous produce of our lands, and give better encouragement to our manufacturers.

By making our country an universal storehouse; for when our merchants have no customs to advance, they will be importing continually, upon speculation, for better markets, all sorts of goods that were to be sold cheap in all parts of the world, whereby such fortible cargoes as were vendible to advantage, being always ready to seize the favourable opportunity, would be as continually exporting, giving employment to a vast number of watermen, carmen, porters, coopers, packers, &c. besides supplying hereby our own manufacturers with all foreign necessaries and materials in the cheapest manner. To which may be added, that where the best assortments

ments of goods are to be had, there will be the greatest trade, one sort helping off another; consequently vast quantities of our own commodities will be required to assort our imports of foreign goods, and be exported with them. A free port causes the best assortments of goods; consequently a free port causes a great exportation of home-commodities.

By increasing our navigation. This is a consequence of the last observation; for by the vast quantities of goods continually going out and coming in, we must have an immense number of ships constantly employed, and seldom send them out in ballast; and whenever our sailors are eased of their taxes, they will be able to navigate as cheap, or cheaper than any; and being indisputably the most able, and expert in *Europe*, must have a great share in the *Greenland* and herring fishing-trades, and in the navigation of the *Baltic*, with other nations whose navigations are vastly increased by those trades: all which, joined to our *Mediterranean* trade, would make us the chief carriers of *Europe*.

By increasing the vent of our goods abroad; for all foreign necessaries and materials coming a great deal cheaper to our people, who having no taxes they need pay at home (if our monopolies were but once abolished) our labour would be so cheap, that we could send

all our goods to foreign markets cheaper than any people, by reason of our superior natural advantages. It is a just observation of Sir *William Temple*, in his account of *Holland*, "There is no sort of goods but what will find a market at one price or another, and they will be masters of it that can afford it cheapest." It should therefore be our chief study to make all our goods bear only their natural value, which nothing contributes more to than a free port trade: add to which, that our merchants being enabled to barter away our goods for whatever commodities they could find in any country where money was scarce, must increase their sale prodigiously.

By putting all traders on the same fair footing; for where no customs are to be paid, smuggling must cease.

By preventing the smuggling of our wool, without registries, dragoons, or cruizers; for as our taxes, monopolies, &c. have been proved, in page 80, to be the causes of smuggling, so is the removal of them the certain remedy for this evil; as thus,

*English* labour in a bale of cloth of 100 *l.* price, is computed in page 80 to be 75 *l.* having, in page 77, an artificial value arising from taxes, &c. of 51 per cent. which being deducted, the natural value of that labour is but 36 *l.* 15 *s.* *French* labour for the same, in

in page 80. is estimated at 50 *l.* 'Tis plain the *Englishman* can give 63 *l.* 5 *s.* for the same wool for which a *Frenchman* can only give 50 *l.* which is 26  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. under the *English* price; consequently our people being able to afford the best prices, smuggling of wool must cease, and the whole manufacture of it be secured to ourselves.

By gaining us the herring-fishery; for the *Dutch* having liberty to sell their fish on the coasts of *England*, would snap at such a market, and some of them settle with us of necessity, by trading on the best footing; for those who would not settle, must make two expensive hazardous voyages, one back to *Holland* to cure and pack the fish, and the other from thence to the coasts of *Britain* to sell them, especially the west coasts, which those settled here would be free from, and the *Dutch*, by living among our people, must instruct them in the trade.

By securing to us all growths, fisheries, and manufactures the nation is capable of; for what *French* or *Dutch* growers, fishers, or manufacturers could pay taxes at home, the charges of package, putting on board, freight, insurance, postage of letters, relanding, housing, warehouse-rent, and commission on their goods to sell to our people, being growers, fishers, or manufacturers themselves, un-

taxed,

taxed, free from the above charges, and blessed with superior natural advantages? 'tis ridiculous to suppose it; unless that in the beginning of a free-port trade, the demand for our goods should be so great, that we should sell what should be our own supply, and content ourselves with inferior sorts of goods from abroad, as the *Dutch* do.

The farther benefit that trade receives by a free-port, the reader will find in the answers to the objections raised by some authors against it, which will be considered hereafter.

2. It will employ our poor.

This is a consequence of the last remark; for necessaries and materials being by a free-port trade, and the reduction of taxes rendered cheap, labour must be so too; and by the same causes the vent of our goods be enlarged, the poor find constant employment on the wool we shall keep at home, on the hemp and flax we shall raise, in all manufactures we are capable of, in the herring and *Greenland* fisheries, and in the increase of our navigation by the great demand for sailors, so that none can want employment that won't be idle. *Holland* is an example of this, whose customs are so low that their trade is almost free, and there is no country in the world where the poor are so well employed, or in sickness better provided for.

One

One flourishing manufacture promotes all others; for the better employment the people have, the better they live, and the more they spend for a comfortable subsistence: a manufacturer who earns by his industry enough to purchase warm cloathing and hearty food, is a greater encourager of the industry of others than a beggar covered with rags and starving with hunger; therefore it need not seem a wonder, that when our woollen trade flourished, all others prospered, and the poor's rates were low; and that the reverse happens by the decline of it. If *English* wool was intirely kept at home, the manufacturing of it must employ at least one million of people, who may be supposed to maintain at least another million of helpless infants, women whose labour is in part diverted by the care of their families, sick and aged people; and the same in proportion for *Scotland* and *Ireland*.

The silk manufacture, at least for our consumption, must, by taking off our taxes and making our trade quite free, be intirely secured to us: and supposing the quantities of *India*, *French*, and foreign wrought silks smuggled in upon us by the temptation of high duties, and consumed here, to amount only to the value of 200,000 *l. per annum*, the labour whereof to be  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the value, and the medium earned *per head* to be 6 *l.* the supplying

ing this consumption by our own people would employ about 25,000 of them, and they maintain an equal number, as was observed of the woollen trade above.

The linen manufacture is of such vast consequence, that the *Dublin* society, in the first volume of their *Weekly Observations*, No. 7. reckon the consumption of linen in *England*, at the lowest computation, allowing only 10 s. per head, to amount to four millions, the greatest part of which, they say, is imported every year: but as they take no notice of the vast quantities of linens we import for our plantations, which may overbalance what is made in *England*, yet I shall only compute, that we pay foreigners for this article three millions, the labour at  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the value, and the medium earned per head 6 l. which a reduction of taxes, and a free-port gaining, will thereby employ about 370,000 of our people, and they maintain an equal number, as was observed of the woollen trade above.

It is impossible to estimate the numbers of people that a free-port trade would give additional employment to, such as watermen, carmen, porters, coopers, packers, &c. or the additional numbers of sailors employed in the carrying-trade, the amount of all which must be prodigious.

Sir

Sir *Walter Raleigh*, in his *Observations on Trade*, says, That thirty several trades are set on work by the fishing ships; and as this herring-fishery is on our own coasts, we can carry on this trade that promotes thirty others, cheaper than the *Dutch*, and of course beat them out of it; they must make long voyages out and home for the fishery, and receive their supplies in the same dangerous and expensive manner; whereas we are at home, and can land our fish and receive supplies without almost any charge: we can victual in *Ireland*, and some parts of *Britain*, at half the charge they can do in *Holland*: in blowing weather the *Dutch* must lie still, they cannot take in their casks and stores in a rolling sea; whereas we can run into Port, and the unloading, repacking, and dispatching our fish go on in all weathers. All fishing-vessels push to get first to market; so our people, from some parts of our dominions, can be at the markets of *Spain*, *Portugal*, or *Italy*, almost as soon as the *Dutch* can arrive in *Holland*, whereby we may always forestal them. The *Dutch* have heavy taxes on necessaries, we need not have any. All which duly considered, cannot fail securing us this trade, with the navigation belonging to it. The *Scotch Islanders* are expert fishermen, necessity forces them to it for their own supply; but their poverty prevents their giving the trade



trade that extent abroad it is capable of, and the present clogs upon our trade cut off the people of *England* from any considerable correspondence with them, so that they are in a manner lost to each other; whereas was our trade free, the *Dutch* by settling with us, and trading backwards and forwards, would create an intercourse between the *English* and the *Islanders*, whereby the stocks of the former would aid the industry of the latter, make them outdo all foreigners, and besides expert fishermen render them good sailors, and raise the greatest nursery for seamen in the world.

The importance of this fishery will appear from the following authors. In the *Memoirs of De Wit*, p. 24. there is a quotation from *Emanuel de Materen*, who says. "That in the year 1610 there sailed from *Holland* in three days time 900 ships and 1500 buffes for the herring-fishery:" and he quotes *Gerard Malines* and *Sir Walter Raleigh*, who agree "That the *Dutch* sell yealy 300,000 tons of herrings and salted fish, and that there went out yearly above 12000 men for the north and whale-fisheries." And *De Wit* in p. 25. says, "That trade and navigation being increased above  $\frac{1}{3}$  since that time, it is easy to conceive that the sea produces yearly above 300,000 tons of salted fish to the *Dutch*. And the author of *Britan-*  
*nia*

*nia Languens*, p. 31. informs us, "That according to modern calculations the mere fishing-trade for herring and cod, on the coasts of *England* and *Scotland*, employs above 8000 *Dutch* ships or vessels." Besides, this fishery will support our manufactures, as appears from *De Wit*, in p. 29: his words are, "Tho' it appears from history that many manufactures were made in the towns of *Holland*, at the time that the trade and navigation of *Europe* were carried on by the *Hanse-towns* and the *East-country* people, and before the Fishing and Carrying-trades were established in the country; so that it might be said, that the navigation has been produced by the manufactures; it is nevertheless very certain, that the fishery and navigation give all the motion to manufactures; for 'tis what brings in all raw materials to be worked up in the country, and to sell afterwards the stuffs when they are made, by the seas and rivers in all foreign countries.

"We see then, by these reasons, that the *Dutch* can make, with the greatest advantage to themselves, sea-salt, manufactures of silk, linen, wool, hemp for cordage, cables, and nets; besides the ship-building Trade."

The reasons whereof are plain:

*First*, A fishery furnishes a cargo to purchase raw materials with instead of money,  
M and

and prevents a nation's being impoverished, and its manufactures languishing through a scarcity of money.

*Secondly*, These raw materials are thereby rendered cheaper; for the better profit the fish give, the cheaper the returns can and will be afforded, the general profit of the voyage being computed on the first disburse and incidental charges.

*Thirdly*, It affords a cheap sustenance to the poor, whereby wages and labour are kept low, to the encouragement of all trade.

*Fourthly*, It creates a multitude of Seamen, whereby their wages are kept low, and of course freights, consequently a great navigation is maintained, which brings in raw materials cheap, and carries out our manufactures the same, by which means only their vent can be extended abroad; therefore the fishery and the navigation are the causes of manufactures.

*Fifthly*, "It is the Sailor who is the life of trade; without him the skill of the Merchant, the beauty and cheapness of the manufacture, and the quantity of shipping are useless and vain. *Glover's* speech, page 28.

It has been already proved, that we can outdo the *Dutch* in the herring-fishery, consequently we can employ therein more of our poor than they; let us see how many people the

the fishery employs in *Holland*. *De Wit*, in his *Memoirs*, p. 34. computes the fishing-trade to give employment to 450,000 people in the province of *Holland* only. The author of *Britannia Languens*, p. 31. divides the employment of the above people thus: "200,000 Seamen and fishers, and 250,000 people more employed at home, about this particular navigation, making of fishing-nets, and the curing, ordering, and preparing of the fish." *Zealand* is not included in this account, tho' it be a great province for fishers; nor the *Hamburgers*, *Lubeckers*, and *Bremers*; nor the *French* fishing-vessels that swarm round our coasts. So that, upon the whole, it may be supposed, that double the above number of people are employed in this trade by those several nations that fish upon our coasts, besides the *Greenland* fishery. So that was our trade eased according to these proposals, this branch only would maintain most of our present poor; and one trade belonging to the fishery is so easy, viz. the making nets, that the most helpless of our people may work at it, such as women, children, cripples, and aged people; and the employment is so great, that *Sir Walter Raleigh*, in his *Observations on Trade*, affirms, "That 300 persons are not able to make one fleet of nets in four months time for one bus."

M 2 *Thirdly*,

*Thirdly, It will increase the stock of people.*

By inviting merchants to settle where business can be transacted with so little trouble.

By furnishing employment to our own poor, they will be kept from deserting their country, preserved from want and diseases, consequently from death; by their industry they will procure themselves a comfortable maintenance, and thereby be enabled to marry and raise families.

By securing the manufacture of our own wool, we shall reduce the woollen-trade of our neighbours; which, joined to the extensive vent our natural advantages enable us to give this manufacture, will oblige us either to enlarge our growth of wool, or import foreign; whereby we should have occasion for more hands than we ever yet employed, consequently gain them; for it is a maxim in trade, That such as your employment is for people, so many will your people be.

By gaining the silk, linen, and other manufactures, we must gain some of the manufacturers; for what *Dutchman* or *Frenchman* would pay taxes at home, and the heavy charges mentioned in *page 127.* on the goods he sent to *Britain*, when he could remove thither, live untaxed in that plentiful country under an easy Government, and add all these savings to his profits? it would not be in the power of any laws to keep him at home;

home; he would remove, nay some must; for as our manufactures increase, the foreign will of course decrease, the poor want work, and they must either starve or fly; and where would the fugitives find an asylum so inviting as that of *Britain*? besides, when we became thoroughly versed in the linen and silk trades, our own supply would not confine us, but we should rival other nations at foreign markets.

By gaining the herring-fishery, we shall gain some of the *Dutch* fishers, who will find it more convenient and cheap to remain here than to go home; add to which what is observed in *page 60.* that our own country being better than *Holland*, nothing but our cramping of trade could keep multitudes of its people from us.

By drawing in foreign sailors, which is a consequence of the increase of trade and navigation; for our number of sailors is even now too scanty for our confined trade, as appears by the difficulty of manning our ships of war, and the high wages our merchants give; which latter temptation is defeated by the high price of all necessaries: but were these to bear only their natural price, our pay in our ships of war would be of so great value, that we should have the picking of all *Europe*, have no need of that arbitrary expedient of pressing; for a free-port furnishing

employment for more sailors than we now have, vast numbers would flock here to enjoy our plenty, riches, and easy government.

*Fourthly, It will increase our riches.*

By giving a greater vent to our manufactures by their cheapness, foreigners will be the more indebted to us, which will be paid in money or in goods; if in the latter, and they are laid by for better markets, must resolve at last into more money: by gaining manufacturers from abroad, our wants will grow less, consequently less money need go out to supply them: *A penny saved, is so much won.* Gee in his *Discourse on Trade*, page 186. computes, "that we have one million of people supposed to be out of work." I have already proved, that a free-port, with a reduction of taxes, can give employment to all our poor, and the labour of individuals makes the riches of the whole; therefore supposing these people to earn at a medium six pound *per annum* each, it makes six millions, as true as if dug out of a mine in our country, nay better with regard to the people's healths. That this is not all imagination, will appear by viewing what a Free-port is capable of gaining us in four branches only, *viz.* the herring-fishery, the woollen, linen, and silk manufactures.

It is proved in page 131. that we can outdo the *Dutch* in the herring-fishery; the value

value whereof will appear from Mr. Smith, in his book called *England's improvements revived*; who informs us in page 249. and 250.

"That he was sent in 1633 to *Shetland*, to discover the manner and way of trading, &c. and the manner of the *Hollanders* fishing with buffes and other vessels, for ling and cod." And in page 270. he says, "that, during the war between *Spain* and *Holland*, the Fishermen agreed among themselves to pay a dollar on every last of herrings, to maintain ships of war to secure the fishing; that a record was kept, the amount of which was 300,000 last of herrings taken in one half year, which, at a medium of the ordinary prices, was worth five millions Sterling; whereunto if we add the cod, ling, and hake, and the fish taken by the *Hollanders* and our neighbours on our coasts all the year long, the total will evidently arise to above ten millions yearly."

Now though we may be proved capable of gaining the whole of this, I shall compute our gain to be only of the half, or

L 5,000,000

If 100,000 of the above million of unemployed poor are woollen manufacturers, (though I imagine they must be much more in the present declining condition of that trade); however, that number earning six pound *per head*, makes 600,000 *l.* and the value of the material

being

Brought over	L 5,000,000
being computed at $\frac{1}{3}$ of that, or 200,000 l. makes altogether 800,000 l. which as a Free-port will gain, we may set down as so much additional profit	800,000
The linen manufacture that we shall gain, and which we now buy of foreigners, is proved in page 130. to amount to	3,000,000
The silk is computed at	200,000
Total value of the four branches of trade gained by a Free-port,	L 9,000,000

If  $\frac{2}{3}$  of this sum are paid to the people's labour, it makes exactly six millions, or the employment of one million of people at six pounds *per head*.

As to the value of the materials above, which are included in the profit, I must observe, that the abatement made in the value of the herring-fishery doubly over-balances their value.

But it will be said, that this proves only the employment of our own people, but does not prove that we shall draw in foreigners; or if we do, that what foreigners come over will starve our poor, who will have but just employment to maintain them. To this I answer, That the value of the herring-fishery is computed only at the half, our woollen-trade is computed only to recover what we have lost, our linen and silk manufactures are computed only for our own consumption, but not for what we shall export when the manufactures are well established; therefore double the

the number computed to be employed in these several branches of trade may be drawn in; there is no computation for the improvement a Free-port will give our navigation and other branches of trade, which will all want hands. In short, there is no computing what numbers a Free-port can maintain here; consequently no ascertaining the extent of the riches it will bring in: only this I must observe, that trade maintains in *Holland* seven times more people than the land deprived of it could subsist.

Besides, 'tis the nature of Free-port trades to be hoarding up in cheap times all sorts of goods, to sell again when the markets are advanced, whereby they take advantage of the necessities of all the world, and must amass immense over-balances, besides supplying their own wants; and if the goods are only for foreign account, when one considers what a vast sum the freights, boat-hire, portorage, cartage, warehouse-rent, merchants commission, and often package and cooperage, before the goods are sent out again, do amount to, it must be concluded, that the universal storehouse of a Free-port must bring a vast profit to a country.

*Fifthly, It will increase the value of our lands.*

By increasing trade, which carries off our superfluities, furnishes employment, consequently a livelihood to our poor, and eases the



the land of the burden of maintaining them; increases the stock of people, which of course increases the demand for necessaries and materials of manufacture; and the greater the demand, the greater price will the produce of lands bear; 'tis people that trade and bring in money; and the more people there are in the nation to do it, the more money will be brought in; and the more money the people have, the better price will the produce of lands bear. In all countries, the natural price of home-commodities is according to their plenty; the demand and the proportion of money that trade circulates, and the more of it is circulating, the better rent can the farmers afford to give for the lands: add to which, that it is people with plenty of money that improve lands; and the more they are improved, the better rents they bear, which in purchase increases the value of lands.

The gradations from the encouragement of trade to the benefit of lands are solid and certain, viz. whatever causes trade, employs the poor; employment increases the stock of people, the increase of employed people, causes an increase of money; the increase of money, causes the value of lands to rise. A Free-port is proved to be the cause of trade, which is the cause of all the rest; therefore a Free-port is a great increaser of the value of lands.

Objections

Objections against a Free-port here having been made by *Joshua Gee* an author of good credit, for that reason must not be left unanswered. In his *Treat on Trade*, page 165. he expresses himself thus.

“ But to think it would be an advantage  
 “ for a trading nation to admit all manner  
 “ of foreign commodities to be imported free  
 “ from all duties, is an unaccountable notion,  
 “ and still less suitable to the circumstances  
 “ of our Island than to the Continent; for  
 “ we have no inland countries beyond us  
 “ (as they have) with whom we may carry  
 “ on trade by land; but what is of the ut-  
 “ most consequence to us, is, that by laying  
 “ high duties, we are always able to check  
 “ the vanity of our people in their extreme  
 “ fondness of wearing exotic manufactures:  
 “ for were it not for this restraint, as our  
 “ neighbours give much less wages to their  
 “ workmen than we do, and consequently  
 “ can sell cheaper, the *Italians*, the *French*,  
 “ and the *Dutch* would have continued to pour  
 “ upon us their silks, paper, hats, druggets,  
 “ stuffs, rattens, and even *Spanish* wool  
 “ cloths.”

To this the following remarks may serve for answer.

*First*, “ But to think it would be an advantage for any trading nation to admit all manner of foreign commodities to be imported

“ imported free from all duties, is an unaccountable notion.” I shall prove this notion to be highly beneficial even from this same author, who in *page 164.* says, “ The *Dutch* duties are small, and the nature of their trade absolutely requires it.” And again, “ They know very well, that if they should load their imports with duties, other trading places would undersell them, and ruin their traffic that way.” The duties on the imports in *Holland* are a mere trifle; the nature of all trade absolutely requires it, *viz.* not to be underfold. The *Dutch* know it, and, by practising what they know, prevent the ruin of their trade. If this is an unaccountable notion, the reader will judge from this same author again; who, in *page 191.* shews the consequence of their knowledge in the following words. “ As *Holland* is a magazine or collection of all the products and manufactures of the world, which they disperse all over *Europe*, the Merchants and Shopkeepers are every where their debtors, and money is brought them from almost all countries.” *Gee* here confesses, that, by their universal store-house, the *Dutch* have every where the balance in their favour; and the purport of his whole book is to prove how greatly the balance of trade lies against us. With what consistency then can he argue against our adopting some of those

wise

wise methods the *Dutch* take to procure themselves such advantages?

*Secondly*, “ And still less suitable to the circumstances of our Island than to the Continent; for we have no inland countries beyond us (as they have) with whom we may carry on trade by land.” But we have in our three kingdoms a large populous inland country of our own (which the *Dutch* have not) to supply with necessaries and materials in the cheapest manner, or else we raise the prices of our manufactures to the prejudice of their sales, besides the supplying our vast possessions in *America*. But no Inland-trade can be compared to the Free-port trade, any more than an inland country-town can be to the sea-ports of *London* and *Amsterdam*, or the navigation of the *Rhine* and *Maes* to that of the *Baltic* or *Mediterranean*; for a Free-port must have a finger in all the trade of the world, even in all those Inland-continent trades that *Gee* so much praises, *viz.* by trading to and supplying the sea-ports that are the inlets thereof in all countries; and the cheaper we can come to market, and with the best assortments, which a Free-port trade only can effect; the more of that Inland-continent trade must we have, the more vent for our manufactures, and the greater navigation.

*Thirdly*, “ But what is of the utmost consequence to us, is, That, by laying high

N

“ duties

“duties, we are always able to check the vanity of our people in their extreme fondness of wearing exotic manufactures.” — *Gee* says, “We are always able, by high duties, to check the vanity of our people, &c.” The great *De Wit*, in his *Memoirs*, p. 170. says just the contrary, “For it is generally found, that these great and too excessive customs fall of themselves;” the reason whereof is obvious, the higher the duties, the more profit by smuggling. Extreme fondness checked, naturally breaks out into madness; which appears at court every *Gala* day, in the number of *French* brocades and trimmings then worn, when that person is thought the happiest who hath the most and dearest *French* fopperies. But what will put this affair quite out of question, will be the consideration of the balance of our trade with *France*, (which shall be hereafter treated on;) if it is more in our favour than formerly, then *Gee*'s opinion will triumph, and the efficacy of restraints and high customs appear; but if the reverse appears, we may safely conclude they have none.

Fourthly, For were it not for this restraint. — In the *Memoirs* of *De Wit*, p. 34. it is said, “that restraint is always hurtful to trade:” the reason whereof is plain; for nature has given various products to various countries, and thereby knit mankind in

an

an intercourse to supply each other's wants: to attempt to sell our products, but to buy little or none from foreigners, is attempting an impossibility, acting contrary to the intent of nature, cynically and absurdly; and, as ours is a populous manufacturing country, highly prejudicial to our own interests: for could we raise all necessaries and vanities within ourselves, this intercourse designed by nature would be destroyed; and then, how is a navigation, our only bulwark, to be maintained? To sell all, and buy none, is to have no back-carriage, no freights home; if so, this will raise the freights outwards; a vessel that makes but one freight out and home, must make that one pay all the wages, wear and tear, charges, and living-profit, consequently makes our goods come dearer to market, and naturally stops their sales; by which, in time, freights outwards would be as much wanted as freights home, and our trade must be destroyed. But where freights are to be had out and home, they ease each other, consequently bring goods cheaper to market; and the encouraging our people by the utmost freedoms in trade, will enable them, by cheap labour, to carry all manufactures we are naturally capable of to the utmost height, and in them foreigners could not hurt us, no restraint being so effectual as cheap prices; and to attempt more, is laying our people under

N 2

difficulties,

difficulties, by taxes, to no purpose; as suppose, for instance, we should take it into our heads, in spite of all taxes and disadvantages, to make all our own linens, and, in order to restrain the importation of foreign linens, put on them all the same duties we lay on the *French*; well, now, money is to be saved to be sure! the poor employed, and fine things done: but alas! this restraint won't make our own labour one farthing cheaper, but the dearer; for our own linen manufacturers having a monopoly against the rest of the people, and a vast demand, will certainly raise their prices; but not being able to supply quantities sufficient, some foreign may pay the high duties, some will be smuggled, and sold cheaper than what pays duties, but still dearer than before the laying on this additional duty, which we will suppose to advance the price of linens to the people only 1 s. per head. Is not this laying a duty of 1 s. per head on our Woollen, Silk, and Iron Manufacturers, on our Sailors, on our Labourers of all sorts? Certainly it is. Do the same in favour of Iron, it will prove a tax on the rest; and so of any one of them. Do the same by them all, and they all tax one another, all raise each other's prices at foreign markets, and stop their sales; foreigners gain upon us; we distress our whole trade, upon the pretence of gaining only a single branch; and this  
single

single branch will grow still dearer, because, it being a burden on the Woollen, Silk, and Iron Manufacturers, Sailors, and Labourers, the Linen Manufacturers will pay dearer for those goods, pay dearer freights, dearer for all necessaries; it will be

- Linen dearer to Woollen.
- Woollen dearer to Linen.
- Linen and Woollen dearer to Silk.
- Silk dearer to Woollen and Linen.
- Linen, Woollen, and Silk, dearer to Iron.
- Iron dearer to Silk, Woollen, and Linen.
- Linen, Woollen, Silk, and Iron, dearer to Sailors.
- Sailors dearer to Iron, Silk, Woollen, and Linen.
- Linen, Woollen, Silk, Iron, and Sailors, dearer to Labour.
- Labour dearer to Sailors, Iron, Silk, Woollen and Linen.

The dearer our linens grow, the more foreigners will smuggle in upon us, and stifle our fabric; all our artifices will prove vain to maintain it, and, after injuring all our other trades, find to our cost, That nothing but freedom can secure trade.

By the above account, may be also seen, how prolific the mischiefs of our restraints by customs are to trade; how our many taxes on commodities are oppressive; how they add an artificial price to goods; how our country has grown universally dearer, without being richer; and how foreigners ruin our trade, who soon seeing through our mean designs of engrossing every thing, grow angry, and stir

up their Governments to distress us in their turn, by easing their trade, which we shamefully neglect. Has the linen manufacture in *England* increased by the prohibition of *French* linens and high duties on *German*, *Dutch*, and *Flemish*? so far from it, that it is decreased by our dear labour, taxes, and disadvantages: *Scotland* and *Ireland* attempt it with some success by their cheap labour, and when our people are eased of their oppressions, so may we.

Besides, discouraging to a great degree the use of foreign products by the restraint of high customs, is prejudicial; tho' the contrary is the common received opinion, arising from a mean selfishness that would let none live but itself; as for instance, suppose *Portugal* to take annually to the value of 800,000*l.* of our woollens, and pay it all in wines, What is the result of this? Why nothing more, but that our rich people drink such an amount of woollens, which they would not consume otherwise; double the present duty on that wine, thinking that less would be drank, and we should drain *Portugal* of her gold: see what would be the consequence, only that the king of *Portugal* would lower the duties on the *French* and *Dutch* woollens; 800,000 *l. per annum* would be uncirculated amongst us; the price of wool must sink, whereby the *French* and *Dutch* would get it easier

easier to ruin the rest of our trades; about 100,000 of our poor would be deprived of a diligent subsistence, and come upon their parishes for an idle maintenance, while perhaps at the same time *Portugal* wine, by its dearness, would become more fashionable, great quantities would be drank and paid for with our money, and instead of our draining the *Portuguese*, be drained by them.

*Fifthly*, "As our neighbours give much less wages to their workmen than we do, and consequently can sell cheaper, the *Italians*, the *French* and the *Dutch*, would have continued to pour upon us their silks, paper, hats, druggets, stuffs, ratteens, and even *Spanish*-wool cloths.

*Gee* would have done well to have pointed out the reasons why our neighbours give less wages, and consequently can sell cheaper, and since he has not done it, I shall attempt it. As the *Italians* are more remote, and pay dearer freights on their goods to *England* than the *French* and *Dutch* our neighbours, I shall confine myself wholly to the latter.

The reason why the *French* work cheaper than we, is the care their Government takes of not taxing many necessaries of life, or materials of manufacture, but that the Manufacturers shall be supplied with them in the cheapest manner; whereby necessaries bearing



ing only their natural price, they can afford to work and sell cheaper than we; 'tis the taxes that make the difference. To prove this, I shall quote the Author of a pamphlet called *Observations on British wool*, published in 1739, said to be wrote by a person sent abroad by the Ministry to inquire into the state of the woollen manufactures among our neighbours, and what wool was smuggled to them; he informs us in page 8. " That the *French* send vast quantities of stuffs, stockings &c. to *Spain, Portugal, and Italy*, and undersell us 10 or 12 per cent. And in p. 21. " the reason that goods are to be bought cheaper in *France* than in *England* is, because the labour is  $\frac{1}{3}$  cheaper there." And he accounts for labour's being  $\frac{1}{3}$  cheaper here in p. 28. " At *Lisle* the Magistrates have built a storehouse, in a convenient part of the town, ten stories high; in the upper rooms of it, they lay wheat, rye, barley; and in the cellars, they lay wine, oil, and brandy: those goods are bought up when they are cheap, and so soon as the markets are short, and goods begin to rise in the price, then the storehouse is opened to the poor, that they may buy what they have occasion for at the old market-price. This storehouse was built since the woollen manufactory hath so increased in this town, in order to support that  
fabrick;

" fabrick; which is a great encouragement to the manufacturers, and a means to keep labour low. All other things that are needful to the poor are also cheap in proportion, as candles, oil, soap, &c.

Far from raising their prices with taxes, as we do, their study is to make necessaries cheap; and can we wonder that they beat us by 10 or 12 per cent. in the markets of *Spain, Portugal, and Italy*?

Having shewn how the *French* run away with our trade by reason of our heavy taxes, I shall examine how the *Dutch*, tho' the most taxed in the necessaries of life of any people, beat us out of our trade too, by stating the disadvantages of an *English* woollen manufacturer, and the advantages of a *Dutch* one.

The disadvantages of an *English* Woollen Manufacturer are, 1. That he must buy bread made of *English* corn, tho' dearer than foreign, whereby the farmer has a monopoly against the manufacturer, and all monopolies enhance the prices of goods. 2. He has no drawback on his corn. 3. He has no drawback on his malt. 4. He has no drawback on leather. 5. He pays a duty on his coals of 10 s. per chaldron in *London*, and 5 s. in the Out-ports. 6. He must buy *English* beef, pork, mutton, lamb, and butter, tho' he can have *Irish* cheaper, whereby the grazier has a monopoly against him, to make his meat dear. 7. He must buy fish caught by *British*  
(except

(except a few forts) tho' he can have it cheaper from the *Dutch, French, &c.* whereby the fisherman has a monopoly against him to make his fish dear. 8. He must not buy foreign hats, cloths, stuffs, stockings, or any coarse woollens for his use that are cheaper now than *English*, even tho' he could sell his own to greater advantage than wearing them himself, whereby these several branches have a monopoly against each other and the rest of the nation, to make all sorts of cloathing dear. 9. He must not buy *French* linens for his use, tho' ever so cheap, whereby the other linen countries have a monopoly against him to make his linen dear. 10. He must not buy for his use foreign shearmen's shears, iron, or tin wares, tho' ever so cheap, whereby those manufacturers have a monopoly against him to make his iron or tin wares dear. 11. He may not have several sorts of goods imported for his use bought at the cheapest market, but only at the usual port of shipping\*, whereby those countries have a monopoly against him to make those goods dear. 12. He may not have those above goods shipped at the cheapest freights, but must be shipped on *British* ships, or ships of the country, and at the usual port of shipping, whereby those ships have a monopoly against him to make those goods still dearer. 13. He has heavy customs to pay

\* *Vide* the Index to the Book of Rates, goods <sup>on</sup> inward, article 6.

on the oil and sope he uses in manufacturing his goods, which helps to advance their dear-ness. 14. And lastly, He has long expensive land-carriages to pay to *London*, the chief market for his goods, the navigation of our rivers not being sufficiently improved.

A *Dutch* Woollen Manufacturer is in a situation just the reverse of this; his advantages are, 1. That he may buy always the cheapest corn that can be got to make bread, has no corn-monopoly on him. 2. He has 5 s. per quarter drawback on *English* wheat; computing freight, and charges, at 1 s. 6 d. per quarter, he is fed by the *English* cheaper than their own people by 3 s. 6 d. in every quarter of wheat. 3. He has 2 s. 6 d. per quarter drawback on *English* malt, to make his drink come cheaper to him than to our own people. 4. He has 1 d. per pound drawback on *English* leather. 5. He has *British* coals at 3 s. per chaldron duty, which is 2 s. cheaper than the Out-ports, and 7 s. cheaper than the *Londoners*. 6. He may buy beef, &c. in *Ireland*, or any country where it can be had cheapest; has no monopoly on him in this case. 7. He may buy fish of any that sell cheapest; has no monopoly on him in this case. 8. He may buy and wear the cheapest woollens he can get from any country; and if he can buy cloth for his use at 4 s. per yard, he will, provided he can sell his own of 5 s. per yard value with the usual profit; no branch

branch of the trade has a monopoly against the rest of the people. 9. He may buy the cheapest linens he can get; no country has a monopoly against him in this case. 10. He may buy the cheapest iron and tin wares he can get; has no monopoly against him in this case. 11. He may have all those goods (specified in the *Index to the book of rates* in Article 6. of *Goods Inward*) bought where cheapest; no country having a monopoly against him. 12. He may have all the above goods shipped on the cheapest sailing ships, no shipping having a monopoly against him. 13. He has customs so light, that they are a mere trifle; has not the prices of his goods raised by heavy customs on his oil and sops. 14. He has cheap water-carriage almost every where.

I shall now prove, that, was our trade quite free, no nation could hurt our staple, the woollen manufacture; and that if cheapness pours in goods to a country, we should do it on the *French* and *Dutch*, instead of they on us; consequently that *Gee's* objection is void.

By the above-mentioned observations on *British* wool, we find that the *French* can send to *Spain*, *Portugal*, or *Italy*, 50 stuffs that shall now cost in *England* 100 *l.* cheaper by 10 or 12 *per cent.* say 12 *per cent.* cheaper, or at

L. 88

In page 77. I have proved that above half the present value of our woollen goods is fictitious, that our taxes, monopolies, and ill-judged laws advance the natural value of our woollen

goods

Brought over  
goods above 104 *per cent.* and that the true natural value of 100 *l.* worth of our woollen goods at present is but 49 *l.*

L. 88

So that were our taxes, monopolies, and ill-judged laws removed, 50 stuffs that now cost 100 *l.* might be sent to market at

49

The difference is L. 39

39 *l.* charged by *French* or *Dutch* taxes and natural disadvantages on 49 *l.* is an advance of almost 80 *per cent.* on the *English* price.

Therefore the *French* and *Dutch*, who now beat us by 10 or 12 *per cent.* might be beat by us excessively; they could not sell woollens at any foreign market until all ours were sold, much less pour them in here to ruin our manufactures, as *Gee* imagined; but the rest of their trade must decline greatly wherever we came in competition with them: and where would be the nation in *Europe* that could hurt us?

By this it appears, that 'tis only our ill regulations of our trade that give these nations any advantages against us.

Silks and paper are still poured in upon us, and the boasted benefit to the woollen trade by restraints at present is a farce; for as our foreign demand declines, our people naturally turn all their stocks to supply the home-consumption, until it is so overglutted that

O

great

great quantities have been sold for less than they cost making, or at *French* prices, which must break an over-taxed *Englishman*. Our people manufacture neater than any in felt and wool; so that foreign hats, cloths, &c. being ill made, suit not the *English* taste; for which reason, if it should take ten years time to break the remainder of our Clothiers, their stocks would sell so cheap, that the *French* could do very little during that time; but afterwards, by getting some of our fugitive manufacturers to improve their own people, and underselling us so vastly, they will run woollen goods as much as they do teas, brandies, and rich goods now, and reduce us to the state we were formerly in with respect to *Flanders*, viz. they to buy our raw wool, and return it us in manufactures improved three times its first value.

Two more objections may be made.

*First*, That it seems contrary to reason to take off the duties or prohibitions on the goods of any nation that will not do the same by ours.

*Secondly*, That the balance against us with *France* must increase by taking off the duties on *French* goods.

To the first objection I answer, That with regard to Duties, it is already proved, that they

they destroy trade, and constant experience shews us that Free-ports increase it. If other nations will destroy their trade, ours must rise upon their ruins; and would it not be absurd for us to refuse, by a contrary conduct, to increase ours? If our enemies will commit such follies, why should we? or rather, could we wish them to do worse?

Nothing makes a country's goods so cheap as a Free-port, consequently the fewer foreign goods could be consumed here; more might be imported to lay by for better markets, the profits on which must enrich us; for the cheaper our goods are, the greater vent they will have; and the higher the duties foreigners lay on them, the more will be smuggled upon them.

Besides, those nations that are our rivals in trade, and persist in keeping high customs on our goods, persist also in refusing to make their country an universal storehouse, deny their people the advantage of it, and force their customers to buy at other markets those goods they lay high customs on to prevent their coming in. If a mercer, being a weaver, should refuse to admit into his shop damasks, because he did not make them, and think thereby to improve the vent of his other silks, he would soon find his mistake; for his customers that went to other places for damasks, would be importuned and induced, if only to

save themselves trouble, to buy other silks they wanted at the same time. *The British Merchant*, vol. III. p. 298. remarks, "That it is natural for us to buy every thing we want at the shop where we are obliged to buy any thing." And would it not be strange, if another Mercer, being also a Weaver, should be angry with such a man, and refuse to admit into his shop the other's fatins, because he refused to admit his damasks, and thereby drive away his trade to those general traders that were wise enough to improve upon their errors, by admitting every thing that could be sold with profit? The case is the same with nations.

Customs on foreign goods hurt ourselves more than foreigners; tho' our false notions of trade make us think the contrary, by confining our thoughts to the seller, without regarding the buyer, who being our own subject, should be the person most considered: as for example, in the case of *Spanish* oil; we have laid a duty on it, no doubt to retaliate on the *Spaniards* the duties they lay on our woollens. But whom does our duty affect? not the *Spaniard*: it cannot hurt him; for he being paid for his oil, has parted with his property in it, and has nothing more to do with it. But 'tis the *English* merchant whose property, on payment, this oil becomes, and which might be called *English* oil, for such in reality

reality it then is; he is cramped by this duty; part of his capital in trade is taken away to pay it, the interest of which, and officers fees in and out, make the oil too dear to export; he is not allowed that profit; he must sell at home, and must shift the load from his shoulders on the Manufacturer who uses it, and he on the Consumer; whereby our goods are rendered dearer, and less capable of exportation.

Here is a duty on a foreign commodity indeed, but to be paid by our own people; 'tis their feet that are entangled in the net laid for these *Spaniards*.

With regard to a prohibition, this acknowledges the goods it is laid on to be good and cheap, otherwise it were needless; for what trader will buy bad or dear goods, if he can get better or cheaper; and they must be necessary, otherwise they would not be demanded, consequently would not be imported; for who will import goods where there is no demand?

A prohibition on the goods of any one nation, gives a monopoly to other nations that raise the like growths: thus the prohibition of *Spanish* oil in the late war, gave a monopoly to *Galipoly*; all monopolies raise the prices of goods; thus *Galipoly* oil, that before our *Spanish* prohibition was sold for 15 to 16 ducats the salm, was thereby raised to 26 and



27 ducats; the same with all other sorts of goods used instead of *Spanish*, whereby the Merchant's profit on the advanced price, and that of the several tradesmen whose hands these goods passed thro', did further enhance their prices vastly to the Consumer; which, since my making this remark, hath been verified by a petition of the Clothiers of *Stroud-water* (and of most of our greatest clothing-towns) presented to the House of Commons, *February 2. 1742*, complaining, that, since the prohibition, the price of oil is advanced from less than 29 *l.* to 60 *l.* a-tun.

But it will be objected, that, on the declaration of war, *Spain* prohibited our goods.

To which I answer; That heavy taxes, with many other difficulties, are the consequences of war; and in a time of such a general calamity, is it not absurd to distress our trade in making our people buy bad or dear goods of foreigners, by a prohibition against any one nation, which other nations having the like commodities, take the advantage of and raise their prices upon us? is not this adding an unnecessary tax upon our people, whereby they grow sooner impoverished and unable to support a war? if the *Spaniards* will commit such blunders, why should we imitate them?

Trade cannot, will not be forced, let other nations prohibit by what severities they please, interest

interest will prevail; they may embarrass their own trade, but cannot hurt a nation whose trade is free, so much as themselves. *Spain* has prohibited our woollens, but had a reduction of our taxes brought them to their natural value only, they would be the cheapest in *Europe*, of their goodness, consequently must be more demanded by the *Spaniards*, be smuggled into their country in spite of their government, and sold at better prices; their people would be dearer clothed with duties and prohibitions than without, consequently must sell their oil, wine, and other commodities dearer; whereby other nations raising the like growths, would gain ground upon them, and their balance of trade grow less and less. But should we for that reason prohibit their commodities? By no means; for the dearer they grow, no more than what are just necessary will be used; their prohibition does their own business; some may be necessary; what are so, we should not make dearer to our own people; some may be proper to assort cargoes for other countries, and why should we prohibit our people that advantage? why hurt ourselves to hurt the *Spaniards*? if we would retaliate effectually upon them for their ill-intent, handsome premiums given to our Plantations to raise the same growths as *Spain*, might enable them in time to supply us cheaper than the *Spaniards* could

could do, and establish a trade they could never recover. Premiums may gain trade, but prohibitions will destroy it; of which let the following example suffice.

*Portugal* being united to *Spain* in the reign of *Philip* the II. during the revolt of the *Dutch*, *Puffendorf* in p. 78. of his *Introduction to the history of Europe*, tells us, "That *Philip* being intent upon the reducing of the Netherlands, thought that nothing could do it more effectually than to stop their trade and commerce with *Spain* and *Portugal*; for hitherto the *Dutch* had traded no further, being used to fetch away their commodities from thence, and to convey them into the more northern parts of *Europe*. Upon this consideration, *Philip* concluded, that, if this way of getting money were once stopped, they would quickly grow poor, and thereby be obliged to submit. But this design had a quite contrary effect, for the *Hollanders* themselves being excluded trade with *Spain* and *Portugal*, tried about the end of the latter age to sail to the East-Indies; and as soon as they had got footing there, they greatly impaired the *Portuguese* trade, who hitherto had been the sole managers of it, and afterwards took from them one fort after another. And the *English*, with the assistance

ance of *Abbas* King of *Persia*, forced from them the famous city of *Ormuz*. Nor was this all, for the *Hollanders* took from them a great part of *Brazile* and several places on the coast of *Africa*; which the *Hollanders*, in all probability, would have had no reason to attempt, if *Portugal* had remained a kingdom by itself, and had not been annexed to *Spain*.—i. e. If no prohibition had happened."

Second Objection, That the balance against us with *France* must increase, by taking off the duties on *French* goods.

Answer: Here experience can decide, by comparing the difference of the balance against us when we had a Free-trade formerly, and later times, when most sorts of *French* goods are loaded with such high duties as amount to a Prohibition.

No person who has read the *British Merchant* will say that he is a partial author in favour of the answer to this objection.

In vol. III. p. 106. he says, "the stated maxim among Merchants to know whether the trade be for or against us, is to have recourse to the Course of Exchange; it is a nicety many of our merchants are themselves unacquainted with; yet as the exchange holds the balance of trade, so as that is for us or against us, it immediately decides the point."

" If

“ If the exchange be above the par of the money of the country we trade with, it is a plain argument that the balance is on their side; for no man will bring silver from a country, when the exchange is more favourable than the coin ”

The author of the *Political reflections on the commerce and finances of France*, elegantly calls the Exchange the *Barometer of commerce*.

In the year 1683, it appears by the *British Merchant*, vol. I. p. 332. that tho' there was a prohibition; yet he tells us, in p. 338. “ the court hindered the execution of it.” Dr. *Tancred Robinson* the physician, favoured me with the sight of a memorandum he made in that year, on his setting out for *Paris*, viz. for 60 l. Sterling paid in *London*; he received a bill of exchange on *Paris* for 259 crowns 1 livre.

The *British Merchant* in vol. III. p. 118. informs us, the par of the exchange was 54 d. Sterling, for the old French crown: therefore he should have paid only 58 l. 7s. for 259 crowns 1 livre; consequently the exchange was in the disfavour of *England*, not quite

3 per cent.

In the year 1686, the prohibition being quite taken off, the *British Merchant*, vol. I. p. 318. informs us, the exchange was at 56 d. per crown, the par as above being 54 d. the exchange was in the disfavour of *England* about

3 3/4 per cent.

In

Brought over

3 3/4 per cent.

In the year 1729, the French goods having been loaded ever since king *William III.*'s reign, with such high duties on most articles, as amount to a prohibition, by *Castaing's* paper of March 28. the exchange was at 32 1/2 d. per Ecu *Tournois*.

By Sir *Isaac Newton's* Table of Assays, Weights, &c. of Foreign Coins, published by *Willock* in 1740. the par is 29 d. 149 dec. was in the disfavour of *England* above

11 per cent.

In the year 1740, by *Castaing's* paper of February 3. the exchange was at 32. 5/8 d. The par, as above, was in the disfavour of *England* almost

12 per cent.

By the customhouse books our imports from *France* in 1686, exceeded our exports, as by the *British Merchant*, vol. I. p. 305.

L. s. d.  
769,190 16 0

He adds for goods clandestinely imported, p. 306.

428,139 16 9

Total over-balance that year

L 1,197,330 12 9

The *British Merchant* says above, “ That the exchange holds the balance of trade, so as that is for us or against us, it immediately decides the point.” By the *so as* he must mean proportionably, that is, that the exchange is affected by the balance of trade, agreeable to the French author above, as the quicksilver

quicksilver in the barometer is by the atmosphere. As no man that understands trade can deny this truth, I shall leave it to the curious to determine, what proportion an overbalance that affects the exchange almost 12 per cent. must bear to one of 1,197,330 l. 12 s. 9 d. that affected it only about 3 1/4 per cent.

*France* takes from *Britain* wool, corn, dye-stuffs, hard-wares, and tobacco in great quantities, some *India* goods, tin, lead, ships, horses, &c.

But since *France* is increased in the woollen manufacture, in navigation, and in sugar-planting, she takes vast quantities of wool and provisions from *Ireland*, to improve her manufactures, victual her ships, and supply her colonies, which amount to vast sums yearly; and tho' these articles are vastly increased, yet still the balance of trade cannot be brought in our favour; prohibitions and high duties have made it vastly more disadvantageous to us than in the times of a free-trade, the difference in the exchanges being almost 12 to 3.

As the general interest of the nation, with respect to our trade, seems to have hitherto been little understood, let us examine this *French* trade a little farther.

Our great dealings with this *French* shop formerly, were occasioned by its cheapness, (an

(an excellent cause) and its being near us occasioned cheap carriage (*better and better*), and tho' the *French* had a great balance against us, yet other nations had the less; but party-prejudice running high against the *French* King's ambitious designs, in King *Charles* II. and King *William* III.'s time; this balance being considered abstractedly, without any view to our general trade, an inconsiderate zeal hurried our ancestors into the vain scheme of distressing the *French* King by prohibitions and high customs on his goods, not considering the hurt we should thereby do ourselves, and without ever effectually putting in motion those means that were practicable to ease our own trade, so that we only dispersed, during our last wars, our trade to dearer nations; we bought dearer *German* and *Dutch* linens, dearer *Italian* and *Dutch* silks, paper, &c. as if it was better to pay those nations 15 or 18 d. for what the *French* would sell for 1 s. distressing our people by dear prices, and thereby draining us of our money the faster; for such large quantities of cheap *French* goods as were consumed here, being prohibited, made the demand greater for the *Dutch*, *German*, and *Italian* dearer goods, giving them at the same time a monopoly against ourselves, which made them raise their prices on us still higher.

P One

One would be apt to think that our forefathers had a mind to drive all the money out of the nation. For God's sake! let us have wit in our anger, and not pay dear prices to pretended friends, when enemies will sell us cheaper; let us befriend ourselves a little, by saving our money, which is the life of trade, and the sinews of war; let us keep this power in our own hands, to command weight and respect from our neighbours, not squander it away to them, and be forced to court the assistance of those we give power to, and sometimes even court in vain. So much for times of war.

But, in times of peace, the smuggling-trade goes on easier; high duties are temptations that promote it; Ministers of State may be bribed to brow-beat or discharge officers for doing their duty. Goods that, in a free-trade, cost but 100*l.* being charged with 50 *per cent.* duty, a smuggler will sell for 120 or 125*l.*; for the risk must be paid for, tho' the duties are saved; so that even the smuggling-trade costs us more than a free-trade, and may perhaps be one of the reasons that the exchange with *France* is so much against us: whereas, had our country been made a free-port in King *Charles II.*'s time, and all taxes laid on the consumers of luxuries, the *French* themselves, during their last wars with *England*, would have fled from  
misery

misery at home, to a country that, by its freedom from taxes and ease in trade, seems to invite the establishment of all manufactures, our balance to *France* could not have arose to that destructive height it has been at, nor had the *French* ever made the figure in trade they now do.

The courses of the exchanges are facts notorious to people conversant in trade; upon those facts I rest my arguments, in answer to the above objection; by which it appears plainly, that a free-port trade would lessen the balance against us, even with *France*. Agreeable to the author of *Britannia Linguens*, who in *p.* 281. says, "now, if we look back to the grounds and reasons of the decay of our *English* trade, we shall find them to be no other than our own ill constitutions in trade; which are not a bit remedied by the *French* prohibition, and therefore will prevent any advantage we might, perhaps, otherwise receive from it." And in *p.* 286. "should we suppose that it (*i. e.* the prohibition) would restore the balance, nay, that it should render the national trade of *England* somewhat beneficial, yet it must be confessed, that a compleat regulation of our trade would render it prodigiously more beneficial, (perhaps more than all the trade of  
P 2. "Europe



“ *Europe* besides), considering how our advantages in trade would reduce the trade of our neighbour nations, as ours does improve.”

Notwithstanding what has been said in favour of a free-port, such strong prejudices against a free trade with *France* have been raised by most of our late authors on this subject, that few people have any but frightful ideas of it. The *British Merchant*, a work in great reputation, has brought heavy objections against a trade with *France*; the strength of which, it may not be improper to examine. In *vol. I. p. 12.* he says,

I.

*Goods imported to be re-exported, is certainly a national advantage; but few or no French goods are ever exported from Great-Britain, except to our Plantations, but are all consumed at home, therefore no benefit can be reaped this way by the French trade.*

II.

*Letting ships to freight cannot but be of some profit to a nation; but it is very rare if the French ever make use of any other ships than their own; they victual and man cheaper than we, therefore nothing is to be got from them by this article.*

III.

III.

*Things that are of absolute necessity cannot be reckoned prejudicial to a nation; but France produces nothing that is necessary, or even convenient, but which we had better be without.*

Each of these objections is introduced with a general maxim which the *French* trade is asserted to be inconsistent with, and if understood according to the present or then state of our trade, are founded in truth; so that I would not be thought by the following remarks to reflect on the authors of the *British Merchant*, for seasonably opposing our engaging in trade with the *French* on unequal terms during our present ill regulations. But these objections are founded only on those ill regulations, for they otherwise have no weight, and will fall to the ground when they are removed; so that they affect not an *English* untaxed Free-port trade with *France*, which I shall endeavour to prove and shall farther confirm by proving, that had our trade no incumbrance on it, a trade with *France* must be beneficial.

To the *first* objection, I answer, That it can proceed only from our ill regulations of our trade; for high customs prevent Merchants engrossing in cheap times, the duties running away with great part of their capitals, the interest of money lying dead for

duties, is such a charge as no trade can bear that is rivalled by people free from such clogs; besides, great part of the duties on *French* goods are not repaid on exportation, so that it is impossible to send them to any market but our plantations; our monopolies and ill-judged laws that make navigation dear, prevent our giving that vent to the *French* goods which the *Dutch* are capable of doing, though they have not the natural advantages that we have, and they cherish this trade that we condemn as one of their best branches, being a great support of their navigation.

According to the Representation of the body of Merchants to the *French* king in 1658, a copy whereof was sent to the States-General by their ambassador *Boreel*, the exports of *France* to *Holland* and *England* (*Vide Memoirs De Wit, p. 211. the British Merchant, vol. 2. p. 232.*) amounted to 30 millions of crowns making

*L. 6,750,000*  
The *British Merchant, vol. 1. p. 306.* makes our imports from *France* in 1686, by the custom-house accounts, amount to *L. 1,284,419 10 03*  
To which he adds of himself, for goods clandestinely imported, *428,139 16 09*  

---

*L. 1,712,559 07 0*

But to leave no room for cavil, in *vol. 2. p. 238.* he

publishes

Brought over *L. 1,712,559 7 0 L. 6,750,000*  
publishes an account of Mr. *Fortrey's* which made our imports from *France* amount yearly to *2,600,000 0 0*

*L. 4,312,559 7 0*  
The medium of which two accounts is *2,156,279 13 6*

Which being deducted, the remainder must be the *Dutch* imports, amounting to *L. 4,593,720 6 6*

*De Wit*, in his *Memoirs, p. 211.* says, "The greatest part of the *French* exports are for *Holland.*" The above account verifies it; and, in *p. 214.* he says, "That the *Dutch* consume and sell almost all the wines and salt that go out of *France;*" and in *p. 213.* he says, "It is certain that the *French* gain every year upon the *Dutch*, above 30 millions of money, besides the goods they send to *France;*" these I take to be livres, making 10 millions of crowns at *54 d.* is *2,250,000 l.*

The *Dutch* cannot consume that quantity of *French* goods; for if they did, they could not have a shilling left in the country with such an immense yearly over-balance for near a century; therefore the bulk of these imports must

must be for re-exportation, which the Objection says is certainly a national advantage. This the *Dutch* know, and feel the sweets of; for they were so far from being, like us, frightened at the amount of the imports, or the over-balance above, tho' vastly superior to ours, that neither the *French* war in queen *Ann's* reign, nor the intreaties of their allies, could persuade them to prohibit that trade; nay, they are grown excessively rich with double the importation that we thought would beggar us. Such clear perceptions have the *Dutch* of trade, and that true foundation of it, Freedom: such enemies are they to prohibitions, or to give any foreigners monopolies against them, or to pay dearer to friends for what enemies will sell them cheaper. Therefore, as the *Dutch* reap a benefit by this trade, much more may the *English*, whose natural advantages, if disincumbered, are greater than theirs.

To the *second* I answer, It is notorious that foreign ships frequent the *French* ports, and take in ladings, some of which I presume are for *French* accompt: but that we can get nothing from them by freight, because they victual and man cheaper than we, can arise only from our ill regulations in trade; for our natural advantages are superior to theirs in navigation.

In

In the shipping-article the *French* are deficient, and forced to buy of us to a large amount yearly.

In the victualling-article the *French* are deficient, and forced to buy in *Ireland* to a large amount yearly.

These articles bring some profit to our own people, and are attended with some charges in their transportation to the *French*, consequently are enhanced in price to them.

By our bounties we furnish the *French* with wheat for biscuit at 3 s. 6 d. per quarter cheaper than our own people. *Vide p. 155.*

That the *French* man cheaper than we, I doubt, tho' they pay less wages; for not being so expert as we, they are forced to put more hands on board their ships, whereby their expences are enhanced by additional wages and consumption of stores; to which add the advance of Insurance they are forced to pay; no Insurer in general will underwrite on *French* ships for so low premiums as on *English*.

Before the prohibition of *Irish* provisions we victualled cheaper than any people, and sold to both *French* and *Dutch*; and was that monopoly, with our taxes and bounties, taken of, we should be in the same state as before; consequently victual cheaper than either.

As customs and excises enhance the prices  
of

of necessaries, they make all victualling and stores come dearer to our owners of ships.

As customs and excises enhance the prices of necessaries, they oblige the Sailor to demand high wages to support himself and family.

We have more sailors than the *French*, as appears by the lists of ships at foreign ports, consequently should navigate cheaper; for it is a maxim in trade, The greater plenty of hands, the lower the wages.

But this benefit we defeat by our navigation-act, which gives the Sailors a monopoly against our Merchants; so that, on the least spurt of trade, they extort excessive wages.

Let these ill regulations be removed, and will any one say that the people who are buyers of ships, and victuals for them, can navigate cheaper than the sellers? that the people who put the most hands on board, and pay a high insurance, can navigate cheaper than those that put few hands on board, and can be insured the cheapest of any people? that a nation that has a less number of sailors can navigate cheaper than another that has a greater? that a people that pay arbitrary taxes can navigate cheaper than those that pay voluntary taxes? It cannot be.

As no people by their natural advantages can navigate so cheap as we; so no people are enabled to give such a vent to their  
growths,

growths, manufactures, and imports as we; and those nations that would give theirs the same vent must employ our shipping, or trade to disadvantage; therefore we can force the *French* either to give us freights, or ruin their trade, either of which must lessen their navigation, riches and power, and increase ours.

To the *third* I answer, These very authors, in *p. 15.* reckon, "that, had the duties on *French* goods been lowered according to the stipulations in the treaty of commerce made at *Utrecht*, our annual consumption of *French* linens would have been 600,000*l.*" being the greatest amount of any one article: This objection therefore is a mistake, occasioned by an over zeal; for it appears by the same authors, *vol. I. p. 283.* "that we used to import from *France* several necessary articles, such as prunes, salt, soap, thread, &c."

I believe I need not prove linens to be either necessary or convenient, since no body can deny it; therefore *France* produces something that we want; and until we can gain the manufacture of it ourselves (which the removing the clogs on our trade only can effect) highly necessary to be bought where cheapest, which I presume by the quantities imported, and the prohibition, to have been in *France*, otherwise the prohibition had been needless; and if we raise the price of *French*  
linens

linens by customs to exceed other foreign that are dearer, I have proved in *p.* 148. that we distress our whole trade; and in *p.* 130. that by a Free-port trade we must gain that manufacture, at least for our own consumption,

I come now to a bold attempt, and what at first view will startle most people; and that is, to prove, that were all our taxes, monopolies, and ill-judged laws removed, or, in other words, if our trade had no incumbrance on it, but was quite free, that then our trade to *France* must be beneficial.

The authors of the *British Merchant*, writing against the treaty of commerce made with *France* at *Utrecht*, compute, "that had the duties on *French* goods been lowered according to those stipulations, we should have paid to *France* yearly for

<i>Wine.</i>	L 450,000
<i>Brandy,</i>	70,000
<i>Linen,</i>	600,000
<i>Paper,</i>	30,000
<i>Silks,</i>	500,000
	<hr/>
	L 1,650,000

Let us examine how much of this sum we should pay, if our trade was quite free.

As to the wine-article, I agree, that being the most esteemed of any in *Europe*, our importation might even exceed that sum; but great

great part of it would be reduced by our re-exportation; for our natural advantages being greater than the *Dutch*, we should give those wines a greater vent than they were yet ever able to do, and be the common carriers of them; by which means our profits and freights would make our own consumption come very easy, easier than ever it was to *Holland*. But to avoid all objection, I will allow for that expence the above sum of 450,000 *l.*

As to the brandy-article, that could not cost us any thing; for as our rum can be imported cheaper, and is more wholesom, our consumption would be chiefly that; so the brandies imported would be chiefly for re-exportation; for which reason, I can't help thinking but the profits and freights must greatly exceed our consumption in value.

But there is one consideration that will reduce this wine article, and that is, That as it is not a perishable commodity, we should hoard up in cheap times vast quantities; and when the markets were advanced by bad seasons, or other accidents, make extraordinary profits by the stocks we had by us, which besides would be a great benefit to our navigation.

As to the linen, paper, and silk-articles, them I strike out entirely; for, by the encouragement



couragement of our trade, we must gain those manufactures, as is proved in p. 130.

Therefore all these mighty consumptive importations are reduced only to the wine-article above of

L 450,000

In *vol. I. p. 15.* the authors of the *British Merchant* compute our yearly Exports to *France* on the peace at only

L 200,000

Whereas in p. 305. by a custom-house account they publish, *viz.* from Mich. 1685 to Mich. 1686, (in which are wanting the Michaelmas quarter for *Deal, Dartmouth, Whitby* and *Milford*) our Exports amounted to

515,228

*Note.* In this account there is no mention either of the wool or ship-articles; the corn-article amounts but to 14285 l. 8 s. the hard-ware, under the heads of wrought-iron, clock-work, and nails, amounts but to 1646 l. 12 s. 6 d. and the tobacco but to 2793 l. 9 s. 2 d.

In *vol. II. p. 238.* they quote Mr. *Fortrey*, who makes our annual Exports amount to

1,000,000

The medium whereof is

L 1,715,228

L 571,742

The *Dutch* can't be supposed to export less of their *French* imports than the amount of what *De Wit* says the over-

balance

balance of *France* is on them, *viz.* 2,250,000 l. which is a very moderate computation; for it makes their annual consumption far superior to whatever *England's* was proved to be, and must be a great deal too much for that frugal people; now the freights, charges, and profits paid the *Dutch* on that re-exportation cannot be less than 10 per cent. amounting to 225,000 l. clear gain to *Holland* by that trade.

As the natural advantages of *Britain* are shewn in p. 89. greatly to exceed those of *Holland*; so, by a free-port trade, we cannot be supposed to give a less vent to our *French* Imports than the *Dutch* did, or with less profit; therefore we may safely add to our Exports the gain *Holland* received by re-exporting *French* goods, amounting annually to

225,000

L 796,742

From that must be deducted the wine-article above, amounting to

450,000

Therefore the annual benefit to *Britain* from *France* by a Free-port trade must be at least

L 346,742

Our goods are so well manufactured, that their neatness recommends them every where; nothing obstructs them but their dear price: but was their fictitious value once taken off, they would come cheaper than ever they yet were; so that our exports to *France* would naturally increase, and might exceed even

Q 2

Mr.

Mr. Fortrey's computation of 1 million *per annum*.

The letter in defence of the *East-India* Company, printed in 1677. p.2. informs us, "That there was formerly vended in *France*, annually, *English* drapery to the amount of 600,000*l.*" As we beat the *French* out of foreign markets, their manufactures must decay, and of course they will want the greater supply from us; if they prohibit them by high duties, they put themselves in the case of the *Spaniards*, p. 163.

Here is, I think, demonstration to those that will open their eyes, that *Great Britain*, by disencumbering and making its trade quite free, cannot be hurt by *France*, much less by any other power in *Europe*, but must of necessity hold the first rank in trade.

But now perhaps it will be said, This favours of *French* designs; this author is a concealed *Frenchman*; the *French* are already too powerful; we must take care.

To this I answer, That *Britain* should be always vigilant over the designs of *France*, but need not be afraid of her power; her wise regulations in trade should be the objects we should keep our eyes upon, and out-do her if possible; or else as she rises, we must sink. But it is our comfort that our remedy is always in our own hands; nor can there be any solid reason for the nation's paying dearer

dearer to other countries for goods we could buy cheaper in *France*. Would any wise dealer in *London* buy goods of a *Dutch* shopkeeper for 15 or 18 *d.* when he could have the same from a *French* shopkeeper for 1 *s.*? would he not consider that by so doing he should empty his own pockets the sooner, and that in the end he would greatly injure his family by such whims? and shall this nation commit an absurdity that stares every private man in the face? Do our good friends, the *Dutch*, commit such a blunder in favour of us? They know their own interest too well, and have too good notions of trade to do it. The present power of *France* is indeed great; her dominions in *Europe* are bigger and more populous by at least  $\frac{1}{3}$  than ours; but as her naval force cannot match the half of what we have, our situation makes us the only one of her neighbours that need not fear her; besides, her people are not in proportion so rich, her colonies not so populous as ours: but the certain way to be secure, is to be more powerful, that is, to extend our trade as far as it is capable of; and as restraints have proved its ruin, to reject them, and depend on freedom for security, bidding defiance to the *French* or any nation in *Europe* that took umbrage at our exerting our natural advantages. Before these taxes we

Q 3 were

were more powerful, why not so again? 'Tis our own fault if we are not. By the *British Merchant*, vol. II. p. 232. the exports of France in 1658, according to *De Wit*, were

L 6,750,000

And in p. 314. the exports of England in 1699 were

6,788,000

To which we may add the value of the four branches of trade gained by a free-port, vide p. 140. besides the other benefits not enumerated,

9,000,000

L 15,788,000

Suppose the *French* to have now doubled their trade of 1658, we can not only double the value of ours of 1699, but more, as appears above: besides, the progress we should make in *Europe* and in the *East-Indies* by a free trade, and the vast improvements our colonies in *America* are capable of, must increase the demand for our manufactures beyond what was ever known. Let all these be duly considered, with the vast strength of our navy, and the fear of the *French* power must vanish like a phantom. *Imperator maris, terræ dominus*, is a proverb applied by *De Wit* in his *Memoirs*, to a king of *England*. Let us examine whether this remark on our power will hold good at this time. If *France* can give laws by land, *Britain* can do it by sea; and in a little time the sea will command the land;

land; for our men of war can destroy their ships, ravage their coasts, batter down their forts, and burn their sea-port towns. This must ruin their trade; as trade goes, so must their money; and when the money is gone, the armies cannot be supported; they must be drawn from the countries they invade, or they will desert rather than perish with hunger for want of pay. Had we pushed on the war in *Queen Anne's* reign only by our fleets, we should have given quicker relief to our Allies, saved our money, prevented a load of debts, and soon brought the war to a conclusion; for the strong towns which we took in *Flanders*, with so much expence of blood and treasure, must have been abandoned by the *French* troops for want of pay, want of ammunition and provision, and have fallen into our Allies hands without striking a stroke, or making only such a faint resistance as the *Queen of Hungary's* unpaid troops and unprovided towns did lately. We have never yet exerted our natural naval force; had the *French* ever felt the full weight of it, they would be more humble; they would not dare so wantonly to invade our Allies on the Continent, for fear of drawing down our vengeance upon them.

If any *Englischman* should be so vapourish as to doubt whether trade and navigation can effect this, I desire him only to consider what

a few *Dutch* fishing-towns were enabled thereby to do in their revolt from *Spain*, whose power was then the dread of *Europe*; the mighty wars they maintained by sea and land for fifty seven years against that crown, which at last gave such a shock and reduction to the power of *Spain* as it hath not been since able to recover. The extending at the same time their trade all over the world, and making vast conquests in both *East* and *West Indies*, until they arose to such a prodigy of riches and power, that they became the envy and terror of all their neighbours; and that from so low a condition, that at the union of *Utrecht*, *Puffendorf*, in his *Introduction to the History of Europe*, p. 226. says, "they coined a medal, wherein their State was represented by a ship without sails or rudder, left to the mercy of the waves, with this inscription, *incertum quò fata ferant.*"

And will not trade and navigation have greater effects in these three kingdoms, whose natural advantages exceed any in *Europe*? and had two years ago a greater naval force in commission than all *Europe* could oppose against it in a twelve-month; and would we but exert it, should hardly suffer our enemies to have a fishing-boat at sea, or to gain a penny thereon to pay armies to invade their neighbours. This is the shortest, cheapest, and best way to reduce the exorbitant power  
of

of *France*, which, when distressed on the sea-coasts, like a human body that has one part diseased; will languish throughout, and afford an opportunity to its neighbours to make easy conquests upon it in their turn.

There are two farther considerations in favour of carrying on a *French* war by sea only, and ruining their trade.

*First*, What trade they lose, we shall get; for by harassing their coasts, their merchantmen could not, without great risk, get out or in; the *Turkey*, *East-India*, Fishing and Sugar trades would be rendered impracticable to them, and the bulk of them fall into our hands again. Every 100 *l.* that we get by supplanting them in trade, or taking their ships, makes them so much weaker to defend themselves, and we so much stronger to attack them; which is a double damage to them, and a double benefit to us; now the stronger our attacks are, and the weaker our enemy's defence, the sooner must a war terminate to our honour: and the *Spaniards*, whom we are incapable of attacking in any other manner with success, have a proverb, *pax con Ingalaterra y con todo el mundo guerra*, peace with England and war with all the world; so severely did they formerly feel the effects of our naval force.

*Secondly*, Money is the sinews of trade as well as war. The bulk of our expences in a  
sea

sea war, being laid out at home or with our colonies, circulates back again among our people, and prevents our trade from languishing by a scarcity of money: whereas the bulk of our expences in a land war being laid out abroad, circulates among foreigners, to the enriching of them, and the encouragement of their trade, but to the impoverishing of us, and the discouragement of our trade.

A sea war is our natural strength, and can preserve our riches, our trade, and our power: A land war is our unnatural strength, and always has proved and always must prove destructive to us.

But because the incumbrances on our trade at present have given the *French* so much the start of us in times of peace, that war seems absolutely necessary to obstruct their growing power: might not a compleat easing of our trade, put us in such a situation as to be above fear, consequently unconcerned at *French* quarrels, and make it contrary to our interest to be constantly embarking in them?

To this I answer, that such a situation is one of the many happy effects of freedom in trade: for turbulent ambition defeats itself; to what a low condition has not a set of war-delighting kings reduced the kingdom of *Sweden*? War is so far from increasing the strength of any country that it really weakens it, by cutting off several channels of trade,  
by

by oppressing the people with grievous taxes, by wasting their numbers, by lessening their riches, dragging away the laborious who bring them in, to recruit armies which dissipate them: What person that can fly from such calamities will stay to take part in them? what nation that can avoid them would wantonly bring them on? Countries are powerful by their numbers of people, not by their extent. *Spain* tho' larger than *France*, having less people, is  $\frac{2}{3}$  less powerful; but *France*, by the calamities of war, may reduce its people and power to the standard of *Spain*; and tho' it should thereby equal the latter in extent, yet would that make it still weaker; for the greater the extent of any country, the fewer the number of people to defend it, the more easy it is to be attacked with success. The United Provinces, tho' not much above  $\frac{1}{3}$  part of the extent of *Portugal*, yet being 4 times as populous, are 4 times as powerful. Where trade is most free, thither people flock, as may be seen in the United Provinces; therefore freedom in trade may make these kingdoms more populous, consequently more powerful than *France*; and that sooner and the more so, the oftener the latter embarks in destructive wars; which if sufficiently attended to, or if our own interest only was consulted, would make us sit down quiet and easy, without frightening ourselves at  
every



every motion made by *French* armies on the Continent, being assured that the more employment they have from their other neighbours, the weaker they grow, consequently have the less inclination and ability to hurt us. 'Tis their cultivating the arts of peace that makes them truly formidable, and which we should dread; not their losing the substance by catching at the shadow, in attempting to extend their frontiers with the loss of their trade and people; for then is our time, by preserving a strict neutrality, to have the trade and navigation of *Europe* left free and unrivalled to our share, to increase our people, and therewith our power; the happiest situation we ever can be in: a situation the *Dutch* so hugged themselves in lately, that even the repeated most humble intreaties of our ministers could not prevail with them to quit, by declaring war against *France*. And tho' it is a hellish policy to set other people together by the ears for our own advantage, yet if of themselves they will commit such follies, it is the height of madness in us to distress ourselves by entering into destructive land wars, to prevent the *French* from doing what we should most wish they would do.

But now, methinks, I see some politicians who would be thought to understand foreign affairs,

affairs, shrugging up their shoulders, and asking, whether we shall not be the last devoured, when our Allies are swallowed up?

To such timorous Gentlemen, I answer; That foreign affairs, in the literal acceptation of the terms, have been shewn above to be affairs quite foreign to us; that when our Allies find that we are not so weak as to take their loads on our shoulders, or pay them for doing their own business, they would exert themselves in a different manner to what they have done of late years; that they are not so easily destroyed as is imagined; that the *French* have no reason to boast of their late campaigns in *Germany*; that, supposing they should destroy these dear Allies, they must by so doing in some degree destroy themselves; that peace will increase our riches, and the calamities of war on the Continent increase our people, and both increase our power: Now, I would ask these politicians, these men of foreign affairs, What probability there is of a weakened nation's devouring a strengthened one. How, by understanding our own affairs, and pursuing them only, viz. in reviving our militia, easing our trade, and promoting good officers in our navy, the mercenary slaves of an absolute Monarch could devour freemen in arms, superior in numbers,

numbers, fighting *pro aris & focis*; and what instances there are in history to warrant such a prodigy?

But to return; Our prohibitions and high duties have not ruined the *French*, who make a greater figure in trade, and empty our pockets more than ever; so that, unless we have thereby improved our trades to other countries, we are in a fine condition.

The authors of the *British Merchant*, vol. 2. p. 4. writing against the shameful treaty of commerce made with *France* at *Utrecht* in the year 1713, say, "We gain a million every year by the balance of our trade with *Portugal* and *Italy*, and near twice as much as that with *Flonders*, *Germany*, and *Holland*; and shall we venture the losing the gain of three millions every year from those countries, not for the sake of gaining, but of losing a fourth million every year to *France*?"

Let us see now how these advantageous balances have been secured to us by high customs and prohibitions.

By *Castaing's* paper of Feb. 3. 1740,

London gave to <i>Genoa</i> for the dollar	54 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.
to <i>Venice</i> for the ducat banco	51 $\frac{1}{4}$ d.
to <i>Leghorn</i> for the dollar	50 $\frac{3}{8}$ d.

By

By Sir *Isaac Newton's* tables,

*Genoa*, the par is 54 d.

Loss to *England* about 1 per cent.

*Venice*, the par is 49 d. 492 dec.

Loss to *England* about 3  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

*Leghorn* the par is 51 d. 69 dec.

Gain to *England* about 2 per cent.

To *Genoa* and *Venice* the balance is against us, and favourable only a small matter to *Leghorn*.

Feb. 3. 1740.

*London* gave to *Lisbon* for the millree 65 d.

The par is 67 d. 166 dec. Gain to *England* about 3  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent.

The *British Merchant*, vol. 3. p. 107. informs us, that "in some years, when corn was cheap here, and dear in *Portugal*, (he means during *Queen Anne's* war) our balance was so very great, that notwithstanding we paid subsidies to the King of *Portugal*, and paid for troops, there were also vast sums for supplies of our armies in *Valentia* and *Catalonia*; yet still the overbalance lay so much against them, that the exchange has been at 5 s. 2 d. and 5 s. a millree."

*Portugal* is a constant market for corn, either for *Britain* or its *American* colonies; the latter, together with *Ireland*, supply it with vast quantities of provisions, great part of the payments of which centers in *London*. And tho' we have no subsidies or armies to pay, as in the last war; yet the *Lisbon* exchange

R. 2 change

change is so far from falling to 5 s. or 5 s. 2 d. per millree, that it has not for many years been under 5 s. 3 d.; which can be only owing to the decline of the *Portugal* market for our manufactures, particularly the woollen. Foreigners working cheaper, steal it away by degrees: cloths between 8 and 11 s. per yard, the *Dutch* supply them with; and have beat out ours about that price entirely, as has been observed before. *France* begins to supply them with some woollens; but to *Italy* she sends vast quantities. So that it appears by the exchanges now, that not much of the supposed annual gain of a million from *Portugal* or *Italy* can now remain, great part of the *Portugal* gold brought here being for *Dutch* account; and the moidores circulated for 2  $\frac{1}{10}$  d. more than they are worth, by which the nation is cheated about  $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent.

Feb. 3. 1740.

London gave the pound Sterling to *Antwerp* for 35 s. 10 d. The par is 35 s. 17 dec.

Gain to *England* about 2 per cent.

London gave the pound Sterling to *Amsterdam* for 34 s. 11 d. The par is 36 s. 59 dec.

Loss to *England* about 4  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

London gave the pound Sterling to *Hamburg* for 33 s. 11 d. The par is 35 s. 17 dec.

Loss to *England* about 3  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

London exchanges with *Norway*, *Sweden*, and *Russia*, by the way of *Hamburg* and *Amsterdam*

*Amsterdam*. *Joshua Gec*, who was also a writer in the *British Merchant*, as appears by the preface; in his *Treatise on Trade*, published several years after, supposes, p. 178. the balance we pay to

<i>Norway</i> to be.	L. 130,000
<i>Sweden</i>	240,000
<i>Russia</i>	400,000
	<hr/>
	L. 770,000

He supposes, p. 179. that we pay a balance to *Flanders* of 250,000 l.; but as the exchange to *Antwerp* appears to be advantageous, to avoid all exceptions, I shall suppose we gain as much,

The interest paid to foreigners, proprietors in our funds in 1740, being chiefly <i>Dutch</i> ,	250,000
Neat annual balance due to <i>England</i> from <i>Germany</i> and <i>Holland</i> , to make the <i>British Merchant's</i> calculation,	400,000
	<hr/>
	580,000

---

L. 2,000,000

Such a formidable sum due to us yearly, as 580,000 l. must make the *Hamburg* and *Amsterdam* exchanges something at least in our favour. But is it so? alas! it appears by the course and par of the exchanges above, that this balance in our favour is not only all gone, but that we have a balance to pay ourselves to both *Germany* and *Holland*; and it cannot be a small one neither, since it makes the exchange to both so much in our disfavour.

R 3 We

We are going headlong to destruction with carrying on losing trades with our neighbours; and what has brought us to this low ebb? Certainly our excises, customs, prohibitions, ill-judged laws, monopolies and national debts; these are the causes; the effects are lost trades, and decaying rents. No quacking with the effects will restore us to a sound constitution; the causes must be removed or it is all lost labour.

Before unloading our manufacturers of the above mentioned grievances, it would be an unaccountable notion (agreeable to *Gee's* opinion) to make our ports free; but, after those political fetters are taken off, having so many superior advantages, nothing could be feared but by those who envy our success. Our natural advantages are so great, that they are the foundation of great part of the riches of our rivals; and that they may make the greater impression on the reader's memory, *page 89.* where they are enumerated, should be here turned to: and, after that view, will any one doubt, whether any foreign manufacturers can underwork a people untaxed, free from oppressions, and with such advantages; 'tis an affront to the *British* nation to suppose it. We may rather suppose, that, by such blessings, upon every war or calamity on the Continent, the declining manufacturers would fly to this asylum with their  
arts,

arts, adding wealth and strength yearly to the nation. We have acted upon narrow principles, as if the trade of the world could be made subservient to our restrictions, which are inconsistent with its very nature, and always throw it into a new channel. Customs have been compared to a tradesman's setting up a turnpike at his door to raise money on his customers; and would it be a wonder if they contracted their dealings with so wrong-headed a man? Sir *Walter Raleigh's* remark on the fate of *Genoa*, fully proves this; which being formerly a free-port, was the storehouse of *Italy*; but setting a custom of 16 *per cent.* on goods imported, they lost their trade of foreign merchandize to *Leghorn*, made a free-port by the duke of *Tuscany*; which continuing still free, retains its flourishing condition. If such a duty ruined the trade of *Genoa*, what will become of ours that is loaded on some articles from 50 to 100 *per cent.*?

Monfieur *Colbert* made *Lewis* the XIV. so sensible of the advantages accruing by easing the trade of *France*, that, after declaring in the introduction to the *Tariff* of 1664, that a large bounty shall be given to encourage manufactures and navigation; yet he lays not such a stress upon the bounties as the lessening the duties on the exports and imports, which he calls the most effectual means for  
the

the restoring of trade. What effect they have had, the ruin of our sugar, *Turkey*, woollen, and home-fishing trades, declare.

The *French* now permit the landing the sugars and indico of their colonies, at *Havre* and *Bordeaux* for re-exportation, duty free.

To conclude the remarks on this first article. Whatever is necessary for life or manufactures, we should study to let our people have in the cheapest manner, that the poor may maintain themselves by their labour without burdening the rich, and raise taxes only on the luxurious; and, if low prices rather prevent than encourage the consumption of foreign vanities, why should we recommend them by raising an esteem for them with high customs? Let us politically, like the wise *Dutch*, tempt foreigners to encourage our manufacturers, pay our ships freights, and to our merchants commission, and warehouse-rent for the goods they lodge here upon speculation: no concern of ours what they are, we must get by them; so shall our poor have full employment, our country become the storehouse, and our sailors the carriers of the world.

Second

Second PROPOSAL.

*To abolish our monopolies, unite Ireland, and put all our fellow-subjects on the same footing in trade.*

By abolishing monopolies, I only mean all exclusive trades, not to prevent any from trading with a large joint stock who choose it, but that every one should trade in the manner he found most beneficial.

*Of the benefits arising by abolishing monopolies, &c.*

1. *It will increase trade.*

By restoring our people to their natural rights, and allowing them to gain, by their industry, an honest livelihood, wherever they can find it.

By preventing any set of people from combining together to raise extravagant wages for labour, or prices for goods.

By furnishing us with the cheapest necessaries, and at the cheapest freights, the market being open for all.

By taking away from our goods all their present fictitious value, whereby their cheapness must prodigiously increase their vent; especially the woollens, whereby the price of



of wool will be raised, and its smuggling prevented.

By lessening the *French* and *Dutch* woollen-trades, in depriving their people of our wool to afford their goods.

By extending our commerce to three-quarter parts of the globe, where it now languishes.

By ruining all foreign *East-India* Companies, who could not support themselves against our Free-traders.

By increasing the number of buyers at home for our goods, consequently raise their value; a company being but one buyer.

By increasing the number of buyers abroad; private dealers trade at a less expence than companies, and pushing against one another, must sell for reasonable profits; whereby a greater vent is given to our goods.

By gaining us the herring-fishery, for the reasons mentioned in p. 127.

By increasing our navigation vastly; for by the fishery, and by opening the *East-India* and *Turkey* trades, twenty ships would be employed where one is now. There go above twenty private ships to *Africa*, to one the Company sends.

By opening the woollen-trade of *Ireland*, that of *Britain* will receive benefit (tho' the contrary is the common opinion); which I prove thus. Suppose one pack of *Irish* wool of

of 6*l.* value, to make four cloths, that pack of wool being smuggled to *France* works up two packs of *French* wool, making altogether twelve cloths.

A pack of *Irish* wool smuggled to *France*, hinders the sale of twelve *English* cloths, supposing them of 6*l.* value each, prevents the circulating of L. 72

A pack of wool manufactured in *Ireland*, can hinder the sale but of four *English* cloths at 6*l.* each; can prevent the circulating but of 24

The difference is L. 48

It is computed that one third of what *Ireland* gets, centers here at last; which on the four cloths at 6*l.* each, making 24*l.* is 8

The benefit that *England* receives by every pack of wool manufactured in *Ireland*, instead of being run to *France*, is L. 56

The wool of *France* is too coarse to manufacture for exportation; but being mixt with one third *Irish*, makes saleable cloth; every four cloths exported from *Ireland* as above, stops the exportation of twelve *French* cloths; the foreign consumption is still the same, let who will supply the market. *Ireland* can export no more manufactures of our sorts than it grows wool; for, were the *English* untaxed, and unmonopolized, they would manufacture all their own wool; if twelve cloths are wanted at any market, and *Ireland* can supply but four, and *France* for want of *Irish*

*Irish* wool, not any, *Britain* must supply the remaining eight.

Our Colonies<sup>n</sup> in *America* extend as far north, and farther south than the latitudes of *Europe*, and seem capable of raising all *European* growths; they have a more convenient navigation to the *Baltic* and *Mediterranean* than they have to each other: they build ships cheap, have land for a trifle, therefore can supply the *Baltic* with the southern growths, and the *Mediterranean* with the northern growths, cheaper than they can each other; therefore our ships with Plantation cargoes, must swarm in those seas, by low freights, beat out other nations, and be the common carriers of *Europe*. The *British* Islands, when free-ports, by their natural advantages, must be the center of the trade of *Europe*; therefore cargoes home will present themselves in abundance; and our manufactures, when reduced to their natural prices, becoming the cheapest in *Europe*, the supply for the Colonies must of course be here: the labour of their white people being at present very dear, our manufactures would come cheaper to them than they could make them; and a free trade causing a prodigious demand for their growths, these would give better profit than manufactures, consequently cause them to be neglected. Besides, there must be a large importation of negroes to raise these

these growths in our Colonies, which must increase the demand for our manufactures; and as the northern Colonies supply the *French* and *Spanish* Plantations with great quantities of provisions, our people would have thereby opportunities to introduce the cheap manufactures of *Britain*, to which the saving the high *European* duties would be vastly conducive.

By this proposal the taxes on *Britain* will be lessened, suppose our numbers of people as follows,

In <i>England</i>	8 millions.
<i>Scotland</i>	2 ditto.
<i>Ireland</i>	2 ditto.
<i>America</i>	1 ditto.

Total 13 millions.

The general amount of our taxes and part of their consequences, in p. 41. is 15,289,375 l.

If part of the people, the 8 millions in *England*, pay this, it amounts to 1 l. 18 s. 2 1/2 d. per head.

But suppose the tax on the Consumers of luxuries to take place, adding no artificial prices to goods; but diminishing the expences of the Government, yet that, by paying off our debts and carrying on public works, 8 millions of money are wanted, to which the

S whole

whole 13 millions of subjects contribute, it amounts but to 12s. 3 1/2d. per head, not the one third of the above.

Thus, by putting all our fellow-subjects on the same happy footing, no discontents could arise, but a general improvement spread over our whole dominions.

2. It will employ our poor.

This is a consequence of the last remark; for the more manufactures, navigation, and fisheries flourish, the greater employment they provide for the poor.

3. It will increase the stock of people.

This is a consequence of the first remark; for wherever trade is most free, thither people flock: if the door be opened to receive, whatever sailors, fishermen, and manufacturers we want, will be drawn in.

4. It will increase our riches.

This is a consequence of the foregoing remarks; for the abolishing monopolies, making our goods cheaper, and at the same time opening the trade of the whole world to vend them in; foreigners must be more indebted to us, and the people that flock here, teaching us new manufactures, or improving some of those we already have, our wants must grow less, and the general balance of trade be brought more in our favour.

By opening the trade of Ireland and the Colonies, which countries being too poor to give

give it the extent it is capable of, must therefore be carried on for years to come by English stocks; consequently a great part of the profit falls into the hands of the English merchants: add to which, that about one third of what Ireland and the Colonies get, is sent here for goods, or spent by absentees; therefore the richer they grow, the richer must Britain become.

5. It will increase the value of our lands.

This is a consequence of all the above remarks; for whatever causes trade, employs our poor, increases the stock of people, and increases our riches, must increase the value of our lands; for the proofs of which the reader is referred to p. 141.

The abolishing of monopolies is proved to be the cause of trade, which is the cause of all the other remarks; therefore the abolishing of monopolies is a great increaser of the value of lands.

Third PROPOSAL.

To withdraw the bounties on exported corn, and to erect public magazines of corn in every County.

Having shewen in p. 65. the prejudice we do our trade in feeding foreigners cheaper by

bounties than our own people, and that the pretence of keeping up the value of lands by any method that hurts trade must prove fallacious; I shall now shew how their value may be kept up without any bounties, *viz.*

By permitting each County to form a company at 100 *l.* each share, to erect magazines of corn, to be managed by twelve or more Directors, one sixth part of whom to go out yearly, uncapable ever to be elected again; their shares to remain one year unfold after they go out, as a security for their past conduct.

No person capable of being chose a Director whd is not possessed of ten shares.

Every share to have a vote for Directors.

That the stock be not less than one quarter of wheat for each head in the County, after the computation of 5 persons to each house.

That they never buy but at 20 *s.* *per* quarter of wheat precisely.

That they never sell but at 40 *s.* *per* quarter of wheat precisely.

Except that to prevent its spoiling, with the consent of a General-court, they may sell the old corn, and replace the same quantity of new.

That they never sell but to the Millers of the County, who shall give security to grind the wheat, and not export the flour.

That

That they never sell more *per* week than the 52<sup>d</sup> part of the corn they have in the magazines at the time of opening.

That their General-courts be empowered to enact by-laws.

*Of the benefits arising by erecting public magazines of corn.*

1. *It will increase Trade.*

By creating this new branch which we never yet had, and by which the *Dutch* reap great advantage, and it cannot fail answering the same to us; for with regard to the proprietors, it may be observed, That this is a solid trade, not liable to seizures at the caprice of foreign princes, to captures by privateers, to storms and shipwrecks at sea, or to the frauds of officers in remote countries; here the provident, who store up the excess of the bounties of nature against the unavoidable calamities of bad seasons, besides the pleasure of seeing our own people fully supplied, whilst our neighbours are complaining, will be benefited in their incomes, not by grinding the faces of the poor, but by preventing their miseries; and as corn is seldom many years together under 40 *s.* the magazines may pay better interest than any of our present funds.

By rendering all our other laws relating to the importing, engrossing, exporting, &c.

of corn, needless; for when the fictitious value of our goods is taken away, we can raise corn as cheap or cheaper than our neighbours; therefore none can be imported for our own consumption to sink the value of our lands, but only upon speculation for better markets abroad; which a Free-port trade giving encouragement to, we should have thereby more corn in more hands in the nation than at present; consequently be less liable to be imposed on by engrossers, who even could afford to sell to our own people 10 or 15 per cent. cheaper than to foreigners by the freight, charges, and risk being saved: and when any foreign demand happens, having not only our own public magazines for our own supply, but also more private granaries, the exportation of corn, so far from being dangerous, must create a trade vastly beneficial.

By encouraging manufactures, as being a means to keep labour low; for as the income must bear its proportion to the necessary expence, when corn in bad years is dear with our neighbours, their labour, and consequently their manufactures, must grow dear in proportion; whilst our own people, being supplied cheap from the magazines, are able, by cheap labour, to bring their manufactures cheap to market, whereby they make their way against foreigners, and establish a reputation difficult to be removed.

By

By encouraging our navigation; for as freights must bear a proportion to the ship's expence, so, by this method, our ship-owners in general will be furnished with biscuit cheaper than either *French* or *Dutch*; and the cheaper our freights, the more of the carrying-trade must we get: besides, the importation of corn upon speculation for better markets, and its re-exportation when the markets are advanced, must give constant employment to a vast number of ships.

2. *It will employ our poor.*

This is a consequence of the last remark; for the cheaper labour can be performed, the more constant employment will be found; and this being a means to feed the poor cheaper in times of scarcity than foreigners, can give no pretence of raising their wages above them; but the miseries the poor now suffer in hard winters be in a great measure prevented, and the granaries and corn-trade will furnish employment to great numbers of Sailors, Watermen, Carmen, &c. &c.

3. *It will increase the stock of people.*

This is a consequence of the encouraging trade, and employing the poor, as has been before proved; to which may be added, That all times of scarcity produce distempers, which carry off great numbers of people; whereas this will prevent that calamity, consequently



frequently preserve many lives; and the better the means of living are in any country, the more people will be drawn in to partake of them.

4. *It will increase our riches.*

By bringing in vast sums of money in scarce years from foreigners. Sir *Walter Raleigh*, in his *Observations on Trade*, presented to King *James I.* says, "That *Amsterdam* is never without 700,000 quarters of corn; a dearth in *England, France, Italy, or Portugal*, is truly observed to enrich *Holland* for seven years after; that in a scarcity of corn in his time, the *Hamburgers, Embdeners, and Dutch*, out of their storehouses, furnished this kingdom; and, from *Southampton, Exeter and Bristol*, in a year and a half, carried away near 200,000 *l.* and he computes their supply then for the whole kingdom carried away two millions." Had magazines of corn been erected some years ago, what immense sums might we not have brought into the nation in the year 1740?

5. *It will increase the value of our lands.*

This is a consequence of all the above remarks; for whatever causes trade, employs our poor, increases the stock of people, and increases our riches, must increase the value of our lands; for the proof of which the reader is referred to p. 141.

The

The erecting public magazines of corn is proved to be the cause of trade, which is the cause of all the other remarks; therefore the erecting public magazines of corn is a great increaser of the value of lands.

This proposal will prevent the price of wheat from ever sinking so low as to ruin the Farmer; but, on the contrary, keep up a good price, that must even increase the present natural value of our lands; 20 *s.* of real, true, intrinsic value per quarter of wheat, taxes, &c. taken off, being as good a price as 40 *s.* 9 *d.*  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the present fictitious value: at which last price if wheat could be kept now, the value of our lands would rise considerably; consequently must do the same when a price equivalent to it is constantly preserved.

Fourth PROPOSAL.

*To discourage idleness by well regulating our poor.*

Sir *Joshua Child's* scheme in his *Discourse on Trade, chap. 2.* seems very conducive to this, with some few additions.

"That there be a Corporation established in every County for regulating the poor, to consist of fifty persons with perpetual succession, to be stiled Fathers of the poor."

That

That the said number of fifty be constantly filled up by election of the freeholders once a year.

“ That all the parish-officers within each County be subordinate and accountable to their respective Corporations.”

“ That the said Corporations have power to assess and compel the payment from every parish in their County of the medium of the poor's rates raised in the three years preceeding.”

That one tenth part of the said sum be abated yearly, until the whole in ten years time be done away, and the poor maintained by the donations of the charitable only.

That each Corporation do appoint a Treasurer to receive the alms of all charitably disposed persons.

“ That the said Corporations have power to erect workhouses, Hospitals, working-schools, houses of correction, and to exercise all other powers relating to the poor, that any number of Justices of the Peace may now do in their Quarter-sessions, or otherwise.”

That they receive none but infants and persons well recommended for their diligence and sobriety, as proper objects.

That each of the said Fathers of the poor have power to commit any vagrant, or person not having a visible estate or trade, and their

their own disorderly poor, to the County goal.

That the said commitments beailable.

That, at the Assizes for the Counties, the persons names so committed be called over, and those who cannot give a good account of themselves be transported for three years.

“ That the said Corporations have power to admit as Members, having equal power with those elected, every person paying in 100 l. to the poor's use.”

That seven or more Fathers of the Poor do make a Court.

That every Minister and Church-warden go together once a year to every house in their parish to collect the alms of charitably disposed persons, entering the same in a book.

That the whole collection being made, the money be remitted to the Corporation the parish belongs to, with the said book signed by the said Minister and Church-wardens.

“ That all money given for the poor be accounted sacred; and that it be felony to misapply, conceal, lend, or convert it to any other use or purpose whatsoever.”

That every Corporation do publish its accounts yearly.

That whatever the said Corporations want, be publicly bought of the lowest contractor.

That whatever the said Corporations dispose

pose of, be advertised to be sold by public auction to the best bidder.

That whenever they want money, or whenever a time of general calamity brings on an extraordinary charge, they take care to give public notice thereof, to stir up the charity of all good people to relieve their distressed and starving brethren.

*Of the benefits arising by well regulating our poor.*

1. *It will increase Trade.*

For our poor seeing that no idle vagrants can live here, but must be transported, and that none but those well recommended for their diligence and sobriety can be maintained by the Fathers of the Poor in sickness or old age, they must of necessity become frugal, industrious, and work at such prices as trade will afford; not spend half of their wages in drink, (as the *British Merchant*, vol. 1. p. 7. asserts it to be well known that ours do) whereby no nation can out-rival us on account of the plenty of provisions of all sorts that our country abounds with, and its natural advantages for trade superior to any nation, the exemption from oppression by taxes, the advantage of a Free-port, and other good regulations offered by these proposals; so that our poor, by abating their luxury and idleness,

ness, will be able to work as cheap as any people; the consequence of which is a certain increase of trade.

By taking off our burdensome and unjust Poor's Rates on the industrious, who now maintain the idle, our goods will become cheaper, consequently more vendible.

2. *It will employ our poor.*

This is a consequence of the last remark; for as 'tis certain that they who bring their goods the cheapest to market will have the most trade, so those that work the cheapest must have the most employment; for 1. It will be more constant by being cheaper. 2. Though they receive a less number of pence for wages, yet they will be more valuable by the prices of necessaries being freed from taxes with their consequences. 3. The poor being, by this proposal, inured to labour and restrained from idleness, they will work more and spend less, therefore be enabled to lay up a better provision for their families than they now do.

3. *It will increase the stock of people.*

Though this has been proved before to be a certain consequence of the two former remarks, yet as some people, out of a false tenderness, may think that the transporting of many vagrants may depopulate the nation, I shall endeavour to shew the contrary.

T

1. Idleness

1. Idleness is the root of all evil, and two of the punishments of evil-doers with us are hanging and transportation; so that idleness deprives us of many people; but this proposal, tending in its nature to make our people frugal and industrious, will preserve and save many from those two calamities.

2. Idleness brings on want, diseases, death, and thins a nation; but frugality and industry cause plenty, health, long life, and people a country.

3. Idleness disables men from supporting a family, therefore prevents marriage; frugality and industry enable men to marry, and stock a country with people.

4 If this proposal drives away the idle, so much the better; they are a burden instead of a benefit to the community; it will supply their places by increasing trade with more deserving people from our neighbours, agreeable to this maxim, Such as your employment is for people, so many will your people be.

5. When our people see that idleness is deemed a crime, and punished accordingly, but that frugality and industry are virtues, rewarded with good wages and a comfortable subsistence; a thorough reformation must ensue among them, the idle be few, and this objection vanish.

4. It

4. It will increase our riches.

This is a consequence of the other remarks, and of the proposal itself, which tends to make our people industrious; *the hand of the diligent maketh rich*; and the greater number of diligent hands we have, the more riches we shall get.

5. It will increase the value of our lands.

This is a consequence of all the above remarks; for whatever causes trade, employs the poor, increases the stock of people, and increases our riches, must increase the value of our lands; for the proofs of which the Reader is referred to p. 141.

The well regulating our poor is proved to be the cause of trade, which is the cause of all the other remarks; therefore the well regulating our poor is a great increaser of the value of lands.

*Objection.* But perhaps it will be said, That the poor being left to subsist on charity only, will be starved.

To this I answer, That the great number of idle beggars we now voluntarily maintain, proves the contrary; that in all times of general calamities our charity is eminent, as Sir *Josiah Child* says it was after the fire of *London*, and was again proved in the hard winter in 1739; besides, the Fathers of the Poor hereby proposed, being persons of character and fortune, will, for their own honour, by their

T 2

delicate

delicate sense of public good, and their love for true charity, take care to distinguish between the real and pretended objects of want; by which the numbers of the former will appear to be but few, and they, by good management, maintained at a small expence; whereby the encouragement to charity will be vastly increased, by people's knowing certainly where to give their money to do good; the want of which certain knowledge, is a great damp to our charity at present.

Therefore, as we now maintain voluntarily more idle people than really want, there can be no doubt but they will, when reduced to proper objects only, be sufficiently provided for.

#### *Fifth* P R O P O S A L.

*To pay off our debts by public bonds, bearing interest, negotiable by indorsement, and liquidating part of our debts yearly.*

That books be opened at the Exchequer for receiving money from any person or persons desiring public bonds, which money to be applied immediately to pay off our national redeemable debts; those that bear the highest rate of interest, and are of the longest standing, to be first paid off.

That

#### *Decline of the Foreign Trade.* 221

That the said bonds, for the conveniency of trade, be for any sums not lower than 5 *l.* nor exceeding 1000 *l.*

That they be divided into classes according to their rates of interest.

That the 1 <sup>st</sup> class do not exceed 3 millions Sterling,	
	at 3 per cent.
2 <sup>d</sup> ,	6 at 2½ per cent.
3 <sup>d</sup> ,	9 at 2 per cent.
4 <sup>th</sup> ,	12 at 1½ per cent.
5 <sup>th</sup> ,	15 at 1 per cent.
6 <sup>th</sup> ,	for the remainder
	of the debt,
	at ½ per cent.

That the bonds of every class be numbered, and the numbers never altered.

That the interest be payable at an office to be erected for that purpose, whenever it be called for, and a new bond given in the name of the person receiving it, with its original number, and the date the interest is paid to.

That the bonds be negotiable by indorsement to any creditor, and for any taxes to the Government.

That the bonds for the amount of both principal and interest, be a legal tender for any tax, bill of exchange, note, or any debt whatsoever.

That a sum equal to the amount of one subsidy be granted yearly by Parliament, to pay off our redeemable debts and public bonds; those that bear the highest rate of interest,



terest, and are of the longest standing, to be the first paid off.

That public notice be given in the *Gazette* monthly, by the Commissioners of the office, how far they can pay off the bonds, specifying the number of the class, and number of the bond they pay to; the interest on all the included numbers to cease and determine at the expiration of three months after such notice.

That accounts be delivered yearly to Parliament by the Commissioners.

That a curious stamp be added to the bonds; for though their being negotiable by indorsement only to creditors, may make forgery difficult, yet too much caution cannot be used to prevent it intirely, and give the bonds the greater credit.

*Of the benefits arising by paying off our debts by public bonds.*

1. *It will increase trade.*

By putting our debts that have almost ruined us, on a footing of being speedily paid off with honour.

By creating a currency more valuable than our coin: money lying by, brings in nothing; but all these bonds pay something for keeping, and I presume that no persons (much less the

the Bank or the Bankers) would keep money by them lying dead, when they could have current bonds that bore only a half *per cent.* interest. Would the Bank, who are computed to have always a dead cash of above one million by them, refuse making 5000 *l.* *per annum* profit of it at a half *per cent.* in bonds? Could the Directors answer to the proprietors the neglect of not adding such a sum yearly to their usual profits? Would any person take out a bank-note that bore no interest, when he could have a bond carrying a half *per cent.* and equally convenient; for any trader would as soon give change for it, as for a bank-note?

By increasing the currency of the nation; for as trade always languishes where money is scarce, so the benefit by taking off all monopolies might be defeated, for want of a proper currency to carry on the flow of trade thereby caused; whereas, adding an increase of currency to an increase of trade, must carry it to a greater height than we ever yet knew.

By reducing the interest of money, which is a great encouragement to trade, by forcing people to industry, who would otherwise live idle on the high interest of their money; whereas the interest of these bonds sinking gently to a degree too low to indulge people in idleness, the possessors of them who have not lands to improve, must either find out  
new

new branches of trade, or study to improve the old; enter into partnership with Traders of experience, or lend them their money to trade with; whereby private credit will be increased, and our Traders enabled to buy at home with ready money, and sell at long credit abroad; which will make them steal away the trade of all those nations, whose high interest will not enable them to do the same; and the lower the interest, the more moderate profits our Traders can content themselves with, whereby the vent of our goods must be increased: for, was the natural rate of interest at 2 per cent. a Trader who borrowed money would think 4 per cent. good profit; whereas he who borrows at 4 per cent, cannot be satisfied with less than 6 or 7, and must neglect all trades that will not give that profit, which the *Dutch*, by their low interest, are glad to undertake; and when our case is the same, so shall we.

By making our people frugal; for a low rate of interest forcing a low profit in trade, people's expences must grow more moderate; and the less we consume, the more we shall have to sell, which is the most solid way to make a nation rich.

By gaining more experience; for low profits raising estates slowly, men cannot quit business so soon for idle country lives as they do now, but must bring up their children to their

their business, in order to assist them in their old age; which may go on to the fourth or fifth generation, before an estate is raised to turn country Esquires upon, whereby a foreign correspondency with the best houses, the knowledge of proper workmen, and the characters of masters of ships, are secured to the son by the father's experience; consequently, from such a foundation, the utmost skill in trade must be attained.

2. *It will employ our poor.*

3. *It will increase the stock of people.*

These having been already proved to be the consequences of the increase of trade, the Reader is referred back to these heads in the remarks on the foregoing proposals.

4. *It will increase our riches.*

Not only as a consequence of the above remarks, but also by reducing those vast dividends the foreign proprietors of stocks have now remitted to them, whereby more money will be kept in the nation.

5. *It will increase the value of our lands.*

This is the consequence of all the above remarks; for whatever causes trade, employs our poor, increases the stock of people, and increases our riches, must increase the value of our lands; for the proofs of which the Reader is referred to p. 141.

The paying off our debts by public bonds is proved to be the cause of trade, which is the cause

cause of all the other remarks ; therefore the paying off our debts by public bonds is a great increaser of the value of lands.

Besides, where plenty of currency is to be had, there it will be borrowed by the Landholders, and employed in different manures, cultures, plantations, new products, whereby yearly improvements will be made; and when the corn magazines are compleated, there being no other employment for money but in trade or lands, those who did not understand trade, or care to trust their money to those who did, or who had raised sufficient estates by it, must become purchasers of land; which number by increasing, must increase their value.

Having thus attempted to shew that our natural advantages in trade are undoubtedly superior to any nation's whatsoever; that if properly cultivated they would render us more formidable than *France*, consequently than any country in *Europe*; that if we had no taxes but on the voluntary consumers of luxuries, and if our trade was quite free, all fictitious value would be taken from our goods; whereby they might be afforded cheaper than any in *Europe*: and if those vast sums that now lie dead in our funds were circulating in bonds, we should raise an immense

menſe trade all over the world, a vaſt navigation for our protection, increaſe the number of our people, give employment to all our poor, accumulate riches yearly; and that all this cannot be done without vaſtly increaſing the value of lands, which, in the Remarks on the ſeveral propoſals, I have endeavour'd fully to prove, to the conviction, I hope, of thoſe gentlemen for whoſe benefit this *Essay* chiefly was intended, viz. our Country-Gentlemen, the Landholders of theſe three kingdoms. Before concluding, I muſt repeat, That my chief intent herein was to remove that deſtructive prejudice ariſing from the falſe diſtinction of *Landed* and *Trading Interests*, by ſhewing, that there neither is or can be any difference of intereſt between them; for whatever clogs trade, muſt ſink the value of lands; and that any benefit to trade, how remote ſoever it may ſeem from land, will at laſt terminate in increaſing its value: therefore I dare boldly affirm, That the giving trade the utmoſt freedoms and encouragements, is the greateſt and moſt ſolid improvement of the value of lands. " It muſt be evident, ſays the author of *Britannia Languens*, p. 290. that were our trade eaſed as our neighbour nations, *England* would have the ſuperiority, ſince the ſame cauſes muſt produce greater effects in *England*,

“ *England*, being invigorated with these our  
“ national advantages, which no other na-  
“ tion doth or can enjoy.”

Was our trade eased and encouraged by  
the foregoing proposals beyond that of our  
neighbours, to what a height of riches and  
power would not our natural advantages car-  
ry us? The consideration of which is hereby  
submitted to the Legislature, which can,  
whenever it pleases, make us the most  
flourishing people in the world.

F I N I S.