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S E R M O N,

PREACHED

BEFORE THE LORDS SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL,

On Wednesday, January 30, 1793.

With an APPENDIX, concerning the Political Principles of CALVIN.

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[PRICE ONE SHILLING AND SIX-PENCE.]

Die Jovis, 31^o Januarii, 1793.

ORDERED, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the Thanks of this House be, and are hereby, given to the Lord Bishop of St. David's, for the Sermon by him preached before this House Yesterday, in the Abbey-Church, Westminster; and that he be desired to cause the same to be forthwith printed and published.

GEORGE ROSE, *Cler' Parliamentar'.*

A
S E R M O N,
PREACHED
BEFORE THE LORDS SPIRITUAL
AND TEMPORAL,
IN THE
ABBEY CHURCH OF ST. PETER, WESTMINSTER,
On WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1793:
BEING THE ANNIVERSARY
OF THE
MARTYRDOM
OF
KING CHARLES THE FIRST.

With an APPENDIX,
Concerning the Political Principles of CALVIN.

BY SAMUEL,
LORD BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S.

L O N D O N:
Printed for J. ROBSON, Bookfeller, New Bond-street
M.DCC.XCIII.

S E R M O N, &c.

ROMANS xiii. 1.

LET EVERY SOUL BE SUBJECT UNTO THE HIGHER POWERS.

THE freedom of dispute, in which, for several years past, it hath been the folly in this country to indulge, upon matters of such high importance as the origin of Government, and the authority of Sovereigns; the futility of the principles, which the assertors, as they have been deemed, of the natural Rights of Men, allege as the foundation of that

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semblance of power, which they would be thought willing to leave in the hands of the Supreme Magistrate (principles rather calculated to palliate sedition, than to promote the peace of Society, and add to the security of Government); this forwardness to dispute about the limits of the Sovereign's power, and the extent of the People's rights, with this evident desire, to set civil authority upon a foundation on which it cannot stand secure; argues, it should seem, that something is forgotten, among the Writers, who have presumed to treat these curious questions; and among those Talkers, who, with little knowledge or reflection of their own, think they talk safely after so high authorities. It surely is forgotten, that whatever praise may be due to the philosophers of the Heathen world; who in order to settle, not to confound the principles of the human conduct, set themselves to investigate the source of the obligations of morality and law; whatever tenderness may be due to the errors, into which they would inevitably fall, in their speculations concerning the present condition of mankind, and the apparent constitution of the moral world; of which, destitute as they were of the light of Revelation, they knew neither the beginning nor the end; the Christian is possessed of a written rule of conduct, delivered from on high, which is treated with profane contempt, if reference be
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not had to it upon all questions of duty, or if its maxims are tortured, from their natural and obvious sense, to correspond with the precarious conclusions of any theory, spun from the human brain. It hath been forgotten, that Christians are possessed of authentic records of the first ages, and of the very beginning of mankind, which for their antiquity alone, independent of their Divine authority, might claim to be consulted in all enquiries, where the resolution of the point in question depends upon the History of Man.

From these records it appears, that the Providence of God was careful to give a beginning to the Human Race, in that particular way, which might for ever bar the existence of the whole, or of any large portion of mankind, in that state which hath been called the State of Nature. Mankind, from the beginning never existed otherwise, than in Society, and under Government. Whence follows this important consequence: that to build the authority of Princes, or of the chief Magistrate under whatever denomination, upon any compact or agreement between the individuals of a multitude, living previously in the state of nature, is in truth to build a reality upon a fiction. That Government, in various forms, is now subsisting in the world, is a fact not easily to
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~~be denied, or doubted.~~ That the State of Nature ever did exist, is a position, of which proof is wanting. That it existed not in the earliest ages, the pretended time of its existence, is a fact, of which proof is not wanting, if credit may be given to the Mosaic records. But to derive governments which now are, from a supposed previous condition of mankind, which never was, is at the best an absurd and unphilosophical creation of something out of nothing.

But this absurdity is in truth but the least part of the mischief, which this ill-conceived theory draws after it. Had what is called the State of Nature, though a thing so unnatural hath little title to the name; but had this state been in fact the primæval condition of mankind; that is, had the world been at first peopled with a multitude of individuals no otherwise related, than as they had partaken of the same internal nature, and carried the same external form; without distinct property, yet all possessing equal right, to what they might have strength or cunning to appropriate, each to himself of the Earth's common store; without any governor, head, or guardian: no government could ever have been formed, by any compact between the individuals of this multitude, but what their children, in the very
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next generation, would have had full right to abolish; or any one or more of those children, even in opposition to the sense of the majority, with perfect innocence, though not without imprudence, might have disobeyed. Infomuch that if such compact be the true foundation of sovereign authority, the foundation is weaker, than these republican theorists themselves conceive.

The whole foundation of Government, in their view of it, is laid in these two assumptions: the first, that the will of a majority obliges the minority; and the second, that the whole posterity may be bound by the act and deed of their progenitors. But both these rights, that of the many to bind the few, and that of the father to make a bargain that shall bind his unborn children; both these rights, though sacred, incontrovertible in civil society, are yet of the number of those to which civil society itself gives birth, and out of society they could have no existence. The obligations on the minority, and on the child, to stand by the resolutions of the majority, and the engagements of the father, arise not from any thing in the nature of man individually considered. They are rather indeed unnatural: for all obligations, strictly speaking, are unnatural, which bind a man to the terms of a covenantant.

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nant made without his knowledge and consent. But they arise from the condition of man as a member of society; that is from the relation of the Individual to the Publick: a relation which subsists not, till a Publick is formed. And to make those civil rights and obligations the parents of public authority, which are indeed its offspring, is strangely to confound causes and effects.

The plain truth is this. The manner in which, as we are informed upon the authority of God himself, God gave a beginning to the world, evidently leads to this conclusion; namely, that Civil Society, which always implies Government, is the condition to which God originally destined man. Whence the obligation on the citizen to submit to government, is an immediate result from that first principle of religious duty, which requires that man conform himself, as far as in him lies, with the will and purpose of his Maker. The Governments, which now are, have arisen, not from a previous state of no-government, falsely called the State of Nature; but from that original government, under which the first generations of men were brought into existence, variously changed and modified, in a long course of ages, under the wise direction of God's over-ruling Providence, to suit the various climates of the world, and the

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the infinitely varied manners and conditions of its inhabitants. And the principle of subjection is not that principle of common honesty, which binds a man to his own engagements, much less that principle of political honesty, which binds the child to the ancestor's engagements; but a conscientious submission to the will of God.

I must observe, that the principles, which I advance, ascribe no greater sanctity to Monarchy*, than to any other form of established government. Nor do they at all involve that exploded notion, that all or any of the present sovereigns of the earth hold their sovereignty, by virtue of such immediate or implied nomination on the part of God, of themselves personally, or of the stocks from which they are descended, as might confer an endless indefeasible right upon the posterity of the persons named. In contending that Government was co-æval with mankind, it will readily be admitted, that all the par-

* It is true, that for many generations after the Creation, the whole world must have been under the monarchy of Adam; and of Noah, for some time after the Flood. But this primitive patriarchal government, in which the Sovereign was in a literal sense the father of the people, was so much *sui generis*, so different from any of the monarchical forms which have since taken place, that none of these can build any right of preference upon those examples.

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particular forms of Government, which now exist, are the work of human policy, under the controul of God's general over-ruling Providence; that the Israelities were the only people upon earth, whose form of Government was of express divine institution, and their Kings the only monarchs, who ever reigned by an indefeasible divine title. But it is contended, that all government is in such sort of divine institution, that, be the form of any particular government what it may, the submission of the individual is a principal branch of that religious duty, which each man owes to God: it is contended, that the state of mankind was never such, that it was free to any man, or to any number of men, to choose for themselves whether they would live subject to government, and united to society, or altogether free and unconnected.

It is true that in the world, taken as it now is, and hath been for many ages, cases happen, in which the Sovereign Power is conferred by the act of the people, and in which that act alone can give the Sovereign a just title. Not only in elective monarchies, upon the natural demise of the reigning prince, the successor is raised to the throne by the suffrage of the people; but in governments of whatever denomination, if the form of government undergo a change, or the established

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established rule of succession be set aside by any violent or necessary revolution, the act of the nation itself is necessary to erect a new sovereignty, or to transfer the old right to the new possessor. The condition of a people, in these emergencies, bears no resemblance or analogy to that anarchy, which hath been called the State of Nature. The people become not, in these situations of government, what they would be in that state, a mere multitude. They are a *Society*; not dissolved, but in danger of dissolution; and, by the great law of self-preservation, inherent in the body politic, no less than in the solitary animal, a society so situated hath a right to use the best means for its own preservation and perpetuity. A people therefore in these circumstances hath a right, which a mere multitude unassociated could never have, of appointing, by the consent of the Majority, for themselves and their posterity, a new head. And it will readily be admitted, that of all Sovereigns none reign by so fair and just a title, as those who can derive their claim from such public Act of the nation, which they govern. But it is no just inference, that the obligation upon the private Citizen to submit himself to the authority thus raised, arises wholly from the Act of the people conferring it, or from their compact with the person, on whom it is conferred. In all these cases, the Act of the People is only the

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means*, which Providence employs, to advance the new Sovereign to his station. The obligation to obedience proceeds secondarily only from the Act of Man, but primarily from the will of God †; who hath appointed civil life for Man's condition, and requires the Citizen's submission to the Sovereign, whom his Providence shall, by whatever means, set over him.

Thus in our own Country, at the glorious epoch of the Revolution, the famous Act of Settlement was the means, which Providence employed to place the British Sceptre in the hands, which now wield it. That statute is confessedly the sole foundation of the Sovereign's title. Nor can any future Sovereign have a just title to the Crown, the Law continuing as it is, whose claim stands not upon that ground. Yet it is not merely by virtue of that Act, that the Subject's allegiance is due to him

* Quasi vero Deus non ita regat populum, ut cui Deus vult, regnum tradat populus.

Milton, Defensio pro Pop. Angl.

† Ratio cur debeamus subjecti esse magistratibus, quod Dei ordinatione sunt constituti. Quod si ita placet Domino mundum gubernare, Dei ordinem invertere nititur, adeoque Deo ipsi resistit, quisquis potestatem aspernatur: quando ejus, qui juris politici auctor est, providentiam contemnere, bellum cum eo suscipere est."

Calvin. in Rom. xiii. 1.

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whose claim is founded on it. It is easy to understand, that the principle of the private Citizen's submission must be quite a distinct thing from the principle of the Sovereign's Public Title. And for this plain reason: The principle of submission, to bind the conscience of every individual, must be something universally known, and easy to be understood. The ground of the Sovereign's Public Title, in Governments, in which the fabric of the constitution is in any degree complex and artificial, can be known only to the few, who have leisure, and ability, and inclination for Historical and Political researches. In this country, how many thousands and ten thousands of the common people never heard of the Act of Settlement? Of those to whom the name may be familiar, how many have never taken the pains to acquire any accurate knowledge of its contents? Yet not one of these is absolved from his allegiance, by his ignorance of his Sovereign's title. Where then shall we find that general principle, that binds the duty of allegiance equally on all, redde or unredde in the Statute-book, and in the History of their Country; where shall we find it, but among those general rules of duty, which proceed immediately from the will of the Creator, and have been impressed upon the conscience of every man by the original constitution of the world?

This Divine right of the first Magistrate, in every polity, to the Citizen's obedience, is not of that sort which it were High Treason to claim for the Sovereigns of this Country. It is quite a distinct thing from the pretended Divine right to the inheritance of the Crown. It is a right, which the most zealous Republicans acknowledged to be Divine, in former times, before Republican zeal had ventured to espouse the interests of Atheism*. It is a right, which in no country can be denied, without the Highest of all Treasons. The denial of it were treason against the paramount authority of God.

* "All Kings, but such as are immediately named by God himself, have their power by human right only: though, after human composition and agreement, their lawful choice is approved of God, and obedience required to them by Divine Right." These are the words in which Bishop Hoadly states Hooker's sentiments. Hooker's own words are stronger, and more extensive. But the sentiment, to the extent in which it is conveyed in these terms, the Republican Bishop approved. See Hoadly's Defence of Hooker.

Quod Dii nuncupantur, quicumque magistratum gerunt, ne in eâ appellatione leve ineffe momentum quis putet: eâ enim significatur, mandatum a Deo habere, divinâ auctoritate præditos esse, ac omnino Dei personam sustinere, cujus vices quodammodo agunt. Calvin. Inst. Lib. iv. cap. 20. § 4.

— resisti magistratui non potest, quin simul Deo resistatur.
Calvin. Inst. Lib. iv. cap. 20. § 23.
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These views of the authority of civil governors, as they are obviously suggested by the Mosaic History of the first ages, so they are confirmed by the precepts of the Gospel. In which, if any thing is to be found clear, peremptory and unequivocal, it is the injunction of submission to the sovereign authority; and, in Monarchies, of loyalty to the person of the Sovereign.

"Let every soul," says the apostle in my text, "be subject to the higher powers."

The word "powers" here signifies persons bearing power. Any other meaning of it, whatever may be pretended, is excluded by the context*. The text, indeed,

* It has been a great point with Republican Divines, to explain away the force of this text. But for this purpose, they have never been able to fall upon any happier expedient, than to say that the word "Powers," *ἐξουσιαι*, signifies not Persons bearing power, but Forms of government. Then, restraining the precept to such governments as are perfectly well administered, and finding hardly any government upon earth administered to their mind, (for they never make allowance for the inevitable imperfection and infirmity of all things human) they get rid of the constraint of this divine injunction, which, by this interpretation and this limitation, they render as nugatory as any of their own maxims, and find their conscience perfectly at ease, while they make free, in word and in deed, with thrones, dominions,

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indeed, had been better rendered, "Let every soul be subject to the sovereign powers." The word "sovereign" renders the exact meaning of that Greek word, for which the English Bible, in this place, rather unhappily puts the comparative "higher." In another passage* it is very properly rendered

dominions, and dignities. Whatever be the natural import of the word *ἐξουσία*, the epithet, which is joined to it in the text, shews, that it must be understood here of something, which admits the degree of high and low; but of this, forms of government are incapable. Every form is supreme, where it is established; and since different forms of Government cannot subsist at the same time among the same people, it were absurd to say, of Forms of Government, that one is higher than another. Again in the 3d verse of this same Chapter, the power [*ἐξουσία*] is said to bestow praise upon those who do good; in the 4th, to be "the Minister of God;" and in the 6th, to receive tribute, as the wages of a close attendance upon that Ministry. None of these things can be said of Forms of Government, without a harshness of metaphor unexampled in the didactic parts of Holy Writ. But all these things may be said with great propriety of the persons governing.

In the xiith chapter of St. Luke's Gospel, the first preachers are warned, that they are to be brought before synagogues, and magistrates, and powers, [*ἐξουσία*]. There the word evidently signifies, Persons bearing power. I will venture to add, that not a single instance is to be found in any writer, sacred or profane, of the use of the word *ἐξουσία* to signify Form of Government. Nor is that sense to be extracted, by any critical chemistry, from the etymology and radical meaning of the word.

* 1 Pet. ii. 13.

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by a word equivalent to sovereign, by the word "supreme."

"Let every soul be subject to the sovereign powers." The sovereignty particularly intended, in the immediate application of the precept to those to whom the epistle was addressed, was the sovereign authority of the Roman Emperor. Nero was at the time the possessor of that sovereignty. And the Apostle, in what he immediately subjoins to enforce his precept, seems to obviate an objection, which he was well aware the example of Nero's tyranny might suggest.

His reasoning is to this effect.

"The sovereignty, you will say, is often placed in unfit hands, and abused to the worst purposes. It is placed in the hands of sensual rapacious men, of capricious women, and of ill-conditioned boys. It is in such sort abused, as to be made the instrument of lust and ambition, of avarice and injustice. You yourselves, my brethren, experience the abuse of it in your own persons. It may seem to you, that power, derived from the Author of all Good, would never be so misplaced, nor be permitted to be so misused: And you may perhaps be ready to conclude, that the Father of lies once at least spake truth, when he claimed

claimed the disposal of earthly sceptres as his own prerogative. Such reasonings, saith the Apostle, are erroneous. No king, however he might use or abuse authority, ever reigned but by the appointment of God's providence *. There is no such thing as power but from God. To him, whatever Powers, good or bad, are at any time subsisting in the world, are subordinate. He has good ends of his own, not always to be foreseen by us, to be effected by the abuse of power, as by other partial evils. And to his own

* Hoc nobis si affiduè ob animos et oculos observetur, eodem decreto constitui etiam nequissimos reges, quo regum autoritas statuitur; nunquam in animum nobis seditiosæ illæ cogitationes venient, "tractandum esse pro meritis regem, nec æquum esse ut subditos ei nos præstemus, qui vicissim Regem nobis se non præstat." Calvin. Inst. iv. 20. § 27.

Si in Dei verbum respicimus longius nos deducet, ut non eorum modò principum imperio subditi simus, qui probè, et quâ debent fide, munere suo erga nos defunguntur, sed omnium, qui quoquo modo rerum potiuntur, etiamsi nihil minus præstent, quàm quod ex officio erat principum.

————— in eo probando insistamus magis, quod non ita facilè in hominum mentes cadit, in homine deterrimo, honoreque omni indignissimo, penes quem modò sit publica potestas, præclaram illam et divinam potestatem residere, quam Dominus justitiæ ac iudicii sui ministris, verbo suo, detulit: proinde à subditis eadem in reverentiâ et dignitate habendum, quantum ad publicam obedientiam attinet, quâ optimum regem, si daretur, habituri essent. Calvin. Inst. iv. 20, 25.

secret purpose he directs the worst actions of Tyrants, no less than the best of Godly Princes. Man's abuse therefore of his delegated authority is to be born with resignation, like any other of God's judgements. The opposition of the Individual to the Sovereign power is an opposition to God's providential arrangements. And it is the more inexcusable, because the well-being of Mankind is the general end for which Government is ordained; and this end of Government, under all its abuses, is *generally* answered by it. For the good of Government is perpetual and universal; the mischiefs resulting from the abuse of Power, temporary and partial. Inasmuch that in Governments which are the worst administered, the Sovereign Power, *for the most part*, is a terror not to good works, but to the evil; and upon the whole far more beneficial, than detrimental to the subject *. But this general good of Government cannot be secured upon any other terms, than the submission of the Individual to what may be called its extraordinary evils.

Such is the general scope and tenor of the argument, by which St. Paul enforces the duty of the

* —Nulla tyrannis esse potest, quæ non aliquâ ex parte subsidio sit ad tuendam hominum societatem. Calvin. in Rom. xiii. 1.

private Citizen's subjection to the Sovereign authority. He never once mentions that God of the Republican's idolatry, the consent of the ungoverned Millions of Mankind*. He represents the Earthly Sovereign as the vicegerent of God, accountable for misconduct to his heavenly Master, but intitled to obedience from the Subject †.

While thus we reprobate the doctrine of the first formation of Government out of anarchy, by a general consent; we confess, with thankfulness to the over-ruling providence of God, we confess and we maintain, that in this Country the King is under the obligation of an express

* The first mention that I remember to have found any where of compact, as the first principle of Government, is in the Crito of Plato; where Socrates alledges a tacit agreement, between the Citizen and the Laws, as the ground of an obligation, to which he thought himself subject, of implicit obedience even to an unjust sentence. It is remarkable, that this fictitious compact, which in modern times hath been made the basis of the unqualified doctrine of resistance, should have been set up by Plato, in the person of Socrates, as the foundation of the opposite doctrine of the passive obedience of the individual.

† Neque enim si ultio Domini est effrenata dominationis correctio, ideo protinus demandatam nobis arbitremur, quibus nullum aliud quam parendi et patiendi datum est mandatum. Calv. Inst. iv. 20, 31. De privatis hominibus semper loquor. ibid.

contract with the people. I say, of an *express* contract. In every Monarchy, in which the will of the Sovereign is in any degree subject (as more or less indeed it is in all) either to the controul of custom, or to a fixed rule of law, something of a compact is implied at least between the King and the Nation. For limitation of the Sovereign power implies a mutual agreement, which hath fixed the limits. But in this Country, the contract is not tacit, implied, and vague; it is explicit, patent, and precise. It is summarily expressed in the Coronation Oath. It is drawn out at length and in detail in the Great Charter, and the corroborating Statutes; in the petition of Right, in the *Habeas Corpus* Act, in the Bill of Rights, and in the Act of Settlement. Nor shall we scruple to assert, that our Kings in the exercise of their Sovereignty are held to the terms of this express and solemn stipulation; which is the legal measure of their power, and Rule of their conduct. The consequence, which some have attempted to deduce from these most certain premises, we abominate and reject, as wicked and illegitimate: Namely, that "our Kings are the Servants of the People; and that it is the Right of the People to cashier them for misconduct." Our Ancestors are slandered! their Wisdom is insulted! their Virtue is defamed! when these seditious maxims are set forth as the principles, on

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which the great business of the REVOLUTION was conducted; or as the ground-work, on which that noblest production of Human Reason, the wonderful fabric of the BRITISH CONSTITUTION, stands.

Our Constitution hath indeed effectually secured the Monarch's performance of his engagements: Not by that clumsy contrivance of Republican wit, the establishment of a Court of Judicature, with authority to try his conduct, and to punish his delinquency; Not by that coarser expedient of Modern Levellers, a reference to the judgement and the sentence of the multitude—wise judgement! I ween, and righteous sentence! but by two peculiar provisions of a deep and subtle policy; the one, in the form; the other, in the principles of Government; which, in their joint operation, render the transgression of the covenant, on the part of the Monarch, little less than a moral impossibility. The one is the judicious partition of the Legislative Authority, between the King, and the two houses of Parliament; the other, the responsibility attaching upon the advisers and official servants of the Crown. By the first, the Nobles, and the Representatives of the Commons, are severally armed with a power of constitutional resistance, to oppose to prerogative overstepping its just bounds, by the exercise of their own Rights and their own privileges: which power of the estates of Parliament

with the necessity takes away the pretence for any spontaneous interference of the private Citizen, otherwise than by the use of the elective franchise, and of the Right of petition for the redress of grievances. By the second, those, who might be willing to be the instruments of despotism, are deterred by the dangers, which await the service. Having thus excluded all probability of the event of a systematic abuse of Royal Power, or a dangerous exorbitance of Prerogative, our Constitution exempts her Kings from the degrading necessity of being accountable to the Subject. She invests them with the high attribute of political Impeccability. She declares, that wrong, in his public capacity, a King of Great Britain cannot do; and thus unites the most perfect security of the Subject's Liberty, with the most absolute inviolability of the sacred person of the Sovereign.

Such is the British Constitution. Its Basis, Religion; its End, Liberty; its principal means and safe-guard of Liberty, the Majesty of the Sovereign. In support of it, the King is not more interested than the Peasant.

It was a signal instance of God's mercy, not imputing to the people of this land the atrocious deed of a desperate faction; it was a signal instance of God's mercy, that the goodly fabric was not crushed,
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in the middle of the last century, ere it had attained its finished perfection, by the phrensy of that fanatical banditti, which took the life of the First Charles. In the madness and confusion, which followed the shedding of that blood, our History holds forth an edifying example of the effects, that are ever to be expected—in that example, it gives warning of the effects, that ever are INTENDED, by the dissemination of those infernal maxims, that Kings are the servants of the people, punishable by their Masters. The same lesson is confirmed by the horrible example, which the present hour exhibits, in the unparalleled misery of a neighbouring Nation; once great in Learning, Arts and Arms! Now torn by contending factions! Her Government demolished! Her Altars overthrown! Her First-born despoiled of their Birth-right! Her Nobles degraded! Her best Citizens exiled! Her riches, sacred and profane, given up to the pillage of sacrilege and rapine! Atheists directing her Councils! Desperadoes conducting her Armies! Wars of unjust and chimerical ambition consuming her Youth! Her Granaries exhausted! Her Fields uncultivated! Famine threatening her multitudes! Her Streets swarming with Assassins, filled with violence, deluged with blood!

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Is the picture frightful? Is the misery extreme? the guilt horrid? Alas, these things were but the prelude of the tragedy. Public Justice poisoned in its source! profaned, in the abuse of its most solemn forms, to the foulest purposes! A monarch deliberately murdered! A monarch—whose only crime it was, that he inherited a sceptre, the thirty-second of his illustrious stock,—butchered on a public scaffold, after the mockery of arraignment, trial, sentence! Butchered, without the merciful formalities of the vilest malefactor's execution! The sad privilege of a last farewell to the surrounding populace refused! Not the pause of a moment allowed for devotion! Honourable interment denied to the corpse! The Royal Widow's anguish imbittered by the rigour of a close imprisonment! with hope, indeed, at no great distance, of release—of such release as hath been given to her Lord!

This foul murder, and these barbarities, have filled the measure of the guilt and infamy of France. O my Country! Read the horror of thy own deed in this recent heightened imitation! Lament and weep, that this black French treason should have found its example, in the crime of thy unnatural sons! Our contrition for the guilt that stained our
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land, our gratitude to God, whose mercy so soon restored our Church and Monarchy; our contrition for our own crime, and our gratitude for God's unspeakable mercy, will be best expressed by us all, by setting the example of a dutiful submission to government in our own conduct, and by inculcating upon our children and dependants, a loyal attachment to a King, who hath ever sought his own glory in the virtue and prosperity of his people; and administers justice with an even, firm, and gentle hand: a King, who, in many public acts, hath testified his affection for the free constitution of this country: a King, of whom, or of the Princes issued from his loins, and trained by his example, it were injurious to harbour a suspicion, that they will ever be inclined to use their power to any other end, than for the support of Public Liberty. Let us remember, that a conscientious submission to the Sovereign Powers is, no less than brotherly love, a distinctive badge of Christ's disciples. Blessed be God, in the Church of England both those marks of genuine Christianity have ever been conspicuous. Perhaps in the exercise of brotherly love, it is the amiable infirmity of Englishmen, to be too easy to admit the claim of a spiritual kindred. The times compel me to remark, that brotherly love embraces only brethren. The term of holy brotherhood is profaned by an indiscriminate application. We ought to mark those, who
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cause divisions and offences. Nice scruples about external forms, and differences of opinion upon controvertible points, cannot but take place among the best Christians, and dissolve not the fraternal tie. None, indeed, at this season are more entitled to our offices of love, than those, with whom the difference is wide, in points of doctrine, discipline, and external rites; those venerable exiles, the Prelates and Clergy of the fallen church of France, endeared to us by the edifying example they exhibit of patient suffering for conscience sake. But if any enjoying the blessings of the British Government, living under the protection of its free Constitution, and its equal Laws, have DARED to avow the WICKED sentiment, that this day of national contrition, this rueful day of guilt and shame, "is a PROUD day for England, to be remembered as such by the latest posterity of freemen," with such persons it is meet that we abjure all brotherhood. Their spot is not the spot of our family. They have no claim upon our brotherly affection. Upon our charity they have indeed a claim. Miserable men! "They are in the gall of bitterness and in the bond of iniquity." It is our duty to pray God, if perhaps the thought of their heart may be forgiven them.

A P P E N D I X.

IT is much less from any high opinion of the importance of Calvin's authority, to confirm the assertions of the foregoing discourse, that reference has been so frequently made, in the notes at the bottom of the page, to his Theological Institutions, than from a desire of vindicating the character of Calvin himself from an imputation, which they, who think it ill-founded, will be concerned to find revived in a late work of great erudition, and for the ability of the execution, as well as for the intention, of great merit, the "Jura Anglorum" of the learned Mr. Francis Plowden. In a matter, in which the

sense of the Holy Scriptures is so plain, as it certainly is upon the questions which are treated in the foregoing discourse, the Preacher esteems the additional weight of any human authority of little moment. But he cannot allow himself not to take advantage of an occasion, spontaneously as it were arising from his subject, of rescuing the memory of a man, to whom the praise of conspicuous talents, and extensive learning, must be allowed by all, from unjust aspersions. The injustice of which lies not, however, properly at the door of the learned author of the "Jura."

Calvin was unquestionably in theory a Republican. He freely declares his opinion, that the Republican Form, or an Aristocracy reduced nearly to the level of a Republic, was of all the best calculated in general to answer the ends of Government. So wedded, indeed, he was to this notion, that, in disregard of an Apostolic institution and the example of the Primitive Ages, he endeavoured to fashion the Government of all the Protestant churches upon Republican principles; and his persevering zeal in that attempt, though in this country, through the mercy of God, it failed, was followed upon the whole with a wide and mischievous success. But in civil politics, though a Republican in theory, he was no Leveller. That he was not, appears from the passages cited in the Notes upon the foregoing discourse, and will be still more evident to any, who will take the trouble to peruse the whole of the last chapter of the last book of his Institutions of the Christian Religion. In that chapter, he professedly treats the question of the consistency of Civil Government with the scheme of Christianity, which he maintains against the Fanatics of his

times*. He shews that submission to the Magistrate is, under all forms of Government, a religious duty †. He declares his preference of a Republican Aristocracy to any other form ‡. But this declaration is prefaced with an express protest, against the futility of the question, what form is absolutely, and in itself, the best §? He affirms, that the advantage of one Government above another depends much upon circumstances ||. That the circumstances of different countries require different forms. That Government, under every form, is a divine ordinance **. That the variety of Governments, in the different regions of the earth, is no less conducive to the general benefit of mankind, and no less the work of Providence, than the variety of climates ††. And with respect to Monarchy in particular, (by which it is to be observed he means absolute Monarchy) he remarks, that submission to Monarchical Governments is particularly enjoined in Holy Writ, for this especial reason, that Monarchy was the form, which, in the early ages, was the most disliked †††. Whatever preference therefore, in speculation, he might give to the Republican form, he could not, with these principles, be practically an enemy to the Government of Kings. This last chapter of his Institutions, in which he expressly treats the general question of Government, must be supposed to contain the authentic exposition of his deliberate opinions upon the whole of the subject, the confession of his political faith; and by reference to this, any passages, in other parts of his writings, in which subordinate questions are incidentally touched, ought in can-

* Institut. lib. IV. cap. XX. sect. 1, 2, 3. † Sect. 8. ‡ Ibid.
§ Ibid. || Ibid. ** Sect. 4. †† Sect. 8. ††† Sect. 7.
dour.

dour to be interpreted. The passages, in which he has been supposed to betray the principles of a Leveller, lie widely scattered in his Comment on the Book of Daniel. They shall be briefly examined, nearly in the order in which they occur. If it should be found, that they bear a different sense from that which hath been imposed upon them, it will necessarily follow, that they will not justify the reflections, which have been cast.

In the 39th verse of the second chapter, "And after thee shall arise another Kingdom inferior to thee," this difficulty presents itself. With what truth could the Prophet say, that the Kingdom, which was to arise next after Nebuchadnezzar's, namely, the Medo-Perfian, should be inferior to his, when, in fact, in wealth and power, it was greatly the superior of the two? For Nebuchadnezzar's Chaldean Kingdom, with its appendages, made a part only of the vast Empire of the Medes and Persians under Cyrus. Calvin's solution of the difficulty is this (whether it be the true one or no, is not the question, but it is this) that the Medo-Perfian Empire was in this respect inferior to Nebuchadnezzar's, that it was worse in a moral sense; the condition of mankind being more miserable, and their manners more degenerate. The cause of which he refers to this general maxim, that the more Monarchies (i. e. Empires under whatever form of Government) extend themselves to distant regions, the more licentiousness rages in the world*. That the word "Monarchiæ" he renders Empires, without regard to any particular form of Government, is most manifest from the use of it in the comment on the very next verse;

* —quo sese longius extendunt Monarchiæ, eo etiam plus licentiæ in mundo grassatur.

where,

where, after the example of his inspired Author, the Expofitor applies it to the Roman Empire under its *popular Government*. From this general observation, upon the baleful influence of overgrown Empires upon the Happiness and Morals of Man, he draws this conclusion: "Hence it appears how great is the folly and madness of the generality, who desire to have Kings of irresistible power, which is just the same as to desire a river of irresistible rapidity, as Isaiah speaks, exposing this folly." And again, "They are altogether mad, who desire Monarchies of the first magnitude; for it cannot be, but that political order should be much impaired, where a single person occupies so wide a space*." It is evident that this passage expresses no general disapprobation of Monarchy, but of absolute Monarchy—of the arbitrary Rule of one Man—of such arbitrary Rule, stretched over a vast extent of country; and of such extensive arbitrary Dominion founded upon Conquest. In truth, irresistible Military Force is the specific thing intended under the epithet "potentissimos," as appears by the reference to the Prophet Isaiah; for that is the power represented by Isaiah under the image of a flood, when he would expose the folly of those, who court the alliance of such Princes †. And it is to be observed, that though such power is reprobated in speculation, as what none but a madman could wish to see in its plenitude, yet it is not said, nor is it in-

* Unde apparet, quanta sit omnium fere stultitia et vefania, qui cupiunt habere Reges potentissimos: perinde ac si quis appeteret fluvium rapidissimum, quemadmodum Iesaias loquitur coarguens hanc stultitiam.

Prorsus igitur delirant, qui appetunt summas Monarchias, quia fieri non potest, quin tantundem decedat ex legitimo ordine, ubi unus occupat tam latum spatium.

† Isa. viii. 7.

finuated, that the Government of a Conqueror is not to be quietly submitted to, when once his dominion is established; or that Conquest may not be the foundation of a just title to dominion. It is only in a loose translation, in which the natural force of the Epithets "potentissimos" and "summas" is neglected, and their specific application in these sentences, taken in connection with the entire discourse, overlooked; that the passage can appear as a sly insinuation against Monarchical Government in general, or an oblique hint to the subjects of any Monarchy, to rise in rebellion against their Prince.

Chapter IV. 25. "Till thou know that the Most High ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will."—Upon this passage Calvin remarks, "that it teaches us, how difficult it is for us to ascribe supreme Power to God. Especially when God hath raised us to any degree of dignity, we forget that we are men. Monarchs, says he, hold forth in their titles that they are Kings, and Dukes, and Counts, by the Grace of God. But many of them make a false pretence of the name of God, to found a claim of *absolute* Dominion for themselves. Meanwhile they would willingly trample under foot that God, under whose shield they shelter themselves. So little do they seriously reflect, that it is by his favour that they reign. It is mere disguise, therefore, when they give it out, that they reign by the Grace of God*."

In

* Iterum docet hic locus, quàm difficile sit nobis, Deo tribuere summam potentiam. — Præsertim ubi Deus nos extulit in aliquem dignitatis gradum, obliviscimur nos esse homines. —

Hodie Monarchæ semper in suis titulis hoc obtendunt; se esse Reges, et
Duces,

In this he means not to deny the doctrine, that Princes reign by the Grace of God, of which he was indeed a strenuous assertor. He condemns not the use of such titles, but the abuse of them. He says the title is abused, when it is made the pretence and instrument of Tyranny. He says that the Prince, who, in the exercise of his power, profanely forgets the God, whom he confesses in his Title, is a Hypocrite. He says, these solemn Titles have in fact been so abused; and that Princes have been guilty of this Hypocrisy. Would God that History refuted him in these assertions!

Chapter VI. 25, 27. Upon the edict of Darius enjoining the worship of the God of Daniel, Calvin remarks to this effect. "Darius, by his example, will condemn all those, who at this day profess themselves either Catholic Kings, or Christian Kings, or Defenders of the Faith; and at the same time not only bear down true piety, but, as far as lies in them, shake the whole worship of God; and, could they have their will, would blot his name out of the world; who exercise Tyranny against all pious men, and by their cruelty establish impious superstitions*." It is not to be wondered, that this

Duces, et Comites, Dei gratiâ. Sed quàm multi falso nomen Dei prætexunt in hunc finem, ut sibi asserant summum imperium. — Interea libenter Deum, cujus clypeo se protegunt, calcarent pedibus: tantum abest ut serio reputent, se habere ejus beneficio ut regnent. Merus igitur fucus est, quod jactant se Dei gratiâ pollere dominatione.

* Darius — exemplo suo damnabit omnes eos, qui hodie se profitentur vel Catholicos Reges, vel Christianos, vel Protectores fidei; et interea non modo obruunt veram pietatem: sed etiam, quantum in se est, labefactant totum Dei cultum, et libenter nomen ejus extinguere à mundo: exercent sævam tyrannidem adversus omnes pios, stabiliunt suâ sævitiâ impias superstitiones.

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exaggerated and indecent language of invective should be offensive to the learned Author of the *Jura Anglorum*. It is to be hoped, that, in the present age, it is offensive to every one, of whatever Communion he may be, who reads the passage. It is not indeed to be borne, that the forms of worship of any Christian Church, however grievous its corruptions, should be uncharitably stigmatized in the gross with the odious name of IMPIOUS Superstitions; nor is it true of the Princes, who persecuted the Reformed Churches, cruel as the persecutions were, that their object was, to overturn the whole worship of God, and blot his name out of the world. That project was reserved for the accursed crew of French Philosophers, turned Politicians, at the close of the eighteenth Century. But it is to be remembered, that Calvin lived in an age, when neither the Christianity, nor the good Policy, of religious Toleration was understood: and he himself possessed a large share of the intolerant spirit of his times. How little he possessed of the Spirit of a Leveler, appears from what he says upon Chapter IV. 19, of the duty of submission to those very Princes, whose conduct he so vehemently arraigns. The learned reader will find the passage entire at the bottom of the page*.

Chapter VI. 22. The exposition of this verse concludes thus. "Earthly Princes divest themselves of their authority, when they rise in rebellion against God; nay they are un-

* Discamus igitur, exemplo Prophetæ, bene precari pro inimicis nostris, qui cupiunt nos perditos: maximè vero precari pro tyrannis, si Deo placeat nos subijci eorum libidini: quia, etsi indigni sint ullo humanitatis officio, quia tamen non præsumunt nisi Deo ita volente, modè feramus jugum: neque id tantùm propter iram, ut Paulus admonet, sed propter conscientiam. Alioqui non tantùm illis, sed etiam Deo ipsi sumus rebelles.

"worthy

"worthy to be reputed among Men. It were better therefore to spit upon their persons, than to obey them, where they so far exceed all bounds, as to attempt to rob God of his right, and as it were take possession of his throne, as if they were able to drag him down from heaven*." This passage, taken by itself, may seem, it must be confessed, to go to the full extent of those detestable maxims, which had been propagated in an earlier age, that "He, who is in mortal Sin, is no civil Magistrate," and "that a King, not having the Spirit of God, forfeits his Dominion." Accordingly, it is produced as affirming the same, or equivalent, propositions. But if it be considered, not by itself, but in its connection with the discourse of which it makes the close, the sense of the expressions will be found so restrained by the subject matter, as to convey nothing of this pernicious meaning. Daniel, having openly paid his daily devotions to his God, during the time that the edict of Darius was in force, prohibiting the adoration of God or Mortal, but the King himself, for 30 days, was, in pursuance of the edict, thrown to the lions, and lay in the den the whole night. The next morning, when he was found alive by the King himself, he gives the King this account of his deliverance. "My God hath sent his Angel, and hath shut the lions mouths, that they have not hurt me: for as much as before him innocency was found in me, and also before thee, O King! have I done no hurt." Daniel had disobeyed the King's Edict. Yet he

* Abdicant enim se potestate terreni principes, dum insurgunt contra Deum: imo indigni sunt, qui censeantur in hominum numero. Potius ergo conspuere oportet in ipsorum capita, quàm illis parere, ubi ita protrivunt, ut velint etiam spoliare Deum jure suo, ac si possent eum è caelo detrahere.

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that

says, that, even with respect to the King, he had committed no offence; and he alleges his innocence, in that respect, as in part the ground of his miraculous deliverance; intimating, that he should not have been thought worthy of the divine protection, could he not have said for himself, with truth, that "before the King he had done no hurt." Calvin contends, that it was with great truth and justice, that the Prophet thus asserted his innocence, even as a Subject. To make this out, it is necessary to shew (for the thing could be made out in no other way) that the King's edict was in itself a nullity. This is the point, which Calvin argues. And thus he argues it: "Earthly Kingdoms are established by God; but under this condition, that God derogates nothing from himself; but that whatever there may be of pre-eminence in the world be subordinate to his glory.—"Fear God and honour the King" is one entire precept. The two parts are to be taken in connection, and cannot be separated. And the fear of God must precede, in order that Kings may maintain their proper authority. —Daniel therefore upon just ground here defends himself, as having done no harm against the King; inasmuch as it was under the obligation of paying obedience to the government of God, that he neglected what the King commanded, in opposition to it. For earthly Princes abdicate their own authority*," &c. It is evident, that the subject matter restrains

* Scimus constitui terrena imperia à Deo, sed hæc lege ut ipse sibi nihil derogat——et quicquid est præstantiæ in mundo ejus gloriæ sit subiectum.——Deum timete, Regem honorate. Sunt hæc duo inter se connexa, nec potest alterum ab altero divelli. Præcedat igitur oportet timor Dei, ut Reges obtineant suam auctoritatem.——Jure ergo Daniel hic se defendit, "quod nullam pravitatem commiserit adversus regem," quia scilicet, coactus parere Dei imperio, neglexerit quod in contrariam partem Rex mandabat; Abdicant enim, &c.

this

this implied abdication of authority, to authority exercised in those individual commands, which expressly contravene some express command of God. And it is in the individual instances of such commands, that Calvin asserts, that the guilt and danger of contempt, accompanying the just refusal to obey, would be nothing, in comparison of the guilt and danger of obedience. Certainly the priest Urijah, had he spit upon King Ahaz, when the King commanded him to make an altar after the fashion of the idolatrous altar at Damascus, though such contempt of Majesty would not have been altogether free of blame, had done however better than he did, when he executed the King's order. And yet this wicked act of the King's was no forfeiture of his title to the Crown, nor a general release of his Subjects from their allegiance. This passage therefore of Calvin carries in it no such meaning, as may appear upon the first view of it, detached from the context; but it contains indeed a principle, upon which the faithful are bound to act, when the dreadful necessity arises. Calvin could never support the abominable doctrine, that the ordinary misconduct of a King sets the Subject free, without contradicting the principles he lays down, in the last Chapter of his Theological Institutions, of the duty of Submission even to the worst of Kings, in things not contrary to the express commands of God.

It is not to be apprehended, that the learned and candid Author of the "Jura Anglorum" will be displeas'd, that the memory of a great man should be vindicated from an unfounded accusation; which has been revived, not originally set up, by him, upon the authority of Heylin and other writers, on whom he thought he might rely. No injustice of intention, nothing

worse than a very pardonable mistake, is imputed to this respectable author. The Christian Spirit of Charity and Tolera nce which breathes through this work, and appears in the sentiments, which the author avowed in a former publication, entitled "the Case Stated *," acquits him of the most distant suspicion of a design to advance the credit of his own Church, by wilfully depreciating the character of an illustrious adversary. In the citation of passages in proof of the charge, it is justice to him to acknowledge, that he hath only copied verbatim, as it should seem, from an anonymous work entitled "Philanax Anglicus." He will certainly esteem it no disservice done to that great Cause, in which his learning and his talents have been so honourably engaged, the cause of Government and Liberty united, if the Levellers are deprived of the authority of Calvin's name, to which, together with that of Luther and of other celebrated Reformers, some among them have pretended; in the pious design, no doubt, of passing off their political opinions, as a branch of the general doctrine of the Reformation. When Salmasius upbraided Cromwell's faction with the tenets of the Brownists, the chosen advocate of that execrable faction replied, that if *they* were Brownists, Luther, Calvin, Bucer, Zwinglius, and all the most celebrated theologians of the Orthodox, must be included in the same reproach †. A grosser falsehood, as far as Luther, Calvin, and many others are concerned, never fell from the unprincipled pen of a party-writer. However sedition might be a part of

* See the Case stated, p. 42—48; but particularly p. 47, 48.

† Ita Lutherus, Calvinus, Zwinglius, Bucerus, et Orthodoxorum quot-quot celeberrimi Theologi fuerunt, tuo iudicio Brunistæ sunt. Defens. pro Pop. Angl. Cap. V. sub fin.

the puritanic Creed, the general faith of the Reformers rejects the infamous Alliance.

It is alleged indeed against Calvin, by grave and respectable Historians, that he expressed approbation of the outrages of John Knox in Scotland. If the charge be true, his conduct, in this instance, was contrary to his avowed principles. But the accusation requires better proof, than Knox's own interpretation of some general expressions in Calvin's Letters. It cannot however be denied, that he too often indulges in a strain of coarse invective, against the foibles and the vices incident to Kings, of which he sometimes speaks as if he thought them inseparable from Royalty; and that he treats many of the Princes of Europe, his contemporaries, with indecent ill language. Some allowance is to be made for the natural harshness of the man's temper; more, for his keen sense of the cruel treatment of Protestants in many Kingdoms. But the best apology for him is, that he lived, before a perfect specimen of a just limited Monarchy had been any where exhibited—before the example of the BRITISH CONSTITUTION, in its finished state, and of the Princes of the BRUNSWIC line, had taught the world this comfortable lesson, that MONARCHY AND CIVIL LIBERTY ARE THINGS COMPATIBLE, AND MAY BE BROUGHT TO AFFORD EACH OTHER THE MOST EFFECTUAL SUPPORT.



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