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The Two Great

QUESTIONS

CONSIDER'D.

I. *What the French King will Do,
with Respect to the Spanish Mo-
narchy.*

II. *What Measures the English ought
to take.*

LONDON,

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T H E
P R E F A C E.

*S*ince the Following Sheets were in the Press, some Letters from France advise, that the King of France has saluted his Grand-Son the Duke D'Anjou, as King of Spain.

Some of the most Intelligent Part of Mankind, think He has done so by way of Politics ; to see how the rest of Europe will resent it ; as He once did in a like Case. to the Prince of Conti as King of Poland ; whose Pretensions He did not think fit to pursue.

The Author therefore thinks the following Sheets are as much to the purpose as they were before ; and without any farther recommendation refers the Reader to the perusal.

T H E
Two Great QUESTIONS
C O N S I D E R ' D.

WE are told, That the Deceased King of *Spain* has by his last Will bestow'd his Kingdoms on the Duke *D' Anjou*, Grand-Son to the Present King of *France*. Amongst the many weak Actions of that Effeminate Prince, who hardly ever did a Wise One, This the most Ridiculous; if it be proper to give such an *Epithet* to the Actions of Sovereign Princes.

1. To imagine the Most Christian King wou'd give any Regard to, or put any Value upon such a Bequest, any farther than consist'd with his other Measures, or at least with his interest; must be a Folly none could be guilty of, but such as know very little of the King of *France*, or of the Affairs of *Europe*.

2. To think that the Rest of the Princes of *Christendom*, wou'd suffer the *Spanish Monarchy* to bequeath'd by Will to a *French Man*, without any Title or other Right than the Deed of Gift of the late King, and without any Regard to the Right of the Lawful Pretenders, is also most Egregious Nonsense.

To make way therefore, to the Case in hand, and come at the Questions before us with more Clearness; 'tis necessary to Examine the Nature, and probable Consequences of this Last Will and Testament of the King of *Spain*.

1. As to the Nature of the Thing, it seems to be a Tacit Invitation to all the Competitors to a Dangerous and a Bloody War; as if the King of Spain shou'd have said to his Privy Council, *I'll be revenged on them all for attempting to divide our Dominions; for I'll give it to One that has no Title, let the Rest fight for it, and the longest Sword take all.*

As to the Duke D' Anjou, he has no Manner of Title, but what is presumptive on the Death of his Father and Elder Brother without Issue; if they should have Children the Emperor of Morocco has as good, and perhaps a better Title to the Crown of Spain than He.

The Dauphin of France has an Unquestion'd Title to the Crown of Spain, if it be True, that the Renunciation made by his Father and Mother at the Pyrenean Treaty; cannot bind the Children so as to deprive them of their Right, which is the great Argument now us'd to defend their Title: Now if their Right be good the Crown is the Dauphin's, and after him the Duke of Burgundy's and his Heirs.

But I shou'd be glad to have it answer'd, how the Duke D' Anjou can have a Title while the other are alive? It cannot be in the Power of the Dauphin to say, I will give my Right to my Second Son, for I do not think it worth my while, to accept of it for my self or my Eldest. Because,

2. The Consequence of that will in all Probability be this, that the Duke of Burgundy's Son when he has One will say again My Grand-Father had no Power to give away my Right, I am the Undoubted Heir to the Spanish Monarchy, and so no Question he will be if the present Dauphin has a Right; and if Power be in his Hands to subdue it, he will have it, tho' the Possession be his Uncle's; for Crowns know no Uncles, Brothers,

or any Relations; when Power of Possession joyn'd with right is before them.

So that the King of France cannot but see, that to take the Crown of Spain from the Will and Testament of the late King, is Disclaiming the Right of his own Son and Involving his Grand-Sons in Bloody Wars; the Issue of which a wiser Head than His cannot foresee. This leads me to Consider,

The First Question.

What Measures the King of France will take, with respect to the Succession of the Spanish Monarchy?

By saying what Measures he will take, I mean what He will in all Probability take, or what his Interest will lead him to take; for I suppose, no Man will imagine I am of his Privy Council.

To debate this Matter, 'tis necessary to consider the King of France, with respect to the Terms He stands in with the rest of Europe.

If the King of France were Absolute Master of his own Measures, and had no Leagues or Neighbours to regard; there is no Question to be made, but that rejecting all Conditions, he would immediatly enter upon the Dominions of Spain as his own undoubted Inheritance; or at least his Sons; annex the same to the Crown of France and make it one Entire Empire, and any Man else wou'd do the like.

But as He has Measures to take with Powerfull Neighbours, who as Potent as He is, are able to give him Diversion enough; and if He shou'd embroil himself with them, may make it a hazard

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 Hazard whether he should obtain it or no; He is too Wise a Prince not to see that his Interest will Oblige him to act in Concert with his Neighbours, as far as conveniently He can.

The Truth of this Argument is abundantly confirm'd in the Measures He took, and the Alliances He made before the Death of the King of Spain.

They who think the King of France so Magnipotent that He Values none of his Nighbours, and talk so big of him, that like his Medal-makers they place him among the *Invincibles*; must have forgot the Siege of *Namure*, and the Vain Effort of the Power of France to relieve it; they must pass over his Deserting the Late, and Acknowledging the Present King of England at the Peace of *Reswick*; they must overlook the low Steps he was oblig'd to make, to draw the Duke of *Savoy* from the Confederacy, how he was unable to save *Casall*, which cost him so much Money; how he delivered the Impregnable Town of *Pignoroll*, which his Father call'd the Right Hand of France, and which cost him two Millions to fortifie; how he married the Fortune of France, to a Daughter of *Savoy* without a Portion, and bought the Duke of *Savoy* at the Price of his Grandson's Dishonour; how he surrendered the large Dominions of *Lorraine* and *Luxemburgh*, and above 100 Fortified Towns to the Confederats, which though he were always Master of the Field, wou'd cost him Seven Years to recover by the Ordinary Course of Sieges and Attacks.

These are plain Demonstrations, that he found himself overmatch'd by the Confederacy; and he is not a Man of so little Sense, as not to know it.

Why else in the League now made for the Partition of the Spanish Monarchy, should he content himself with the Dominion the *Spainards* had in *Italy*, and quit the Delicious Morcel of *America* to the House of *Austria*.

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 What Reason can any one assign for it, but that finding the *English* and *Dutch* never to be brought to consent, to his being so very powerful at Sea, as that Addition would make him; he was willing to accept so large a portion as the *Italian Part* assigned to him upon easie Terms, rather than venture like the Dog in the Fable; to loose all by covering too much.

Upon these Terms therefore. in Concert with the *English* and *Dutch*, his most Christian Majesty has agreed, that on the Decease of the King of Spain, the Spanish Monarchy should be thus divided.

All the Dominions which the *Spainards* possess in *Italy* to be given to the *French*, *Millan* excepted, which is to be given to the Duke of *Lorraine*, in Consideration of the Dutchies of *Lorraine* and *Barr*, which are to be yeilded to the *French*, and all the rest, some few Towns on the Frontiers of *Navarr* excepted, to be given to the Arch Duke of *Austria*, with other particulars needless to Repeat.

This League being concluded, the King of Spain (as if he had linger'd out his Days only 'till it was thus fix'd) dyes according to our Account on the 22^d October last.

The *Spainard* on pretence, that they would not have their Monarchy divided, and taking no Notice at all of the Right of any Prince to succeed; has made a Legacy of his Kingdoms, and given them all away to the Duke *D'Anjou*, a Prince who has no more Right to it; or pretence of Right, except as before, than the Prince of *Wales*, or the Czar of *Muscovy*.

Now 'tis a Mighty Disputed Point among our Politicians, what the King of France will do in this new Juncture of Affairs, whether he will stand by the Partition agreed on, or accept of the late King of Spain's Bounty, and take the Kingdom as a Gift to his Grandson?

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What he will do, as is before noted, cannot positively be asserted; but what Reason the State and Nature of the Thing, and his own Undoubted Interest will dictate, to be done by any Prince in his Circumstances, any one may Judge.

If He be the same King of *France*, that He has alwise been, who has very rarely took false Measures, or baulkt his own Interest, if he be guided by the same well mannag'd Council as he us'd to be, He will certainly adhere to the *Postulata* of his Alliance, and quietly accept the partition of the *Spanish* Monarchy, as it is agreed in the beforemention'd League, For,

By this Acquisition of *Italy*, He secures to Himself the Absolute Dominion of the *Mediterranean Sea*; He entirely excludes the House of *Austria* from any farther Concern in *Italy*. He has the Church so absolutely in his Clutches, that He may make himself Pope if he thinks fit; And whenever He is pleas'd to be Angry with the petty Princes of *Tuscany*, *Parma*, *Modena*, *Mantua*, &c. They shall lay down their Principalities at his invincible feet, and count it more an Honour to be call'd *Princes of the Blood*, or *Peers of France*, than to be absolute Lords of their own Dominions. So he shall when ever he thinks fit, re-establish the Old Kingdom of the *Lombards*, and annex it to the Tittle of *France* and *Navarr*.

And all this without the Expencc of Treasure or Hazard of his Armies, without fitting out a Fleet, or Fighting at Sea or on Shore; the *English* and *Dutch* being assistant to put him into the possession of it.

If the Emperor shou'd be so weak to oppose Him, He must stand upon His own Leggs, and in the present Circumstance, His Power does not seem formidable enough to make the Matter doubtful.

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And now we are come to mention the Emperor, let us say a Word or two to those Gentlemen, who in His behalf speak big and say, he is able to baffle all these Measures.

First, They tell you, how powerful the Empire now is by the Acquisition of the Kingdom of *Hungary*, and the most advantageous Peace with the *Turk*.

They tell you, His Imperial Majesty has an Army of 120 Thousand Men, besides the Troops of the *Circles* which are 80 Thousand more; that of these, 50 Thousand lye ready on the Confines of *Italy*, and all the rest of his Forces are drawing down to the *Rhine*, that the Duke of *Brandenburg* on Condition of being made King of *Prussia* will join him with all his Forces; that the Duke of *Lunenburgh* on account of the *Ninth Electorate*, will maintain 30 Thousand Men at his own Charge, and thus all the Princes of *Italy* are on his side.

By these they tell you, the Emperor will immediatly on the one side secure *Italy*, and on the other side make such a Vigorous Diversion on the *Rhine*, that the King of *France* shall have work enough to secure his own Dominions, while in the mean time the Arch Duke *Charles* shall be sent into *Spain*, where the *Spaniards* who Naturally hate the *French*, wil immediatly Proclaim him King.

Those are great things indeed, and if the Emperor be so strong, he may cut out a great deal of Work for the Confederates, and I'll suppose, the Emperor should be so blind to his own Interest as to attempt it, yet it seems not at all propable, that his Imperial Majesty, who has hardly been able to support himself this War, in Conjunction with the whole Confederacy of *Europe*, should imagine himself capable of putting a Check to the Power of *France*, in Conjunction with *England* and *Holland*; for
whatever

ever he might do in *Italy* and on the *Rhine*, he would never be able to defend *Spain* and *Flanders*, if he really had them in Possession.

First, *Flanders* which has always been maintain'd by the Conjunction of the *Dutch*, would immediatly be entred by the *Dutch* on one side, and the *French* on the other; and must fall into their hands with little difficulty.

Secondly, *Spain* cou'd never hold out against the *French* by Land, assisted with the Naval Forces of the *English* and *Dutch* by Sea, the Islands of the *Mediterranean* must submit to the Masters of the Sea, and *America* would lye like the *Golden Garland* to the Wrestlers, to be given to the Conquerors.

No Man can imagine, but the Emperor, to whose Son so considerable a Dominion is allotted, will accept of the Partition for his part, especially when he sees how impossible it will be to make better Conditions by Force.

What the *English* and *Dutch* are to do, if he should, remains to be debated under another Head.

I'll now suppose that which to me seems very unlikely, That the King of *France* should accept of this Legacy, and claim the Crown of *Spain* for his Grandson the Duke *D'Anjou*, and attempt to set up that Rediculous Title of a Last Will and Testament, as the Foundation of his pretension.

Let us calmly consider the consequences.

1. He inevitably renews the War with the whole Confederacy, that Peace which cost Him so much to procure is immediatly broken, upon the first Invasion He makes on the Territories of *Spain*, who are a Branch of the Confederacy.

2. He renews the War under insuperable disadvantages, such as are infinitely greater than He lay under before, and such as loudly tell the World, He never will Venture to Fight the whol

whole Confederacy again. viz. The multitude of strong Towns and Cities which he Surrendered to the Confederates, which are a sufficient Guarantee of the Peace, and the Different case, of the Emperor, who is more than twice what he was the last War, by his Peace with the *Turks*.

3. If he should make the Duke *D'Anjou* King, *France* would really get nothing by the Bargain, for in one Age the Race would be all *Spaniards* again; Nay, in a few Years, Property wou'd prevail, and he wou'd no more let his Brother the Duke of *Burgundy* when King of *France* encroach upon him, than the late King of *Spain* wou'd the present King of *France*; We do not want instances in the World, that Interest banishes all the Ties of Nation and Kindred, when the Duke *D'Anjou* had been King of *Spain* for some time, he will look upon *Spain* to be his Own, his Native, his Peculiar, and be as far from Subjecting himself to *France*, because he was born there; as if he had never seen it: Possibly he might be willing to join Interest with *France*, and it may be join Forces upon Occasion; but it must be where the Interest of the two Nations did not clash then and that is almost no where, but if ever *France* encroach upon him, she would find him King of *Spain*, not Duke *D'Anjou*.

So that all the King of *France* could get by accepting the Crown of *Spain*, would be a little present Satisfaction, to see a Son of the House of *Bourbon* on the *Spanish* Throne, but as King of *France* he wou'd not be One Farthing the better for it.

But this would not be all as is before Noted, but whenever the present Duke of *Burgundy* comes to Enjoy the Crown of *France*, it will in all Probability be an eternal Cause of Contention, between them: For if the Family of *France* has any

any Title to *Spain*, 'tis in the Eldest Son of the Family, and there can be no Colour of a Title in the Second Son while the Eldest is alive, but what is founded either in the Gift of the One King or the Other.

As to the Gift of the *Dauphin* to his Second Son the First being alive, it cannot be valid; for he has no Power to give away what is his Son's by Inheritance, nor can no more give the Crown of *Spain* from him then the Crown of *France*; if Gift could be pleaded, the Grand-Father gave it away from them all before they were Born: Nay, if the Duke of *Burgundy* should consent to it, His Children if ever he has any will declare, he had nothing to do to give away their Right, any more than the present King of *France* had Power to give away the Right of the *Dauphin*; for since the Deficiency of that Action in Its own Nature is the whole Ground of the *Dauphin's* Title now, it will directly destroy the Title of the Duke *D' Anjou* for what is a good Argument for him cannot be a bad One against him.

As to the Gift of the *Defunct King of Spain*, I see nothing in it to build a Pretence of Right on; If he had bequeath'd it to the Right Heir, I presume, he wou'd not have thought his Title on for the better for it. And if he had bequeath'd it to the *Grand-Signior*, the King of *France* wou'd not have thought his Title the worse for it; So that it signifies just nothing at all.

We come now to the Grand Question proposed.

Quest. 2. What Measures the English ought to take in this Juncture.

The Answer must be in two Parts.

1. Supposing the French King adheres to the Partition agreed upon by the League before mentioned.

2. Supposing

2. Supposing the French King for Reasons which we know not should think fit to quite the Treaty, and push for the whole on the pretence of a Will made by the King of *Spain*.

'Tis confels'd *England*, since her Troops are broke, and her People more divided in Temper than 'twas hop'd they wou'd have been under so mild and gentle a Government, makes but a very mean Figure Abroad; and were any King at the Head of her Councils as well as Forces, but King *William*, hardly any Nation would trouble their Heads to Confederat with her.

But all the World does not yet see our weak Side, and the Reputation of the King makes us more formidable a great deal than we really are.

But we are to act according to the Knowledge we have of what our Circumstances really are, not what other Nations may believe them, least we let them know our Weakness as the Price of our Destruction.

However I'll for the present suppose what all good Men wish: That we were in the same good Posture as the War left us, united in Council, and ready for Action, And willing to preserve the Character we had then in the World.

And first, Supposing the King of *France* adheres to the Partition of the Spanish Monarchy.

If so, without Question *England* ought to put her self in to such a posture as to be able, in Conjunction with the Dutch, to Force the Emperor and Princes of *Italy* to comply with the Conditions.

At the same time so to maintain the Ballance in the Partition, as to oblige the King of *France*, to accept of, and rest contented with the particulars Stipulated in their Respective

spective Leagues, without farther Encroachment, and to make themselves Trustees for the rest, in behalf of the Heir.

It is already started as a Query, what if the King of France does accept of the Partition, and the Emperor should continue to stand out, the King of France is then at Liberty to take the whole if he can get it.

No such Matter, I do not pretend to have been privy to the Debates, or of the Council, in the contriving this League, nor to be acquainted with what Provision is made, in case the Emperor refuses to come in, but in order to give a Judgment as near as can be done without Doors, as we call it: I shall briefly state the Reasons, which in my Opinion should move the English and Dutch to form this League: And the great Reason, which, as I conceive, gave Birth to the first Project of this League, setting aside private Reasons of State, was the maintaining the Ballance of Power in Europe.

This has been the Foundation of all the Wars in our Age against the French, and in the last Ages against the Spaniards and the Emperor.

A just Ballance of Power is the Life of Peace. I question whether it be in the Humane Nature to set Bounds to its own Ambition, and whether the best Man on Earth would not be King over all the rest if he could: Every King in the World would be the Universal Monarch if he might, and nothing restrains but the Power of Neighbours; And if one Neighbour is not strong enough for another, he gets another Neighbour to join with him, and all the little ones will join to keep the great one from suppressing them. Hence comes Leagues and Confederacies; Thus the German Protestants

call'd

call'd in the Assistance of Gustavus Adolphus to match the Power of the Emperor Ferdinand the 2. and founded the famous League call'd the Conclusions of Leipsick, which brought the Imperial Power to the due Ballance which it now stands at on the Foot of the Treaty of Westphalia; So the French and the English assisted the Dutch to bring the Spanish power to a Ballance in the time of Philip the 2. when the Spanish Greatness began to be terrible to Europe, which Ballance was established in the Peace of Aix la Chappel.

So the power of France was brought to a Ballance, but not so equal as it might have been. had King Charles II. stood to his own Proposals at the Treaty of Nimeguen, the Defects of which Peace were in a great Measure the Occasion of this late War, which has been the longest, most chargeable, and most bloody that ever the French Nation has been engaged in since the Days of Francis the I. their own civil Wars excepted.

This War has brought the power of France to a Ballance, she had fortified her Frontiers with a continued Rampart, a Line of strong Cities from Hunningben on the Confines of the Swiss, down the Rhine, the Mosell, and the Maes, to the very Sea-side, the greatest whereof she has been oblig'd to part with, to enable her Enemies to be their own Guarantees; by which in some places she is left so naked, that she is fain to build new Cities, or fortifie old ones to supply the Vacancy, as at Brisac, and in other the lyes wholly open as at Pigneroll; she has stoop'd to such a Peace, as has made her far less formidable than before.

Now the precarious Life of the King of Spain gave the King of England just Umbrage, that this Ballance in which our Safety so much consists, should receive a Shock, to the prejudice of the Protestant Interest, by the Addition of the Spanish Dominion to that of France.

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And here I place the Original of the project, as a probable Conjecture, at least drawn from the Nature of things according to Rational Conclusions from probable Premises. when better Grounds are made publick, I shall own my self mistaken.

When the pretenders to the Spanish Succession are considered they are found to be the Emperor and the King of France, the Prince of Bavaria being dead before.

To let the Emperor possess the Spanish Dominions, would be the Overthrowing the Ballance made at the Westphalia Treaty, by which the House of Austria already strengthened by the Conquest of Hungaria, and the Peace with the Turks would be too potent for the Princes of Germany, nor would the French like well that the Emperor, the Eternal Competitor of France upon the Rhine, should be strengthen'd with such an Addition, by which he would have been Lord of almost half the World.

To let the French possess the Spanish Dominions, would overthrow the Ballance Purchas'd in this War with so much Blood and Treasure, and render fruitless the Treaty of Reswick. 'Twould especially ha' been Fatal to the English and Dutch, by the increase of Wealth from the Mass of Money, returning Yearly from the Empires of Mexico, and Peru, which the French would be better Husbands of than the Spaniards; by their increase of Shipping, which would make them too strong for all the World at Sea, and by their ruining the Spanish Trade, which is the greatest and most profitable in Europe; twould immediatly unhinge all the Settlement of our Merchants and Factories, and turn the whole Channel Trade; for the ports of Spain being free to the French as Subjects, all our Negoce that way would be destroyed, then their Neighbourhood in Flanders, and in the West-Indies, would be intollerable and insupportable.

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'Twould fill a Volume to set down the Inconveniencies which England and Holland must expect to feel, in case the French were Masters of the Spanish Monarchy, the Streights Mouth would be like the Sound, and all our Ships should pay Toll at Gibraltar, as they do at Elsenour, your Fishing Trade from New-England and New-found-land would perish, for the French from the Banks of Newfoundland should go free, and you pay 23 per Cent, &c. We must erect an Admiralty in the West-Indies, or maintain a Fleet there, or our plantations would be always at his Mercy; our Colonies of Virginia, and New-England, would easily be destroy'd while the French would lye on their backs quite thro' their Country from Canada to the City of Mexico.

These are some of the lesser Inconveniencies, which, as I presume, were the first Motives to the Treaty.

The Confederates therefore not being willing the French should have Spain, and the French being resolv'd the Emperor should not have it, a Medium is propos'd, that since it was not convenient for Europe, that either of them should have it all and both of them had a Tittle to it, it should therefore be divided between them in Manner and Form, as aforesaid.

This is the short History of this League, which really has more of Policy than of Right in it, for strickly Considered, the Right of Succession can devolve but upon one Person, let that one be who it will, is not the present Business. But publick good, the Peace of Kingdoms, the General quiet of Europe, it vails to set aside the Point of nice Justice, and determine in favour of the Publick Tranquility.

And I crave leave to make Two Observations here.

First Our Jacobite Protestant-Brethren, whose Understandings are so blind, that they cannot see the Interest of their Native Country, have here fairly represented to them the Condition

England

England had now been in, and Europe in General, if a Papist and Confederate with France had been on the English Throne; if England had not had a King who cou'd so far Influence the Ambition of the powerful Prince, as to prevent his seizing that Monarchy of Spain, which none but England cou'd hinder him from.

Secondly, Our Non Jurants who hold the right Lines of Princes such Sacred things, may see that even among Hereditary Princes themselves, the Rights of Succession are oftentimes infringed, and the private Interest of Princes and Families set aside when the publick Interest of Nations, the Preservation of Peace, and the keeping a General Ballance of Power among Princes, comes to be the Question, and the Histories of all Ages and Nations give Instances to prove it as well as this.

Having thus run thro' the Reasons of this League of Partition, the Question is answered of course, that if the Emperor shou'd refuse to come into the Partition and push for the whole, then the King of France is not thereby at Liberty to possess the whole, if he can, for that wou'd overthrow all the Measures upon which the League of partition is built.

The Emperor is not so weak a prince, to refuse the Kingdom of Spain with all its *Isles* in the Ocean, *Flanders*, and *America*, but upon some Expectation to get more; the Confederates therefore are to preserve that part which is Design'd him free, and then effectually to put it out of his power to obtain the rest, and with all not to admit him into the part Reserv'd for him, till he agrees to accept it on the Terms propos'd; if he shou'd absolutely refuse it, which is a ridiculous Supposition, there are other Heirs of that Line to have Recourse too, there's no doubt the Crown of Spain need not go a begging for an Heir.

It may be answered, if it be thus, it is the Emperors best course to lay his Measures for the whole; and if he cannot carry it, he may accept of the Partition at last.

That's more than the Objector may be able to prove how far the Confederates may think fit to bestow the Remainder, if the Emperor after a War shou'd be reduc'd to accept of it, is more than any one can answer, and more than the Emperor will try, if he be not insatuated worse than ever a certain King was; who, if he had not, might have been a King still.

The Second Branch of the Answer is supposing the King of France should so far beget himself, as to quite the League of partition, and claim the Crown of Spain for his Grand-son *Duk d' Anjou*, by virtue of the Will of the King Defunct.

It must certainly then be the Interest of England and Holland, first to put themselves in such a posture as may prevent the French King seizing of Spain it self, and *Flanders* in particular.

And upon the first Invasion of the Territories of Spain by the French King, to declare War against him in Name of the whole Confederacy, as an Infringer of the Grand-peace at *Reswick*.

And then by appearing on the Frontiers in such a formidable manner as shall give him Diversion enough, that he cannot be able to enter Spain with any considerable Forces.

The first of these things is to be done immediatly, by fitting out a good Fleet, which should so scour the *Mediterranean*, that the French wou'd not be able to do much on the side of *Catalonia*: for Experience has told us a Fleet at Sea will make their War in *Catalonia* very uneasy to them, and by Landing a small Force of about Eight or Ten Thousand Men at *Ponterabia*, which should be sufficient to defend that side of the Country from the Invasions of the French.

But this Pamphlet is not wrote to direct Methods, but to argue the General Point.

The Conclusion of the Argument must come to that sort of People, who have appeared Champions for our English Liberty; as to damn all kind of force, as useles, burthensom to the Kingdom, and Badges of Slavery, and all Arguments to be only pretences for supporting Arbitrary Designs.

If the French shou'd attack *Spain*, I am far from saying I am glade they will be convinced; but I must say I am sorry the People of *England* have been deluded by their specious pretences.

For if the *French* carry the Spanish Monarchy for want of our being in a Condition to prevent it; I am bold to tell those Gentlemen, GOD Almighty must be put to the trouble of working another Miracle to save us, or we are reduc'd to a very dangerous Condition.

But say they, we have a great Fleet, and in that we are safe; It is true, Gentlemen, so we are from Invasion, I believe we need not fear all the World; but what is *England* without its Trade, without its Plantation Trade, *Turky* and *Spanish* Trade, and where will that be when a *French* Garrison is planted at *Cadiz*, and the *French* Fleet brings home the Plate from *Havana*.

What will the *Virginia* Collony be worth when the *French* come to be strong in the Lakes of , and have a free Commerce from *Quebeck* to *Mexico* behind ye, What will our Northern Trade be worth in a War, when the Ports of *Ostend* and *Newport* are as full of Pirates as *Dunkirk* and *St. Malo*?

A wise Man cannot patiently Reflect upon the formidable Power of *France*, with the Addition of the Spanish Dominion, and should he at last annex it to the Crown of *France*, who can consider without Horrour that all the Ports from *Sluce* in *Flanders*, to the *Faro Messina* in *Sicily*, should be in the Hands of the *French*, which is a Coast of near 3000 Miles, *Portugal*, *Genoua*, and *Leghorn* excepted; and how long they will hold out, is easie to imagine.

I know GOD can prevent Humane Contrivances, and I believe He has placed King *William* on the *English* Throne, on purpose to disappoint this Invincible Monarch in these vast Designs, but no Thanks to our Gentlemen that have so weakened both his Hands and his Interest at home, as to make him less able to perform for us what is more our own Advantage than his Majesty's wou'd be, and than the Case requir'd.

As to wayes and means I meddle not with them, I leave them to the wise Heads of the Nation, but with Submission to their

their Judgement, this I am positive in, let our Measures be what they will, if they do not keep the Enemy, the *French*, I mean out of *Spain*, we are undone.

In all the Histories of Times and Wars, I never read of a General who would not chuse to be Master of the Field, and able to fight his Enemy, rather than to be coop'd up, and bound to defend the Walls of a Town.

If the *French* get the *Spanish* Crown, we are beaten out of Field as to Trade, and are besieged in our own Island, and never let us flatter ourselves with our Safety consisting so much in our Fleet; For this I presume to lay down as a fundamental Axiom, at least, as the Wars, go of late, 'tis not the longest Sword, but the longest Purse that conquers. If the *French* get *Spain*, they get the greatest Trade in the World in their Hands; they that have the most Trade, will have the most Money, and they that have the most Money, will have the most Ships, the best Fleet, and the best Armies; and if once the *French* Master us at Sea, where are we then? And though I would not lessen our Fleet, which I believe is now the best in the World, yet he that looks back to the *French* Fleet before their Misfortune, will tell you that all our *English* was not able to look them in the Face, if we had no *Dutch* on our side, and hardly with the *Dutch* and Us together.

I am answer'd by some, that if the *French* should have *Spain*, we shall Trade thither still, they cannot do without our Manufactures.

To this, I answer, time was, *France* could not Trade without our Manufactures. Now they are fallen into them to such a Degree, that they only want Wool, and they have Hands enough to supply all the World with Manufactures, and they're so supplied with that from one place or another, that they buy none of our Goods now, or but a trifle; and if the Ports of *Spain* come to be filled with *French*, they will fill every place with their Goods, as well as People.

Besides, the Laws of Trade when Masters of the Ports will bring

bring all Nations to Trade under foot with them, and with great disadvantages and hardships which will in the end ruine all that Trade that does not run thro' their own Hands.

The present King of *France*, like a wise Governor, puts his People upon all manner of Improvements; tho the *Spaniards* are a slothful Nation, if the *French* Diligence come once to thrive in *Spain*, he knows little of *Spain* that does not know they are capable of Improvements, several ways to the disadvantage of the *English* Trade.

I'll give but one instance, *Spain* is a very hot Country, and yet such is the constancy of the *Spaniard*, to the old Ridiculous Custom, that they wear their Cloaks of course black English Bays, should the *French* King when he is Master of *Spain*, forbid the *Spaniards* the wearing of Bays, and introduce some antick *French* Druggs, or other thin Stuff, such as they make in *Normandy*, it would at once destroy our Trade of *Bays*; which is the noblest Manufacture in many Respects that we have in *England*, and send forty thousand people who depend on that Trade to beg their Bread, or seek other Work, which other Work must of Consequence lessen the Employment of other Poor Families which it maintained before.

I could give many instances of the like Nature, as for one more should they prohibit the Exportation of *Spanish* Wool and Manufacture it among themselves, or into *France*; let the West Country Clothiers speak for themselves, and say what strange work it would make among them, or our *Hambrough* Merchants give an account what their Trade would come to, where they are outdone already in course Cloth and wou'd ha' no fine over to send to Market.

I know not but I may present the World with a short Account by it self, of all the Sensible Losses our Trade will come under, if the Kingdom of *Spain* should fall into the Hands of the *French*, tho me thinks it should be needless to run thro' it, the meanest Understanding being capable to know that the greatest part of the Wealth of this Nation has been, and is still Rais'd by the Gainful Trade we have with the *Spaniards*.

F I N I S.