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THE *A. e. 25.*
ORIGINAL
Lauderdale AND *A. Theology No. 15*
INSTITUTION
OF
Civil Government, Discus'd.

VIZ.

- I. An Examination of the Patriarchal Scheme of Government.
- II. A Defense of Mr. Hooker's Judgment, &c. against the Objections of several late Writers.

To which is added,

A Large ANSWER to Dr. F. Atterbury's Charge of Rebellion: In which the Substance of his late Latin Sermon is produced, and fully examined.

By BENJAMIN HOADLY, M. A.
Rector of St. Peter's poor.

The Second Edition.

L O N D O N,

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St. Paul's Church-Yard. 1710.

P R E F A C E.

I Here lay before the Reader, what I, some time ago, promised, as a second part to the Measures of Submission, formerly published: viz.

I. An Examination of the Patriarchal Scheme of Government; as it hath been amended, and new dress'd, by its latest Patron, Mr. L. I confess, I had once an utter Aversion to the looking into such Papers, as that Author's Rehearsals were represented to me, to be. And when I expressed my self to this purpose, it was literally true, that I neither had looked into them; nor ever designed to do it. But finding that others built mighty matters upon them; and put the Strength of their Cause upon the Truth of the Principles maintained in them; and being reproved by Himself several times for the Slight I had put upon what, He assures me, as good Men as my self have regarded; I have not only read those in which he layeth down his own Foundation-Principles; and attacks those of his Adversaries; but considered them, I believe He will acknowledge, more thoroughly than perhaps ever any one, whether Friend, or Foe, hath yet done. I hope, therefore, the Deference which I have now paid them, will more than recompense for my former Neglect: at least, it will shew that I am ready to give up my own Humour, or Prejudice, to the Opinion of those whom I would willingly convince. And the Reader will, I hope, either approve, or, at least, excuse, the Pains I have taken, with respect to those Papers: Because I

ii P R E F A C E.

knew not where else to find the Lineaments of the Patriarchal Scheme, and the Proofs of it, as it is now embraced; or some of those Objections against Mr. Hooker's Judgment, which many expect should be consider'd. And besides, the Author hath in those Papers handled his own Scheme in a continued Series of Discourse, as much as if He had written a Treatise about it. However; I have not so confined myself, but that, in this Examination, I have handled several matters relating to Civil Government, not peculiar to this Scheme only: And I have put the particulars in the Contents so distinctly, that every one may chuse for Himself, what to read, and what to pass over.

II. There follows, in the second Chapter, a Defense of Mr. Hooker's Judgment concerning the Institution, and Nature, of Civil Government: In which I have endeavoured fully to answer all the Objections I have met with against it. And this seems to be the only thing requisite towards a general, and hearty Approbation of it. In this Chapter, I have particularly considered what Mr. L. hath offered about the Original of Civil Government, in a Book which He is pleased to call The best Answer, &c. which I was induced to do very seriously, because I was informed that great weight was laid upon it by some Men; and that it was expected from me. That matter is handled in that Book, from p. 20. to p. 30. and from p. 42. to p. 53. And I do not know that I have passed by any thing which He himself thinks material.

As for other parts of that Book; they will appear, to any one who will examine it, page by page, to be, either, 1. Personal Abuses, with which I have nothing to do, unless it be to forgive them; or, 2. Jest, and Witticisms, and Ironies, and Sarcasms, which I do not envy Him; or, 3. Sly Insinuations, and Bitter Reflexions upon the Government, which need not my Remarks; and these, since confirmed by his more open

P R E F A C E. iii

Answer to Mr. Higden; or, 4. Such Representations of me, and of what I have said, upon other Occasions, as any one may see to be uncharitable, or groundless, without my help; or, 5. Such matters as have been since, sufficiently considered in the Reply to the Ld. Bp. of Ex. or, 6. Such as had been before accounted for, in the Measures of Submission, and are now only repeated by Him, without any regard to what I have there alleged. For instance,

He represents me, p. 17. as saying, in the Measures of Submission, that I can see nothing in the Homily about Rebellion, against the resisting of Evil Princes. He doth not quote the Page indeed, in which I say this; because He can't: For I never said any thing like it. Whoever will look into what I say, upon that Head, will find that my main Defense goes upon the Supposition that there are Sentences in the Homily against the resisting of Evil Princes; and that it is my Business to prove, not only for my own sake, but for that of all my Brethren, that our Subscription doth not oblige us to assent to every particular Sentence in the Homilies; but to the main Doctrine, and Tenour, which I have shewn not to have been design'd to touch the Case, in which I have allowed Resistance. And how hard is it that this Gentleman should not make Conscience of representing fairly to his Readers what I truly say? How much of the Excrecencies of Controversy might, this way, be cut off? and how much Ill-will towards me might have been prevented?

And now I am upon this Head, I cannot but remark farther, how hard it is, that this Topic should still be kept up: when my Brethren of the Clergy know that it equally condemns every one of themselves, who in some point, or other, differ from some Sentences of the Homilies, as much as I do in this; when they know that Archbishop Laud himself, in his own Justification, openly declared that Subscription did not extend to the Justification

iv PREFACE.

cation of every particular Sentence in the Homilies, but to the Tenour of them; when they may know that the Use of Organs, in Churches, is condemned, in one of them, as Superstitious, which yet We generally (I am sure, I can speak for my self;) account very delightful Helps to Devotion, when artfully and duly managed; when even the Non-Jurors themselves, who have made most Noise with this Objection, are come to plead (as their Cause indeed requires) that our Subscription is not a Subscription to every individual Sentence. Doth not one of the Answerers to Mr. Higden recur to this, in p. 96. of his Remarks on Mr H-'s Utopian Constitution? Nay, must not they all recur to it, before they can reconcile their Non-Compliance with some of the Arguments made use of in the Homilies? Doth not Mr. Lesly himself, even whilst he is upon the Subject of Rebellion, manifestly contradict them? and not only contradict, but insult them, when he ridicules that Notion of Lucifer's rebelling against God himself, Reh. 54. which they have espoused? as is plain from their paralleling it with that of Adam, who had no Governour over him, but God. Do not all, in some matter, or other, without scruple differ from them? And if every one, thus takes the Liberty to chuse in what Instance He will contradict them; may not I justly desire that the same Liberty may be allowed me? and that I particularly, may not be excepted out of the General Allowance?

To return now to the Book I was speaking of; the way in which that Author continues to produce the Homilies against me is, likewise, a very remarkable Instance of his urging his Old Topics, without taking the least notice of what I have said to them. His representing me, as if I had placed the last Resort, or Appeal from the Decisions of any Governour, in the People; and arguing, through great part of that Book, against me, under this Notion; is of a piece with what went before.

But

PREFACE. v

But these sort of Representations serve his purpose best: But if he should faithfully, and candidly, always tell his Readers, that I only allow the People, that is, the Governed Society, to judge when they are universally oppressed, and upon the Brink of Destruction; and to defend themselves against certain Ruine; and to put themselves into a State, not of Confusion, but of better Government for the future; and likewise, that I have shew'n that this Writer, in his own Scheme, imposeth a Task upon the People that requires more Capacity, and as much Integrity as this: I say, if He represented me thus to his Readers; his Ends might be lost; and his Followers not so astonished at what I maintain, nor so unwilling to listen to the Proofs of it. Let him perplex it with never so many Terms, or Questions: Let every one, that will, may know what Self-Defense is, and what it implies in it. What He saith about a Last Resort; or an Authority, and Commission, against Right, is fully accounted for, in the first Chapter, p. 27, &c. and in the Answer to Dr. Atterbury, p. 89. As the Words of our Lord to Pilate, have been, long ago, in the Meas. of Sub. tho' now urged, as if they had never been considered.

Nothing remains untouched of all that He saith any Stress upon, unless it be two or three very small matters, which will not affect the main of the Cause. As, 1. He saith, p. 19. That the Case of Madnes in King or Parent, is a personal Incapacity for the Time. But no Forfeiture of their Authority. This is giving up the Question. For if Incapacity be utterly inconsistent with Rule, during the Time that the Incapacity lasts; then, wheresoever there is any thing which destroys, and renders void, the Capacity of the Person for Government; and this not to be cured, or separated from Him; there must be a lasting Incapacity, which amounts to a total Forfeiture of Authority. As, in Case of Bigottry to a Religion,

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which professedly teacheth to keep no Faith with Protestants ; this doth as effectually destroy all Capacity to rule this Nation, as a Total Distraction could do. For Incapacity is Incapacity, whether it lie in the Understanding or Will.

2. *He adds, p. 20. that the laying a Father in his Bed, in a Fever, comes under no Notion of Resistance ; but is Helping and Serving Him. I never contradicted this. But if his Fever lasts for Life ; He is incapable of governing his Family for Life : which amounts to much the same thing. By this likewise this Author gives up the Cause of Non-Coercion. For to coerce, and confine a Prince, in a State of mind incapable of Government, (parallel to this of a Fever) may, according to Him, be done, not under the Notion of Resistance, but under that of Help, and Assistance. And that a Disposition bent upon Tyranny and Oppression, is the Fever, of the Mind ; and as great an Incapacity as any Bodily Distemper, is very evident. But all this while, a great deal of what I have said of Self-Defense is overlooked by this Writer. To his kind Insinuation, as if the only Use, which I, and others, can make of the fore-mentioned Allowance, is to have the Liberty to call a King, or a Father mad, when we think fit, and so to get loose from his Authority, I answer, It toucheth himself as nearly : And it may, with as much Justice, be insinuated, that the only Use, which He and his Friends, can make of his Concession in this place, is to have the Liberty to judge their King, or their Father, to be in a Fever, when they think fit ; and so to coerce, and keep them confined to their Beds ; by this means getting loose from their Authority, under pretense of helping, and serving them. But Charity forbids all such Insinuations.*

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3. *His Argument against Self-Defense, taken from our being entitl'd to the Protection of God, who tells us that the Heart of the King is in his Hand, p. 40. is built upon a wrong Notion of our Title to God's Protection ; which ever supposeth our own Concurrence. And as to the latter part of it ; it is no more an Argument against the Allowance of Self-Defense, to urge that the Heart of the King is in God's Hand ; than it is an Argument for this Allowance, to allege that nothing can be feared from it, because the Scripture assures us, that God ruleth in the Nations of the World ; that he stilleth the Noise of the Seas, the Noise of their Waves, and the Tumult of the People ; Ps. 65. 7. But this way of arguing is fallacious ; and gives Men false Conceptions of God's Providence.*

4. *He argues, p. 64. that God hath put no Limitations to his Command concerning Non-resistance, as He hath to others : And therefore that none ought to be put : And thus others argue likewise. I therefore observe that my Business was to prove that a general way of Expression, in Scripture, doth not infer an Unlimitedness in the Command. And this is most plain from those Cases, in which there is a Limitation in the Scripture it self ; and in which, notwithstanding, the Command is delivered in general Words. Children obey your Parents in all things. This is more than is said in the Case of Magistrates. And yet the Command not to sin against God ; and our Duty in our other Relations, limit this. This, I say, shews that it is the way of Scripture to speak in general Terms, without intending them to be understood absolutely.*

But besides this Answer, I ask, where doth the New Testament limit that Prohibition, Swear not at all ? For this matter must be tried by the New Testament, in which our Lord takes the Duty of Mankind into

viii P R E F A C E.

into Consideration anew, to vindicate it from the Mistakes of Men; and to put it into stricter Bounds than those in which even the Dispensation of the Old Testament had confined it. It is not enough here to allege Examples of some Good Men calling God to witness; or an Allusion to the Customs of Men: But the point is, whether, Swear not at all, be not as free from all Restriction, by any express Declaration of the Gospel, as Non-resistance can be. Again, Non-resistance to private Evils, or Enemies, is laid down by our Lord himself, in Opposition to the Allowance given under the former Dispensation; and this without any Limitation: Nay, it is press'd to a great degree. Yet all this doth not hinder but that this Writer, and all who oppose me, allow Cases, in which Swearing, and Resistance to Private Enemies, are not only lawful, but highly commendable. It is manifest therefore, that, in this Case of the Gospel's laying down the Heads of Duty in general Terms, the Question is not, whether God himself hath actually, and expressly, made any Limitations by way of Revelation; but whether Reason, and the Honour of God, do not evidently require these Limitations; and whether they may not be justified by all Rules of Interpretation.

Thus much for this Author: who, I hope, will not insist upon lesser matters, when he sees the Pains I have taken to examine the Foundations themselves, upon which he professeth to build all his Notions concerning Governours, and Governed. And if I have taken too much pains in examining every Branch of his Scheme, as He himself hath mark'd it out; (which He seems to fear I should, by his last, which He calls, Best of all;) I think, He, of all Men, should take it well at my Hands. I assure Him, I desire to call nothing but Argument into the Debate: But could not help taking notice of his Behaviour towards a Government, which

P R E F A C E. ix

which had so long permitted Him to write. I taxed Him with Affronts which he cannot find in his Heart plainly to deny: Not with quoting any other Author; but with manifest Jest, and Banter of his own, upon the Establishment, the Administration, and the Nation's Happiness. My own part in his Lampoons I heartily forgive Him; as I do all that Wit, of which He is so profusely guilty in his late Title-pages.

III. To these two Chapters about the Original of Civil Government, I have added A large Answer to the Reverend Dr. Fr. Atterbury's Charge of Rebellion: In which I have examined his late Latin Sermon. For after I had been contending against the hearty Opposition of those who truly and really differ from me; I thought it proper, fully to consider the Attacks of One, who would only seem to do so: That so the World may see, at once, the utmost Efforts, both of Open Force, and Artful Disguise, against the Principles which I have maintained; and judge of the Cause, and of the Managers, as shall appear reasonable. In this part it was impossible to avoid several Personal Observations: Because my Business was to defend against a particular method of Controversy; so peculiar to one certain Person, as that I know not that it hath ever been practis'd, or attempted, by any other Writer. However, there are in it many material points, relating to the matter of Civil Government, and to the true meaning of some Passages of Scripture, more fully handled than ever they were yet by me: and I hope after such a manner, as still more effectually to vindicate Almighty God, and the Gospel of Jesus Christ, from the Imputation of patronizing the most abject Slavery. If I have, in the least matter, mistaken, or misrepresented this Author; I am ready upon the first notice, to set it right again. All I pretend to, in what I produce out of His Sermon, is to let the Reader into his

x P R E F A C E.

his true Meaning, and Design: not to come up to the Beauty of his Expression; which I think, in many Places, to be almost inimitable.

Many others have appeared of late in the same Controversy. Amongst these, I beg leave just to observe to the Author of a Paper called *A Letter to a Friend*, that I have, in the following Book, handled the matter of a Last Resort in Civil Government; that a Last Resort to determine Cases of Private Concernment, and an Obligation upon particular Persons, to acquiesce in such Determinations, tho' Unjust, result from the Nature, and Ends, of Civil Government: but that a Last Resort, in such Sense, as that a whole Nation shall be obliged to submit to those Decrees of their Governour, or Governours, which, they are universally sensible, must bring immediate Ruine, and Misery, upon the whole Body, is just as contradictory to the Ends of Government, as Confusion and Anarchy themselves are. This is a Case, which he gives me leave to suppose, viz. That the Governing Part of a Nation, enact what is certain Misery, and Ruine, to the present, and succeeding Generations. And to say, that the Ends of Government require a Passive Submission in this Case, is to say that, if it should be decreed that every individual Man in the Governed Part of the Nation should be cut off, the Ends of Government require that no Self-Defense should be practised; but, that the Land must be made a Desolation, and Wilderness, in order to answer the Ends of Government. I know, it is next to impossible that any such Case should happen: But if such things be said, and such Cases, in effect, be put, it is necessary to speak, upon the Supposition of such Cases. Such Principles as these absolutely take away from the whole Body of Subjects under an Absolute Monarch, all possibility of Redressing the greatest Universal

P R E F A C E. xi

versal Misery that can be conceived: And methinks it is but a narrow-spirited proceeding in us, to go just no farther in our Notions than a Compliance with our own present Condition forceth us; to exclude from our Regards, the Condition of all other Nations, and all Cases, but just that which hath happened, last of all, in our own; nay, to condemn even That it self, if it be found that the Legislature had before gone so far, as to make the Person of the King free from all Coercion; and to take away the Arms of Self-Defense, in all Cases, both from Parliament, and People. Is not Universal Misery, and Ruine, the same, whether it comes from the Hands of Many, or of One? Would not the Unhappiness of this Nation, in particular, have been the same, whether a Late King alone, or by the help of a formal Law, had subjected it to the Religion of Rome, and the Maxims of France? And, upon Supposition of such an Attempt, would not our late Deliverance have been as glorious, and great, and justifiable; as much wanted, and as truly beneficial; as it was upon the Attempt of the King alone? Would not the Invitation of the Prince of Orange; the Election, and Meeting of the Persons who made up the Convention; and the Consequent Establishment in the Protestant Line, have been as requisite, and as useful? Nay, would not the Ends of Government have been more effectually answered this way, than by Submission to a Total Dissolution of all Happiness at present, and of all hopes for the future? How then can it be said, That the Ends of Government require that Degree of Submission, upon the one Supposition, which they are allowed not to do, upon the other: When the same Misery, and Destruction, must follow a Submission, in both Cases; and the same Universal Happiness must, in both,

be the Consequence of a just, and well-managed Self-Defense? Or, would the Ends of Government be destroyed, should the miserable Condition of the whole People of France, which hath proceeded from the King's being Absolute, awaken the Thoughts of the Wisest Heads amongst them; and move them all to exert themselves, so as that those Ends should be better answered for the Time to come?

For the rest of those who have appeared in Opposition to me; I hope they will excuse my not taking more particular Notice of their Labours: since I have chosen to go to the Foundation of our Differences; and have spared no Pains in considering what is offered by Writers, more esteemed, and regarded, by Men of their own Principles, than themselves are. But with respect to these, and all others, who may hereafter profess to confute what I have written; I must beg this piece of Justice of all Readers; that they would only turn to those parts of my Books, where I handle that particular part of the Debate, which any one undertakes to consider. For instance; if any one professeth to talk of the pernicious Effects of my Doctrine; or of the Passive Principles, and Practice, of some of the Primitive Christians; or of the Homilies of our Church; or of the Absurdity of allowing a Judgment to the People; (which are the four grand Topics;) all that I request of Readers, is, to turn to those parts of the Measures of Submission, in which I professedly handle these points; and then to judge whether any thing be offered sufficient to invalidate what I there say. The same Favour I request, with respect to any other point handled in this, or any other of my Writings, published since that. The Reason of my Request is this: Because otherwise the Cause cannot be judged of; and because I must say once more, what I would not say but that

I am forced to it, that, tho' Multitudes have urged again and again these same Topics, and made large Declamations, in general, about them, (which I never denied) yet no one Writer, as I know of, hath so much as pretended to reply to those particular Considerations, by which I have endeavoured to shew the Weakness of those Objections.

If any Persons of Judgment meet with the Repetition of the same things, in several parts of this Book; or any thing that seems to them tedious; I hope they will pardon it: Considering, that One and the same Truth may be the best Answer to Multitudes of Errors; and that to many other Readers, a longer, and more prolix way of Proof may be of great use, for the explaining, and inculcating, an important Subject. All that I can say for my self is, that I have done my best, amidst many Inconveniencies, and many Avocations.

If any think such Controversies, especially amongst the Clergy, of scandalous and pernicious Consequence; I answer that it is not the Difference, but the manner of handling, and debating it, that is the Scandal; that I see no way left but that, either All must agree in Judgment; or all must equally consent to be silent; or, one side only must speak; or, there must be Debates, and Controversies. But, in my Opinion, if we behave our selves, as becomes Christians, in the Management of them; this is our only Concern, in such Cases: Nay, I have often thought that this would make even Controversy it self a Glory to Christianity. Nor am I conscious to my self, that I have acted a part unbecoming a Divine, in entering into this Debate: because it hath been so managed in our Nation, that the Will of God; the Declarations of the Bible; and the Precepts of Christianity; (which are the peculiar Care of Divines;)

xiv P R E F A C E.

vines;) have been made a great, and essential part of the Debate.

To conclude; As I can solemnly profess, that I at first undertook this Cause, and have since proceeded in it, out of a pure Desire of being Useful to the World: So, the whole of what I have written, I do now sincerely, and humbly offer up, to the Glory of God; the Honour of our Holy Religion; the Interest of our Happy Establishment; and the good of the present, and succeeding Generations.

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A N
 EXAMINATION
 OF THE
 Patriarchal Scheme
 OF
 GOVERNMENT.

Sect. I. Introduction.

AMONGST all who contend for an Unlimited Passive Obedience to the Civil Power, there are none who are more confident in their Assertions, or more secure of their Cause, than those who espouse the Patriarchal Scheme of Government, and found Civil Authority entirely upon the Paternal Authority devolved by Almighty God himself upon the Governours of this World. And although there be but few who do openly adhere to this Scheme: yet since great Triumphs are acted by the Patrons of it; since many are their Followers, and Admirers in the Conclusions built upon it; and since

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it attacks our whole *Constitution* at once, waging perpetual War against it; it cannot be amiss to consider a little what it is; on what it is founded; of what Authority it is; of what Use and Consequence to *Humane Society*, and the like; and to make such *Observations* upon it as shall naturally offer themselves, and appear to be of Importance to the Cause. If this shall be esteemed as *lost Labour* by some *judicious Persons*, who may possibly think that this *Scheme* deserves not so many serious Thoughts; they may easily pass over this Part of the *Controversy*: and impute the Pains I have bestowed upon it to a too great Readiness to consider seriously what any *Writers* seem seriously to espouse; and to the inclination I have to leave nothing untouched which might be thought, by any Men of Parts and Learning, to bear a near Relation to the Cause I have undertaken.

But before I proceed, it will be but *Justice* to let the Reader know what it is I mean by the *Patriarchal Scheme of Government*; and on what Foundations it is supposed to stand by the *Patrons* of it. Now by the *Patriarchal Scheme*, I understand not only that *Scheme* which fixeth *Absolute Uncontrollable Authority* in *Adam* and his *Male-Line*, according to *Primogeniture*, down to the *universal Deluge*; and in *Noah* afterwards: but that *Scheme likewise* which is engrafted upon this; and which may more properly indeed be call'd the *Scheme of Possession*; as will appear from the following View, which I shall lay before the *Reader*, of the whole taken together.

I shall only just observe, before I come to this *Earthly Scheme*, that, in the first place, to prepare us for it, The *Order and Government of the Angels* in the *Heavenly Scheme*, is set forth, as *Absolute*, and *Unlimited* in the Hands of *One over many*; and the *Rebellion of Lucifer* is described to be only a Refusal to submit to the *Monarch* set over Him by *Almighty God*.

God; and as particularly related, as if the *Historian* had been a *Traveller* into those *blessed Countries*, and present himself at that remarkable *Transaction*. *Reh. N^o 54*. For my own part, I cannot think it our Duty to pay any Deference to this, till *Almighty God* hath revealed to us the *Methods of Government Above*, and laid them upon us as the *Model of our Governments below*. In the mean time, supposing the Matter of *Fact* to be true, it cannot follow, that because *Almighty God* hath establish'd a *Monarchy* to which he requires *unlimited Subjection* in *Beings* whose *Wisdom, Knowledge, and Goodness*, elevates them above the *best of Men* numberless Degrees; therefore he likewise hath established the same *Absolute Monarchy* in the Hands of *weak Men*; and requires the same *unlimited Subjection* to such *Monsters* as *Nero*, and others here below. No: The *Supreme Being*, who doth all Things in proportion, cannot require the same *Subjection* to a *weak and Passionate Man*, as he may perhaps to an exalted *Angel*, whose *Dispositions and Abilities* are *God-like*, and under whose *Administration* probably there can be no Occasion given for the Misery of any sort of *Passive Obedience*. But I must not spend the *Reader's Time* in considering what is of no Importance to the *Business in Hand*; which concerns the *Civil Government* said to be established by *Almighty God* for the *Inhabitants of this Earth*.

Sect. II. *The Patriarchal Scheme distinctly proposed in its several Branches.*

In order to what I design, I must now, in the first Place, lay before the *Reader* the *Patriarchal Scheme* it self, the *Tenor* of which is as follows.

1. It is affirmed, That *Adam* was an *Universal Monarch* over all who descended from him.

4 *An Examination of*

2. That the *Monarchy* begun in *Him*, was *absolute* and *uncontrollable*, not to be forfeited by any *Misbehaviour*; not to be resisted or opposed on any Account by any of the Race of Mankind, and was made so by the Institution and Appointment of God himself.

3. That, *Cain* being banished, *Adam* was succeeded, according to *Divine Appointment*, in this same *Universal Absolute Monarchy*, by *Seth*, and so successively by the *eldest Sons* in his Line down to the *Flood*.

4. That, after the *Flood*, *Noah* was *Absolute Universal Monarch*, vested with the same Powers and *Privileges* which his *Predecessors* before the *Flood* enjoyed.

5. That at the *Division of Nations*, after the *Flood*, this *Universal Monarchy* was changed into *seventy independent Monarchies*: the several *Nations* being rank'd by God himself under their proper *Rulers*.

6. That the *Succession*, in these several *Governments*, went on as formerly, by *Primo geniture*, in the *Male-Line*; and this by *Divine Institution*. But, at last,

7. Whilst we perhaps are thinking ourselves secured from all *fatal Mistakes* about this important *Affair*, by so plain a *Scheme of Government*, so positively founded upon the *Word of God*, on a sudden it all dwindles away into this final Assertion, That the *Present Possessor* of any *Throne* hath the *Right* to all the *Powers* and *Privileges* of the first *Monarchs*, where there is no *Claimer* who can make out a better *Right*, To which is added,

8. That it belongs to all *Subjects* to judge of this *Right*, in *Case* of any *Doubt* or *Competition*. This is the *Scheme* which is called the *Patriarchal Scheme*, and now defended as such; because the *Monarchical* and *Absolute Powers*, annexed to it, are founded upon those supposed in it to have belonged to *Adam* and his *Successors* in his *Monarchy*. Some *Branches* of which *Scheme* having been examined long ago by the *Author* of

the Patriarchal Scheme.

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of the *Two Treatises of Government*, (published in the Year 1698.) to *Him* I must in Justice refer the *Reader*: who will easily, I believe, be led by the *Former* of them to judge rightly on what *Foundation* they stand. I now proceed to the farther *Examination* of the *Proofs* which support it, and to the *Observations* which I have to make upon it. And in what I shall say, it is not my *Design* to comprize all that may justly be said against the *Truth* and *Usefulness* of this *Scheme*: but only as much as may be fully sufficient to detect the *Weakness* of its *Supports*, and the *pernicious Influence* of it upon the present *State* of the *World*, and of *this Kingdom*; in particular, to which we belong.

Sect. III. *An Examination of the first Branch of this Scheme.*

And 1. The *first Branch* of this *Scheme* is this, *viz.* That *Adam* was *Universal Monarch*, properly so called, over all his *Descendants*. And this is said to be very apparent from the *Subjection* to *Him*, required of *Eve* by *Almighty God*; from his being the *Father* of Mankind; and from the *Obedience* due to *Parents*, and the many express *Commands* of God in holy *Scripture* for the same, which *Commands* include our *Duty* to our *Governours*; and lastly, from *Almighty God's* calling himself a *Father*. These are the *Reasons* given for this *first Branch*, by the *latest Patron* of this *Scheme*; [*Rehearsal*, No. 55.] So that *Civil Government* was instituted by God in *Adam* over *Eve*, by positive *Command*; and over their *Descendants*, by natural *Right* of a *Father*; and by many subsequent *Commands* of *Obedience*, many hundreds of *Years* afterwards, given to *Children*.

There is indeed another Argument, in other Places, sometimes made use of by the same Writer; and that is this. *Adam* was *Civil Governour*; For who else could be so but He? that is, If *He* were not *Monarch*, then were his *Descendants* without *Civil Government*, and the like. Now *these* are the very Things to be proved, because about *these* the Difference is, viz.

1st. That there was not a Time at first in which there was no *Civil Government*, properly so called.

2ly, That as soon as there was *Civil Government*, *Adam* was the Person in whom it was solely lodged.

3. That, supposing Him at any time a *Monarch*, He claimed this Power of *Civil Government*, as by Right belonging to Him, and did not enjoy it by the open, or tacit, *Consent* of his *Descendants*, voluntarily chusing Him as an *Arbitrator* in all their Differences. These are Points, without the Proof of which, this *Scheme* cannot stand: But merely to ask, *Who else could be?* Or merely to urge the *Consequence* of the *World's* being without a *settled Civil Government* at first, as an *Absurdity* upon those who think it none, and are contending for that very Thing; is, in the most true Sense, to take the Thing for *granted*, which is the Point to be proved: for it is to demonstrate a Proposition to those who think it might be otherwise, by asking, How it can be otherwise? Or by affirming that it *cannot*, without supposing a Thing to be true, which they believe and contend to be true. The only Method in this Case, is to produce *Instances* of *Adam's Civil Government* over all his *Descendants*; and to prove that this *Civil Government* was his *unalienable Prerogative*, nor in the least depending upon the *Consent* of his most remote *Posterity*. Till this be done, the other sort of *proving* Things, by alleging no Proofs of them, can make no Impressions. I return now to the fore-mentioned *Particulars* produced for the Support of this *Branch*: with respect to which I observe,

1.

1. That the Command of *Subjection* given to *Eve*; or her Oligation to *Submission*, resulting from her being formed *after Adam*, and out of Him, respected *Adam* only in the same *Capacity* in which all *future* lawful *Husbands* were to succeed Him: who were to be looked upon as *Successors* of *Adam* in this *Superiority*, by the Appointment of *God*; and their *Wives* as succeeding *Eve* in her *dependent* and *inferior Condition*.

2. That the *Apostle* makes this Use only of the *Superiority* of *Adam* over *Eve*, to set it as a *Precedent* for *Husbands* and *Wives*, consider'd in a private *Capacity* only as such; and doth not in the least imply any Possibility of applying this to the Matter of *Civil Government*: as any one may see who consults 1 *Tim.* 2. 13. 1 *Cor.* 14. 34. For the *Apostle* makes use of it for the *Instruction* of such *Husbands* and *Wives* as were jointly under the *Civil Government* of others. If therefore the *Subjection* which the *Apostle* layeth upon *Wives*, makes not their *Husbands* *Civil Magistrates*, neither will the *Subjection* of *Eve* from which the *Apostle* argues) makes *Adam* a *Monarch*. It was, the *Subjection* only of a *Wife* to an *Husband*, which is very different from that of a *Subject* to a *Prince*.

3. That supposing this *Injunction*, upon *Eve*, made *Adam* a *Monarch*; it made Him only *her Monarch*: not a *Monarch* over any of his *Son's* *Wives*, whose *Subjection* was required in this same Command, and in the same Degree, and in the same Kind, to be paid to their own *Husbands*.

4. It is true, as this *Writer* saith, That it is exceeding plain that there was no *State of Independency*: for *Eve* was made *Dependant* upon *Adam*, and so were his *Children* born. But this is evading the *Question* by an ambiguous Word. For no one ever said that there was any time such an *Independant State of Nature*, as that *Wives* and *Children* were not *dependant*, as such, on *Husbands* and *Parents*; to whom, as to *Instruments* under *God*, their *Offspring*

B 4

owed

owed their very Lives. But what is this to that *Independant State* which is pleaded for, of *Husbands*, and *Fathers*, with respect to one another: who, notwithstanding what this Argument pleads, might be so much upon *equal Terms*, as that the *Civil Government* of many *Families* united, might be a Matter of their own *Choice* and *Compact*, without the *Violation* of any *Duty* owing to *Parents*. For,

5. All the *Injunctions* given afterwards to *Children*, to obey, and honour, and relieve, their *Parents*, can have no Original Relation to *Civil Magistrates*, because these *Parents* themselves were under *Civil Magistrates*. Nor are the Duties owing to the *Magistrate*, ever left, in *Scripture*, to be collected from those owing to *Parents*. Nor are they called *Fathers* in *Scripture*: nor is their *Office* ever spoken, or treated of, as if it were founded upon the *Paternal Authority*. But the *Case* of *Magistrates*, and *Rulers*, and of *Subjection* to them, is handled expressly as a Matter wholly distinct from the *Case* of *Parents* and *Children*, or *Husbands* and *Wives*. And I appeal to any one whether it be probable that nothing of this would have been plainly said, had either *Moses*, or *St. Paul*, known any thing of this Foundation of all *Government*; or whether in the *New Testament*, when the true Foundations of the *highest Obedience* were to be taught, we should not have heard of this, in those Places where the *Duty* of *Subjects* is laid down; or whether the *Duty* of *Subjects*, and that of *Children*, would have been so distinctly handled both by *St. Paul*, and *St. Peter*, as if they had no Dependence upon, no Relation to, one another.

6. It hath been indeed a common thing, in later Ages, to reduce, as we say, the *Duty* of *Subjects* to the *Injunctions* laid upon *Children*; and so of all *Inferiors* to *Superiors*; as the *Duty* of *Servants* to *Masters*, and the like. Nay, the very Duties of *Parents* towards

wards *Children*, have been reduced to the *Fifth Commandment*. But this is only by way of *Common-place*; and often for the sake of *Brevity*. So doth our *Catechism*, after having said that from the *Ten Commandments* we learn our *Duty* towards *God*, and our *Duty* towards our *Neighbour*, teach us to enquire more fully what our *Duty* to our *Neighbour* is; and then gives us a summary Account of what is owing from *Inferiors* to *Superiors*. Now this no more proves that the *Fifth Commandment* founds *Civil Government* upon *Paternal Authority*, or the *Duty* of *Subjects* upon that of *Children*; than that it founds the *Duty* of *Servants* to *Masters* upon the same Bottom; or no more than the reducing to the *Fourth Commandment* the Observation of *Festivals* and *Fast-days* appointed long since, will prove that it was the Design of the *Fourth Commandment* to enjoin the Observation of *Christmas-day*, or to found it upon the *Divine Institution* of the *Jewish Sabbath*. Certainly it may be proper to reduce the Points of *Duty* to such and such certain *Heads* or *Classes*, as the *Commandments*, without supposing that they were originally designed to imply in them every Thing that may be reduced to them, merely for the sake of a *methodical* and *compendious* Way of treating several *Subjects*. But it is evident, that neither *Moses*, nor *St. Paul*, nor *St. Peter*, thought that the *Injunctions* about the *Duty* of *Children*, bear any such plain Relation to that of *Subjects*, as to imply and carry it along with them; and that they never reduced the latter to the former, but spake of them as of *two* very distinct and separate *Heads* of *Duty*.

7. The being called therefore by the Name of *Fathers*, will not prove, either that *Civil Government* had its Original Foundation in *Paternal Authority*; or that *Adam*, by being a *Father*, became a *Monarch* over all his *Descendants*. Especially since it is easily accounted for another way, *viz.* that they might well

well be called so, in a figurative Sense, from the *Duty* incumbent upon them, which is to exercise a *Fatherly Care* and *Goodness* over their *Charge*: and this many are said to do, who are never thought from hence to have their Office founded upon *Paternal Authority*, properly so called. It is said in the *Prophet* that *Kings* shall be *Nursing-Fathers*, and *Queens Nursing-Mothers* to the *Church*: but the *Partisans* of this Scheme will be the last in allowing them an *Absolute Parental Authority* over it. *St. Paul* calls himself a *Father* to the *Churches* he established: and *Bishops* have been called *Fathers* in a much more continued way of speaking, than *Civil Princes* have been; and the *Duty* due to them is likewise reduced to the *Fifth Commandment*, as to it's *Head*. But doth not all the *World* know that this is a *figurative* way of speaking, with relation to their Office and *Duty*; their *Care* and *Love* of their *Charge*? Or can any one think from hence that they have all the *Powers* of *Fathers*, properly so called? Or that their Office is likewise founded upon *Paternal Authority*, and consequently is the same with that of *Civil Monarchs*? The *Argument* holds equally in *both*: and therefore not at all in *either*.

If this will not satisfy this *Writer*; let him remember, That in the *Republican Form*, which flourished so long at *Rome*, nothing was more common than for the *Senate* to decree the Appellation of *Pater patria*, or *Father* of the *Country*, in honour to any Man who had done any signal Service for the *Preservation* of the *Common-wealth* from Ruine, and particularly from the Attempts of such as would have turned it into an *Absolute Monarchy*. It will as well follow therefore that *Tully* was an *Absolute Monarch*, or had all *Paternal Power* over the *Romans*, because he was call'd the *Father* of his *Country* for his *Vigilance* against *Catiline's* Attempts; as that any others had all *Paternal Authority*,

Authority, because they are called *Fathers*. The *Name*, it is plain, was given only on the Account, either of what they ought to be, or actually had been, to a *Country*, viz. *Guardians*, *Deliverers*, and the greatest of Blessings. Thus, it is plain, *Tertullian* understood this Appellation, when in his *Apology*, ch. 34. he saith, *Qui Pater patriæ, quomodo Dominus est? Sed & gratius nomen est pietatis quam Potestatis. Etiam Familia magis Patres quam Domini vocantur.* I enter not into the *Argument* he is upon: but observe only that he distinguishes, and speaks as if all the *Romans* allowed the *Distinction*, between *Pater patriæ* and *Dominus*; that he makes *Pater* a *Name* of *Piety*, and not of *Power*; and that though he owns the *Authority* of the *Emperor*, yet he adviseth that he should rather affect to be called by the *grateful* *Name* of *Father*, than by a *Name* which signifieth *Power*. From whence it appears that *Tertullian* was of the direct contrary Opinion to this *Author*: since it is plain that it had been very much to his purpose to have observed that the *Title* of *Pater patriæ* was fully sufficient to represent the *Power* and *Authority* of the *Emperor*; and yet, on the contrary, he is pleased with that Appellation because it was a more *grateful Representation* of him to his *Subjects*, under quite another Notion than that of *Power* and *Grandeur*. But.

8. What is a *Demonstration* against the *Proofs* of this *first Branch*, taken from the *Injunctions* laid upon *Children* afterwards, is this, that the very same would have been laid upon them, whatsoever had been the *Foundation* of *Civil Government*. And if these would, and must, have been the same that we find them, whether *Government* had been founded upon *Compact*, or upon *Paternal Authority*; then these *Injunctions* can be no *Proof* that it was founded upon the *latter*, or that *Adam* was a *Civil Monarch* merely by virtue of *Paternal Authority*. The *Injunction* of *Obedience* to
Parents

Parents is the same, we see, even in those *Common-wealths* and *Governments* which we know to have been founded, how irregularly soever, upon *Equality* and *Compact*. And had *Adam* given leave to his younger *Sons* to remove with their *Wives* and *Children* to a distant Part of the *Earth*, not yet inhabited, and to enter into what *Compact*, concerning an *United Civil Government*, they thought best, (the Power of doing which is granted in effect to him in this *Scheme*) the *Duties* of the *Children* in the particular *Families* had been just the same to their respective *Parents*, whether they had chosen an *Absolute Monarch* with *Unlimited Powers* (and he styled *Father*;) or an *Aristocratical* or *Democratical Form*; and just what the *Duties* of these several *Fathers* had been before to *Adam*, considered as their *Natural Father*. The *Texts* of *Scripture* therefore relating to *Filial Obedience*, cannot have respect to the *Foundation* of *Civil Government*; because they must have been what they are, upon the *Schemes* and *Principles* of all who contend for any sort of *Civil Government*.

Nor is it a frivolous *Observation*, as it hath been represented, that this way of *Arguing* will equally prove the *Mother* as absolute a *Monarch* as the *Father*, because these *Texts* ever command *Honour* and *Obedience* to *Her* in the same *Sentence*, and the same common *Word*. For it is not enough to answer to this, That the *Father*, as *Husband*, having *Authority* over the *Mother*; her *Authority* over the *Children* must be subordinate to *his*, and *his* the *Supreme*. For the *Argument* being taken from these *Texts* only, as if these *Texts*, considered by themselves, asserted all *Power* to be originally in the *Father*; it is well answered, That as far as these *Texts* are of *Force*, they concern that *Honour* and *Respect* which is equally due to *both*; which the *one* cannot hinder the *other* from demanding by *Right*; to which the *Father* hath no juster

Title

than the *Mother*; and consequently, that these *Texts* were never design'd to place all *Power* originally in the *Father*: which if they had aimed at, it is impossible to think that they should have been so expressed as to make equal mention of, and pay equal *Regard* to, both *Parents*, without supposing any *Ground* for making a difference in the respect of their *Children*. If there be a *Superiority* on other *Accounts*, in the *Father* over the *Mother*; that is, in *Cases* to which an *Husband's Authority* extends; This is not the *Children's Business* to examine into. This is founded on other *Texts*, and very different *Considerations*. But I say, that these *Texts* in which *Father* and *Mother* are so constantly joined together as the *Objects* of *Obedience*, and *Honour* of *Children*, cannot possibly determine in which the *Supreme Power* is originally lodged: Nor can they concern those *Cases* in which the *Parents* contradict and oppose one another; and therefore cannot fairly be alledg'd for the *Supreme Power* of either, because they neither express nor imply it; but leave it to be determined by other *Considerations*, which will as certainly in some *Cases* determine in Favour of the *Mother*, as they will, in others, in Favour of the *Father*.

But, notwithstanding all these *Objections* against this first *Branch* of the *Scheme* now under *Consideration*, let us suppose, in order to proceed, That *Adam* was a *Monarch*, by being a *Father*; it will still be *Matter of Enquiry* how He came to be *Universal Monarch*, as well over his *Children's Children*, many removes from him, as over his own *Children* properly so called; whether by a *Paternal Right*, or the *Right* of a *Grand-father*, or *Great Grand-father*. If the *Right* of a *Father* be said to have given him the *Monarchy* over his own *Sons*, and consequently over their *Children*, by having a *Right* to the *Civil Government* of their *Father*; I should desire to know by what *Means* this

this could be. Whatsoever Powers he could have, considered merely as a *Father*; his *Sons*, considered as *Fathers*, must have the same over their own *Children*. How came therefore the *Paternal Power* of his *Sons* to be in *Him*? It must be either by *God's Appointment*; or by the *Consent and Compact* of his *Sons*. If by *God's Appointment*; Where may we find it plainly said, That *Adam* was to have the *Supreme Paternal Authority*, not only over his *Sons*, but his *Sons Children* to many *Generations*; so that it was their *Duty* to obey their *Grand-father*, or *Great-Grand-father*, many *Removes* off, rather than their *immediate Parents*: I say, Where is this plainly said, or indeed so much as in the least hinted? If by *Compact*, and by his *Sons* and *Grandsons* voluntarily transferring their *Authority* upon their *common Father*; we are then come to the hated *Scheme of voluntary Compact*, and to all the supposed *evil Consequences* of it. Or can it possibly be said, that the *Grand-father*, or *Great-Grand-father*, can have *Paternal Authority* over all his *Grand-Children*, during the *Lives* of their own *Parents*? when no such *Thing* was ever allowed of in any *Nation*; and when all the *Commands of Obedience* given to *Children* in *Scripture*, relate to their *Immediate Parents*; and therefore can prove nothing, by way of *Analogy*, with respect to the *Remote*. Besides, had it been in *Almighty God's Design* to have established an *Universal Monarchy* in *Adam*, Who can think that he would not have done it plainly and effectually? Who can think that He himself would have obliged *Cain* to have begun the *Foundation* of a distinct *Family* and distinct *Nations*, in a part of the *World* removed from *Adam's Habitation*? for it doth not appear at all (what hath been of late affirmed without any *Proof*) that the *Departure* of *Cain*, and his *Building a City*, was *Rebellion* against his *Father's Civil Government*. But, on the contrary, he was manifestly directed and obliged

obliged to it by the *Decree of God himself*. If any say that *God himself* obliged *Him* to this, for his *Sin*; I answer, This is to suppose that, for the sake of his *Crime*, *God* should destroy the *Universality* of his *Father's Monarchy*; and put him into such a *Condition*, and such a *Place*, as that he might set up for an *Independent Monarch* over his own *Progeny*, equal to *Adam himself*.

But last of all, Who would think that any one could undertake to prove a *Monarchical Power* in the *Paternal*, because *God* is called a *Father* in *Scripture*? For,

1. The same may be proved to be in a *Master*, because *God* is likewise called *Master*.
2. He is on more *Accounts* than one, call'd and compar'd to a *Father*; as on the *Account* of his bringing us into *Being*, as well as of his *Tenderness* and *Pity*, and the like; but never once, as I remember, when his *Supreme Sovereignty* and *Dominion* over all the *World*, are designed to be represented to us: which makes against this way of *Reasoning*.
3. His appealing to the *Honour* due to a *Father*, cannot suppose that *Fatherhood* implies in it *Civil Authority*, because the *Appeal* was made by *Almighty God* in those *Times* in which the *Fathers* themselves, to whose *Rights* He alludes, were under the *Civil Authority* of others.

Sect. IV. An Examination of the Second Branch of this Scheme.

But supposing this for the present, That *Adam's Paternal Authority* made him an *Universal Monarch*; we will now enquire after the *Evidences* upon which he is said to have been *Absolute* in the highest Sense:

Sense: For this is the *Second Branch* of the *Scheme* before us, viz.

2. That this *Monarchy* which began in *Him*, was *Absolute* and *Uncontrollable*; and not liable to be forfeited by any *Misbehaviour*; not to be resisted or opposed on any account, by any of the *Race of Mankind*: and that it was made so by the *Institution* and *Appointment* of *God* himself. Now this is said to be plain,

1. From the *Fatherly Authority* which is absolute; and particularly from the *Power of Life and Death*, in the first Times, absolutely lodged in *Fathers*; as well as from the *Commands* given to *Children* in *After-Ages*, of *Unlimited Obedience* and *Submission*.

2. From the *Apostle's* founding the *Authority* of all *Husbands* upon that of *Adam* over *Eve*.

3. From the *Nature of Civil Government*, which requires that the *Monarch* should be *Absolute* and *Uncontrollable* in all *Cases*, *Reh. N° 56*. These are the *Proofs* alleged for this *Second Branch* of the *Patriarchal Scheme*, which I must now consider. And,

1. How do we find it plainly made out that the *Fatherly Authority* extended to *Life and Death*, and all Things relating to this *World*, in so absolute a Manner, as that no *Resistance*, on any *Account*, could be *Lawful*, even upon *Supposition* that *Adam* should have been wicked enough to have sported himself with the *Miseries* or *Deaths* of his *Children*? And after this, How do we find it made out that he had, not only this *absolute Authority* over his own *Children*, but *their Authority* over *their Children* lodged in *him* likewise, to the same *Degree* and *Extent*? The former of these is said to be proved,

1. From the actual *Claim* and *Exercise* of this *Power* by *Fathers* of old. For Instance, *Adam* proscribed *Cain* for the *Murder* of *Abel*. This is the only *Example* given before the *Flood*: and this is so far

far from being certain that it is entirely devis'd by the forecited *Author*, who himself only saith that it is to be suppos'd he did so, because otherwise *Adam* was not the *Governor* of the *World*, which is indeed taking the thing for granted which is in dispute, and going against the apparent *meaning* of the *scripture* itself, which is very particular in this *tragical* piece of *History*, *Gen. 4. 9*. *Almighty God* himself takes the *Matter* into his own *Hands*, before any *Mortal*, as far as appears, knew of it. He himself discovers the *Murderer*, and condemns him to be a *Fugitive* and a *Vagabond*, *v. 12*. upon which *Discovery* *Cain* replies to *Almighty God*, that the rest of *mankind*, knowing him, after this, to be the *murderer*, will look upon him as a *common Enemy*, and arm against him, and in *probability*, some or other of them, will take away his *Life*. Upon this *God* himself orders the *contrary*, and sets a *mark* upon him for his *Preservation*: Now could any one think it possible for a *Man* to discover from this *story* that *Adam* had proscrib'd *Cain*, and that this made him say, *he should be slain*: when it appears that neither *Adam*, nor any *man* knew (for it is plain there were many now in being not mention'd in the *History*) that he was a *murderer* before this *Discourse* between him and *Almighty God*? Doth it not rather appear that ev'ry one did, as well as they could, defend themselves and their own particular *Families*, from a *common Enemy*, as well as from *wild Beasts*? And is here any sign that *Adam* was now *Civil Governor* of all, in such *Sense* as that he only pass'd *judicial sentence* upon all *Delinquents*, and ordain'd their *Punishment*? Or is it likely that *Almighty God* would have revers'd the *first Decree* perhaps of this *Civil Governor*, whose *absolute Authority* was now to be establish'd as a *Matter* of very great *Importance*? But so it must be suppos'd to be: otherwise *Adam* was not the *Supreme Civil Ruler*

Ruler of the World. To which I answer, that then *Adam* was not the supreme absolute Governor: for it is manifest, that he had not proscrib'd *Cain*, or discover'd his being a Murtherer; and yet it is as manifest that *Cain* fear'd being slain by others, as a common Enemy, without this Proscription, or any Commission from *Adam*. And this, if it prove any thing, proves that all were then suppos'd to have an equal Right to slay the Murtherer; and that the sole Authority of decreeing and determining his Punishment was not then lodg'd in *Adam*. I appeal to the History it self, without supposing or devising any thing for the Support of any Hypothesis.

But granting, for the present, that *Adam* did proscribe a Murtherer, did issue out Orders that any Man might kill his Son *Cain* for such a flagrant Wickedness, will it follow from hence that he might have proscrib'd *Abel* before his Death, or any other of his good Sons? Will it follow that any of the best of his Posterity, thus treated and thus destin'd by him, without any Crime, to be massacred, must have submitted and not defended themselves? What Connexion is there in this, he proscrib'd *Cain* for Murther, therefore he had absolute Authority to proscribe any other of his Sons, tho' never so guiltless or virtuous? Whence could he have this Authority? It is Blasphemy to say from *God Almighty*, who could not give him any Authority but for the Good and Benefit of his Children, whose Commission to him cannot, without Sin, be said to extend to all Wickedness and Tyranny whatsoever. Nor could his being an Instrument of their coming into the World give such Authority, for this is owing entirely to the Will of *God*: and it is his Power only which gives Life. Nor can such an Authority be deriv'd to Fathers from what depended entirely upon the Will of *God*: nor can any Authority be lodg'd in them but what is given by Commission

Commission from *God*. Besides, whatsoever Authority results merely from this must necessarily be in the Mother equally at least with the Father; nay more, if Pain and Care can give any Title. And then this could extend no farther then to *Adam's* immediate Children; who must have in themselves all the Authority over their own Children which mere Fatherhood necessarily brings along with it: which therefore could not be absolute over *Adam's* Grand-Children either in them, or in *Adam*. Not in them; because *Adam* could command them as their Father: not in *Adam*, because they could by being Fathers command *Adam's* Grand-Children as their own Children.

Another Instance of the Exercise of this Fatherly Power is many Years after the Flood, viz. that of *Judah* ordering his Daughter-in-law *Tamar* to be burn'd for Adultery: which was probably, in many Places, a known, and ordinary Punishment, at that time, for that Crime; as many learned Men have thought. It doth indeed appear from hence that Families, even a long time after the Division of Nations, and the pretended Establishment of Monarchy in them all, were govern'd by their respective Heads: which makes against this Scheme. But,

1. It doth not at all appear that *Judah* was so absolute as that he could have done what he pleas'd even with his own Relatives. It doth not follow that because he ordain'd the common Punishment of a Crime to be inflicted upon a Criminal, therefore he had Authority to inflict the same upon those who were not criminal; and that it was unlawful to resist any thing he should attempt. It doth not appear that he did, by any absolute Power, ordain this Punishment. It was, more probably, a Customary, which amounts to a sort of legal Punishment, known, and expected. And if the Head of a Family did, amongst his own Relatives, execute such Punishments for Crimes, as

were commonly annex'd to them, it doth not follow that he could have arbitrarily impos'd any other, much less that his Punishment of any guiltless Person after such a manner must in Duty have been submitted to without Reluctance or Resistance.

2. This Instance will be but of little Service to Adam's authority over all his Descendants. For Judah left his Father and his Brethren, and govern'd by his own Right his own Family: nor is there any mention of his being manumitted, according to a Story since invented, but of his voluntary Departure, as of no extraordinary and uncommon thing. According to this multitudes of Adam's Descendants may very well be suppos'd to have been distinct, independent Governors over their own Families: over whom therefore Adam could be no more an absolute Governor than Judah's Father was over him and his when they were departed and settled in another part of the Country.

What becomes therefore of this absolute Sovereignty? or of the second Proof of this absolute authority in the Fatherhood, and consequently, as it is said, in Adam over all mankind, during his Life, taken from the Injunctions of Obedience to Parents, laid upon Children many Ages after? For these Injunctions being calculated for that State of the World, in which it is certain all these Parents were under the Civil Government of other Superiors, they can't respect Civil Government at all. And all relating to the immediate Parents, they can signify nothing towards the proving a Grand-father, or Great-grand-father, absolute over his Grand-children; or towards the Support of the authority of the remotest Head living: to which, according to this, they ought to have been directed. Nay, that these commands can't prove the immediate Parents absolute is plainly demonstrated from hence, that they respect active obedience chiefly, if

if not totally: and this no one was ever so absurd as to make absolute or unlimited. And if the unlimited Form of Expression do not make that Obedience absolute which was the main End of the Command, it is so insuperable a Difficulty, that no one hath yet attempted to prove how the mere absolute Form of Expression can imply an Unlimitedness in any other sort of Submission, to which without doubt the Command was not principally directed. Nor can these Commands, according to the Patrons of this Scheme themselves, possibly be absolute, because the Parents themselves were, according to them, under the absolute Command of others, their Civil Superiors: and yet these Commands relate to Parents, consider'd as such, and their Government of their private Families, as is too plain to be deny'd, and are directed to Children as such, and not to Subjects, who are in other Places and from other Topics instructed in their Duty. Since therefore these Texts cannot so much as prove that Parental Authority to which they immediately relate, absolute, even upon the Principles of those who argue from them: much less can these, consider'd by themselves, as they were design'd either under the Law, or the Gospel, possibly prove the absolute Authority of any others to whom they were not at first apply'd at all, and cannot now, but by a figurative way of speaking, or by way of Accommodation, or for the sake of a methodical digesting a Discourse under as few Heads as may be.

In fine, If Adam's Title to the Obedience of his Descendants were the same with that of Parents in the New Testament (as it must be if this Argument signify any thing) then his Authority must have been of such a nature, as that it might have consisted with his own Subjection to a civil Superior, and so cannot, in the nature of it, be inferr'd to have been either what we call a civil Authority over his own children, when

when they were grown up, and had Families of their own; or an absolute unlimited Authority; to either of which that the Parents now spoken of had no Pretense, is plain from the Considerations just now alleged. But if this Title to Obedience, as a Father, differ'd from the Title of later Fathers; then no Argument can possibly be drawn from the Authority of these, to prove what his Authority was.

Nay, if Parental Power be thus the Foundation of Civil Authority, I desire to know, after this Settlement, which was made, it seems, at the very beginning, what remain'd, or what remains at this Day, for any Father upon Earth to claim, who is not a Civil Monarch likewise? For all parts of Paternal Authority are equally lodg'd in the Prince. What then is the true Import of, Honour thy Father and Mother, in the Law; and of, Children obey your Parents, in the Gospel? Why, as it hath been decreed already, in this Scheme, that Honour thy Mother shall signify no more than Honour thy Mother as far as thy Father will command, or permit thee; so it is plain that honour, or obey, thy Father, can signify no more, than Honour thy Father as far as the Prince will permit thee. Thus, tho' the Pain, and Care, and Trouble of bringing Children into the World, and educating them, so peculiarly belong to the Mother; yet hath she, it seems, no Title to any Honour but what the Father will please to spare her: and thus, tho' the Concern, and Provision for Children belong to the Father, and are his Duty, and Burthen; yet neither must he pretend to any Return from his Children but what his Monarch will allow them to make. After this manner do some Christians now, as the Scribes and Pharisees of old, Matth. 15. 6. make this Commandment of God of none effect: not by their Tradition indeed; (for none of their Forefathers ever dream'd of any such Scheme;) but by their new and groundless Invention: and this, all

all the while, under the good Pretense of defending and magnifying the Paternal Authority. But they themselves must see that Commands of limited Submission (as the Commands now before us must be, upon their own Scheme) cannot be alleg'd, without great Absurdity, to prove the Submission due to Princes to be unlimited.

2. Much less can any Man of Understanding imagine any Force to be in the Argument drawn from the Apostle's building the Superiority of Husbands over Wives, upon that of Adam over Eve. A Cause stands in need of Supports indeed, when it flies to such as these.

For, 1. It is manifest that the Apostle is only arguing for such a Superiority as is consistent with the Husband's being subject to a superior Civil Power himself: and consequently, not for an absolute Power in any Husband.

2. This Argument therefore makes against those who use it. For since the Apostle argues from Adam's Power, to the same in Husbands who are under a Civil Government: it follows from hence infallibly, that the Power which Adam had, as an Husband, was such a Power as that of those Husbands concerning whom St. Paul speaks; and consequently very distinct from all Civil Authority, and consistent with his own Subjection to a superior Civil Authority; and therefore could not be the Foundation of absolute Power so much as over Eve, much less over all the World, because,

3. His Sons Power over their own Wives, being upon the same Foundation with his, must be the same with his, as they were Husbands: there being no Inequality in this Marital Superiority, even according to this Argument it self.

4. Besides this, If the Authority of Husbands in later Ages be founded upon, and the same with, Adam's

Adam's, then *Adam's* could not be absolute, because the Husband's Authority is not so. Neither our Saviour nor *St. Paul* speak of it as such. The latter, in those places in which he alludes to the Law, and to *Adam*, is only arguing against the Wife's affecting any domineering Authority over the Husband, or pretending to teach in public Assemblies. And it is very hard indeed that this cannot be said, but that presently absolute uncontrollable Authority must be infer'd to be lodg'd in the Husband, even originally to Life and Death: when this same *St. Paul* in another place, *1 Cor.* 7. 4. gives to the Wife the Power over the Body of the Husband, which one thing will hinder all Pretenses to Absoluteness in his Behaviour to her, and in another *1 Cor.* 7. 11. supposeth the Lawfulness of her departing from her Husband in some Cases, and in the same Verse forbids the Husband to put away his Wife, in as unlimited Expressions, as he forbids the Wife to depart from her Husband, *v.* 10. which is agreeable to what our *Lord* himself saith, *Mark* 10. 11, 12. where he speaks of the Case of Husbands and Wives leaving one another, in the same way of Expression: and must be suppos'd to allow to the Wife an equal Right to a Release in Case of the personal Vice of Adultery, tho' in other Respects the Husband be never so good or wife a Governor:

Doth it appear then that they thought of an *absolute unlimited passive, or active, Obedience in Wives?* that they must not stir nor resist if a *mad, or drunken, or passionate Husband*, should attempt the Lives of themselves and children? or that the giving some Superiority gives an *absolute unlimited Power?* Who but Men devoted to a Cause could say this? Nay, will they themselves permit us to apply the Allowances given to *Wives* in the *New Testament* to *Subjects* under *civil Government?* According to this way of reasoning they ought to do so. And if they do, let
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them look to the Consequences: for this must give to *Subjects* a greater Loose than ever I gave them yet, as much as I have been complain'd of, and abus'd. In fine, *St. Paul* doth indeed make the Inferiority of *Adam's* Wife a Precedent for all *Wives*, in all ordinary Cases: but, by this, he puts her in the Case of other *Wives*, and consequently not under an Obligation to unlimited Passive Obedience. From whence it follows that *Adam* could not be her absolute Monarch, by virtue of being her Husband: and little did *St. Paul* dream, I believe, of having the contrary Inference drawn from his mention of *Adam's* Superiority. Add to this that there must be extraordinary Cases allow'd, in which the Wife must be the Governor of the Family, and the Husband must often be restrain'd and coerc'd by Force: as in the Cases of Idiotism, Lunacy, or during actual Drunkenness, all which, or any other Exceptions, are entirely inconsistent with absolute unlimited Submission. Add to this, what I am often forc'd to observe, that the Commands which respect Active Obedience cannot prove that to be absolute which in so many Cases must be refus'd, and that it is indeed a very unfair way to argue from them to an unlimited Passive Obedience, as it is call'd, which they were not design'd, at least not principally, to touch.

5. If *St. Paul* had thought of founding *Government* upon the *marital Authority*, how easy and natural had it been for him to have said in his *Directions to Subjects*, in order to press the Duty of *Submission* upon them, *The Monarch was first form'd, and then the Subjects*, as he doth in relation to *Wives*, *Adam was first form'd, then Eve*, *1 Tim.* 2. 13? Or, as he doth with respect to *Wives*, *The Man was not created for the Woman, but the Woman for the Man*, *1 Cor.* 11. 8. so to have taught *Christians*, that *Governors* were not instituted for the sake of the governed, but that the
subject

subject part of mankind, to be governed, was created on purpose for the use of their Governors? But let any one read the seven first Verses of the thirteenth Chapter to the Romans, and then let him fix such a Notion upon St. Paul, if he can.

6. Add to this, as was said in the Case of Parental Authority before, that, according to this way of arguing, no Subjection can be due from the Wife to the Husband, under Civil Government, but what the Civil Monarch will please to permit her to pay: the Civil Monarch being vested with the Marital Authority; and the Husband and Wife being equally, and absolutely, under his Government. But if it be said that God hath nam'd some particular Instances in which he hath forbidden such Interposition, (which cannot be said in the Case of Parents;) I answer by asking, How then can the Supreme Civil Power of Monarchs be founded upon the Marital Authority, which is superior to it in some Cases? or how can the Subjection of Wives, commanded by God to be paid to their own proper Husbands, possibly be the Foundation of their absolute Subjection to the Civil Monarch; when it must terminate in their Husbands, against the Command of the Monarch himself? Is not he to be look'd on rather as the supreme Husband, as well as Father, if the Consequences of this Argument be pursu'd; who may claim by the supreme Marital Authority all that other Husbands claim, who are but subordinate Husbands, as well as subordinate Fathers? But,

3. The chief Argument made use of, in defense of this absolute Power, and unlimited Obedience, is this, that the nature of Government requires it; that otherwise the *wicked* and *refractory* cannot be punish'd, and the like: which would only raise one's Astonishment, and not require an Answer, were it not said by some admir'd Authors. For the nature of
Government

Government doth indeed require the contrary: it being inconsistent with the Ends of it, that any one should be vested with Authority sufficient, and effectual, to destroy the very Ends for which it was instituted. This is so visible in Families, that one End of the Institution of *Civil Government* is to restrain and punish the *Abuses of Power* in *Family-government*. And indeed this Assertion is only a fair begging the Question, which is, whether the Power of the Civil Magistrate be unlimited: that is, in other Words, whether the nature of his Office require it to be so. But what? Is it the End of that Office, that one particular Person may do what he pleaseth, without Restraint; or that Society should be made happy and secure? Who will say the former? And if the latter be the true End of it, a less Power than absolute will answer it. Nay, an absolute Power is a Power to destroy that End, and therefore is inconsistent with the End it self. Can any one say, that a Prince cannot have Authority to do Good without having Authority to do Mischief? Whence can he have this Authority? Not from God, because he can give no Commission to any thing that is Evil: consequently not from the nature of his Office, because then God must be suppos'd to approve of his having it, as he must approve of his enjoying all things necessary to his Office: which is absurd. And if his Commission cannot be suppos'd to give him this Authority; whence comes his Title to an unlimited Obedience? This hath been often propos'd, but never consider'd, or answer'd any otherwise than by naked Assertions. But I ask, Cannot a Father have Authority for Family Government, if his Children and Domestics have a Liberty of examining his Commands, and of refusing Obedience to some sort of them; as they are commanded to do by God himself? This no one denies, with respect to active Obedience: which yet is the main Support of all Government.

vernment. Cannot a Leader of an Army have the Power requisite to his Office, unless his Soldiers and Officers be oblig'd to obey him, tho' they all see him so mad as to command them to leap down a Precipice, or to stab one another? Cannot a Master have Authority for his ruling over Servants, without their being oblig'd to offer their Necks and Lives to all his Attacks? And cannot a Civil Governor have Authority enough for the answering the Ends of his Government, without having too much for it? Cannot he have Authority to punish a Criminal, without having Authority to murder the Innocent? And is it not sufficient for his Office that Criminals must be brought to suffer their due Punishment, but must the Innocent, for whose Defense he is set, be ruin'd by him, for fear he should not have Power enough to defend them from those who are not so? What the meaning of this strange assertion can be I can't imagine, unless it be this, that if any particular Governor be oppos'd, or resisted, so as to be shaken off, for the sake of all the Evil imaginable, then this particular Ruler must be hinder'd by this from prosecuting or answering the true Ends of his Office in any Instances. And what then? what if he be? It is as manifest that the Ends of Government may be better answer'd, in pressing Necessities, by lodging the Supreme Authority in new Hands, as it is that it is often necessary to change the subordinate and deputed Magistrates: And it may as well be argu'd that, if an unlimited Submission be not acknowledg'd to be due to these, how shall the Guilty be punish'd? as it is in the Case of the Supreme. I say not that other Considerations may not make a great Difference: but I say, that, as to this argument, drawn from the nature of their Office, they bid as fair for an unlimited Submission as any others. I say likewise that tho' other Considerations must determine particular Subjects to a peaceable Submission

Submission to some particular acts of Injustice; yet it will puzzle all the Wit of Man to make this appear but probable, that because a Man is call'd to the Office of administering Justice, and doing Good to Society, therefore and upon that account it is indispensably necessary that this Society should entirely submit itself to him when he decrees and administers Injustice, Oppression, and universal Misery: or to shew that the End and Nature of his Office doth not strongly imply the contrary. But if it be said that in all Government there must be a last Resort, and this must be absolute in all cases, I desire to know why? because it must? Is it not sufficient for the Ends of Government that it be absolute in carrying forward those Ends? Nay, can those Ends require that it should be absolute in destroying themselves? I know these things are often said, and have been long swallow'd, and, if no body interposeth, must be settled for undoubted Truths and unquestionable Maxims: tho' they be Contradictions to the very Design of Government, whether instituted immediately by God, or devis'd and appointed by Man. Let us put the Case fairly, and we shall quickly understand this matter aright. The last Resort in a Government is that Person, or Society of Persons, who are appointed to try, or finally determine the Punishment of Criminals, for the Good of the whole People, and to whom the People may ultimately appeal for Justice in Disputes amongst themselves concerning private Rights and Properties, and after whose Decision they can appeal no farther. Now in our Constitution the last Resort is not only in some Cases, in the King or Queen, but in others, as, in some Cases, in the House of Lords, from whom there is no Appeal. But will it follow from hence, that because, in Matters of private Concern, their Judgment determines the Point, and a Man must acquiesce: therefore in Matters of Universal Im-

Importance they must be submitted to, should they attempt what threatens Ruin to the whole Body. So, in Case of the Supreme Executive Power, will it follow that because there is no Appeal from the Sentence, in private Matters, therefore that the Ruin of the Public, plainly seen so to be, must be submitted to the same Sentence? Or, because the Legislative Powers have the Right of making Laws, can it therefore follow that the Subjects must acquiesce, if they could be so void of all Humanity as to endeavour to establish Murther, or Adultery, or Intemperance, or universal Debauchery, and Idleness, by a Law? If it be ask'd, whither can the Appeal be made? I answer, to the Law of Nature, and of God, which allows of Self-defense, and Self-preservation in Societies, as well as particular Persons. As therefore a Man may lawfully defend his Life against the Attaques of another, who is his Superior in other Respects, so may a People, or Nation, defend it self against any Attempts to ruin it, tho' coming from Persons who have Authority in other Cases. There is no Appeal from what is call'd the *last Resort* in Cases criminal, or *causes of private Right*: but there is no such thing as such a *last Resort* in Government, at the Decree and Determination of which, the Lives and Fortunes of the govern'd Body are to be submissively given up. That there should be no Appeal is highly necessary, in some Cases, for the Good of the Public, and the putting an end to private Quarrels: but it will no more follow that this implies in it the Power of absolute Determination, even to the Ruin of the Public, than it follows that the House of Lords, alone are the absolute Disposers of our Lives and Fortunes; nay, no more than it follows that the Person to whom 2 contending Men submit the final Arbitration of a Dispute about Property, (or whom God himself is suppos'd to have appointed to that Office) hath by that Submis-

sion.

son of theirs, or Appointment of God, a Right to their Acquiescence, if he seize the Property to himself, or, in order to it, attempt to take away their very Lives: and that they have no Redress left but *Passive Obedience*, and cannot without Sin appeal to Self-defense, and Self-preservation.

Near a-kin to this way of arguing is the playing with the Word *Supreme*, and representing it as *stupid Nonsense*, to say that any *Resistance* is lawful to what is call'd the *Supreme Civil Power*, because this is to suppose something in the World superior or equal to the Supreme, as high, if not higher than the highest. And so it is indeed with those who are resolv'd that *Supreme* shall signify *Supreme*, not only as to those Ends, for which Government was instituted, but also in the very contradicting and destroying those Ends, and in all possible Cases. Thus to say, that a Person who is Supreme in all Cases, hath any Superior, or Equal, in any Case, is absurd, and contradictory. But to say that a Person who is Supreme in some Cases, may have a Superior, or Equal in others, is so far from being *Nonsense*, that it is what we see in fact every day, viz. that Officers whose Commission makes them superior to others in some respects, are perfectly upon the Level with them in all cases, to which their Commission doth not extend. So that the Right of *Self-defense* remains in private Men as much against one, who is in some respects a Superior, as against one who is in some respects an Inferior: how much more in the whole Body Politic, against all Attempts to ruin it, tho' coming from those who are, in other respects, superior to it, viz. as far as their Commission, founded upon the Will of God, makes them so? Now to argue from any Person's being, by Title, *Supreme*, against *Equality* in any respect, is to abuse the Reader with Words, and to take the very thing for granted which is in dispute; and

and to lead him to think that *Supreme* and *Superior* are absolute Terms, and signify an absolute and unlimited *Supremacy* in all Cases: whereas he may find by daily Experience and common *Sense* that the words in ordinary use never signify more than a limited *Superiority*, extending to *some Cases* only. This is the thing to be prov'd, that the Title *Supreme* or *Superior* to all; given to any *Governor*, signifies any more than a *Superiority*, as far as the *Ends* of his *Office* require it, or as far as his *Commission* extends it self.

From what hath been here said it appears how frivolous and weak that *Objection* is, that the asserting the Right of *self-defense* in a govern'd Society makes Inferiors Superiors, and turns the Government into *Governors*, and the like, repeated again and again, without any regard to what hath been said to it already. To which the *Answer* is plain, that it doth not make a *servant* his *Master's Master*, to allow him the *Liberty* of defending himself, should his *Master* attempt to murder him, but only supposeth him equal to him in Cases which touch not the Relation between them; that it doth not make a *soldier* his *General's Ruler*, to allow him the Right of *Self-defense*, should his *Commander* attempt to take away his *Life* in his *Winter-Quarters*; that it doth not make *Subjects Rulers*, to allow them a Right to judge of the *Commands* of their *Rulers*, and to refuse *Obedience* to those which they themselves judge to be unlawful; tho' this bids as fairly for the dissolving the Relation between *Governors* and *Governed* as any thing can well do. Besides we know, and see daily, that the pretending to the Right of *Self-defense* and *Self-preservation*, in *private Cases*, is not a *Pretense* to *Superiority* or *Government* over those against whose *Attques* we defend ourselves, but only to a Right of preserving what they have not the least *Shadow* of Right to take from

us. So, with respect to a govern'd Society, the Pretense to the Right of *Self-Defense* is not a Pretense to *Government* over those against whom it defends it self; but only to the Right of preserving it self, and its *Privileges*, against those who have no Right to invade, or destroy them.

Alike to the preceding way of arguing is that which is built upon the interpreting the Words, *Rule*, *Obey*, *Government*; *Obedience*, *Subjection*, and the like, in *Scripture*, so as to take it for granted they signify unlimited *Rule*, and *Government*, and *absolute Obedience*, and *Subjection* in all Cases. For by this means, it is but resolving, wherever we meet with the Word *Rule*, or *Obey*, that it shall signify *absolutely*, and *unlimitedly*; and the Cause is gain'd: whereas this is the very thing to be prov'd that these words are thus to be interpreted, and a thing which needs something more than a bare *Affirmation* to prove it. For this we know, that these *Expressions* regarding chiefly *Active Obedience* cannot possibly be intended to signify *absolutely*, or extend to all Cases: and this we may know, if we will consider, that these *Expressions* might have been just what they are, and deliver'd in such a general manner, even supposing *Government* to have been founded perfectly on *Human Voluntary Compact*, and upon Supposition of the Lawfulness of *Resistance* in some Cases. Thus in the *New Testament* we find the *Commands* of *Active Obedience*, given to *Children*, absolute in Expression. Thus we see the *Commands* of *Passive Submission* to private *Injuries* given in absolute Forms, without the expressing, or implying, any excepted *Cases*; which yet are allow'd of by those with whom I am now arguing. Thus likewise, tho' the *Commands* of *Obedience*, and *Subjection* to *Civil Governors* be given in general *Expressions*, without the mention of any *Exception*; yet this can be no *Argument* that none are to be admitted:

as is plain from the way of interpreting all other such *general* Rules, and Expressions. Nor could it be expected that *Exceptions* should be mentioned in such a *Case*, and all Particulars discuss'd: since the *Affair* is only briefly touched upon, amongst other general *Heads of Duty*, not particularly handled; and since, as I take it, there was no *Danger* then of any such Opinion as that which gives up whole *Nations* to be ruin'd at the Will of one Man; but rather of the *contrary*, amongst some *Judaizers*, viz. that no *Subjection* was due to the *Governors* then in being, any farther than *Fear*, and *Terror* made it wise, and politic. And this, by the by, I take to be the Reason why the *Commands* in the *New Testament* run so much in *general Terms*, both with respect to *Passive Submission* to *private Injuries*, and to *Subjection* to the *Higher Powers*: because there was not then the least *Danger* of Mens interpreting the *one* so as to take away from themselves the *Right of Self-preservation* in all possible *Cases*; or the *other*, so as to infer from them that there is no such *Right* remaining to the whole *govern'd Society*, whenever it should be the *Pleasure of Governors* to destroy it. Yet I must mention, what I cannot help yet thinking, that *St. Paul's Reasoning* doth certainly in effect, limit, and restrain the *Subjection* enjoin'd by him.

I have been the longer in handling this *Argument* drawn from the *Nature of Government*, because it is of great *Importance* to the *Cause* before us; and because it gave me *Occasion* to mention several *incidental Observations* that may help to give *Light* to it. And having now seriously examin'd all the *Proofs* alledg'd for *Adam's absolute, unlimited Authority*; and the *Obligation* of all his *Descendants* to an *unconfir'd passive Subjection*; taken from his being an *Husband*, a *Father*, a *Grandfather*; or from the *Nature of Civil Government* supposed to be in *him*: I must leave it

it to the *Reader* to judge, on what strong *Foundations*, and on what plain *Texts*, this *universal, absolute Civil Authority* of *Adam* is built; and whether it be not very becoming a *Christian*, and a *Divine*, to assert the *Divine Institution* of this to be as evident in the *Bible*, as that *God created the Heavens, and the Earth*.

Sect. V. An Examination of the third Branch of this Scheme.

But in order to proceed, let us again suppose, for the present, that *Adam* was a *Monarch*, an *Universal Monarch*, an *absolute universal Monarch*, vested with a *Right* to the *unlimited Subjection* of his *Descendants*: let us now consider the *next Branch* of this *Scheme*, which offers it self, viz.

3. That *Cain* being disinherited, *Adam* was succeeded, according to *Divine Appointment*, in this *universal absolute Monarchy*, by *Seth*; and so successively by the *Eldest of his Branch* down to the *Flood*.

1. That this *Succession* by *Primogeniture* to *Adam's* *Sovereignty* was the *Design*, and known *Institution* of *God*, is said to be plain from *God's own Words* to *Cain*, *Gen. 4. 7*. And,

2. That, he being disinherited, the *Succession* to his *Kingdom* was actually in the *next eldest Branch*, is said to be plain from the *Names* of the *Patriarchs* recorded, *Gen. 5*. These are the *Proofs* of this *Branch*.

1. It is affirm'd to be very plain, that this *Succession*, by *Primogeniture*, to *Adam's universal absolute Sovereignty* was the *Design* and *Institution* of *God*, from his own *Words* to *Cain*, *Gen. 4. 7*. Thus it is argu'd that the *Design* of *God*, in this place, must be to comfort *Cain* by telling him, that if he

did well, he should be accepted : but tho' he did not well, and that Sin lay at his Door, yet that did not take away his Right of Primogeniture, and the consequent Right of his Dominion over Abel, when he should succeed his Father in the supreme Fatherly Authority, nor only over his own Children, but his Brethren, and all the Children of Adam. For that Notion was not yet born, that Dominion was founded in Grace. Rehearsal No. 57. Now,

- 1. It is unreasonable to found such a thing as this upon one obscure Passage, capable of other Interpretations.
- 2. Supposing it to relate to the Superiority of Cain over Abel; all Superiority is not Paternal Superiority: nor is it presently to be interpreted to be absolute: nor is all Subjection unlimited. Particularly, the same Expressions are us'd of Husband and Wife: yet is not the Subjection of the latter absolute; but Cases are named in Scripture, in which she is releas'd from this Subjection. Besides that Active Obedience cannot be absolute.
- 3. It is more probable that this related to his present State in his Father's Life-time, and his present Privileges: and this because it is impossible to think that it could be any Satisfaction to him, in his present ill-humour, to know that above 800 Years afterwards he should rule Abel. How intolerable is it to suppose that God should allege this for his Comfort? and yet it must be so, if this Interpretation be true, that Almighty God bids him be satisfy'd now, because, 800 Years after this, he should succeed in Adam's Government over Abel. But if these Words respected any present Right to Superiority; then the Words Rule, and Subjection, cannot signify absolutely.

4. If

4. If Cain understood any such thing, or could receive any Support from knowing that he was to become the absolute Lord of Abel, after Adam's Death: Can any one imagine that he would immediately have kill'd Abel, and not have stay'd till he came to this Sovereignty, with the Prospect of which he was comforted; when, it seems, he might securely have done it, without any Apprehensions of being us'd as a common Enemy by other Men, under which he presently grew uneasy? But,

5. Whatever be the meaning of this Passage; the Interpretation now mention'd cannot possibly be the Truth, because it supposeth Almighty God to tell him that his Personal Vices could not forfeit his Right to this Sovereignty over all the Children of Adam: when, if we read but a few Verses further, we shall find that for his Personal Vice, and only for that, God himself curses him to fly, and utterly incapacitates him to inherit any such Right. If therefore it was the Design of God, in comforting him, to let him know that Dominion was not founded in Grace, it is impossible to suppose that he himself should immediately divest him of his Right to this Dominion, merely for a Personal Vice. But it plainly appears that he was absolutely debarr'd this Right (supposing there was such a Right) merely on account of his Crime: and therefore it follows that it cannot without the highest Absurdity be suppos'd that God himself should tell him that his Personal Vices shou'd not debar him from this Right. This I argue upon Supposition only: for I am far from thinking, nor do I know any Man in his Wits who thinks, Dominion to be founded in Grace. Nor is it sufficient here to say, that God may dispense with his own Rules, tho' Man may not. In many Cases, without doubt, this is true: but here the Question is, whether God can be supposed first to tell Cain, that let him behave himself

how he would, he had an unalienable Right to succeed his Father in his universal Monarchy; and then immediately, merely on the Account of his Misbehaviour, to banish him, and cut off all his Right to that Government. Nor ought that to be received, which one modern Author affirms, *viz.* that *Adam*, as supreme Civil Governor, had adjudg'd him to Death. For I have shewn before that the Sacred History teacheth us that God himself took the Business into his own Hands, before the Murderer was discover'd by any Man.

6. I think it very probable that this Verse relates to some sort of Excellence, and Privileges, of the Elder above the Younger; with respect to which the one was superior, and the other in some degree subject. God seems to refer to some evil Design in the Heart of *Cain* against *Abel*: and the meaning seems to be this; *If thou dost well, shalt thou not preserve thine Excellence? but if thou dost not well, doth not sin, i. e. the Guilt or Punishment of Sin, lie near thee? Be quiet; harbour no hard Designs against him, and thou shalt still have the Superiority of the First-born over him.* This is agreeable to the *Hebrew*. But it is an unreasonable way of arguing to infer from hence, or from the like Sayings, that this Superiority imply'd in it an *absolute Power* over the Lives and Fortunes of younger Brethren, and their Descendants; or even the same Power, whatever it were, that the Father himself had over his Children. Thus the Reader may see what Ground there is for affirming the Right of Succession to *Adam's* Kingdom, by *Primogeniture*, to be plain from the Words of God to *Cain*, Gen. 4. 7. Let us now,

2. Examine whether it be true that in fact there was a Succession to *Adam's* supposed Monarchy in *Seth's* Line, and this according to *Primogeniture*. For we are told that the *Genealogy* from *Adam* down to

to the *Flood* is continu'd, Gen. 5. by the naming only his Line by *Seth*; that in the *Genealogy* the *First-born* only are mention'd; that in the Contents of the Chapter, made the other Day, these are call'd *Patriarchs*; which Word *Patriarchs* signifies Rulers of a Country: and that from hence it undeniably follows, that the absolute universal Monarchy of *Adam* was continu'd in *Seth's* eldest Branch, down to the *Flood*, after the Banishment of *Cain*. In answer to this, let it be observ'd, more seriously than such Inventions deserve,

1. That this *Genealogy* would have been the same, whatsoever Government had been upon the Earth before the *Flood*: or at least it might have been the same. For it is very hard indeed that *Moses* might not tell us the Names of the eldest Sons of the Branch of *Seth*, without being oblig'd to intend that we should understand by them so many universal Monarchs; when he only barely mentions them, without giving them any Titles at all. What? might we not know by what Branch *Noah*, and *Abraham*, and God's peculiar People, descended from *Adam*? and was it not lawful for the Historian to tell us this, unless they were absolute Monarchs? Was it not sufficient for him to intend to give us this *Genealogy*? but shall we oblige him to intend just what we please? However, if it be but possible that this *Genealogy* might have been given us, as many others are, without any regard to this *Hypothesis*, it is enough to overthrow this Argument. For if it might be thus given us, tho' these Persons had not been universal absolute Monarchs; then its being thus deliver'd is no Argument that the Persons nam'd in it were so. But,

2. Are they not call'd *Patriarchs*? I answer, where, and by whom? Not by *Moses*. He neither styles them *Patriarchs*, nor *Kings*, nor *Governors*: and

and he generally tells us, in other places, what he is doing, even when he reckons up petty Princes: that such an one was King, and, after his Death, another reigned in his stead, and the like. And would he have been so silent here, if he had understood these to have been Lords, in their several Turns, of the World? Or if he had thought it of any Importance for us to take them for such? Add to this, that *Gen. 11.* he in the same manner gives us the Genealogy of *Abraham*, and *Lot*, from *Shem*: and that he himself hath given a Title to both these Genealogies. To this latter, *These are the Generations of Shem*, ch. 11. 10. To the other, *This is the Book of the Generations of Adam*, ch. 5. 1. And who will not see that these Words were not chosen to raise in us the Idea of a Succession of absolute Lords, and Princes: but to prepare us for the Deduction of *Abraham's* Pedigree from *Shem*, as of *Shem's* from *Adam*? But what if *Moses* himself had called them Patriarchs? He that found out that *David* is called Patriarch in the New Testament, might have found out too, if he had a mind to it, that several others are likewise there call'd so, who had not, during their Lives, Possession of any Country, as their own; nor the least Shadow of Supreme Civil Authority: and this, as the Word signifies, only on Account of their being the Originals and Roots of considerable Families. As the 12 Patriarchs, *Acts 7. 8.* eleven of whom accompany'd their Father (from whose Government some of them had never before been releas'd) and became the Subjects of the King of *Egypt*: and the 12th was *Joseph*, who was sold young into *Egypt*, and there liv'd, and dy'd the Subject of an absolute Monarch: as all the rest did likewise. Nor did they who call'd the *First-born of Seth's* Line by this Name, intend any thing more than this by it: but suppose they did; their having been

been call'd so, in any other Sense, since the Division of the Bible into Chapters and Verses, will no more prove them to have been so, than any late Author's writing on the Head of the Chapter, the Names of the absolute universal Monarchs down to the Flood, will presently turn them into such. Besides, Is it not very strange that, in no other part of the Bible where mention is made of these, any one of them should be call'd by the Name of Prince, or King; as *David* and *Solomon* are: but that some of them, as *Enoch*, and *Noah*, should be represented under such Characters, as not to raise in us any Idea of Monarchs, if the Discovery had not been made since?

3. Let it be observ'd farther, for the perfect Determination of this Particular, that it is impossible that *Moses* should have design'd in this Pedigree to give us an Account of the Successors in *Adam's* Monarchy or a Catalogue of Rulers and Princes: because, besides *Noah's* 3 Sons, who come in at the End, and never were Princes, according to this Scheme it self, either before or after the Flood (as we shall see by and by;) there are 2 mention'd, who never could have been Monarchs, because they did not outlive their Fathers; if that Expression may be us'd of one of them. *Enoch* was remov'd to Heaven at the Age of 365 Years: after which his Father *Jared* liv'd 435 Years. *Lamech*, who is another in this Genealogy, was born in the Year of his Father *Methuselah* 187. after which *Methuselah* liv'd 782: of which 782, *Lamech* liv'd 777. so that his Father out-liv'd him Five Years. I believe this was not observ'd by those who make this a Succession of Monarchs, or Patriarchs in that Sense: and it is to be hop'd that so plain a Demonstration will be accepted. For these were *Patriarchs*, as well as the others; but never Monarchs: which shews likewise the Vanity of the

the Argument drawn from their being call'd Patriarchs. But all Things answer to the other Supposition, that it is only a Deduction of Noah's Family, by whom the Earth was afterwards repeopled, (and consequently of Abraham's) from Adam, by the true Line. The Conclusion at last likewise, that Noah beget Shem, Ham, and Japhet, had been improper, had it been the Design of Moses to have deduc'd the Succession of the Universal Monarchs down to the Flood.

4. It is likewise worthy of Observation that Gen. 11. we have just such another Genealogy from Shem down to Abraham, exactly like this, and only the Continuation of it. Yet that, according to this Scheme it self, cannot be a Succession of Monarchs: because, as will appear by and by, this very Scheme robs Shem the chief of them of all Pretense to Monarchy; because, supposing Shem a Monarch, Arphaxad and Salah could not be Successors to him in Monarchy, since they both dy'd before him; and because this Scheme it self, upon the Strength of the 10th chap. makes Arphaxad, and Salah his Son, as well as Eber and Peleg here mention'd, independent Monarchs in different Kingdoms, at the same time, appointed by God himself. Here then is an Argument that it cannot be prov'd from Moses's reckoning up the First-born only, Gen. 5. that he intended they should be recorded for successive Monarchs: because here, Gen. 11. he takes the same Method, where it is impossible he should intend any such thing. And indeed, as he concludes the former with Noah's begetting his three Sons; so doth he conclude the latter with Terah's begetting Abram, Nabor, and Haran. Which shews that all his Design was to deduce the true Pedigrees, of Noah from Adam; and of Abraham from Noah: without any regard to Monarchical Government.

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5. The Repetition of these and the like Genealogies, in St. Matthew and St. Luke, shews the Design for which they were recorded, viz. the Deduction of the true Pedigree of the Israelites, and of our blessed Saviour in particular, whose Kingdom was not of this World. And when it is prov'd that these Genealogies are Tables of the Succession of absolute Monarchs in the same sort of Earthly Kingdom; then the same may with a much better Grace be affirm'd of the Genealogy recorded Gen. 5.

We see therefore how evident it is, either that God himself did imply in his Words to Cain, Gen. 4. 7. that by Right of Primogeniture, he had an unalienable Title to rule and govern his Brother Abel, and the whole World, 800 Years after the Words were spoken to him; or that, in fact, the Line of Seth, recorded Gen. 5. is to be understood as a Succession of universal Monarchs, made such by Right of Primogeniture. Thus are we come down to the Deluge.

SECT. VI. An Examination of the fourth Branch of this Scheme.

4. The fourth Branch of this Scheme is this, that after the Deluge Noah was absolute universal Monarch, vested with the same Powers and Privileges, which were enjoin'd by Adam, and the rest of his Predecessors before the Flood: and so continu'd till the Division of Nations. Rehearsal, No. 62. That Noah had fatherly Authority is most certainly evident from his being a Father: but whether his being a Father made him absolute Lord over all his Descendants is another Point, concerning which the Reader may probably before this be satisfy'd by what hath been said on each side, in the Case of Adam. Noah curs'd his wicked Son, and this prophetically, and declar'd

clar'd he should be a Servant to his Brethren. And what follows from this? The Curse, as far as it was propheticall, could not be founded on Paternal Authority, consider'd as such. Nor did it touch the Person, or the immediate Posterity, of *Cham*: for we shall see by and by, that, according to our Schememakers, this same wicked Son had more Monarchs, and these absolute and independent, in his Branch, than either of his Brethren had. The Curse therefore could be nothing but propheticall, and this relating to a very distant Posterity: and so signifies nothing either to Paternal or Civil Authority.

Well, but God saith to *Noah*, Gen. 9. 6. *Whoso sheddeth man's Blood, by man shall his Blood be shed*: and the Execution of this Law was certainly in *Noah*, not in his Sons, who were in an inferior Rank. Now,

1. Suppose this were so, what will follow from hence? Why, that *Noah* had Authority to punish with Death any one who should wilfully murder another. But it can never follow from hence that he had absolute Power of Life and Death; to kill innocent Persons, never guilty of this or the like Crimes; and that all Restraint upon him was a Sin. But,

2. This Law hath all the appearance of being laid down as a general Allowance for all Mankind, whether under Government, or not: or if it supposeth Civil Government, yet it doth not at all shew who are the *Governors* that are to put it in Execution. For it is acknowledg'd to have been given to *Noah* and his Sons, conjointly; and it is deliver'd in unlimited Words, equally comprehending, and respecting, them all. So that, supposing a settled Civil Government at that time, yet this Law, consider'd by it self, cannot prove that he was supreme universal Monarch: but other Arguments must do that, before it can be plain, that the Execution of this Law was com-

committed to him, as supreme Civil Magistrate. But,

3. This Argument I think, is too plain to be eluded. This Law or Allowance might have been exactly what it is, supposing no Civil Government: that is, Men might be allow'd to kill a Murtherer, tho' they liv'd in a State of Equality. And therefore it is impossible that this should be any Proof that there was then any settled Civil Governor. And, as for *Noah* himself,

4. No Man can shew, unless by taking it for granted, that he was exempt from the Penalty of this Law, any more than any of his Children, should he himself have become a wilful Murtherer: for the Law is equally express against all Murtherers. If this be not granted, then Almighty God must be suppos'd to design to speak, in this Law, what the Words of it do not in the least imply, viz. Whosoever of you his Children, or of his future Descendants shall be guilty of Murther, shall be put to Death at his Command: but he himself shall have the Privilege of murdering as many as he pleaseth, without any Violence or Resistance to be offer'd to him. Or thus, You that are Subjects shall be put to Death, if you commit Murther: but the Magistrate, whose Office it is to punish others for this Crime, shall have free Scope, without any of your Opposition or Notice, to murder as many of you his Subjects as he shall think fit at any time: For it is your indispensable Duty to be quiet, and submissive, under all his Assaults and Violences. If any thing like this can be suppos'd to have been principally design'd, or imply'd, in these Words, *Whoso sheddeth Man's Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed*; no one need despair of proving any thing from Scripture. But I hope there is more Regard left to the Words of

of God himself, than to suppose them so little expressive of what was mainly designed in them.

Notwithstanding what is said, *Reb.* No. 66. I cannot but think the *Account* given of the Design of building *Babel*, *Gen.* 11. to be a very good Argument against any such *universal absolute Monarchy* of *Noah* as is here pretended. For,

1. The *People* are not represented as encouraging one another to do what their *Monarch* commanded them; but as first designing the thing themselves, *v.* 3, 4.

2. Had any *Edict*, or *Command*, been set forth for this Purpose, it is so material a thing that it could not have been omitted.

3. Had it been *Noah's* Act, and Deed, can we imagine that the *Historian* would not once have mention'd *him* in it, but have attributed it entirely to the *People*?

4. Who can imagine that *Noah*, who feared *God*, and worked Righteousness, should knowingly, and with Deliberation, command a Thing that must have many Circumstances in it (not known to us now) very displeasing to *Almighty God*?

5. It is something pleasant to see a *Writer* so put to it, as to be forced to allow a *Privy-Council* for the Assistance of his *absolute Monarch*: and, rather than to admit any thing against the Grain, to suppose that *Noah*, and his *Counsellors* said to one another, *Go to, let us make Brick, and burn them thoroughly*; that *Noah* and his *Counsellors* had *Brick for Stone, and Slime for Mortar*: for these Circumstances proceed; and these Things are said of the same Persons who presently say to one another, *Go to, let us build a Tower, &c.* But,

6. The whole Story indeed looks as if there was yet no such thing as a *fixed regular Government* amongst them. The *People* are represented as journeying

journeying from the *East* in a *Body*, voluntarily; and choosing their Habitation; *v.* 2. then as consulting with one another about Materials, and presently about the Building it self, *v.* 3, 4. And *v.* 6. which I think puts it beyond all doubt, *God* himself attributes the Design, and *Imagination* to the *Body* of the *People*, alleging that when this should be accomplish'd, *nothing will be restrain'd from them which they have imagin'd to do*: which Expression cannot be supposed proper, upon Supposition that they were then under the absolute Sway of so good and wise a *Prince* as *Noah*, by whom any of their Imaginations, or Designs could have been restrain'd, and check'd. These *Circumstances*, laid together, afford a much stronger Argument against any such unlimited *Universal Monarchy*, than can be alleged for it. I do not deny but that a *Body* of Men may speak to one another, and encourage one another in doing what their *Governors* command; or that the *People* may be said to do what is consulted, and commanded by *others*: but I appeal to the Particulars of this *Story*, whether here can be any Command of *Noah* supposed; whether the Design as well as the Execution of this Matter be not attributed to the *People*: and I appeal to any *Reader*, whether any place of *Scripture* hath been, or can be produc'd, in which a great and remarkable Design is recorded, and the whole of it attributed to the *People*, when it was entirely projected and set on foot by a very considerable Person, under whose Direction they were; and yet he not once nam'd in the Matter; and whether these *Circumstances* laid together do not afford a much stronger Argument against any such *universal absolute Monarchy* in *Noah* at the time of this Building, than any that can be produc'd for it. Nay, the great *Patron* of this *Scheme* himself, *Reb.* No. 62. gives such an Account of the *Contrivance* and *Execution* of this

Piece of Work as must exclude *Noah*, and his Privy Council from having any Hand in it. For he tells us, That *God* had a Design of separating multiply'd Mankind into diverse Colonies, in order to people the Earth: But a great many of them gathered together to build a great City, and a mighty high Tower, to secure themselves against another Deluge, and, we may suppose, to establish an Universal Monarchy, to continue after the Death of *Noah*, &c. And now, from this very Account of the Matter, let any one judge, whether the first Design of this could come from *Noah* their only suppos'd Governor; whether that good Man could have had any Thoughts of contradicting the Designs of *God*, from whom he had receiv'd so many Communications of Favour, and to whom he had given so many Proofs of his Faith: whether such a Man as he, or indeed any one else at that time, could think of securing themselves against a Flood, which *God* had, but a little while before, solemnly promis'd never to bring upon the Earth again; and whether *Noah* could be so weak and void of Understanding as to think of a Tower as a Security against such a Flood as he had already been Witness to; against that Power of *God*, the Effects of which he had seen; and this, when he knew the way of securing himself much better by an Ark: and whether consequently this was not the Action of a deliberating free People, not under the Restraint of absolute Power. Is it not a sad thing to see such Absurdities as these now mention'd, and smoothly swallow'd, rather than a darling Notion shall be drop'd?

But since we are sent back to the Case of *Adam* to search for *Noah's* Fatherly Power, and absolute universal Monarchy; I must therefore refer the Reader to what hath been before discours'd upon that Head: remarking only this, that *Noah*, according

according to this Scheme, was Universal Absolute Monarch before the Flood, succeeding by Right of Inheritance; and that therefore this Branch neither makes any Addition to the Scheme, nor needs a distinct Place in it.

Sect. VII. An Examination of the Fifth Branch of this Scheme.

5. I come now to the Fifth Branch, viz. That at the Division of Nations, after the Flood, this Universal Monarchy was changed by Almighty *God* into seventy Independent Monarchies: the several Nations being rank'd by *God* himself under their proper Rulers, all named, *Gen.* 10. to the Number of 70. viz. the Sons of *Japhet*, 14. the Sons of *Ham*, 30. the Sons of *Shem*, 26. *Reb.* N^o. 62. upon which I have the following Observations to make.

1. It is impossible to suppose that it should be the Design of *Moses* in this Place to signify to us that *God* himself ranked all the Race of Mankind under these Seventy, as so many independent Rulers; because He doth not once tell us, or intimate to us, that He intended any such thing.

2. Since this whole Chapter might have been just what it is, supposing He had only designed to give us an Account from which of the Sons of *Noah's* Sons, these several People derived themselves; it is impossible to draw an Argument from it, that it was designed for an exact Account of Seventy Independent Monarchies: when it might have been exactly what it is without any such View. For,

3. There is not one mentioned as a Monarch but *Nimrod*, and He is mentioned as the First that was known of the sort, (especially if the Contents be of any Authority) and manifestly differing from the rest here named, who are not described by any such Characters as He is.

4. I can't but think it a good *Argument*, even to the *Patrons* of this *Scheme* themselves, that, by their way of interpreting this *Chapter*, as an Account of the 70 *Kingdoms*, and *Kings*, under which the whole Race of Mankind was sorted, here is no *Kingdom* or *People* left, either for *Noah*, or *Shem*, or *Ham*, or *Japhet*. And what a mean Figure must *Noah* make, who, the Minute before, was *Universal Monarch*, and now is left destitute of a Foot of Land, or an Handful of *Subjects*? What? Must *Noah* become a *Subject* to his *Grand-children*? Or *Shem*, *Ham*, and *Japhet*, to their *Children*, who are now supposed to be in Possession of the *seventy Nations*, and *Kingdoms*, besides whom there is none left for any other. *Noah* lived two hundred and fifty Years after this *Division*. *Shem* lived four hundred Years after it: and *Japhet* and *Ham*, to be sure, a considerable time. What Figure did they make? Under what *Characters*, and *Circumstances*, did they appear? Can any one imagine that, in the Distribution of *Royalties*, and *Governments*, the *Grand father* (who had had all Power in himself) and the *Fathers*, should be overlooked entirely; and no Place left for them, unless they would be the *Subjects* of their own *Children*? Yet thus it must be, if this *Chapter* certify us that, at the *Division* of *Nations*, the whole *Earth* was distributed into *seventy Independent Nations* under 70 *Rulers*, the Sons of *Shem*, *Ham*, and *Japhet*: of which Number *Noah*, and they themselves, could not be.

5. This will appear the more strange to those who have unwarily adhered to this *Scheme*, because, if we go on to the *eleventh Chapter*, at v. 10, we shall find a *Genealogy*, by which it will plainly appear that several Persons, named *Gen. 10.* and affirmed to have been, at the Time of the *Division* of *Nations*, by Divine Appointment, established for *Monarchs*, could not possibly be capable of being so, at that

that *Division*, when this *Appointment* is said to have been made: and that others there named could not possibly be then living. For Instance, *Peleg* was but just born at the time of this *Division*, taking his Name from the thing: and I do not suppose that an Infant in Swadling cloaths could be appointed the first *Leader* and *Monarch* of any particular Nation. His Brother *Joktan*, even supposing him the *Elder* of the two, could not be of Age to speak plain: and supposing Him born at the same time, was equally incapable of such an Office. But He was not then born, if *Peleg* were the *Elder*; as appears by the next *Chapter*. And whether He were, or no; all his Posterity here counted up, could not possibly be then living, when this Constitution of *seventy Independent Kingdoms* is imagined to have been made. This Observation most certainly takes off *Almodad*, and the rest of *Joktan's* Sons, v. 26, 27, 28, 29. to the Number of *thirteen*; who could not be so much as living at that time. And how then can this be supposed to be an historical Account of the *Monarchs* under which the World, was at the Time of the *Division* of *Nations*, rank'd by the immediate Interposition of *God Almighty*? Should other Men have been guilty of such Blunders, and Absurdities, as these, how many severe Reproaches must they have expected? But,

6. Many of the *Names* there recorded are the *Names* of *Nations*, not of particular Persons: which shews that the Design was, to relate from what Originals such and such Nations, known in the times of *Moses*, were descended; as those that are in the plural Number, or at least some of them, v. 13, 14. and the *Jebusite*, *Emorite*, *Girgashite*, and the rest, v. 16, 17, 18. Whereas this doth not at all correspond to the Design of giving an account of *seven-*

by *Monarchs* appointed by God; which therefore *Moses* cannot be supposed to have had in View.

7. The naming of *Philistim*, v. 14. and of *Ashur*, v. 11. and of the Border of the *Canaanites*, v. 19. which was not then spread abroad, v. 18. shews likewise that the Design was not confined to what was transacted just at the Division of Nations, but respected the *Original* of Nations afterwards known in the World; viz. the giving an account from which of *Noah's* Sons every Nation proceeded, by way of Comment upon the 19. v. of the 9th Chap. *These are the three Sons of Noah: and of them was the whole Earth overspread.*

8. Agreeably to this Design, upon the Mention of *Noah's* three Sons, it was proper to give an Account of the Nations proceeding from them: but supposing the *Historian* to have had his Eye upon what was done immediately upon the Confusion of Languages, it is not to be imagined that He would have told this, before he gave an account of that Confusion of Languages. The Place alleged in defense of the contrary Supposition *Reb. No. 66. viz. John 19. 18, 25.* only shews the Inadvertence of those who allege it. For the *Crucifixion* is there first related: and then what followed it: not any thing which went before it, as is by Mistake supposed. For tho' the *Passages* related v. 24. &c. were before our Lord's Death, yet they were not before his Being fixed to the *Cross*, upon which He remained some Hours before he died.

From what hath been here said is evident, beyond all Contradiction, that this Chapter cannot be an Account of 70 Independent *Monarchs* made so, at the Division of Nations, by God Almighty. Nor doth it signify much to allege that some of the Nations long retained the Names of some of the Persons here mentioned: for this might be; supposing those Per-

sons

sons only the *Originals* of these Nations, as well as supposing them to have been the *Arbitrary Monarchs* of these Nations, appointed by God. The *Israelites* retained the Name of *Israel*: yet had not He any Signs of *Monarchy* about him. His Days were spent in Conflicts and Difficulties amongst strange People: and ended in the *Dominions* of the King of *Egypt*. Consequently it appears from all this laid together, that this *Fifth Branch* of the *Patriarchal Scheme*, is without all good Foundation; and mere *Modern Invention*.

As to what is urged from a very antient Author, *Eccles. 17. 17.* that in the Division of the Nations of the whole Earth, God set a Ruler over every People;

1. This is manifestly intended to signify the Difference between God's dealing with other Nations, and with the People of *Israel*: for it follows immediately, *But Israel is the Lord's Portion*, by way of Opposition to the *Government* of other Nations. This therefore could not possibly relate to the Time of that Division of Nations under their several *Monarchs*, which *Moses* is, by this Scheme, supposed to have related, *Gen. 10.* because in that Chapter are mentioned *Arphaxad*, and *Eber*, and *Peleg*, from whom *Abraham* and his Posterity, the *Israelites* descended; who must therefore, according to this Scheme, be *Monarchs* of the same sort with those of other Nations there supposed to be mentioned. And if so; how can this Text say that at this first Division God set *Monarchs* over other Nations, but not over the Forefathers of the *Israelites*: as it must do, if it be any thing to the purpose for which it is alleged? But,

2. If it respect the *Israelites*, as the Children of *Israel*, properly so called many Ages after this first Division; then the former part of it cannot respect the Time of the Confusion of Tongues, and Division

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of *Notions*: but, on *one* Hand, the ordinary *Providence* of *God*, bringing it about that the other *Nations* of the *Earth* should be ruled by *Earthly Princes*; and, on the *other*, his extraordinary Regards to the *Israelites* manifested in his being himself much more immediately their *King*, and *Governour*. And, being the most usual thing, in *Scripture*, and other *Writings* of the *Jews*, to attribute that to *God*, which comes to pass only by his *Permission* under the *Inspection* of his ordinary *Providence*; even such things as are not approved by Him, but owing entirely to the *voluntary Choice* of *Free-Agents*; and this particularly, with respect to *Kings*, and *Kingdoms*; the *Writer* of *Ecclesiasticus* cannot be supposed to intend any more by this *Sentence*, than that *God* permitted the *other Nations* of the *World* to be much more under the *Government* of *Weak* and *Frail Men*, than the *Israelites*. At least it is certain that it might be so intended, according to the usual *Way* of *Expression*: and therefore can be no *Authority* in a very material Point, in which *Moses* himself is perfectly silent. In which, I say, *Moses* himself is perfectly silent: for the *Text*, *Deut. 32. 8.* alleged likewise in this *Cause*, speaks nothing of *God's* appointing *Rulers* over the *Divided Nations*; but only of his appointing the *Bounds* of the several *Nations*: which certainly at this *Day* depend upon his good *Pleasure*, and may be equally said to be appointed by Him; tho' He do not immediately interpose, and mark them out himself, but only by his *Providence* dispose the *Affairs* and *Minds* of *Men* so, as that they shall be what He sees fit, and what may answer his own wise *Purposes*. And for all *Fancies* and *Imaginations* upon such *Texts*; it is high time to discard them: or, at least, not to pretend to build certain *Pieces* of *History* upon them.

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Se&t. VIII. The Sixth Branch of this Scheme Examined.

6. The *Sixth Branch* of the *Scheme* now before us is this, That the *Succession* in these 70 *Independent Monarchies*, went on (as formerly it did in the *one Universal Monarchy*;) by *Primogeniture*, in the *Male-line*: and this by *Divine Institution*. This is proved after the following manner, *Reb. No. 66.* When there is an *Exception* to a *general Rule*, the *Rule* stands in all *Cases* not excepted. The *Exception*, made at the *Division* of *Nations*, is only as to an *Universal Monarchy*. This was all the *Alteration* was made. Therefore, the *Succession* went on as formerly, by the *Rule* of *Primogeniture*; as it hath been in all the *Earth*, from that time to this *Day*. So that this *Branch* is founded upon these two *Arguments*.

1. *Succession*, by the *Rule* of *Primogeniture*, was the *Law* and *Practice* from *Adam* to this time: in which no *Alteration* was made by *God*.

2. The *Constant Practice* of all *Nations*, from the time of this *Division*, shews that this *Law* was understood to remain in full force.

1. As to the *first* of these, I must refer the *Reader* to what hath been before said to the *third Branch* of this *Scheme*: under which I have, I think, plainly shewn,

1. That the *Words* of *Almighty God* to *Cain*, *Gen. 4. 7.* could not relate to *Cain's* having a *Right* to govern *Abel*, and all the *World*, *eight hundred Years* after the time they were spoken to Him. And,

2. That it is impossible that the *Genealogy* of *Seth's Branch* from *Adam* down to *Noah's three Sons*, recorded *Gen. 5.* should be the *Genealogy* of *Monarchs* succeeding one another in *Adam's Universal Monarchy*.

These two Places of *Scripture* are the only Proofs alleged for this *first* Proof of the *Branch* now before us: and these I have fully shewn to be wholly mistaken, and misapplied.

2. I come now to the *Second* Thing here alleged, viz. The constant Practice of all Nations from the Time of this Division, confirming the *Rule* of Succession by *Primo-geniture* to have been the known Rule instituted by God: which *Constant Practice*, to give it the greater Force, is called the *Law of Nature*. This is a main Point in the *Cause* now before us: and as well deserves to be handled carefully, and plainly, as any part of the whole *Scheme*. And therefore, I shall under this Head consider, *first* what Light the *Scripture* affords us in this Matter; and *secondly*, what offers it self from the *Heathen Moralists*, and *Historians*; and *thirdly*, What *Consequence* there is in the *Argument* that can be drawn from the *Practice* of *Nations*, to prove it to have been founded upon a *divine Institution*.

First, As to the *Scripture*; it appears to me so far from establishing the *Truth* of this *Pretense*, that I cannot help thinking it affords many very strong Suspicions, and considerable Proofs of the *Groundlessness*, and *Falseness* of it. For,

i. Where we should most expect an exact *Account* of this Matter, which is esteemed of the greatest Importance to all the *Kingdoms* of the *Earth*, and all *Generations* of Men; there we have not one Word said of it by *Moses*, on whose Authority only it pretends to rely. Not a Word of *Adam's Monarchy*, or of the *Succession* to it by *Primo-geniture*, before the Flood: not a Word about his Power, either as a *Father*, or an *Husband*, but what may be now applied to any *Father*, or any *Husband*, under the *Civil Government* of *Superior Powers*. Not a Word of any *Succession* to Him in *Kingship* over all his *Descendants* either in any *Law*

Law laid down about it; or in any Part of the *History* of those Times: as I have evidently shewn. After the *Flood*, what Empire *Noah* had, according to *Moses*, I have already examined: and as to any *Succession* to what others imagine, they themselves are so far from contending for any, that their own *Scheme* debarrs all his *three Sons* from having any *Kingdom*, or *Government* at all. But when we come to the *Division* of *Nations*, and God's Establishment of their *Monarchies*, as it is pretended; where there is the greatest Occasion for his mentioning the *Rule* of *Succession* said to be laid down by God himself; He saith not one Word about it; nor one Word about the several *Nations* following such a *Rule*. Now, that a Thing of such Importance, which would forever have prevented all Disputes about so great a Point, should not once be plainly laid down, where there was most Occasion for mentioning it: nay, that there should not be the least Intimation about it; is incredible. But this shews that it is not incredible, but very reasonable to judge from hence, that *Moses* knew nothing, either of this imagined *Divine Appointment* of *Monarchs*, or of any such *Rule* established for all the *Kingdoms* of the *Earth*.

2. Nor is there any Mention made, in any other Part of *Scripture*, that any such thing as this was known, or believed, to have been the Institution and Appointment of God for all Nations; not even in those Places, either of the *Old*, or *New Testament*, where the establishing, or recognizing this *Law*, might have been of vast Service to the Direction of *Subjects* in their Duty: which, supposing this *Scheme* to be true, is utterly unaccountable, considering the Importance of the Matter.

3. When God *Almighty* was induced, by the unreasonable Cries of the *Jews*, to establish a *Monarchy* over them, after the manner of the Nations then about

about them, 1 Sam. 8. He did not recur to the right Heir, according to this Scheme, tho' He could most easily have done it; nor did He fix the Kingdom in the Family in which it began, tho' there was in it a very deserving Son: but He chose, after the first Monarch, one who was the youngest Brother of a Family which had no Claim to any such Pre-eminence; and after David's Death, He continued not his Kingdom by the Eldest Branch. I grant that God Almighty may dispense with his own positive Institutions, (which is here pleaded;) but I deny it to be in the least probable that He should do so, in the Case before us. That He should lay down a Law, and a Rule for all Mankind to go by; that He should declare, as is supposed, both before, and at the Division of Nations, an unalienable Right to belong to the Eldest Branch of such a particular Family, which is in effect as much a Promise to that Family as what He afterwards said to David; that He, who could so easily have put the Jews into the true Way, instead of doing it; instead of pointing out the Man who had a Right to be their King, antecedent to the present Appointment, should so order the Matter that they never should have one Monarch, according to this Original Institution: who can believe this possible? Nay, where is there an Instance in which He ever did do it; or can be supposed to have neglected, or dispensed with his own Institutions, unless when apparent Necessity required it? And what Necessity was there here? Could the personal Vices of the Right Heir make it necessary that He should be overlooked? Did the personal Vices of Saul make it necessary that his whole Family should be rejected? Did the Qualifications of David make it necessary that He should be fixed upon? or of Solomon afterwards, who was not the Eldest Son? These Things will hardly be admitted: for they are accounted

accounted of no Importance by the Framers of this Scheme. To what Purpose therefore is it to say that God may dispense with his own Institutions; since it is not possible to imagine that He should actually do it in such a Case as this? and since it appears likewise from the whole Procedure, That the Jews knew nothing of such an original Appointment, or of any Person who had such a Claim to the Kingdom; and that God Almighty takes no notice of it, but acts exactly as if there had been no such Institution heretofore? Doth all this look as if there had been any such Scheme as this, fixed by Almighty God before? or as if He had any Concern to recommend it to the Regard of his People?

4. By God's professing to build a sure House for David; i. e. to establish the Kingdom in his Family, could not be meant (as is pretended) the Establishment of it in his Eldest Branch: for that was not done. Nay, the very declaring his Will concerning the fixing this Kingdom to that one Family, is imputed by God himself to a particular, and personal Regard to David; not to any Law laid down before concerning the Necessity of any such Succession. From whence it appears, that God Almighty himself knew nothing of his having before fixed any such important Law as this; since He thought requisite to put the whole of this Establishment of the Succession, upon a positive Command of his own, unknown till He now promulgated it. Add to this, that God's Declaration to Jeroboam, that He designed to have built him a sure House, as He had done for David, implies in it that where there was not this immediate Interposition of Divine Providence, there the People were left to themselves; and the Succession to the Kingdom was not determined to one certain Family. For this saying to Jeroboam was in effect to this purpose, That, upon some Conditions, God would have immediately interposed and fixed the Succession

tion to the Kingdom of Israel in Jeroboam's Family, as He did that of Judah in David's: but that He had resolved to leave the Israelites free from any such Obligation, if He himself did not walk in his Ways, 1 Kings 11. 38. Which Chapter, and the 14th, from the 7th Verse, will satisfy any Reader of Common Sense with how much Justice the Author now before me (Reb. N^o. 77.) interprets the Part of Almighty God in this Affair of Jeroboam's revolting from the House of David, to be only his permitting that Wickedness, as it is called. We know very well what is alleged, that God is often in Scripture said to bring to pass what he only permits other Beings, of their own free Choice, to bring to pass: but this is nothing to the present Purpose. For it is evident from the Passages here cited, that Jeroboam was so far from designing any such thing against David's House, that He was actually a great Favourite of Solomon's, and pursuing his Interests, when the Prophet Abijah found him in the way, and told him that it was God's Design, and God's Will, That, after Solomon's Death, He should be King of ten of the twelve Tribes. So that the first Design, and first Thought of that Revolt was from God himself: who promised Jeroboam by the same Prophet to be with him, and to build him a sure House, as He built for David, if He would walk in his Ways. So that He himself had this Kingdom from God himself; from God's own Design, and actual Concurrence, as David himself had: tho' it were not so established in his Family, as that of Judah was in David's, because of his making Israel to sin in other respects. This Design of God's, thus declared to Him by the Prophet, He was obliged in Conscience to concur with, and to execute. It had been a Crime in him not to have done it: and therefore God did not only permit, but require Him to revolt. He never was blamed by Almighty God for this

this Revolt, as He was for his Idolatry. The People of the ten Tribes, were never accused of Sin in joining with him. The King of Judah was commanded by God to desist, when He was designing to reduce them to Obedience by Force, 1 Kings 12. 24. which yet He had a Right to do, had the Israelites been Rebels in a Criminal Sense. And doth all this look like Permissive Providence only? At this rate of interpreting Scripture, it cannot be proved that any thing at all was ever brought to pass by the positive Interposition of God. But this, by way of Digression, to shew the Faculty of some Authors in over-looking even the plainest Words of Scripture, when they suit not with their own Fancies, and Imaginations. Methinks it had been much better to have adhered to their Maxim, of God's dispensing with his own Institutions, than thus to interpret away some of the plainest Narrations of Scripture History. As for its being said that the People made Jeroboam King; 1 Kings 12. 20. This surely should not be alleged by an Author who hath Occasion to know, and particularly to mention, that the People are said likewise to have made Solomon, King; 1 Chr. 29. 2. whom yet they knew to be set over them by the Appointment of God. The Evils which afterwards fell upon this separate Kingdom, were never charged upon its not being a Lawful, or Hereditary Kingdom; nor were they merely the Consequences of its being Elective: but are ever charged upon their Idolatry, and Sins; to which it was entirely owing that God did not make it a great and flourishing Kingdom: as it is plain that He not only permitted, but approved of, the Foundation of it in Jeroboam. But the Matter which gave me Occasion for this Mention of Jeroboam was this, that the Israelites were left free, in his Kingdom, from any Divine Law obliging them to continue the Crown in his Family; for if there were any such Divine Law, bound

bound upon the Consciences of Men before this time; He must have had a *sure House*, in the *Scripture Expression*, and this *Law* would have given his *Family* a certain Title after him. But it is manifest that neither *He*, nor his *Family*, nor any of his *People*, nor *Almighty God* himself, knew any thing of any such *Rule* laid down to oblige all Nations to *Absolute Hereditary Monarchy*.

5. Besides this *negative Argument* drawn from the perfect Silence of the *Scriptures*, in those Places in which we might justly have expected a *Declaration* of the Will of *Almighty God* concerning the *Divine Right of Succession* by *Primo geniture* in the *Male-line*; they seem to me to furnish us with several *positive Proofs*, which appear to bear very hard upon this *Scheme* now before us, and particularly upon this *Branch* of it. I shall not here insist upon what I have already observed, that the Race of Mankind seem to have been equally empowered to kill *Cain*, *Gen. 4. 14.* and that they seem to have done all relating to *Babel*, with mutual Consent, and as under no Restraint from *Noah*: which are Arguments against any such *Divine Institution of Government* before the *Division of Nations*, as their *Universal Consent*, after it, is supposed to be founded upon; and therefore are a strong *Presumption* against any such *Consent*. But I shall come to the *Times* after this *Division*, and the *sacred History* of them. And,

1. The *Kingdom* founded in the *Infant Peleg*, *Gen. ch. 10. 15.* (for according to this *Scheme*, every Name of a Person there, is the Name of a distinct *Monarch*, whose *Kingdom* was to continue by *Succession*: This *Kingdom*, I say) over all the *People*, who were the *Descendants* of his *Subjects*; over all the *Posterity* of *Himself*, of his Son *Reu*, his Grandson *Serug*, his Great Grandson *Nabor*; *Nabor's* Son *Terah*, and all *Terah's* *Descendants*, must have come, by *Descent*,
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into the Hands, either of *Abraham*, if He were *Terah's* *Eldest Son*, or if the *Uncle* be allowed to rule the *Nephew*; or of *Lot*, if his *Father* were the *Eldest Son*, (as He appears to be,) and the *Nephew* be allowed to *Rule* the *Uncle*. But we find no such Thing, nor any *Government* either in *Abraham*, or *Lot*, but that over their own respective *Families*; nor any *Pretense* made by either of them to *Superiority* over the other: but they are all along recorded to have ruled their distinct *Families*, and to have managed their distinct *Concerns* with *equal Right*. See *Gen. ch. 13. 9, 10.*

2. If you search for the *Kingdom* to which *Terah* must, according to this *Scheme*, have succeeded, before *Abraham*, or *Lot*; you will find it hard to discover any *Footsteps* of one. For his dwelling is said to have been in *Ur* of the *Chaldees*, *ch. 11. 28.* which Expression doth not at all suit with the *Supposition* of his being the *Sovereign Prince* of the *Country*. And if He were, it is manifest, He abdicated his *Kingdom*: For, *v. 31.* *Terah* took *Abram*, and *Lot*, and *Sarat*, and left this *Habitation*, to go into *Canaan*: and dwelt, and died at *Haran*. Doth this look like a *Monarchy* fixed in *Peleg*, and his *Eldest Branch*; and fixed by *Almighty God* himself, with *Design* of *Continuance*; in which there never were but *three Monarchs*, *Peleg*, *Reu*, and *Serug*, who outlived his own Son; and which after this immediately vanished? Who would not rather conclude that *Peleg* was not made a *Governour* by *God*, before He could speak; and that there was no such *Successive Monarchy*, in his Line as is pretended? But

3. In *Abraham's* Time, who was but the *Sixth*, inclusively, from *Peleg*, we find amongst some other Nations no *Footsteps* of that *Absolute Successive Monarchy*, which is said to have been settled for all, at the *Division of Nations*. In *Gen. ch. 23.* We find him amongst
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amongst the *Children of Heth*, (who was one of the *Sons of Canaan* the Son of *Ham*) one of the *Absolute Monarchs*, constituted by *God*, according to this *Scheme*, *Gen. 10.* And yet this *Monarchy* seems so soon to have been brought to nothing. For, v. 3. 4. wanting a sure Title to a *Sepulchre* for his Family, He doth not go about to procure it by applying himself to any *Absolute Monarch*, by whose Will, or whose *Commission*, He could presently have obtained the Title He wanted, supposing they had had any such Ruler. But the Business is transacted with the *Sons*, or *Children of Heth*. v. 3, 5. who are the *People of the Land*. v. 7. Some of them answer him, v. 6. To them He bowed himself, v. 7. Them He intreats to intercede for Him with *Ephron*, v. 8. who is represented as a *Common Inhabitant* of the Land, v. 10. to whom *Abraham* gives no Title of Honour, tho' *Ephron* did to Him. The Burying-place was made sure to Him, in the Presence of the *Children of Heth*, v. 18. nay, the Title to it was made sure unto *Abraham* by the *Sons of Heth*. v. 20. Let any ordinary Reader judge, whether here be any Appearance of *Absolute Monarchy* in the Line of *Heth*; or any Probability that any such was fixed by *Almighty God*, and so soon vanished, as if it had never been?

4. The *Children of Heth* do indeed tell *Abraham*, that He was a *Prince of God*, or *mighty Prince* amongst them, v. 6. But we know, He was a *Stranger* or *Sojourner* with them; v. 4. without Right to any *Government*, but that of his own *Family*, which He came not to by *Succession*; and which is very distinct from the *Successive Monarchies* we are seeking after, in the *Eldest Branches* of those named *Gen. 10.* And this gives us another very good hint, that even in those Days there were few *Monarchs*, in the modern

modern Notion, settled, or heard of in these Parts, when *Abraham*, tho' a *Traveller* and a *Stranger*, was accounted a great *Prince*, because *God* had blessed him with a numerous Family of his own *Descendants* and *Servants*. *Family-Government* seems at that time to have been in use: and not to have been so overruled, or swallowed up, by a settled Form of *Civil Government* set over it, as it was afterwards. This appears from *Abraham*, *Isaac*, *Jacob*; and particularly from *Judah*, who, in a *strange Country*, was permitted, according to the Patrons of this *Scheme*, to exercise Power, as a *Father of a Family*. *Gen. 38. 24.* which, supposing the Place to be so intended, shews that there then was no *Settled Civil Authority* in those Parts, *Supreme* over all *Family-Government* of such as were *Inhabitants* amongst them: and that this People, therefore, is an Exception from the pretended *Universal Consent* in *Absolute Hereditary Monarchy*.

5. In *Gen. 36.* at the 31. Verse, we have a Succession of *seven Kings* in the Land of *Edom*, recorded: not one of which succeeded by Right of *Primogeniture*; or had any relation, as far as appears, to his *Predecessor*. And how *Bela*, the first there named, to whom they succeeded, came to be *King*, doth not appear. But before him, it seems that the *Edomites* were without *Monarchical Government*.

6. If we go back to the 34th ch. We shall find *Hamor* the *Hivite*, (the Name of a *People* mentioned amongst the *Posterity of Canaan*, ch. 10. 17. and consequently, according to this *Scheme*, obliged to *Absolute Hereditary Monarchy*;) called the *Prince* of the Country, a Name different from that of *King*, used when the *Historian* speaks of those who really were *Kings*, ch. 36. 31. a Name no higher than what was bestowed upon *Abraham*, in a Land in which He had no Possession, or *Monarchy*, ch. 23. 6. and which belonged

longed to any who had Riches and Interest in a Country. This *Hamor* came to *Jacob*, who was a Stranger in the Land, not pretending to any Government over *Him*, or his Family; which yet every Monarch hath a Right to, over Strangers living in his Dominions: but communing with him and his Sons, upon equal Terms; praying them to enter into Alliances, and Trade, with them, and the rest of the People. v. 8, 9, 10. After this they return to their City, and use all persuasive Arguments to the People to comply with the Terms offered by *Jacob's Sons*, v. 21, 23. in which there is no appearance of Command, or of making such Decrees and Laws, as Monarchs used to issue forth; or of any thing besides Persuasion, and Argument. So soon was the supposed Monarchy of the *Hivites*, instead of increasing in Power, dwindled away into a State, in which there doth not appear to have been any Pretense to Monarchical Power; or any such Succession to it, as one cannot but think would have been, had there been so positive an Institution at the Division of Nations, as is pretended.

7. If we proceed farther, and read *Josh. 12.* where we find thirty three Kings conquered by *Moses*, and *Joshua*, in Part of that one Tract of Land, afterwards possessed by the Children of *Israel*; we shall hardly be able to think that there was any such Universal Consent about Hereditary Monarchy, in all Nations, from the time of their Division: upon which Supposition it is impossible to account for such a multitude of Petty Monarchs as must have been bordering upon one another in these Parts. For this Universal Consent about this Succession in the Male-line, must probably have preserved the Monarchies then settled from being crumbled, by this Time, into so great a number of Little ones. It is worth while to consider.

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8. That amongst, and in the midst of, these Monarchies, there were, it is probable, several Governments of another sort, in being. As the Government of the *Gibeonites* plainly was both Aristocratical, and Democratical mixt. *Joshua 9. 11.* where the Persons, who have Authority to make a League with *Joshua*, declare themselves sent, and empower'd, to treat with them, by the Elders, i. e. the Senate, and all the Inhabitants of their Country. All which helps to confirm us in believing, that the Masters of several Families in any Neighbourhood were at first so far from universally thinking themselves obliged to adhere to One Branch of any one certain Family, that they thought themselves at Liberty to make Choice of such a Form of Common Government, as they themselves thought best, and to make Trial of the Rule, either of One whom they thought qualified; or of Many; just as they thought best for the Purpose intended.

9. In the Book of *Judges, ch. 18. 7.* We meet with the People of *Laiſh* seemingly without any Government at all, living careless, quiet, and secure, without any Magistrate that might put them to shame in any thing, according to our Translation, and the Opinion of many learned Interpreters. I confess the Passage is something obscure: but I think I may produce it as an Instance of a People not under the Government of Absolute Hereditary Monarchy. But,

10. The Kingdom of *Israel* is a standing instance in Scripture-History, of a Monarchy allowed to be Elective, and not Successive: the People of which Kingdom, it is manifest, are therefore an Exception from this Pretense of Universal Consent. The Question here, is not whether Elective Monarchies be not exposed to more Miseries than Successive: but whether there was any such Universal Notion concerning the indispensable Obligation of adhering to one certain Branch of one certain Family. This the *Israelites*,

it is plain, knew nothing of : and how then can we imagine that any of the *Heathen Nations* should know any thing of this *Rule*? Nor were they ever taxed with a *Crime*, either for following *Jeroboam* at first ; or for not continuing the *Crown* in his Family afterwards : which they certainly must have been, had there been any such general *Divine Institution*. They are indeed taxed with setting up such *Kings* and *Princes*, as were displeasing to *God*, *Hos.* 8. 4. but it is manifest that He did not require them to adhere to *Jeroboam's* Family ; nay, that their adhering to it would have been disagreeable to his Purposes. *1 Kings* 14. 7. Nor can the Design of the forementioned Place be any other than this, that the People had been extremely to blame in their setting up such Persons, as *God Almighty* could not approve of.

So then, it appears from what hath been said, that the *Scripture-Account* of this pretended *Universal Consent* in *Absolute Hereditary Monarchy* in the *Eldest Male line*, stands thus. The *Kingdom of Judah* was not established in *David's Eldest Branch* by *God* himself ; nor would have been continued in his Family, but by a particular new *Divine Command*, at that time, founded upon a Regard to *David* himself, and to the *Messiah* who was to descend from him. The *Kingdom of Israel* was left void of such a *Rule* by *God* himself ; and the *People* under no *Obligation* to keep to it. The *Kings of Edom*, recorded by *Moses*, could not be so, by *Succession* by Right of *Primo-geniture*. No Instances in *Him* of other *Kingdoms*, in which this *Right of Primo-geniture* is so declared to have been observed, as it is, in this *Instance*, not to have been observed. No *Catalogues* are to be found in *Him*, of *Kings succeeding* by *Primo-geniture*, either before, or after the *Division of Nations*. Several Instances are to be given of *People* without the *Monarchical Form of Government*. No such *Rule*, as this, about

about *Absolute Successive Monarchy*, is ever laid down in *Scripture* : nor are any *People* ever blamed for violating it, or for having another Form of *Government*. Nay, what need of more Words, when it is plain, to a *Demonstration*, that there were no such *Monarchies* instituted by *God*, *Gen.* 10. as is pretended : and consequently no such *Law* laid down for their *Preservation*, and *Continuance*? And now, for any one to come and affirm that the *Institution of God* ; the *Voice of Heaven* ; the *Law of Nature* ; the *Universal Consent* of all *Nations* from *Adam* to this *Day*, are all on the side of this *Absolute Hereditary Monarchy* in the *Eldest Male line*, is such an Instance of the *Fondness* of *Men* for any *Scheme* once embraced, as can hardly be paralleld.

6. But I must not forget to consider what is triumphantly urged from the *oldest Books of Scripture*, concerning the *Rights of Primo-geniture*, there recorded : because from hence it is affirmed to be most manifest, that the *first born Son*, or *Grandson* was, by *Divine Appointment*, to succeed his *Father*, or *Grandfather*, not only in the *absolute Government* of his own *Children*, but of all his *Father's Family* and *Descendants* ; not excepting his own *Mother*, or *Grandmother*, *Uncles*, *Aunts*, and their *Families*, and *Children* to all *contemporary Generations*.

1. The *first Instance* of this *Right* in the *First-born Male*, is that of *Cain* over *Abel*, said to be plainly implied in the Words of *God* to *Cain*, *Gen.* 4. 7. concerning which I must refer the *Reader* to what hath been already said under the *third Branch* of this *Scheme*, to which this properly belonged.

2. I have there likewise considered the *Genealogy*, *Gen.* 5. and shewn the *Absurdity* of supposing it a *Succession of Governours*, by Right of *Primo-geniture*.

3. I have here under this *Branch* observed enough to shew the little Reason we have to imagine any such *Universal Practice* in those *Nations* of which the *Scriptures* give us an *Account*. So that we have

no notice from them of any such *Government* pretended to by *Right of Primogeniture*; unless in the *Kingdom of Judah*, given by the express *Will of God* to *David*, and yet even that not continued from him by his *Eldest Branch*.

4. Supposing therefore, that it was afterwards continued in *Solomon's Eldest Branch*: if this be an Argument of *God's great Regard to Primogeniture*; certainly it is, on the other side, an Argument of his little Regard to it, that He made choice of *David* for *King*, who was the youngest amongst many *Brethren*; and of *Solomon* for his Successor, who was not his *Eldest Son*. So that neither is the *Kingdom of Judah* it self such an Instance of *Succession to Government by Primogeniture*, as we might expect it to have been upon the Principles of this *Scheme*.

5. Other *Passages* produced for this *Right to Government by Primogeniture* are such as give a *Preminance*, and some *Privileges* to the *First-born Sons* above others: but none of them such as do imply a *Right* in them, by *Divine Institution*, to *Paternal Power*, whatever that was, over their *Brethren*; or to *Marital Authority* over their own *Mothers*. Both which are necessary to the Point in Hand: tho' if both could be proved, it would not follow, that *Civil Authority*, which was to be *Supreme* over all *Family Government*, was to be conveyed down, unalienably, after this manner; because this can respect only *Family government*, as such.

Nay, methinks it is absolutely contradictory, according to other Principles of this *Scheme* it self, to the express Words of the *Fifth Commandment*, thus to represent *Almighty God* as making the *Eldest Son* Heir to all the Power of his *Father* over his *Mother*. For then the Meaning of that *Commandment* must be this, that it is the Duty of the *Eldst Son* to honour his *Mother*, subordinately, only during

ring his *Father's Life*; (for afterwards it seems, she her self is to pay the profoundest Duty and most absolute *Passive Obedience* to her Son;) and of the *younger Children*, after their *Father's Death*, to pay a much greater *Deference* to their *Eldest Brother*, than to their *Mother*; nay, to neglect her *Commands*, in comparison to his: the *Mother* being but *Fellow-subject* with them, after the *Father's Death*, to their *Brother*, and her own *Son*. Now I grant that she may be so; supposing *Parental Authority*, and *Civil Authority* to be different Things. For then, the *Son* may have *Civil Rule* over his *Mother*; nay, and exercise it even to the punishing her, if that become necessary for the *public Safety*; and yet pay her all the *Obedience* and *Honour*, required by this *Commandment* to be paid her, as a *Parent*. But if this *Commandment* be the Foundation of *Civil Power*, and the *Divine Commission* by which it is conveyed, as in this *Scheme* is pretended; how comes the *Mother* to be subordinate to the *Son*? Or doth this *Commandment* convey a *Civil Authority* to the *Father* only, tho' the *Mother* be mentioned in the same Sentence, and after the same Manner? Or, doth the *Civil Authority* of the *Mother*, subordinate to the *Father*, cease at his *Death*, and become *Obedience* and *Submission* to the *Son*? In what part of the *Commandment* is this *Mystery* hid? Or where have we any Command of *God*, requiring the *Mother's Obedience* to her *Eldest Son*; and *Brethren's Submission* to their *Eldest Brother*, to supply the *Defect* of this *Commandment*? For, as it hath pleased *God* to signify his Will; without the Help of some *Interpreters*, *Eldest Sons* may be so weak as to think that all *Paternal Authority*, as such, remains in the *Mother* after the *Father's Death*, and so lose their *Birbright*; or the *Youngest* may imagine that the *Command* obliges them to honour their *Mother* with the highest Duty after the *Father's Death*, and

to rebel against their *Eldest Brother*. My Argument is this. Either the *Authority of Parents* necessarily implies in it a *Civil Authority*, or it doth not. If not, then one main Support of this *Scheme* is lost. If it doth; then *Maternal Authority* must likewise imply in it *Civil Power* as well as *Paternal*; and after the *Father's Death*, an *Absolute Civil Power*, according to this *Scheme*: because it was *subordinate* only to *Him* during his *Life*; and the same *Expressions*, in the same *Commandment*, are used concerning *Obedience* due to *Her*, that are used for the *Father*. Put the *Case* therefore, that this *Commandment* had been in force from the beginning (as to be sure it was) and that *Adam* had a *Right* to the *Civil Obedience* of his *Descendants* by virtue of that Part of it, *Honour thy Father*, as it is affirmed: could it be otherwise understood than that *Eve* should have a *Title* to the same *Obedience*, granting it only *subordinate* during his *Life*, yet *absolute*, and *unlimited*, supposing she out-lived him, by virtue of the other Part, expressed after the same manner, *Honour thy Mother*? Or could *Seth*, or any of her *Children*, (supposing this *Commandment* the Foundation of *Civil Obedience*) have thought it at all reconcileable to the express Words of it, to have pretended to a *Right* to her *Obedience*, and *Absolute Subjection*? Or would not the younger *Children*, in such *Case*, have an unanswerable *Plea* for adhering to the *Civil Government* of their *Mother*, that they had as express a *Command* for that, as for obeying their late *Father*; but not the Shadow of a *Command* for *Civil Obedience* to the *Eldest Brother*. But to return,

Of these Passages now mentioned, there are several sorts produced, *Reb. N^o. 57.*

1. Such as do allude only to some sort of *Pre-eminence* and *Dignity* in the *first-born*; as when *God* saith, *He will make David his first born*, and the like: which

which is only a metaphorical Expression, signifying that, as the *first-born* amongst Men have been generally reckoned to have in some respects the Favour of their *Parents*, and to be distinguished from their Brethren; so *God's Favourites* may be called his *First-born*. But this doth not all determine in what this *Pre-eminence* consisted; or whether any *Pre-eminence* at all were instituted by *God* himself: because the *Allusion* would have been the same, whether this usual *Pre-eminence* implied in it any Power over their Brethren, or not; and whether it had been founded merely on *humane Custom*, or a *divine Law*. This is certain, that one of the passages produced, *viz. Heb. 12. 23.* in which the *Church Triumphant* is called the *Church of the first-born*, cannot relate to any thing of *Government* annexed to the *Primo-geniture*, but only to the *Favour* and *Love* of *God* manifested in Heaven to the *Saints*: For the *Saints* in Heaven are not a *Society of Governours*. From such *Allusions*, therefore, nothing can follow but this, in general, that some *Favours* and *Privileges* were usually annexed to the *Primo-geniture*: but what, is not implied in them.

2. It is said, our Saviour is called our *Elder Brother*, *Rom. 8. 29* *The First-fruits of them that slept* *1 Cor. 15. 20.* and *the first begotten from the Dead*, *Rev. 1. 5.* and all this to express his high Authority over us. Whereas it is evident that he is called the *first-born amongst many Brethren*, or the *Elder Brother* of all *Christians*, with relation to the Favour of *God* to *Him*; and to *them*, thro' *Him*, as adopted into his Inheritance: and this still in *Allusion* to the larger *Portion of Estate*, or *Favour*, bestowed upon the *first-born*; not to *Government* over *Brethren*, for the Mention of which in this Place the *Apostle* had not the least Occasion. And then for the *first-fruits*; they were something very different from *first-begotten Sons*: and

and their Privilege was to sanctifie the Lump, out of which they were taken, and offered to God for that purpose. So that this Expression is unhappily alleged by one who pretends to so exact a Knowledge in the Sacred Writings: unless he can be so happy as to prove that inanimate *first fruits*, as well as *first-born Men*, had likewise *Government* annexed to them. Nor was our Lord ever called the *first-begotten* from the Dead, on the Account of *Rule and Government* over such as are to *arise* from the dead: as He must be, if this *Expression* signify any thing to the purpose. For immediately after the *Resurrection*, He is to deliver up his *Kingdom* to God, even the *Father*: whereas by *Virtue* of being the *first begotten* of the *Dead*, according to this Argument, He ought to rule, as the *first-begotten* from the *Dead*, over all who shall arise from the *Dead*. This therefore, respects only the *Pre-eminence* of arising first himself from the *Dead*, in order to be the *Pledge and Assurance* of the *Resurrection* of those whom He condescends to call *Brethren*. But, supposing these, and the like Expressions were not so easily to be accounted for; I add this, that it is very hard indeed, if there may not be *Allusions* in *Scripture* to the *Homage* paid to many *Princes*; or to the *Government* descending in many *Kingdoms* to the *first born*; but that presently this must be made an Argument that *God* approved, and instituted from the *Beginning* these things to which the *Allusions* were made: which *Allusions* had notwithstanding been the very same, tho' He had neither instituted them at first, nor ever after approved of them.

3. There are other *Passages* produced, in which the *matter of fact* is pretended to be delivered in an *Historical Manner*; and these such as are said plainly to fix, or suppose, this *Right* in the *first-born Son*, and his *Eldest Branch*. Upon this Head, I must be so just

just as to refer the *Reader* to what hath been said in the *former* of the *Two Treatises* concerning *Government* before mentioned; and to observe, that the only *Question* of Importance here is, whether there can be any *Instances* produced of such a *Right* granted, or allowed, to the *Eldest Sons*, as belonging to them by *Divine Institution*. Now I must remind the *Reader* again that I have shewn the *Instances* of this, pretended to have been before the *Division* of *Nations*, to be wholly mistaken, and nothing to the purpose. And if we proceed any farther, I can meet but with *Two Passages* insisted upon, *Reb. No. 57.* where this *Matter* is pretended to be completely handled.

1. Isaac blessed Jacob, as his *First-born*, by declaring him *Lord, &c. Gen. 27. 29.* And,

2. Jacob declared Reuben, his *first-born*, to be the *Excellency of Dignity, and the Excellency of Power, Gen. 49. 3.* So that the *Argument* relies on these two *Instances*, and deserves to be shewn to the *Reader* in its full *Strength*, thus. *Jacob*, considered as the *first-born*, tho' He was not really so, was declared *Lord* of his *Brethren*; and *Reuben* to be the *Excellency of Power*, tho' He never enjoyed it: from whence it follows plainly that it was the *Appointment of God*, that, in all the *Kingdoms* of the *Earth*, *Civil Government* should be *hereditary* in the *Eldest Branch* of the *Eldest Son*. To represent this *Argument* once to the *Reader*, is to answer it. But since these two *Instances* are seriously, and sometimes triumphantly produced; it becomes us to consider them as seriously as they are proposed. Now,

1. There might be several *Reasons* for a *Regard* to the *Primo geniture* in that particular *Family*, without making that the *Universal Rule* of *Succession* in *Civil Government*; especially considering that this *Regard* here paid to it in these two *Cases*, was at times,

times, when it could not respect an *Absolute Common Civil Government* amongst several *Brethren*, and their *Families*.

2. Tho' *Jacob*, under the Notion of the *Eldest*, was made *Lord* of his *Brethren*, and his *Mother's Sons* were to bow down to Him; yet he was not made *Lord* of his *Mother*; nor was she to bow down to Him, as we read of: and therefore this cannot be an Instance of the *Succession of the Eldest into the full Power and Authority of the Father*, as it is said to be.

3. Tho' *Jacob*, under the Notion of the *Eldest*, was made *Lord* of his *Brethren*; yet it is plain from *Fact* that He neither did, nor pretended to, rule *Esau* as a *Civil Governour*. On the contrary, He paid all the *Civilities* imaginable to Him; nay, He paid Him the *Submission* of a *Servant*, and humbled himself much more to *Esau*, than ever *Esau* did to Him; and always looked upon Him as having the same *Right* to govern his own *Family*, as He himself had over his own *Wives* and *Children*: as will appear to any one from *Gen. 32. & 33. 36.* in which *last Chapter* is an account of his separating himself, and *Cattel*, by a voluntary *Deed* of his own, as far as appears, from *Jacob*; and this upon prudential *Considerations*. What therefore is replied to this? Why. It is said, *Reb. No. 60.* That *Esau* had been before, this *manumitted* by his *Father*, and settled in another *Place*, and so *Jacob* had no *Right* over him. That *Esau* had sometimes lived separate from his *Father*, may be true: but that He had been *manumitted*, in the Sense of this *Writer*, is manifestly contrary to the *History Gen. 27. 1.* where *Esau* is called for, by his dying *Father*, as now in his *Family*, and under his *Government*. It is contrary to this *Scheme* it self, which expressly gives Him an *Expectation* of succeeding in the *Government* of his *Father's Family*, which is inconsistent with his having been dismissed before. Or, if it be said that He was afterwards *manumitted*

numitted, or made *free* by his *Father*; I answer that this is contrary to the Words of *Isaac* himself, quoted by this *Author* in his preceding Paper, from *Gen. 27. 37.* in which He makes *Jacob* as expressly *Lord* of *Esau*, as of any other Part of his *Family*. Behold I have made him thy *Lord*. If these Words therefore gave him no *right* to *Absolute Dominion* over *Esau*; neither did any other the like Words give him any *Right* to such *Dominion* over any other Part of his *Father's Family*. And so the whole *Blessing* is come to nothing: and *Isaac* is represented as making *Jacob* a *Civil Governour* over *Esau*, and resolved to bless him after this manner; and afterwards as undoing all this, and making *Esau* equal to, and independent upon, his *Brother*. What inconsistencies are these? Besides that after this, *Gen. 36. 6.* an *Account* is given of *Esau's* Departure from *Jacob*, upon the Increase of their *Substance*, without the least *Mention* of *Isaac*; or of his having before *manumitted* Him; or indeed of any thing, through the whole *Story*, that looks towards it. But

4. If it were in the Power of the *Father* to *manumitt* as many of his *Sons* as He should think proper; nay, to dismiss his *Eldest Son* himself, as He should think fit; or to disinherit his *eldest Son*, as *Jacob* did *Reuben*, according to this *Scheme*: then here is an unanswerable *Demonstration* against such a *Divine Appointment* in favour of the *first-born*, as is pretended. For supposing that *God* himself may dispense with his own *Institutions*; yet it is over and over said by the same *Author*, that *Man* cannot. Now if the *Divine Institution* were, that the *Father's Kingdom* shall descend unalienably to the *eldest Son*: then cannot it be in the *Fathers* Power either to dismiss or disinherit this *Eldest Son*; or to make all his others equal to Him in their several *Independent Monarchies*. The *Supposition* of which Power in the *Father*, utterly frustrates, and renders insignificant, the *Divine*

Divine Right pretended to be annexed to the *First-born*: for this absolute Power in *Fathers*, puts it entirely in their Breast, whether any one *Eldest Son* in the World shall ever succeed in *Government*, or not: And then what signifies this *Divine Institution*?

5. Whatever was contained in the Blessing of *Superiority* given to *Jacob*, it is manifest that *Esau* the *Eldest*, founded not his Expectation of a *Blessing* upon *God's* own Appointment, as He must have done, according to this *Scheme*; but referr'd himself to his *Father*, and his *Will*: which is inconsistent with the Supposition of his knowing any thing of this *unalienable Right* to *Government* belonging to the *Eldest*.

6. *Esau* is allowed to have forfeited his *Right* to this *Blessing* by one *personal Vice*, *Reb. No. 60.* as *Reuben* did his *Right* to *Pre-eminence* by one single Crime. Now how can this *Pre-eminence* signify a *Right* to *Absolute Civil Authority*, in the Opinion of this *Author*, who so often ridicules the Notion of *Dominion's* being founded in *Grace*; and who knows the sad Consequences of making *personal Vices* the Ground of any one's Forfeiture of his *Right* to reign? But all the *Forfeitures* of the *Rights* of *Primo-geniture*, which we read of, are on the account of *Personal Vices*. If therefore the *Right* of *Primo-geniture* be a *Right* to *Civil Authority*; then this *Right* to *Civil Authority* is forfeited by *Personal Vices*. But the *Right* to *Civil Authority* is not forfeitable on account of *Personal Vices*. Therefore this *Right* to *Civil Authority*, which is not in such manner forfeitable, is somewhat wholly distinct from those *Rights* of *Primo-geniture*, which certainly were so.

7. We are enquiring after *Instances* of *Eldest Sons* succeeding, in their own Persons, to their *Father's* Authority whatsoever that was, over their own *Mothers*, and *Brethren*, &c. And we are here very fairly referred to *two Instances* of *Eldest Brothers* put by this

this supposed *Right*; or disinherited on account of *Personal Vice*. Nay,

8. One of these Passages is acknowledged to relate to what should, in Fact, happen to the *Posterity* of *Jacob* and *Esau*; not to what belonged of *Right* to their *Persons*. I may add, or to their *Posterity*: For this *prophetical Blessing* of *Isaac*, given to *Jacob*, gave no more *Right* to his *Posterity* to subdue, and govern, the *Edomites*; than his Blessing, given presently after to *Esau*, conveyed any *Right* to the *Edomites*, his *Posterity*, to shake off the Yoke of their *Government* again. What signifies it therefore, in an *Enquiry* after the *Right* to *Government*, given under the Notion of a *Right* by *Primo-geniture*, to allege that *Isaac* did declare that, in a very distant Age to come, the *Posterity* of *Jacob* (whom He took for his *Eldest Son*) should, in fact, be superior to the *Posterity* of *Esau*, considered as if He had been the *youngest*. Will this at all shew the *Right* of *reigning* to have been a *personal Privilege* belonging to the *Eldest Son*, which is the Point we are upon? Or will it shew that this *Right* belonged to his *Posterity*, when it doth not pretend to touch the Matter of *Right*, but only of *Fact*.

9. Add to this, that in the *Completion* of this *Prophecy*, so little Regard was had to *Primo-geniture* (on the *Right* of which it is supposed to have been founded;) that *Jacob's Eldest Branch* did not reign. *Reuben's* Line was put by: And *Judab's* chosen. But in *Judab's* Line, not the *Eldest Family*; nor the *Eldest Son* in that Family which was chosen, but the very *youngest*; nor this *youngest Son's Eldest Son* after his Death. These are the great Regards of *Almighty God* to *Primo-geniture*, so much boasted of; and made the Foundation of so important a Matter as *Civil Government*.

10. What

10. What is here alleged as spoken of *Jacob* and *Esau*, is meant of *Nations*, and not of any two particular Persons, as is plain from the Words of *God*, *Gen. 25. 23.* And if this Instance proves any thing, it will prove this, that the Posterity of an *Elder Brother*, (for as such *Jacob* was considered by *Isaac*) have a *Right* to subdue, and govern the Posterity of a *younger*; tho' He had been *manumitted* by his *Father* before, and had a *Right* to form a distinct Family, and *Government* by himself.

11. If this Instance, and that of *Jacob's* calling *Reuben* his *First-born*, the *Excellency* of *Dignity*, and of *Power*, be alleged only as *Proofs* that there was a *Pre-eminence* in the *First-born Son*, in this, or in other Families; I know no one who denies it. But this is such a *Pre-eminence* as may be at this Day in the richest and most powerful *Branch* of any Family, wholly void of any *Right* to govern the others, notwithstanding such *Pre-eminence*; tho' possess'd of what may make them capable of obliging, or distressing them. For the being *richer*, and *stronger* than others, gives no *Right* to *Civil Government* over them.

12. Nor doth the Expression of *bowing down* to a *Brother*, necessarily imply in it any *Right* in him to *Government*, properly so called, over those, of whom it is said that they shall *bow down* to him. For tho' *Joseph* saw his *Brethren* making *Obeysance* to him, under the Figure of *Sheaves*, *Gen. 37. 7.* and afterwards likewise his *Father* and *Mother*, *v. 9.* which his *Father* calls *bowing down* themselves to *Him*, to the *Earth*, *v. 10.* yet was this only to signify the *high Station* He was to be put in, in order to relieve and support them in their great *Wants*; not any *Civil Authority* over them. So that it is plain, that Expressions denoting very great *Pre-eminence* may be used of the *first born Son*, without implying a *Right*

to *Civil Authority* over all the Household and *Descendants* of his *Father*. And,

13. Whatever this *preeminence* did consist in; it might have been founded upon the *Fondness* and *Custom* of *Fathers*; not upon any *Divine Institution*: as we see it is allow'd, that the *Father* did often either destroy, and disannul it quite; or might diminish it to an *equality* with the rest of the *Brethren*, even by those who place it in *Civil Rule* and *Government*.

14. The departure of *Esau* from *Jacob*, *Gen. 36. 6.* as well as that of *Judah* from his *Brethren*, *ch. 38. 1.* in his *Father's* Life-time, both shew a *Voluntary Departure*, according to their several *Estates*, and *Exigencies*, and *Designs*: without a Word of asking leave; or being *manumitted* by the *Father*, or his *Heir*, according to a *modern invention*. And in these instances, there were distinct *Estates*; distinct *Interests*; and *Independent Governments*, equal in their several Families: which, I think, proves that *Jacob* never looked on *Esau* as his *Subject*, or rather *Slave*; nor even upon his Son *Judah*; for his departure is recorded as a *voluntary act* of his own, and not as an extraordinary thing. It seems to me that when *Sons* were grown up, and had it in their power to provide for themselves, and to erect Families of their own, they had then a *right* to Govern themselves; tho' their obligation to respect, and assist, their *Parents* never ceased. Especially it seems, that *Marriage*, according to the Original appointment of *God*, gave them a *right* to leave *Father* and *Mother*; and to begin the Foundation of a distinct Family, and a distinct Family-Government, if they thought fit: with respect to which, they were, from that time, *equal* to their own *Fathers*: But before, living in their *Father's* Family, He must be the *Ruler*: tho' not *absolute*, or free from *Coercion*, in all possible cases. So likewise the *Eldest Son*; as long as his *Brothers* keep

still in the Family, (as they did with the *Father*;) might be esteemed the *Ruler* of that *Family*: but this not so, as to be *absolute*; or to be complied with in all things: or so, as that they shall not have a *right* to depart, whenever they please; and raise a *Family* of their own; and Govern it after a manner independent upon Him. Nor is there any ground to make the *Father*, or *Elder Brother*, in this case, *Ruler*, in such sense, as that it shall not be equally the *Right* of any of the *Sons*, or *Brothers*, voluntarily to Arm, and defend, against a *Common Enemy*, before a *Compact* made to the contrary; or to take a *Robber*, or a *Murderer*, and in *cool Blood* to judge, and execute him: which are the distinguishing Marks of no Establish'd *Civil Government*.

But to return; What hath been said, is fully sufficient to give an account of what is any where said in *Scripture*, of the *Rights* of *Primo-geniture*: and from hence we may judge, how precariously, and upon how small an appearance of *Reason*, they are made the foundation of the *Divine Institution* of *Absolute Hereditary Monarchy*, in the *Eldest Male-Line* of a *Family*, impos'd upon all Nations of the *Earth*, for the *Standard* of their *Civil Government*. At least, it is a full Answer to what hath been produced, on this Head, by the last *Patron* of this *Scheme*, in that place where He professedly undertakes to demonstrate the Truth of this Branch of it, *Reb. No. 57*. And as for what concludes that paper, the *Right of Government* by *Primo-geniture* in *Cain*; and the *Successive Universal Monarchs* before the *Flood*, a sufficient *Reply* hath been made already to it.

Before I leave this *Head*, I must take some Notice of that remarkable Text, *1 Chron. 5. 2*. in which it is declared, that of *Judah* came the *Chief Ruler*, but the *Birthright* was *Joseph's*. From whence it seems plain, that the *Birthright*, and *Dominion*, were two distinct things, and that a *Person* or *Family*, might have

have what is called the *Rule*, or *Dominion* without having what is most particularly called the *Birthright*; and another might have the *Birthright* (properly so called) without having the *Dominion*. Nay, since it is declared *v. 1*. that the *Birthright*, forfeited by *Reuben* for his Vice, was given to *Joseph's* Sons, in contradiction to the *dominion* obtained by *Judah*, which is not spoken of as the *Birthright* either here, or *Gen. 49. 8*. It follows from hence, that the *Civil Government*, Established in *Judah*, was not the *Birthright*, or the thing which *Reuben* had a Title to, by right of *Primo-geniture*, before his forfeiture of it: And consequently, that it could not be implied in *Jacobs* calling *Reuben*, considered as the *Eldest*, the *Excellence of Power*, that He had a Title to the *Civil Government* of the whole Family of his *Fathers Descendants*. Let any one consult *Reb. No. 61*. He will see under what difficulties the great *Patron* of this *Scheme* finds himself, when he is forced to interpret this *Text*, so as to give both to *Judah* and *Ephraim*, the *Birthright of Civil Dominion*: as if the *Sacred Historian* had spoken after this manner. *Judah prevailed above his Brethren, and of him came the Chief Ruler*, i. e. In his Line was a *Kingdom* Established, which was the *Birthright* of the *Eldest*. But the *Birthright* i. e. the *Birthright* of the *Eldest*, which is declared by this Author to consist in *Rule*, or in prevailing above the rest of the *Brethren*, was *Joseph's*, i. e. was in *Ephraim*, which signifies the *Ten Tribes*. So, according to this *Author*, *Joseph's* two Sons, to whom in plain words, the *Birthright* is declared to have been given, are *Ephraim*, or the *Ten Tribes*; amongst which, was the Tribe of *Reuben* himself, who had forfeited this *Birthright*. So then, there may be a *Birthright*, it seems, where there is not *Hereditary Succession to Government*: for this *Writer* knows that there was not in the *Kingdom* of *Israel*. And

Ephraim may have the *Birthright*, tho' *Nine* other *Tribes* have an equal Share in, and an equal right to, *Government*. And *Joseph's* Sons, it seems, may be said to have had a *Birthright* given them, which belonged to *eight* other *Families* as well as to theirs; and to have had a *dominion* which was no more confined to *their line*, than to that of these *eight* others. After another manner of expression, *Joseph's Birthright*, or *Dominion*, saith this *Author*, was over *Ephraim*, i. e. the *Ten Tribes*: That of *Judab*, was over the Kingdom of *Judab*. What can be the meaning of this? Had *Joseph's* Family, or *Right line*, or any *line*, such a Right to the Kingdom of *Israel*, as *Judab's* had to that of *Judab*? Or was that *Dominion* ever fixed *Hereditarily* in *Joseph's* Family? No, This *Author* saith, it was an *Elective Kingdom*. Then how was *Joseph's Birthright*, or *Dominion*, over *Ephraim*, i. e. the *Ten Tribes*? Or how can the *Birthright* given to *Ephraim*, as the Text saith, be the *dominion* over *Ephraim*? What account can be given of such *Confusion* as this?

Another very unlucky thing follows from this Text, That a *Birthright* may be given to more than one, and be divided between *two*, according to the Letter of the Text; and, according to the forementioned Interpreter, between *Ten Sons* of the same Family: for the Right to govern, was fixed to no one of the *Ten Tribes*. I am afraid this must, according to this Author, bring in the sad Calamity of *Coordinate Powers, Equality*, and all manner of *Confusion*; and turn the Blessing of the *Birthright*, given to *Joseph's* Sons, into a Curse. More Absurdities might be fairly charged upon this Interpretation, espoused merely to avoid a plain proof of this truth; viz. That the *Birthright*, forfeited by *Reuben*, was a thing wholly distinct from *Civil Rule*, and *Dominion* over his *Brethren*. This is a plain Text, and without any

any Obscurity; making a distinction between them. And I may challenge the greatest *Patrons* of this Scheme, to produce one, so free from all exception; which makes the *Birthright*, and *Civil Dominion*, the same thing.

In fine, It is not justifiable to build so important a Matter as that of *Civil Government*, upon a few obscure Hints in *Sacred Antiquity*, relating to a *Pre-eminence* in the *Primo geniture*. It is sufficient, in answer to all, that none of them speak of any such thing as an Institution of *Almighty God*: and that no one Instance is produced, out of *Moses*, of any Son actually succeeding, in his *Father's* Power, over his *Mother* and *Brothers*, and all their *Descendants*; much less, exercising an *Absolute Civil Authority* over them, by virtue of being the *First-born*. This is what we are seeking after, but find nothing of it; but a great deal, to make us believe that there was no such *Universal Practice* known, or thought of, by that *Sacred Historian*. As for the Kingdom of *Judab*, I have before accounted for the *Argument* drawn from it. And thus much may suffice for the Proofs out of *Scripture*, that *Hereditary Successive Monarchy* by *Primo geniture* hath been the *Way*, and *Practice*, of the *whole Earth* from the very beginning: a Point so frequently affirm'd; and yet so wholly void of the least substantial Proof.

Secondly, I come now to consider what offers itself, in relation to this *Universal Consent*, from the *Heathen Writers*. And,

i. The *Heathen Historians*, and other *Antient Writers* who took their Accounts from them, allow that the first *Essay* of *Government* was generally that of *One* single Person: but yet maintain that at the very first this *one* Person was pitch'd upon by the *Voluntary Consent* of those who were to be under him; and that the Qualifications and Abilities of the

Person, manifested before, were what determined the People to seek for Redress of Injuries, and Assistance in carrying forward the *Ends* of *Humane Society*, at his Hands; and consequently, that at the beginning, there was no such thing as *Hereditary Monarchy*, at least in the greatest part of the Earth, but only *Elective*. Thus *Justin*, who copied from a great Author, *Trogus Pompeius*: and all, I believe, who go so high as *He* did.

2. From hence it will follow that Increase of *Power*, and *Ambition* to leave a *Name*, and the like; or, in some Places, the Gratitude of the People, came to fix a *Government* in one certain Family: yet this not so, but that, in many Places, the *Prince* in Possession pretended to dispose of his *Kingdoms*, and to name his *Successor*, or *Successors*, as *He* pleased; nor so, as that there was any Notion amongst those who came in time to obey *Hereditary Monarchy*, that they were under any obligation to do it by a *Divine Institution*.

3. In the most *Antient Histories* we have Instances of *Queens*, as well as *Kings*: which entirely destroys the supposition of any such Notion as the *Confinement* of *Monarchy* to the *Male-line*. Particularly *Semiramis*, at no great distance from the *Division* of *Nations*, when one would think the *Rule* should not have been forgot, was willingly and with pleasure obey'd, even after she put off her *Disguise*, and own'd her self a *Woman*. Nor did her *Diffidence* and *Artifice*, at first, proceed from any such Notion in the World of a *Divine Institution*, and the unlawfulness of a *Woman's* undertaking to govern; but from a fear that Men, knowing her to be a *Woman*, at first might think her incapable of such an Office. But having given Demonstration of her great Capacity, she professed what she was: and the Knowledge of her *Sex*, saith the *Historian*, was so far from diminishing her Authority, that her *Subjects* obeyed her, thro' a very long Reign, with

with the greatest Admiration. Whereas, according to this Notion, they must have been sensible, that nothing could have been more improper, nor more injurious to the *Rights* of *Primo-geniture*.

4. No such Notion as this appears at the beginning of the *Roman Kingdom*: for the first *Kings* of *Rome* did not succeed by *Right* of *Primo-geniture*. Nor indeed, as appears by the *Event*, was there any Notion of *Absolute Submission* due to them in all Cases; or their having an *unalienable* Right to the *Supreme Government*.

5. With respect to the *Medes*; *Herodotus*, a most *Antient Historian*, relates such a Story, as shews that their *Monarchy*, after they had shaken off the Yoke of the *Assyrians*, and lived for some time in a more irregular *State*, was founded entirely upon the *People's* *Voluntary* Choice of a fit Person, to secure them from the Evils of mutual Robbery, and Oppression, and all the Inconveniences of a *State* of greater *Equality*. *Herodot.* Lib. 1. about the *middle*.

6. Agreeably to this, *Tully* (who certainly was capable of making as strict *Enquiries*, and as good a Judgment, upon this Matter, as any Man) thought the beginning of *Government* in other Places, to be what it was amongst the *Medes*; and that the *End* of it was purely the good of the *Governed Society*; that there was no ground for Submission but upon this bottom; that *Nations* were not tied to the *Form* which they first tried; that they had a *Right* to make *Laws* for the better Security of themselves against the evil *Consequences* of *Arbitrary Power*; and to make the Experiment of any other *Form*, besides that of *Hereditary* and *Absolute Monarchy*. In which indeed *He* did but follow *Aristotle*: whom *Mr. Hooker* calls the *Arch-Philosopher*, in that Judgment which, after mature Deliberation, *He* had formed concerning *Political* Matters. The Passages relating to this, in both

these *Writers*, and several others, are so many, and so plain, and have been so often produced, that it is needless to trouble the *Reader* with them now. So that we have the *Heathen Writers*, both *Historians*, and *Politicians*, giving Accounts of the *Original of Civil Government*, entirely different from this *Scheme*.

7. The many *Exceptions* from this *Rule of Hereditary Government* in the *Male-line*; the many *People* amongst whom *Government* was preserved without it, are great and considerable Instances against this pretense of *Universal Practice*. No, It is said, These *Exceptions* affirm the *Rule*, *Reb. N^o 56*. But how this can be applied to the Case in Hand I cannot imagine; unless this *Author* will shew us how this *Practice* not being in many Places, helps to make it the more *Universal*. Well, But the beginning of all *Deviations* from this *Practice* are known; as the *Grecian* and *Roman Common-wealths*; and the *Elective Kingdoms*. *Ib.* Therefore these other *Forms of Government* could not be from the beginning. And can this *Author* therefore prove, against all the most *Antient Historians*, that the *First Kings* were so, by any *Personal Right* of their own, or *Divine Institution*? Can He prove that the *Roman Kingdom*, or all the *Grecian Kingdoms* were, in the *Male line*, *Hereditary*, before the *Common-wealths* began? Can He prove that any one *Nation*, of those which submitted to *Hereditary Monarchy*, did it upon the Notion of the unalienable *Right of Eldest Sons*? Or that many of those unknown *Nations*, and *Families*, of whom *Histories* are silent, did not live under other *Forms of Government*, before they were swallowed up by the Torrent of a prosperous *Neighbour*? Can He prove that *Nations* at first did not think themselves at liberty to try any *Forms* which might seem fit? Can he prove that there never was an *Elected King*, or a *Government* by a *Council*, where there had not been before an *Absolute*

late *Hereditary Monarchy* settled? If not, his Point is not at all gained. And I appeal to any *Impartial Reader*, whether, from what I have already said, it doth not appear that this *Hereditary Monarchy* in the *Male-line* was not from the beginning; nor ever esteemed by the *Nations* of the World, as essential to their *Government*.

Sometimes it is said that the *Heathens* erred in this Matter, not knowing the *Scriptures*, and the *Will* of *God*. Where therefore are the *Nations*, or *Writers*, who have spoken, or acted, contrary to them in this? I have alieg'd several Things from *Moses*, and other *Scripture Writers*, against this Pretense of *Universal Practice*. The *People* of the ten *Tribes* knew the *Scriptures*: yet they lived under an *Elective Kingdom*, without being condemned for it. The *People* of *Judah* knew of no one *Family*, who had a *Right* to govern them, till *God* fixed it by a *Law* made on purpose; nor of any *Scriptures* which obliged them in this *Case*, before *God* had declared his positive *Will* about *David* and his *Family*. So that, both those *Nations* which knew the *Scriptures* on which this *Scheme* is founded, and those which knew them not, were equally without any Knowledge of any such *Universal Law* of *God*; and are equally *Exceptions* from this *Pretended Universal Practice*: unless it be in this, that *God* expressly declared his *Will* about *David*, and his *Family*. Nor doth *Moses* say any thing more in favour of it, than either *Aristotle*, or *Tully*. How strangely unaccountable then is it to find it so solemnly, and positively affirmed, that before the *Grecian Common-wealths*, the way and manner of the whole *Earth*, without any *Exception*, was *Hereditary Monarchy* in the *Male-line*. *N^o 56.* that no other *Species* of *Government* was know, and the like: when this is so positively contradicted by all the *Antient Accounts* we have, whether *Sacred*, or *Profane*? But one would think it a *Degree*,
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even of *Enthusiasm*, (which always borders upon *Profaneness*) to find the same Proofs alleged for this *Matter of Fact*, which are brought for those which support the Truth of *Christianity* it self; and declared to be as *Cogent* in *one Case*, as in the *other*. This shews an *heady* concern for an *Hypothesis*; and a cold regard to a *Matter of infinitely greater Importance*: of which no one could be capable but *one* who hath in other Places declared his own *Scheme of Government* to be as plainly taught by *Moses* as that God created the *Heavens*, and the *Earth*; and who seems to lay it upon the Consciences of Men, as indispensably as the *Belief* of this. As if the *Doctrines of Creation*, and *Redemption*; and this of *Absolute Hereditary Monarchy* in the *Eldest Male-line*, were, of necessity, to be embraced with equal Faith, and adhered to with equal Zeal, and Constancy. But, to proceed,

Thirdly, I think it evident that no sound *Argument* can be drawn from the *Practice of Nations*, to prove this *Absolute Hereditary Monarchy*, in the *Male-line*, to have been the *Divine Institution*. For,

1. It doth not appear that any of the *Nations*, who did at any time submit to this *Rule*, whether *Jews*, or *Gentiles*, ever apprehended it, or practis'd it, as a *Divine Institution* for all People: as I have observed already.

2. The *Eldest Nations*, in History, did not so much as practice by this *Rule*: as I have now observed from *Antient Writers*. Both which things are hardly to be supposed, granting a *Divine Institution*; but especially the *latter*, because the *Eldest Nations* must have known more, and have had stronger Notions, about this *Institution*, than any following Generations.

3. The *Israelites* must have known of this *Divine Institution*, if there had been any: but it is manifest, from the nature of their *Kingdom*, that they knew of no such thing, as the necessity of *Hereditary Monarchy* in the *Male-line*.

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4. Granting the *Consent of Nations* in *Monarchy* to have been even as great, and early, as is pretended; this alone is not sufficient to prove a *Divine Institution*. For in such *Cases* as this, which relate to things capable of improvement, most Nations consenting to try this, or any other, form of *Government*, will no more prove that it was a *Divine Institution*, than their universally agreeing, in their first *Essays in building*, to try what first offered to their thoughts in their necessities, will prove that *Building with Dirt and Straw*, or the like, is a *Divine Institution*. Let not any one here be so injurious as to represent me as comparing *Government*, in all respects, with something so much below it; tho' as necessary to the well-being of Mankind as it self. What I mean is this, The Necessities of Men made them make the Experiment of *Building*; in which probably their first *Essays* were generally alike: so, supposing Men left to the dictates of their own Prudence, and the pressure of their own Wants in the *other case*; it is probable that their first *Essays in Civil Government* might generally be alike, without any thing of a *Divine Interposition*. And the first Thought offering it self to an unexperienced Company of Men, might be to agree to commit themselves to the *Rule*, and *Arbitration*, of *one* amongst them, whom they took to be wise, and just: without any Imagination that by this they precluded themselves from introducing settled *Laws* afterwards; or from trying any other Methods, whenever it should seem necessary for the answering the *Ends of Government in Humane Society*. This general Agreement, therefore, at the beginning, being to be accounted for another way: it is impossible that this, of it self, should be an Argument of a *Divine Institution* (as it hath often, with a sort of Triumph, been made;) which might have been the same without one. But, in truth, it cannot be so much as said that there was,
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from the very beginning, a *Consent* in *Hereditary Monarchy* in the *Male-line*; as I have sufficiently demonstrated: which destroys the whole ground of the *Argument*.

From what hath been said, the *Reader* will easily judge of the *Truth* of this *Sixth Branch* of the *Scheme* before us, *viz.* that the *Succession* in all the *Kingdoms* of the *Earth*, from the time of the *Division of Nations*, went on, according to *Divine Institution*, by right of *Primo-geniture*, in the *Male-line*.

SECT. IX. The Seventh Branch Examined.

7. I come now to the *Seventh Branch* of this *Scheme*, *viz.* that the present Possessor of any *Throne* hath a *Right* to all the *Powers*, and *Privileges*, of these first *Monarchs*, where there is no *Claimer*, who can make out a better *Title*. The *Reader* may perhaps be extremely surprized, to find himself advanced not one *Step* towards the *Title* of any one *Prince* upon *Earth*, by all the *Six* foregoing *Branches* of this *Scheme*; and ask, of what use, or to what purpose they are. For, supposing *Adam*, and *Seth's Eldest Branch* to have been *Universal Monarchs* before the *Flood*, supposing 70 *Independent Monarchies* establish'd after it; and the *Succession* appointed to be inviolably observed: according to *Primo-geniture*, in the *Male-line*: what follows from hence that can be of *Importance* to any *Governour* or *Government*, now in being; when there cannot be produced any one *single Governour*, who ever did claim, or doth now enjoy, his *Government*, by this *Right*? To what *End* have we been thus amused with other *Divine Institutions*, if *Mere Possession* at last be the only *Divine Institution*, in which we can have any concern; and can convey a *Right* equal to that of *Primo-geniture*, in a *right Line* from
Noah's

Noah's *Grand-Children*? A great deal of *Pains* might have been spared; and this might have been the *First Branch* of the *Scheme*, not without *Advantage* to the *Scheme* it self: because all that hath been said before concerning the importance of the other *Branches*, doth but reflect *disgrace* upon this; as the *Nature* of the supposed *Titles* of the *Primitive Monarchs*, doth indeed shake the very *Foundations* of the *Thrones* of their *Modern Successors*.

This *Branch* is handled *Reb. N^o 66.* upon occasion of this *Objection*, That, according to the last *Branch*, it must be necessary that every *King* now in the *World*, should derive himself from some of the 70 *Monarchs*, (made at the *Division of Nations*) and by the *Eldest Son* all the way: which is indeed such an *Objection*, as invalidates the importance of all the foregoing parts of this *Scheme*. But nothing so easie as for some *Men* to account for *Difficulties*, when they have a mind to it. This *Author* therefore solves it immediately, after the following manner: He saith,

1. It is the design of *Almighty God*, that there should be always *Civil Government* in the *World*.

2. He saith down the *Rule*, as I have expressed it above; and affirms it to be the *Rule*; and endeavours to prove it by a *Simile*.

3. He argues that *Possession*, according to this *Rule*, wrongs no *Body*; and therefore cannot be *Usurpation*; and therefore must be a *Rightful Title*.

1. The first of these, I know no one who will deny: but every one, who can think, will deny the consequence; that because it is *God's Will*, there should be *Civil Government*, therefore *Mere Possession* of any sort, or any duration, gives the *Eldest Male-Line* of a particular *Family*; an *Unalienable Right* to the *Supreme Government* of a *Nation*. There may certainly be *Civil Government* without this; as is plain in fact: and therefore this consequence must be denied;

denied; at least till we have considered what follows, viz.

2. His proof of the goodness of this Rule, by the following familiar Simile. Suppose I should rob you of your hat, this doth not give me a right against you. But it gives me such a Right to it, that if another should rob me of that hat, it would be robbery in Him: and this because He could shew no right that He had to it. And the Case of a Crown is, it seems, the very same, in this point, with that of the hat. Now I do not see how a greater Affront can be offered to Princes, whose Absolute Power this Scheme pretends to support, than what this Simile implies in it. For,

1. According to this, a Prince hath no more right to his Crown, than the first Robber hath to the hat; unless He can deduce His Pedigree from the Eldest Male Branch of one of the 70 Antient Monarchs.

2. If the Reason why the second Robber should be condemned be, because He can shew no right to it, tho' He hath Possession; the same reason will condemn the first Robber, who likewise can shew no right to it. And if this second Robber could not come off at his Trial, for want of this; much less could the first, who knew the true Owner, in whom only the Right was; and yet took the hat by Fraud, or Violence from him.

3. The Right which Mere Possession gives in the Case of the Hat, and all like Cases, is no Real Right: which can be only in such or such a particular Person, whether known or not. So the Right to Rule, according to this Scheme, can be only in one particular Man, descended in a right line from one of Noab's Grandsons, whether He be known, or not; whether He be now in possession, or not. And I appeal to this Author himself, whether, if this Man could now be found, the prescription of a thousand Years, could give

give such a right to any other Family, as that they must not in Conscience yield up their Possession to this Man. From hence it is evident, that Possession gives no right: because this Man would have the only right, even without Possession; and those in Possession none at all, really and justly speaking.

4. Indeed it is excellently contrived by Humane Laws, that, after Possession for such a Term of Years, there should be no Title allowed to be good against such Possession: because otherwise the Quarrels, and Disquiets in Humane Society, would be endless; and chiefly because, in the Petty Disputes amongst Men, it must be supposed that, after so many Years, it becomes a much more intricate, and difficult matter to determine concerning these Titles. This is a voluntary Humane Law, for the ending of Strife and Contention; not for the determining of Real Right: and a Law which is alterable at the pleasure of Legislators; if they should see fit to shorten, or prolong, the Term of Years. But what is this to Government, with which Voluntary Humane Laws have nothing to do, according to this Author; which is a matter not of Private, but Universal Concern; which was, according to him, appointed immediately by God; and the Right to it fixed unalienably in One only Person, in one time and place, which determination excludes all but this one Person from any right to it? If He say Public Good requires this Rule: I answer, it may be so often; but whenever it is so, it is not Possession, but Public Good, which gives the Title. And this same Public Good must, in some possible Cases, oblige a Nation to go out of this way; and will give as good a Title, contrary to this Rule.

5. The Case is this. The only right ariseth from being the Eldest Son of the Eldest Branch from one of Noab's Grandsons: which right could be but in one. As soon as this right in this Person is set aside; all be- fides

rides himself are in a *State of equality*, as to *right*: no one having a *right* more than another; unless perhaps, the Man who was the first *Robber*, may have less right, if possible, than any of the others. Now it is very true, that no *one* of the *others* hath any right, to rob the *Robber*, so as to seize the *Kingdom* for himself, by *Fraud* or *Violence*: but it is false to say, that He, or his *Family* after Him, have any *right* to it. As to *Right to Government*; it is manifest they are in a *State of Equality* with others; supposing the only *Heir* set aside, or *Buried in Obscurity*: And tho' no one *Person* hath a right to take the *Kingdom* from the first *Robber*; yet they have all a *Right*, upon this supposition, to come to a *Consultation*, and enter into *Voluntary Compacts*, concerning *Government* for the future. And tho' *Force* may hinder them from the *Exercise* of this *Right*; yet it can never destroy the *Right* it self. As in the *Case* of the *Hat*, supposing it a thing of any importance and advantage; it is evident, were the true *Heirs* dispossessed, and become perfectly unknown, that the *first Robber*, or his *Heirs*, ought no more to have the advantage of it, than the *second*, because they can shew no *Title*; but that the *Community* or *Society*, ought to enjoy the *Benefit* of what no particular *Person* can make out any *Title* to.

6. Behold, therefore, to what this *Rule*, and this *Simile* reduces the *Divine Right* of *Princes*; even to the *Divine Right* of *Possession*, obtained, and guarded by *Fraud* and *Violence*. For it gives the most *Established* of them no apparent *right*, but that of being *Heirs* to *Thieves* and *Robbers*; no right but the *right* coming by *Mere Possession*, following an unjust acquisition, and lasting no longer than till *another Family* can dispossess them, and secure their own *possession* for a particular *Term of Years*, sufficient to make the *Title* of any other *Family* disappear: i. e. indeed no *right*

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at all: which surely, one would think, enough to dissatisfie the *Minds* of *Subjects*; and to disturb the *Consciences* of *Princes* themselves: were there not a plainer, and surer *Foundation* of their *Authority* than this. But, after this manner, are they devested of all *Title*; for fear of allowing the *Consent*, and *Approbation* of their *People* to be any *Title* at all: tho' it be indeed the most *Secure*, as well as the most *Glorious* *Foundation*, upon which the *Throne* of any *Earthly Prince* can be *Established*.

3. I must now just take notice of the other *Argument* advanced, in the third place, to prove this *Possession*, tho' supposed to be at first acquired by *Robbery*, a *Rightful Title*; viz. that by means of this *Possession*, *The Peace of the World is preserved*, *Government continued*, and *no Man's Right invaded*: and if that be not *Right*, there is no *Right in the World*. Now,

1. I will say the same of any *Prince*, dethroning another, and taking *Possession* of his *Crown*. By means of this *Possession*, *The Peace is preserved*; *Government continued*; and *no Man's Right invaded*: forasmuch as the *Prince* dethroned can no more make out a true *Title*, than the *Invader*, without taking for granted that *Possession* is a good *Title*; which now the *Invader* is supposed to have. *No Man's Right it invaded*: because the only *Right*, according to *God's own appointment*, ariseth from descending, in the *Right Line*, from one of the *70 Primitive Monarchs*; and no particular *Person* can pretend to this *Right*. If the *Invader* therefore hath not *Right* by *Success*; there is no *Right in the World*. But,

2. This can only give a *Title*, as long as the *Possessor* doth indeed preserve the *Peace*; and answer the *Ends of Government*; and not invade the *Rights* of those, whose *Right* it is his *Office* to preserve: for that

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that others have Rights, as well as Possessors of Thrones, will ever be the Opinion of Mankind; what ever such Writers as this may be suggesting to the contrary. Nay, methinks, if Possession be now the only Title of any Family to Rule, and Government; Possession might likewise be allowed to confirm the Rights and Privileges of Subjects. For no Governour is wronged, here in England, for instance, by the Rights that Subjects are possess'd of: because, supposing them at first to have been obtained by Robbery, (which is the Complement paid by this Author to Princes themselves;) yet the Prince cannot make out a Title to them, stronger than that Possession by which Subjects enjoy them; since Possession is the only Right, by which this Author will permit the Prince himself to claim any thing.

3. What is said in this Argument, is not indeed true, according to this Scheme it self. For this Possession could never be, without doing wrong to the one only true heir: nor, after it became impossible to discover the true heir, could it be, without doing wrong to the whole Society; the Members of which, from that time, must be in a State of Equality, and must have a Right to enter into Consultations, and Compacts, about their Common Interest; from the exercise of which Right, this Possession hath violently hindered them. And consequently, this Possession cannot be a Rightful Title, but must be Usurpation: because it could not be without manifest Injury; first, to one particular Person, and afterwards to the whole Body.

The Truth of the Matter is this. Mere Possession, tho' of never so long a continuance, gives no Right, properly so called, but only is allowed to put an end to Quarrels of Private Concernment, between Man and Man, in Cases in which it is supposed, that there is no other way of doing it. But it doth not fol-

follow, that this is to be allowed in such a matter as Government: unless it can be shewn, that Public Good requires it; which it cannot always do. But however; this is not a Right: no, not in private matters. For proof of this, let it be considered. I can have no more right to the Estate I possess, than the Person from whom Originally my Title comes. If that Person got it by Robbery of his Neighbour, tho' many Hundred Years ago; and this appears to me; and I find out the certain Heir of this Injured Neighbour; I am obliged, in Common Justice and Honesty, to restore it to him; tho' the Law would certainly defend my Possession of it, upon presumption that, after so long a Possession, (as is generally true) no other Title could be made out. This is sufficient to prove, that Mere Possession, tho' of never so long duration, gives no right, but one improperly so called; not a Right in Conscience and Justice. And farther, as, in the Case of Restitution, tho' the Injurious Man cannot find out the very Persons whom he hath injured, yet his own Title is really not at all the better for this; but He must get rid of what He unlawfully possesseth, after the best, and most useful manner possible: So likewise, in the Case of Government, supposing the one only right heir, according to this Scheme, cannot be found, this gives the Possessor no more right, than if He could be found; but, in this Case, there ariseth a right to the whole Body, which ought to be restored to it, if it have been Usurped, to enter upon equal terms, into Free Debates, and Consultations, about the Public Happiness. But let it be here observed, that I only argue thus, with respect to this Scheme: which hath undertaken to fix upon Almighty God, the appointment of the true, and only Line of Inheritance to Government; and then renders this appointment intirely insignificant, by making it useless to every particular Monarch in the World; send-

ing them for a *Title*, to *Possession*, which gives none; and making up the defects of *Divine Institution*, by *Humane Laws*, voluntarily, and arbitrarily made; and these mistaken and misapplied. We ought rather, since this *Scheme* professeth to be built upon *Revelation*, more than *Reason*; and to be out of the reach of all *Determinations* purely *Humane*; to demand a plain *Text* of *Scripture*, declaring this *Right* to be confined to the *Eldest Male Line*, and unalienably so fixed, in *one Family*, by *Mere Possession*. Till this be done, both *Reason* and *Revelation*; both *Humane*, and *Divine Laws*, will be presum'd to join in condemning this Position. I do not deny but that there is an obligation to *Obedience*, and *Subjection* to a *Government*, which manifestly was founded in *Usurpation* and *Violence* without *Right*: but this must arise, not from any *Real Right* which a *continued Possession* gives; but from the consideration of *Public Good*; and the *Ends* of *Government* being answered, and the like. As it is plain that *Christianity* hath not concerned it self with the *Personal Rights*, or *Titles* of *Civil Magistrates*; but with the *Ground* of *Obedience*, arising from their being appointed in general, by the *Providence of God*, for an excellent *Work*; and from the benefit of their *Office* to *Humane Society*, leaving us no directions how to *Judge* of their *Titles*, besides what were known before, and are agreeable to the *Laws of Nature*, and particular *Societies*; speaking both of *Supreme*, and *Deputed*, in the same *General Expressions*; and saying nothing of the *Titles* of *any*, but what will equally agree to the *Titles* of *all* in *Possession*; unless other *Considerations* are taken in, besides what is in general suggested by the *Sacred Writers*.

It cannot therefore be true, that *Mere Possession* gives any *Right* at all: And it cannot but appear void of all *Reason*, to suppose, as this *Scheme* doth, that

that *Almighty God* first appointed a *Right* by *Primogeniture*, in the *Male-line*, to be the only *Right*; and then fix'd the *Titles* of all *Monarchs* upon *Possession* only; and, after the most pompous *Institution imaginable*, left them nothing to shew for themselves, but their *Power*, and their *Success*. Thus much for this little, unregarded *Branch*, into which this mighty *Scheme* is at last dwindled away.

Sect. X. The Eighth Branch of this Scheme Examined.

8. The last thing to be considered, is, the *Task* imposed by this *Scheme* upon all *Subjects*, viz. that the *People* are to be the *Judges*, in *Case* of any doubt, or *Competition*, to whom the *Right*, and *Title*, to the *Supreme Government* belongs. *Reb. N.º 66*. The *People*, i. e. (If I would give my self leave to speak as this *Author* doth, when the *Judgment* of the *People* is spoken of, in any other *Case*) the *Tinker*, and the *Cobler*, are to decide the *Controversy*. But I see the *Treachery* and *Fallaciousness* of such a way of speaking too plainly to be guilty of it. I confess it is a very great *Favour*, that this *Author* will allow the *People* a right to *judge* in any *Case*. For, shall the *Sons of Belial*, under the direction of *Belzebub* the *God of Flies*; the *People*, that could not see our *Saviour's Title*, but cried *Crucify him, Crucify him?* Shall these at last be trusted with a *Commission* to try the *Titles* of *Contenders*? these, who desire nothing, according to this *Author*, but *Confusion*, and to fish in troubled *Waters*? And hath *God* left his *Institutions* so void of *Guards* as to be liable thus to be shaken, and over-turned by their *Humours* or *Passions*? How dangerous a thing is this? How destructive of *Public Happiness*? It is esteem'd by this *Writer*

a Diffolution of all Order, to give even to the whole Society a power to judge when they are oppressed, and upon the Borders of Ruine: Yet they are to judge of the Titles of Contenders! Yes, saith this Author, Every Man must inform himself, as well as He can, which of them are nearest in Blood to the preceding Rightful King. Reh. N°. 66. But,

2. What if they differ in their Judgments, whether true or false: as it is very certain they will? How shall the Difference be decided? Shall every Man vote, or fight, on one side, or other? For every Man, to vote; that hath been declared impossible by this Author, on another occasion: and for every Man to fight is equally impossible, (unless by Representatives, as they may likewise vote;) and a much more barbarous, and unlikely way to establish Right, and Truth. Or shall the Kingdom be divided; and both Competitors be made Kings over the Subjects of differing Judgments? This will quickly bring in Endless Competitions, and Divisions: in which Wrong must be done to some; and consequently others must be Usurpers. Methinks, according to this Scheme, in which the People make the Figure only of Beasts of Burthen, the Competitors ought rather to appeal to Providence, by single Combat: and the People, who sometimes are represented as not having the Sense of Horses, to sit still and see to whose Lot they shall fall.

3. Putting it to the Vote, or Judgment of the People, makes it a sort of Elective Kingdom: and sinks all the Divine Institution at last into this single Position, that He is to be actually King, not who truly hath a Right, but whom the People imagine to have one.

4. They must inform themselves, which is nearest in Blood to the preceding Rightful King. But how shall they do this? Whom shall they trust? How can they determine, in some possible Cases, which is the nearest

est Degree of Consanguinity; or, who was the preceding Rightful King, since Noah's Family was lost in Obscurity; or, by what Right that King reigned, to whom the Competitors pretend to be next Heirs? The Question is infinite; and their Judgments must be infinite about the Right to Rule; and perpetually byas'd by Interest, and Passion. But all this can be swallowed: whilst it is represented as impossible that the People should so much as judge, when the whole Society is made happy, or miserable, by a Governour.

5. What is this Judgment now allowed to the People? A Judgment of Discretion, or Authority? If it must be called a Judgment of Discretion only; it is such an one as actually determines who shall be their Governour for the future: and this is a sort of Discretion as carrieth as much Authority, as ever any one lodged in a People. And when their Judgments alter about the Title of this Governour, they are at liberty to transfer their Allegiance, nay, they are bound in Conscience to transfer it, to the Person, whom they now imagine to have a better Title. And this is the Scheme that professeth to fix Government upon an unmoveable Basis; and to place it out of the reach of Belial, and all his Sons! Blinding Men's Eyes by a few specious Positions concerning the Primitive Institution of it by God himself; and then resolving all into the most undoubted Title of Mere Possession; and committing all Disputes about Rightful Possessors, and those nearest in Blood to them, to the People, i. e. saith this Author, the Mobb. And now, if these be not equally Mobb-Principles with any He can think of; then it is hard to say, what are so. But I have done. I have examined, from Beginning to Ending, this Scheme; going through every Branch of it distinctly; and considering what hath been offered in Justification of it: and must now leave it to the Reader to judge, whether the Foundations on which it is built

be found or rotten; whether it be as plainly true as that God created the World; or as plainly false, as that one and two make four.

SECT. XI. Some Observations, of Importance, upon the foregoing Scheme, deduced from what hath been before discours'd.

Having now carefully, and sincerely, examined the Foundations upon which the Patrons of the Patriarchal Scheme do yet profess to build it; it will now be the more proper to conclude with some Observations upon it, which flow from what hath been already proved; and which are of great Importance to us, as we are Christians; and as we are Men; and as we are the Subjects of a very peculiar and excellent Constitution of Government. And,

I. Whoever hath a true Knowledge of the Nature, and Perfections of God, and the least serious Concern for his Honour, will hardly be able deliberately to admit a Scheme which doth so many ways reflect Dishonour upon him. That the All-wise God should institute a Scheme, which in Fact never hath been of use, to any one Prince, or Nation in the World, (as far as History both Sacred and Profane can inform us;) will never be believed by any who consider that the only End He could propose to himself in such an Institution must have been the Usefulness of it, to Princes, and Subjects; and that it might be a clear, and infallible direction, about Dominion on the one hand, and Submission on the other. But what Prince ever yet claimed his Throne by Right of Succession, in the Male-line, from one of Noah's Grandsons? Or what Nation ever yet obeyed, on that Foundation? Did the Kingdom of Judah, founded by God himself? Did the Kingdom of Israel, which was Elective? Did

Did the Heathen Nations adhere to this Rule, or think themselves obliged in Conscience to do so? To what one Kingdom then in the World hath this Rule been of use? Nay, how could it be of use in any, when, as far as appears, the very Invention of it was entirely reserved to be the Ornament of this last Age: an Age, in which it was become absolutely impossible to receive any Benefit from it? Or what? Shall we think, that Almighty God first ordained one only Method of Rightful Government; and then kept it a perfect Secret from all those Nations for whose use only it could be intended? Or, did He afterwards declare to the World, that He did indeed at first ordain Government, to continue in such and such particular Branches of a Family only: but that He now ordains, Possession and Prescription to be the Rule to all Generations? Is this likewise as plain as that God created the World? That the All-wise God can act at this rate; say, and unsay; do, and undo; that He could lay down a Rule to guide Men in the matter of Government, which never was of use, as we know of; never, we are sure, for Multitudes of Generations past; and which, we are sure, never can be, through all Generations to come; that He could make mere Possession to convey a Right, in a Case in which He himself ordained the Right to be conveyed another way; that He can add a Divine Right to the Title of One, who is supposed to possess his Throne merely by being the Grandson, or Great-Grandson of a Robber, and Usurper, who by Violence, or Fraud, first obtained it: These Things will ever be incredible to all who believe a God of Goodness, and Justice; and the last of them must ever be looked on as little less than Blasphemy. Yet this is the only Divine Right which by this Scheme is left to all the Princes of the World who are not Descendants, in the Eldest Male-Branch, from one of the 70 Monarchs, constituted by

by Almighty God, at the Division of Nations. But to proceed,

2. This Scheme reflects likewise extremely upon our Saviour, and his Apostles. For who can think, if this be a Matter of that vast Importance; upon which not only the well-being of Society, but the Eternal Salvation of Christians depends (as the Patrons of this Scheme represent it;) that neither our Lord, nor his Apostles should ever take upon them to lay down the plain Rules for determining the Titles of Princes; but leave their Followers to be instructed in the only true Method, above 1500 Years after their Deaths? They do indeed condemn the Jewish Conceit of the Unlawfulness, or No-obligation, of paying Obedience, and Tribute to Heathen Governours; and argue from the Excellence, and Usefulness of their Office to their being, in general, ordained of God; to whose Will the very End of their Office is so highly agreeable: and this with respect to all, Deputed, as well as Supreme. But they never go beyond the Bounds of this most just Argument. They never declare Possession in a Family for such a Term of Years to be an unalienable Right. They speak nothing, either of the Powers of Adam, or Noah, in their Universal Monarchies; or of the 70 Monarchs made at the Division of Nations; or of the Indispensable Necessity of Absolute Monarchy; or of the intolerable Absurdity of a Mixed Form; or of many other Things, which they could not but have fixed most plainly, and most certainly, had they thought it of Importance to the Salvation of Christians to be informed of them. Either, therefore, this Scheme is false, and groundless; or our Lord, and his Apostles are very defective in their Instructions, not only in a Matter of great Importance to the Peace and Happiness of Human Society, but in a Matter which touches the Eternal Salvation of their Followers. And I leave it to any Serious Christian

Christian to chuse, which of these two He thinks most likely to be true.

3. Nor shall Episcopacy it self escape; which one would think too great a Darling of these Men to be brought into a Quarrel in which it might possibly receive any hurt. Now I confess I have my self such a Concern for a Constitution, which, in its Essential Parts, I believe to be Apostolical, as that, tho' I cannot make it absolutely necessary to the being of a Christian Church, yet I cannot be contented to have it put upon a level with so unsupported a Scheme. For the Matter of Fact of Episcopacy, or the Superiority of one Man, over many Presbyters, for the better Execution of their Office, and answering the Ends of Christianity; For this Matter of Fact, I say, we have the concurrent, universal Testimony of competent Witnesses in the first Ages after the Apostles, besides the Instances of Timothy, and Titus, and the Angels of the Churches in the Revelations, in the very Days of the Apostles: and we have it plainly declared by these Witnesses, and in the Instances of Timothy, and Titus, that this Matter of Fact was the Institution of the Apostles; their very Act, and Deed, in a literal Sense; as I have had occasion, in another Place, to shew. And now for any, who pretend to love and value this Institution so much above their Neighbours, as some do, to come and level this to the Proof that supports this Scheme; when they have not one Witness, nor one Instance, in the Age in which any part of this Scheme is pretended to have been instituted, giving Testimony plainly that at such Time, and Place, such an Institution was made by God; when they have no Witness in the first Ages following such a pretended Institution, speaking of it as the Institution of God, or as a Matter of Universal Necessity; when they themselves are forced to own that Moses doth not call them Monarchs, or Kings, or Governours,

Governours, either Gen. 5. or 10. whom they have declared to be so; and to have recourse to their own way of arguing for want of such plain Declarations in the *Historian*; when they are obliged to reason, after their manner, about the necessity of *Government*, in order to give the *Families* in Possession, any *Right*, or *Title* at all: for these Men, I say, to equal the *Case* of *Episcopacy* to this, is to shew indeed a mighty Concern for the *one*; but no such singular Regard to the *other*, but that their Neighbours may pretend to set it in as good a light; nay, and to vindicate it from the Injury which so unequal a *Parallel* might do to it. But who will much wonder at this, when

4. It must be here observed, as it hath been before, that neither the *Creation* of the *World*, nor the *Redemption* of Mankind by the appearance of *Jesus Christ* in the *Flesh*, have been allowed any greater Favour? For if this *Scheme*, or such particular *Branches* of it, be not plainly true, then it is not plain that *God* created the *Heavens* and the *Earth*; then the *Matters* of *Fact* which support *Christianity* it self, must e'en suffer with them. What sport must this make for *Infidels* and *Deists*, to see every peculiar fancy of our own put upon equal Terms with the *greatest Articles* of *Religion*; as if even the *Creed* it self were of small Importance, because the Matter of *Government* is not put into it? And how must it wound the Spirits of *Good Men* to see such Advantages unwarily, and rashly given to the *Enemies* of *Religion*? It is like the Zeal of the *Papists* for their absurd and senseless Doctrine of *Transubstantiation*: which they profess to dote upon to such a degree, as if they thought it hardly worth any ones while to embrace *Christianity*, unless they firmly believe this, which they represent as supported by as good Proofs as any the most *essential Part* of *Christianity* it self.

5. As

5. As *Religion*, and the *Honour* of *Almighty God*, can reap but little benefit from this boasted *Scheme*; so neither can either the *Title*, or *Honour* of any *Princes* in being. Will any of them be so weak as to put their *Title* to their *Thrones*, upon their being descended in a *right Line*, from the *Eldest Branch* of one of the 70 *Monarchs*, the *Grandsons* of *Noah*, who ruled the same Country, nay, the *Progenitors* of the same *individual* persons, now in being, and under his *Rule*? And if not, what remains in this *Scheme*, but that He is the *Heir* to some one, who must have been a *Robber*, and *Usurper*? Behold the *Scheme* that settles the *Titles*, and advanceth the *Honour* of the *Absolute Monarchs* of this World!

6. I have, in another place, observed, and must here repeat it, the great injury done by this *Scheme* to our *Excellent QUEEN*, to whom, in so signal a manner, *God* hath been pleased to give the *Hearts* of Her *Subjects*, and the *Necks* of Her *Enemies*. For as to the only true *Right*; this *Scheme* conveys none but to the *Eldest Male-Branch*, in a right line from *Noah's Grandson*: and as for the *Mock-right*, graciously annexed to a *Family* in possession; this likewise can belong only to *Males*. So that every *Eldest Son*, of the *Eldest Branch* of any *Family*, is a *Better Claimer*, than a *Woman*: because it is possible that *He* may be the *True Heir*: but impossible that *She* should. Nor is *She* relieved at all by *Possession*, as other *Princes* are: because it is only for *Males* to Inherit the *Rights* of *Primo-geniture*, and the Privilege of *Rule* and *Government*. The very Building the Powers and Authority of *Princes*, upon *Paternal*, and *Marital Authority*, puts a *Woman* out of all *Claim* to any *Authority*, but what is *Subordinate*; and, what I am ashamed to say, makes it more *Her Duty*, to pay an *Absolute Passive Obedience* to the meanest of Her *Male-Subjects*, than their Duty to acknowledge any *Right* in Her, or to obey any

any of Her Commands. How, therefore, ought we all to resent such an indignity offered to the Title of such a Princess; were it not, that we know that She holds her Crown by a much surer Right, than what so precarious a Scheme can give to any. In the mean while, how much She is obliged to it, is evident from hence, that it leads inevitably to these two Conclusions, viz. That Possession, it self, can give no Title to Her; tho' it may to Males: and that Her Possession cannot but be Usurpation, as long as there is a Man in the Nation. This I have mentioned, upon other occasions, more than once: nor hath the Person concerned, offered to prove that these are not the inevitable Consequences of his Principles; unless it be by faintly denying it.

7. Neither can our whole Constitution, as consisting of King or Queen, Lords, and Commons, be so much as agreeable to the Will of God, according to this Scheme; or stand secure; if this be once admitted. For, according to these Principles, it is the Will of God that Absolute Uncontrollable Authority, in making Laws, as well as executing them, should be lodged in the Hands of one Single Man: and all other Forms are Deviations from his Institution; the effect of Popular madness; the Voice of the People, i. e. the Voice of Belzebub, and the like. If this be true therefore, it was so far from being blameable in a late King, to endeavour to subvert this Constitution; to destroy all appearance of any Authority, Co-ordinate with his own in Legislation; and to set up a Dispensing Power in himself over all Laws; that it was indeed his Duty to do what He did: and the Duty of a Christian Nation to thank him for bringing them into the right way, and Establishing them upon the only true Foundation. No wonder, therefore, that the Writers who defend this Scheme, are perpetually railing at the pretended Authority of Lords and Commons, to make

make Laws in Conjunction with the King; and crying up the Glorious Effects of Absolute Monarchy; and preparing Men's Minds to accept of it, or even to invite it in amongst us, upon any terms: as it is, certainly, our indispensable Duty to do, upon this Scheme. That, Power is Co-ordinate with the Kings in Legislation, without which the King, can make no Law, according to the Constitution: But without the Authority of the Parliament, no Law is of force. Therefore the Houses of Parliament have a Co-ordinate Power in Legislation. As they without Him, so He without them, cannot make a Law: and as it is He that Enacts, so it is by their Active Authority likewise, that every Law is said to be Enacted; and not only with their Passive Consent. The Members of one House are chosen voluntarily by the People; and in making Laws, act entirely as their Representatives, in conjunction with the King: and therefore are something more than a Sluice to a Mill, which is drawn up, and let down entirely at the Miller's pleasure; which is the best Complement the Author I have been speaking of can bestow upon them. I wonder indeed, He could permit himself to go so far: when even this low Similitude will prove them to be so necessary, that no Law can be made without them. But we see what some Men are driving at, by fixing Schemes upon Almighty God; even to ruine the best contrived Constitution, merely because it is the result of Humane Wisdom. I hope all, who love it, will be upon their Guard against such Principles, and put some stop to the Affronts that have been offered it. And I hope that those who are free enough to applaud it, as the most secure from Inconveniencies, and the most likely to answer the ends of Government, will take care how they impute to Almighty God, the invention and Institution of Absolute Monarchy for the Nations of the World: which must either be a reproach

reproach to his *Wisdom*, or a contradiction to the *Complement* paid to our *Constitution*.

8. I hardly dare to speak, in this place, of the *Injury* this *Scheme* doth to every other *Form of Government*, which is not *Absolute Monarchy*, like that of *France*, or *Turkey*, or *Muscovy*, or *Morocco*; by encouraging any particular *Person* to raise *Commotions* in them; and to endeavour to transplant the *power* out of the hands of *many*, into those of *one person*, agreeably to the *Will of God*; and the like. But I hardly dare, I say, to speak of this; well knowing how ready some are to represent those that differ from them as *Republicans*, upon the least pretense in the *World*. Yet, since I have mentioned it, I must do that *Justice* to the *Scheme* before us, as openly to acknowledge that the *Republican Form of Government*, strictly so called, is something more obliged to it, than either our own *Constitution*, or our *QUEEN*. For the *Governed Part* are more likely in some instances, to be *severely Governed*, than in our *State*: in which point it agrees more with *Absolute Monarchy*. And then, the *Governing Part*, being all *Males*, and generally *Fathers*, and *Husbands*, must be thought to have a better *Title* to *Obedience*, and *Submission*, than a *Woman*; who can have no *Title*, according to this *Scheme*, to any more than *Subordinate Obedience*, even of her own *Children* and *Domestics*. Nay, to come to our own *Nation*; I see not but that *Oliver Cromwell* may meet with much more favour from this *Scheme*, than Her present *Majesty*. For He, tho' an *Usurper*, yet brought the *Government* much nearer to the *Primitive and Divine Form of Absolute Monarchy*, than any of our *Legal Princes* before him had done. He preserved it from being a *Strict Republic*. He was a *Father*, and an *Husband*: And left his *Power* to the *Eldest Male* of his *Posterity*. And if *Possession* could have been preserv'd in his *Family* for a long
Term

Term of Years, sufficient to darken the *Title* of any other; would at last have grown up into a *Right*, according to this *Scheme*. But this is more than the *Patrons* of it can say, consistently with themselves, in favour of a *QUEEN*, whom they, in their *Consciences*, believe to be likewise an *Usurper* of the *Right* of another; who hath openly declared Her self an *Enemy* to *Absolute*, and *Arbitrary Power*; and who is of that *Sex*, to which they can allow no *Original Right* to *Civil Authority*; and to which *Possession* it self, tho' of never so long a duration, cannot possibly give a *Right*: nay, who is still under worse *Circumstances*, according to these Men, if *She* founds Her *Government* upon *Acts of Parliament*; or the *Free Consent* of the *Nobility*, and of the *Representatives* of the *People*. So extremely obliged is our *Constitution*, and our Good *QUEEN*, to these *Gentlemen*! who make use of the *Quiet* and *Freedom* they enjoy under the *best of Governments*, to attacke it's very *Foundations*; and to engage the *Consciences* of Men to Rebel, and Arm against it, by motives taken from the *Divine Will*, and the *express Commands* of *God*: and all the while have the *Cunning* and *Artifice*, to cry aloud against *Rebellion*, and *Rebellious Principles*; and to charge those who, of all others, are the most firmly engaged to the *present Establishment*, with *Sedition*, and I know not what *Crimes*; hoping I suppose, by this method, to escape for Men of *Quiet*, and *Submissive Minds*, till a lucky opportunity offers it self for putting in practise those *Principles*, which oblige them, in *Conscience*, to ruine, and destroy it when ever they can. In the mean time, they are *Writing down* every Branch of it, and every thing that looks like *Happiness* in it, as heartily, and as zealously, as Men can well do it. But,

9. I have, in effect, observed before that this *Scheme*, as it consults the *Honour* and *Interest* of no *Prince* now

in the World ; so it never was of any use to any People, or Nation, as we know of, in the directing them in the important affair of *Government*. As to the *Kingdom of Judah* ; *God Almighty* himself fixed the Family in which that should be continued, in contradiction to this *Scheme*. The *Kingdom of Israel* was *Elective*. So that this *Scheme* was of no use to those Nations, who only could be supposed to keep up amongst them a Knowledge and Sense of it, had there been any such *Divine Institution* ; or a just regard to the *Rights of Primo-geniture*, as set forth in it. As for the *Heathens* ; the Wisest and most knowing amongst them, thought themselves at perfect Liberty to enter into *Measures* concerning *Government*, absolutely contrary to those of this *Scheme* : nor are the accounts given by them of the first *Election*, and *Office*, of *Kings*, consistent with it. So that no Nation in the World, as we know of, ever had any benefit from it.

10. The *Equality*, so much ridiculed and hated, is not sufficiently avoided by this *Scheme* it self : tho' it were invented for no purpose more, than to destroy the very Notion of it. I shall give too proofs of this : which I think cannot be denied.

1. The power allowed to *Fathers* in it, and contended for, in order to avoid other Difficulties ; I mean, the power of *manumitting* their *Children* ; which must inevitably bring in a vast number of *Equalities* : since every one of these *Children*, when they were dismissed, became *equal* to their *Fathers*, as to the point of *Government* ; and equal to their *Elder Brethren*, after their *Father's* Death. Who knows, how many of his Sons *Adam* made Free, according to this *Scheme* : and how many other *Fathers* afterwards *manumitted* ? The short *History* of *Moses* furnisheth the Patrons of this *Scheme* with several Instances of this *Manumission* ; as they think. Now, tho' this will

will not indeed prove a Natural, and Primitive *Equality* : yet it must bring the World to that pass, by introducing so many independent *Governours* of the several *Branches* of *Families*, out of the *Jurisdiction* of one another, that a *Common, Civil Government*, may well be supposed, by themselves, to come at last to be settled amongst several such *Neighbours*, by *Mutual Agreement*, and *Voluntary Compact*, for the *Mutual Defense*, and support of one another's *Families*.

2. This *Scheme* likewise necessarily ends, in supposing whole Nations in a *State of Equality*, and free to enter into *Compacts* about *Government*, as soon as the true Heirs, in the Male-Line, from the *Grandsons* of *Noah*, became unknown and lost. For having fixed *God's* own appointment of *Civil Government*, to one certain *Line*, of one certain *Family* ; all others are by this means made *equal*, with respect to *Civil Government*, and left without any *right* to it. When therefore this particular *Line*, in any *Nation*, became utterly unknown ; then there was introduced an *Universal Equality* in that *Nation*, as to *Civil Government* : because no one, more than another, could pretend to a *Right* to it. Now supposing, according to this *Scheme*, any *Nation* to have adhered unmoveably to this particular *Line* ; it could not but be known exactly, when that *Line* failed, and was extinct : as it would be perceived in *France*, now, if the *Male-Line* of *Lewis* were become wholly unknown. Consequently, if any of the *Patrons* of this *Scheme* ask, as they often do, when was there this *State of Equality* ; their own *Scheme* will lead them to an Answer, and fix the Time of it to have been in all *Nations*, just when the *Male-Line* of *Noah's Grandsons* became obscure, and unknown. If there be no such Time as this mark'd in any *History*, Sacred, or Profane ; this will be a Demonstration that there was no Knowledge

in any Nation, of any such Rule to go by. So that this Scheme, tho' first fixing an inequality, inevitably brings us to a State of Equality: And this Equality Universal, with respect to Families; and such as must give a Right, at least to the Fathers and Heads of all Families, either by themselves, or their Representatives, to meet and consult about the methods of Civil Government, to be observed amongst them for the future.

II. This Scheme first fixeth a positive Institution upon Almighty God; and then puts it in the power of Fathers to annul, and frustrate his designs: making the Divine Right yield to Humane Prudence; and indeed to Humane Passions. Of this I shall likewise give two incontestable Instances.

1. Before the Deluge, and some time after it, it is affirmed, that God designed, and instituted an Universal Monarchy, in such a particular Line of one Family: and yet in the same Breath it is allowed, and contended for, that Fathers might manumitt, and make free, as many of their Sons as they should see fit; releasing them by this means from their own Civil Government, and making them as truly Sovereign Princes, Independent Monarchs, over their own Descendants, as they themselves were. So that God instituted an Universal Monarchy, in one Branch: and yet Fathers had a Power and Authority to crumble this by little and little into a thousand Independent Petty Monarchies. The same may be said with respect to his fixing the Civil Government of particular Nations, at their Division after the Flood, to one certain Branch of one certain Family: which is, in effect, excluding all others by his Will. Yet, according to this Scheme, these Fathers might manumitt as many of their Children, (and Subjects, as well as Children properly

perly so called;) as they should see fit: and by this means contradict, and undo, the design, and institution of God. But if any will say, this is likewise part of the Divine Institution; I answer, let them only believe it, who can fix any inconsistency upon Almighty God himself. For is it not highly absurd, to introduce Almighty God, as declaring to the World, I do institute and appoint this particular Line of one Family, to be Governours of this particular Nation: but I do at the same time give them a Power to frustrate this my design; and to place the Government of it in other hands, as they see fit. What signifies the first part of an Institution, if the second utterly makes it void, and of no more account than if it had never been?

2. The same may be said with respect to the Power allowed to Fathers, in this Scheme, to Disinherit the Eldest Sons, and to esteem which of their Sons they saw fit, as such. For this absolutely contradicts the Divine Institution of the Rights of Primogeniture; and God's fixing the Succession to Civil Government, in the Eldest Male-Line; and, in effect, overturns the Decree of God, by making it depend upon the Father's Will, whether there shall be so much as one Succession, according to the express appointment of God. Who would give much for such a Title, and such a Divine Right, as depend entirely upon Human Will; and must stand and fall, just as a Frail Man sees fit? One would as soon believe that Dominion was founded in Grace, as in the Humour of one Man. But who that believes such a Divine Institution, in favour of the First-Born Male, can believe that the same God who was the Author of it, could ever leave a Power in Fathers, to make it intirely useles, and of none effect? This, and the foregoing Head, will easily shew us what a strong Foundation of Truth that

Scheme must have, which destroys its own chief Purposes; and contradicts its own main Ends.

12. As will appear likewise from hence, that one great *End* of inventing this *Scheme* was to devest the governed *Society* from all pretense to *judge* when themselves were oppressed; and yet, in one of the *Branches* of it, it doth it self make it not only lawful, but the *Duty* of every Member of this govern'd *Society*, to *judge* concerning the *Titles* of *Pretenders*: a *Case* much more difficult than the other; full as dangerous to the supposed *Right* of any *Particular Heir*; as fruitful of *Confusion*, *Civil War*, and all *Disorder*; and, in some possible *Circumstances*, what it will be too hard for the greatest *Heads* to come to an *Agreement* in. So, for fear they should pretend to *judge* when the *whole Society* is oppressed, and destin'd to *Ruine*, they shall be allow'd to be *proper Judges* in a much more intricate and perplex'd *Question*. Again,

13. Another main *End* proposed by this *Scheme*, is to restrain all *Coercion* upon *Princes*; and to fix their *unalienable Right* to *Government* by their own single *Will*, secure from all *Pretenses* taken from their *Incapacity*, or the like. It may not be amiss therefore to ask, Whether *Humane Society* may be allowed any *Fence* against *Idiots* and *Lunatics*, succeeding to *Government* in the *Right Line*? To answer, No, is to speak *Blasphemy* against the *Most High*, and to give us one of the worst *Representations* of the *Deity* that can well be made. But if this may be allowed; then follows a *Judgment* in the *governed Society* for their own *Security*: or in some parts of it: which is all one; since all in it are equally *Subjects*. Then follows an allowed *Restraint*, and *Coercion* upon *Princes*, either by *Guardians*, or *Protectors*, or by *Counsellors*, whose *Subject*, and not *Governour*, the *Idiot*, or *Lunatic* is: or else follows an *alienation* of the *Right* to *Government*

Government for want of *Capacity*; of which want of *Capacity* the *People* are to *judge*, before they withdraw their *Obedience*; during which time of *Suspense* there must be all *Confusion* and *Disorder*. Hence follows a *Right* in the *Governed Society* to take care of themselves, and even to withdraw their *Allegiance* from the *Will* of their *Prince*; should He be found, at any time, after he had enter'd well upon his *Administration*, to be either *Idiot* or *Lunatic*. And this arising only from hence, that He is plainly *incapable of Government*; from all this it follows that a *Capacity* to *govern* must be supposed in all *Divine Institutions* about this *Matter*: and that, an *Incapacity* to *govern*, arising from other *Reasons*, being exactly the same with respect to the *Ends* of *Government*, but much more criminal in the *Governour* himself, there must follow, from this particular allowance, a general allowance of a *Right* in the *Governed Society*, to preserve themselves from *Ruine*, in other *Cases* as well as this; *viz.* whenever the *Case* is so, that their *Governour* hath shewn himself absolutely incapable of answering the *Ends* of *Government* so far that the *Society* may be safe under *Him*. For where is the difference, as to this *Argument*, between a *Governour's* being *totally* an *Idiot*, or *Madman*; and *partially* so, with respect to *Government* only? Or between an *Incapacity* as to his *Understanding*, and *Incapacity* as to his *Will*? See, therefore, if this *Scheme* can be thought so much as to establish its own chief *Designs*. Once more,

14. The Support of *Absolute Passive Obedience* being likewise the great *Design* of this *Scheme*; we cannot but observe that even this great *Article* of *Faith* (for it never, I believe, will be an *Article* of *General Practice*;) is really rather taken for granted than proved in this *Scheme*. For the *Right* of *Princes* to this is founded, in this *Scheme*, peculiarly upon the *Right* of *Fathers*, and their *Power* over their *Children*; and

and upon the *Commands* of *Obedience* given in general Expressions to *Children*: the Argument taken from the *Ends* of *Government* not belonging peculiarly to this *Scheme*. Now this *Right* must be the *Original Right* of *Fathers*: which is not at all proved to lay any *Obligation* upon their *Children* to *Absolute Non-resistance*, (should they attempt arbitrarily to murder, and torment them,) either from any *Texts* of *Scripture* which declare this; or from any *Instance* of any *Father* in his *Senses*, who thought he had such a *Right* to their *Submission*. Nor can this be supposed: unless we can suppose that *God* can give an unlimited *Commission* to any *Person* to transgress, and contradict the very *Ends* of their *Office*, or *Institution*; and be the *Encourager* and *Patron* of *Madness*, and *Tyranny*. Hath any *Officer* in the *World* a *Commission* beyond the *Ends* of his *Office*? Or, are any under him obliged by his *Authority* to submit, in *Cases*, to which His *Commission*, i. e. his *Authority* cannot reach? Had *St. Paul*, who received his *Commission* from *God* immediately, any *Powers* in it, but what were necessary for his *Apostle-ship*, and the *End* of his *Ministry*? Or, had He those likewise which gave him *Authority* to contradict, and disappoint those *Ends*? And shall the *Original Commission* to *Fathers* be only excepted, and be supposed absurdly to bear them out, even tho' they are acted by *Madness*, and *Fury*? This is another *Point* in which this *Scheme* may likewise be said to do *Dishonour* to *Almighty God*. The *Instances* alleged, I have elsewhere shewn to prove no such *unlimited Power* in *Fathers*. As for the *Commands* given to *Children*; the *Mother* is always joined with the *Father*, and consequently must have the same *Title* to *Absolute Subjection* in all *Cases*, when the *Father* doth not interpose; or when He is dead: which yet is denied to her by this very *Scheme*. And then, the chief *Intent* of these *Commands* being *Active Obedience*; I have

have often observed that the Argument drawn from these will equally prove that to be due in an unlimited manner: which is so evidently false, that it is denied by all. Besides that no such *Absoluteness* can be proved from *general Expressions*: because we know there are so many other, as *general Expressions*, in *Scripture*, which not only admit, but require *Limitations*. Add to this, that these *Commands*, given in *Scripture*, are given with regard to all *Nations*, after the *Matter* of *Civil Government* is supposed, in this very *Scheme* to have been settled by *God* himself. Now this appointment of *Civil Government*, in one certain *Family*, is a transferring the *Power* of all other *Fathers* under it, and placing it in the *Prince*; particularly the *Power* of *Life* and *Death*, supposed to have been originally in *Fathers*. To talk therefore, after this, of an *Absolute Power* in *Fathers*, or of *Unlimited Submission* in *Children*, is another way which the *Patrons* of this *Scheme* have of ruining their own *Work*, and contradicting their own *Design*. For if all *Fathers* be still absolute; then they are equal: and consequently no one *Supreme Civil Governour* was constituted by *God*, vested with *Supreme Paternal Power* over all others, *Fathers*, as well as *Children*. But if there was such a *Divine Constitution*; then no *Absolute Submission* can be inferr'd from the *Commands* given to *Children* after this *Constitution*: because their *Fathers*, who are the *Objects* of the *Obedience* commanded, are *subordinate* to the *Supreme Father*; and in the *State* of *Children*, and *Slaves*, themselves. What room therefore is here left for the *Absolute Submission* of *Children*, properly so called; when indeed it would be a *Contradiction* to the pretended *Divine Institution*, to maintain that the supposed *Original Title* of all *Fathers* to *Absolute Subjection* can remain, after it is transferred, and lodged in another by *God* himself? And how unaccountable is it

it for these Men to argue such an *unlimited Submission* to all *Fathers* from *Commands* given to *Children* in a *State*, in which *God* himself is said to have removed their *Obligation* to this *Obedience* to another *Object*? For thus stands the *Argument*. *God* first diminished the *Authority* of all other *Fathers*, and lodged their original *Absolute Power* in *One*: after this He gave *commands of Obedience* to all *Children* to their particular *Fathers* in general *Words*. From whence it is plain that *God* requires of these *Children* *unlimited Passive Obedience* to these *Fathers*; tho' their *Right* to it be transferred to another: and consequently that *Passive Obedience*, in all possible *Cases*, is due to *Princes*, vested with *Paternal Power*; because it is required of *Children* towards their own *Fathers*; after *God* himself hath taken off the *Obligation* to it, by transferring the *Right* to it to the *Civil Governour*. Behold therefore, how this *Favourite Doctrine*, (with an eye to which this *Invention* was first set on foot,) is left destitute of any good *Foundation* in it. And let all *Fathers* see how falsely it flatters them with *imaginary Rights and Powers*; when it destroys its own *Complements*; and disannulls those *Original Rights* it pretends to bestow upon them: first giving with a bountiful *Hand* more than they can claim, or ought to desire; and then removing their *Title* to the *Supreme Monarch*, and freeing them from the *Burthen* of those *Privileges* with which it first obliged them.

Sect. XII. A Recapitulation of what is contained
in the foregoing Sections.

To conclude; I think I have very evidently shewn, in the preceding *Pages*, that the *Scheme*, which I have now been examining, is a *Scheme of Civil Government*

without foundation, or appearance of *Truth*; a *Scheme* which charges great *Absurdities* upon *Almighty God*; and which hath been so defended, as to do prejudice to the greatest *Articles* of the *Christian Faith*; a *Scheme of National Government*, with which no *Nation* was ever acquainted, as we know of, and from which no *People* ever received any *Benefit*; a *Scheme* for establishing the *Rights and Titles of Princes*, by which no past *Prince* ever did, as far as appears, and no present or future *Prince*, ever can, claim his *Crown*; a *Scheme* which utterly condemns our happy *Constitution*, as *Rebellion*, and our excellent *Queen* as an *Usurper* above all *Usurpers*; a *Scheme*, which, to our *Comfort*, deals as hardly with *it self* as with *others*; saying, and unsaying; giving *Commissions*, and annulling them; destroying its own *Designs*; confuting its own *Principles*; contradicting its own *Ends*; and leaving even *Passive Obedience* it self without a *Guard*, and void of all *Substantial Proof*. The *Reader* therefore must know, from the foregoing *Pages*, what *Judgment* to pass upon such a *Scheme*: and, I dare say, thinks it high time for me to release him from all farther trouble about it.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

I Have, in the foregoing Chapter, shewn that the Patriarchal Scheme sinks the Titles of all Princes into Mere Possession; pretending that there can be no Wrong, or Usurpation, where no other particular Person can make out a juster Title to a Crown, than that of Possession: And I have made it evident that this Possession can give no Right, properly so called; that is, no Right, sufficient to justify the Possessor. That there was a time, when the true Heirs of Noah's Grandsons became unknown, cannot be denied. At that time there was no one particular Person who had more Right to Government than another. And where there is no one, who hath any more Right than another; there a People are equal, with respect to Right, because no one Person hath any at all. Nothing therefore, can be rightfully done in such a State; but by their entering (all, or part, of them,) into Consultation, upon equal Terms. And that Possession, which by Force, or Fraud, hinder'd this, can be nothing but Usurpation: not indeed an Usurpation of a Government which belongs, by right, to any particular Person: but an Usurpation of what belongs not to the Possessor, or any one else; and an Usurpation upon the Community, by hindring the Exercise of that Right of Free Deliberation, and Consent, which belongs to the whole Body. The Argument therefore, being this, that the Present Possessor hath the Right, unless another can shew a better Title; the Fallacy of it is manifest, in the Case before us.

For

For there is no need at all that any one should produce a better Title: it is enough that there is an equal Title, belonging to others. This will sufficiently prove that there is no Right belonging to the Possessor, which can give him a claim to Government over those others? and likewise that those others had a Right to meet for Consultation, and Debate, in whom to lodge Civil Authority, as soon as the pretended Heirs of Noah's Grandsons became invisible; and to resist the Violence, and Fraud, of any who should assume to Himself an Authority to hinder them from this. But because the Author, whom I traced throughout the foregoing Chapter, hath, in his Scheme, placed so much upon one sort of Possession: I shall therefore produce a few Passages out of a Book of His, written by way of Letter to the Reverend Mr. Higden, upon occasion of his defending Submission to the present Possessor of the Throne of Great Britain: that we may see, whether the same way of Reasoning will not equally destroy his own beloved Scheme. Page, 4. *What! saith He, for Right to become Wrong, only because it suffers wrongfully! and Wrong to become Right by being still more wrong, and improving in Wickedness without Repentance, and, being fully hardened, after killing to take Possession! Does this purge Defects, and set all right again? You set up the Crown, like the Goal at Prison base; the best Runner carries it.* Page, 24. *The principle of Possession being once admitted, there remains no other Principle in the World; no right, or wrong; no just, or unjust; &c.* Page, 104. He asks, *Doth Possession against Right give a Title to nothing but to the Crown? Unhappy Government! which of all things ought to be best settled, is left in the most unsettled Condition; floating, like a Cork upon the face of the Waters: his own, whoever can snatch it first!* Page, 105. It is compared

compared to a Crust, hung up for every hungry Dog to leap at, and make it his own, who can snap it first. Again, p. 108 It is represented as a *Monstrous* Absurdity, that *Wickedness*, by being exceeding *Wicked*, that is, accomplishing all its designs, every step against the Law of God, should by that become Right in the sight of God! And bind our Conscience to submit to it, and support it against Right, and Truth! And which, because it is once overpower'd, must never be asserted, nor defended any more! Now let any one apply the reason of these Sentences to that part which the same Author gives to Possession in the Patriarchal Scheme. For I ask, Is it not to make Right become Wrong, only because it suffers wrongfully, to give up that Right to Debate, and Deliberation, which must be in many equally, when, according to his own Principles, the Right-Line of the Race of Noah, became invisible? And is not Wrong made by Him, to become Right, by being still more Wrong, and improving in Wickedness; when He resolves all into the Possession of those, who could first seize the Crowns left destitute of a Patriarchal Heir? And into that Possession, which can Guard it self long enough to efface the Title of any particular Person? Is not this to set up Possession for a Principle, tho' it be a longer possession than what he opposeth? Is not this to set up Government, as a Goal? to leave it as a Cork? to hang it up as a Crust? For his benefit, who can get, and keep Possession long enough? Is not this to suppose Wickedness, by being exceeding Wicked, and accomplishing all its designs, by a long possession, to become Right in the Sight of God, and to bind our Conscience to support it against Right? even the Right of Free Consent? And is not this to overpower the Right, so as that it must never be asserted nor defended any more? Is not this to make Possession, and Strength, to give a Right to Govern? Which is one of the *Condemned Positions*, mentioned by him, p. 103. Thus much

I thought fit to produce, in order to shew the inconsistency of some of His own Principles, when He writes against Possession, with his beloved Scheme; if we pursue them thro' their just Consequences, and apply them to what He hath said, in defense of that.

But it is no wonder that He should be found thus inconsistent in this point; when He, like some other ingenious Writers, seems to be carrying on two different views, upon two differing sorts of Principles, according as occasion offers. For instance; when He writes against me, the QUEEN may have Two Titles to Her Crown: but when against another, then the Title of the QUEEN is spoken of, as if He meant to insinuate that it wholly depends upon the Revolution. *Best Answ.* p. 10. *Lett. to Mr. Higd.* p. 5. When he is to shew himself against my Doctrine, then the Clergy may come in upon other Principles; the Government may be complied with, and the Revolution be defended, upon another bottom: *Best Answ.* p. 3, 4, &c. But when He comes to shew his zeal against one who hath left the Cause of the Non-jurors; then what He thinks, seems to flow from Him, in a quite different strain. Then, the Government is not beholden to any Convert, who shall come in otherwise than upon Revolution-Principles. For, saith He, tho' He may satisfy himself, yet if his Arguments prevail, he will unsettle Thousands. And what He understands by Revolution-Principles, is plain from the last words of the same Paragraph. I think, saith He, I may set this down as a certain Rule, that whoever sticks still to his Old Passive Obedience Doctrine, cannot be a true Friend to the Revolution. *Lett. to Mr. Higd.* p. 2. He then goes on to observe, the unwillingness with which the Passive-Obedience Men comes in: and that they go not an Inch farther than just they must for the time. And, p. 3. Well, saith He, I must say it of the Clergy, that they came in with the worst Grace of any. They were brought to

to the Oaths, as a Bear to the Stake : and have the least share in the merit of the Revolution. He plainly insinuates, that it is the consequence of the *Doctrine* of *Non-resistance*, that the late, and present *Government* are to be accounted *Usurpations* : and, in his *Advertisement* at last, ridicules *Converts* to the *Government*, who have been once *Non-Furors*, and still retain that *Doctrine*. He saith, they expose the *QUEEN*, to excuse themselves ! It is impossible for a *Jacobite* to be a real *Convert* ! something still sticks with them, and they cannot help it. Nay, the very *Whigs*, who at other times are treated as void of common Sense, are, in this last Work of his, applauded in comparison of those who come in upon the Principle of *Possession*. How He came to speak his Thoughts so freely, I cannot tell. But it is hoped, that the *Clergy* will know their Man, for the future ; and not think their *Cause*, and their *Reputation*, safe in such hands ; or obliged to such an *Advocate*. They may see, by this Trial, that, notwithstanding all his Compliments, His *zeal* will transport him ; and that he can no more spare them, if they don't please him in their whole Behaviour, than He can, even *me*, whom He treats under the most hated Names: nay, that, when he is warm, He can openly deprecate the *Conduct* of those, whose *Cause* He would sometimes be thought to maintain, much below that of the *Whigs* themselves, against whom, at other times, He betrays so much heat, and bitterness. But it is time now to proceed to the other part of my present *Design*.

C H A P.

C H A P. II.

A
D E F E N S E

O F
Mr. *H O O K E R*'s Judgment,
Concerning the
Original, and Nature, of Civil Government.

S E C T. I. *Introduction.*

I Have in the foregoing Pages given sufficient Demonstration, that the *Patriarchal Scheme* of *Government* is void of all substantial Proof ; full of many great and intolerable Absurdities ; and wholly ineffectual for the establishing the chief Purposes for which it was first Invented. Unless, therefore, We find Reason to the contrary from other *Considerations*, We may justly think ourselves at Liberty to embrace that *Judgment*, concerning the *Original, and Nature of Civil Government*, which hath the reputation

K

tion of as great Names to recommend it to us as ever were known in the *Learned* and *Thinking* World; and is transmitted down to us of the *Church of England*, in particular, by Mr. *Hooker*, the great *Defender* of it's *Cause*; whose *Title* was *Judicious*; and whose *Notions* were never heretofore esteem'd by *Churchmen*, to have done *dishonour* to the *Church*, or by *Princes* themselves to have done injury to their *Real Authority*, and *Interest*. I mention not his *Name*, as if every thing he had said were presently to be receiv'd as *True*: For I am sensible that the mere *Authority* of *great Names* is of no account in the *Enquiry* after *Truth*. But there are many who will hear that with *Patience* from Mr. *Hooker*, which they will receive with *Abhorrence* from another; and who may possibly be induced to judge soberly and calmly of the *Principles* of their *Brethren*, when they know, (which as yet some do not so much as know) that such a Man as Mr. *Hooker*, the *Darling* of the *Old Church* of *England*; the *Favourite* of *Princes*; and as great a *Lover* of *Government* and *Order* as could be; that this Man, I say, espoused, and openly maintained the *same*. I propose therefore, at this time,

First, To lay before the *Reader* the *Judgment* of that Great Man in his own Words.

Secondly, To draw such *Conclusions* and *Inferences* from it as are plain, and undeniable. And,

Thirdly, To *Vindicate* it from the *chief Objections* which have been made against it.

S E C T.

S E C T. II.

The Judgment of Mr. Hooker, concerning the Original, and Nature, of Civil Government.

First. I Will lay before the *Reader*, the Judgment of this Great Man in his own Words, taken out of his *Celebrated Treatise* of *Ecclesiastical Polity*, and out of that part of it particularly in which he professedly layeth down his *Notions* concerning this matter.

1. The first *Passage* I shall transcribe is this, p. 86. *Ed. ult. We all make complaint of the Iniquity of our Times, not unjustly; for the Days are evil. But compare them with those Times wherein there were no Civil Societies; with those Times wherein there was as yet, no manner of public Regiment establish'd; with those Times wherein there were not above Eight Righteous Persons living upon the face of the Earth: And we have surely good cause to think, &c.*

2. Then follows immediately, *To take away all such mutual Injuries, Grievances, and Wrongs, there was no way, but only growing unto Composition and Agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of Government Public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto: That unto whom they granted Authority to Rule and Govern, by them the Peace, Tranquility, and happy Estate of the rest might be procur'd. Again, Men always knew—that Strifes and Troubles would be endless, except they gave their Common Consent all to be order'd by some whom they should agree upon. Without which Consent, there were no Reason that one Man should take upon him to be Lord or Judge over another. This Notion He repeats in other Words; and afterwards*

sums up his Judgment concerning the Original of Civil Government in the following Sentence : So that, in a Word, all Public Regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have risen from deliberate Advice, Consultation, and Composition between Men, judging it convenient and behoveful ; there being no impossibility in Nature, consider'd by it self, but that Men might have liv'd without any Public Regiment. Thus much for his Judgment concerning the Original of Civil Government.

3. Here follow some Passages out of the same Section, relating to the several kinds of Civil Government. The Inconveniencies of one kind have caused sundry others to be devised, p. 86. Again, The Case of Man's Nature standing therefore as it doth, [i. e. it being very corrupt] some kind of Regiment the Law of Nature doth require ; [viz. In order to the well being of Mankind ;] yet the kinds thereof being many, Nature tieth not to any one, but leaveth the choice as a thing Arbitrary. At the first, when some certain kind of Regiment was once approv'd, it may be that nothing was then further thought upon for the manner of Governing ; but all permitted unto their Wisdom and Discretion which were to Rule ; till by Experience they found this for all Parts very inconvenient ; so as the thing which they had devised for a Remedy, did indeed but encrease the Sore which it should have cured. They saw that to live by one Man's Will, became the Cause of all Men's Misery. This constrained them to come unto Laws, wherein all Men might see their Duties beforehand, and know the Penalties of transgressing them, p. 87.

4. With respect to the Power of making Laws, He presently adds these Words, The lawful Power of making Laws to command whole Politic Societies of Men, belongeth so properly unto the same entire Societies, that for any Prince or Potentate, of what kind soever upon Earth, to exercise the same of himself, and not either by

express

express Commission immediately and Personally received from God, or else by Authority derived at the first from their Consent upon whose Persons they impose Laws ; it is no better than meer Tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which Public Approbation hath not made so. But Approbation not only they give, who Personally declare their assent by Voice, Sign, or Act ; but also when others do it in their Names, by Right, originally at the least, derived from them, &c. *Ib.* Again, p. 88. He sums up his Judgment in these Words, Of this Point therefore we are to Note, that such Men Naturally have no full and perfect Power to command whole Politic multitudes of Men ; therefore, utterly without our Consent, we could in such sort be at no Man's Commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that Society, whereof we are part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after, by the like Universal Agreement.

5. Mentioning that famous Place of Scripture, Rom. 13. 1. Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers, He adds these Words as an Explanation of it. The Public Power of all Societies is above every Soul contain'd in the same Societies. And the principal use of that Power, is to give Laws unto all that are under it ; which Laws in such Case we must obey, unless there be Reason shew'd which may necessarily enforce, that the Law of Reason, or of God, doth enjoyn the contrary, p. 101.

6. I shall add a Passage or two more, out of that part of this Treatise which was not perfected by the Author ; nor Published till after his Death : but they are such as are not at all disagreeable to the former Positions transcrib'd from it, or at all unlikely to come from a Man of his Principles. In the Eighth Book, p. 444, He gives it as his Judgment, that all Kings, but such as are immediately named by God himself, have their Power by Human Right only : Tho' after Humane Composition and Agreement, their Lawful Choice

is approv'd of God, and Obedience requir'd to them by Divine Right. Afterwards He speaks particularly of this Kingdom, and declares that, in it, the People are in no Subjection, but such as willingly themselves have condescended unto for their own most behoof and Security. And then he goes on thus, In Kingdoms therefore of this Quality, the highest Governour hath indeed Universal Dominion, but with Dependency upon that whole entire Body, over the severall Parts whereof He hath Dominion. So that it standeth for an Axiom in this Case, The King is Major Singulis, Univerfis Minor. And again, By Dependency We mean Subordination and Subjection, p. 445. So that by comparing the Body with the Head, as touching Power, it seemeth always to reside in both: Fundamentally and Radically in the one, in the other Derivatively; in one the Habit, in the other the Act of Power. In the following Page He speaks again of our Limited Constitution in these Words, In which respect I cannot chuse but commend highly their Wisdom, by whom the foundation of the Common-wealth hath been laid: Wherein tho' no manner of Person, or Cause be unsubject to the King's Power, yet, so is the King's Power over all, and in all, limited, that in all his Proceedings the Law itself is a Rule. The Axioms of our Regal Government are these, Lex facit Regem. The King's grant of any Favour made contrary to the Law, is void. Rex nihil potest, nisi quod jure potest. And it this said of our own Constitution, after he had concluded the foregoing Chapter, with expressing his Concern that every People at the first original Conveyance of Power, should take Care to Limit it in expresse Terms, that so the Right of the Body Politic to withdraw the influence of Dominion which passeth from it, (as his Expression is) upon all just Occasions, may be the more undoubtedly apparent.

If

If any one say, that these last Books of Ecclesiastical Polity have received Alterations and Additions from bad Hands, in favour of the Governed Part of Mankind; I answer, That I desire no more to be granted than what undeniably follows from the Principles Published by himself in his Life-time. But I add, that it is much more likely, that whatever is found in these last Books, or hath been said to be found in them, which is manifestly disagreeable to, and inconsistent with the Principles laid down by himself in his first Book, was either added by some other Hand; or design'd to be introduc'd by himself by way of Objection only; or as the Opinion of others; marked down for that purpose, in his Papers found after his Death: which are allow'd to have been little more than the Brief Notes, or Rough Draught of what he design'd to compleat, and did indeed afterwards compleat, in Papers, unfortunately, and unaccountably lost.

And I appeal to any Impartial Judge, whether a Man of his Principles, had he been oblig'd to speak out, upon some possible Suppositions, which this Age hath seen verify'd, must not inevitably have partaken in the scandalous Character of a Man of Revolution-Principles: As I have indeed my self heard him given up by a Great Patron of another Cause, and styled the Father of the Whigs, and Latitudinarians, not without some tokens of his Resentment against Him.

This Judgment of Mr. Hooker concerning Government, is much more remarkable, because it is laid down by Him with design to bring his Adversaries to a due sense of the Authority of Governours and Laws; and therefore to be sure was carried by him as high as in Conscience He could permit himself to carry it: Of so contrary an Opinion was this Good Man to that of some others, who can never oppose one Extreme without running to another as bad, if not worse; and think they cannot enough condemn Rebellion, without giving

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the *Divine Sanction to Tyranny, and Oppression*. This *Judgment* ought likewise to be of the more Weight with such as profess the most profound Veneration for the Memory of K. *Charles the First*, and the Honour of the *Old Church of England*: Because this *Treatise* in which it is to be found, was chosen out of many others by that *Prince*, to be recommended to his *Children*, as the best *Instructor* they could converse with; and was had in such *Estimation* by all *Churchmen* from the time of its appearance, that it may well pass not only for his own *Judgment* in particular, but for the *Judgment* of the whole *Church of England* at that time. How unlike to these *Days!* in which these *Principles* are by many *Celebrated Writers* styled the *Principles of Confusion, and Disorder*: and the *Maintainers* of them not allow'd to have any better *Title* than that of the *Sons of Belial*; nor to be under any better *Influence* than that of *Beelzebub*; nor to *Copy* after any better *Pattern* than that of *Lucifer*; nor to have any better *Character* than that of *Atheists, or Deists*; nor to deserve any better *Fate*, than that of *Apostates, and Rebels*. Had that *Good Man* been reserved to have blessed this *Age*, it is not all his *Piety* that could have secur'd him from such infamous *Accusations*; nor all his *Labours* for the *Church*, that could have made him a *Churchman*: But for *these*, and some *other* of his *Principles*, even *He* must have been content, to have born the *Character* of a *False-Brother*, and an *Half-Church man*; of a *Betrayer* of its *Rights*; and a *Contradictor* of its *Doctrine*. Nay, Who knows but that some *Synodical Notice* might be called for, of the *Dishonour* done to the *Church* by such a *Defender*, who hath openly espoused such *Principles* in *Civil Government*; who hath maintained the *Cause* of the *Church* after such a rate, as, in the *Opinion* of many, cannot support its *Dignity* in many *Points*; and who hath treated those who in a most furious and unreasonable manner

manner were impugners of it, with the *Christian* appellation of *Dear Brethren, and Beloved in our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ?* But enough. Well may the *unworthy* suffer any *Indignities* with *patience*, in the company of so much *worth*, and so much *Excellence!* It is time now to proceed.

S E C T. III.

Inferences from the foregoing Quotations.

HAVING thus given the *Reader* a true account of the *Principles* of *Mr. Hooker*, with respect to *Civil Government*; I cannot forbear to make some particular *Observations* upon what hath been now transcrib'd from him; and to draw a few *Inferences* from it which are plain, and undeniable *Consequences* of his *Doctrine*.

1. This great Man was of *Opinion*, not only that there might reasonably be suppos'd a time at *first* in which *Mankind* liv'd without *Civil Government*, properly so call'd; but that actually there was a space of time, in which (to repeat his own Words) *there was no manner of Public Regiment Establish'd*; even from the *Creation* to the *Deluge*. As I think probable, from his Expression, *Those Times in which there was, as yet, no manner of Public Regiment Establish'd*.

2. By his account of this matter, He declares, in effect, that *Paternal Authority* was not the ground of *Civil Government* over *Public Societies*; or the *Foundation* of any *Authority* in any but such as were *Natural Fathers*.

3. He expressly founds *Civil Government* upon the *Voluntary Agreement, Composition, or Compact* of the *Members*

Members of the Govern'd Society; from whom originally comes all the Authority of Governours: So expressly, that He declares it impossible that any should have compleat lawful Power but by this Consent, in the ordinary Cause of God's Providence.

4. He leaves it entirely, as a thing indifferent, to the free Consultation, and Deliberation of Men, what Form of Government shall be tried, or establish'd.

5. He plainly enough teacheth that the first Trial, or Compact, doth not so oblige the govern'd Society, but that, upon experience of Universal Evil, they have a Right to try by another Form to answer more effectually the Ends of Government: For he saith expressly, that the Experience of the Misery of being govern'd by one Man's Will, constrain'd Mankind to come to a Government by written Laws. It could not, it seems, appear tolerable to Him to lodge, in the Governours of any Society, an unlimited Authority to annul, and alter the Constitution of the Government, as they should see fit; and to leave to the Governed the Privilege only of Absolute Subjection in all such Alterations. But He thinks it but reasonable that, as the first Establishment was founded upon the Compact, and Agreement of the Govern'd; so in them there should be left a reserve of Right to change this, when upon trial they have found such Universal, and Intolerable Evils in it, as they were not at first apprehensive of.

6. He is so far from applauding, or approving, Absolute Monarchy, that he saith that Mankind found that this did indeed but increase the Sore which it should have cur'd; and that to live by one Man's Will was the Cause of all Men's Misery.

7. He applauds a Legal Constitution, and prefers it before Absolute Monarchy; particularly our own: Which it had been inconsistent for him to do, unless He thought the Laws a Rule to the Prince, as well as the

the Subject; and the Executive Power bound to the due Execution of those Laws.

8. Tho' he places the Authority of Governours, after their appointment, above any particular Members of the Society; yet he doth not place it above the whole Govern'd Society, or People, or Body Politic. Tho' therefore the separate Interests of Individuals must yield to it; yet the united Interest of the Whole must be of greater Consideration: According to which Notion he interprets Rom. 13. 1. As to which place of Scripture I observe likewise,

9. He interprets it equally with respect to all Forms of Government; not with a particular View to the Roman Emperor, exclusively of the Senate, but with a general regard to all who have lawful Power of Legislation: So much doth he differ from the Ingenious Dr. Atterbury, who, in his Latin Sermon, confines it to the Executive Power, consider'd as distinct from the Legislative.

10. It must follow from his Principles, whether He said it, or thought it, or not, that no Governour can have Authority to Ruine the Govern'd Society: it being impossible that any People should give any such Authority by their Compact; or that any Authority should be devolv'd upon Him by the Will of God, but what is requisite for the Ends of Civil Government: To which this is absolutely repugnant. Authority given to a Governour, to judge of private Injuries, and to guard against Public Enemies, cannot imply in it an Authority to do Injuries, or to become a Public Enemy himself; but the contrary.

11. It follows therefore likewise, that, after such Compact, and Composition, there must remain in the Governed Society a Right to defend, and preserve itself from Ruine: as well if this Governour should attempt it himself; as if He should encourage, or carelessly permit any other Public Enemy to attempt it; or absolutely refuse to use the Power lodg'd in Him for the frustrating such an attempt from abroad.

I might draw several other Consequences from the Principles laid down by this Great Man: But these are sufficient to my present purpose. And I cannot but hope that, tho' his Name be not of force enough to recommend his Principles to some Men; yet, it may have Power to conciliate a small degree of their Favour, and good Opinion, to the Persons of those who differ from them. It may methinks be allow'd possible, for a Man to be a Christian; a Churchman; an honest Man; a Man of no Evil Designs; whose Doctrine is no worse than what hath either by express Words, or by just Consequence, been taught long ago by as good a Christian; as true a Churchman; as honest and well-designing a Man as ever perhaps was known in this Church, and Nation.

S E C T. IV.

Several Objections to this Judgment of Mr. Hooker concerning Government, answer'd.

Against this Judgment of Mr. Hooker, concerning the Original and Nature of Civil Government, I am not insensible that several Objections have been urg'd; and that with such a shew of Triumph, as if nothing could ever be devis'd more senseless, and more destitute of all support, than what appear'd to so good a judge, most just and reasonable. Which Objections; those of them, I mean, which have come to my Knowledge, I design now briefly to consider.

Obj. 1. Whatever founds Government must be superior to it, and above it. Now Humane cannot be superior to Humane. Therefore Government among Men cannot

not be deriv'd from mere Humane Authority. Reh. Numb. 53. I answer,

1. The Beginning, and Original of any Society of lesser importance amongst Men, is often Voluntary Compact, and Agreement: By which Voluntary Compact and Agreement some Powers are frequently devolv'd upon particular Persons in this Society, for the answering the Ends of it. But still this Compact and Agreement, design'd only for the answering the Ends propos'd, is Superior to the Will of those Persons; and is the Rule, and Direction of their Actions: By which Rule the whole Society still have a Right to judge of the behaviour of those Persons, and to take care that the Ends of their entering into that Society be answer'd. And in this Sense Humane is superior to Humane: and that which convey'd these Powers is superior to them. So it might possibly be in Civil Government, notwithstanding this Argument. Humane Compact might found Government: and yet be superior to it, so as to be its Rule; and so as that the whole Society might still have a Right to take care of themselves, superior to the particular Right of any Man to govern, which was given only for the good of the whole. But,

2. It is hard indeed to conceive what the true meaning of this Objection is. It cannot surely intend to assert that one Humane Person may not be superior to another: For this is contended for. Nor can it signifie that the same individual Humane Authority cannot be superior to itself: For this is an Absurdity maintain'd by no Man. All that I can make of it, as apply'd to this Cause, must be this, that Humane Compact cannot be superior to Government founded upon Humane Compact. And this is evidently an assertion without Ground. For in this Compact, upon which Power is given to a particular Person, the Conditions of this Compact must be the Rule, and Measure of his Authority: And there must be a Right in all who enter into this Compact, to take

take care of their own Common Preservation, against the *unauthoritative* attempts of *Him* in whom the *Power* is lodg'd. There is not the least appearance of *Inconsistency* in this: And this *Superiority* is what is contended for. In this *Sense* therefore *Humane* may be superior to *Humane*: And consequently, notwithstanding this *Argument*, the Foundation of *Government* may be *voluntary Compact*, and *Agreement*.

3. If the *Ends* of *Government* may be answer'd, supposing *Humane Compact* the first original of it; this *Objection* signifies nothing against this opinion. But the *Ends* of *Government* may be answer'd this way: Therefore this *Objection* is of no importance.

4. If it be true that *whatever founds Government must be superior to it*, as is here affirm'd; then the justness of the *Consequence* drawn from Mr. *Hooker's* Principles is most evident, *vis.* That the *Governour*, tho' *major singulis*, yet is *universis minor*; tho' *Greater* than any *particular Member* of the *Body*, yet is *less* than the *whole* put together.

5. Supposing I should deny for the present, that *what founds Government* must necessarily be *Superior* to it; and only maintain that it must be *equal* to it; then this *Argument* (which consists in playing with the word *Humane*) must fall to the Ground; and yet the *Ends* of *Society* may be answer'd too. For it cannot be deny'd that *Humane* may be *equal* to *Humane*. We may argue, therefore, after the following manner. *Whatsoever founds Government must indeed be equal to it. But Humane is equal to Humane. Therefore Humane Consent may be the Foundation of Humane Government*; as far as this way of reasoning is concern'd. And upon the *Supposition* of this *Equality* only, there will ever remain in the *Govern'd Society* a *Right* to defend themselves from Ruine. Nay, supposing this *Universal Consent* of no force against that part of the *Government* of a *particular Governour* which is agreeable to

to the Conditions of the *Contract*, and not *equal* to his *Authority* in this: Yet it may, notwithstanding this, be at least *equal* to that part of his *Government*, which is disagreeable, and contradictory to the *Conditions* of this *Contract*; and of force enough to secure the *Society* from being ruin'd by such *Evil Administration*, as hath nothing in the *Contract* to bear it out.

Object. 2. *All acknowledge that a Divine Right is necessary; even they who make the Voice of the People the Voice of God: But Humane Compact cannot give a Divine Right; and therefore there must of necessity be some higher Original.* In answer to this,

1. If that *Maxim*, concerning the *Voice* of the *People*, implies in it that there is a *Divine Right* in *Governours*; it must be, either in that *Sense* in which those who make this *Objection* contend for it, or in a different *Sense*. If in the same *Sense*; then there is no need of any dispute. For, if all allow the *thing*, what need of any farther debate about *Words*? If in a *different* *Sense* from those who argue thus; then this is not allowing the *thing* it self, but only using a word, which is us'd by them, in a *Sense* very different from *theirs*. For *Divine Right* in this *Question* is *Divine Right* in one particular *Sense*, as understood by those who oppose the *Scheme* of *Humane Compact*; and consequently, in a *Sense* inconsistent with *Humane Compact*. But in this *Sense* no one can allow a *Divine Right*, who pleads for *Humane Compact*: because this is pleading for it, and against it in the same *Breath*. The *Foundation* therefore of this *Objection* is quite remov'd: Since, if the Followers of Mr. *Hooker* allow a *Divine Right*, in the same *Sense* with those who oppose him, there can no difference remain but what lies in *Words* only; and if they allow it, in a *Sense* different from his *Opposers*, this is not allowing the thing contended for, or granting any thing to them. Both these ways the *Objection* is wholly invalidated. 2. The

2. The true meaning of that Maxim, as apply'd to the *Case* now before us, and that alone in which any Persons of *Common Sense* use it, is this, *viz.* That whatsoever methods of Government, or Persons to Govern, a whole Society, or Community, do voluntarily pitch upon, for the good, and support of themselves, and carrying forward the *Ends* of *Humane Society*, are approv'd of by God, as resulting from the good use of that *Reason* which is his *Voice*, and his *Law*; and as confirm'd by his *Reveal'd Will*, to those who enjoy the Light of it. This is the *Voice of God*, or the *Divine Right* imply'd, and acknowledg'd, in this *Maxim*. But the *Divine Right* contended for by our *Opponents* is an *immediate Divine appointment* of the *Form of Government* to be adhered to; and the immediate communication of the *Authority to Govern*, from *God* himself. Now what relation the *one* hath to the *other*, I cannot see; nor how it can follow that the *allowance* of a *Divine Right* in the *former* of these *Senses*, can lead to the *allowance* of it in the *latter*: which is indeed so far from being a *consequence* of the *other*, that it is directly contrary to it. *Humane Compact*, it is plain, therefore, can give, or draw after it, such a *Divine Right* as they contend for, who plead for *Humane Compact*: And consequently there can be no need, in their Opinion, for any *Higher Original* of Government. For those indeed, who contend for it, in another Sense, there may be a necessity for *another Original*: But their way to convince others of this necessity, is to prove to them from other Arguments that there must be a *Divine Right* in the *Sense* in which they deny it; and not to argue from their allowing it under one Notion, that therefore they must allow it under the quite contrary.

3. Upon *Humane Compact*, and *Voluntary Association* of Mankind into *Societies* for *Civil Government*, the Powers that are necessary for the Happiness aim'd at
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by *Civil Government*, are convey'd to the *Person*, or *Persons*, call'd to the *Office of Governing*. And it is *God's Will* and the *Voice of Reason*, that they should have all Authority necessary to the *Ends* of their *Office*: As it is his *Will*, that *Persons* concern'd in any other *Compact*, should have all Powers necessary to the *Ends* propos'd by that *Compact*. A *Divine Right* therefore, all are free to grant in this *Sense*; a *Right* founded upon *Reason*, and confirm'd by the *Will* and *Approbation* of *God*. And methinks this *Scheme* might be as easily embrac'd and adhered to as that other, in which, upon mere taking and keeping possession of what belongs no more to one than to another, *Almighty God* is introduced as willing this possession to be a *Right*; and dispensing such *unlimited Powers*, as destroy the very *Ends* of all *Civil Government*. If some Persons take the Liberty of making a long Possession, tho' obtain'd by *Force*, or *Fraud*, to be the *Voice of God*; one would think it need not be scandalous for others to make the *voluntary* agreement of a *Community of Men*, for their common good, the *Voice of God*, who approves and confirms every thing that is just, and reasonable.

Object. 3. This Judgment of Mr. Hooker concerning the Original of Government cannot be true; unless there were a Time, and a Number of Men in the World, before the Institution of it: But no such Time can be nam'd. And consequently, this Judgment cannot be well-grounded. I Answer,

1. There is no necessity at all that such a *Time* should be nam'd; nor doth the *Truth* or *Falshood* of this *Scheme* at all depend upon the naming, or not naming it: Because there might be such a *Time*, and yet not mark'd precisely in those short accounts of the first Ages, which are transmitted down to us by *Antient Historians*, whether *Sacred* or *Profane*. That there should have been a *State of Things in Fact*, not
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particularly noted by the *Sacred Historian*, is no strange or unaccountable thing to any one who considers that the transactions of many hundreds of Years before the Flood, take up but a few Lines (comparatively speaking) in his *History*. Neither will it appear more strange that the *Variations* with respect to *Civil Government*, or *No-Government*, should not be expressly remark'd by *Him*, if we consider that his business and design doth not appear so much as to have led him to one thought concerning that Matter. And as for the *Profane Historians*; supposing that they give us no accounts of any such time, it is manifest that their *Histories* go not so high as the *Confusion of Languages*, and *Division of Nations*. There are but few things related of the *Oldest Times*, either by the *Sacred* or *Profane*. But it doth not follow from their being silent, that therefore nothing but what they relate, happen'd in Fact. Supposing therefore that no time can be fix'd, in which *Men* were without *Civil Government*, because no such time is precisely noted by *Historians*; this is no good *Argument* that really there was no such time.

2. This *Objection* may with much more Justice be retorted upon the *Objectors*, who this way design to introduce a *positive Institution of Government*, by the immediate interposition of *Almighty God* himself. For this *positive Institution* being a matter of so great and universal Concern; of so singular and undoubted importance; it is hardly possible to suppose, that the *Sacred Historian*, whose design was to give some account of the *immediate Transactions* between *Almighty God*, and *Mankind*, should have omitted this, had He known any thing of such an *Institution*. It is reasonable therefore to ask those who are so zealous for such an *immediate Divine Appointment*, in what part of the *Sacred History* it is to be found. If they answer, that it is imply'd in the *Duty* laid upon *Eve*, and the *Children of Adam*; I have already shewn that this is a matter wholly distinct

distinct from *Civil Government*: And must have been just the same at that time, had *Adam* himself had a *Civil Governour* over him; and consequently cannot possibly imply in it, the appointment of him for *Civil Governour*. Besides, We are seeking for a plain positive *Institution* of *Royalty*, or *Civil Government*, considered as such: And this, at best, is suppos'd to be no more than a *Virtual* or *Consequential Institution*. And can any one suppose that a matter of this Nature; an *Appointment* of this Importance would have been left by the *Historian* to have been collected by the *World* from *Eve's* being made *subordinate* to *Adam*, and from *Children* being born of them? Which all may see to be the *Case* of all other *Husbands* and *Fathers*, tho' settled under *Civil Government*. But I have said enough of this before. I only observe now, that We have more reason to call for the *Express Records* of this *Divine Institution*, from those who so earnestly contend for it, than *They* have to require that the precise *Time* should be nam'd which preceded the *Humane Institution of Government*: Because it is much less likely that the *Sacred Historian* should omit so signal an *Act of Divine Interposition*, had there been any such, than that he should not take express notice of a space of time without *Civil Government*, even supposing the *Institution* of it to have been preceded by such a *State*. At the least, both these *Schemes* are upon a level, with respect to this. For supposing, on one side, that no such *Time* can be pointed out; it is evident, on the other side, that there is no express account given to the *Sacred History* of *God's* institution of *Civil Government*.

3. Once more, I argue, supposing not only that there can be no such *Time* pointed out, but that there never in reality was a *Time* in which *Mankind* were not actually under a *Civil Government* properly so call'd; yet this will not destroy this *Judgment* of Mr.

Hooker, as to the most essential part of it. It will prove indeed that a *Voluntary Compact* was not formally made by Mankind, in order to the first *Civil Government*: But this will not prove that *Voluntary Compact* is not the only Foundation of *Rightful Government*, unless in *Cases* in which *Almighty God* immediately interposeth to nominate the *Persons*, and *Families* which are to *Reign*. Supposing therefore that *Adam* was *Universal Monarch*, or *Civil Governour*, over the whole *Race* of *Mankind*, during his long *Life*; this will not prove that he had a *Divine Right* to be so. This might proceed from his taking upon himself that *Office*, and establishing himself in it by degrees; or from the tacit and general *Consent* of his *Descendents* for their own *common Good*. If merely from his own *Will* and *Power*; this is barely *Possession*, which those who object this, will not allow at first to convey a true *Right*, or *Title*. And notwithstanding that he he was *Universal King* before any *Compact*, yet this will not prove that he was *rightfully* so, or that there is any other *rightful Title* to *Civil Government*, but what is founded upon *Compact*, in the ordinary *Course* of *Things*. If his *Monarchy* were founded upon, and supported by, the tacit *Consent* of his *Descendents*; this amounts to such a *Compact* as I am now defending. Whether therefore there ever was one *Hour* without *Civil Government*, or no; whether there ever was a *Compact* actually made in any one *Place* in the *World*, or no: Yet this *Judgment* may stand good, that there cannot be a *Right* to *Government*; properly so call'd, without the *Consent* and *Agreement* of the *Community* and *Society* which is to be *Govern'd*. A *Man* may be possess'd of *Government* without a real *Right* to it. There may be a tacit *Consent* where there was no *formal Contract*, or preceding *State* of *No-Government*. And *Power* may keep a *Community* from exerting a *Right*, which nevertheless it hath within itself.

itself. And thus may this matter be accounted for, even supposing it true, that there was not a *State* of *Things* without *Civil Government*, followed by a *Formal Voluntary Contract*.

4. Thus far have I argued upon the *Supposition*, that there could be no *Time* nam'd, in which *Mankind* were without a *settled Civil Government*, properly so call'd. But I now design to point out several such *Spaces of Time*: which if I can do to the Satisfaction of *Persons of Sense*, and *Judgment*, it will wholly destroy the very *Ground* of this *Objection*. And,

1. It is highly improbable that *Moses* should not in a very express manner, inform us of the *first Institution* of *Civil Government*; that he should not give us one single instance of any *Regal Act* of *Adam*, or his *Successors*, down to the *Division* of *Nations*; supposing *Monarchy* to have been in them; that he should not give us the *Names* of these, under the *Title* of *Kings*, or *Civil Governours*, or so much as *Patriarchs*: This I say, is very improbable, had he known them to have been such. And the more improbable, because when *Mankind* came to multiply, after the *Division* of *Nations*, he gave us *Catalogues* of *Governours*, calling them *Kings*, or *Dukes*, expressly: and not leaving his *Reader* to collect their having the *Office* of *Governours* from their being *Husbands*, or *Fathers*. He gives us indeed a *Pedigree* from *Adam* to *Noah*, and so to *Abraham*: But I have already shewn that this cannot be suppos'd to be a *Catalogue* of *Kings*, or *Civil Governours*; and must have been what it is, supposing no such thing as *Civil Government* in Being.

2. It will be allow'd by the *Patrons* of the *Patriarchal Scheme*, that either *Adam*, and *Noah*, were actually *Civil Governours*, or *Kings*; or that there was a *Time* in which *Mankind* were without *Civil Government*: But there is not the least *Mark* in *History*, by which they appear to have exercis'd the *Office* of *Kings*; and

some plain Signs of their not exercising it: As I have amply shewn in the foregoing Chapter. Therefore, it is at least much more probable than the contrary, that there was a Time at first in which Mankind were without a settled Civil Government. What follows will help to prove both the Branches of this Argument more plainly.

3. I argue thus: There was a Time at the beginning of the World, when all the Men then in Being were look'd upon by the Murtherer Cain, as equally the Avengers of Blood; and equally authorized to destroy the Murtherer as a Public Enemy. This is manifest from the Fear express'd by Cain; not that Adam would Try him, and have him Executed, but that all Men knowing Him, after God had discover'd the Fact, to be the Murtherer, would be arm'd against Him, and kill Him when, and wheresoever, they should meet Him. There cannot be a plainer Proof than this, of a State of Things without Civil Government: And this Proof is not supposed by me, but express'd in plain Words by the Historian. No wonder therefore that Labour, and Art, are both apply'd to evade the force of this Evidence. It is said, therefore, by the Advocate for the Patriarchal Scheme, that Adam had proscrib'd Cain, and given orders to all Men, empowering them to Kill him. It is said that We cannot suppose it was in every Bodies Power to Kill another for any Crime. That would make wild Confusion upon the Earth; and it never was so in any Nation or Government whatsoever. For it is inconsistent with all Order, Rule, and Government, Reh. Num. 56. Now, 1. I have shewn in the foregoing Chapter, that Adam took not the Matter into his Hands; that the Murther, and Murtherer, were not known till God Almighty himself interposed; and that, immediately upon this discovery, without any Act of Adam, Cain betray'd this Fear, that all Men would be arm'd against

against Him. It is impossible therefore, that here should be any room for his being proscrib'd and condemn'd by Adam. This Supposition therefore is not only not in the Sacred History; but inconsistent with the Circumstances of the Story, as it is there related. 2. We are now enquiring into the State of Things, as recorded by the Historian; not into what may be suppos'd by our selves for the advantage of our own Opinions. We are enquiring now, whether Moses relates any Act of Regal Power in Adam; or any Matter which shews a State of Equality, as to the Magistratical Office. I find it there expressly recorded, that Cain was afraid of all equally. This is the very State of Equality we are seeking after. To answer to this, that it is to be suppos'd that Adam had before exerted his Authority in proscribing Him, (even tho' it did not contradict the History, yet it) is not to produce any thing out of Moses against the State of Equality; but out of a Man's own Invention. It is to suppose the very thing to be prov'd: whereas, on the contrary, I produce the Matter of Fact, as related by the Historian. 3. To argue that we cannot suppose every Man might kill a Murtherer, because this would make Confusion, and never was so in any Government, is to argue thus. We cannot suppose that there was a State of Equality at that time, because then there was Confusion, and it never was so in any Government: That is, there must be Government, because otherwise there would be No Government. This is again to suppose the very thing in Dispute, in order to prove itself. Now the Dispute here is not whether of the two is the most desirable State; but which of the two was actually the State of Mankind, at the time of the Murther of Abel: and this we find in Fact to be the State of Equality with respect to avenging his Blood, and defending themselves from a common Enemy. And if this

State be a State of *Equality*, inconsistent with Civil Rule, and Government: as this Author saith; then it being evident that this was actually the then State of the World, it follows evidently that there was a *Time* at the beginning, in which Mankind were actually in a State, inconsistent with the supposition of Civil Rule, and Government, properly so call'd.

4. The prodigious increase of Wickedness, and Villany, from this time to the *general Flood*, is an *Argument* to Mr. Hooker, that there was in that Space of Time no *settled* manner of Civil Rule and Government: which he supposeth, could not but have abated much of that *Exorbitance of Vice*; and seems particularly adapted to restrain that Violence, which at length fill'd the *whole Earth*.

5. With respect to the *Time* between the *general Flood*, and the *Division of Nations*, I argue thus: The manner in which God declares to *Noah*, and his Sons, that Murder shall be punish'd, shews that it was no more the peculiar Business of *Noah* to try, and punish the Murtherer, than it was of any of the rest of Mankind. Therefore, at that time there was no *settled* Civil Governour. The Words are, *Whoso sheddeth man's Blood, by man shall his Blood be shed*: A manner of Expression the most *indefinite*, and *indeterminate* possible. For, 1. *Noah* could no more plead from these Words, that it was his peculiar Business to be an Avenger of Blood, than any of his *Descendants* might have done: The word *Man* in the *latter part*, taking in all Men as much as the word *Man* in the *former part* of the Sentence. 2. *Noah* could no more plead an *Exemption* from being us'd as a Murtherer himself, by Virtue of these Words, than the meanest of his *Descendants*; for the word *Whoso*, in the beginning of the Sentence, takes him in as much as any others then in being; And consequently

quently, if these Words suppose *Him* the Civil Magistrate, to avenge the *Murther* committed by *others*, they equally suppose others invested with the same Power to avenge *Murther*, should it be committed by *Himself*. But indeed, 3. There can hardly be imagin'd a more ineffectual *Expression* than this; had it been design'd to be signify'd by it alone, without the help of any thing else in the History, that the *Avenging* of *Murther* was the peculiar Business of *Noah*, and not of any Man besides Himself; nor of any Man against Himself. It is not supposable, that any one could make choice of such *general* Words, in order to teach Men the peculiar Office of a Magistrate: And therefore I cannot dare to think that God *Almighty* could design this *one* thing, and chuse such *Expressions*, as he might and would have chosen, upon the very contrary Supposition. 4. It remains therefore, that all were equally the *Avengers* of *Blood*, at that time: *that is*, in other Words, That there was then a State of things, without an Establish'd Civil Governour, whose peculiar Business it was to punish that Crime. The Words seem to me to have been spoken by *Almighty* God, for the use of the increasing Generation of Men, with these *two* Views: *First*, in order to signifie to them, that, tho' in the Case of *Cain* murthering *Abel*, at the beginning of the *Ante-Diluvian* Generation, He himself had interpos'd so as to keep him alive, and put him out of the reach of his *Brethren*; yet he would not do the like again, but leave the *Murtherer* entirely to Men to Avenge and Retaliate the Injury: And *Secondly*, in order to signify to them that, tho' in that State of *Rapine* and *Violence*, which had preceded the *General Deluge*, many *Murtherers* had escap'd, or been conceal'd and protected by others (by which means *Vice* had wonderfully increas'd) yet that now He expected, and expressly requir'd all Men to arm against Murtherers; to

to be so far from protecting them, as to avenge the *Crime* upon them. These two *Considerations* seem to give a good account of God's express mention of this Matter, just at the beginning of the *New Post-diluvian* World. But the Establishment of *Civil Government*, properly so call'd, appears to have been left by *Almighty God*, as were other things necessary to the well-being of Mankind, to be the result of *Reason, Wisdom, and Deliberation*. Great indeed would have been the Happiness, if God himself had seen fit to interpose, and regulate this Matter, by the Principles of perfect and unerring Wisdom: And great likewise had been the Happiness, if in several other Instances it had pleas'd *Him* to interest himself in the concerns of this Life. But alas! these are but Wishes. His design in placing us in this State, was not that we might find *Happiness* and *Stability* here below: And the Conditions of it are such as evidently shew that it is the Province of *Reason* and *Understanding*, to press towards them as much as we can, thro' multitudes of Obstacles, and Difficulties hardly to be conquer'd. To return,

6. The *People* of the *Earth*, that is, a vast *Majority* of Mankind, are represented by *Moses*, as voluntarily journeying from one part of the *Earth* to another; as voluntarily entering into a Resolution of Building a *Tower* of prodigious Height; as universally engag'd in a Design so extremely Foolish and Vain, that *Almighty God* thought fit to interpose, and disappoint them. Here again are all the Tokens of *Mankind's* being in a *State* of *Equality*, or, in other Words, without a *common Civil Government*. I have shewn, in the foregoing Chapter, that *Noah* cannot possibly be suppos'd to have had any part in this Design, so displeasing to *God*; and that all the *Circumstances* of it are so related as to shew it to have been the contrivance of a Number of Men who look'd upon themselves as upon equal Terms with one another. Let any one read *Gen. 11.*
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and see if he can find any Footsteps there of a *Governour* first ordering this Work; or afterwards interposing so as to endeavour to hinder it. If there were any *Rightful Governour*, one would think it must be *Noah*, according to those with whom I am now arguing: And let any one judge whether he could be *Civil Governour*, and yet not effectually put a stop to a Design so highly derogatory to the *Power* of *God*, of which he particularly had had so amazing a Proof, at the *Deluge*. Could he put it in their Heads to preserve their Name by an high Tower, who had seen the Waters prevail above the highest Hills, and knew that they could again destroy all Humane Buildings, as they had before? Or could He stand by, and contentedly see *God's Power* affronted by such vain Arrogance, without putting a stop to it? Or could *Moses* relate all this Matter, without taking any notice of the part which his *Regal Power*, and *Edicts*, must have born in this Affair, had He been *Supreme Monarch*? His being an *Husband-man*, and planting a *Vine-Yard*, is indeed recorded: But of his being a *Monarch* there is not one word; no not in this place, where, I should think, the mention of it could not have been avoided, had He been truly so. Thus much it may suffice to have produc'd out of those very short *Memorials* of the *first Ages*, which are left us by the *Sacred Historians*.

7. If from *Moses* we proceed to the *Heathen Historians*, in them we shall find indeed that the *first Essay* of *Government* was generally *Monarchical*: But that none of the *first Kings* pleaded any *Original Right* in themselves to their *Office*, antecedent to the *Election*, at least of part of the *Community* to be govern'd by them. They were chosen for their good *Qualities*. This is the *Notion* which the *Heathen Historians* have of the Matter. Now this very *Choice* implies an *antecedent State* of *Equality* with respect to this *Office*:
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And the Election of the first King, necessarily supposeth a State of Things before, and without, Civil Government. If therefore the first Kings were the first Governours; and were made Kings by Election; there must have been a State wholly void of Civil Government, before the first Election. But, as far as the Heathen Historians knew any thing of this matter, they were chosen for their real, or suppos'd Abilities for their Office. And consequently, according to these Historians, there was a Time before, and without, Civil Government, properly so call'd.

There are therefore, as plain Marks as could be expected in such a Case, both in Sacred and Profane History, of a space of Time, in which the first Ages of Mankind were without Civil Government. And from these plain Marks of No Government, let any one turn to those Proofs, produc'd in the former Chapter, by which the Objectors pretend to shew that Adam, and Noah were, in their own Right, Civil Governours from the beginning: And he will find that there is not one positive and direct Proof amongst them; not one Text declaring any such thing in plain Words; not one instance alleg'd, unless by way of their own Supposition, of Regal, or Magistratical Authority exercis'd by them; nothing, in short, but some Consequential Reasonings from their being Fathers, or Husbands, or the like. From hence he will be able to judge, whether there be not much more positive Proof of a State antecedent to the Establishment of Civil Government, than can be produc'd for the contrary: And whether this be not a Demonstration that after such a preceding State, Civil Government could not be founded upon any thing but Voluntary Consent, unless in Cases in which God himself thought fit immediately to interpose.

The sum of what hath been said is this. The present Objection is taken from hence, that no Time can be pointed out, in which Mankind were without Civil Govern-

Government; which therefore was not founded upon Voluntary Consent. To this I have answered, 1. By observing, That supposing no such Time can be found out in History it doth not follow, that therefore there was none. 2. By remarking, That supposing actually no such Time to have been, it doth not follow but that there ought to have been such a Time: That is, it follows only, that there were some from the Beginning, in possession of Civil Government; not that any could be rightfully possess'd of it without Consent; not that their Rightful possession was not founded upon the tacit Consent at least of those who grew up under these first Civil Governments. And 3. By giving some plain and positive marks, both from Sacred and Profane History, of such a Time as is here enquired after, viz. A Time in the first Ages of the Ante-Diluvian, and Post-Diluvian Worlds, in which Mankind were without Civil Government, properly so call'd.

8. I shall only here add, with respect to all the Nations and Civil Governments now in being, That there must have been a Time, in which these several People, were in a State of Equality, with respect to Government; according to that Scheme itself, which I examin'd in the foregoing Chapter: That is, a State in which no one could pretend to a real Right to the Civil Rule of any particular Nation, any more than another. For, supposing Government to have been at first settled by Divine appointment, in such a particular Line of a Particular Family, exclusively of all others; there was certainly a point of Time, in which that Line became obscure and unknown. At this very point of Time, each Nation was in a State of Equality: Nor could a Civil Government be rightfully settled from that Time, but by Consent; supposing Almighty God not to interpose. And this is sufficient to establish Mr. Hooker's Judgment, with respect to all the present and future Governments of the World. I now proceed to another Objection.

Obj. 4. The Judgment of Mr. Hooker, concerning the Original of Civil Government, cannot be allowed, because the Time and Place cannot be named, when and where, the whole Race of Mankind first met to consult, and deliberate about it; nay, because 'tis impossible that they should all meet, freely to vote, and consent to the Institution.

1. That part of this *Objection*, which is taken from our not being able to name the *Time*, and *Place* of such a Meeting, is sufficiently Answer'd under the foregoing *Objection*, supposing that no such *Time*, and *Place*, can be particularly pointed out; this will not prove that there was no such *Time*, and *Place*. For the *Sacred Historian* is far from pretending to record any Particulars of this Nature in the *first* Ages of the World: And the *Profane* do not ascend high enough in their *Accounts* for us to expect any such thing. Supposing that in reality there was no such *Time* and *Place*, it doth not follow that *Government* was rightfully founded, without *Humane Compact*. Besides, this may be very justly retorted upon the *Objectors*, who pretend an *Express Divine Institution*, which cannot be known but from the express Words of the *Sacred Historian*. And he is entirely Silent as to the *Time*, and *Place*, at which any such *Institution* was made. According to this *Argument* therefore, there was no such *Institution*. But,

2. Supposing that all who had a right to *Vote* in this *Case*, did never actually meet; nay, supposing it impossible that they should all *Vote*, either by themselves, or such as were truly their *Representatives*: it will not follow from hence that no part of Mankind met for that purpose, and deliberated about, and consented to the *Institution* of *Civil Government*. It will not follow from hence, that what was agreed to by this part of *Mankind*, did not rightfully conclude all who did thus agree to it. Nor will it follow from thence, that the
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Governours thus Chosen and Submitted to, were not rightful *Governours*, and had not *Authority* to defend this *Society* from all the rest of the World, who should become *Enemies* to it. Now, this is all that is requisite towards the forming and founding this *first Government*, viz. That some Persons should meet, and deliberate, and consent, to transfer the *Right* of *Self-Defense*, formerly lodged in themselves, to a particular Person, or number of Persons. [See Reply to the Lord Bishop of Ex. p. 51.] Just as it was amongst the *Medes*, according to *Herodotus*. After they had cast off the Yoke of the *Persians*, and lived, for some time, in a more confused manner, they found out *Deioces*, a *Wise Man*, famous for *Justice*, and *Integrity*. To him, first his next *Neighbours*, and afterwards multitudes of others from all Parts about him, voluntarily referr'd the *arbitration* of their *Differences*: And after he had obtain'd a still greater Fame for *Justice* and *Wisdom*, they Met, and formally establish'd him for their *Civil Governour*. It is not to be suppos'd that every *Individual Person* concerned, met upon this occasion. But yet here was a *Government* voluntarily settl'd amongst those who did thus meet together. As for those who did not actually appear and Vote, they were either such as, after this was done *voluntarily*, tho' *tacitly*, consented to it, and gladly embrac'd so great an *Happiness*; or such as entred into other Measures for forming another sort of *Government* amongst themselves; or such as were *Enemies* to this procedure, and those who erected this *Government*. Whatever were the *Consequences*; and whoever should *Dissent*, either now, or in *Time* to come; and how few soever actually consented: Here was a *Civil Government* formed, and *Authority* given to *Deioces* against all, who now, or hereafter, should become *Enemies* to this *Society*, which had thus enter'd into *Compact* with him. And thus it is, in some degree, with ourselves
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now, with respect to the *House of Commons* chosen by the *People*. For supposing it impossible that all those who have a Right to chuse *Representatives*, should meet to that purpose, yet *they* who do meet and consent in such particular Persons, have the benefit of this, notwithstanding the *Absence* or *Dissent* of others. *They* who are chosen by *these*, have *Authority* to join in *Legislation*. and in such *Acts* as may preserve them from all who are *Enemies* to them. So that, tho' we are often entertained upon this *Head*, and asked, with a sort of *Triumph*, how it is possible, that all concerned should meet in any one Place to give their *Consent*, and how a *Government* can be formed without their *Consent*, according to this *Scheme*; yet we see how little this *Difficulty* affects the Matter in Dispute. For it need not be; it is not affirm'd; that every *individual Person* concerned, ever actually came to a Meeting and deliberation, in order to the Foundation of *Civil Government*. But there is no difficulty in supposing that some Persons and Families, in the first Ages, as well as the *Medes* afterwards, did agree voluntarily in a particular form of *Civil Government*, the better to preserve the Peace of *Humane Society*. This forms a *Government*, and gives the Persons pitch'd upon for the *Office*, all the Powers necessary for the *Ends* of it. There is no more difficulty in conceiving this to have been the *Case*, in the first *Ages*, than, that it hath actually been the *Case* in several parts of the World, in the *later Ages* of it. But should this be still supposed a *difficulty*; tho' it be so, in Truth, no more than the *agreement* of two *contesting Persons*, to leave the decision of their Quarrel to the *arbitration* of a *Common Friend*, or of any Man of known *Justice*; I add,

3. That even the *Truth* of this Matter of Fact is not necessary to the main part of the *Question* now before us: Which is not so much what was *actually* the *Original* and *Foundation* of *Government*, as what ought

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in Right to have been so. So that even supposing that no one Government in the World was ever actually founded upon the Consent of any Number of People met together, and formally entering into Consultation upon that Matter: yet it may be true, notwithstanding this, that thus it ought to have been; and that nothing can give a Right to any Governors, in the ordinary Course of God's Providence, but this. Force and Fraud may have gotten Possession: and the Happiness of Human Society may induce many to join in the preserving this Possession, rather than run the hazard of greater Evils. But whatever Right there is it cannot come from that Possession only which hath hinderd all previous Deliberation, but must arise from this tacit and suppos'd Consent of the whole Community: unless God himself hath immediately interpos'd in the Case.

And thus we see that, supposing it impossible that there should have been, in the first Ages, Assemblies of all Persons concern'd, in order to vote and form a Government; nay, supposing that no part of *mankind* have ever met for this purpose; yet, it may be true that a Right to Civil Government can result from nothing but the voluntary Consent of the People govern'd, or to be govern'd, unless God think fit to nominate Persons to this Office: and consequently that the Objection before us doth not destroy or annul the Supposition, that the rightful Foundation of Civil Government is the voluntary Compact and Consent of Mankind. Let not therefore any Writers insult and ridicule this Notion upon this Account, till they can shew better Ground for it than they have yet done.

Obj. 5. *There could not be such a State of Independency, and Equality, as this Judgment of Mr. Hooker supposeth necessary to the Rightful Foundation of Civil Government, amongst a Race of Creatures all deriv'd from common Parents, and descending one from another: viz. A State, as a certain Writer describes it, in which no*

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Man in the World had any Dependence upon any other Man; and in which no Man was superior to another, Rehearsal, Numb. 55. And consequently, This Judgment cannot be true. I answer,

1. The Case is not rightly here stated. For no one ever contended, that there was any such State as this, in which no man had any Dependence upon any other man, and in which no man was superior to another. What hope is there of ever coming at Truth, if Men will thus represent their Opponents? Nay, who will be convinc'd of the Falshood of this Opinion of Mr. Hooker's, by such Representations as they know to have no Foundation?

2. The Question here is not, Whether there was ever a State of perfect Independency, and Equality; but whether the Generation of Mankind, one from another, be not perfectly consistent with an Independency, and Equality, with respect to Civil Government. Now, that it is so, is evident, even from the present State of the World. Parents and Children, consider'd as such, are in a State of perfect Independency, and Equality, as far as the Matter of Civil Government is concern'd; both equally under the Laws and Restraints of it. And yet Children owe their Beings to their Parents, next under God, and have a great Dependence upon them, in other things: and they are superior to their Descendants. This shews that there may be a Superiority in some, and Dependency in others, without any regard to Civil Government; with respect to which, they may still be independent upon each other. This shews the Truth, I say, of this Proposition, that the Generation, and Production of Mankind, one from another, is not, of itself, sufficient to shew a Dependency and Inferiority of any, with respect to Civil Government: or, that the Dependency or Inferiority of Children, consider'd by it self, doth not imply in it a Right to Civil Government in those, upon whom they depend as Children. If any reply, that tho' it be not thus now, yet it was so at first

first, in the Case of Adam; I have sufficiently examin'd this in the precedent Chapter. I only add, that if mere Production be the Ground of this; Eve and all succeeding Mothers, must have had an equal Title to Civil Rule over their Children. If Fatherhood, properly so call'd; then all Fathers must have been equal, with respect to their own Children: and this would introduce Independency enough to support Mr. Hooker's Judgment. If it all depend merely upon being the first Man; not to observe, that no Reason can be given, why this pre-eminence should be allow'd, merely on the account of being first; this can be no Advantage to any succeeding Fathers, who at least, upon the first Man's Decease, must have been in a State of independent Equality. If God's immediate Appointment and Institution of the Rights of Primogeniture, be brought in to supply this Defect, this plainly shews that the Production of Mankind, one from another, consider'd by it self, is not sufficient to ward off this State of Independency, and Equality, against which it is produc'd; or to do Service to any one Civil Government, besides the suppos'd Monarchy of Adam, or of Noah. This Dependency therefore, and Inferiority of Men, consider'd as produc'd one after another, may, we see, be perfectly consistent with a State of Independency, and Equality, as far as Civil Government is concern'd.

3. That the Rights and Superiority of Fatherhood, and the Subordination and Obedience of Children, are things very distinct from Civil Rule, and the Submission of Subjects, is, I think, evident from hence: That, supposing a Father King of one Country, and a Son King of another, this Son may pay all the Obedience that is truly filial, all the Respect which his Father can require on account of his Fatherhood, and yet be oblig'd, in Justice to his own Subjects, upon many Occasions, to wage War with his Father, and even divest him of all, or part of his Power, if it threaten Ruin and Desolation to them.

4. Let us suppose that Almighty God himself had reserv'd in his own Hands the Civil Government of Mankind, properly so call'd; or that some good Angel had been appointed to the Office, at the very beginning: yet the Production of Mankind one from another; the Formation of *Eve* out of *Adam*, and the Generation of all others from them, might have been just what they have been. And if they might have been so; then other good Accounts may be given why Almighty God chose to People this World with successive Generations of Men, without recurring to *Adam's* Civil Authority. And if this might have been his Method on other Accounts, and tho' *Adam* himself had had a Civil Governor, properly so call'd, as other Fathers have now, then it is evident that this Method of bringing Mankind into Being, is not, of it self, sufficient to prove, that a Race of Beings, produc'd one of another, might not be independent on one another; and in a State of Equality, with respect to Civil Government, tho' still dependent and unequal in many other Respects.

5. Amongst the *Medes* Mankind, without doubt, was produc'd after the same dependent and subordinate manner: but this did not at all hinder, but that they enter'd, upon equal *Terms*, into *Deliberation* about the Establishment of Civil Government, and founded the Authority of *Deioces*, whom they chose, upon voluntary Consent and Compact. So must it be *whenever* any *Clans* of those poor *Americans*, who live in so confus'd and low a manner, consolidate into large Civil Societies with *common* and *Establish'd* Governors. Nay, whether there be actually any such Companies of Men in being or no who have still their *Right to self-defense* in common, yet if it be but possible that there should be any such, this is sufficient to shew, that there may be a *Race of Creatures dependent* upon and *subordinate* to one another, by being produc'd one of another, and yet independent, with respect to Civil Government,

ment, and equal, as to their *Right*, to transfer their Power, now in common, to any particular Man, or Number of Men.

6. The being produc'd from *Adam*, doth not imply in it, that his *Sons* so produc'd, had not a *Right*, when they came to have Strength and Sense enough, to defend themselves from *Cain*, or any other *common Enemy*, equal to that which he himself had, in this respect. And therefore this alone cannot prove that they were not in a *State of Equality* with him, as to *Civil Government*. For, what *Connexion*, I might ask any Man living, is there, between a Man's being born of such *Persons*, and his not having the same *Right*, which they themselves have, to defend himself, and them, from common Enemies, when he is able. And if there be no *connexion* between these two things; the one cannot possibly follow from the other. And if this one Point be gain'd, here is Ground enough for *voluntary consent, compact, or agreement*. To be born of, and educated by, *another*, supposeth indeed a *Subordination*, and *Inferiority*, implying *Respect*, and *Reverence*: But, who can possibly say, that it implies in it any such thing as this, *viz.* that the Person, so born and educated, hath not a *Right to Self-defense*, equal to that of his *Parents*, or *Educators*? The whole indeed seems to depend upon the *Fallacy* of always understanding *Superiority*, and *Dependency*, in an *unlimited Sense*; or the not being able to comprehend, that *one* who is *Superior*, on some *Accounts*, is not necessarily so, on others; and that *one* who is *dependent* in some respects, is not necessarily so in *all*. But since it must be evident to any one *who will* enter into his own *Thoughts* and *Notions*, that the *Idea* of one's being born of another, is by no means inconsistent with that of having a *Right* in himself to *Self-defense*; it is manifest, that *one* may be born of *another*, and yet have such a *Right* likewise in himself to *Self-defense*, when he grows up, as may put him upon a *level*, in this respect, with the *other*, and give him a

Right to enter, with that other, upon equal Terms, into *Deliberation*, and *Consultation*, how best to carry forwards the *Ends* of *Humane Society*, and to what *Person*, or *Persons*, this *Common Right* to *Self-Defense*, may be transferr'd, for the greater *Security* and *Happiness*.

7. In a word; Either the being the *Sons* of *Adam*, necessarily implies in it a *Right* to *Civil Government* in *Adam* only; or it doth not. If not; then the *Argument* is lost at once. If it doth; then it could not possibly be in the power of *Adam*, or any succeeding *Monarchial Father*, to manumit from his *Civil Subjection*, any of his *Children*. But it is a part of the *Scheme* examin'd in the *foregoing Chapter*, that there was this *Power* in them. And consequently, this *Civil Subjection* cannot be necessarily implied in their *Fatherhood*. For whatever *Right* necessarily results from being a *Father*, cannot be given up by any *Father* upon *Earth*. No *Father* can dissolve the *Obligation* there is upon his *Children* to that degree of *Respect*, and *Honour*, which *Fatherhood* implies in it; no more than He can unmake his own *Relation* to them; no more than he can ordain, that He is not a *Father*, or that they are not *Children*, which is impossible. If therefore *Adam*, by being a *Father*, had necessarily this *Right* solely in himself; it is impossible that He could release any of his *Children*, on any account, from their *Civil Obedience*, any more than he could cease to be their *Father*; the *Rights* inseparable from his *Fatherhood*, being inseparable from *himself*, who was the *Father*; and incommunicable to any other *Person* who was known not to be so. If it be answered, that this results from the *Absolute Power* lodged in *Him* by *God*; I answer, that then the *Argument* is drop'd which is taken merely from *Fatherhood*, and *Childhood*: And likewise, that no *Power*, no not that of *Almighty God* himself, can grant him such an *inconsistent Commission*. The *Power* of the *Supreme Being* reacheth not to *Impossibilities*. A *Man*, remaining a *Man*, cannot be a *Man*, and ano-

another *Creature*, at the same *Time*. A thing cannot be, and not be, at the same individual *Moment*. This would be making nothing of the *Power* of *God*, to suppose that he *Himself* could make things *Consistent*, and *Contradictory* at the same time: And it would be turning every thing into *Scepticism*, and *Uncertainty*. The *Rights* necessarily resulting from *Fatherhood*, therefore cannot be altered, or parted with, by a *Father*, any more than his *Fatherhood*: Neither could the *Supreme Power* of all bring it to pass, that *Adam*, remaining a *Father*, should part with the *Rights* necessarily resulting from his being a *Father*; because this would be to cause *Him* to be a *Father*, and not a *Father*; to be, and not to be, at the same *Time*: Which is the highest *Absurdity*, and *Impossibility*. Thus much for the *Objection*, taken from the *Race* of *Mankind* proceeding successively, from one another, and from *Adam*, the *first Man*.

Obj. 6. But it is asked by many, Where this *Original Contract* is to be seen, upon which *Civil Government* was founded? Why it is not *Printed* for the benefit of *Mankind*; that *Recourse* may be had to it upon all *Occasions*? And many the like *ingenious Questions* are put upon this *Subject*. It is enough to Answer,

1. That when the *Original Commission* given from *Heaven*, at the beginning of the *World*, or immediately after the *Deluge*, is discovered, and laid before us in plain *Characters*, empowering all *Princes* to Rule by their own *Wills*, and raising them above all *Opposition* on any *Account* whatsoever: When this *Divine Commission*, I say, is produced; then it will be time to *Triumph*, because the *first Contract* cannot. But till that time comes, it is as good an *Argument* against any such *Divine Commission* as is contended for, that the *Original* of it is not to be found amongst the *ancient Records*; as it is against *Contract*, and *Compact*; that no *Authentic Draught* of the *Original Contract* between *King* and *People*, can be produced. As to this, therefore, the

two opposite Suppositions are upon a level: unless any one will call the Order of Nature, established by God, in the Superiority of Adam over Eve, and his Children, as an Husband, or Father, by the Name of an express legible Commission, for all the purposes of Civil Government; and this for the use of succeeding Kings; tho' not in the same Circumstances with Adam. This Commission I have examined already: And if People be so easy to be satisfied in this Case, we need not despair of as good consequential Proofs of Contracts, and Compacts.

2. But supposing I could produce the very Conditions of a Compact made in the Days of Adam himself, yet this cannot satisfy the Persons who profess to be seeking after it: Because this could be nothing but an egregious piece of Rebellion, and Arrogance, upon their Principles, who see so plain a Divine Commission to the contrary in the Superiority of the First Father, and the First-Born Sons. Since therefore, the being able to produce such a Contract, can signify nothing to prove the Right there was to enter into it; and since it is impossible to convince these Persons of this Right, even by producing what they call for: it seems equal, with respect to their Cause, whether it can, or cannot be produc'd. And as for the Cause which I am now maintaining.

3. I observe, that the main part of it doth not at all depend upon this matter. For the chief Question is not, whether there was ever such a Contract formally, and actually made: But whether Mankind had not a Right to make it. For if they had; Civil Government, in the ordinary course of things, could be rightfully founded upon nothing else, but this, or what is equivalent to it, a Tacit Consent of the Governed. And since the latter must be of the same effect with the other; this may be sufficient for our present purpose, unless any Persons think fit to call also for the Original Draught of a Tacit Consent.

4. Hero-

4. Herodotus assures us, that the Medes, and Deioces, did in effect, enter into Contract together: And yet all the Conditions of that Contract are no more to be found, than any other. This, we see therefore, is no Argument against the thing itself. And if, in an Age so remote from the beginning, there was a Contract, and that not by any lasting Methods preserv'd in its Form, for the benefit of succeeding Times; how much more might those of the very first Ages be buried in Oblivion, when we can much less suppose that they had any Skill, or Art, of transmitting them to Posterity?

Obj. 7. But the Authority of Civil Governours implies in it a Power of Life and Death; which Power could not be communicated from the whole Community, because it never was in it: and consequently Civil Government cannot rightfully be founded upon Humane Compact, and Voluntary Agreement. Now,

1. Let us consider what this Power of Life, and Death is, which the Magistrate hath in himself. For tho' it may be true that the Ends of Government might possibly be answer'd without Capital Punishments; yet, since it is likewise acknowledg'd to be true that the Magistrate hath a Right to make use of these in some Cases, it must here be debated what this Right contains in it: Because the Objection leads us to enquire, not what is barely sufficient for the Ends of Government, but what that is, which the Magistrate hath Right to do for the compassing those Ends. And all Governments that we know of making use of this Power of Life and Death; or certainly having a Right to do so, upon some Occasions; this Objection cannot be satisfy'd, unless this Power, which the Magistrate may certainly make use of, in some Cases, if He thinks fit, be shewn to contain nothing in it but what the People, whom He governs, have in themselves, supposing them without His, or any other Government. Now the

Power

Power of Life and Death, in the *Supreme Civil Magistrate*, is a *Power* to punish with *Death* the *Enemies* of that *Society* of which he is *Governour*, whose *Lives* are inconsistent with the *Common Security*; or whom so to punish is necessary for the *Preservation* of the *Society*. This *Power* is sometimes exercis'd when, upon a fair hearing, a Man hath been found and prov'd such an *Enemy*: Sometimes it is committed by the *Supreme Magistrate* to a *General*, to be exercis'd against such as are in *Arms*, and profess, and acknowledge themselves *Enemies* to this *Society*, wheresoever He meets with them, without any such *Trial*, or *Deliberation*. This being therefore that *Power of Life and Death*, it is to be enquir'd,

2. Whether this very *Power*, supposing no *Civil Magistrate* settled, doth not reside in the Members of the same *Society*. Let us suppose these Members therefore, thus without *Civil Government*, to be surrounded, threatned, and harass'd by *Robbers*, and *Cutthroats*; I say, They have a *Power* to defend themselves, upon all *Attagues*, against them in such a manner, as to take away their *Lives* in their own *Defense*. This is freely granted by all. And this being founded wholly upon the *Law of Self-Preservation*, the Benefit of which They are allowed to have; whatsoever is necessary to this *Self-Preservation*, must be as lawful for them to do, as to kill a Man who *attaques* them: which is only allowable, because it is necessary to that *End*. Nay, in the *Magistrate* himself, this is only allowable for that *Reason*. They may therefore not only thus defend themselves, when they are actually *attaqued*: But likewise any of them may go out voluntarily against these *Enemies*, so terrible to their *Safety*, and destroy them wherever they meet them, because this is one *Method* of consulting their *Common Safety*. Or, if they take any one of them, they may in a more sedate manner, and without any Signs of *Passion* in an *Assembly* publicly, first prove his *Crimes* upon
Him,

Him, and then put him to *Death* in a place, and manner, which may strike most *Terror* into his *Accomplices*. They may go out against these *Enemies* in a confus'd manner, or they may delegate a *General*, and a chosen Number, to perform this part of *Self-Defense*. They may condemn any of them, and execute them in a *popular* manner; or they may delegate this part to some few of their *Fellow-Members*. The Point is, the taking away the *Life* of an *Enemy*, in order to their *Safety*, and *Preservation*: And whatsoever is necessary for that *Preservation*, being in their *Power*, by the *Will* of their *Creatour*, this thing must be in it; and the several *Methods* of performing this, being equally *Lawful*, and equally justify'd by the *Law of Self-Preservation*, they must be contain'd in their *Right to Self-Defense*, as they are, in the present State of Things, contain'd in the *Magistrate's Right* to defend and preserve the *Community*. Whatever, therefore, is contain'd in this *Right* of the *Magistrate*; remove all Tokens of *Magistracy*, and the same remains in the Members of the *Community*, as certainly as the *Right of Self-Preservation* remains in them. The great difficulty which some conceive in this matter, seems to arise from an apprehension, that this is robbing *Almighty God* of the sole disposal of this *Power of Life and Death*. Whereas this is no more than what is imply'd in *Self-Preservation*, and *Self-Defense*; and what could never come from Him to any *Civil Magistrate*, but because it is necessary for the safety of the *Governed*. It is no more dishonour to *Almighty God* that He should originally give a *People* this *Power*, than that He should give it to one single Man. The one no more derogates from his disposal of this *Power*, than the other: For *Mankind* have it from Him, as they have all their *Powers*. It is His grant, and ought to be so acknowledg'd, when he made them *Rational* and *Sociable Creatures*. The greater *Indignity* is to suppose them void of such *Powers*, when it is manifest,

nifest, in fact, that there have at least been Intervals of Confusion in many Nations. But certainly it is as honourable to Almighty God, (if not more so) to suppose that he gave such a Right to Mankind; as to suppose that he gave it to one certain Man, or one certain Family. And if we consult the plain Declarations of Scripture, it seems that he himself esteem'd it so, when he thought fit openly to promulgate this Law of Self-defense against Murtherers, presently after the Deluge, in such Terms as give all Men equally an Original Title to it; without the least Intimation of his own immediate Interposition to lodge it only in some particular Persons. This Difficulty being remov'd; I hope,

3. I may securely draw up this Argument. The Power of Life and Death, now lodg'd in the Magistrate, is a Power of putting to Death those Enemies whose Lives are inconsistent with the common Security of the People under him. But this Power is imply'd in that Right to Self-preservation, which certainly remains to this People, supposing no Civil Magistrate amongst them. And therefore is such a Power, as might be transferr'd from the Community, and lodg'd by them, in particular Persons, for the more regular Management of Self-defense, and Self-preservation. Concerning this, the Reader may consult the *Reply to the Lord Bishop of Exeter*, p. 39. 40. And an Instance of all this *Herodotus* gives us in the *Medes*, frequently mention'd by me, who transferr'd their common Power to *Deioces*, for their greater Security, and better Defense against the Enemies of Humane Society.

If therefore any one will speak to this Point, let him be so just as to take the whole together. Let him not represent me, as persuading a Man to be hang'd for *Self-preservation*, or the like, which only can serve to hinder Men from seeing where the *Truth* lies. I have indeed said that a Man hath such Power over

over his own Life, as to contract to give it up, when Public Good necessarily calls for it: But I never undertook to answer all the Difficulties of this Question this way. I have declar'd on the contrary, that the chief thing is this, that a People hath such a Power over the Lives of their Enemies, as I have been now describing; and that such an one as is sufficient to found a *Civil Government*. But who ever went about to persuade a *Criminal* to come *voluntarily* to be hang'd, when he could save himself if he would? The Point here, is not to satisfy a Man that he ought not to escape, upon Pain of Eternal Damnation: but to furnish the Magistrate with a sufficient Right to take away his Life, when it is in his Power to do it; even supposing all the Magistratical Rights to be founded upon Compact and Agreement. And therefore the Answer to this must be to prove that a People, suppos'd to be without a Civil Magistrate, have not in themselves that Power of Life and Death over their common Enemies, which the Magistrate now hath. I know not that any one hath advanc'd any Proof against this, unless it be by calling it senseless, best Answer, p. 22. and by endeavouring to bring an *Odium* upon it, by saying, I transcrib'd it from the *Rights of the Christian Church*: tho' the Reader will find it in the *Measures of Submission*, publish'd some time before that Book.

This Matter is indeed handled with great Self-complacency by the *Author* of the aforesaid Answer, from p. 20. to p. 31. which I am willing to consider with much more Seriousness than he is pleas'd to afford me: not designing to contend with him, or any Man else, in *Jest*, and *Raillery*. And 1. He represents me as laying Stress upon this, That *when a Soldier is list-ed, he contracts to expose his Life, as an Argument that a Man hath Power over his own Life*: Whereas, if he had quoted my own Words, which would not have cost him more Pains, the Reader would have seen

seen that I say, that *when a Soldier voluntarily lifts himself, he doth, in effect, contract, &c.* From the Power a Man hath voluntarily to enter into the Service, I argue to such a Power over his own Life, as to contract to give it up for the *Public Good*, at the Command of another. To this he answers, by asking, *Where is this Contract to be found?* And by affirming that *all Governments have absolute Power over the Lives of their Subjects, without asking their Consent.* Two Things which touch not the Point at all. For I say not that there is a written *Contract* between the General and the Soldier. I only say that when a Man voluntarily enters into the Service, he contracts to be subject to the Laws of this Service. And then again, supposing that all Governments may force *their Subjects* into the War, this makes nothing against me, who only say that a Man hath a Power to lift himself voluntarily: which, I hope, is very consistent with the other. What he ought to have prov'd against me was, that there is no such Power in any Man, as this, of voluntarily giving up his Life to Public Good; or, that the voluntary entering into the Service of War, is not, in effect, a voluntary contracting to be subject to the Rules of it. It is of no Importance to this Point, whether there ever was any one Volunter in the World: The Question is, whether a Man hath not a Power to offer himself voluntarily. But to cry out, *wretched Stuff!* after he hath represented me as pleading for a *Deed of Conveyance every Soldier in the Army, to transfer the Power over his Life to my Lord Duke of Marlborough*, is only to shew a readiness, rather to divert his Reader, than to inform those who read his Book, and never look into mine, what it is that I have truly said. In the same Paragraph I speak of a Neighbourhood of Men, whom the Question gives us leave to suppose, without a Civil Governor, surrounded by Robbers, and say that any one of these hath such a Power over his

his own Life, as that he may go out, and sustain the first Onset of them, tho' he were sure to lose it, in order to consult the Preservation of his *Fellows*: and that having this *Power*, he may contract to do that at the Command of another, which he may lawfully do of his own Head. But not one Word is spoken to this by this Author. However this may be, he knows that I laid the chief Stress upon a Power in Men over their Enemies, imply'd in Self-preservation, as I have just now explain'd it.

To this he comes, p. 22. the first thing he advanceth is this, That the taking away another Man's Life, in necessary Self-Defense, is *not the having Power or Authority to dispose of his Life, as I think fit, or to vote it away at my Pleasure.* No, he knows that this is what I am contending against: an Authority which I deny to be in any Earthly Civil Governor. And as he goes on to distinguish between *Power*, as it signifieth *Strength*, or *Might*; and *Power*, as it signifieth *Right*, or *Lawful Authority*; so, he knows, I have often done: and that I deny that any Prince upon Earth hath a Right or Authority to dispose of the Lives of his Subjects as he thinks fit, tho' he may have Power and Strength enough to do it. A Civil Governor, I say, hath Authority and Right to take away the Lives of such Persons as are Enemies to the Safety of the Community, and of such only. A Community, or Neighbourhood of Men, suppos'd without a Civil Governor, have the same Right to vote, and take away the Lives of such Persons. Therefore this Authority may come to that Civil Governor from them.

Let any one compare this with what he here saith, and see which of us it is that banter's Mankind with the Sound of Words only. If he thinks that his Affirmation alone will convince us that Civil Governors have an Authority to do Wrong, and commit Murder, he is mistaken. If he thinks that their having

Power

Power or Strength to do it is sufficient, a Community of Men may have the same Power or Strength for the same Facts. Nor is what I defend, as he would make his Reader believe, *Hobb's State of Nature*, nor the giving a Right to *Injustice*: but the giving a Right to *Self-defense*, and *mutual-defense*, against it. The *Accusation* lies more strongly against those, who speak of *Governors*, as if they had a *Right*, and *Authority* properly so call'd, to do whatever they please.

Secondly, He goes on, p. 23. to argue, *None can have any Authority, but what is given him by some other, except God alone: And therefore, God having not given to Man power over his own Life, or, in his natural State, over the Life of any other Man; consequently, the Power of Life and Death, could never come from the Gift, or Grant of the People in their Natural State.* Here again, by *Authority in Governors*, he is resolv'd to understand, an *absolute arbitrary disposal of the Lives of Subjects*, whether *innocent* or *guilty*, whether the *best* or the *worst* of Men, even of every *individual Life*, if it seem good to them. Whereas, there cannot be in them any such Authority: And it is the highest Indignity to suppose that God could grant it to any. I answer therefore, that tho' this absolute Authority to dispose of Lives cannot come from the People, because I *acknowledge* and *contend* that it can be in no Man, or number of Men, yet Authority to defend the Society against *Enemies*, even to the taking away their Lives, if Necessity be, may come immediately from the Members of this Society, because God hath given to them this Authority of *Self-defense* and *mutual-defense* against *Enemies*. This is an Authority which answers the *Ends of Government*: but an Authority to rage against the *Society* it self, which *Governors* are oblig'd to defend, is something monstrous. It is an *Authority* to defeat the *Ends* for which they have any *Authority*. It is an *Authority* to commit Sin. It is an *Authority* to become greater and more formidable *Enemies* to the Society, than

than any *Enemies*, *Robbers*, or *Murderers* in the World. And therefore sometimes this *Author* himself is contented with saying, that tho' a *Governour* hath not a *Right* given Him, (*i. e.* an *Authority* in my Sense) to act unjustly, or barbarously; to *Murder* his *Subjects*, and lay waste the *Society*; yet his *Decrees* of this sort are to be submitted to, by the Command of *God*, and for fear of greater *Evils*. Now, this is a very different Account of the Matter; and shews us, that an *absolute disposal* of the *Lives* of their *Subjects*, or an *Authority* to do what they please with them, is not always thought to be given to the *Civil Magistrate* by *God*: For to give them antecedently a *Right* to take away Lives unjustly; and to forbid *Resistance* to them, in this *Injustice*, are two very different Things. If therefore they may be supposed *Irresistible*, even in Acts of the highest *Injustice*, without being supposed to have an antecedent *Authority* given them to commit that *Injustice*; then it is plain, that such an *Absolute Authority*, over *Lives*, is not necessarily implied in the *Powers* given to *Princes*; even supposing them *Irresistible* in acting against their *Commission*. It remains therefore, that, notwithstanding this *Argument*, what there is of *Authority* in *Civil Governours* may come immediately from the *People*; because there is not in it that *absolute Power* of *Life* and *Death*, from which alone this *Argument* takes it's force. The *Power* of *Life* and *Death* given to *Governours*, doth not imply in it, according to this *Author* himself in other Places, a *Right* to commit *Murder* upon their good *Subjects*: And therefore is not any thing but what may come immediately from the *Members* of the *Society*; even upon his own *Principles*; as far as his present *Argument* is concerned.

He argues, p. 24. That the *positive Institution* of *God*, is necessary to found *Government*, and invest *Magistrates* with the *Power* of *Life* and *Death*; and that without this, no *Obligation* of *Conscience* can be laid upon any *Man* to submit to any *Government* whatsoever. For no *Man* can

so dispose of his Natural Right, but that He may resume it again, when He sees it reasonable, and necessary to his own Preservation. Agreeable to this is his Ingenious Dialogue between me, and the Hottentote, p. 47. where I am introduced persuading a Man to be Hang'd for Self-preservation; and the Man is made to retract his Compact when it comes to that; and a Man of better Principles is call'd for to persuade him to be Hang'd, for fear He should be Damn'd for endeavouring to escape it. I would to God, for his own sake, that this Writer would seriously consider the Account he hath to give for such a manner of representing and treating me upon this Head. For, 1. I only observ'd, that, in some Instances, as in that of going out against Publick Enemies, men have such power over their Lives, as to offer them to the General Good; and to contract to do it, at the Command of others. 2. I put the stress of the Argument upon the Power the Society hath Originally in itself, over it's Enemies. And therefore, supposing any to repent of the Contract they have made, and to become Public Enemies themselves; the Power, or Authority, to take away their Lives, is deriv'd to the Governour from the remaining Members of the Society, who might do it themselves, were they without such an Establish'd Ruler. To this here is not one Word said. 3. This being so useful an Institution, I have often added, and inculcated, that it is become God's Ordinance, by his bearing Testimony, and adding his express Approbation, to it. Is not Resistance therefore, according to me, Resistance to God? And cannot I tell all, to whom it is proper to speak of it, of his Wrath, and Damnation? And is not here Obligation upon Conscience to submit to Government? But it did not seem fit to him to mention any thing of this. Indeed, 4. I must observe, that I can threaten God's Anger against none but those, against whom I think God hath threatned it; i. e. against such as oppose the Ends of Civil Government. But I cannot tell such as manifestly

make

make Government more useful than it was before, that they shall receive to themselves Damnation, for the sake of the greatest Benefits they could possibly do to a Nation. 5. My Business was not to make any Persons contented to be Hang'd when they can avoid it merely by flying away; which I shall never undertake; or to convince any that it is a damning Sin so to escape it: but to shew, that a Governour hath Authority delegated to him from the Society, to Execute such Public Enemies as He hath in his Power. And against this there is nothing in the Objection. 6. How can a Positive Divine Institution be absolutely necessary for the carrying forwards the Ends of Civil Government, when there have been so many Civil Governments; and these Ends sufficiently answered in multitudes of Nations; which could not possibly have any knowledge of it, supposing there had been such an Institution? But enough of this.

I have formerly said that, supposing no fix'd Civil Government, He would be a Public Benefactor who should kill a Public Enemy. To this He answers, p. 25. That another Man might kill the Executioner, and another Zealot might kill that other Man, and so on. But this is no Reply to this Position of mine. For He who kills one, who is really a Public Enemy, would be a Public Benefactor, notwithstanding this; i. e. notwithstanding that another might have Strength and Wick- edness enough to kill this Benefactor. He forgets here his own Observation, that might, in this Question, signifies might Lawfully, Justly, and Rightfully. Now, He doth not; He cannot say, that it would not be Right, or Just, in this Man to kill a Public Enemy for the Security of himself, and Neighbours; or that it could be Right and Just, in any other to kill this Benefactor. And notwithstanding this Reply, what I have affirmed is as true, as it is, That a Civil Magistrate is a Public Benefactor in killing a Public Enemy, altho' another Man should be so wicked, and unreasonable, as to Murther this Civil Magistrate for his good Deeds.

I am, in the next place, called upon to shew, *When there was no Government in the World*; to which I have already Answer'd amply; and have shewn, that it is not of Importance to the present Question. The *Right to Govern*, properly so call'd, may come from *Consent*; tho' there can be no Time named, when there was no *Government*. Nor doth the granting that there were some always, and every where, in possession of *Government*, hinder the Truth of this, That a Company of Men, suppos'd without *Civil Government*, have in themselves a *Magistratical Authority*. I am likewise told by him, that *Justin the Historian* saith, that in the beginning of Things, the *Government of Nations was in Kings*; for so he should have translated the Words; *i. e.* That the first *Governments* of which He had received any Accounts, were *Monarchical, or Kingly*: For this *Author* will not, I dare say, allow, that *Justin* had any Knowledge, or any Accounts of what was in the Beginning, properly so call'd. But he forgets the main part of that *Sentence*, which declares that these *Kings* were elected for their *Virtues*; and consequently, that there was a *Time* for *Deliberation and Consultation*, before the *Election* of the first.

As for what he tells me, p. 26. of *Adam*, and of *God's* founding a *Civil Government* in Him; I have, in the preceding *Chapter*, amply considered it. Nor is it of Importance, whether there actually be any People in the *World* without an *Established Civil Government*, or not. It is possible there may be some in such a confused State: And I have shewn, that, upon the supposition only of such a State, the *Cause* I am now upon, may be sufficiently defended. But that in Fact there are some such, is, I believe, a Doubt to no one, but this *Author*, and his Followers, when it is for the advantage of their *Cause*, to doubt of it. But he asks, supposing any such, *Whether I would take my Notions of Nature from them*; and goes on in his usual, just, and kind way, to speak of those who love such a State of

Original

Original Freedom; as if I had been pleading and contending for a return to it. Could I think that I had after this manner represented any part of his *Cause*, I would ask his *Pardon* a thousand times. But he knows himself, that I am far from this *Love*; and that there are none, I believe, whom He can name, who do not *abhor* such a State, as much as they pretend to *abhor Tyranny, and Slavery*. He knows that all that I said, with respect to any People in such a State, was, That *Civil Government* could not, in the ordinary course of Things, be settled amongst them, without *Consent, and Compact*; and that they had in themselves the *Power* of guarding against their *Common Enemies*. My *Notions of Nature* I only thus far beg leave to take from them: that by them I may shew what *Authority for Self-Defense, and Mutual Preservation*, is in a company of Men, without a *settled Civil Governour*; and what may be transferr'd from them.

He goes on, p. 29. And because I had said that, *even in a settled Government Men, have an Authority to kill the Attempter, in Case of an Attaque too sudden to be warded off by the Magistrate*; He asks, *What is this to Resisting a Lawful Magistrate?* Just as much truly, as I designed it should be: that is, nothing at all. For any one who reads the *Considerations offer'd to my Lord Bishop of Ex.* will see that I am not speaking of that Matter, but of one very different from it.

In the same Page he argues, That this *Position* of mine, is not sufficient for the foundation of *Government*, because *this Natural Power being only the Right to Self-Defense, in case of sudden and violent Attaques; no more can, according to this, be transferred from the People to the Magistrate than a Right, to defend them in those sudden Attaques, in which they cannot possibly defend them. But what is this to hearing and trying Causes, or executing Malefactors in cool Blood? which is never allow'd to any private Person by any Government.* Now, I. I never made this the *Foundation of Civil Government*: but only observ'd, as I had occasion, that

such

such a *Power* as this remained in *private Persons*, even after a *Civil Government* is supposed to be settled amongst them. This is their *Privilege*, even when they are under other *Governours*. 2. But I now take occasion from hence, to argue, that if, under *Civil Government*, they have in them whatever *Powers* are still necessary to *Self-Defense*, and *Self-Preservation*; certainly, supposing them without *Civil Government*, they have likewise whatever is necessary to the same *Ends*. And more *Powers* being necessary to these *Ends*, in such a *State*, than when they have one who is their settled *Defender* in all ordinary *Cases*; they must be allowed to have all that is necessary for those *Purposes* in themselves. And this by the *Will of God*, who cannot be supposed to have denied them any thing necessary to their *Self-Preservation*. Now, it is as necessary for their *Defense*, and *Safety*, in such a *State*, that they should have a *Power* to Try, and Kill a *Malefactor*, or *Public Enemy*, even in *cool Blood*, and for a *Terror* to others; as it is, that a *Magistrate* in any settled *Form of Government*, should have this *Power*. And consequently there is no Reason to be assigned, why this *Power* should not be allowed them, supposing them, in that *State*; as well as the *Right* to kill one who Attacks them, when they are under *Civil Government*, and the *Magistrate* cannot interpose time enough. The *Powers* both equally result from the *Right of Self-Preservation*, and *Self-Defense*; and have nothing implied in them, but this *Right*. The *Reason* why a *Private Man*, under *Civil Government*, is not allowed to act so in other *Cases*, is, because another can defend Him, with more advantage to the *Common Peace* and *Happiness*. The *Reason* why it is allowed Him in such a *Case of Exigence*, is, because He cannot be defended by the *Magistrate*. If therefore, in other *Cases*, He were equally without help from the *Magistrate*, He would have equal *Right* to whatever is necessary for his *Defense*. And in such a *State* as we now suppose, the *People*, being

ing without one *Common Defender* to order every thing necessary for their *Preservation*, must have in themselves a *Right* to every thing necessary to that *Preservation*; whether the *Attques* of their *Enemies* be sudden, and violent, or not. In *Cases* in which the *Magistrate* cannot, in the present *State of Things*, interpose: in these *Cases*, I say, the *People* may be considered as wholly without *Magistrates*. And, we see, it follows immediately, that they have a *Natural Right* to do that for themselves, which the *Magistrate* should do, if He could. Now, in a *State*, in which no *Civil Magistrate* is supposed, they are in all *Cases*, just as, on the contrary Supposition, they are in this one: *i. e.* without a *Common Defender*. And consequently, as in this *Case*, in which they are still without a *Magistrate*, they are allowed a *Natural Right* to whatever is necessary for their *Self-Defense*; so, in the other *State*, being in all *Cases* without a *Civil Magistrate*, they have a *Natural Right* in all *Cases*, to whatever is necessary to their *Defense*, and *Security*: and having it, may transfer it to another. As, therefore, it is inconsistent with the *Notion* of an *Established Civil Governour*, That *Private Men* should have a *Power* to Try and Execute *Malefactors*; so is it inconsistent with the Supposition of *No Established Civil Governour*, that they should not have this *Power*. But whether this *Power* be exerted in *cool Blood*, or in *hot Blood*, is of no importance to the *Cause*. In *Cases*, in which a *Man's Life* is not in *Danger*, He is no more allowed, under *Civil Government*, to kill another in *hot Blood*, than in *cool Blood*. On the other side, should a *Magistrate*, or *Executioner*, Try, and Execute always in *hot Blood*, and in a *Passion*, against *Public Enemies*; he would not cease, by this, to be a *Magistrate*: any more than a *Regular Military Officer* ceaseth to be such for fighting with the *Enemies* of his *Country* in *hot Blood*, or a *Passion of Zeal*. Again, whether a *Company of Men*, without *Civil Government*, having gotten a *Common Enemy*

Enemy into their Hands, immediately, in hot Blood, Execute Him, as *Magistrates* under some Forms of Government, at this Day, do; or bring Him to a Trial in an *Assembly*; ask him *Questions* by turns; receive what *Witnesses* have to say; and then by a *Majority* of *Votes* condemn Him: It toucheth not the Point; which is only this, whether they have a *Right* to do whatsoever is necessary to their own *Defense*, and *Preservation*. They have as much *Right* to do the former, as the *Emperor* of *Morocco* hath; and as much *Right* to take the latter Method, as any of the most *Civiliz'd* Governments in the World now have. I say, they have a *Right* to either of these Methods, supposing them without *Civil Governours*: But do not let any one take occasion from hence to represent me as pleading for such an *unhappy disorderly State*. I shall only add here, That it is in the most *civiliz'd Nations*, that *Persons accused* of the greatest *Crimes* are tried the most sedately, and in the *coolest Blood*; and that this is so far from being the *Privilege* of the *Magistrate*, that it must be accounted properly the *Privilege* of the *People* under Him, by all who consider that the great *End* of this is, that the *Innocent Subject* may not, in a *Passion*, be Executed as a *guilty Delinquent*; but that the *Guilt* may openly appear to the whole *Community*, before the *Punishment* be ordained, and inflicted; and that *Innocence* may have time allowed to prepare it's *Defense*. This is rather a *Fence* against *Arbitrary Power*, in it's Original Design, and a *Privilege* of the *Governed*, than a *Right* properly so called, of the *Governour*. And this *Writer*, of all Men, should not talk so much of *cool Blood*, because, according to his *Scheme*, a *King* need not fear *Humane restraint*, should he, in one *hot Fit*, ordain the *Devastation* and *Destruction* of the *whole Nation* under Him. The result of the whole is this, That, tho' under a *Civil Government*, *Private Men* have Power over the *Lives* of their *Enemies*, only in *Cases* in which the *Magistrate* cannot interpose, yet,

yet, this is not their whole *natural Power*; and that, in a *State* without any particular *Civil Governour*, the *People* must have in themselves all other *Powers* necessary to their *Self-Defense*; even all that a *Magistrate* hath now, tho' they cannot be exerted in the same *Form*, and *Order*: and that consequently they may devolve these *Powers* upon a particular Person. And accordingly we find, that to the *Magistrate* are communicated and entrusted, all *Powers* necessary for their *Defense*, in those *Cases*, in which *He* can be at Hand to defend them: but that in themselves still remain the *Powers* necessary to their *Self-preservation*, in those *Cases* in which he cannot be Appealed to. From whence it is evident, that, supposing no one *Capital Case*, in which he could be appealed to; the whole *Power* over the *Lives* of their *Enemies*, in all *Cases*, must of necessity belong to the *People*, as well as the *Power*, in one *Case* out of his reach: and this by the *Original Grant* of *Almighty God*, in the Great Law of *Self-preservation*. For from that results all this *Power*, or *Authority*, whether it be in the *Magistrate*, or the *People*. The *Magistrate* hath no more than what is necessary for their *Preservation*, and *Defense*; and *They* themselves have as much as is necessary to that, supposing them either with, or without a *Magistrate*. If we suppose them with a *Magistrate* set over them; they have a *Power* to *Defend* themselves, when he can't do it: And this is all that is necessary, because in *other Cases* he is their *Defender*. If we suppose them without a *Civil Magistrate*; they have still a *Power*, in all *Cases*, sufficient for their *Self-preservation*, and *Mutual Defense*.

But p. 30. I am told, that *Self-Defense* against those who have no *Authority*, is no *Authority* at all. I confess, I know not what *He* here means by *Authority*: Nor am I willing to dispute with Him about Words. If any one attacks the *Magistrate* himself; the *Attacker* hath no *Authority*. But hath the *Magistrate*, therefore, no *Authority* against

against Him, in his own *Defense*? So, if any one wrongfully *attaques* another's Life; this other hath an *Authority* to defend it, given him by *God*, against this Man who hath no *Authority* to *attaque* it: An *Authority*, in *Case* the *Magistrate* cannot interpose, exactly parallel, and of the same effect with the *Magistrates Authority*, could He interpose; and should He, in the Conflict, take away the Life of the *Aggressor*. But if He had rather call this a *Right*; He knows, I understand the word so; and that it is sufficient for my purpose, and indeed the very same thing, if the *People*, without a *Civil Magistrate*, have a *Right* to do all those things for their own Preservation; which, in *Civil Governments*, the *Magistrate* hath a *Right* to do, for their common *Safety*.

Page 50. after a great excess of *Wit*, and *Raillery*, He comes again to the Subject, and argues against me thus. *There is no Authority but from God*. And again, *All Authority is dependent, and subject to them who gave it*. Therefore it is impossible for any to give *Authority over himself*. Because such *Authority must be for ever subject to him*. And consequently is no *Authority over Him*. But, I. I have often enough said, that this very *Authority* came from *God* to the *People*; that He is the *Fountain* of all, in this method, as well as the other: And therefore it is a very partial way of proceeding, to argue as if this *Scheme* set up an *Authority* independent upon *God*: and looks as if Men were resolved not to represent the whole of any thing, which is against themselves. It is true that *God* is the *Fountain* of all *Knowledge*: But doth it therefore follow that it is to set up another *God*, to say that *Knowledge* may be communicated from one Man to another. So, *God* is the *Fountain* of all *Authority*: But doth it therefore follow, that He might not lodge this at first, in Men, to be transferr'd to the *Magistrate*, as they should find requisite for the *Common Good*? Or, is it to set up another *God*, to say that
Civil

Civil Authority was transfer'd immediately by the *People*; tho' originally given by *God* to them, and always dependent upon him? The *Question* is not whether *God* be not the *Fountain* of it: but whether the great *Creator* did not see fit to lodge it first in common, so as that it might be transferr'd by Mankind to *Governours*. And let me tell this Author, that as, in his *Scheme*, He doth not set up another *God*, by making the *Subordinate Magistrates* receive their *Authority* from the *Supreme*, and not from *God* immediately; so, in the other, it may be affirmed, without incurring the Guilt of such a *Crime*, that Mankind, in common, first receiv'd *Authority* from *God* for *Self Defense*, and afterwards communicated it to *Governours*: But,

2. Because He saith that no one can give *Authority* over himself, (tho' it is plain that every one, who voluntarily goes into the *Army*, doth knowingly contract that another shall have *Authority* over Him, for all the purposes of *War*;) I, therefore, again must remind the *Reader*, that the Matter was not put upon this; but upon a Company of Men having a *Right* to defend themselves against all *Enemies* to their *Common Quiet*, and *Interest*; and transferring this to one, or a few, for the better and more effectual exerting this *Right*, and establishing their *Security*: As I have just now, at large, explain'd and defended it. What follows, about a *Last Resort* in *Government*, hath been sufficiently answer'd, in the foregoing *Chapter*, p. 26. &c. as his talk, about the Folly of allowing a *Judgment* to the *People*, hath been, long ago, in the *Measures of Submission*, p. 165. tho' not the least notice hath ever been taken of it. I have endeavour'd to separate from the rest of that Book what is said in it concerning the *Original* of *Civil Government*; and here, in its proper Place, have examin'd it: that so, all relating to that *Subject* may appear at one View.

I now come to such *Objections* against Mr. *Hooker's* Judgment concerning the *Original* of *Civil Government*,

ment, as are taken from *Scripture*; and the *Expressions*, in some places, made use of, by the *Sacred Writers*.

Obj. 8. It is said, by some, that Kings are call'd, the Lords anointed, but never the anointed of the People: Therefore the People did not make them. Reh. Numb. 54. But,

1. Who ever contended that *Saul*, or *David*, or *Solomon*, were chosen by the *People*? Or that *Almighty God* might never interpose to nominate a *King*? Or that the *People* chose those whom *God* himself chose to reign over *Judah*? Or that the *Succession* in that *Kingdom*, was not settled by *God* himself; And what therefore is this to the first *Civil Governments*? What is this to all the other *Nations* of the *World*, with respect to whom this *Enquiry* is chiefly made?

2. It happens unluckily that this *Form of Expression* should be us'd by *David* himself, of the *House of Judah*, *2 Sam. 2. 7.* where he sends *Messengers* to the Men of *Jabesh-gilead*, with these Words, *The House of Judah have anointed me King over them.* So that *David* acknowledges himself, in effect, the *Anointed of the People*, as well as the *Anointed of the Lord*. From hence it is evident to those who make this *Objection*, that that *Form of Expression* alone cannot determine this *Point*, because it is us'd both of *God*, and of the *People*.

3. The same *Objector* is often speaking of the other *Kingdom of Israel*, as an *Elective Kingdom* contrary to the *Will of God*. Now the *Kings of Israel* were either the *Anointed of the Lord*; or not. If they were; then that *Appellation* will not prove so much as an agreeableness to his *Will*. If not; then it is manifest, this *Expression* was us'd properly, only with respect to that one *Kingdom* in which He had settled the *Succession*; and can prove nothing, but that the *Succession* in that *Kingdom* was not the appointment of the *People*: Which no one ever said it was.

4. The

4. The *Kings of the Nations*, round about, are not throughout the *History of the Bible* call'd the *Anointed of the Lord*; but spoken of in another manner; as any one may see, by reading those *Parts of the Historical Books*, in which they are mention'd: Which is a strong *Argument* against the very purpose for which this is here alleg'd. For this shews that *God* had not interpos'd in other *Nations*, as He had in that of *Judah*; and that the *Kings of Judah* were distinguish'd from other *Kings*, as well as from their own *Subjects*, by being the *Anointed of the Lord*. This *Appellation* being peculiarly given to them, doth, I say, more strongly imply, that other *Kings* were originally the *Anointed of the People*, than the contrary. Others indeed may be call'd the *Anointed of the Lord*, as approv'd of by *Him* in the execution of an useful *Office*. But we are speaking now of the *Original*, and *Ground* of this *Title*: which, I say, was not to speak any thing in favour of the *Kings of other Nations*; but to distinguish the *Kings of Judah* from them. And consequently this rather hurts, than helps the *Cause* it is design'd to support.

5. *Cyrus* is indeed call'd by *God*, *His Anointed*, *Isa. 45. 1.* but not consider'd as a *King*; but as that word is frequently us'd of such *Persons* as are pitch'd upon by *Him*, to be the *Instruments* of his *Providence* in some great *Event*. *Anointed*, signifieth, design'd, and pitch'd upon by *Him* for some great *Work*: As great *Prophets*, and others besides *Kings* are his *Anointed*. So here, *Cyrus* is his *Anointed*, in opposition to other *Kings*, whose *Strength* *God* declares shall be loosed before *Him*, in the same *Vers*e. From whence it is evident that this *Title* was not given *Him* merely as He was a *King*; but as He was the *Man*, chosen by his *Providence* for a signal, and wonderful *Event*. This likewise helps to prove, that nothing can be argued from this *Expression* in favour of *Kings*, and *Civil Governours*, in general; because this is spoken here to distinguish

distinguish *Cyrus* from other *Civil Governours*; and not spoken of *Him*, with the least regard to the *Government* of his own *People*, (which according to this Argument it ought to have been;) but with respect to something in which He was to be the *Instrument* of *Providence* to others. He was thus call'd, not as *King* of his own *People*; but for *Jacob my Servant's sake, and Israel mine Elect*, saith *God* himself, *v. 4.* It is evident therefore, that this Expression is not us'd of any *other Kings*, as it is of those of *Judah*; that it's being us'd of those can only signify *God's* peculiar interposition in that *Kingdom*: But doth not shew either the Powers given to *them*; or any thing with respect to *other Kings*, unless it be that *God* never interpos'd in their Case, as He did in the other, and consequently that they are originally *the Anointed of the People*, rather than the contrary.

Obj. 9. The same Author argues, Magistrates are call'd Gods: And can the People create Gods? Reb. Num. 54.

I could not have believ'd any one capable of arguing after this manner, had I not seen it. But I suppose, it would be complain'd of, if no notice were taken even of this. The *People*, it is true, cannot create Gods: But they may Elect, and give Power to *Magistrates*, who are not *Gods*; but only call'd so, on the account of the usefulness of their *Office*. It is not in the Power of *Almighty God* himself, to create *Gods*: Because the being *Created*, and the being *God*, are as inconsistent, as to be, and not to be, at the same time. And by the same *Argument* He himself may be excluded from the creation of *Magistrates*. So that this Argument descends so low, as to play with the Words, *Create*, and *Gods*: And it is indeed descending too low, to pretend to answer it. One would think that this *Author* had work'd himself up into a belief that *Magistrates* are *Gods*, properly so call'd. As for their being

being call'd so; that can no more prove that the *People* cannot constitute and appoint them, than the calling the *Idols* of the *Heathen, Gods*, will prove that they were not made with Hands. But what doth this *Author* think of *Elective Kingdoms*, not approv'd, as He saith, by *God*? Are not the *Magistrates* in them call'd *Gods*? And yet, do not the *People* nominate, and appoint them to that *Office*? But, after all, it is unhappy to his *Cause*, that, in the place where they are call'd *Gods*, it is manifest that the *Supreme Monarch* is not spoken of, but *Judges* of an inferior, and subordinate Rank: And consequently, that this Expression is no *Argument* against the *People's* part in this Affair, because They can certainly create *Gods*, as well as any Man whatsoever. And therefore, if *subordinate Magistrates*, made by a Man, may be call'd *Gods*: Certainly they who are call'd *Gods*, may be made, instituted, and appointed by the *People*. But too much of this: Which may be comprehended in one Word, that the being call'd *Gods*, arises from their Godlike Office; and that all the Powers necessary to an useful, and god-like Office, may be derived from the *People*.

Object. 10. St. Paul's affirming the Powers that be to be ordain'd of God, is declared to be inconsistent with this Judgment of Mr. Hooker concerning the Original of Civil Government.

1. I have shewn upon several Occasions, and it is allow'd by all, and contended for, in some Cases, by the greatest *Enemies* of this *Scheme*, that things are said to be ordain'd of *God* in *Scripture-Language*, which he sees fit barely to permit. How much more such a matter as *Civil Government*, the usefulness of which makes Him highly to approve it? And since another account may be given of this, there can no Argument be drawn from this Expression. The *Reader* may see this matter fully handled, in the *Reply* to the *Lord Bishop of Exeter*, p. 42, 43, 44, 45, 46. Every thing that

that results from Reason, comes from God, and is ordain'd of Him: And therefore the supposition that the Authority lodg'd in the Civil Magistrate, may be the result of Thought, and Deliberation, doth not at all contradict the Apostles declaring it to be ordain'd of God. But it is not fit to be always repeating these Things.

2. The Author of the Best Answer, and those of his Principles, can never urge this, with respect to Kings, or Emperours, in general; because no Form is, according to his Scheme, the ordinance of God, but that of a lineal Succession in the Male-line; and no Princes are ordain'd of God, but such as succeed exactly according to that appointment. When He therefore can shew how any Queen in the World; or how any King, or Emperour, not succeeding by right of Primogeniture, ever was, or can be, ordain'd of God, when they are not so much as approv'd of by Him, if we believe him; then I will shew how much more properly the Institution of Civil Government may be call'd his Ordinance, on account of his approbation, altho' it be immediately owing to the People. By his Principles many, even of the Roman Emperours, must be cut off from all benefit by this Expression; of whom, He saith, it was principally meant; unless He will allow an Interpretation of the Phrase, lower than the strictest and highest Sense of the Words. And if He allows of such an Interpretation; this is enough for my Purpose: which is to shew that this Expression contradicts not the Notion I am now defending.

3. I argue, on the other side, from St. Peter's calling Kings an Humane Ordinance, or Humane appointment. For if others will say that, ordain'd of God, signifieth that the Institution, or Commission of Princes is from Him immediately; why may not I, as reasonably, maintain that Humane Ordinance signifieth that their Institution, and Commission is from Men? If the Sound of Words be so strong in one place, why must no account be had of it in another? Nay, I will add that

that this Expression affords a much stronger Argument one way, than St. Pauls doth the other way. For, supposing the Institution, originally from the People; yet the usual Figurative way of Scripture Expression allows that it may be said to be ordain'd of God, as it is highly approv'd by Him: But, supposing it the Institution, and immediate appointment of God; it is contrary to all the known ways of speaking, for St. Peter to call Governours, an Humane Ordinance; and to plead for subjection to this Humane Ordinance, for the Lord's Sake, as to an useful thing, highly well-pleasing, and agreeable to his Will. I know, it is said by some, that they may be so called on other accounts; and not because St. Peter thought the Institution, or Commission, of Governours to be immediately of Humane Original. And I, who do not pretend to settle the Foundation of Government upon this single Expression, only desire that it may, on the other side, be granted that St. Paul might use the Expression, ordain'd of God, upon other accounts; and not because He thought their Institution and Commission immediately from God. All that I desire is, that his Expression may not be confin'd to one Sense, when it is possible (I add likewise, probable) that He might mean it in another, by those who will not let St. Peter's Expression be confin'd to a Sense they dislike, because He might possibly, or, as they think probably, mean it in another. The Cases being Parallel; the same proceeding may be justly expected in one, which they think proper in the other. But if any will affirm, with the Ingenious Dr. Atterbury in his Latin Sermon, p. 23. that Magistrates are call'd by St. Peter an Humane Ordinance, because very often their Authority is given to them, upon the Consent of Men, or upon the People's Nomination of them to the Office; or because this Authority is portion'd out to Governours in differing manner and measure, as Men see fit; or because this Authority is exercis'd by Men, upon Men; or on account of its being design'd for the use of Men: But that if the Enquiry be, from whence they have their Authority, we must of necessity confess, that, according to St. Paul, they are truly the very Ordinance of God himself. I say, if any one think fit positively to affirm this, I think it a full answer to affirm, on the other side, That St. Paul doth very properly style Magistrates the Ordinance of God, because their Office is so highly approv'd of by Him: But that if the Enquiry be,

be, from whence immediately came their Commission, and Institution, we must, of necessity, confess that, according to St. Peter, they are, both Supreme, and Subordinate, an Humane Ordinance. I add likewise, that the two first of these Reasons cannot take place here, because St. Peter is speaking more particularly of one Form of Government; of the Emperor, and the Roman Proconsuls; who are the Humane Ordinance, He speaks of: and likewise because He is speaking of Governours, consider'd as vested with Authority for their Office, not with the least view to the manner of their coming to that Office. That the third Reason cannot take place, is evident from hence, that Paternal Authority is exercis'd by Men over Men: and yet nothing would be more improper than to call it an Humane Ordinance. So likewise no other Authority, equally of Divine Original, can be, on this account, call'd an Humane Ordinance: especially when a Writer is pressing Subjection to it; and consequently hath most occasion to exalt it. That the fourth Reason is no better, is evident from hence, that the design of our Saviour's Incarnation, and the great work of Redemption was the Good of Mankind, and yet who would call it absolutely an Humane Ordinance upon that account? So likewise, if Government, and governing Authority, were the Institution, and immediate Gift of God to Magistrates; who would call this absolutely an Humane Ordinance, merely because the Good of Men was aim'd at in it? This may shew that these Reasons will not account for St. Peter's calling Governours an Humane Ordinance, supposing Him to have been of the Mind of some Modern Authors. But the ground of my mentioning this Expression of his, is, as I have said, that those who will not permit others to insist so much upon the Form of Expression us'd by St. Peter, may be induced not to insist themselves upon the Form of Expression us'd by St. Paul.

Object. 11. Taken from that Expression, Prov. 8. 15. By me Kings Reign, is consider'd in the Reply to the Lord Bishop of Exeter, p. 46. And any one who reads that Verse, together with the rest of the Chapter, will find that the Sense of it is only this, That Wisdom is the Rule, and Guide of Government, to just Governours; or something equivalent. And this toucheth not the Cause we are now upon, viz. the Original, and Institution of Civil Government.

Obj.

Obj. 12. Magistrates are call'd Gods, Psal. 82. 6. And our Lord himself, Joh. 10. 34. saith, That this is because the Word of God came to them, i. e. because, being call'd forth by his Command, and set over Nations, they are, as it were, in his place, &c. as it is explain'd by Dr. Atterbury in his Latin Sermon, p. 22.

1. I have already observ'd that the managing a most useful, and godlike Office in the World, is sufficient Ground for this Appellation: As the being a Benefactor hath often, by a figure of Speech, been call'd the being a God.

2. That this is the meaning of that Phrase of the Word of God coming to them, is by no means certain: and therefore nothing can certainly be argued from it.

3. Supposing the Words had been more plain and that Magistrates had been said to be call'd forth by Him; We know that to Him is attributed, in Scripture, whatever comes to pass under his inspection, especially if it be approv'd by Him. And therefore nothing could be collected from this Expression: Since, supposing that the People had the Power lodg'd in themselves by God at first, and afterwards communicated it to the Magistrate, He might still, in the Scripture-Phrase, be said to be call'd forth to his Office by God; as He might be, in the Apostle's Phrase, to be ordain'd of God.

4. What, I think, renders this Objection utterly Vain, is this, that the Words in the Psalm are us'd of Judges of an Inferior Nature, who are exhorted to do Justice; and not of the Supreme Magistrate, or King: And therefore cannot be apply'd to prove the Magistratical Authority to be immediately from God; because they are us'd of such Officers, as are allow'd not to have their Powers so communicated to them.

Obj. 13: The Apostle calls God the Only Potentate, 1 Tim. 6. 15. and this in the same Sense, in which He styles Him the Only Immortal: Which shews that as to Him is to be referr'd the Original of that Immortality by which Men excel Beasts; so likewise, of that Power by which Kings rule over Men. This is, very probably, the meaning of St. Paul's Words: And to this Sense of them Irenæus and Tertullian seem to have had their Eye. At the same God's Command, Kings are set up, at whose Command Men are Born, saith the Interpreter of Irenæus,

næus, *Lib. 5. Cap. 24.* And thence, saith Tertullian, is the *Emperour*, whence was the Man before He was *Emperour*: Thence comes his *Power*, whence came his *Spirit*. *Apol. Cap. 30.* The Authority and Commission of Princes ought not therefore to be supposed to come immediately from Men. This I find alleg'd to this purpose by Dr. Atterbury in his *Latin Sermon*, p. 22. 23.

1. It is very unhappy that *Irenæus* may not argue against the *Devil's Power* to dispose of the *Kingdoms* of this *World*, as He professeth in that place to do; and assert the *Government of God*, and his providential disposal of them; without being supposed to concern himself with the *immediate Original of Magistratical Authority*. And it is as unhappy that *Tertullian* may not say, that the *Emperour* owes his being in *Power* to the *Providence of God*, as well as the *Man*, his *Life*; without being presently made an *Arbitrator* in the same *Question*.

2. The general ways of speaking then in use in other Cases, will shew any one that they cannot, in reason, be supposed to mean these Sayings in the *Sense*, in which this *Author* is pleas'd to understand them. For Instance, had *Irenæus* or *Tertullian*, been speaking of *Wise Men*; they would not have scrupled to have said, that *Wise Men* are from *God*; or that *Wisdom* comes from the same Place, and Being, whence the *Spirit of Man* came; and the like. This, I say, is a manner of speaking us'd without scruple, where the *Subject* doth not lead *Writers* to be more particular: And without any thought of intimating by it, that there is no *Wisdom*, or *Knowledge*, in the *World*, but what comes from immediate inspiration. So, in the *Case* before us, it may very well be said, that the *Power of Magistrates* is from *God*, without intending thereby that it is *immediately* communicated from Him; and not by means of other Men. This may suffice for what concerns *Irenæus* and *Tertullian*, supposing them not to have respect to the *Words of the Apostle*: as it doth not at all appear that they had. And supposing they had; they leave the *Words* as *general* as they found them, and affix no *Interpretation* upon them contrary to the *Position* which I am now defending. And,

3. They are neither of them, in the *Passages*, considering *Man as Immortal*; but as a *Living Creature*, born into this *World*: and are only saying, that as no *Man* is born into

into the *World* but under the inspection and direction of *God*; so no one is possess'd of *Rule and Government*, but under the same *Providence*, and not according to the arbitrary disposal of any other Being. The *Parallel* therefore is not drawn by them between the manner of the rational *Soul's* infusion or conjunction with the *Body*, by the immediate interposition of *God*; and the same *immediate* infusion of *Authority* into *Princes*: But between the over-ruling of the *Will of God*, as to the *Man's Birth*, and the *Emperor's* being possess'd of *Power or Government*. The *Word Spiritus* here signifieth *Life*; and not the *Soul* considered as *Immortal*. And whoever considers that, in this same Chapter. *Tertullian* is representing the *Prayers of Christians* to be all alike, with respect to all *Emperors*, will not easily think that he is speaking here, either of their *Right to Government*, properly so call'd; or introducing *God* as giving an *immediate Commission* equally to all. On the contrary, his design is to put them in mind, in order to *depress*, and not *exalt* them; that, tho' the *Emperor* was possess'd of more *Humane Strength*, and *Power* than any that was known upon *Earth*, yet *God* was more powerful: Nay, that he could no more have been brought to such a high Station, than he could have been brought into *Life*, unless it had seem'd fit to *Almighty God*. It doth not appear that his *Thoughts* were at all upon *Right, or Authority*, properly so call'd; or that he was led by his *Subject* to enter into the Matter of the *immediate Original of Civil Government*. Here is nothing but the ascribing to *Providence* the *Government of the World*: Nothing but what *Mr. Hooker*, or any one of the same *Principles*, might have said upon the like occasion: And therefore nothing but what these *Fathers* might have said, had they thought the *immediate Original of Civil Authority* to have been *Humane*.

4. Nor is there any doubt but that they meant the same promiscuously of all *Governours*, actually possess'd of *Power*, by what means soever obtain'd: which will wholly hinder the application to a *legitimate and regular Authority*. But, the great Point is, what *St. Paul* meant by that Phrase. And therefore,

5. Let any one but consider that the *Word Dominus*, used by him, hath no relation to *Right, or Authority*, properly so call'd, or *Commission*; but to *Power, or Strength*: And it will appear

appear that the Apostle could not have chosen this Word, had he had in view what is here laid upon Him: Indeed, He explains himself, adding the *Lord of Lords, and King of Kings*; and shews that he meant to ascribe to Him, a *Strength and Power* above the greatest *Earthly Power*; and in a perfect and absolute degree. The only *Powerful* therefore, is the only Being who deserves truly to be called *Powerful*, who hath none to restrain him; whereas, all other *Powerful Beings* are under Him. But what is this to the method by which a *Right to Govern*, or an *Authority in Governing*, is dispensed to *Princes*?

6. Thus likewise, *who only hath Immortality*, signifieth, that he only deserves that Title; all other *Beings* being only *Immortal* in a less perfect Sense: And this Phrase might be used of Him, whether he immediately infuse *Immortality* for the Time to come into all *Beings*; or it could be communicated from one to another, by a Law, and Order, laid down by Him.

7. Thus *God* is said in several Places, to be, *the only Wise, the only Good, the only Holy*; because he only deserves properly these Names, who is perfectly and without defect so: But this not so as that every degree of *Wisdom, Goodness, or Holiness*, is immediately infused by Him. It is enough that those Faculties which lead to any of these, are His Gift, and Originally owing to him, So likewise,

8. In the *Case of Government*, it is enough that Mankind had all their Powers from Him Originally; to entitle Him to the name of the *Fountain*, and *Author* of them all. And supposing that *St. Paul* meant, which he did not, to make Him the *Fountain of Magistratical Authority*; it would not at all appear from hence, that he meant to deny his making use of intermediate Means to convey this to *Magistrates*. It is true, as well upon supposition of his lodging those Powers in *Mankind* first, to be by them transferr'd to *Governours*, as upon supposition of his immediate communication of them to every particular *Prince* in the World. We see the same way of Expression exactly, is used in those Instances, in which there is no immediate communication supposed. And therefore nothing can be argued merely from such Expressions: especially where the *Writer* cannot be supposed to have any Thoughts of accurately handling such a Point of Controversy. One thing I must here again take Notice of, that this *Writer* as well

well as others, speaks as if the Position I am now defending, robb'd Almighty God of his Title to the Original of the Magistrate's Authority: Whereas he is equally the Original of it, whether he first lodg'd it more in common, and left the Communication of it to particular Persons, to be the result of Reason and Deliberation; or himself immediately gave it to those particular Persons. As he is equally the Original of all Wisdom, whether he endow'd Men with Faculties leading to it; or immediately infuseth it into every individual Person, who hath any degree of it. So likewise they argue, as if it cannot be the Ordinance of God, unless it be immediately, and, without the Intervention of Men, appointed by him: Whereas, its being the Result of Reason, and Judgment, and certainly intitled to his well-liking, makes it as truly his Ordinance, who endow'd Men with the Faculties leading to it, and cannot but add to it the Confirmation of his Divine Will, and Approbation.

C O N C L U S I O N .

Thus have I gone through all the *Objections* which I have met with against Mr. Hooker's Judgment, concerning the immediate Original of Civil Government, and of the Authority of *Magistrates*. I might indeed have deduc'd the Truth of it, as a *Consequence*, from what hath been said in the foregoing Chapter, against that immediate Divine Institution, which is maintain'd by some. For having answer'd the Arguments upon which that is built; it remains, that if that be void of all Proof, the contrary must be true. But I was willing to spare no Pains, in order to remove all suppos'd Difficulties from this Judgment of Mr. Hooker; that it might appear as free from all Contradictions, and all Absurdities, as it really is. I might here produce a long Catalogue of as great Names as ever were known, for Sense and Learning, in favour of what I have here defended. But I desire to stand, or fall, by Reason, and Evidence; not by Prejudice, and Authority. That Great Man, under whose Name, I here propose, to my Brethren of the Clergy, in a particular manner, that Judgment which is the Subject of this Chapter, made choice of this Scheme, not only as the Truth, but as fit to be openly declar'd; and as fully sufficient for his purpose, when he

was

was professedly going to establish the Authority of Govern-
 nors. And whoever considers the Matter impartially, will
 easily find, that there is nothing wanting in it towards the
 giving them all that Authority which the Ends of their Of-
 fice require they should have; and nothing advanc'd in it,
 either to divest their Office, and Authority, of God's peculiar
 Approbation, and Confirmation; or themselves of any Rights
 which they can reasonably wish for; or of any Authority, but
 what the very worst of them will always profess to disclaim,
viz. the Authority, to ruin those Societies of which they
 are the Guardians, and Patrons. And I have nothing far-
 ther to add, at this time, to what I have already said in
 Defense of this Judgment of the judicious Mr. Hooker, but
 to entreat all who are Friends to our Ecclesiastical, and Ci-
 vil Establishment, to be so favourable and christian to him,
 who was a true Defender of the Church, and to that great
 Queen, under whose Reign, and for whose Interest, he esta-
 blish'd these Principles, as not to make the present Defense
 of his Notions the Mark of an Enemy to the Church; or to
 insinuate, that they tend to the Prejudice of as great a Queen
 now reigning, whose Throne is more visibly founded upon
 their Truth and Stability; and more apparently supported
 by them. And, as I know it to be my Design, to do true,
 and lasting Service to Her Excellent Majesty, Her Protestant
 Successors, and Her People, whose Interest She accounts in-
 separable from Her own: So I beseech Almighty God, that
 the Event, and Success, may be happy, and universal. This
 will give a Pleasure to all the Pains I have taken, or can
 take; and make those Reproaches, which have been so
 plentifully poured upon me, sit easy, and light upon my
 Mind.

F I N I S.

A Large ANSWER

T O

Dr. Francis Atterbury's

Charge of REBELLION:

In which

The Substance of his late Latin Sermon
is Produc'd, and fully Examin'd.

Those little shifting Equivocal Forms of Speech He
 is so full of; those savings and softnings He throws
 in every where, shew that the Thistles He was mumbling
 did not pass easily; and that He had not only no assu-
 rance that He was in the right, but a shrewd guess
 that He was in the wrong; and laid in matter there-
 fore for evasion, against He should have need of it.
 So that I question not, this will be one main part
 of his Apology, to some persons, that whatever
 He hath said that may sound harsh in one part of
 his Sermon, He hath unsaid again, and qualified in
 another. I will not deny Him to have a Right to
 this Plea, such an one as it is: but He who makes
 use of it, doth in effect, own that He had taken up-
 on himself the hard task of maintaining a point which
 yet He saw was not defensible; and that his Conscience
 stared Him in the face every step that He took: never-
 theless being in, He was resolved to go thro' with it. And
 if this Excuse will be of any service to Him, by my Con-
 sent, He shall be allowed it. Dr. Fr. Atterbury, in his
 Preface to the Rights, &c. of an English Convocation.
 p. 12.

A a

To

To the Reverend
 Dr. Francis Atterbury,
 Dean of Carlisle, &c.

Reverend SIR,

I Have lately learnt from a † Celebrated Writer, not unknown to your self, how little Credit is due to Accusations when they come from Nameless Pens; and how severely they ought to be censured who take advantage from their writing in the dark, to attaque the reputation of others, without hazarding their own. I confess, I little expected, after such open declarations, that You could make so light of your own Censures, as to publish any Paper without a name; much less, a Paper, which seems to many to have been chiefly designed for the attacking the reputation of others, your Superiors, as well as Equals and Inferiors, and a Paper which you would have to pass for an Authentic Account of some Proceedings in the Convocation A. D. 1705. Nay, I have gone so far as sometimes to argue from hence, that this Paper could not possibly come from You. But I am convinced. For

† Pref. to Dr. F. Atterbury's Vol. of Sermons. p. 1. 2.

I am sensible that *Great Geniuses*, tho' they claim a *Right* to make *Rules* for others, yet are not, in their own *Opinions*, obliged to observe them themselves : And I must do *You*, in particular, the justice to own, that in every *Work* of yours, especially *Controversial*, there are so many peculiar *Marks* and *Characters* sufficient to distinguish it from that of any other *Writer*, and to speak its *Author* ; that you may well judge it wholly needless to fix *Your name* to what, You need not doubt, will universally be adjudged to *You*, without any such *Ceremony*.

In this late *Pamphlet*, relating to some *Proceedings* in *Convocation*, 1705. on which You have indeed been careful to impress every *Character* peculiar to your self, You have been pleased, amidst higher flights, to descend so low as to *attaque* the reputation of one of an *inferior Station* ; and to divert out of the way of an *Historian*, in order to pass your *private Censure*, and vent your *private Resentment* : and that in these words, p. 25. *Mr. Hoadly hath ventured to treat the Body of the Established Clergy with Language more disdainful, and reviling, &c. charging them with Rebellion in the Church, whilst He himself is preaching it up in the State.*

I am willing that the artful, and reproachful way of introducing this *Censure*, in order to give the greater keenness to it, may be forgot ; being heartily disposed to overlook every such provoking circumstance. But the *Accusation* it self is of that *Nature*, that I think *Silence* under it would be a *Crime*, and might induce many to judge that I esteem my self guilty of what is here laid to my charge. I hope therefore, that You will pardon me, if I endeavour to do my self *Justice* in a matter of such importance.

The

The *Charge* You have here drawn up against me, I will divide into two parts, 1. That I have treated the *Body* of the *Established Clergy* with disdainful and reviling Language ; charging them, *i. e.* The *Body* of the *Established Clergy*, with *Rebellion* in the *Church*. 2. That I am my self a *Preacher* of *Rebellion* in the *State*.

I. For the support of the first part of this *Charge* against me, You quote the *Preface* to *The Measures of Submission* : upon which account I think fit publicly to observe, that, upon representation made to me, that Men of a contrary *Sentiment* would peruse the *Book* with greater freedom and impartiality, were that *Preface* removed, I had yielded it up to this *Consideration* ; and sometime before this severe *Censure* of yours, had published a *second Edition*, in which I had omitted both *that*, and every little word in the *Book* it self, which might create any disgust ; or prejudice any *Reader* against the *Doctrine*, which was my main concern. That You knew this, is evident from your quoting the *Preface* to the *first Edition* by name : but that you had no regard to it, is as evident from your *Censure*. Supposing therefore, that, under a very great provocation, I had expressed my self more severely against some proceedings than it became a person of my station to do : yet since I took the very first opportunity of burying in oblivion what I had said ; *Christianity*, *Good Nature*, and a *generous Temper* of mind, methinks, should have disposed you either to have overlooked the whole, or to have done me the justice to take notice of the *one* as well as of the *other*. But I am sensible that this would have blunted the *Edge* of your *Satyr* : and how then could I expect such a favour ? or how can I take it amiss, that the *Author* of the *Rehearsal*, in his late *Best Answer*, &c. should lay it again

6 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*

again before the world at full length, for fear it should not be found any where else; since in your own *Phrase*, p. 25. He doth but *Eccho back the reproaches* of another; and hath such a *Precedent* to produce, to justify this sort of *Usage*. But I now return to Your *Charge*, which, I assure You, I do not design thus to avoid. And,

1. I acknowledge that I did publicly, and heartily bear testimony against that *Behaviour* of some particular persons towards His Grace, and the much greater part of the *Bishops* of this Province, which I was fully persuaded was as *unjustifiable*, as it is *unprecedented*. And this I thought my self obliged to do on many accounts. Nor need it methinks stand in need of a long *Apology*, that any one should express himself on such an occasion with a more than ordinary vehemence, when it is considered that at that time, matters were come to that height, that Her Majesty thought it worthy of Her Royal Wisdom, to interpose, by declaring Her Resolution to maintain the due subordination of *Presbyters to Bishops*: which Declaration she is pleased in Her gracious Letter, Apr. 8. 1707. to say, the *Innovations*, (afterwards called *Illegal Practices*) of some, contrary to the Duty they owed to Her, and their Ecclesiastical Superiors, gave Her occasion to make. For I think it needs only to be asked, whether it be a *Glory*, or a *Reproach*; a *becoming Freedom*, or an *unpardonable Impudence*; to declare openly and zealously against those particular practices, against which Her Majesty thought fit to appear with a more than ordinary zeal, and resolution. And this being my crime, that I did once publicly, and heartily express my dislike of the proceedings of some few particular Men, whom the Queen Her self charged with acting contrary to their Duty to Her, and to their Ecclesiastical Governours.

An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 7

2. I beg leave to ask, by what *Figure* of Speech it is that You are pleased to call your self and your Friends in the Lower-House of the Convocation of one Province, by the name of the *Body* of the *Established Clergy*. I acknowledge that You have a very *Oratorical* and *Declamatory* way of speaking; and that you claim to your self, by a long custom, as great a *Liberty* in the use of words as ever any *Christian Writer* did; nor would I appear too hard in a nice examination of every particular *Phrase*, or in imposing too great a restraint where it can so little be born. But this seems too bold a figure to be justified by the common *Rules of Rhetoric*, and may come in time to be as dangerous a *Precedent* as any that You are much more afraid of. For,

1. I think it hard that no account should be made of the whole Province of *Tork*, for which You ought to have shewn some *Concern*, as You bear a more eminent relation to that than to the Province of *Canterbury*. Or, Are there no *Established Clergy* in that whole Province? or, are they not worthy your *Regard*? or, are they legally concluded by what You and Your Friends transact here? or, are you certain that they all heartily approve your conduct here? or, Can You so much as assure us that the *Dean* of *Carlisle* himself, in a Convocation of that Province, would act the same part which his Friend the *Arch Deacon* of *Totness* hath acted in a Convocation of this Province? or rather, Is it by such *Insinuations* as this, that you think to arm the *Body* of the *Established Clergy* against me? But,

2. If we confine our selves to the Province of *Canterbury*; how unusual a liberty and boldness of Speech is it, for You to entitle Your self and your Friends, the *Body* of the *Established Clergy*? as if those multitudes who differ from You, even amongst those whom, in name, You represent; and that *Body* of

Representatives in the *Lower-house* who always oppose Your new claims, were all of no more account than if they were not in being; and ought not to have so much Benefit from the *Act of Uniformity*, as to be esteemed of the *Established Church*? In behalf of all these, therefore, I beg leave to enter a just Claim against You, who, whilst You are complaining of *Affronts* offered to the *Established Clergy*, have excluded, by your own *Authority*, a very great, if not the greatest, part of them from being of that number. And on these accounts I leave it to any one to judge, who it is that hath given the worse treatment to the *Body of the Established Clergy*.

3. Nor can You say that the *Act of You and Your Friends*, which gave occasion to that passage in the *Preface*, was an *Act of that Nature* as legally to conclude even those whom You do truly represent. For, it was no *Synodical Notice*, or *Censure* of Mr. H's *Doctrine*, but a *Request*, that some *Synodical Notice* might be taken of it; and this drawn up at a time when none but *Friends* were present; and, if I be not misinformed, not heartily approved of, by every one of them: so that it doth not at all appear, had the *Request* been admitted, and the matter freely debated in a full House, what the *Synodical Act* would have been; or whether there would have been any *Synodical Act* relating to it, or no. I think therefore that I have too great reason to complain of the Injury You have done me, in applying that to the *Body of the Established Clergy*, which cannot in any Sense, nor upon any tolerable supposition, nor by any allowed figure of Speech, be said to belong to them. If any such *Synodical Act* should in a legal and unexceptionable manner be passed against me; I hope I shall be able to receive it with all marks of *Due Deference*, and *Submission*; and to plead my *Defense* in the Spirit of *Meekness*,

ness, and *Humility*. But, in the mean time, I hope, that my *Brethren* of the *Established Church* (for whom I desire to retain all possible respect) will not be led, by such insinuations, to take to themselves what can have no manner of relation to them; nay, what cannot possibly be applied to the *Body of the Established Clergy*, unless it be by those who use words as if they thought themselves above the restraint of those *Common Rules of Speaking*, by which others are obliged.

Had I indeed made *myself* the *Representative* of the *Body of the Established Clergy*; or had I virtually excluded a very great part of them from being of that number; or had I supposed them to be concluded by *Acts or Motions* of a partial and private nature; I would be heartily disposed to intreat their pardon. On the other side, Had I treated the *Heads* of this *Body of Established Clergy* with contemptuous and reproachful Language; or had I vilified to the utmost degree all who have pleaded the *Cause* of their *just Authority*: I should have looked upon this to be so much the concern of the whole *Body of the Established Clergy*, as that they might justly take the injury as done to themselves; and must have feared their resentment, as long as the very name or shadow of an *Episcopal Church* should remain in this *Nation*. But not being conscious to my self of any thing of the like nature; or of any such Indignities offered to them; I take the freedom to leave it to others, (who I fear have more concern in it,) to answer for such a *Treatment* both of *Ecclesiastical Superiors* and of *Equals*; of *Fathers* and of *Brethren*; of the *Head*, and of many of the *Members*; as, if we consider it from the beginning to this day, in the *matter*, and the *manner* of it, cannot I believe be *parallel'd* by any *past Instances*. And God grant it may never be *parallel'd* in time to come!

II. The second part of your Charge against me is this, that whilst I am thus treating the Body of the Established Clergy, charging them with Rebellion in the Church, I my self am preaching it up in the State. I have already shewn ; 1. That what I charged some particular persons with, was no more than what Her Majesty herself thought necessary to charge them with. 2. That, as for the Body of the Established Clergy, I have said nothing that can possibly, even with all your dextrous management, be made to imply any thing that bears the least relation to them. And therefore, if I have been a Preacher of Rebellion, only whilst I have been thus treating the Body of the Established Clergy, I am as sure that I have not been a Preacher of Rebellion, as I am that I have never so much as thought of thus treating the Body of the Established Clergy.

But, Sir, This is a charge of an heavy nature : for which, as You must finally answer at that solemn day of Accounts, when every injurious word shall be brought into judgment ; so You may justly, at present, be called upon by me, to produce the proofs of this severe Censure before the eyes of the same world of Men, to whom You have, in so public a manner, presented this Accusation. This indeed I was preparing to do, and to press You, by all proper Arguments, to make out the justice of it ; and, even for the sake of Truth, to use your best endeavours to undeceive me, and many others, in a very important matter. But I was informed that You had voluntarily undertaken to do it, and that before the same Honourable Audience that had formerly heard my Doctrine ; upon the same occasion, the same Text, and in the same Language in which I had spoken. I confess, I thought within my self that You could not

not have chosen, either Audience, or Time, or Text, or Language, more proper to put a stop to mischievous Principles, than those which I had chosen in order to propagate them. And I will own, that I waited, not without some impatience, to see what could be alleged in justification of such a Charge ; and indeed not without the expectation of receiving, from your hand, either a Confutation of my Errors, or a Confirmation of the Truth of what I had taught. Not without the expectation, I say, of one, or other, of these. For I have made it my observation upon some very Ingenious Writers, and Men of the finest parts, that they sometimes unwarily confirm the truth of what they would appear extremely to condemn, by a certain peculiar way of arguing against it : either using such studied words, as deceive no longer than till they can be examined ; or making some unfortunate Concession, which being confronted to every one of their foregoing positions, shall wholly take out their strength, and leave them without life, or force. But I long waited in vain : for it seems it was not thought advisable that the English world should be undeceived ; or that an English Antidote should be given to expel English Poison ; or that the proof of your heavy Charge should be made in the same Language in which the Charge it self was : At length it was thought more expedient, to cloath the same discourse (I mean the same, as to the main of it ;) upon the same Text, in a learned Language ; to preach it to the Reverend, the Clergy of this great City ; and at last to publish it in this dress : Nay, to publish it under their Patronage, and with the specious pretense of their Universal Agreement with You in what You had delivered. Whereas I dare say, I may answer for several of them, that the only mark of their Approbation was their requesting the publication of it, in which I my self should have heartily joined,

joined, had I been present; and that the only reason of their requesting this, was, that the *Colours of Art* might the more clearly appear when exposed to a brighter light; and that, upon this, it might be evident to all the world, that there are some persons who never more truly agree in judgment with their Neighbours, than when they would seem most of all to disagree; and that there is an *Art* of managing words with such a dexterity, as that the *Ears* of many *Auditors* shall be caught with the charm of Sounds, and led into a belief that the *Speaker* is in their *Sentiments*; when, in truth, He only useth such a manner of expression as may at once unwarily induce them to *think* so, and yet leave room enough for a *fair Apology*, upon a good occasion, with all others.

This *Sermon*, as it now appears, I take for the utmost stretch of your *Judgment*, and *Wit* united, in order to prove your *Charge*, and compass your *Ends*, against *One*, who hath neither given ground for such a *Charge*, nor deserved so much of your Zeal. To return you your own words, [*Rights of Convoc. Pref. p. 1.*] *The Love I bear to Truth; to my Church, and Country; soon gave me resolution of stating this matter anew, and of taking off the slight Colours under which You had disguised it.* To this End, therefore, it is my design to produce the main substance of the *Sermon* it self, in our native Language, and carefully to examine it; as well as in order to my own necessary justification.

The *Reasons* why I thus reply to a *Latin Discourse* in *English*, are, I think, very prevailing. 1. Because the *Subject* of our *Debate* is of equal importance to the *illiterate*, and the *Scholar*; and of the highest consequence to the whole *Body* of *Laity*, who certainly have a *Right*, whether *learned*, or *unlearned*, to be considered in a *Controversy* which toucheth their *Universal*,

versal, Temporal, and Eternal Felicity. 2. Because the *Doctrine* which you call *Rebellion* was delivered in the *English* Language: and therefore it is fit that, if it be true, it should be vindicated in the same; or, if it be false, the *truth* opposed to it by You should appear in the same light to the same persons. If any who are not skilled in the *learned Languages*, have been misled by *me*, they cannot be set right by *You*, unless You speak in a *Tongue*, which they understand. 3. Because your *Charge* of *Rebellion* was made in *English*, and because I was by *You* represented to the *English* world as a *Preacher* of *Rebellion*; therefore it is before *them* that the *Cause* ought to be tried, to whom Your *Accusation* was preferred. 4. Because this very *Sermon* of yours was first preached in *English* to an *Auditory* of *Lay-men*, before it appeared in *Latin*; and was the occasion of much more discourse *then*, than it hath been since it was preached in another Language. 5. Because your own handling this matter in a *learned Language* is merely accidental; arising, not from any impropriety, or absurdity in managing the same *debate* in *English* (as appears from your having done it upon a former occasion) but from your *preaching*, where *Custom* required that Language. 6. Because this *English Nation*, particularly, and above all others, seems at this time concerned in the *Subject-matter* of your *Discourse*; having had it for many Years debated publicly; having heard a great deal of it long before this; nay, having been but lately saved from ruine, and established upon an happy foundation by the *Arms* of that *Resistance*, the lawfulness of which I have been so bold as to teach. These *Reasons* are such, as render it highly improper for me to confine what I have to produce upon this occasion, to the *Learned* only, who are incomparably the less part of the Persons concerned; and highly reasonable to write

in such a manner, as to exclude none, whether *Learned* or *Unlearned*; from a matter which toucheth all equally.

The properest *Method* I can think of, for the prosecution of my present design, is to divide it into the three following parts.

First, To consider what You have alleged, in *this Sermon*, against my *Interpretation* of *Rom. 13. 1, 2, &c.* as well as what you have urged for the support of the contrary.

Secondly, To lay before the *Reader* your *Doctrine* concerning the *Measures* of *Civil Subjection*, and to compare it with *that* which I have delivered.

Thirdly, To consider what You have offered against the fitness and reasonableness of teaching the lawfulness of *Resistance* in some particular Cases.

First, As to the *Interpretation* of *Rom. 13. 1, 2, &c.* You digest what relates to this, under the following heads, *p. 4.* proposing to consider, I. What is meant by the *Higher Powers*, to which *St. Paul* commands *Subjection*. II. *How far*, and to what degree, this *Subjection* is commanded by *St. Paul*. III. The *Arguments* by which *St. Paul* presseth this *Subjection*. IV. The *Persons* concerned in these precepts of *His*.

I. What is meant by the *Higher Powers*, to which *St. Paul* commands *Subjection*. And,

1. It is laid down, *p. 5.* that the *Apostle* is not here speaking of the *Right* to govern, but of the *Persons* rightfully possessed of the *Power* of *Government*: i. e. of *Governours*; not of the *Governing Right* in those *Governours*. This is proved from the tenour of the *place*, commanding *Honour, Tribute, &c.* to be paid: which must refer to the *Persons* themselves, and not to the *thing*, the *Governing Authority*, separated from the *Persons*. And likewise from *St. Peter's* command of *subjection*, whether it be to the *King*, as *supreme*,
or

or unto *Governours, &c.* which determines it to the *Persons governing*. I know not that I have any where contradicted this, or shewn any *Averseness* to this *Interpretation*; tho', I confess, I cannot see the force of this last *Argument*, that *St. Paul* might not chuse to make a *Discourse* concerning the *Right to Rule* separately considered, because *St. Peter* chose to speak of *Rulers* themselves.

2. The same words of *St. Peter* are brought, *p. 6.* to prove that *St. Paul* meant to speak not only of the *supreme Civil Governour*, but of all *subordinate Magistrates*. That *St. Paul* meant this, I am fully convinced: but can by no means think, that because *St. Peter*, at another time, spake expressly of *subordinate Magistrates*, therefore it follows that *St. Paul* might not speak here wholly of the *supreme Magistrate*. It will follow indeed from *St. Peter's* words, that the *Christian Religion* commands *Subjection* to the *Subordinate*, as well as the *Supreme*; and that in the same absolute expression: but it will not follow that one *Christian Writer* may not, upon one occasion, speak of the *Supreme* only; because another *Christian Writer*, upon another occasion, speaks both of *Supreme* and *Subordinate*. Besides that these words of *St. Peter* are the most improper proof possible that *St. Paul* here intended to speak of the *Subordinate* as well as *Supreme*, because He makes use of the very word *St. Paul* chose, and applies that word to the *Supreme* only: of which you your self seem sensible. Which is an *Argument* to me that it was not in *St. Peter's* view to explain *St. Paul's* words, but to lay down the *general Rule* of *Obedience*, in such words as seem'd proper to himself. Indeed what follows, *p. 6.* is a good argument that *St. Paul* in the words, *ἐξουίας ὑπερχεουσιν*, designed to include the *subordinate* as well as *supreme*, because in another place He himself useth the same word,
in

in speaking of all in *Authority*, even after He hath expressly named the *Supreme*: from whence it is evident that He used this word to take in *all*, of whatsoever rank, possess'd of *Magistratical Authority*. For his own use of the same word in *another place* is justly applied, by all *Rules of Criticism*, to shew the true meaning of it in *this*: tho' a *Sentence* of another Writer, in which the same word is confessedly used after another manner, cannot possibly, one would think, be at all serviceable to this purpose.

3. From the *Apostle's* speaking here of *subordinate Magistrates*, as well as the *Supreme*, You argue, p. 7. that his *Discourse* throughout this *passage* can hardly relate to the *persons* of *Governours* considered as *Legislators*: but that He is speaking here of those *Governours* whom we call the *Executive*; those to whom it is committed to put in execution *Laws* already made. This you think plain from the description here given of *Governours*, which doth not point out to us the *Law-makers*, but the *Administrators* and *Executors* of the *Laws* already made. And if you thus understand the words; then, whatever *subjection* you make him to plead for, you must be contented if we suppose you to infer the *same* with respect to the *Executive Power* of this, as well as all other *Nations*, considered as distinct from the *Legislative*: which will go a great way towards a *Dispensing Power* above our *Laws*, and an obligation to yield to it, even when the whole *Legislative* is against it; at least, in *Cases* of a private, and particular Nature.

As for the *characters* which you are pleased to give us of the *Magistrates* then at *Rome*, tho' you do not pretend to know the time of writing this *Epistle*; *these*, and the part they ought to bear in the interpretation of this *passage*, will be fully considered under the *next head*, which is the main point, *viz.*

II. To

II. To enquire, *How far we are obliged, according to St. Paul, to be subject to these Higher Powers, i. e. to all Persons rightfully possessed of Governing Power.* Before I enter farther into this matter, I have a few Observations to make, with respect to *three sorts of Magistrates*.

1. If they be such as truly answer the *Ends* of their *Office*, there is no dispute about the matter. We cannot help loving and honouring them, after the highest manner possible, if we have any gratitude for the greatest Benefactors, or any Regard to our own Interest. Yet even against the *Best*, You your self acknowledge, there was a perverse prejudice in some of the first *Christians*, *Jews* by *Nation*, arising from the imagination that No *Heathen Magistrate* could have any title to the *Subjection* of *God's people*; and that to remove this was one great *End* of *St. Paul's Discourse*, p. 3.

2. I add that, if they be such as tolerably, and in the main, answer the *End* of their *Office*, with respect to the *Body* of the *Governed*, tho' guilty of many *personal Vices*, or of some Acts of Injustice of a private nature; yet, I know no one who hath said any thing against *Subjection* to *such Magistrates*: But I know that I my self have often said that *Public Good* requires the continuance of *Allegiance*, as long as it is consistent with this *Public good*.

3. There is a *third sort of Magistrates*, whose *Conduct*, in some instances, is inconsistent with the preservation of the *whole Community*: or whose continuing in *office* may certainly prove the destruction of the *Public Happiness*. Of *these*, indeed, I have said that it cannot be the will of *God*, that *Subjection* and *Allegiance* should be continued to them.

But now let us see, if we can find it out, how far it is that you maintain *St. Paul* to have put us in *Subjection*.

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on, in this passage : for this is the main *subject* of our present Enquiry.

As to the *first sort*, I have observed that we have no manner of *Dispute*. But p. 10. You go on to this purpose. *But if they* (i. e. the persons rightfully possess'd of *Governing power*) *be such as we cannot heartily respect and love : if they shew neither regard to God, nor Charity, and Benevolence towards Men ; if they indulge their own Lusts ; if they use the reins of Government unskilfully ; if they accumulate honours and riches upon bad Subjects, and are so far from favouring the good that they often set themselves against them, to injure or endanger them :* then we must recur to those *Precepts of Christian Submission*, by which, as it were by a sort of *Holy water*, all the *Comotions of our minds may be appeased, and quieted*; For He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God : and they that resist shall receive to themselves *Damnation*. After this You observe that there are *some* who labour hard, in order to break the force of this *Apostolical Oracle, &c.*

For my own part; I confess, I have said, and still must say so, as long as I can read, that the *Magistrates* described by *St. Paul*, in this place; the *Higher Powers*, v. 1. who are the same with the *Rulers*, v. 3. are quite otherwise set forth by *Himself*, who knew best what *He* meant. And for this I can only appeal to the *Passage* it self, and to what I have long ago said, *Meas. of Subm. Ch. 1. & 2.* If any one can find in the *passage* it self any other *Governours* named besides such as are a *Terror to evil Works, and not to good ; and continually attending upon this very thing*, I am ready for conviction : or if any one can prove, by any *Rules of Reasoning*, that what *St. Paul* said of *Rulers* who are not a *Terror to good works but to the evil ; and who are continually attending their good Office*, concludes equally for these, and for the direct contrary; I am ready to yield. But I fear, I shall be ready to be-

believe that *Bad* and *Good* are the same thing ; that *Terror to evil works* and *Terror to good works* are expressions of the same importance, when I can once be persuaded that *St. Paul* meant, in this place, to make the same inference with respect both to *Bad* and *Good*, both to *Useful*, and *Destructive*; and, in order to this, mentioned but one, and wholly omitted the *other*. This, therefore, being my *Crime*, that I have affirm'd, not that *Submission* in particular *Cases of Injustice*, and *Oppression*, is not a *Duty*; (for I have over and over again allowed, and argued the contrary from *Public Good*;) but only that *St. Paul's* discourse in this place cannot conclude for *Submission* to such *Governours* as are directly contrary, in the general *Tenour* of their *Conduct*, to the *Description* He himself gives of *Magistrates*: Let us now examine what you are pleased to allege against this. And here, give me leave to observe that I have on my side a *positive argument*, drawn from the *Character* given by *St. Paul* himself of those *Higher Powers* and *Rulers*, of whom He is speaking : and therefore may justly expect something, at least as *positive*, taken from *St. Paul's* own expressions, to invalidate the force of this. But I find I may wait long enough before I receive this satisfaction : and therefore must content my self with such *negative*, and *consequential Arguments*, as arise from a fruitful imagination, and not from any thing in the *Apostle* himself.

1. Your first *Argument*, p. 11. is this. *Either the words of the Apostle beforementioned refer to Bad Governours, or, in other words, to Rulers who are a Terror to good works, and an Encouragement to Evil ; or else they will not take in those very Powers, of which mention is made v. 1. the Powers that be : viz. those who were at that time at the head of the Roman Affairs. Now whoever he were, who then was at the Helm, whether Caligula, or Claudius, or Nero ; certainly He could not be counted a-*

amongst Just, and Good Princes. Either therefore the Apostle's words are to be refer'd to Him, or it must be said that, in writing to the Christians about submission to Civil Governours, He wrote what had no relation to their supreme Civil Governour : than which what can be imagined more absurd ? But if his words relate to the Emperour, they so relate to Him, as to insinuate that no submission was due to Him. For He who commands obedience only to just and good Magistrates, sufficiently intimates that no obedience is due to others. And what can tend more to disturb Humane Society than such a sort of Precept ? what is at a greater distance from the Apostle's design, or the simplicity of the Gospel ? And yet there are, who contend that these Encouragements to Sedition, and not Precepts of submission, were designedly, tho' not openly, laid down by St. Paul. Thus far You : to all which I answer,

1. That all this Finesse of Discourse, and Satyr, is entirely taken, not from what you actually find in this celebrated Passage ; but from what you are pleased to imagine should be there : whereas all that I desire is, that St. Paul may speak for himself, who knew his own design, and what was fit for Him to say on so nice a subject, better than either You or I, can pretend to know it. He saith that the *οἱ τοῦ ἐξουσίας*, the Powers that be, which are the *οἱ ἀρχοντες*, the Rulers, v. 3. and the same to whom He presteth submission, v. 5. and forbids Resistance, v. 2. are a Terror not to good works, but to evil. I say, He positively affirms this. From whence I argue that, if the Roman Emperour at that time, in any good sense, answered this Character, then He was included in what St. Paul said. If He did not ; then 'tis not I, but St. Paul, who hath excluded Him. Nor am I answerable for what absurdities you will please to fix upon St. Paul's own words : tho' I must take the liberty of, telling you that they will be placed to your own account, and not to His, by all equitable judges.

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2. St. Paul saith, the Powers, or Rulers, are not a Terror to good Work, but to Evil : and doth not once mention those of the contrary character. But, say you, Unless St. Paul mean't to say the same with respect to such Rulers as are a Terror to good Works, He could not include the then reigning Emperour. Now how do you know this, when you cannot tell the exact time of his writing ? when the best Chronologers have fixed it to a time when the Emperour did tolerably well answer this character, even with respect to Christians, as well as the Body of his Subjects ? Or, if you did certainly know this, (which you do not indeed so much as pretend to know,) why must it be such an absurdity that St. Paul should not particularly concern himself, in a general discourse of the Duty of Governours, and Governed, with the character of the Roman Emperour then reigning, or of any other particular subordinate Magistrate ? For

3. The same argument will hold, with respect to every individual Subordinate Magistrate then at Rome. For you your self say, that the Powers, v. 1. and Rulers, v. 3. are the subordinate, as well as the supreme Magistrate. Now if St. Paul did not mean to command submission to the Unjust Attempts of subordinate Magistrates, as well as to their righteous and just proceedings ; then He took not in all the present Magistrates at Rome, some of whom to be sure were unjust and unrighteous. But what so absurd as to suppose Him to write to Christians at Rome about submission to Inferior Magistrates, and yet not to write what could agree to many of them ? Nay, what implied in it no necessity, in point of Conscience, for submitting to them, but rather an allowance of opposition to them ? What more absurd than the former ? What more distant from his design, which was submission to subordinate Magistrates ? What more distant from the simplicity of the Gospel than the latter ? Thus it might be argued with the same artfull probability :

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and yet I hope, You will not make *St. Paul* to subject mankind to the will of every *Inferior Magistrate*. And if You will not; this way of Reasoning cannot be esteemed by your self to be of greater force, with respect to the *Supreme*.

4. Let us put a parallel Case. Suppose the *Apostle* had written after the same manner to any *Children*, who, He had reason to think, had not true notions of the *Paternal Authority*. Suppose He had declared that those *Children* who set themselves against their *Fathers* should incur *God's* displeasure, and proved it by this argument, For *Fathers* are appointed by Him to guard and preserve their *Children* from Evils; to keep off dangers, and mischiefs; and to act a most godlike part towards them. From hence I should not scruple to observe, if there were occasion, that *St. Paul* could not include in this passage, such *Fathers* as were *Enemies* to their *Children*; as attempted their lives; or the like. But it might be replied, there were at that time many such very bad *Fathers* amongst the *Romans*; that if *St. Paul* did not include such, then He did not include many of those, to whose *Children* He wrote: than which what can be more absurd? To which I would answer, that this is arguing against matter of fact; that it is much more absurd to make the same reasoning, in which *Good Fathers* are expressly mentioned, to hold equally for the contrary, the mention of whom is avoided; and that it is so far from being an *absurdity*, that it is the highest honour to *St. Paul*, to have guarded his own expressions so, as to give to *Superiors* all that they can justly claim, and yet not to put *Inferiors* intirely into their mercy.

5. This whole argument turns upon the absurdity of supposing that *St. Paul* wrote directions about *submission* to *Rulers*, and at the same time said what could not be accommodated to the *Emperour* then in being. But this is of no importance to those who consider

consider that it was no more to *St. Paul* to say what might exclude a *Present*, than a *Future Emperour*; that it was beneath him to take more care of *Nero*, or *Caligula*, than of *Heliogabalus*, or the worst of the succeeding *Emperours*; that He was no more obliged to complement the *one* than the *other*; and had an equal concern upon Him about *Civil Government* in all places, and all times. Why then must it be esteemed such a formidable argument, that *St. Paul* cannot be supposed to exclude *Nero* then reigning? when it is not one whit of more importance than to say that, if *St. Paul* did not intend to press *submission* to *Bad Princes*, then He must be supposed to exclude *Heliogabalus*, and some other *Emperours*: for I dare say, He was as much concerned about *these*, as about those under whom He himself lived. *What?* say some, to write to *Christians* at *Rome* about *subjection*, and not press *subjection* to the *Emperour* then reigning? How absurd is this? *What?* may others say, To write directions for *Christians*, in every Age, and every Country, about *subjection* to *Governours*, and yet speak after such a manner as not to take in the *Governours*, of all ages, all times, and all places; how bad soever they may be? Now, if the latter be not absurd, as, I dare say, you will own it is not; I am very certain the *former* is not.

6. Nay, as to the then reigning *Emperour*; I cannot but hope that, upon *second* thoughts, you will be so consistent with your self, as to allow *Him* not to be included in *St. Paul's* argument. You will wonder at my saying this perhaps; but my hope ariseth from my considering what is said, not only in this particular place, but in other parts of your discourse. Here indeed, you say, that nothing can be more absurd than to suppose *St. Paul* not to include the reigning *Emperour*: and you are so kind as to give us leave to chuse whether we will have *Caligula*, or *Claudius*, or *Nero*, for this *Emperour*. For disputation sake,

Let us now suppose *Caligula* to be then reigning; of whom it is said by the *Historian*, that He was come to that pitch of *Inhumanity* and *Barbarity*, that He wished, the Multitude at *Rome* had but one *Neck*, that at one blow they might be destroyed, to satisfy his humourful *Cruelty*. Give me leave now to refer you to the 41st Page of this *Sermon*, in which you come to put the *Question*, whether these words of *St. Paul* are to be understood *absolutely*, and without all limits. *What, say you, if Princes tear to pieces, and overturn, that Public Interest which they are appointed to preserve? What if they confound and pervert all Laws, humane and divine? if they rage, beyond measure, against the lives and fortunes of their subjects? Shall it not be allow'd to their subjects to resist such attempts, and to drive from themselves such Destruction? Your Answer is this, that Judicious and Good Men, no friends to Popular Licentiousness, have contended that this is lawful.* Happy men, that have the fortune to be so much in your good Graces! and to be so favourably treated in the very same *Sermon*, in which another is treated as a friend to *Popular Licentiousness*, merely for giving a licence, even of a lesser extent than this, if possible. But for your own judgment, You add, *Whether they have done right or no in making this allowance, I leave to others to judge*: that is, in other words, you will not determine whether it be *right* or *wrong*, to interpret *St. Paul's* words *absolutely*; or you will not say that, in those *Cases* foregoing, *St. Paul* laid the duty of *Non-resistance* upon *subjects*. From whence I think it follows; (nay, rather, it is the same in other words;) that You will not your self say that *St. Paul's* Rule concludes for *submission* to the then reigning *Emperor*, supposing Him *Caligula*. For, of what *Princes* can it be said, if not of such as *He*, that the *Public Interest* was far from his thoughts, unless it were to ruine, and overturn it; that He confounded, and perverted all laws *Humane*, and *Divine*, as far as his own

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Conduct could do it; that He did beyond measure rage, *immaniter seuire*, against the *lives* and *fortunes* of His subject? If to *Governours* of this *character* you will not say that *St. Paul* commanded *Non-resistance*; then *Caligula* must be excepted. But you give us leave to suppose Him reigning when *St. Paul* wrote. Therefore you your self cannot say but that, in writing to *Christians* at *Rome*, He wrote about *Non-resistance* after such a manner, as not to include the *supreme Emperour* then reigning; or, if He did include Him, so, as to intimate that *Submission* was not due to Him. Than the former of these nothing was, by you, at the beginning of your *Sermon*, imagined more *absurd*; than the latter nothing more distant from *Christian simplicity*: and yet, at the end of your *Sermon*, You cannot, your self, say, that *St. Paul's* words ought to be interpreted of such *Governours*, as, it is plain, the then reigning *Emperour* was, supposing *Caligula* to be the Man. I hope therefore, that You will acquire, by degrees, other notions of *Christian simplicity*, than what seem to have guided You in this *Sermon*; and not be so hasty in fixing *absurdities* upon others, before you are sure not to say the same things your self. But it seems to be a fate upon some Men of *Art*, to contradict themselves, rather than not run into the same *absurdities* which they are, without ground, labouring to fix upon *others*. Nor is this the *first Instance*, by many, that I have lately seen, of this. The sum of the present argument is this. You argue against me thus. Either *St. Paul* meant to command *Non-resistance* *absolutely* to such *Governours* as are a Terror to good works, as well as the *Contrary*; or else He takes not into his account, the *reigning Emperour*, which is the most *absurd* supposition possible: or, if He takes Him in, He in effect, implies that *submission* is not in all things due to Him, which is not agreeable to *Christian simplicity*. To which I reply thus.

Either

Either St. Paul commands *absolute Non-resistance* to such Governours as do pervert *Humane and Divine Laws*, and rage against the lives and fortunes of their Subjects; or He doth not include Caligula, whom we will suppose to be then reigning. But you have declared openly that you will not say, He preffeth *Absolute Non-resistance* to such Governours. Therefore you will not say, it is absurd to suppose that He might speak after such a manner as not to include the then reigning *Emperour*; or that it is contrary to *Christian simplicity* for Him to speak of Governours after such a manner, as rather gives to subjects a licence for *self-defence* than wholly takes it away from them.

7. But alas! If we state the *Case* impartially, it will appear that St. Paul hath acted a part, not only free from all *absurdity*, but most strictly agreeable to *Christian simplicity*; even tho' he should be found to have spoken so of Governours, as not to include the then reigning *Emperour*: and this again upon your own *Concessions*. For, p. 2, 3. you are pleased to tell us the occasion of St. Paul's writing with so much concern upon this subject; viz. that there were some amongst the *Christian Professors* who were not wanting openly to maintain that *Heathen Magistrates* could have no right to Government over God's People; and that there were others who had entertained a very bad notion of *Christian Liberty*, as if it exempted them from all subjection to *Humane Government*; and that it was for the interest of the *Christian Religion* that these opinions should be rooted out of the minds of it's Professors; as well as those *Calumnies* removed which had been undeservedly cast upon it, on account of some disturbances and seditions raised in places where the *Christian Religion* had begun to be planted. Well then: If this were the occasion of his writing this passage, whatever is necessary to serve this purpose may justly be expected here; whatever hath nothing to do with this purpose may justly be excluded,

excluded, unless expressly mentioned by the *Apostle*. Now I cannot think it in the least necessary to this purpose that St. Paul should so much as know, or concern himself, who, or what, the *Emperour* was: much less was it at all necessary to it, for Him to tell them that let the present *Possessor* attempt what He pleased, the *Nation* must be absolutely submissive to Him in every thing.

The Truth of what I am saying will plainly appear, if we distinctly consider the *three occasions* which You your self lay down for St. Paul's writing this *Passage*, For, 1. As to those amongst the *Roman Christians*, who as You say, maintained No Subjection to be due, in point of Conscience, to *Heathen Governours*; it is fully sufficient for the putting a stop to this *Error*, for Him to assure them that all who execute so useful an Office in the world as that of *Magistrates*, are approved of God in that their business; and in the sacred phrase, *ordained of Him*; so that Obedience and Subjection to them become a Duty. But it is wholly superfluous, and unnecessary, as far as this *Error* is concerned, for Him to put them, and whole Nations, immediately under *Absolute and Unlimited Subjection* to their Governours. It is agreeable to his design of informing these Men aright, to observe the usefulness and excellence of the Office, as well when executed by *Heathens*, as by *Jews*: but it is foreign to this design for Him to make no exception, as to the different behaviour of *Magistrates* in the execution of their Office. I have therefore, in my interpretation, given to St. Paul every thing necessary for this part of his design. And I hope it is neither absurd nor double dealing, for Him to say nothing more than what his present purpose led him to. The *Question*, with respect to this first sort of *Erroneous Christians* was not, What the degree of *Subjection* should be, and to what *Cases* it should be extended; but whether the general *Duty of Subjection* was

was owing to all sorts of *Magistrates*, as well as *Jews*: and therefore, in answer to this, it was not in the least degree necessary for *St. Paul* to decide the former *Question*; in which all the world at that time, seem to have been agreed 2. As to that second sort of *Christians* at *Rome*, who, You say, had entertained a very bad notion of *Christian Liberty*, as if that exempted them from all *Subjection* to *Humane Government*; what is it that is necessary to the ridding the minds of *Christians* from this foolish notion? Not that *St. Paul* should affirm that an *Unlimited Subjection* was due to *Governours*, tho' guilty of the worst designs and worst attempts: but that He should assure them that *Christianity* rather obliged them to be subject to those possessed of so useful an Office as that of the *Civil Magistrate*, than the contrary. For the *Question* with respect to these Persons, was, not whether *Subjection*, to an unlimited degree, in all possible attempts, were the *Duty* of *Christians*; but whether the *Gospel Liberty* implied in it any freedom from that *Civil Obedience* and *Subjection*, which the other part of their Fellow-Subjects were obliged to. From this second *Occasion*, therefore, there arose not the least necessity for *St. Paul* to enter into the other *Question*, which did not so much as offer it self to Him. Let us now, 3. proceed to the other *occasion* You mention for his writing this passage, viz. that there had been *Calumnies* undeservedly cast upon the *Christian Religion*, for the sake of some disturbances and *Seditions*, which had been sometimes raised in places where the *Doctrine* of *Christ* had begun to prevail. p. 3. If You had been so particular as to have named the *Disturbances* which You mean, We might the better have known what to have said. But at present, I confess, I am at a loss to know whether there had been any such *Seditions*, as gave occasion to any part of what *St. Paul*

Paul here saith. For I can hardly think but that He would as plainly have mentioned these Evils, in applying Remedies to them, as He doth, on other occasions, the *Ecclesiastical Schisms* among *Christians*. But supposing there had been *Disturbances* which had been undeservedly imputed to the *Christian Religion*, and had fixed a *Scandal* upon it amongst the *Heathen*; it is to be first enquired from whence these *Disturbances* proceeded. And I think it plain that, if any *Christians* had any part in them, it must have proceeded from the two sorts of principles just now mentioned; and that no other original of them can be justly assigned: and consequently that nothing was requisite, on *St. Paul's* part, towards the putting an end to such *Seditions*, and the *Scandal* arising from them, but to declare openly for *Subjection* to *Governours* in a sense inconsistent with those Principles, and after such a manner as to put a stop to the growth of them. This therefore cannot be called a *New occasion* of his writing this passage, distinct from the other two; and so hath been already accounted for. And then in the next place, supposing this passage to have been written purposely to remove a *Scandal* and *Reproach*, fixed by *Unbelievers* upon the *Gospel*; is it conceivable that, in order to do honour to *Christianity* amongst the *Romans*, He should declare them all to be absolutely subject to all the *Caprices*, and all the wild furies of their present *Emperor*, whether *Caligula*, *Claudius*, or *Nero*. If You will have this matter judged by *Absurdity*; think of this insupportable one, which must be true, if *St. Paul's* precept of *Subjection* reacheth all parts of the *Conduct* of *Caligula*, viz. that, in order to gain *Credit* amongst the *Romans* to the *Gospel*, He should lay it down for certain, that they were all the *Slaves* of their *Emperor*; that if they had but one *Neck*, and He should have a mind to strike it off for his own diversion,

sion, they were all obliged in conscience to bow it to the fatal stroke, and receive it with all Submission. Than which what could be imagined a greater *Disservice* to the *Christian Cause*? what could have set the whole *Roman Empire* more heartily against it? *Caligula* indeed might have been thankful: and *Nero* afterwards must have been so far from hating the *Christians* as He did, that I am persuaded, for the sake of this one *Doctrine*, He must have thought it worth his while to have embraced, and cherished the *Entertainers* and *Promoters* of such a Notion; so useful to his Designs, and so agreeable to his Temper. They both of them wanted nothing but such a *Doctrine* to place them as much above the *Checks of Men*, as they were above the *Terrors of God*. *Caligula* particularly must, both by his *Example* and *Decrees*, have encouraged the profession of *Christianity*, which brought his Heart's desire along with it. He wished that all his *Subjects had but one Neck*. According to some representations, He needed not to have wished long for such a Blessing. If He could but have made them *Christians*, He need have sought no farther. The *Doctrine of Absolute Non-resistance* would have done the rest for him, It would have given them all *one common Neck*; and one common heart to have laid it down at his *Princely Command*; and submitted it to his *Divine Authority*. And therefore I can never believe that *St. Paul* was understood to publish any such notion, because He himself is recorded to have suffered under a *Tyrannical Emperour*; and likewise because I don't find that any of the *Roman Subjects* made this objection against the *Christian Religion*. For as surely as *St. Paul* had maintained such a *Subjection* due to the *Emperour*; so certainly, I believe would *Caligula*, and *Nero* both have been *Favourers of Christians*; and so certainly would the *Body of the Roman Subjects* have consulted their

their common safety by remaining in their *Infidelity*, and by hating the *Christians*, much more than ever, on this very account. But *Caligula* and *Nero* were not *Favourers of Christianity*; whilst vast multitudes of *Subjects* became *Professors* of it. Therefore it seems to follow that there was no such *Doctrine* understood to belong to the *Gospel*, as subjected all their lives and fortunes entirely to *Caligula*, or *Nero*. Nay, long after this, one head of *Railery* against the *Christian Religion* was *Sedition*: which, tho' wholly groundless, yet shews that there had not been any *public Declaration* understood to be made by the *Apostles*, in favour of *Universal Submission* to all *Tyranny*.

Give me leave, under this head, to observe, by the by, that if the removing the *Scandal of Sedition* from the *Christian Religion* were a good reason, as You say, for *St. Paul's* writing this *Passage*; then the removing the contrary *Scandal of Slavery* from the same *Religion*, is a sufficient reason for a *Christian Divine* to endeavour to shew that the *Gospel* layeth not whole *Nations* under irreparable *Slavery* and *Misery*, at the will and pleasure of those whose business it is to ward off such *Evils*. Nay, I cannot help thinking that *St. Paul* himself would have taken as hearty pains in the *one*, as He did in the *other*; had He blessed these *Times*, in which so many *Christians* have themselves labour'd hard to bring this blot upon the *Religion* they profess.

To return; This seems a demonstration to me too strong to be eluded. If *St. Paul's* design, in this *passage*, were to remove out of the minds of *some Christians* that foolish prejudice against the *Right of Heathen Magistrates*; or, of *other Christians*, that fond and wretched Opinion concerning an exemption of *Christians* (by their *Gospel-Liberty*) from all *Humane Government*; or to put a stop to a *Scandal* arising

sing in the minds of the *Heathens* against the *Christians*; as you assure us your self: then is it not at all necessary for the compassing these *Ends* that *St. Paul* should so much as know *who* was *Emperor*; much less is it necessary to these *Ends* that He should make all his Subjects his absolute Slaves, in every respect, and in every part of his Conduct. Every one of these *Ends* can be answered without his concerning himself any more with the *present*, than with all *future Emperours*: and consequently, according to your own account of his *Designs*, He might lay down such *Rules* about *Civil Subjection* as might serve his purpose, and, at the same time, not include the then *Reigning Emperor*, in all parts of his *Conduct*; or so include Him, as to imply *Subjection*, in some Cases, not to be due to Him. And this, so far from all *absurdity*, (which You are pleased to deny;) that the contrary part would have been the *absurd* part, and much more distant from *Christian Simplicity*. It is not at all *absurd* in Him, to adapt his *Discourse* to his *Design*, and to say what is sufficient for his present *Ends*, without adding any thing *superfluous*, and *unnecessary*: But it would have been *absurd* in Him, to have gone to remove one *Scandal* from *Christianity*, by fixing *another* upon it; and that a much greater in the Eyes of the *Old Romans*. It is highly agreeable to *Christian Simplicity*, and to the *plainness* and *Honesty* of the *Gospel*, for Him to speak his mind about *Subjection* to *Civil Governours*, without having an Eye to the *Present*, whether they might be pleased or displeas'd; whether his way of arguing took *them* in, or not; if so be He rid the minds and manners of *Christians* from what was really false, or justly scandalous to the World about them. But it would have been as disagreeable to *Christian Simplicity*, as *Flattery* it self is, for Him to have complemented those *Monsters* of *Iniquity*, *Caligula*, and *Nero*,

Nero, with the absolute Disposal of the *Lives* and *Fortunes* of their *Subjects*. And they who think otherwise seem to be little acquainted with the true nature of *Christian Simplicity*. which will no more permit a *Christian* to exalt the *Princes* of this World above measure, than it will, to depress, and load any of his *Brethren* with all the *Infamy* that a *Copiousness* of *fine Language* can furnish, for maintaining no worse than what he himself can't help believing.

8. These *Ends*, which You have been so careful to declare were the *Grounds* both of *St. Paul's*, and *St. Peter's* Concern upon this Subject, will, above all Things, help us to find out their true meaning: and be of great use to shew you that the *Interpretation* of *St. Paul*, which you have pretended to set up with the utmost Zeal against mine, cannot possibly be accounted just, and true. For instance, The *Error* of those who laboured under that *Prejudice* that it was *God's Ordinance* that one of their own Religion only should reign over *God's People*, founded on *Deut. 17. 15.* easily induced *St. Paul* to tell them that they must not make any *Distinction*, upon this Account; and naturally led him to the very Expression of the *Ordinance*, or *Appointment* of *God*: that they might know that the *Civil Government* of *Strangers*, and *Heathens*, was his *Ordinance*, and agreeable to his Will. This gives a good Account of his saying, in such high Expressions, *The Powers that be are ordained of God; and, whosoever resisteth, resisteth the Ordinance of God*: to satisfy them that *All*, executing the Office of *Magistrates*, are the *Ordinance of God*, as well as those whom they themselves allowed to be so, when of their own Nation, and Religion: and that therefore whosoever opposeth, or sets himself against this *Office*, tho' in the Hands of a *Stranger*, sets himself against an *Office* approved of *God*. This likewise naturally led him

to argue the Necessity of *Subjection*, not only in Point of *Humane Prudence*, (of which there was no Dispute,) but in Point of *Conscience*: and to enforce the Duty of paying Tribute and Custom, and the like, as their *Neighbours* did. Again, The *Error* of those *Christians* who judged themselves exempt from all *Subjection* to *Humane Ordinances*, by virtue of their being *subject* to *God* and *Christ*, gives a very good Account of *St. Paul's* commanding every *Soul*, tho' of never so great *Christian Accomplishments*, to be *subject* to *Civil Governors*; and of his arguing the Usefulness of the *Magistrate's Office*, in order to prove that they would incur *God's Displeasure* if they were not *subject* to it. But it helps more effectually, if possible, to lead us into a true Account of the peculiar Expressions made use of by *St. Peter* upon this *Subject*. For upon the Supposition of this *foolish Error* amongst *Christians*, nothing could be more natural than for *him* to press *Christians* to be *subject* to *Civil Governors*, under the express Notion of their being *Humane Creatures*, or *Humane Ordinances*; from which, considered as *Humane*, they were pleading an *Exemption*. Nor could any thing be more to his Purpose than to command this *Subjection* for the *Lord's sake*. 1 Pet. 2. 13. *Submit your selves to every Humane Creature, or Humane Ordinance, for the Lord's sake*: as if he had said, Your being the *Subjects* of *Christ*, and redeemed into the *Liberty* of the *Gospel*, is so far from being an *Argument* that you are exempted from *Subjection* to the *Humane Appointment* of *Civil Governors*, as you think; that I make it an *Argument* for it, and charge you, on Account of your being the *Subjects* of *Christ*, so much the more, for *his sake*; in Honour and Obedience to *him*; to be *subject* to all such *Humane Ordinances*. For that *Master's sake*, whose *Followers* you are, be *subject* to what is so agreeable

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to his Will. And again, this gives a very good Account of his adding, as it were in the same breath, *As free, and not using your liberty for a cloke of maliciousness; (or evil;) but as the servants of God,* v. 16. that is, behaving your selves, as Persons truly free, in the *Gospel* Sense, which I grant you are: but not so as if you made this *Evangelical Liberty* a *Licentiousness* for every thing; a Pretext to hide and excuse *Disobedience*, and *Evil Tempers*, as you seem to do. But as becomes the *servants of God*, that is, making no other Use of your *Subjection* to *God* by the *Gospel*, and your near Relation to *Him*, on which you found your *Freedom*, but to be free from all those Things which it is his Will you should be free from; and to be *subject*, as becomes his *Servants*, to all those Things which are agreeable to his Will: amongst which is the *Humane Ordinance* of *Civil Governors*. And then, in the last place, these foolish, and bad Principles of some *Christians* having made their *Religion* scandalized amongst the *Heathen*, gives a good Account why *St. Paul*, and *St. Peter*, both should labour to settle their Minds in the *Truth*; and do what was fully sufficient to remove this *Scandal*: of which *St. Peter* expressly speaks, [probably, v. 12. *having your Conversation, or Behaviour, honest, i. e. creditable, and honourable in the Eye of the Gentiles; but certainly,*] v. 15. where he tells them, that it is by their *Submission* to *Humane Ordinances*, and not by pleading a *Freedom* from *Civil Government*, that *God* requires them to *put to Silence the Ignorance of foolish Men*. But the removing this *Scandal* requir'd only that the *general Duty* of *Subjection* should be declared as truly incumbent upon *them*, as upon all their *Heathen-Neighbours* around them; and that they should be pressed to this general Duty upon the best, and highest Motives: not that, upon this occasion, they, and the whole *Roman Empire*, should

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immediately be declared the absolute Slaves of their Emperor; and He the Unaccountable Disposer of all their Lives and Fortunes: which would have affrighted, and affronted their Fellow-subjects, sooner than have reconciled their Affections to them.

9. Let any one but put in to the Interpretation of St. Paul, the then reigning Emperor, suppose Caligula, in the worst part of his character; and remember that your own critical Remark is, that the Particle *for*, *ἵνα*, is always here to be referr'd to the Words immediately preceding it, as the Reason of them; and he will quickly find how weak a Writer this must make St. Paul. They that resist Caligula now reigning, who is a Terror to good Works, shall receive due Punishment for it: for Rulers are not a Terror to good Works, i. e. That you shall be punished for resisting Him who is a Terror to good Works is plain from hence, because he is not a Terror to good Works, &c. But of this way of arguing, which you have laboured to fix upon St. Paul, I shall say more by and by.

In the mean while, From what hath been said upon your own Account of the Occasion of St. Paul's writing this passage, it will appear which of the two Interpretations agrees best with the Designs which he had in view: that which you with Zeal would appear at present to espouse; or that for which I have been so often in this Sermon complemented with the Title of *absurd, ridiculous, Abuser of the Apostle, Enemy to Regal Authority*, and I know not what. For let any one judge, whether the Apostle could not fully answer the Ends proposed in this Passage, without so much as knowing, *who*, or *what*, the present Emperor was; nay, whether he could possibly answer those Ends, by subjecting the whole Body of the Roman Empire to the absolute Will and

and Pleasure of such a Monster as Caligula: and from all let it be judged, of what Importance your first Argument is, which is taken from the Necessity of supposing Caligula, or Claudius, or Nero, even in the worst part of their Characters, included in this Discourse of Subjection; when we thoroughly examine it, or only compare it with your own Concessions, and Your own Account of the several Occasions of St. Paul's writing it.

2. You come, in the second place, p. 12. to argue against those who conjecture that this Epistle was written at the beginning of Nero's Reign, at which time he tolerably answer'd the character here laid down: and therefore might be included in the Apostle's Discourse now, tho' not when he became of the very contrary Character. I confess my self to be the Person here pointed at, and that I have, in the Defense of my Sermon, p. 49. made this Observation. As for the Argument; I am now ready to justify it: but as for the Time of writing; I took it from Grotius, and that great Chronologer, Bishop Pearson, who, I dare say, did not fix it without good Grounds. The Reason why I observ'd this, and argu'd from it, was not because I thought it necessary that St. Paul should think any more of the present Emperor, than of any particular one to come a Thousand Years after: but because others argu'd for an unlimited Passive Obedience to the worst of Governors, from the Character of the Emperor reigning when St. Paul wrote this, to whom he must particularly refer. To this, therefore, it was natural to reply, that neither will this conclusion follow, supposing St. Paul to have his Eye upon the Emperor particularly: For the Epistle, and consequently this Passage, was written when the Emperor was not a very bad Governor, but rather a good one. Supposing therefore St. Paul designedly to include him particularly; this being at a time, when

when indeed he was not a *bad Governor*, cannot possibly prove that *St. Paul* designed the same *Conclusion* for all others of the contrary Character, nay, or even for the same *Emperor* wholly alter'd into a *Tyrant*, and *Monster*. Against this way of Reasoning you have not been able to urge any thing. 1. To what I have, in other places said, I add now, 1. That to all who follow you, and think that *St. Paul* must particularly design to include the *then reigning Emperor*, *St. Paul's* own Words will be a *Demonstration* that he wrote this at a time when the *Emperor* was not a *bad Governor*. For if the *Powers*, v. 1. which are the *Rulers*, v. 3. must include the *Emperor* then reigning, as you say; then you ought to believe *St. Paul*, that the *Emperor*, who is particularly included in the Word *Rulers*, was not a *Terror to good Works*, but to the evil, when he wrote: tho' afterwards, he himself is supposed to call him a *Lion*, for his Ferity, and ill Designs. This, I say, is *St. Paul's* own Affirmation to *You*: and from hence I argue that what he here says, with respect to *Him*, under this Character, can no more prove the same *Universal Subjection* to be due to *Him*, alter'd into the nature of a *Tyrannical wild Beast*; than it would prove *Friendship* to be due to a *Man* when he becomes in future Times an implacable *Enemy*, to argue that he is now, at this time, one perfectly disposed, and perfectly fitted for such a Return. 2. I add, That supposing it only *probable*, nay, but *possible*, that this *Passage* might have been written when *Nero* deserv'd a good Character as a *Governor*; the whole Force of that *Argument* is broken, which urgeth from this *Passage* the Necessity of an entire *Submission* to *Governors* of the worst Characters, because otherwise the *Emperor* would not be included: For if it be but *probable*, or *possible*, that the *Emperor*, when *St. Paul* included him, was indeed a good *Governor*;

vernor; then it cannot be shewn from this *Passage* that any other can be included in it. But that this is *probable*, all will be apt to think who consult the best *Accounts* of such Matters: that it is *possible* no one can deny, who considers that the *highest Assertors* of *Non-resistance* have not been able certainly to fix any other Time. So that supposing it can't be prov'd that this *Epistle* was written at the beginning of *Nero's* Reign; yet since the *contrary* can't be proved, it can never be justly affirmed that *St. Paul*, in this *Passage*, included an *Emperor* who was a *Monster* of *Tyranny*: nor consequently can it be justly infer'd from this *Passage* that he therefore designed his *Precepts* equally to respect *Civil Governors* of the worst, as well as of the best, Characters, and Designs.

But now let us examine what You allege, upon this Head: first calling to mind that the *Question* here is whether *St. Paul*, in this *Passage*, includes *Civil Governors* of the worst Qualifications, and worst Designs. Having therefore said nothing to invalidate the foregoing *Arguments*, You go on, p. 12. to this Effect. But let it be certain that *St. Paul* wrote this *Epistle* at the Time just now mentioned; yet at that very Time the *Christians* were surrounded with many Evils, many *Injuries*, many *Reproaches*, and many *Affronts*, which the most mild and benign *Emperors* did not take sufficient Care to ward off. This is plain from the Eighth Chapter of this *Epistle*, and from the latter End of the Twelfth; which must necessarily be thought to prepare the way, and to have a strict Relation to the beginning of the Thirteenth Chapter about the Duty of *Subjects*. Whether therefore we consider the Condition of *Christians* in the most quiet Times; or the Connexion of the *Apostle's* Discourse; this is plain from both, that the higher Powers, to which Resistance was forbid, were

Powers, or Rulers, from whom the Christians suffered a great deal at that Time.

I find indeed that in the Eighth Chapter St. Paul speaks of the *Sufferings* of the *Christians*: and I allow likewise that at the End of the Twelfth Chapter he is exhorting *Christians* not to *avenge themselves*; not to be overcome of *Evil*, but to overcome *Evil with Good*; and the like: and that then follows the Injunction, *Let every Soul be subject unto the higher Powers, &c.* But what all this imports, in this Cause, I cannot apprehend. For,

1. That the *Apostle's* Discourse concerning their *Patience*; *Placability*; *Forgiveness of Injuries*, is a Matter wholly distinct from their *Submission to Civil Governours*, is as plain as Words can make it. There is a new Head of Discourse taken up, *ch. 13.* and the *Topics* urged for *Submission to Civil Governours* are perfectly different from those used in the other *Case*. *Magistrates*, as such, are represented as useful *Friends*; and denied to be of the Number of their *Enemies*: *Subjection to them* is urged from thence; and paying *Tribute*, and the like. Whereas *Patience*, and *Forgiveness of Injuries*, are recommended from other *Topics*, as distant from these as can be. And if any one thinks that this looks like the Continuation of the same *Subject*; I will venture to affirm, that it is impossible to prove that in the whole *Epistle* there are any two distinct *Subjects* taken up, and handled.

2. Here is not the least Mark of the Continuation of the same *Subject*; nor any *Particle*, as usual, to give the least *Connexion*; nor any *Ground* to imagine it.

3. If it be sufficient to say that the *last Verse* of the *12th ch.* speaks of the evil State of *Christians*; and therefore this must be a Continuation of that Discourse: this will prove any thing to belong to any thing just as we shall please to fancy. For instance,
ch. 13.

ch. 13. v. 14. But put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh to fulfil the Lusts thereof. Then follows immediately, *ch. 14. v. 1. Him that is weak in the Faith, receive you:* and a new Head of Discourse is prosecuted as different from the former as possible. But according to this way of arguing, this is only a continuation of the same *Subject*. For the words immediately foregoing, must make way for those immediately following. Whereas it is most evident that the *Apostle* having very different *Subjects* to treat of, must often break off from one, and immediately go to another, as distinct from it, as if it were not in the same *Epistle*: and that whether He doth so, or no, must be judged from other *Considerations*, and not from its *Situation* in the *Epistle*.

4. What signifieth it to allege that the *Christians* met with a great many *Evils* in the *best Times*, under the *best Emperors*; when these *Evils*; these *Affronts*, and *Injuries*, were all from private Hands? How can you infer, as you do in so many Words, that the *Rulers were Rulers from whom the Christians suffered many things*, from hence, that many of their *Subjects* were injurious to the *Christians*? Whilst, at the same time, no regal Redress was denied them; no *Injuries* from the Public Administration offered them; no *Properties* taken from them, by any *Publick Act* of the *Executive Power*, on the Account of their *Religion*? Will it be sufficient to prove that *Protestants* suffer many *Evils* from the *Civil Governours of Popish Countries*, to allege that they are affronted, and injured by their *Popish Neighbours*, whilst the *Governours* have no hand in it; whilst there is no *Public Act* for their unjust Oppression; nay, whilst the *Laws* are open to them as well as to *Papists*? And might not any one write to *Protestants* urging them to bear patiently the *Evils*, the *Injuries*, and *Affronts* of these private *Enemies*: and at the same time incite them to
Subjection

Subjection to the Civil Magistrate, as a most useful Officer, and upon very different Motives; without implying that they suffered those *Evils* from *Him*? If this might be; then the present Argument comes to nothing. And certainly that it might be, no one can deny: especially if the Writer be careful to describe the *Magistrate* after so different a manner as effectually to exempt him from the Number of these Enemies. But yet, tho' *St. Paul* hath been so careful as to do this in express Words; the slightest Grounds must serve to make him imply the very contrary.

5. But let us suppose that this beginning of the *Thirteenth Chapter* was naturally introduced by the *End* of the *Twelfth*; I appeal to any one, who will lay things together, whether it be not more probable from the Account given by *St. Paul* himself of the *Civil Magistrate*, that he points *Him* out to the *Christians* as one from whom they might at that time rather expect the *Redress* of the Injuries they received from *others*, than any *Addition* to them. For connecting the *Two Chapters* together, we shall find that, having first press'd them to the Duty of *forgiving Injuries*, and *overcoming Evil with Good*, he then immediately directs their View to the *Civil Magistrates*, telling them that *they are not a Terror to good Works, but to evil*; that they are the *Ministers of God for Good*; the *Avengers to execute Wrath upon him that doth Evil*. Now let it be remembered that he had before been saying that they were not, in ordinary Cases to be their own *Avengers*, but that *Vengeance belongeth to the Lord*; and that he here puts them in mind that *God* had entrusted this *Vengeance* in the *Hands of Magistrates*, who are his *Ministers* by whom he exercises this *Vengeance*; who execute the Temporal part of his *Wrath* against the Man that doth *Evil*: I say, let these things be laid together, and, if you be resolved to frame a Connection between these *two Chapters*,

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see first if it be not much more reasonable to suppose that he points out to them the *present Magistrates* as Officers who were at that time likely, in a lawful way, and as *God's Ministers*, to avenge the *Evils*, and *Injuries* they suffered from others, if *they* behaved themselves well; than that he is pressing them to *Subjection* to them, as *Magistrates* not at all concerned for *Justice*; nay, from whom, it seems, *they were suffering, at that time, many Evils*: which is plainly contrary to what he implies; and indeed affirms. I do not say, or think, that this was the *Apostle's View* in placing his Precepts about *Magistrates*, next to those about *private Enemies*: but I say, that a better Connection can be made out this way, than the other; in which the very Words of *St. Paul* must be contradicted.

6. But supposing again that the utmost you here contend for be granted; the utmost that will follow from it is this, that the *Apostle* commandeth *subjection to Civil Magistrates*, at a time when *Christians* suffered many *Evils*, and great Injuries, not by means of any *Public Act* of these *Civil Magistrates*, but from the malice of *Private Men* against them, perhaps without so much as the knowledge of any one *Civil Magistrate*; or perhaps thro' the remissness of those who ought better to have protected them; and that a *Party of Subjects* must not rise up against their *Prince*, because others of his *Subjects*, and not *He* himself, treat them ill. And of what importance is this? Was it a likely way for them to cure the *Private Evils* they suffered, by arming the whole *Executive Power* against them, which had never yet declared it self their *Enemy*? In what *Reign of the Best Princes* doth it not often happen, that some *Señ* or other becomes odious, and is used by many with contumely, and reproach; whilst the *Civil Authority* hath no hand in it? But,

7. What

7. What need of more words, when you have your self laid down the several occasions of St. Paul's writing this particular Passage, viz. the prejudices of some Christians against Heathen, and of others against all, Governours; and on the other side the Heathen Prejudices against Christianity on account of Seditions, &c? Now, if these were the occasions; then this Chapter hath no relation to the foregoing Precepts about their Behaviour under the Private Hatred and Malice of their Neighbours; but to something wholly distinct from these, and not at all referr'd to, in what went before.

Last of all, If these Precepts about submission to Civil Governours must be put upon the same foot with Patience, and Forgiveness, and Good Temper, under Private Injuries; then I argue that, as the obligation to the latter, tho' expressed in never so absolute Terms, did not divest the Injured, in many Cases, from their Right to Self-Defence, so neither can the former, which are so closely connected to them, be supposed to divest the Subjects of Nero, or Caligula, from that same Right. If Nero, or Caligula, must be thus joyned by you, with the present Private Enemies of the Christians; Why must the Non-resistance commanded to them be extended to all and every of their mad attempts, when the Non-resistance, commanded likewise in the same Discourse, to their Private Enemies, is allowed to be of a limited and Restrained Nature? And thus at once is the main End proposed by you in this Argument, defeated.

You go on to argue, p. 13. 14, 15. that whether Christians were then persecuted by the Emperour or not; yet St. Paul knew their fate too well, not to arm them against it: And who can think it credible that He should write precepts, of no effect for above a Year or two, whilst the Emperour's Good conduct render'd all things quiet? They who make
St.

St. Paul act such a part, however wise they may think themselves, seem to have no great opinion of the Apostle's wisdom: who, according to them, hath past by the Duty of greatest moment, and that which Men have the greatest aversion to; and hath spent all his pains only to persuade Christians to what hath hardly any thing of weight in it, and to what they were ready, of their own accord, without any of his solicitations, to perform; viz. a ready obedience to the Civil Magistrate considered as performing a godlike, and beneficent office, in the world: a Duty, which you say, needs no Persuasives to recommend it. Again, When we are afflicted and oppressed by Unjust Princes; when our lives and fortunes are in eminent danger, &c. then indeed we have need of Exhortations, and Persuasives to keep our stubborn spirits in their Duty. This is a Cause worthy of the regard of an Apostle. But they who represent Him as only taking care that we be not ungrateful toward those who deserve well at our hands; seem neither to see what is proper for such a subject, or what becomes the Apostle. I answer,

1. All this again proceeds from a too great fondness for our own opinions; and a readiness, rather to tell St. Paul what to speak upon a subject, than to be content with what He actually hath spoken. Let any one read over the first seven verses, five hundred times; and see if He can find one word there of Lives and Fortunes in danger; of Tyranny, or Oppression; or the character of any Princes but Good ones: and then judge, which have the lower opinion of their own wisdom, and do most honour to the Apostle; they who only declare what they find in his own argument as managed by Himself; or they who will not allow Him to speak any thing fit for an Apostle to say, unless He urgeth just what they see fit; and be understood to mean what they will supply:
and

and what is not to be found in his own words. How must all this way of reasoning reflect, at last, upon the *Apostle* himself; that He must not be allowed to have said only, what He hath said; but it must be proved absurd that He hath not said more than He hath?

2. This leads us to enquire farther into the honour done to the *Apostle*, by this modern account of what He *ought* to have, and consequently what He *had*, in view. For, it seems, nothing could become the *Apostle*, but to press *subjection to Unjust, Oppressive Princes*. Unless this were his aim, it seems, the *Discourse* was not worthy of *Him*. Of every thing else there was no need. *Unhappy Apostle!* not to know his own design; or not to prosecute it in a better method! that he should principally mean *Caligula*; and yet paint Him in such Colours as if He mean't to exclude him! that He should chiefly mean to press obedience to *Rulers* who are a *Terror* to good works; and yet make express mention of those only who are not so! that He should intend primarily to argue for *subjection* to such as attempt our Lives and Fortunes; and yet describe to us only the contrary! that it should be his chief design to settle the interest of those who watch for our destruction; and He should unhappily speak of those only who watch for the contrary! that He should have his Eye principally upon such as are *God's Scourges*; and yet should Describe only those who are his *Ministers* for the good of their People! in a word, that He should neglect those, whom only, You now say, it was worth his while to mention; for whose sake only it was worthy of Him to write upon this subject; that He should leave these to the common fate of a *general Expression*, (not *absolutely* interpreted even by your self; and particularly mention those whom, it seems, there was not the least

least occasion to mention; who need not his assistance, or his Zeal! What account can be given of this? Is it not true, literally true, that He doth not, in express words, so much as mention *Tyrannical Oppressive Governours*? Is it not as true that He mentions expressly those of the contrary Character, and hath woven them too closely into his Argument ever to be separated from it? What then shall we say? Would You, or any other, handle this design after this manner? When your chief, or only View, is to support the Interest of the *Bad, Oppressive Governours*, do you think it sufficient to do this by a few general Expressions, left to shift for themselves; and then to run off into the express description of *Good, and Excellent Governours*: the very mention of which in the same Argument, is entirely inconsistent with the main design? Is it not evident that, when this is in your view, you are so careful to speak only, or principally, in express words, of *Destructive and Tyrannical Governours*, as if nothing less than this could serve the purpose? and yet *St. Paul* must be supposed free from all Sense, and Conduct, unless He means this very thing, whilst He manifestly avoids one single express word about such sort of *Governours*; or so much as any hint, but what you are pleased to force into his general Expressions! But indeed *St. Paul's* avoiding the express mention of *Oppressive and Destructive Governours*, is to me a demonstration that his design at that time was not to concern himself about them. Had it been otherwise, who can think but that, instead of saying, *For Rulers are not a Terror to good Works, but to the Evil*, He must necessarily have been led to say (what his *Commentators* have since supplied) *For tho' Rulers be a Terror to good Works, and an Encouragement to all Evil, yet in all Cases, they must be submitted to.* This was the only point worthy

worthy of himself, according to his *New Defenders*. Here then remains the *Difficulty*. If your account of what alone it became *St. Paul* to handle with particular Zeal, be true; then it is *matter of Fact* that *St. Paul* hath avoided the doing what alone became Him: that is, the pressing subjection to *Tyrannical Governours*. If it were not worthy of Him, to take notice of any other; If there were no need of his Concern about *Good Governours*, or the *Magistratical Office* duly executed, as you affirm; then is it *matter of fact*, that He hath concerned Himself expressly to mention, what it was not worthy of an *Apostle* to touch upon. In both, the *Apostle* is very much obliged to you; and his Honour gloriously vindicated. But all who can think will, I hope, allow that the *Apostle* knew best his own Design; that was the fittest Judge of what it became Him to say; that what he hath actually said doth truly become Him; and that we ought to take his own express Words as the *Rule* for finding out his Design; and not to set our own Imaginations to frame a Design for him, and then declare it the only design worthy of him, before we consider whether it be agreeable, or contradictory, to his own express words.

3. You will not, your self, affirm, even in the Heat of your Zeal, that *St. Paul's Non-resistance* is to be *unlimited*, or to be practised in *all Cases*; nay, You give very broad Hints that you think the contrary: and yet, if this way of reasoning be good, it will equally hold, in those *Cases*, to which You will not extend it, and with as much force, as it doth in those, to which you apply it. For since the *Cases* put by you, p. 15. are no more mentioned by *St. Paul*, than those put p. 41. how easy it is for one, who is pressing *Non-resistance* in the most *absolute* and *unlimited manner* possible, to argue thus. The great Danger of all is, that a *Princes's Authority* should be cast off, when

when He laith waste the *Public Interest*; when He rageth against the *Lives*, and *Fortunes* of his *Subjects*. This is a matter worthy of an *Apostle* to interpose in; to quiet the provoked Spirits of his *Subjects*; to teach them to trust *Providence*, and to resign themselves to God, in the way of Submission. Here is a field of Discourse that deserves his Zeal, to keep Men from flying out in *Cases*, in which alone they have it in their power to make any *Head* against Him. As for *Cases* of *Private Injuries*; there is no great danger. How angry soever particular persons may be: yet few are concerned with them, if they see the *Public Interest* safe: and by their own *Resistance*, they know that they shall only sacrifice themselves. But the difficulty lies in the *Body* of *Subjects* practising *Passive Submission* when they are all injured, and have it in their power to cast off the *Yoke*. This, therefore, being the most worthy of the *Apostle's* zeal; to be sure was his design. This is the same way of *argument*: yet you declare, in effect, that you see not the force of it; and cannot say, that *St. Paul* meant so. Consequently therefore, neither will your own arguing the same way prove *St. Paul's* design to be what You are willing, at present, to have it thought; that it may go the worse with *some*, who think otherwise.

4. I must observe how consistent you are with your self, as to the argument now before us, in the short compass of a few pages; and this will furnish us with a compleat answer to the present difficulty: as it is peculiar indeed to some writers to make no *objections*, but what they have kindly taken care, by some of their own *Positions* in other places, fully to answer. P. 2. You assure us that there were *some* amongst the *Christians* who believed no Subjection to be due to any *Heathen Magistrates*; and *others* who thought none due to any of what sort soever: that is, in other words, there were amongst *Christians* several who were entirely indisposed to render *Obedience* and *Subjection* to the pre-

ling never so few of the *Jews only* embraced it, yet He hath often with zeal combated their Errors only; and that you your self say that *this* particularly deserved his zeal. 2. That many others might *judaize* in this particular, as well as in others. 3. That you your self say before, that this *Error* only was not the occasion of this passage; that there was another *Error* about *Christian Freedom* to be strenuously opposed; and the *Calumnies* of others to be wiped off from *Christianity*: which required a *great zeal*. That *first Error* therefore is not the only *Refuge*, as you here make it, nor the only *Key* to this *Discourse*: But I take all these occasions, which you your self lay down, and find that every one might effectually be answered without once commanding *Non-resistance* to such *Governours* as contradict the *Ends* of their *Institution*: and from hence conclude (as you ought to do, if you would speak consistently) that it was worthy of the *Apostle* to lay down what was sufficient for these occasions; and unworthy of *Him* to press that *Slavery* which would have brought the greatest *Odium* upon *Christianity*.

6. The matter of *Patience*, and *Good Temper* under *unjust sufferings*, which cannot honourably be avoided, is a matter wholly distinct from *subjection* to *Civil Governours*, as such: and therefore is not to be expected in the same passage. It is handled sufficiently, and inculcated upon *Christians*, in many places: and the first *Christians*, as I have shewn in another place, took their *Motives* to *Passive Obedience*, not from this passage of *St. Paul* about *Princes*, but from the other *Gospel-Injunctions* concerning *Forgiveness* of *Injuries*, and returning *Blessing* for *Cursing*, and the like. That *Injuries* are to be patiently born by *Christians*, whether coming from *Superiors*, *Equals*, or *Inferiors*, is the *Doctrine* of *St. Paul*: but it was not his business to inculcate this in this *passage*; but to speak of

of the *Magistratical Office*, and the *Duty* of *Subjects*, considered as such; which is a point wholly distinct from the other.

But it is not enough to argue thus from your own imaginations to what *St. Paul* ought to treat of. *St. Peter* likewise must be brought in, to affix your pleasure upon *St. Paul*. The next *argument* therefore is this. *St. Peter* delivered the same *Doctrine* of *Subjection* to *Bad Governours*, which you have attributed to *St. Paul* in this *Passage*: and consequently the *Precepts* here delivered by *St. Paul* concerning the *Higher Powers*, cannot be restrained to those *Higher Powers* who answer the *Ends* of their *Institution*; but must be extended to such as you describe, *p. 15*. Now the *Question* being here only about the meaning of *St. Paul* in this particular passage, one answer might suffice entirely to invalidate this argument, *viz.* that supposing *St. Peter* to have said in express words, which He never did, that *Subjects* must be entirely *Passive*, entirely submissive to their *Civil Governours*, tho' never so *oppressive*, never so *Tyrannical*; this is not of the least importance towards the finding *St. Paul's* meaning in this one particular *passage*. *St. Peter* might say these very words, and yet *St. Paul* might press obedience to *Good Governours*; and take his arguments, on another occasion, from their usefulness, and their excellence. This at once puts an end to this *objection*: for, there being several ways of speaking upon the same *subject*, according to the several occasions of doing it; it cannot be proved that two persons, speaking of it, must necessarily speak after the same manner, or handle it in the same extent, or urge it from the same *Topics*. *St. Paul* might commend one sort of *Charity* upon one occasion; and *St. Peter* another sort, upon another. So *St. Paul* might press obedience to *Magistrates* useful, and *beneficial*, in one particular passage; and this

without intending any thing further at that time notwithstanding that St. Peter; upon another occasion, might expressly urge the matter of *Submission* to a greater extent. Supposing this true therefore that you here say of St. Peter; it will follow indeed that the *Christian Religion* forbids *Resistance* to *Bad* as well as *Good Governours*: but it will not at all follow that St. Paul, in this passage, doth it; which is the only matter now in debate, and which is the conclusion, drawn without ground by you from this supposition. But now we will examine the reasons you give for introducing St. Peter as laying down those same precepts for *Subjects* which you have been pleased to frame for Him: for I confess, I do not love to see any thing fixed upon an *Apostle* which doth not seem to have been thought of by him.

1. Here again I observe, in the *first* place, that we must not be so happy as to have any proof of this from what the *Apostle* expressly saith of *Subjects*, and *Magistrates*: but must be led again into a plausible discourse of what it was most fit for St. Peter to say; and what he did say about *Slaves*; into whose condition that of *Subjects* must be now depressed, tho' neither taken *captive* by their *Kings*, nor bought in the *Market* into their service. But let us proceed.

2. We are told, therefore that St. Peter exhorts *Slaves who were Christians* to be *subject* to their *Masters*, not only to the *kind*, but to the *form*; and this immediately after he had been speaking of *Subjects* properly so called; that the argument made use of for the *Submission* of *Slaves* belongs to *Subjects* likewise; that the *Example* of *Christ* proposed to them, belongs more to *Subjects* than to *Slaves*, because *Christ* was ill-treated by the *Chief Magistrate*, and not by a *Private Master*. St. Peter, you say, plainly here signifies that we must be *subject*, not only to *form* *Masters*, but *Princes*, that is, such as treat us unjustly, roughly, and inhumanely; that it was of more

importance for Him to press *Obedience* to the *Civil Magistrates* than to *Private Masters*; that he therefore must have this chiefly in his mind; that his words ought to be refer'd to this, because he wrote to the dispersed *Strangers*, who, it is plain from this *Epistle*, had been very ill treated by the *Proconsuls*, the *Governours* of the *Provinces*, and therefore nothing was more worthy of Him than to support them under the *miseries* coming from such *Governours*: that consequently, he that separates these two *Heads* of *Discourse*, injures the *Apostle*, &c. To all which I answer,

1. St. Peter himself hath distinguished these two Matters, as much as it is possible for them to be distinguished in the same *Epistle*. Let any unprejudic'd person read *chap. 2. v. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.* and not only those two Verses which you have been pleased to single out; and judge if St. Peter doth not in them say all that at that time He thought proper to say about *Civil Subjection*. He layeth down the duty; and gives the *Reason* of it; and fully concludes his Sentence. Then, *v. 18.* without any connecting particle, or any mark of his thinking any more of that matter, He directs his *Discourse* to *Slaves* properly so called.

2. There is no sign of any relation, then thought of by St. Peter, between the two *Subjects*: unless it be that they are in the same *Chapter*; or that they immediately follow one another. Their being in the same *Chapter* is purely accidental; depending upon the will of those *Moderns* who divided the *Bible* into *Chapter* and *Verse*. And if this be enough to prove two matters to be closely related; certainly the argument will hold as strongly, that every thing in the *Epistle* tended originally to one and the same particular purpose: because at first it was all one continued *Chapter*. But if the *Argument* owes its original, and force, to this, that the *Duty* of *Slaves* follows immediately that of *Subjects*, I will undertake to prove by the

same argument, that in laying down the *Duty* of *Wives* immediately after that of *Slaves*, his mind was upon *Slaves* as well as *Wives*; and likewise upon the *Civil Obedience* of *Subjects*; nay, that *one* thing following *another*, must have reference to that *other*; which likewise following *another*, must have reference to the *preceding*; and so that there is nothing in the *Epistle*, distinct from that, *particular head* which had the good fortune to be *first*. This I say, because I am verily persuaded that, had these precepts relating to *Slaves* happened to have been laid down at the *End* of the next *Chapter*, we had never heard any thing of this *argument*: and yet their following next after those, concerning *Subjects* in a *Common Epistle*, in which distinct *Advice* was to be given to several sorts of *Christians*, hath not the least shadow of an *argument* that *St. Peter* had at that time any thing more in his mind than the direction of *Slaves* to whom particularly He speaks.

3. Had any *Writer* of *Common Sense* written, in the same distinct manner, to two distinct sort of Persons; I am confident no one would have used Him after this rate. No one, after He himself had distinguished his Discourse to *Slaves*, from that to *Subjects*, by particularly calling upon *Slaves*, before He begins his directions to them, and leaving off the *Discourse* begun to *Subjects*, would have taxed him with continuing his *Discourse* to *Subjects*; nay with principally intending to address to *them*, in a *Discourse* which He addresses to *others* by name.

But because it is said that *Christians* were now suffering great Evils from the *Proconsuls* and *Governours* of *Provinces*; that therefore the principal thing in the mind of the *Apostle* must be to teach them as *Subjects* to bear the injuries of their *Civil Governours*; and consequently that what was spoken to *Slaves* must be meant principally to *Subjects*: I must observe,

4. That

4. That the matter of *Fact* doth not at all appear. No one of the places quoted by you, doth upon examination, so much as hint that any of their *Evils* came from their *Civil Governours*: and I could not but be surprized to see such a formal quotation of *Texts*, void of any thing to the purpose pretended. Let any one look, and see, *ch. 1. v. 6, 7. ch. 2. v. 1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, ch. 5. v. 8, 9.* and He will not easily help joining with me in this surprize. *Ch. 1. v. 6, 7.* The *Apostle* indeed speaks of *Trials* of their *Faith*, which they either did then, or were likely to, experience. But it is very hard to infer from hence, that they could meet with no injuries, no *Trials*, but from their *Governours*; or that *St. Peter* meant, by these words, a Persecution raised against them by the *Proconsuls*, of whom He saith not one word here. It will be hard, in the next place, to imagine why, *ch. 2. v. 1.* is quoted, in which there is not one word of *Injuries* from the *Heathen World*, but an exhortation to lay aside all Malice, in order to their profiting by the word, &c. as it follows. And if this proves that the *Proconsuls* were then persecuting them; I think it will as well follow that when you are preaching against these Vices, and arguing *Christians* into the *simplicity*, and innocence of *New-born Children*, that you mean by this to signify that they are in a State of Persecution from their *Civil Governours*. Verses, 12, 13, to 19. are likewise alleged. But who could have expected it? He commands *Christians* to be *subject* to the *Proconsuls*, as to those sent for the punishment of Evil Doers, and the praise of them that do well. And shall it be made to follow from hence, that these *Governours* were now actually doing the direct contrary? Or rather, Is it possible indeed to imagine that *St. Peter* had any thing of this in his thought,

thought ; since, when He mentions these *Proconsuls*, and *Governours* of *Provinces*, (which was the proper time for doing it.) He doth not give the least hint of any such thing ? This is very observable that, as *St. Paul* describes his *Rulers* as *Terrors to Evil works only*; so *St. Peter* describes these *Governours* as sent for the punishment of *Evil doers*, and the praise of them that do well: than which description nothing could be more weak, had it been true that these *Proconsuls* themselves were now harrasing, and oppressing these *Christians*; or that his principal aim had been to teach them submission, as *Subjects*, to the oppressive and *Tyrannical Governours* of their *Provinces*. For let any one try the argument; and see how it will sound. Submit your selves to the *Governours* of *Provinces*, tho' harrasing, oppressing, and tormenting You: Submit your selves to them, doing you all manner of injuries, as to *Officers sent for the punishment of Evil doers only*, and the praise of them that do well. i. e. submit your selves to them doing one thing, because they were sent to do only the contrary. Who can affix such reasoning upon the *Apostle*? Again, It can no more follow from *St. Peter's* Exhorting *Slaves* to be subject to *Froward, Humoursome, Bad Masters*; that the *Proconsuls* were now injuring, oppressing, tormenting their *Christian Subjects*; than it would follow from your advising the *Slaves* in the *West-Indies* to bear patiently with their *Masters Unjust Usage*, that these *Masters* and others were now under a *State* of bitter persecution from their *Civil Governours*. Yet this is alleged by you for a proof. Last of all, *ch. 5. v. 8, 9.* the *Apostle* puts them in mind that the *Devil* goeth about like a roaring *Lion*, seeking whom He may devour, and exhorts them to *Patience* from the example of other *Christians* sufferings: and that it should presently appear from hence

hence that these sufferings came from their *Governours*, and not their *Fellow-subjects*, will seem hard to all, who are not resolved it shall be so, notwithstanding that *St. Peter* hath said nothing like it, but something very irreconcilable to this supposition, in that passage in which He speaks expressly of these *Governours*. Again,

5. How must it reflect upon *St. Peter*, to say that this must be his principal aim, to make *Subjects* submit to *Bad Governours*, because it is of more importance than the *Subjection* of *Slaves* to *Bad Masters*; when we find Him executing this *End*, not by speaking to *Subjects* themselves, but to *Slaves*; not by commanding *subjection*, in words, to *Bad Governours*, but to *Froward Masters*. I appeal to your self, or any *Modern Defender* of *Non-resistance*, whether, if it were your principal aim to press this *Duty* upon *Subjects*, as such, You would first tell them only in general that *Obedience* to *Civil Governours* was a *Duty*; and give them a Reason for it, and there conclude with them, to all appearance; without so much as the least mention of what You particularly aimed at: and then immediately call upon *Slaves*, properly so called, and tell them that they must patiently bear with their *Masters* who bought them, or took them *captive*, if they should be unreasonable, and sometimes punish them without ground. Would you leave that great *Duty* thus to be picked out of *Expressions* directed to other Persons? and would you design principally to press one sort of Men to a *Duty*, and not mention it to them, but to others? How dangerous would this way be? Might not the *Subjects*, properly so called, argue thus. Our Condition is very different from that of *Slaves*. We neither were taken *Captive*, in a just War; nor bought in the *Market* for the service of our *Civil Governours*: therefore it is not at all probable that our
Teacher

Teacher should mean to include us in the same discourse with Slaves properly so called. And as it is not probable that He should do so; so it appears that He did not: for He first speaks to us; and then calls upon Slaves to hear him, before He layeth down their Duty. And having avoided speaking of such a Duty to us, as He expressly doth to Slaves; it seems rather that He did not think fit to lay the same Duty upon us, as Subjects, which He mentions to them; than that He would put us into their Condition. Surely, if he designed this doctrine principally for Subjects, He would have said it directly to us, as Subjects; and not have addressed himself to Slaves, chiefly in order to tell us, who are not Slaves, our Duty. And as neither you, nor any Writer of Common sense would have acted this part; so We may expect, you would not lay it upon the Apostle that He hath done that which your self would not have thought fitting, or prudent, or tolerable, to have done.

6. How hard is the fate of Subjects, that they must be brought into the Condition of Slaves; below the state of mercenary Servants, into that of servitude properly so called. Many years have not passed since a certain Writer, nearly related to your self, boasted that the Clergy had been more than once instrumental in removing Yokes, of all sorts, from the necks of Englishmen. But now, it seems, the Yoke of Slavery it self is not too hard, to be brought upon them. Now, the same Rules which included Roman Slaves, must include them. To speak of Slaves is all one as to speak of Subjects. Their Lords and Masters are to represent Civil Governours; who must therefore be to Subjects, as they are to their Slaves. But first, Sir, You should have shewn us the price paid for Subjects by their Princes; in what market they were bought into their absolute power;

power; or in what just War they forfeited their lives, and were taken captive.

7. But the Example of Christ, say you, is more peculiarly fit to be urged to Subjects than to Slaves: therefore, consequently, this passage, in which that Example is urged, tho' directed to Slaves, yet was designed particularly for Subjects. Here again, I cannot but be concerned for the Apostle's credit, who, by this way of arguing, must be supposed either not to know what was proper for Him to do; or not to do what He knew to be proper. For again I ask, If you your self knew this to be much more proper to be proposed to Subjects than to Slaves; and had it in your design to urge the Duty of Passive Obedience upon them: would you, whilst you had this design, address your self to Subjects, and not speak one plain word about it to them? and would you, in turning your Discourse to Slaves, urge them with an argument much more proper for Subjects than for them? or, what you knew peculiarly to touch the Case of those Subjects, would you not so much as mention, in a Discourse particularly directed to them; but reserve it to be said to others, to whom it doth not so much belong? Is this the likeliest? Is this a tolerable method, of recommending a matter to those whom it most nearly concerns; to pass it over in silence whilst you particularly address to them; and to recommend it to others, after you have, in all appearance, made an end of what concerns the former? And yet this absurdity is fixed here upon the Apostle, viz. that his design was to press upon Subjects Non-resistance to Bad Governours; that to this end He knew, it to be peculiarly proper to urge the Example of Christ; that nevertheless He speaks not one word of this when He particularly applies Himself to Subjects; but afterwards speaks that to Slaves, which He designed should peculiarly touch the Case of Subjects,

jects, consider'd as *Subjects*. Let any one digest this that can. I know that our *Lord* suffered, not at the command of any *private Master*, but at the command of the *Civil Magistrate*, (not of the *Summus Magistratus*, the *Supreme Magistrate*, as you hastily say, but) of a *Deputed Governour*. But I know that his *Example of Patient suffering* is fit to be recommended to all his followers, under their Injuries, and Oppressions; and amongst the rest to *Slaves*, unjustly used by their *Masters*. This is done frequently in the *New Testament*: but it is never once applied to the *Case of the Body of Civil Subjects*, properly so called, oppress'd by their *Civil Governours*. And I will be bold to say, that, as this is entirely avoided by the *Sacred Writers*, so the application of his *Example* to their *Case* is of all others the most improper. And tho' in saying this, I am so unhappy as seemingly to contradict you in *this* place; yet I am so happy likewise, as seemingly to agree with you, in *another*. For

8. When you come at last to the point, you cannot help tacitly confessing, in effect, that You cannot collect either from *St. Peter*, or *St. Paul*, that the *Passive Obedience* laid upon *Slaves*, (if that be the same with that laid upon *Subjects*) is *absolute*, and *unlimited*; or, that *Christ's Example*, who made no *Resistance*, is peculiarly adapted to the *Case of Subjects*, tho' never so injuriously treated by their *Civil Governours*. For if you thought this, surely you would have ventured to have said, what *Inclination*, and *Resentment* carried you powerfully to say, *viz.* that as there was *nothing* of Injury and Oppression, to which our *Lord* did not think fit to submit patiently; so there was no injury, no oppression so great, but *Subjects*, (every individual Subject belonging to the *Body*) ought readily and quietly to submit to it. Let any one compare what you have

have said upon this passage of *St. Peter*, with what you could not help saying afterwards; and they will see the *Cause of Non-resistance* no more indebted to you than to me: only with this *difference*, that you betray it with a *Kiss*, and I openly and professedly oppose it.

9. The Truth of the matter seems to be this. Our *Lord's Example* is the great *pattern of Patient suffering*; the great *Example* to which we are to look when we are in hard Circumstances, surrounded with Evils which we cannot honourably avoid; and from thence to receive Encouragement, considering how much more excellent He was, and yet what sufferings He met with, and what noble fortitude, and patience, He displayed in his own Person. But this all relates to the *manner* in which we are to suffer those *Evils*, which we cannot honourably avoid; or which it is for the honour of God that we should suffer. And this *Example* is very proper to be recommended to *Superiors* as well as to *Inferiors*; to *Kings*, and *Masters*, as well as to *Subjects*, and *Slaves*. But his *Example* is never proposed to us, in order to be imitated in every part of his *Conduct* relating to his sufferings. His great design moved *Him* willingly to put himself into the hands of his *Enemies*, even when They were no more than *Private Enemies*; and of those, who, He knew, would take away his life. He had this power to lay down his Life: *We* have not. It would be *sin* in *us* thus to expose ourselves. We have no warrant to bear us out. Therefore neither, in this place, is our *Lord's Example* urged to tell even *Slaves* themselves that there is no *Case* in which they may resist their *Lords*; but to put them in mind of the glory of suffering injuries patiently; and, in many Cases, of preferring that before a *Violent Redress*. The *manner* therefore, and not the *matter*, if I may so speak, of our *suffering*

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64 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*

is to be taken from the *Example* of our *Lord*; how we are to suffer; not *what*; after *what manner* we are to bear the *Evils* which we cannot honourably avoid. But what sort of *Evils* those are; and how far we are to submit to injurious Persons, whether *Superiors*, *Equals*, or *Inferiors*, cannot be altogether learned from the *Example* of our *Blessed Lord*, whose *Circumstances*, and *Design*, and *Commission*, made *that*, in many *Cases*, fit for Him to do, which would not be justifiable in us.

It will as soon follow from our *Lord's Example*, that an *Imocent Person* is obliged in Conscience to go, and deliver himself up into the hands of his *Virulent Enemies*; passively to be led by them to a *Trial* before a *Deputed Governour*; to do nothing for his own acquittance, but profess his *Imocence*; to submit to his *unjust Sentence*, and suffer a death which He could easily avoid: All this, I say, will as soon follow from our *Lord's Example*; nay, much sooner, than that a *Nation* is obliged tamely to submit to *Universal Oppression* and *Misery*, at the will of their *Civil Governour*. Yet is this *Example* still triumphantly urged in this *Controversy*: but ever without taking notice of what hath been said upon it; and without considering what Injustice is this way done to that *Blessed and Glorious Person*, whose *Example* it is. I pray God forgive those who make such use of it! But

10. It is so far from being true that his *Example* was more peculiarly fit to be recommended to *Subjects*, considered as *such*, than to *Slaves*; that I think the very contrary to be evident. For our *Lord's* voluntary Humiliation is compared by himself to that of a *Servant*. The illustration is not once, as I know of, taken from the condition of a *Civil Subject*: but when his lowest estate is to be described, the allusion is made to the circumstances of a *Servant*. When St. Paul is to give the liveliest repre-

An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 65

representation possible of that *Condescension*, and *Humility*, which re-exalted our *Lord* to the *Right hand of God*, it is done in these words, that He took on Him the form of a *Servant*, or *Slave*; not of a *Subject*, or member of a *Commonwealth*. Now, had the state of a *Subject*, and the *submission* due from a *Subject* to his *Civil Governour*, been of the lowest sort possible, and circumscribed by the fewest limitations; nay, had it been but of the same degree with that of *Slaves*; I cannot but think that the lowliness of our *Lord's* condition would have been, at least as often, represented by the estate of *Subjects*; as by that of *Slaves*. But it being always the contrary; I cannot forbear making the two following observations: that there is so essential a difference between *Civil subjection* to *Governours* instituted for the good of the *Governed*, and the *servitude* of *Slaves* bought by Money for the *service* of their *Masters*, that the *Apostle* cannot but be supposed to treat so distinctly of them as not to confound their *Circumstances*, which are very different; and likewise that the *Example* of our *Lord* is much more peculiarly fit to be urged to *Slaves*, by whose *Condition* He is pleased frequently to describe his own *low estate*, than to *Subjects*, whose *Condition* is never used to that purpose, and whom He never is said to personate in his lowest, and most oppressed condition. He suffered indeed under the eye, and by the order, of a *Civil Governour*: for He had no *Private Lord*, or *Master*, to whom He was really a *Slave*; and by whom He could be barbarously used. But that in his *Deportment*, at this time, He thought not of pointing out in his own *Example*, the *Duty* of *Subjects*; is very plain from his first giving up himself to the fury of his *Enemies*, when He could have escaped. Nay, He doth not in the least inti-

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mate that it was not lawful for *Him*, or any other innocent Person, to get out of their hands by forcible Resistance. He only argues from the Prophecies of his suffering, and from his own design in coming into the World, that He must voluntarily lay down his Life; and that this being resolved, his Disciples Resistance would be only their own Ruine: but never intimates, that, setting apart these considerations, it would not have been justifiable in *Him* to have been rescued by the power of Angels; or in *St. Peter* to have used his Sword in his Defence. In this part of his Conduct, therefore, He personated not the Civil Subject, properly so called: nor is this peculiarly fitted to the imitation of Subjects, who are not in the least obliged to such a Conduct. For nothing but the nature of his great design obliged *Him* voluntarily to yield himself up to the Death decreed *Him*: from which He could otherwise have rescued himself without the shadow of a Crime. Nor is this voluntary exposing himself to suffering, as I observed before, recommended even to Slaves: but, the patient suffering of their great Master is recommended to them. And this, I say, is peculiarly proper in their Case: because He is said, with respect to his lowest, and most miserable condition, to have taken on him their form, and under that humble appearance to have suffered with great fortitude, to have been as a Slave himself, and so to have gone before them in bearing ill usage. Besides,

11. Tho' this Example be proposed to Slaves, to encourage them to patience under the ill-usage of Bad Masters; and tho' we suppose this extended to the Case of Subjects: yet neither are the Worst Masters mentioned; nor the highest sort of Evils. Δύσκολοι, which signifies froward, humourfome ill-tempered,

tempered, doth not include all who are, in any degree, barbarous, and inhumane. The Evil particularly specified, viz. Buffeting, or Beating, doth by no means extend to Evils of the highest, and most intolerable nature. And therefore nothing in favour of Absolute Non resistance; nothing that bears the least relation to the ruine, or sufferings, of a whole nation, can be collected from hence. Nor can you say it, your self, when you come to put the Case. Let it be so therefore, that *St. Peter* intended in this passage, which doth not at all appear, to command the submission of Subjects to such Princes as answer to the Δύσκολοι, the Froward, amongst the Masters of Slaves; that he mean't here to press upon Subjects the duty of suffering (in Cases of a particular and private nature) Evils parallel to that here specified, viz. Buffeting, or Beating: what follows from hence? Not that the most outrageous Tyrant is to be born. Not that the greatest of Evils are to be submitted to. Not that *St. Peter* himself said this before He said it; or while He argued only from the usefulness of the office of Governours, v. 14. Not that *St. Paul* said it, or mean't it, where He argues from quite other Topics. Not any thing indeed against any one avowed principle of mine: unless it be this, that Doctrines ought not to be built upon imaginary foundations; or to be fixed upon particular texts in which they are not so much as hinted at.

12. I will make but one observation more upon your interpretation of this passage. Deputed Governours are expressly mentioned by *St. Peter*, v. 14. as well as supreme, v. 13. and submission, in the same general word, is commanded to both. If therefore what he afterwards saith of Slaves and Bad Masters, were designed for the Subjects, and

Rulers, spoken of before; it must hold good with respect to *Deputed*, and *Inferior Governours*, as well as the *supreme*: because both were expressly mentioned. The *Instance* specified by Him, is (as we translate the word) *Buffeting*. Now something very like to this happened to *St. Paul*, a *Subject*, and a *Christian*, by order of *Deputed Governours*. I only ask any one, of the most ordinary Capacity, whether *St. Paul*, considering himself as a *Subject*, behaved himself as under the direction of these *Rules*, laid down for *Slaves*: or whether He did not sedately, and deliberately (as a thing fit for him, and worthy of his character,) resent the usage in expressions of a very remarkable nature. *Paul* and *Silas* were *beaten with many Stripes*, by the order of the *Magistrates* of *Philippi*. According to you, therefore, *St. Peter* declareth it to be their *Duty* to pass it all over in silence, and to follow *Christ's* example, who *when He suffered, threatned not*. That *St. Paul* threatned these *Deputed Magistrates*, is evident from their own fear of the *Consequences*. That He would not pass it over in silence, (as He would have done, had He been their *Slave*, and they His *Lords*;) is, I think, as evident. That He thought the matter of a *public* and *general concernment*; and the *Case* of *Roman Subjects* entirely different from that of *Slaves*; is likewise plain. When He considered these very *Deputed Officers* as executing an useful *Office* in the world, He calls them the *ordinance of God*, and thinks nothing too high for them. *Rom. 13. 1.* which you your self interpret of *subordinate*, as well as *supreme*. But when He found them *injurious* to Him; destroying his *Rights*, and in his, those of all *Roman Subjects*; then He speaks nothing of the *Ordinance of God*, when He had the greatest opportunity of explaining

ing Himself in favour of the most absolute *Passive Obedience*. Then He *threatens* those who were *ordained of God*: and talks of them, with an ayre of singular freedom, as of Persons that were without that character whilst they were transgressing the *Ends* of their *Institution*. He did not resist their *Injustice* indeed by *force*: nor could He if He would. But when they, sensible of their Error, entreat Him to go quietly away. He answers, *Act. 16. 37.* *They have beaten us openly, uncondemned, &c.* which certainly is some degree of *judging*, of *censuring*, and *opposing* the *ordinance of God*, if some Men's *Doctrine* be true. This his *Behaviour* to *Deputed Magistrates*, (who are mentioned expressly by *St. Peter*, as sent for the punishment of *Evil Doers*, and the *Praise of them that do well*,) shews that He did not understand Himself to be obliged to as quiet a *submission* to their *Injustice*, as *St. Peter* recommends to *Slaves*: and consequently that *St. Peter* intended not what He saith to *Slaves*, as a *Rule* necessary to bind *Subjects*, as such.

Thus much may, I think, suffice to prove, against all your *allegations*, that what *St. Peter* saith to *Slaves*, was not designed by Him for the use of *Subjects*: to whom He had before spoken distinctly; and founded their *Duty* upon a very different bottom.

You add therefore, *p. 18.* that, upon supposition that these words of *St. Peter*, directed to *Slaves*, were designed only for *Them*, and not for *Subjects*, yet certainly, if this *subjection* be owing from *Slaves* to *Masters*, much more is it due from *Subjects* to *Civil Magistrates*. For if the *Authority* of *Civil Rulers* be kept up; all *Domestic Discipline* will likewise be kept in force: but if the *Civil Authority* once fall, the *other* must fall with it. To this I answer,

1. It is very true that in *Societies*, under a *settled Civil Government*, it is of more consequence to uphold the *Authority of Civil Governours*, than the private *Authority of Masters* over their *Slaves*: and from hence it follows, that if it be *God's will* to take care of *Rights* of a more private nature, it must be supposed to be his greater *Concern* to take care of the *Authority of Those* whose *Influence* is more diffusive, and hath great effect upon the *Rights* of all under them. If this be all you mean; as one would think by the latter part of your *argument*; what will follow from hence? It will follow indeed, that it is the will of *God*, and the concern of *Christianity*, that the *Authority of Civil Governours* should be kept up: but this only as far as is necessary to the attaining the *Ends* of their *Institution*. It will follow that *Subjects* should be obedient and submissive: but this only in things consistent with that *End*. But it will not follow that the *Case of Subjects* is parallel to that of *Slaves*, as to *submission*; much less that it is *worse*: as you would here make it, without considering that You are resolved, before you come to the *End* of your *Sermon*, in effect, to unsay it all again. It is true that, if *God* takes care of the *Rights of Private Masters*, He certainly takes care of the *Rights of Princes*: so likewise, if *God* takes care of the *Rights of Husbands*, it is certain He takes care of the *Rights of Civil Magistrates*, which are of more public concern. It is certain likewise that all *Domestic Order* is the more securely kept up, whilst the *Magistrate's Authority* is unviolated; that is, whilst his due *authority* is kept up as far as his *Office* requires. But all this is not the least proof that the *Rights of Governours* are the same with those of *Husbands*, or with those of *Masters of Slaves*;

Slaves; or that the *submission of Subjects* must be the same with that of *Slaves*.

2. If you mean to argue thus, If *Masters*, whose *Concerns* are of a private *Nature*, must thus be submitted to by their *Slaves*; certainly much more must *Princes*, whose *Influence* is of a wider extent, be thus submitted to: I answer, that there is no *Consequence* in the *argument*. *Slaves*, bought with *Mony*, or taken *Captive in War*, may be obliged to bear many things from their *Masters*, which *Subjects*, who were not so purchased, may not be obliged to submit to. The *foundation* of the two *relations* is so very different, that no such *argument* can be framed, to conclude them both equally. I do not here say that it may not be proved from *other arguments* that *Subjects* must submit patiently to many *Evils*, as well as *Slaves*. But I say, it can never be proved that this is the *Duty of Subjects*, because it is the *Duty of Slaves*: unless it be first proved that *Subjects* are exactly in the same *Case* with *Slaves*; or in a *worse*.

3. I deny not but that the *Example of Christ* is proper to be urged to all *Christians* suffering wrongfully; as well as to *Slaves*: that it may properly be proposed to the consideration of *Subjects*, or *Sons*, or *Wives*, under unjust persecution, or oppression. And so it may to *Kings*, to *Fathers*, to *Husbands*; to support them under the *Evils* brought upon them even by their *Inferiours*. But this alone will not prove that the same degree of *Non-resistance to Violence* is required of *Subjects* that is of *Slaves*; any more than it will that *Superiours* may not defend themselves from the attempts of *Inferiours*. And therefore no argument can be urged from *St. Peter's* using this motive, to prove that *Subjects* and *Slaves* are equally obliged to bear the same

Evils, without *Resistance*: any more than it may be urged that *Superiors* are likewise obliged to the same *Passive Non-resistance*; because our *Lord* and *Master*, superior to us all, endured, with *silence* and *submission*, the greatest *Evils* from the hands of his *Inferiors*, his *Servants*, and his *Subjects*.

4. Your *argument* being built upon this, that it is of the greatest importance to the *Establishment*, and *Security* of all *Private Rights*, that the *Authority* of the *Magistrate* should be kept up; I must observe that all the world acknowledges it in, all *those Cases* in which these *Private Rights* are generally supported by Him. But put the *Case*, that this *Emperour*, or *King*, or whatever He be, by virtue of his *Power* and *Strength*, invades these very *Rights*; pretends to dissolve all obligations between *Masters* and *Slaves*; *Husbands* and *Wives*; *Parents* and *Children*; and acts the part supposed by you, p. 41. You your self cannot, and will not, say that his *Authority* is still to be kept up. Nay, It inevitably follows, from the *tenour* of your own *argument*; if the *End* proposed in *Civil Magistracy* be the preservation of these *private Rights* of all others; that, when He himself invades them, this *argument* can no longer be urged for his support, but it self will serve for the contrary. Because the *End* of his having *authority*, being the *preservation* of those *private Rights*; this must be of more worth than any particular *Means* for the compassing that *End*. And consequently, when the *power* of a *person* will destroy the *End* for which it was given Him; that *End* must be answered another way, and *New means* made use of for the compassing it. Thus doth your own *argument* prove nothing in favour of

of the *Power* of *Princes*; but that it must be submitted to, as far as is consistent with the *End* of their *Institution*, that is, as long as these *private Rights* are generally preserved by them, to which you your self make their *Institution* to be subservient. And thus much have I said many and many a time: tho' it be not worthy of your notice. But when you go farther; your *argument* fails, and turns it's whole force against *those* whom before it served. For if their *Power* must be kept up, because that will most *effectually* secure all *Private Rights*; then, supposing all *Private Rights* to be invaded by this very *Power*, it will follow that this *Power* must not be kept up, for that very reason for which, upon the contrary supposition, it ought to be supported, and submitted to.

From all this any one may see what to judge of your conclusion of this head, p. 18. to this effect. *The summ of what has been said is this, that it is St. Peter's judgment that we must submit, and obey the Magistrate, however badly executing his Office; however injuring and damaging us. And since St. Peter in this, as it were, acted the part of St. Paul's Interpreter, or, at least, differ'd not from him; it follows from hence, that St. Paul was of the same mind: and consequently that the Precepts, laid down by Him concerning our Duty to the Higher Powers, ought not to be restrained to those Magistrates only, who do perfectly answer the Ends of their Office; qui officio suo prorsus satisfaciunt.* For, 1. It is plain that, in speaking expressly about *Civil Subjection*, St. Peter speaks not one word of *Bad Magistrates*; but expressly of *Governours sent for the punishment of Evil doers, and the praise of them that do well*: exactly parallel to St. Paul's way of speaking. 2. That what he speaks to *Slaves* could not be intended

74 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*

tended by *Him* for the use of *Subjects*, considered as *such*. 3. That *St. Peter* thought nothing of interpreting *St. Paul*; that there is not the least appearance of any thing like it; that there can hardly be any thing supposed of *Him*, more mean, than that He interprets the Precepts of *St. Paul*, given to *Subjects*, by directing his *Discourse* to *Slaves*, after He had left off speaking to *Subjects*; and this without giving them the least notice of his design: And that it will as soon follow that, in what He saith to *Wives*, He designed artfully to interpret *St. Paul's* Doctrine about *Subjects*. 4. That it was his whole design to remove that foolish opinion of *Christian Freedom* from the minds of *Christians*; and to reconcile them to the Office of *Magistrates* as useful, and approved of by their *Lord*. 5. That, supposing He had carried the *Doctrine* of *Passive Obedience* never so high, it will not follow from hence, that *St. Paul* might not, upon another occasion, speak of *Magistrates* with another view; and reason about them after such a manner as necessarily to include only *Good Magistrates*: I do not here say, so as to exclude all of the contrary sort; but so as not to signify at the same time, the least part of his judgment about them. 6. Your putting in the word *prorsus* is something extraordinary. For no one hath ever, as I know of, restrained *St. Paul's* precepts to *such Magistrates* only as do, in every *punctilio*, exactly do their Office: But to such as He himself mentions expressly; such as do, in some tolerable sense, answer his Character, and may, in a good sense, be called *Terrors to Evil Works, and not to the Good*: The very mention of which in particular, and not of any other sort, is a Demonstration that the *others* were not at that time in his Thoughts. I shall here add, that

An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 75

that since, according to your own affirmation, *St. Paul's* Declarations were originally designed by Him for *subordinate* as well as *supreme Magistrates*; since in the *Higher Powers* He himself included both, speaking of *both* in the same *expression*; it will follow from hence that no degree of *Subjection* to the *supreme* can be expressly commanded in this Passage, which is not commanded to the *subordinate*; and consequently that you cannot from *St. Paul's* expressions argue *Subjects* into *Submission* to all possible attempts of *Princes* like *Caligula*, unless (which I hardly think) you can be so unmerciful as to *subject* them equally to the mercy of every *subordinate Magistrate*; to the *Insults* and *Violences* even of the *lowest Officer* in the *Executive Branch*. And since you your self, even in the heat of your Zeal, cannot at last deny that some sort of *Princes* may be excepted out of his *Argument*; which is as truly a *Restraint* upon his *general Precept* as any thing taught by me: methinks your *severity* might have been spared upon *one*, who put no more restraint upon his words than *St. Paul* himself put; and who never spake of a *Nation's* throwing off *Allegiance* to any but *such* as you are pleased your self silently at last to drop out of the *Argument*; and to declare, in effect, that you cannot be their *Advocate*.

Thus much for the *second Head* of your *Discourse*; under which you undertook to shew, *How far we are obliged to be subject to the Civil Magistrate, according to St. Paul*: and under which I have endeavoured to shew that you have contradicted both the express words of *St. Paul*, and your own *Concession* at the end of your *Discourse*; that you have not one positive proof of *St. Paul's* thinking at that time upon any *Governours* but such as truly execute the *Magistratical*

tical Office ; and that your *probable Arguments* are of no importance in this Case ; that your own account of the *false Notions* amongst *Christians* fully releases *St. Paul* from any design besides that of reconciling the understandings, and affections, of those weak Men to the *Magistratical Office* ; and that *St. Peter* cannot, with the least shew of Reason, be said designedly to speak to *Subjects*, under the notion and title of *Slaves* ; or to have it in his *View* to interpret *St. Paul's Instructions* to *Subjects*, by directing his *Discourse* to Persons of quite another rank. I proceed now to your *third Head*, in which you undertake

III. To consider the *Arguments* made use of by *St. Paul* to enforce that *Subjection*, and *Non-resistance*, which He laid upon the *Christians* at that time. And these you say, p. 19. are two. The first taken from that sacred fountain from whence flowed the Majesty of Kings, and Right of Governing, viz. *There is no power but of God.* The other drawn from the great usefulness of their Office, both to private persons, and to the whole Community, viz. *For He is the Minister of God to Thee for good, &c.*

First. With respect to *St. Paul's first Argument*, viz. *The Fountain of Civil Authority* ; I observe, That, having pronounced that it ought not to be supposed that there ever was a time in which Men lived without what we properly call *Civil Government* ; and that it can never be proved that the Power of Life and Death, now in the Magistrate, resided originally in the whole Community, and from them was transferred to Him : I say, having pronounced these decisions, and made a civil excuse of being in too great haste to stay to prove either of them ; you refer us to some texts of

of *Scripture*, which you would have us believe to be inconsistent with these Suppositions. I confess that sometimes *Hast* is a good excuse ; and that there is not room in a *short Sermon* to insist upon every thing. But it happens unluckily that this *Excuse* should be made use of in that part of your *Discourse* which was not preached ; and in which you had all the leisure you could desire to insert any thing *material*. But

i. We are told that there is not much need of saying any thing upon those *two heads*, because they may be refuted by one Sentence of *St. Paul's*, *There is no power but of God.* Let us a little try this matter. The first of them is this, that there was a time before the *Institution* of *Civil Government*, properly so called. *St. Paul's* affirmation, according to your present Interpretation, is this, that there is no *Magistratical Authority*, but what comes immediately from *God*. Now it will puzzle the ablest heads, I believe, to find out how this position, supposing it to be *St. Paul's*, refutes the other beforementioned ; or how the affirming all *Power* to be from *God*, contradicts this Supposition, that there was a time in which Men lived *subject* to no particular *Civil Magistrate*. This is no more inconsistent with *St. Paul*, even as you interpret Him, than it would be to affirm that there are places in the world at this time without *Civil Governours* ; nay, no more than to affirm it possible that there may be such places. The second of the positions is this, that the People, *i. e.* the whole Body, having at first in themselves that power of *Defense*, which is now in *Civil Magistrates* for their good, it was transfer'd from them to their *Governours*. This is likewise to be confuted by this one affirmation of the *Apostle's* ; to which

which I have shewn, in the *Reply* to the *Lord Bishop of Exeter*, that it doth not in the least oppose it self: Unless you first resolve that the *Apostle* shall mean, in this place, that there is no *Authority* in any *Civil Magistrate* but what comes *immediately* from God; and is appointed by Him, in the highest sense of the words, and not in the common acceptation of them in *Scripture*. But this is taking the very matter in debate for granted: And after this manner indeed *Transubstantiation*, or any thing may be proved *Scriptural*: And multitudes of the greatest *Truths* made *Contradictions* in *Scripture*. But since such stress hath been lately laid upon these high expressions of *St. Paul*, as if it had been his professed business to treat accurately about the *Original of Civil Government*: I have thought my self obliged very particularly to consider *this*, and what other expressions you have here alleged against the *Humane Original of Civil Authority*, in the preceding part of these *Papers*, in which I expressly handle this matter. But besides what I have there, and in other places, said, with respect particularly to *St. Paul's* expression; I must not here omit *two* or *three observations*: because they are such as are peculiarly proper to be recommended to you, as they arise from your own *principles*, and *concessions*.

1. You acknowledge, nay, you contend, p. 5. that what is here said, by *St. Paul*, of the *Powers*, respects the *Persons* possess'd of *Authority*; and not the *Authority*, of which they are possess'd. And the *Power*, ἐξουσία, in the singular number, v. 2. You interpret, p. 10. of the *Person* governing; and even considered as acting in many instances against his *Commission*. *He that resists the Power*, &c. Nor is it probable indeed that *St. Paul*, who u-
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feth ἐξουσίαι, and ἐξουσία, (*Powers*, and *Power*) so often in *two verses*, should not always use the word in the same sense. Nay, the *Power*, (ἐξουσία) to which *Resistance* is forbid, as to the *Ordinance of God*, is the same *Power*, the very ἐξουσία which in the verse before is declared to be from *God*. So that from hence it follows, according to you, that what is said of ἐξουσία, or *Power*, is said of the *Person* possess'd of it; and not of the *governing Authority* it self. And have you so soon forgot this, as to produce a Sentence, in which this very word is used, in order to prove the *Divine Appointment* of the *Authority*, and not of the *Person*? Doth it not follow that, if you will understand *St. Paul's* expression to signify an immediate Interposition, it must signify that the very designation and appointment of the *Person governing*, whether *Caligula*, *Claudius*, or *Nero*, was from *God immediately*; that, if the *Power* not to be resisted, v. 2. be the *Person governing*, as you say, p. 10. then the *Power* immediately coming from *God*, v. 1. which is the same, must likewise be the *Person Governing*? This, I believe, is an absurdity too great for you to swallow: And one would think, enough to have prevented you, of all Men, from interpreting *St. Paul's* words, as of an *immediate Divine Interposition*. For, according to you, if they intended *that*; they must relate to the *persons*: But they cannot possibly so relate to the *Persons Governing*: and therefore they could not be so intended by *St. Paul*.

2. You do likewise affirm, p. 6. that the *Higher Powers*, and *Power*, spoken of by *St. Paul*, take in the *subordinate*, as well as *supreme*: And were intended so to do, by Him. From hence I form another argument that *St. Paul* could not mean his
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high expression, of a Commission immediately from God. For the sense must then run thus. Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers, i. e. To the Civil Magistrates, as well subordinate as supreme. For there is no Authority, whether in the supreme, or subordinate, but what comes immediately from God. This no one contends for, in the Case of subordinate Magistrates; because the contrary is apparent: And therefore St. Paul, who, according to you, saith of their Authority, that it is from God, could not possibly mean it of his immediate Commission to them. Once more.

3. You often affirm, that St. Peter acts the Interpreter of St. Paul, 1 Ep. ch. 2. v. 12, &c. If you truly think so, the Case will be too plain to be denied. For if He, having in view St. Paul's Declarations, that there is no Power but of God; and that the Powers that be are ordained of God; asserts, with design of Interpreting this, that Governours are an humane Ordinance, and to be obeyed for the Lord's sake, who approves of so reasonable and useful an Institution; then it is plain, that St. Paul meant nothing, by his Expressions, inconsistent with the supposition that what He saith to be from God, and ordained of God, comes immediately from Men; and is said to be ordained of God, only as so useful an office is confirmed by His Will, and entirely approved of by Him. And how you, who frequently affirm, that St. Peter designedly interprets this Passage of St. Paul, can well avoid interpreting it as He doth, I cannot see. Here is St. Peter's Ἀνθρώπινη κτίσις, Humane Ordinance, to be obeyed for the Lord's sake; to put it beyond doubt with you, what St. Paul meant by his θεῶν διαταγῆν, the Ordinance of God.

4. But

4. But supposing that this expression of the Apostle's, signifieth a Divine Commission given immediately to the supreme Magistrate: yet I must here warn the Reader that He must not collect from hence that it is unlawful, in any Case, to resist any Person who hath received this Divine Character. For I must observe, as I have upon another occasion, that there is a Commission for Self-preservation, and Self-defense, given immediately by God to the Govern'd Society, to counterbalance this Commission given to Princes and Rulers: a Commission which will justify them in defending themselves from ruine, when the Commission given to Magistrates only for the happiness of the Governed, will serve to condemn them for attempting the ruine of the People committed to their Care. Nay, you your self, tho' here indeed, p. 24. You may seem to an unwary Reader to argue from this Commission, and from their being to be obeyed for God's sake, that every thing spoken and done against them, falls at last upon God himself; yet, with your usual kindness, you are pleased to declare at last, that you will not say, that Resistance in all Cases, is a Sin. And indeed

5. These very Similitudes, and the argument here spoken of, all help to limit subjection, as much as ever I limited it. For there is no Prince who sends a Deputy or Ambassador, upon any great Affair for his honour, and the increase of his glory, who will not be so far from taking it ill, as to take it well, at the hands of any, who in some particular Cases, (either opposite to, or distinct from, the Errand He was sent upon,) contradict, oppose, and resist this Deputy, or Ambassador.

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As for instance, suppose the professed and declared business of a Man of such a *Character*, be to establish *Trade*, and *Commerce*, with a neighbouring *Country*; or the like; and this Man should, underhand, for his own private gain, manifestly oppose, and design to frustrate this business: Would the *Prince* who sent Him, being fully persuaded of this, resent it at the Hands of any, who have opposed, and hindered him in the frustrating of his own *Prince's* design? Would He expect that He should be listen'd to, and honoured, for *his sake*; whilst all who see his Conduct, know that he is doing the direct contrary to what He was commissioned to do? I suppose not.

And so again, supposing Him to be engaged in many bad designs, wholly distinct from the business of his *Commission*? Doth a *Prince* expect that, in unjustly, and violently attempting the Life of any Man, He should be considered as His *Embassadour*? If He should undertake to break into the *Houses* of any as a *Robber*, and violate their *Wives*, or take away their Goods: Would He, being rightly informed of this, resent it as an injury done to Himself, or think that for *his sake*, no Resistance ought to have been made to Him? Nay, will He not rather esteem it for his honour, to declare Him no *Minister* of His, in such *Cases* as these; and to acquit those from all blame who acted against Him, only in necessary *Self-Defense*, and not out of the least dislike of that business His *Vicerent* was sent upon.

There may indeed be good reasons for securing the *persons* of some *Deputed Officers* from *Violence*, in some *Cases*. But they are those *Cases*, in which the *persons*, supposed to be injured by them

them, have acted a voluntary part in having any dealings with them: but not *Cases*, in which any persons are forcibly attacked by them, and threatened with *Murther*, or *Robbery*, or the like.

But in our own Nation, in which the *lowest Constable* acts by *Deputation* from the *Supreme Power*, did ever any *King*, or *Queen*, resent it as an injury to themselves, that any such *Officer* hath been resisted, in any *Violent Attempts* upon his *Neighbour's* person, or goods; or in any *Cases*, besides such as are included in his *Commission*? Is it not plain, that in those other *Cases*, He divests himself of the *Character* of the *Prince's Deputy*; and comes under the notion of a common *Robber*, or *Murthurer*? How plain therefore is it, that a *Prince's* being *deputed*, or *commissioned* by *God*, can of it self, oblige to *submission* no farther than with respect to those *Ends* for which He is *commissioned*; and to those *Cases* to which his *Commission* reacheth?

In page, 24. You are pleased to represent this reasoning, after your own manner, as follows. *Yes, So it is, say they who plead the Cause of the People, if so be that Princes do not transgress the limits of their Government fixed by God; if they contain themselves within the rules of Just, and Right: but if they go beyond these limits, and these rules; they oppose the Will of God; they are presently destitute of his Authority. Whosoever therefore resists them, injusta molientibus, contriving and designing unjust things, is not to be thought to oppose the Divine Will, or to resist the ordinance of God.*

I must own my self to be the *person* here struck at; as indeed it is the *person*, more than the *Cause*, which

84 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*

which is manifestly the *object* of your *Satyr* throughout the *Sermon*. But I cannot own this to be a *true*, or *fair* representation of what I have said. I shall therefore transcribe the *passage*, to which any one may see this was intended to refer, and by which they may presently judge what favour *some men* are to expect from you. In the *Sermon*, *Meas. of Submission*, p. 8. after having declared the *public Happiness* to be the only *End* for which *God* can be supposed to give a *commission* to *Princes*, I add these words. *If therefore they use their Power to any other purpose; to the hurt and prejudice of humane Society, they act not in any such instances, by Authority from God, but contrary to his Will: Nor can they in such instances, be called his Vice-gerents: And therefore to oppose them in such Cases, cannot be to oppose the Authority of God.*

I cannot but think that it had been as easy for you to have plainly represented this, as to have laid it down in more general, and loose terms. Here all *Readers* may see that I concern my self only with the *one argument* drawn from *God's Authority*; and that I am so careful as three times to put in the words, *in such Instances, in such Cases*; that I am not speaking of throwing off *Allegiance* to any person, or rejecting their *Government* for a *Mistake*, or *Injury*, but vindicating *God's Authority*, from bearing any part either in *mistakes*, or *Injuries*, as it hath been too often forced to do; and that what is affirmed is, that there cannot be an *opposition* to the *Divine Authority*, in those *instances*, in which there is no *Divine Authority*; which one would think almost as plain as it is that you cannot take *five* out of *four*. But you were not pleased thus to put the *Case*: which if you had done,
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An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 85

your cavils must have appeared as weak, as your *representation* now doth *partial*, and *unequal*. But why indeed you should not have *translated* the *passage*, so as that my *Argument* might have appeared what it really is, I know not.

As I have now produced it again, if it do not appear satisfactory to the *Reader*; I would only desire to know whether it be *justifiable* to *restrain* by force a *Prince* from murdering Himself, or his best *Friend*, in some sudden passion; or whether it be not *justifiable* to go to *Law* with the *Prince*, about a *Title* to any thing. For if it be; then is it plain that this *opposition* is not *opposition* to *God's Authority*; or to the *Ordinance* of *God*; and that what I have said is literally true. But let us examine your *Exceptions* to this *argument*.

1. You do not see, if my way of arguing be just, to what purpose *St. Paul* alleged what is contained in the two *first Verses* of *Rom. 13*. For what signifies it for *Him* to press us to be subject to the *Higher Powers*, because they are of *God*, and ordained under *God*; if they can claim no obedience by their own right, unless when in their whole way of *Government* they rule for the interest of their *Subjects*, with the highest regard to *Equity*, and *Justice*? Such *Rulers*, who would not obey, without being commanded? But *submission* to other sort of *Rulers* is the *Cause* that required the force of the *Apostle*, &c. a *Topic* which we were sufficiently entertained with before.
Now,

1. If you please to look back to your own *Sermon*, p. 2, 3. You will find that then you could tell to what purpose the *Apostle* alleged these argu-
ments,

86 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*

ments, *viz.* to reconcile the minds of some *Christians* to *Gentile Governours*; and of others to *Humane Ordinances*.

2. I have already shewn that these reasons are fully sufficient to justify these expressions, without supposing any thing farther intended by them: as they are likewise sufficient reasons for his pressing the *Roman Christians* to *Subjection*, and *Non-resistance*; because, according to your own account, they were not willing and ready for the performance of these *Duties*.

But say you, *p.* 26. If *St. Paul* had mean't only such as command nothing but what is just and useful, His precept would have been, a *Chearful Obedience*: whereas all that He saith belongs to *Submission* and *Non-resistance*; and therefore respects *Bad Princes*. I wish you would remember that you have in another place declared any thing of this sort to be likewise unworthy of an *Apostle*, and needless. For who say You, is there that is not ready to obey such Governours? or what need of any Exhortation to it? I wish you would consider that this argument will prove that *St. Paul* could mean to include only *Bad Governours* in his *Argument*; and that He had no thought of any others. I wish you would remember that *St. Paul* expressly mentions *paying Tribute*, as well as *Non-resistance*; and that you your self, when you come to explain this argument, *p.* 34. sum up thus. *Since Magistrates are the Administrators of an Office so useful and advantageous to us; it is but fitting that we should honour, and love; and not wickedly resist those, by whose labours and vigilance it is that we our selves securely enjoy so many and so great blessings.*

An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 87

blessings. Here you have put into his conclusion somewhat more than *Non-resistance*, even all that is implied in a reasonable *Subjection*: and here you have confined his *argument* to those whom I, and all the rest of the world, call *Good Governours*; as much as ever I did, or could do. From this, and other passages in your Sermon, I hope, the *Reader* will see that by *Bad Governours* you mean those, who, with all their faults, *labour* and *watch* for the *publick Good*; and that it is a very laborious task to be ever guarding against a *Writer*, who makes no scruple of using words in a sense different from what others understand them in; of saying, and unsaying almost in the same breath; and of magnifying, by these arts, a *difference* which He knows to be very little more than *Nominal*.

3. I have fully shewn that there was no *occasion* at all at that time, which could render it *worthy* of the *Apostle* to make *Subjects* the *Slaves* of the *Worst Princes*; and it is plain that you your self cannot say that He designed to speak of all sorts of *Bad Governours*.

4. I now add that his declaring, either the *Commission* of *Princes* to be *of God*; as sometimes you understand Him; or the appointment of their *Persons* to be *Divine*, and *ordained of God*, as here again you interpret Him; doth not in the least contradict my *positions*: or imply in it, either that they have the *divine Authority* in those instances in which they act against the *Divine will*; or that to *oppose* them, in such instances (for to *them* only I confine the words) is to oppose the *Authority* of *God*. And since you do not so much as attempt to prove any *Contradiction*

diction to them: your *harangue* about what became the *Apostle* must be of little importance; and is only to be looked upon as the effect of a *Luxuriant Fancy* set on work by modern notions.

5. It is your own judgment that what St. Paul affirms, He affirms of *subordinate*, as well as *supreme*: not only that it may in some sense be accommodated to them; but that it was *originally* designed to relate to them.

I ask therefore, If a *Constable* assaults the *House*, or *Life* of his *Neighbour*, merely out of an arbitrary *Humour*; is it to *resist* the *Authority* of *God*, to *resist* and oppose *Him*? Hath He the *Divine Authority* to bear Him out? Or can He claim by his own right, a *submission*? Blessed is the *Condition* of his *Neighbours*, if He can. And yet, if this be not true of this *subordinate Magistrate*; it may be argued, as you here argue; To what purpose doth St. Paul command *subjection* to such *subordinate Magistrates*, for this very *Reason* because they are of *God*, and *ordained under Him*; if He mean't such *Officers* only as preserve *Peace* and *Happiness* in their *Neighbourhoods*? Who will not respect and honour such with thankfulness, and Esteem? But the Cause worthy of *Him* was to press *subjection* to these *subordinate Magistrates*, in their *violent attempts* upon particular *Neighbours*: and the like.

This is enough to shew the unconvincingness of this reasoning, to you, who declare those words of the *Apostle* to have been designed, and as truly affirmed of the *Lowest*, as of the *Highest Magistrate* upon *Earth*. And if you will conclude from what you have said, as you do, p. 26. that St. Paul's *precepts*

precepts belong to those *Princes*, who exercise a *lawful Authority* after an *unlawful manner*; and who being *ordained of God* do not, by any means, or at all, (*neutiquam*) accommodate themselves to his will: I say, if you will argue thus against his own express words; you must take this conclusion along with you likewise, That St. Paul's *precepts* belong to such *Constables*, as exercise their *Authority* after an *unlawful manner*; and who being *ordained of God*, yet do not by any means accommodate themselves to his *Will*. Behold the happy prospect your *Interpretation* sets before your *Eyes*; and see if this be not an *absurdity* too big to be admitted. I know that what you here say of *Princes* themselves, is pretty well *unsaid* in another place. But of that more by and by. I shall only say farther,

6. That the *Question* here is not whether *Subjection* be not still due, even according to St. Paul's will, to *Princes* who in many *Cases* oppose the will of *God*. But whether in those very *Cases*, they have *God's Authority*; or whether, not having it, opposition to them, in those *Cases* only, is opposition to his *Authority*. This is what you should have proved, if you had designed utterly to overthrow my weak argument: but to this you have been pleased, hitherto, to say nothing.

2. You produce another argument against my way of Reasoning, from your own imagination that I confound two very different things, *Right and Authority*: alleging that there are *Cases* in which *Magistrates* act against *Right*; in which nevertheless their *Authority* holds good. As in the *Case* of an *Unjust*

90 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*

Unjust Decree made by a Judge between man and man; the Decree is against, and void of Right; but nevertheless we see it stands good, by the Authority of the Judge, till it be reversed by some higher Court. And it stands good for ever, tho' it be against Law, if the Law allow of no appeal from his Sentence. Here then is Authority without Right; determining, and quieting disputes between men. This hath been an old, and main argument with the greatest Patrons of the Passive Cause. They have often produced it with as much satisfaction, as you seem to do here. And yet I profess I can receive no satisfaction from your argument drawn from hence, after this manner, What? say you, Shall the Decrees of Inferior Judges stand good, tho' made against Right? and if the supreme Civil Governour shall have done any thing not so justly as He ought, shall it be lawfull for Subjects to oppose themselves to Him, and to repel force by force, if occasion be? Shall it be unlawfull to oppose the Sentence of those Judges, who are only subordinate, and owe all their Authority to the supreme Magistrate? And shall it be lawfull to oppose Him, whose whole Authority is derived from the Most High God? Now, in order to get out of this maze, into which this affectionate Passage may lead the unwary Reader, I observe

1. That neither have I, nor any one else, as far as I know, ever affirmed it to be lawfull for Subjects to oppose the supreme Civil Magistrate, and repel Force by Force, merely upon his doing something not so justly as He ought to do, according to your soft way of expressing it: and there-

An Answer to Dr. Atterbury: 91

therefore that this whole *labour'd Invective* falls to the ground, tho' not without reflecting some degree of shame upon those who can thus represent their Brethren. Sir, If you please to recollect a little, you will find that what was said upon this occasion was this, not that there were not any other reasons to make it unlawfull to oppose a Prince, in the particular instances before-mentioned; but, that to oppose Him in such instances, is not to oppose the Authority of God, because in those instances there is nothing of a Divine Authority. This was said to rid Men's minds of such a blasphemous notion as backs every action of theirs with a Divine Authority. And I hope every Reader of the meanest Capacity, will do me the justice, (which others of greater Understandings think fit to deny me,) both to see, and to own, that there is a vast difference, between the saying that to oppose them in any instance of Injustice is not to oppose the Authority of God; and the saying in general, that it is on every account lawfull to oppose them in all such Instances, and even to repel Force by Force: which last are indeed words of your own invention, never mentioned upon this occasion, but by such Antagonists as think no load too heavy to be laid upon their Neighbours. This is what you ought to have proved against my position, without aggravation, or addition, that in any degree, or any manner, to oppose Princes in any Act of Injustice, is to oppose the Divine Authority. But for this you have not said one word. And when you are pleased to speak upon it, remember to prove that to go to Law with the King, is to go to Law with the Authority of God; or that to hinder a Prince, in

92 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*

in any disorder of mind, from murdering his nearest relation, or best *Friend*, is to *oppose* the *Divine Authority*. For till you prove these, and a great many more the like agreeable *positions*, you will not have said any thing *substantial* against what I have advanced.

2. Whatever *submission* is required by *Law*, or practised by good *Subjects*, in the *Case* of *Unjust Judgments*, or *Unrighteous Decrees*, of *Courts* of *Judicature*, is not required, or practised, because of any *Authority* in the *Judge*, to decree *Injustice*: but because the *Public Good* requires that *Private* and *Particular Persons* should rest satisfied with one certain decision of their mutual *Quarrels*. *Public Good* requires that there should be *Judges* to pass *Judgment* in *Cases* of *Private Differences* about *Meum*, and *Tuum*; in *Disputes* about *Title*, and *Possession*. And, as long as their *Determinations* are consistent with, or instrumental to, the *General good* of the *Community*, tho' they should be mistaken, or misled, in some particular instances, yet, *submission* ought to be paid to them. But this doth not imply that these *Judges* have *Authority*, properly so called, to decide so much as *one Cause*, to the *Wrong*, and *Injury* of any; but only that, tho' the *Cause* be decided injuriously to one particular Person, that *particular Person* shall acquiesce, not for *his* sake, who decided it, but for the sake of the *Public Good*, which otherwise cannot be preserved. And thus far I have always contended for *submission* to the *Unjust Decisions*, and *Acts* of *Princes*, viz. as far as *Public Good* can be preserved by, and consist with this *submission*.
But

An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 93

But if I cannot say that *Submission* is due for *their* sake merely; or on account of any *Authority* they can shew from *Heaven*, or *Earth*, for *Injustice*; I hope I shall be excused. So that you see here, that I can contend for *Submission*, in *Instances* of *Private Injustice*, upon a most substantial ground; without interesting the *Authority* of *God*, in the *Cause* of *Error*, or *Wickedness*. And if you will have it otherwise; I beseech you, look to the *Consequences*: for they are not worthy to be trifled with, for the sake of any *Power* upon *Earth*. From hence again it is plain that your *Reasoning* falls to the ground: since *Submission* to the *Unjust Decrees* of an *Inferior Judge*, in a *private Case*, is not for the sake of the *Decreeing Authority*, but for the sake of the *Public*; and since it appears, (contrary to your *Pathetical Oration*) that I am ready to contend for the same, and that in many more instances, with respect to *Private Injuries* received from the *Supreme Magistrate*.

3. In order to set your *argument* upon a *Right foot*, we must observe that the utmost that can be pretended is, that a *Judge* appointed by the *Supreme Power* to decide such and such particular *Controversies*, hath *authority* to do this; but no *authority* to meddle with any thing but what his *Commission* includes in it. Put the *Case* therefore that a *Person* appointed for *this* only, should be so unreasonable, as, under this pretext, himself to invade the *Rights*, and *Properties*, and *Lives* of others, not by a regular process, but in the way of *Violence*. I ask, Can He have the *Authority* of his
his

his Superior in these Cases? or, Can opposition to Him, in these Cases, be opposition to the Authority which appointed Him, not for these enormities, but for quite different purposes? Nay, Would any Understanding Prince resent Opposition, in such Cases, as Opposition to Himself; and not rather look on it as more agreeable to his own general good design, than submission to this Officer, in such Instances? Now, parallel to this, put the Case of a Prince, commissioned by God to act, in a regular Course, merely for the good of a Community; but, instead of this, deviating from the tenour of that Commission; by force invading their properties, or their Lives: and then say, Where is his Authority for this? If it be any where, it must be implied in his having a Commission from God, to do good. But it can never be implied in that, till Good, and Evil; Light, and Darkness can become the same things. If it be not implied in that; it will be hard to find it, or to discover how opposition to what is void of Authority, can be opposition to Authority. But,

4. That Mere Authority is not the ground of submission, in such Cases as you put, but only Public good; I cannot but hope will be evident to your self, if you please to turn to pages the 41, 42, of your own Sermon: in which You declare, that you will not say, that Submission is due to Princes in some particular Cases; i. e. in other Words, that You will not say that to oppose them, in some Cases, is to oppose the Authority of God. Now if mere Authority, supposed

posed to result from a Commission to govern, be a ground for Submission to any thing, either out of, or against, that Commission; it is equally so, for Submission to every thing, tho' never so much against it. But you cannot, you will not, say, that they have the Divine Authority in all their Attempts; or that to oppose them, in all possible Cases, is to oppose the Divine Authority. Therefore I conclude that you cannot, consistently with your self, think that they have the Divine Authority in any Act of Injustice; or that that can be the ground of Submission, in those Instances, in which it is not. Again,

5. You having here founded their Divine Commission merely upon St. Paul's Expression concerning them; and having declared that He designed that Expression for Subordinate as well as Supreme: all your argument, a *minori ad Majus*, from the pretended absurdity of allowing more to those commissioned by Princes, than to Princes commissioned by God, comes to nothing; since you have before declared that both Supreme, and Subordinate, are declared by St. Paul, in the same Common Expression, to have their Power, or Authority, from God. But

6. There was a Time when You your self declared against tamely submitting to those Decrees of the supreme Executive Power, which were contrary to what you supposed to be Right, and Law; of that same Executive Power, whose sole Authority is here represented as of force against Right, and Law: as shall appear at the End of these Papers. Not-

Notwithstanding therefore, that the *Sentence*, and *Decree*, of a *Judge*, in one of our *Courts of Judicature*, stands good in *Cases of Private Right*, tho' it should contradict the *Law* it self: yet, you see see that this was once no argument to you *tamely to give up* any one *Legal Right*, belonging to the *Clergy*, to the arbitrary decision of the *Supreme Executive Power*; tho', You here say, His *Authority* comes immediately from *God* himself. It is plain from hence, that when it suits your present purpose, You can see no conclusiveness in this way of arguing: and therefore you will be the easier to forgive me, if I do not now yield to it's force. Nay, The *Legal Right* there spoken of is a *Right* which you do not think necessary to the *well-being* of the *Clergy* themselves; as appears from your thinking them at present, in a good condition without it. And yet even *this* You would not have given up to the *Decree* of the *Supreme Executive Power*; whose *Authority* is here said to be immediately from *God*. What therefore, must we say? Either that there is no *Authority* in such *Degrees* against *Right* and *Law*; or that You do not truly think *Submission* to *Authority*, against *Law*, a *Duty*; or that You are self-condemned by your own Argument. If you chuse the *first* of these; the whole ground of your *Reasoning* is taken away. If the *second*; the *Conclusion* you draw is destroyed. If the *third*; You must openly relinquish the part you have acted, in another Controversy, against the *Executive Power*. But,

7. Supposing

7. Supposing both that the *Authority* of the *Supreme Civil Governour* comes immediately from *God*; and that, in all *Constitutions*, the *Commission*, in all it's extent comes properly, and solely, from the *Supreme Civil Governour*, to all the *Subordinate*, who try *Causes*, or act the *Executive* part in a *Nation*; yet *They* can receive no more *Authority* than what *He* can give; and *He* can give no more than what He hath received from *God*. And it being impossible that *Almighty God* should give *Authority*, or *positive Commission* to any Person to do one *Single* action of *Injustice*: it is impossible consequently that any *Judge* should receive *Authority* from a *Prince* to decree *Injustice*, because that *Prince* hath received no such *Authority* himself; and consequently, cannot communicate it to another, because He never had it in himself. Again,

8. I cannot help still thinking what I have sometimes expressed, that the *French King*, for instance, hath as truly *God's Authority* to shew, for invading, oppressing, and harrassing his *Neighbours*, as He hath for invading, oppressing, and harrassing, the lowest of his own *People*: Tho' his guilt is indeed aggravated in the latter case by this, that He is appointed as a *Defender*, and *Protector* of those of his own, whom He oppresseth. As, if any person chuseth a *Patron* or *Guardian*, or hath one sent down from Heaven to be his *Defender*; this *Guardian* hath full as much *Authority* to cheat, and ruine a *Stranger*, as He hath to do it to his own *Pupil*, and *Charge*: Though his guilt indeed may be the less, because no trust is violated in that *Case*. And as I cannot but think that the *opposition* of that *Stranger* to *Him* is as much opposition to the *Divine Authority*, as the *opposition* of his *Pupil* would be: So likewise it appears to me that our opposing the *French King's* attempts upon our selves, is as much an *Opposition* to *God's Authority*, as the *op-*
position

position of his own People to his Oppressions at home could be. If it be said that He hath a Commission to govern them, but none to bear him out in demanding our Subjection; I answer, that a Commission to be their Governour, or Guardian, implies in it a Commission to oppress, and ruine them, no more than it implies in it a Commission to subject the rest of the World about Him to his wild Ambition: And that in every thing out of his Commission, He is equally without the Divine Authority.

9. The whole ground of your fallacy, in this subtle discourse concerning Right and Authority, is, that you have thought fit to use the word Right, for what I have generally, in this dispute, called Authority; and to use the word Authority for that which I have called Power in a Man in Office: The Power to which We submit, and ought to submit in many private Cases; tho' without that which I call Authority, and you call Right. So that this is only using words, in different Senses from that in which I have used them; and after such a manner as may perplex, and render intricate, what we ought to study to adapt to the understanding of all Persons concerned. To let the Reader see what the discovery is, which you have here with so great satisfaction made, I will only observe that, in other, and plainer words, it is no more than this, that there are many Instances, in which Private Persons are obliged to stand even to those decisions of Judges, which the Judges had no Right, that is, in my way of Expression, no Authority, to make: A thing which I have openly maintained many a time. But because their Sentence is to be submitted to in such Cases, therefore you argue that they had Authority properly so called to pass that Unjust Sentence; and that it is for the sake of that Authority that they are to be submitted to: Whereas you deny that they can have any Right to make unrighteous Decrees; that is,

in other words, any Authority to do it. For Right, and Authority are, in this Case, inseparable; tho' Right, and Power be not. Now the Reason I lay down, as the true ground of Submission, in such Cases, is the Public Good: for the sake of which Private Losses, and Damages, are to be born. And that Public Good is the true Reason of this, is evident from your self: who, when you come to put Cases, in which the Public Interest of the Community, or a great part of it, is as much shaken, and threatn'd, as the Private good of particular Persons, by any unjust Decree of a Judge, cannot say that Submission is a Duty, or that Resistance, is Resistance to God's Authority. So that, you see, suppose Public Good preserved, Submission to Decrees of Private Injustice, remains unviolated: But suppose Public Good affected; Submission no longer appears, even to your self, an inviolable Duty. What therefore can be plainer than that Submission to any One Unjust Decree is grounded upon Public Good; and not upon the Right, or Authority, of any one to Decree Injustice? And what can be plainer, than that you have unkindly represented me, as if I had argued against Submission to Unjust Decrees in Private Cases: when I have only removed that Submission from a Foundation unable to support it, and injurious to God's honour; and fixed it upon a much firmer ground, than you would allow it to have? But it is time now to proceed to consider your manner of treating

The Second Argument used by St. Paul for Submission, taken from the Usefulness of the Governing Office, both to particular Persons, and to the whole Community.

1. We are informed how We must understand that denunciation of St. Paul, They that resist shall receive to themselves damnation, viz. They shall receive punishment from the Prince to whom they oppose themselves; that is, If particular Persons, or a small party of Men, rise up against a Prince; He will certainly

ly punish them, if He can get them into his Power. *Capitalis Oratio!* I confess, I thought it more worthy of St. Paul to denounce God's anger against opposition to God's ordinance, (which *Magistracy* is declared to be in the words going before;) than to tell them what they could not but be sensible of already, that a Prince will maintain himself in a *Throne* as long as he can, against all *Opposers*, and cut off these *Opposers*, if it be in his Power. And I am very sensible that if I had laboured to make this last the sense of the *Apostle*, I should have been represented as weakening the force of so great a Duty; by making his great *Denunciation*, such a temporal one as is often escaped by *prosperous Rebels*, in this world. But I will examine the *Reasons*, alleged, and at the same time produce my own for the contrary.

1. That the Word *Κεῖμα* (very often used for *Temporal Punishment*) is so used here by the *Apostle*, is plain, You say, from the *Connexion* of the *Apostle's* argument, and discourse. *They that resist shall receive to themselves Damnation: FOR Rulers are not a terror to good Works but to the evil.* We are positively assured, in the *Margin*, that the particle *ἄρα*, *For*, wherever it occurs in this discourse, must be refer'd to the words immediately preceding; and consequently that, *Rulers being a terror, not to good works but to evil*, being given as a proof that *They that resist shall receive to themselves Damnation*; this *Damnation* must be meant a *Punishment* to be inflicted by these *Rulers*: But yet, we are told, *not so, as that no account is here had of those future Punishments appointed in the other World.* What then is it that We must here think? That the *Apostle* in the word *Κεῖμα* comprehended both the *Present Punishment* from the *Magistrate*, and the *Future Punishment* of God himself? If this be so, as we are here told, then, 1. There hath been no crime committed in interpreting the word of *Punishment* from the hand of God,

God, because this is here allowed to have had some place in the *Apostle's* thoughts: Nay, because from hence it will follow that this *Future Punishment* from God himself, must have had the *Principal* part in his thoughts. For it being a matter of much more importance than an uncertain Punishment from the *Prince*; if it were intended at all, it must be intended more than a matter of infinitely lesser consideration. And, 2. If this be so; that St. Paul had both in his mind; I think this concession alone is sufficient to overthrow your own *critical Remark*, and your own representation of the *Apostle's* Argument. For at this rate, the *reasoning* must stand thus: That they who resist shall receive to themselves *Damnation*, *i. e.* Punishment from the *Magistrate* here, and Punishment from *Almighty* God hereafter, is plain from hence, because *Magistrates* are not a Terror to good Works, but to the Evil. *i. e.* according to you, because they will certainly punish Resistance if they can. Now how this is a Proof of the *Divine Punishment* to come, no one will be ever able to see. And that the *Divine Punishment to come* is taken into the account by St. Paul, under the Word *Κεῖμα*, you affirm. From hence therefore, it follows that *Rulers being a terror not to good Works, but to Evil*, is not alleged as a Proof of the immediately preceding affirmation, because it hath no relation to the most important part of the whole of what is meant by it. And certainly if *this*, by the help of the particle, *for*, refer to the *Κεῖμα* before mentioned, after your manner of applying it; it must refer to that *Notion* of it which is of the utmost importance, as well as to *that*, which is of so much less consideration. 3. To shew you yet farther the weakness of your critical observation, (for which we have only your own *Affertion*) as applied by your self, we will put into the *Paraphrase* the supposition of a *Ruler* contradicting the *Character* here laid

clare that *Magistrates will punish those who oppose them*, do it, by speaking first, and chiefly, of their not being a *Terror to good Works*; that is, of their general usefulness to the whole Body, as you acknowledge? a manner of speaking which conveys along with it an *Idea of Magistrates* very different from that of their punishing such as rise up against their own Persons. What I mean is this; that it is not worthy of the *Apostle*, nor of any good *Writer*, to suppose that He should immediately lay it down, as a Proof that they who resist shall receive Punishment from the *Magistrate*, that the *Magistrate's* Office is of general and public usefulness: which is a declaration, framed indeed aptly to make Men reverence the *Office* as agreeable to, and confirm'd by, the *Will of God*; but not so properly and peculiarly adapted at first sight, to convince them that the *Magistrate* can and will certainly punish their *Opposition*; as it ought to be, supposing it to be the *Proof* peculiarly given of that matter. The *Apostle*, when He declared *Rulers* not to be a *Terror to good Works*, but to *Evil*; had his mind, say You, P. 33. *Chiefly fixed* upon the *Common good* derived from the *Magistratical Office* to the whole *Governed Society*, You had before declared that, in the Words immediately preceding, He had his mind upon the *Punishment of Resistance* by the *Magistrate*; and that his denunciation is, by the particle *quod*, so connected to those words, as to the *Proof* of what is contained in them. Now, how we shall digest all this, I am at a loss to know. That He should, in that *Denunciation* of Punishment, have in his *Eye* the cutting off those who rise up against the *Magistrate*; and in his *Proof* of the truth of this *Denunciation*, should have his mind chiefly fixed upon the *Common Benefits* enjoyed by the *whole Society* under the influence of the *Magistrate*; are Points, in my Judgment, too gross to be fixed upon any Man of Sense. For the *Principal Points* intended

tended being put into the *Paraphrase*, as they above all others ought to be; it must, according to this, stand thus. That they who resist the *Magistrate* shall be punish'd by Him, is plain from the great, and many *Advantages* of his *Office* to the whole govern'd *Society*. And what *Writer* is there that would in this cover'd manner, leave the principal thing, intended to be prov'd, and illustrated? But enough of this method of *Interpretation*, viz. fixing sometimes one thing, and sometimes another, upon the same Words. 7. Nor lastly will it prove that *Damnation* here signifieth *Temporal Punishment* from the *Magistrate* to allege that what follows treats of the *Power of the Sword*, and *Temporal Rewards*, and *Punishments* in *Civil Societies*. For the *Apostle's End* being both to satisfy those to whom He wrote, that they would incur *God's Displeasure* by *Unlawful Opposition* to *Heathen Magistrates*; and to rid their Minds of such *Notions* of those *Magistrates*, as if they were to expect nothing good from them: after He had assur'd them of their incurring *God's Displeasure* for opposing his *Ordinance*; and prov'd this farther by declaring the usefulness of their *Office*; it was very proper for him to shew them a way, how to be easy, and without any foolish dread upon their Minds about these *Magistrates*; viz. by behaving themselves well, which, upon supposition of the *Office* being manag'd as it ought to be, would entitle them to their *Protection*, and *Favour*, &c. This it was highly proper to mention, but why the mentioning this should be an *Argument* that He might not in the *former* part of the passage, denounce *God's Anger* against *Opposition* to *God's Ordinance*, I cannot see. Nay, how He could well avoid, in a *Discourse* design'd to convince their *Consciences*, the founding his main and most open (or rather his only *express*) *denunciation* upon the *Anger of God*, and not of the *Magistrate*, who often cannot

cannot reach the *Opposer*; it will be hard to find out: Or why, the denunciation, *They who resist, &c.* which is connected so close, in a continued Thread of Discourse, by the Particle *&*, to the *resisting God's Ordinance*, should not be understood to threaten *God's Anger*; but, by the help of another following Particle, what the *Apostle's* Discourse and Argument have so strictly joyn'd together, should be separated.

Thus much I have said, out of respect to the *Apostle*. For it is, otherwise, equal to me, whether the *Divine Authority* be a separate Argument, not at all connected to the usefulness of the *Magistratical Office*; or the contrary. For I have here shewn that all you have said about *Authority* concludes nothing, for what you allege it; and nothing, even in your own Judgment, for *Absolute Unlimited Non-resistance*: And I have many times shewn that a *Divine Commission* to any one to be the *Guardian* of a *People*, gives no *Commission* for, no *Superiority* in, the least act of *Injustice*; or in the least takes away the *Commission* which that *People* have for *Self-Defense*, and *Self-Preservation*.

2. We come now to the *Argument* drawn by *St. Paul* from the *Public*, and *General*, *Usefulness* of the *Magistratical Office* to the *whole Society*: Which, you say, was principally in his Mind, when He declares *Rulers* to be a *Terror* not to *Good Works*, but to *Evil*; the *Ministers of God* for *Good*; and the *Avengers* to execute *Wrath* upon those who do *Evil*; and from their *Usefulness* argues to *Submission*, and *Non-Resistance*.

Here, say you, p. 34. *The Enemies of Regal Authority* are again very pressing: and confidently affirm that *St. Paul* could not, from the great advantages of the *Magistratical Office*; design to press *submission* to all sorts of *Magistrates*, but only to such as answer the *Ends* of their *Office*, and frame their whole *Behaviour* upon the perfect *Model* of *Good Government*. The Words, here plainly pointed at; I wish, I could say, candidly represented; by You, are these, p. 7. of my *Sermon*.

Now

Now this being the *Argument* of the *Apostle* (*viz.* the *General Usefulness* of the *Magistratical Office*;) all that we can possibly collect from hence is this, That it is the *indispensable Duty* of *Subjects* to submit themselves to such *Governours* as answer the *Ends* of their *Institution*; to such *Rulers* as He here describes; such as are not a *Terror* to *Good Works*, but to the *Evil*; such as promote the *Public Good*, and are continually attending upon this very thing. In the *Measures* of *Submission*, p. 21, 22. The *Reader* will find this explain'd, and fully vindicated; tho' you have not been pleas'd to take notice of it. That this, say you, with a very decisive Air, p. 35. is the *Comment* of such as flatter, and sooth the *People's Lusts*, and *Passions*, and as distant as possible from *St. Paul's Mind*, hath been before at large demonstrated. And, I, leaving to you the *Pleasure* and *Satisfaction* of such *Language*, beg leave to reply, that I have at large consider'd all that you have already alleged: but do not remember that you have so much as attempted, yet, to determine what *St. Paul* meant to conclude from this *Argument*. This is the only Point here, *viz.* what is to be infer'd from this *Argument*, of *Public Usefulness*: and it will appear strange that you should have determined this, before you come to it; before you have once profess'd to speak upon it. Give me leave, *Sir*, to remind you, that the *People* is the whole *Community*; the whole *Govern'd Society*; for whose advantage the *Governour* is instituted, and ordain'd: The same *People* from whose *Necks* it was once thought by you the *Glory* of *Clergy-Men* to be zealous to remove all manner of *Taxes*; the same *People*, whose *Good*, and *Interest*, and *Preservation*, when you come a few Pages farther, is, by your obliging silence, in effect, declar'd to be above the *Interest* of the *Governour*, when He by his *Behaviour* hath separated them from one another. And if *silence* gives consent; according to *A. Bp. Warham's Maxim*, quoted by you, *Pres.* to the *Rights* of *Convoc.* p. 19. *Qui tacet*

cet

et consentire videtur; then remember that you have consented, (tho' in a much more prudent manner) to the same Flattery and soothing of the People, which you would here fix upon others. But to return,

1. It is plain, from my Words, that all that I say, is, That in St. Paul's Conclusion, drawn from one particular Argument, No Rulers can be included but such as are in his Premises: that I don't confine his Conclusion to the very best; the most perfect, in whom there is no Defect; as you would unkindly make your Reader believe; but to such as do in their general Deportment, come up in a good Sense, to his own Words, and his own Description of them.

2. It is as plain that the Question here is not about any other part of St. Paul's Words, but about this particular Argument drawn from general Usefulness; which you have not, till now, concerned your self with: and that the Point here is not whether Public Usefulness be not a good Argument for Submission in private and particular Instances of Injustice; but whether it can possibly be concluded from Rulers being of Universal, and great Advantage to the whole Community; that therefore, and on this very account, when they are not so, they must of necessity be submitted to. This is the one only point which comes under this Head. And, you having so amply spoken of this before, of which I know not that you have said one Word, you only here add one Argument, viz. Either the Apostle here argues for Submission from the Office of Rulers whether they Govern well, or ill; and from the common Advantages to which the Magistratical Office is subservient; or he no where in this Discourse handles this Matter. But it is incredible that he should pass by this Topic, so important to the Cause of Governours: especially when He is solicitously finding out every thing to establish their Authority. Therefore he certainly here argues from the usefulness of Magistrates, whether Governing well, or ill.

Now,

Now, 1. This is not here new, or added to what you have formerly said, as you affirm: but indeed the main Argument used by you before, in discoursing of the general design of the Apostle. 2. I do therefore refer the Reader to what I have already said, to shew the impropriety of arguing from what, we think, ought to be, to what is; instead of considering what is, and from thence concluding what at that time was the Apostle's design. 3. Let any one examine, v. 3, &c. and see if the Apostle gives one hint of his thinking upon any Governours, but such whose Conduct promoteth, and establisheth Public Good. 4. I argue thus, upon your Concession, joined to what I find in St. Paul himself. Either he argues here for Submission to Rulers whether Governing well, or ill; or he no where doth it throughout this Passage. But he doth not here do it, speaking only of Rulers who are a Terror, not to good Works, but evil, &c. Therefore, He doth it no where throughout this Passage. 5. It is a very new procedure, that you should so often tell us of St. Paul's designing accurately to handle the matter of Government, and distinctly to treat of every important Case relating to this vast Subject; and of his copiousness even upon one particular Branch of it; and the like: when the whole of what He saith, is at the End of a long Epistle employ'd upon various Subjects; all compriz'd in seven Verses; and deliver'd in general Terms, without the least appearance of any occasion for him to enter more particularly into the Matter. It seems to me a Reflexion upon Him, to suppose that He designed to determine Cases relating to this Subject, when at the same time there is not a word said which particularly relates to them. 6. It is equally Dishonourable to Him, to suppose that He meant, in this part of his Discourse, to set forth the Public Advantages of Bad Governours; whilst We in Fact find that He hath not once mentioned them. How would this sound in a Paraphrase, For Rulers, after what manner

manner soever executing their Office, are not a Terror to good Works, but to Evil. Do well, and verily thou shalt have praise of the same; whether they be the Patrons of Virtue, or of Vice: for it is equal, as to that. They are the Ministers of God, continually attending upon this very thing: of what Sort, of what Tempers, of what Passions, of what Designs soever they be. Who can be easy under the Thought that such Inconsistencies should be fixed upon the *Apostle*? But, 7. If you mean, all this time, only that *Governours*, in some degree bad, or Defective, may be of great and Public Use to the whole Community, tho' Unjust in some Instances to particular Persons; and that this Public Usefulness is an Argument for Private Submission: Who is there that hath said this oftner than I have? Or what is this to the present Point? The Government of such is consistent with, and promotive of the Public Good; and their General Behaviour makes them come up, in a tolerable Sense, to the Characters given by St. Paul: Nor have I ever excluded them from the benefit of his Conclusion. What makes me sometimes think that you may make use of this Refuge is, that when you come to speak of such *Governours*, whose Behaviour is inconsistent with the Common Good, you are pleased to declare, in effect, that you cannot say, they are included in St. Paul's Argument: which by the bye, is enough to convince you of that incredible thing, viz. That there may be a most important Case, relating to Government, not touched by St. Paul; and of the truth of that monstrous Position of mine, viz. That Submission to *Governours*, destructive of Public Good, cannot be concluded from an Argument drawn from the General Usefulness of their Office, or Behaviour. But then again, what makes me think that you intended your Reader should here understand you to mean more than this, is, your calling them Bad *Governours*, which Those who promote Public Good are not; your describing them to be such as (*republicam*
male

male gerunt) administer the Public Concerns after a bad manner; and your speaking of them without any limitation: And likewise, that if it be only of Rulers bad in some particular and private Instances that you here speak, it is wholly distant from the Point, which was, whether the *Apostle's* Argument taken from *Governours* performing a useful part to Humane Society, can conclude in favour of such who cannot in any Sense, come up to the Character He gives of them. What therefore must I conclude? To suppose that you contradict your self; or that you do not contradict me, where you most of all seem desirous to appear to do it, will, I fear, be equally grievous to you. And yet it is manifest, that you either do not at all contradict me, or very plainly contradict your self.

I go on to that which you are Pleased, p. 36. to make the Subject of your Examination. My Words here plainly pointed at by you, are these, *Meas. Sub. p. 63, 64. What St. Paul hath delivered in this Chapter concerning the Duty of Subjects, is not barely by way of Precept, or Command only, but by way of Reasoning, or Inferring one thing from another, which will help mightily to secure the true Sense of the Place. So that it must be shewn that his Reasoning concludes against the Resistance which I have taught to be Lawful. And that is, Resistance, when the Public Good is ruined without it: For on no other Terms have I ever defended the Resistance of a People by Arms. My meaning is, that it must be enquired whether St. Paul's having argued for Submission from the General and Diffusive Usefulness of the Magistrate's Office, can possibly conclude for Submission, and against Resistance, to such as are destructive of the good of the Community. Whether you have represented me, as you might have done, I leave to others: and come to examine your Proof of what you first positively pronounce, viz. That my Deduction, from this Observation, is false.*

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The great, and only Proof, is taken from what is said in the *New-Testament*, concerning the *Submission* due to *Ecclesiastical Governours, and Teachers*: which is declared exactly parallel to the *Case* before us. Whether it be, or be not; I profess myself ready to be tried by this: nay, very glad that you have proposed this *method of Trial*, because I have often thought that *this* might be of help to our right understanding of the *other*. 1. The *first Passage* alleged is that of *St. Paul*, *Obey those that are set over you, and be subject to them: for they watch for your Souls; as they who must give an account.* The *Reason*, you say, why *Christians* must obey them, is here given, *Because they watch for your Souls.* Now the *Question* here, parallel to our other *Question*, is not whether it may not follow from other *Reasons*, that *Submission* and *Respect*, may be due to these *Persons*, tho' not doing their *Office* well; but whether it will follow from their *watching for the Souls* of *Christians*, that they must be *Obedyed*, and *Submitted* to; when they do not *watch for their Souls*. 2. Another *Question* is, Whether this *Reason*, *because they watch for Souls*, can hold good for those, (if any such there be) who watch *against* the *Souls* of *Men*; who are labouring, together with the *Wicked*, and *Infidel World*, to ruin the *Souls* committed to their *Charge*. If neither of these can possibly be resolved in the *affirmative*, without the highest *Absurdity*; then, I fear, you had better have let alone this *Parallel*. But, *Without doubt*, say you, *Those Ecclesiastical Ministers must be regarded, who both live, and execute their Office a little too negligently (negligentius yea, and even those who Sleep much (multum indormiunt) over their Charge.* I hope it is not to be made a *Reason for Respect* to these whilst they *Sleep over their Charge*; that they are *awake* and *watchful* of their *Good*: Because they cannot be *awake*, and *asleep*, at the same time. I find therefore, that the *Argument* is this, That they are *lawfully Commissioned to preside*, to *Teach*, to *Watch*:
And

And therefore what *Precepts* they give, *have their force*, in your own *Phrase*: as the *Precepts* of the *Scribes* and *Pharisees*, were recommended by our Lord himself. And by and by we are told, that on account of their *Office* committed to them by *Christ*, tho' ill-manag'd, they claim a great degree of *Respect* and *Observance*. Now, this comes not up by any means to the *Point* in hand. Our Lord bids the *People* observe the *Precepts* of the *Scribes* and *Pharisees*, all that they commanded them, *i. e.* without doubt, all agreeable to the *Law of Moses*, and *Will of God*. But why? Not *because they watched for their Souls*; nay, not merely because they were *authorized* to teach them; but because they might, in *Fact*, reap a great deal of *Benefit* from it. But had they taught from the *Chair* as bad *Doctrine* in all *Cases*, as they did in some; He would have commanded the *People* to have fled from them that sat in *Moses's Chair*. For they were directed to *hear* them, in order to *do*: Therefore, to be sure, it was with this *View* they were so directed, that they might hear from them *profitable* Things, and practise them. So that here was no part of their *Teaching* but the *useful* part, that could possibly be recommended to them: From whence it follows, that their *sitting* in *Moses's Chair*, taken by itself, was not the *Argument* for their *observing* their *Precepts*. If it were; the *People*, must, at this rate, have been obliged to observe even *Precepts* contradictory to *Truth* and *Goodness*, when delivered from that *Chair*: which is absurd.

To proceed, *St. Paul* to be sure, knew that there were, and ever would be, many *Teachers*, continually watching to do *Good* to *Souls*: And he urgeth their actual doing this, as an *Argument* for respecting them. As in the other *Passage*, *viz.* 1.

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Thess.

Theff. 5. 12. next alleged by you, he beseeches the *Christians* to Reverence those who *actually* Laboured amongst them, and Admonished, and Advised them: But to Reverence those who do not do this; who do not *labour*, nor admonish; or such as *advise* to Evil, or *Wickedness*; can never be proved a Duty from hence. In the former Passage, His Reason is, Not because they have an *Office* Honourable in itself; but because they actually perform it as those who shall give an Account. In the *latter* he mentions not their being Commissioned to *Labour* and *Advise*, but their actual *labouring* and *advising*. In neither doth He found the Duty of *Respect*, and *Reverence*, merely upon their having been *Commissioned* to a good and useful Work; but upon their actual performance of it. If this therefore, be a *parallel Case*; then this will help us to see that the *Argument* for *Submission* drawn from the usefulness of *Magistrates*, can conclude for none, but such as are actually Beneficial, not destructive to the *Governed Society*. Nay, that it is not the *Commission*, but the *Execution* of it, which is the Ground of *Respect*, I think you have your self unwarily confessed, when you proceed to argue, That, if in the *latter* of the foregoing Passages, *St. Paul* by *Work*, means their actual Labouring, (as it is plain He doth from the Words going before;) this at least must follow, that since they are to be more abundantly had in Honour who are diligent in their Work, they likewise who Labour, tho' never so little, may claim some degree of *Love*, and *Honour*. Here you see, you your self are forced to take your Argument from their *Usefulness*; not from their *Commission*. For if it were their *Commission*, separated from their *Execution* of it, that was the Ground of *Honour*;
then

then the Honour of all must be equal, and not proportion'd to their Work. But the *Honour* and *Respect* decreaseth in proportion with their *Behaviour*. Therefore it is the actual *Labouring* that is the Ground of it. They who Labour much, are to have more abundant Honour. They who Labour and are useful in a lesser degree, must be content with a lesser degree of *Respect*. They who Labour not at all; watch not at all for the good of Souls, cannot claim Honour upon the same Ground that they can, who Labour and Watch continually for it. They who *labour* against Souls, and watch for their Ruine, must expect Dishonour, and Disrespect from all *lovers* of *Souls*, on the very contrary account upon which *Honour* is given to the first sort. And if they have been Commissioned by God, to watch for the good of *Souls*; and have solemnly taken so sacred an Office upon themselves: This will be so far from conciliating *Respect*, *Reverence*, and *Love* to them, that it will help to cover them with Shame: It will help to aggravate their Guilt before God; and make them the *Objects* of *Abhorrence*, not of *Respect*, to all considering Persons. As, suppose a *Guide* is given by God, or hath taken upon *Himself*, to direct a *Body* of *Travellers* in the *right Road* to their *Home*; it is in the due execution of this Office that his *Directions* can be of force. But if this Man carries them to a *Precipice*, and assures them that that is a direct and even *Road* to their *Home*; *Common Sense* will tell them that it is *madness* to Follow, or Observe, or Reverence such a *Guide*, till he alters his *Judgment*, and his way of *Direction*. So it is in our Journey to our *Spiritual Home*. He that would persuade *Christians* down *Precipices*; and into the paths of *Licentiousness*; can-
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not possibly claim the *Respect* due to others, on account of their *watching for the good of Mens Souls*. And indeed you seem here to have forgot that you have effectually declared, p. 10. that there are some *Princes*, whom we cannot heartily *Respect*, or *Honour*, and *Love*, notwithstanding their *Commission*, and the *Office* they have undertaken; merely because of their acting contrary to the design of it. And is it not as plain that there may be some *Ecclesiastical Officers*, Commissioned to an Office most Honourable in itself, whom it is impossible to *respect*, or to *esteem highly in Love*; and this because the whole tenour of their *Labours* may possibly be contrary to what they have undertaken, and destructive to the *Cause of Religion*, which they were Commission'd to maintain?

Let all this be applied to the *Case* in Hand, and it will appear, 1. That *Usefulness* can be an Argument for *Submission* and *Honour*, to none but such as are *Useful*. 2. That the more *Useful Magistrates* are, the greater Title they have to it. 3. That those who are destructive of the *Public Good*, can have no pretense, founded upon this Argument, to the Subjection of others; because they have none to *Usefulness*.

In the *last Passage* you quote, as the most *apposite to your Design*, *The Elders who Rule*, or *Preside*, or *Teach well*, are entitled by *St. Paul*, to *double Honour*; i. e. to a greater degree than others, 1 *Tim.* 5. 17. From whence you would now seem to infer that they who *Rule (malee)* after a manner directly contrary to *well*, have a Title to some *Honour*. But here the Word *καλως*, translated *well*, signifies *excellently well*: And as there are degrees of performing an *Office*, viz. *well*, and *excellently well*; so is the *Honour* and *Respect* to be divided. They

They who do it, *καλως*, Excellently, are to have *double Honour*. They who do it *well*, are to have some degree of *Honour*. But, They who contradict their *Office*, and let Souls perish by their wilful Neglects, or ruine them by their pernicious Labours: Where is the Ground for *honouring these*? Ought not these to be marked with *double Infamy*? And if you your self perchance know any Man devoted to the Service of *God* in the *Church*, perfectly in the Interests of *Profaneness*, and *Irreligion*; *Deism*, and *Libertinism*; can you shew him any degree of *Honour*, and *Estimation*, merely because He was Commissioned, and solemnly devoted in the presence of *God*, for the acting a quite contrary Part? Or, Doth not this very thing, his having received a *Commission* to propagate *True Faith*, and *sincere Piety*; Doth not this itself, I say, raise your *Indignation* against Him? And doth not your *Respect* for his *Commission* and *Office*, force you to bestow a *double portion* of *Abhorrence* upon Him, for his detestable endeavours to propagate *Infidelity*, or *Impiety*? Or, suppose *St. Paul* had had occasion to speak of such as having a *Commission* to do the contrary, had been endeavouring to *ruine the Souls of Christians*; Do you think, He would not have been the *first* who should have divested them of all pretense to *Honour*, and *Respect*? Nay, was not *Timothy* empowered by *St. Paul*, to receive the *Accusations* of *Christians* against *Infamous* and *Bad Presbyters*? And if so; what degree of *Honour*, and *Respect* is there, consistent with those *Accusations* of *Elders*, which are allowed in the very same *Breath*, in which *Honour* had been commanded?

Besides, Whoever reads the *Passage*, will find that the Word *τιμη*, *Honour* is here used for *μισθ* Pay, or *Maintenance*, which probably was to be

distributed entirely at the Discretion of *Timothy*, to whom this Direction is given; and that the title to this Honour is put upon their actual Working. *The Labourer is worthy of his Wages, or Pay*, is the Argument He useth, why they who perform their Office excellently should have double Honour, i. e. double reward. But can any one be supposed, either to speak expressly of those who actually labour in Teaching, as He doth, v. 17. or of the Labourer being worthy of his Wages, as He doth, v. 18. and yet be understood to signify, that they who undertake to Labour, and do not; or they who labour in a destructive way, are worthy of any of this Honour, that is, Wages. For Wages, and Pay, are the Reward of actual Labour; not of Profession, or Pretense of Labouring: as in the other Passage of Scripture produced here by the Apostle, it is the Ox that labours for the use of Man, not the Idle One, that is not to be muzzled. The Labourer is worthy of his hire: Therefore the Pay should be proportionable to the Labour. This is his Argument. But it will not follow therefore that He that doth not labour at all is worthy of Wages: much less, will it follow, that He that labours against the Master's Interest who hires him, is worthy of Reward. On the contrary, the ground of the Apostle's Argument tends to quite another Inference, which you strive to avoid: viz. If it be the Labourer who is worthy of his Hire, or of Wages; it must follow, that He who doth not labour, is not worthy of Wages: and likewise, that He who under pretense of labouring, wilfully doth a great deal of Mischief, is to be esteemed for his Work's sake, that is, as his Work deserves; and ought to be punished, instead of being rewarded.

Thus

Thus much may suffice to shew that, if what is said of Submission, and Honour to be paid to Ecclesiastical Governours, or Teachers, may justly be accommodated to the Matter in hand, as you say, p. 38. it will follow from this parallel Case, that the Reason given by St. Paul for Submission, and Tribute to Rulers, must necessarily limit the extent of the Argument, to which the Reason is annexed; that an Argument drawn from Labour, or Usefulness, cannot conclude in Cases where there is no Labour, nor Usefulness; that consequently Rulers being useful to the whole Community being the Ground, at least of one of St. Paul's Arguments; this peculiar Argument cannot be urged for Submission in any Cases, in which Rulers are the destruction of the Public, and Universal Good. Let any one add to this, that you yourself have only, or chiefly, spoken of such as are a little negligent, and do not their Office so well as they might do, and the like; that you have cautiously contended only for some degree of Respect to these, i. e. in proportion to the degree of their usefulness; which no one ever denied; that you contend not for Respect to those whose whole Labours are inconsistent with the Safety, or Good, of the People committed to their Charge; that you declare afterwards, with respect to Princes, that you will not say that Submission is due to them, when they are destroying the Public Good; and that you had spoken before of Governours, whom We cannot heartily respect, and love, p. 10. Let any one but consider all this; and it will appear that you have been all this time contending against Nobody; that you cannot, your self, think that a Commission to do good, commands Respect in the doing Mischief; or that, whatever the Behaviour of Civil, or

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Ecclesiastical Governours be, *Respect* and *Submission* is due to them, and consequently that all that you have here said, is of no force against me. It will appear likewise from what hath been said, that the *Argument* urged in the *New-Testament* for *Reverence*, and *Submission* to *Ecclesiastical Superiors*, or *Teachers*, is so far from proving that the *limitation* which I have contended for in *St. Paul's Argument* for *Subjection* to *Civil Governours*, is ill-grounded, that it wonderfully helps to shew the great Reasonableness of it; and at the same time to invalidate the whole of what you design to build upon it.

The *Third Head* of your *Discourse* is now concluded; relating to the *Arguments* used by *St. Paul* for *Subjection*: which I have sufficiently discussed; and have evidently shewn that you have not proved; nay, that you cannot, consistently with your self, affirm, that I have misinterpreted his Words, or misrepresented his *Sense*.

IV. As for the *Fourth Head*, The *Persons* concerned in *St. Paul's* Precepts, concerning *Civil Subjection*; there is not, as far as I at present see, any *Difference* between us. I proceed therefore,

Secondly, To the *second Branch* of my present Design, viz. To lay before the *Reader* your *Doctrine* concerning the *Measures* of *Civil Submission*; that so it may be compared with that which I have delivered; and for which I seem to some to have incurred your great *Displeasure*. This is very necessary, because you have been pleased to speak after so various and different a manner of this Matter, that the unwary *Reader* may imagine you to be really as opposite to some of your *Brethren* in *Opinion*, as you seem to be in *Words*; and that all

all that *finesse* of *Satyr*, and *delicacy* of *Reproach*, showred down with so plentiful an *Hand* upon your *Neighbour*, is truly owing to a *Substantial Difference*, and *Diametrical Opposition* of *Judgment*. And,

1. In *Page* the 15th, We find the following *Words*, Cum ab iniquis Regibus premi nos atq; affligi contigerit; cum capita, cum fortunæ periclitentur; cum multa mala perpessi, plura adhuc impendere videamus, &c. When we are oppressed by unjust Princes; When our Lives and Fortunes are in danger, when after having suffered many Evils, we see more hanging over our Heads; then is there need of Exhortations to Submission, &c. This is a Cause, therefore, worthy of *St. Paul*, &c. Again, p. 27. *Authoritate* pollent Principes, non solum cum quæ juri omnino sint consentanea, præcipiant; sed cum ea aut jubeant, aut prohibeant, quæ, sive æqua, sive iniqua sint, suam tamen vim quandam atque robur habent; ita ut Civibus quibus hæc præcepta sunt, aut parendi, aut certe non repugnandi, necessitatem imponant. In which Words, (either there is no meaning at all, or) such an *Authority* is given to *Princes*, in general Terms, without one mark of *Limitation*, as that their *Commands*, whether just, or unjust, must lay a necessity upon their *Subjects* (a Word which takes in the whole Community) either to obey, or, at least, not to oppose themselves to them. In p. 18. It is declared to be *St. Peter's* Judgment, and from thence concluded to be the *Sense* of *St. Paul*, *Rom. 13. 1.* that We are bound to obey, and submit to, the *Magistrate*, that is, the *Executive Power*, utcunque munus suum, male tuenti, utcunque injurias nobis & damna inferenti; i. e. after how bad a manner soever He executes his Office; and however injurious, and oppressive He

He be to us: These are again Terms general enough to take in all Cases, and the whole Body of Subjects.

In another Place it is declared, Non esse ulla in re obistendum, p. 32. That there must be no resisting the Executive Power (in which, by the way, you have included both Subordinate and Supreme) in any thing. But this, you will say, relates to particular Persons. However you have used equivalent Expressions, which take in the whole Body: not to observe that I have met with but few who have denied to a particular Subject the liberty of asserting his Right against the invasion of the Supreme Magistrate, in a Law-Suit, which yet this Determination wholly forbids; and that I cannot think but you your self would allow the Illegant Violence of an Inferior Magistrate to be repell'd by Violence, if occasion be. If not; then are Subjects in a miserable condition: but if you do; how can this Rule be laid down when you are professedly interpreting St. Paul's Doctrine concerning Submission both to Subordinate and Supreme?

But I need not much wonder: for when you come to explain his Argument, as it concerns the whole Community, you declare that he must be understood to speak of Magistrates, whether doing their Office, well, or ill; in general and comprehensive Words. Agreeably to this, p. 26. it was declared before, Paul's præcepta in eos etiam Principis cadere, qui auctoritatem legitimam illegitime exercent; quique a Deo constituti, ad Dei tamen voluntatem se neutiquam accommodant; that St. Paul's Precepts belong to those Princes who exercise a Lawful Authority aser an unlawful manner; and who, being ordain'd of God, do by no means accommodate themselves to his Will; that is, with respect

spect to the Ends of Government. This is again very comprehensive, and free enought from limitation. Nay, p. 38. when you are professedly explaining the Apostles Argument, as it respects the whole Community, you represent him as proclaiming with a loud Voice, Non esse ullatenus resistendum; that there must be no Resistance of any sort, or any degree: which are Words not to be found in St. Paul; and as absolute for Non-resistance, as any that can well be thought of. To which we may add that it is argued by you that his Precepts must have been design'd by Him to relate to Caligula and Nero, in the worst Parts of their Conduct: and likewise that Subjects are by you depressed into the Condition of Slaves.

Hitherto, one would think all was well on the side of Absolute Non-resistance; and that the Cause goes on, as well as the Hearts of some Men could wish. But, alas! these are but occasional Hints, Expressions drop'd en passant. The true trial is when you come to sum up your Judgment, p. 39. and to put the great Case of Importance, p. 41.

2. Let us therefore observe the full Explication of your Opinion in these two Places. In the former, the Reason why it is for the Public Good, not to resist even bad Magistrates is laid down, viz. because more Good than Hurt comes, even from their administration, most commonly: That is, because these Bad Magistrates are Good Magistrates in the main. Hence, therefore, it is plain that by Bad Magistrates, for whom you have been pleading, you understand such Magistrates, as are only bad in some particular Instances of a private Nature; but under whose administration the Public Universal Good is safely preserv'd. Now these are one sort of my Good Magistrates; tho' Bad Men: And

And this at once cuts off all your *Satyr* and shews how Vain all your past *Rhetoric* hath been, against one, who never excluded out of the *Argument* those *Magistrates*, whose *Administration* promoted *Public*, and *Universal Happiness*. The last Words, most commonly, are likewise very prudently put in, and shew that you did not design to press *Subjection* as a *Duty* always, but only most commonly; because the *Argument* made use of, concludes for no more than most commonly. If any one doubt whether this were your Intention, or no; let him read on, and consider the following Words, with respect to particular Persons, *Bona aliquando, &c. Princes sometimes invade the Goods of their Subjects, and violate the Laws of Justice. But these Injuries are to be born by private Persons, lest, by endeavouring to avoid one inconvenience, they run into a greater; and do more Mischief to the Public, than Good to themselves.* Who ever said the contrary? But how naturally here have you yourself condescended to found this *Submission* upon *Public Good*; and not upon an *Authority*, which cannot belong to *Injustice*? And how perfectly are we now going to agree?

Let us proceed to what you say of the *whole Body*. *Imo vero, si tale, &c. Nay, if any thing be done by a Prince, from which not one, or a few, of his Subjects, but the whole Body receives great detriment: To remedy this Evil, They must not PRESENTLY run to Extremities, and try the Cause with the Sword.* [Do you know any one who ever said they must?] For this sort of *Remedy* is worse than the *Disease*. Let us now observe the *Reason* here given for this: Which will help to explain your meaning. *It is better, say you, for the common Good, to continue subject to the Govern-*

ment, even of a most Cruel Tyrant,—— Than what? Not better than it is to shake off his Yoke; and to put themselves under a juster and milder Government? No, But better than wholly to shake off the Yoke; better than to be under no Government; better than to place all their Hopes in Force, and Arms. Behold the *artful Caution* of these Words! and yet not so *artful*, but that it is easily seen through. Whoever pleaded for *No-Government*, or for having no other View in *Resistance*, but *War*, and *Arms*? You have not once said that to bear with the highest degree of *Tyranny* is more for *Public Good*, than to resist it, and by that *Resistance* to bring on, and establish a better Method for the time to come. This was the Point: And now, after the manner of some others, to descend to treat of this Matter, as if any one had ever pleaded for a *State of War*, or a *State of Confusion*, will only impose upon those, who are resolv'd to be impos'd upon. *This is bringing the Engines of Battery against a Place which you might have march'd directly into, without opposition; the Enemy having never undertaken to defend it.* Qui operose brobant (*saieth Grotius of some such sly dealers in Controversy*) *stultum sibi fingunt adversarium de quo facile triumphant.* They are your own Words, and your own Observation, *Pref: Rights of Convoc. p. 123.* tho' undeservedly there apply'd; and with such a *Sting* at the End, as is peculiar to your self, and hardly fit to be remember'd. But you go on to explain your self more fully. *For nothing can be imagin'd more miserable than that State, in which, when the Reins are taken out of the Governour's Hands, the People are carry'd headlong whithersoever they please, and, without restraint or punishment, commit whatsoever their*

their Ungovern'd Lusts prompt them to; all Reverence of Laws; all the Authority of Magistrates, being trampled under foot. This is a most miserable State indeed: But such a State as you know, in your Conscience, was ever detested by those whom you oppose as heartily as by your self. However, it is a good Topic for an Orator, and furnishes out some well-turn'd Periods; and serves to make an Adversary odious to unthinking Persons, as effectually as if it were never so much to the purpose.

Well: from hence you prove that *it is for Public Good that Evil Princes should not be resisted; lest, a Commotion being once rais'd, the Commonwealth should receive a greater Wound by that, than it had before received from the Hand of the Prince.* That you did not intend this to conclude against Resistance in all possible Cases, is plain from what I shall by and by produce out of the next Page. And if you did, it is sufficient to answer that the Miserable State before describ'd, is no Argument why another Misery should not be prevented: Because by a like Argument it may be prov'd equally unlawful to resist a Foreign Enemy; because Tyranny may be thrown off without running into Confusion; and because they that are concern'd to throw off the one, are as much concern'd to ward against the other. Nor can any part of all this flourish be apply'd to a Case, in which the whole Community feel the Load, and unanimously joyn in the Remedy; or to a Case, in which Resistance, is so prudently manag'd, as quickly to End in a better State of Government. Nothing is indeed, worse than a State of General Lawless Licentiousness: But can the Fear of falling into such a State be an Argument against get-

getting rid of a present miserable State, when the Methods are concerted, and the way laid so open, as that there is no appearance of falling into it? If not; this Argument cannot possibly hold against any sort of Resistance, but what seems to tend to a worse State of Things, than what it pretends to cure: And who is there, who ever spake of Public Good, that doth not make that the Measure of Resistance, as well as of Obedience? If it be design'd any farther; the Argument is no better than this: Because it is possible, that the cure of one grievous Disease may end in another; therefore I ought not to get rid of it, even tho' I have taken all necessary Precautions against the other, and have all Moral Assurances that I shall not fall into it. But, to proceed,

The Case is propos'd, in plain Terms, p. 41. But say you, *some one may ask, Is this Command of Non-Resistance so unbounded, and unlimited, &c? What if Princes tear to pieces that common Interest, which they were ordain'd to preserve? What if they pervert all Laws Humane and Divine? What if they exceedingly rage against the Lives and Fortunes of their Subjects? What if they attempt to subject them to a Foreign Yoke? Shall it not be lawful for the People to resist these Attempts; to check this Madness; to drive from themselves this Destruction?* This is the Case propos'd. Now let us hear the Answer. *There are judicious and good Men, who contend that this is Lawful; and these such as have taken useful Pains in defending the Rights of Princes, and in repressing the Licentiousness of the People. Whether they have in this done right, or wrong, let others judge. As for my self, you go on, there are many Reasons which hinder me from inculcating such*

such an allowance, even in this Audience; and many more which would keep me from doing it in a Discourse to the People. Your Reasons, I shall by and by examine. But I must not soon leave this valuable Passage.

1. I take notice that the making this allowance for Resistance is acknowledg'd by you to be very consistent with the taking useful Pains in defending the Rights of Princes, and repressing the Licentiousness of the People. So that the Rights of Princes, do not infer the Unlimited Non-Resistance of the Subject: Neither is Resistance, in these Cases, Licentiousness.

2. I would beg leave to ask, why you will not say in plain Words what your Opinion is, because it would look more sincere in such a Case as this, and because it signifieth nothing to pretend to hide it. Nay, to what purpose is it to hide, after so uncover'd a manner, your real Judgment? All the World can see that you would have solemnly condemn'd all Resistance in this place, if your Judgment would have let you. All who love Unlimited Non-resistance, may see, if they please, that a greater slur is put upon their Cause this way, than if you had expressly preach'd against it. And all who know any thing of Mankind, will think that this is but an artificial way of recommending Resistance, to say, *I will not tell you my own Judgment, whether I think it lawful in these Cases, or not; but this I will tell you, that Judicious, and Good Men, Patrons of Royal Authority, and Enemies to popular Licentiousness, have maintain'd it to be Lawful.* If you do truly believe your own account of the Danger of teaching this; and the propension of the People to Resistance, and to the abuse of an allowance given them: How much have you

you to answer for, in putting such an handle into their Power; in giving them such a complicated encouragement as this is? How must all your Reproaches return upon your own Head; and all your Reasons come back upon you with double Force? And what great difference will either Princes, or others, make between the Men, who layeth it down plainly and seriously, as his Judgment, that Resistance is lawful in such and such Cases; and Him, who tells Subjects that Men of the best Character have allow'd it; tho', as for Himself, He desires to be excus'd from speaking his Mind about it? What difference, I say, unless it be that the one must appear to have more of the simplicity, and openness, which a Preacher of the Gospel should use in resolving a Question, which he sees fit to propose? But,

3. What are we to understand by the People; when you insinuate, that it is so very dangerous to speak before them, what you openly declare to have been allowed by Judicious and Good Men? I ask this, 1. Because the Word People, throughout this Controversy, signifieth the Governed Society; the Body of Subjects; as you your self likewise have used it. And this Notion of it takes in all, even those of the most Sacred Employment. But you do not seem to use the Word so here; but to confine it to the Laity. However, that they may not take it extremely amiss of you; you profess almost as mean an Opinion of your Brethren of the Clergy: for it seems that even their Credit runs low with you; and many things deter you from trusting them with the plain truth of the Case, in this Matter; and from delivering your own Judgment freely, even to them. And, 2. If by

130 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*

People, the *Laity* only are here meant, whom it is declared to be more dangerous to trust with such a *Secret*; then, I beseech you, how came you to trust them more freely than you have done, even your Brethren of the *Clergy*? I mean in your *Sermon* at St. *Lawrence's*, when preaching to the *People*, (that same *People* which is here not fit to be trusted with any such thing) you were pleased out of the plenitude of your *Complaisance*, to declare, or plainly insinuate, your own Judgment to be on the side of those *Judicious and Good Men*, who have allowed of *Resistance*, in some particular *Cases*; nay, to do it in favour of the late *Revolution*, if I be not misinformed; or, if you meant what you said seriously. And, that there was, at least, a Time, when you would publickly, and seriously, have applauded that great *Transaction*, I collect from a Passage in a *certain Book*, in which you claim to the *Clergy* a singular part in the *contrivance*, and bringing about of that *happy Change: Rights of Convoc.* p. 294. 362. Well then, we see that when you were preaching to the *Laity*, you was not deterr'd from declaring your own Mind even more freely than you have now done before the *Clergy*: Who may well take it amiss to be so used, as if they were not as worthy to be trusted with a Word in favour of the *Revolution*, which was in so great a degree owing to those of their *Body*, as the giddy *Multitude* that wants a *Bridle*.

But I cannot forbear taking notice of the *wonderful Caution* of some Men. They will not declare their own Judgment: but they will declare what hath been the *Judgment* of several others; of *Judicious*, and good Men; such as one would wish to follow. They will not contradict

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An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 131

this Judgment: when all the World sees they want not inclination to do it, were it possible for them so much to contradict their own Judgment. They will neatly, and artfully slide over the occasion of speaking what they think. They will not, they say, preach any thing tending that way to the *Laity*. No: It is a dangerous, hazardous Point; not worthy of the Preachers of the Gospel, who are to keep to the general Declarations of *Scripture*! But what is all this, but speaking it as effectually as any one can; tho' not with so much simplicity? What? Do they think that the *People*, so frequently represented as laying hold on any Handle for *Sedition* and *Rebellion*; that the giddy *Multitude*, will not be as ready to lay hold on their Declaration of what is allowed by many *Judicious*, and *Good Men*, as if they had proclaimed their own particular Judgment? Do they think that none of the *Laity* are Sagacious enough to see through the *Silence* of a Man, and to conclude that there could be no other Reason for this *Silence*, but a conviction of the Truth, and reasonableness of that Allowance? Or, Do they think that publishing this to the World, is not preaching to the *Laity*; that there is not one of them who understands *Latin* enough to Read what they say; and to guess their Meaning by their not saying more. But, indeed, I can see no *detering Reason*: unless it were the fear, lest *openly* speaking your Judgment, you should immediately be thought as liable to *severe Censure*, as those whose *Doctrine* had been the entertaining *Subject* of your *Satyr* through your whole *Sermon*. I will not now, as I designed in the last Place,

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Thirdly.

Thirdly. Examine these *detering Reasons*, and consider what you have offered against the fitness, and reasonableness of teaching the *Lawfulness of Resistance*, in the *Cases* just now mentioned by your self.

1. You Discourse to this Effect. *It becomes the Interpreters of God's Word, to frame all their Preachings, and Reasonings, upon the Model of Holy Scripture. Now, as to the present Subject, many things are said in the New-Testament, in order to inculcate Reverence, and Respect, and Submission to Princes. But the Apostles are perfectly silent concerning any Case, in which a Governour may be Resisted, or his Authority disregarded: unless it be that we are taught not actively to obey Him in any thing sinful. It becomes therefore the Preachers of the Gospel, who are to follow their Steps, to be as Silent.*

I confess this sounds well, and expresseth a great and singular regard to the Pattern set us by the *Apostles*. But alas! when we come to examine into the Matter, we shall find it all nothing but *Popular Harangue*, without a solid Foundation; and a *Model* not follow'd even by those who lay it down for others. For. 1. The *Apostles* having a vast variety of Matter, and number of Duties to speak of, in one and the same *Epistle*, or *Discourse*; they are contented frequently to do it in the most general and comprehensive Expressions: not professing, or intending to handle all those particular Cases, which might arise: nay, which could not but arise upon some *Subjects*. But it is so far from being the Duty of *Divines* to follow them in this *general way of Discourse*, that it is their peculiar Duty, to enter into Particulars, upon just occasion; to examine, and consider, and declare when *Questions* arise, whe-

whether these general ways of speaking are to be understood *absolutely*, or with *limitation*: If with *limitation*, of what *sort*, and of what *degree*, the *limitation* is to be. It is the Province; the Duty of *Divines*, and *Preachers*, to accommodate themselves to the present Circumstances of the *Church*; and impartially to interpret those comprehensive Expressions used by the *Apostles*. How indeed are they *Interpreters* of these *Expressions*, as you here allow them to be, unless, when they are called upon by the Circumstances of the *Times*, or the *Enquiries* of *Christians*, they are ready to interpret the general Words of our *Lord*, or his *Apostles*; and to instruct their *Hearers*, in the right understanding of them, whether they are to be taken in an absolute or restrained Sense? Their being, by their *Office*, as you say, *Interpreters* of God's Word, is so far from forbidding, that it implies this in it. For Instance: The *General Rule*, concerning *private Injuries*, both of *Christ* and his *Apostles*, is, *Resist not Evil, or the evil Man*; without any mention of any *Case* in which this is *Lawful*. Now, should there have been a *Case* in which, to save his own Life, or his Family, or all his *Substance*, a Man, had opposed, and taken away the Life of one who violently attacked Him; or should the *Case* of such an *attaque* be supposed; and should honest *Christians* be inquisitive; and attentive, to know their *Duty* in this *Case*, or whether the Man had committed a *Sin* in defending himself: Ought a *Preacher*, or a *Guide* of Souls, to content himself with telling them, Indeed the *Apostles*, and our *Lord* himself, speak frequently of bearing Evil; and of not resisting the Violence of Enemies:

134 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*

but they never once put any Case, in which it is allowed? They are wholly Silent, as to this. Therefore it becomes Us, whose Business it is to Interpret their General Expressions, and be so to; to follow their Example in this: And so to leave you to your selves entirely; Would this be accounted tolerable in a *Divine*? especially considering that some *Christians* had Interpreted these Expressions so as to take away all *Self-Defense*? Nay, would it not depreciate the whole Teaching Office? Would it not make Vain all pretenses to Preaching; and shew the *Laity* that there can be no *need*, because there can be no *use*, of it? But, doth any considering Man, who is a *Divine*, content himself with this? or deny to resolve the particular *Cases* arising upon this Subject, on this account? Doth any one give up the *Right of Self-Defense*, because of this? Do not all in our *Church*, conspire to prove from the Law of *Nature*, and the absurdity of the contrary, that these General Expressions are not to be understood Absolutely, and the like? Just so in the *Case* before us. The *Apostles* having spoken in *general Terms* of *Submission* and *Non-Resistance to Governours*, is far from being an Argument that no restriction may be openly fixed upon their Words, by those who interpret them. Either *Interpreting* signifieth nothing: or it is the Business of *Interpreters*, upon all just Occasions, to do this, if *Truth* allow it. As when a *Case* hath happened which turns a *Nation's* Thoughts upon the *Question*, how these General Words are to be understood, when the *Consciences* of Men are uneasy to be satisfied; when *Enquiries* are frequent; and, what is more, when some have openly

An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 135

penly interpreted the Words absolutely, and without all limitation: then is it properly, and peculiarly, the *Duty of Divines* to examine impartially, into the Matter; and to urge the Reasons, and produce the Arguments for understanding them in a *limited Sense*: This is acknowledged in all other *Cases*. And therefore the *Argument* drawn from the *Apostles* not having made any express Allowance, can no more hold against making it in this *Case*, than in any other: it being as plainly the Business of *Interpreters*, which you allow *Preachers* to be, to explain their *General Expressions*, and to add Limitations, in this *Case*, when there is a just occasion, as it is allowed to be in *others*. And here, 2. I must take notice of a Mistake, which many seem to be guilty of, *viz.* That the adding *Limitations* to a *Duty* expressed, throughout the *Gospel*, in general Terms, even supposing the Limitations to be just, is more against the design of the *Gospel*, than even understanding those *General Expressions* in a *false* and *absolute* Sense. Whereas, in any *Case* where they cannot truly be understood *absolutely*, the adding *Limitations*, as *Occasion* requires, is no more than preaching the *Spirit*, or *true meaning*, of the *Gospel*. In *Cases* of *Doubt*, whether the *Duty* be limited or not, if you keep only to the *General Expressions*, you teach nothing; you resolve no *Scruples*: which yet you ought to do. Upon this present Supposition, if you interpret, and preach up the *Duty* in an *absolute degree*; you preach Falshood and contradict the Will of God. What remains therefore but to preach it with *Limitations*? without which there is either no *Truth* propagated; or not so plainly as to satisfy the *Consciences* of any

who are concerned. 3. You are pleased, yourself, to put the *Question* fully and particularly; and then to declare that many Persons of the best Characters have resolv'd it on the side of *Resistance* in some *Cases*; and afterwards, to refuse to give your own Judgment. Now, What is this? Did the *Apostles* ever put an important *Question*, and then resolve not to declare their own Opinion? Or, Is this proceeding any more agreeable to their Pattern, who never spake of any such *Case*? Or hath it more of the *Gospel* *Simplicity* in it, to propose a difficulty, and then to avoid the *Odium* of giving your own Resolution of it? And doth not this, in the Opinion of all who *can think*, as effectually *shake*, and *limit* the *General Declarations* of the *Apostles*, as any performance of those whom you so much blame, ever did? 4. Let any one but look into your own *Discourses*, particularly that concerning the *Rule of doing as you would be done unto*: and let him judge, whether you yourself do not think that the being *Interpreters* of the *Word of God*, is so far from being an *Argument* for keeping to the *General Expressions* of *Scripture*, that it obligeth you to *bound*, and *limit* them, as all the *Rules of Speech*, and *Reason* require. The *Rule* there treated of, is given in *unlimited Expressions*, *Whatsoever ye would*, &c. No *Case* is put, either by *Christ* or his *Apostles*, in which we are allowed not to do unto them what we would that they should do unto us. Of such *Cases* they are wholly silent. But are you therefort silent? No. The first thing you do, is to raise a *Doubt* about the *Extent* of the *Duty*: and then you declare that it must be allowed that there are many *Cases* where-

in we are, by no means, obliged to grant that to others which we our selves perhaps, (were we in their *Circumstances*, and they in ours) might be willing enough to desire from them. After which you particularly name some *Cases*. This is just parallel to what I have done; when I have contended that there are *Cases*, which are *Exceptions* from the *General Rule of Submission* laid down by *St. Paul*. I never thought I could have been blamed on this account, for what I have taught: and especially by you, who have taken exactly the same *Method*, in the handling another *General Rule*; and, I doubt not, in many others of your *Sermons*. Spare me, therefore; that you may spare yourself: and let not your *Zeal* run so fast, as not to suffer you to consider whether your *Sentence of Condemnation* may not equally fall upon your own *Head*, and upon the *Head* of every *Preacher* in the *Church of Christ*. But how worthy of an *Interpreter* of *God's Word*, would it have been, had you propos'd the *Difficulty*, and answer'd, as you are pleas'd to do in the *Case of Submission*? What? Is this *Rule* *unbounded* in its *extent*? Are there no *Cases* in which we are not oblig'd to do unto others, as we would they should do unto us? Why, truly, *Judicious* and *Good Men* have affirm'd that there are some such *Cases*. For my own part; I care not to say what I think. Neither our *Lord* nor his *Apostles* ever put any such *Case*. And I am, by my *Office*, an *Interpreter* of their *Words*. They are silent, as to any such *Cases*; therefore it becomes me to be silent likewise, who am to follow their *Pattern*. Could You have thought this *Behaviour*, either proper, or tolerable in yourself, upon this,

138 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*

this, or any other occasion: unless when you were using all the *Colours of Art* to make some Persons appear, what you would have them appear? It is manifest you could not. It is manifest, beyond contradiction, that you have quite other Notions of an *Interpreter's Office*, when you are calm within, and have no such Ends in view.

But however; we are not left wholly destitute of Hope, even in the place where all such *Limitations*, and *Exceptions*, are severely forbidden to us Divines. For it follows, p. 43. *Petenda sunt ista*, &c. to this effect. *If it be necessary; such excepted Cases, and Limitations, in the matter of Submission, are to be learnt from the Lawyers; from the Writers of Political Discourses; from the Laws, and Forms of Government, belonging to particular Nations. To these, as to their proper Fountains, We must go for such Exceptions. From the Scripture certainly they cannot be drawn: which, having said nothing of these Limits, ought not to be forc'd, whether it will or no, to fix and determine them.* Now, if ever there was a Quarrel supported by such thin Pretences and Insinuations, I am much mistaken. For, 1. What is it that we are to learn from *Lawyers*, and *Politicians*? Whether *St. Paul's Words* are to be understood with limitation, or not? This is the *first Question*, before we come to the *particular Limitations*. And if you think fit to make this to belong to *Law*, and *Constitution*, you must suppose that *St. Paul* meant to constitute those who study the *Laws*, and *Constitutions of Countries*, to be his *Interpreters* in this Case; and to exclude from that Office all who follow *Him* in the *Ministry*: a Supposition which I should not have expected at your Hands! And,

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An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 139

2. Suppose the *Lawyers*, or *Political Writers*, should determine that *Non-Resistance* is a Duty, limited by such and such *Circumstances*: would this be allowed as a sufficient satisfaction to *Christians*, that *St. Paul* meant so likewise; or that their *Religion* impos'd no more upon them in this Case, than what *Aristotle*, or *Machiavel*, or *Bracton*, have determin'd to be their Duty? The *Question* is about a *Command* of their *Religion*; on the observance of which the Favour of God depends: And will you allow it to be an acquittance to them, if *Aristotle*, or *Tully*, or *Bracton*, should be found to have releas'd them from *Obedience*, or *Submission*, in many Cases? I suppose not. And if not; to what purpose is it to send them to those, to whose decision you will not permit them to stand? 3. Suppose these Persons, to whom you send us all, as to *Interpreters of Christian Duty*, should contradict one another, as without doubt they will; must not the People recurr at last to *Reason*, and the best *Judgment* they can frame? Since they cannot be implicitly guided by two contrary Judgments. 4. This gives that Power to *Politicians*, which you have but just now denied to all those whose business it is to be *Interpreters of God's Word*, viz. The Power of adding *Limits*, and *Bounds*, to those *general Expressions* of our *Lord*, and his *Apostles*, which you declare it to be unworthy of a *Divine* to do. For in this it must end. And why this should be granted to any Persons in the World, which it is absurd in *others* to claim, will not be easily found out. Is it any greater Security and Honour to the *Sacred Writers*, that *Limitations* should be added to their *Rules*, by those who

140 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*
 who study *Politics*, or the *Laws* of Nations; than, by those whose business it is to study whatever is necessary to the right explication of all *Christian Duties*? Or, can it be more unworthy of a *Divine* to limit, as far as is just, an Expression of *Scripture*; than of *them*; 5. But again, It must come to this, that when once the *Lawyers* and *Politicians* have settled this Matter, then the *Divines* may, from *their* Writings, without offense, limit the general Expressions of *Scripture*. And what then becomes of the great Cry concerning the impropriety of this: when in the same Breath you have pointed out to the *Interpreters* of *God's Word* an unexceptionable method of doing what was just now an indecent, and almost unpardonable thing? 6. Will not the Method here propos'd by your self, be as dangerous to the *People*; as disagreeable to *Primitive* and *Modern Doctrine*; as obnoxious to every one of your own *Objections*, as what you have condemn'd? 7. Nay, who would have thought it, that the *Laitie*; the *People*, to whom it was just now declar'd, on many accounts, dangerous to trust the *Truth* of the Matter, should now be made entirely the *Judges* of it; and constituted the *Guides* of *Souls* in this *Case*; the *Oracles* from whence their *Brethren*, and even the *Clergy* themselves, are to fetch the *Measures* of their *Obedience* to a *Christian Precept*? How much your *Auditory* was oblig'd to you for this, I leave to themselves. 8. That our obligations to those worthy Persons who seriously pursue the good *Ends* of their Profession, are great, I am extremely sensible: But that it is committed

An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 141
 to them to fix the Bounds of *Christian Duty*; or to settle the *Measures* of *Submission*, in point of *Conscience*; I dare say, is far from their Thoughts. What they can do *ex Officio*, is to declare what the *Legislators*, or *Custom* have enacted: But whether this be a *right Rule* for *Christians* to walk by; whether their *Religion* and *Duty*, dictate the same; is another, and very different *Question*: which must be determin'd by other *Reasons*, and *Arguments*, besides the affirmation, or decision, of any *Earthly Power*. 9. It is the business indeed of those who interpret any *Rule*, or discourse on any *Subject*, to consider, as well as they can, all *Circumstances*; to consult *Reason*, and the *Writings* of others of all Professions, that may be of use to them; and from all things laid together to give the *interpretation*, most worthy of *God*, and most agreeable to the Nature of Things. In particular, as to the present Subject in *Debate*; the manner of expression in *St. Paul* is to be consider'd and compar'd with the extent of the like Expressions; the *Book* of *Reason*, which is also *God's Book*, and *God's Word*. is to be consulted; the Nature of *God*, the Nature of *Man*, and of *Humane Society*, is to be enquir'd into. And if the absurdity of one sort of *Interpretation* manifestly appears; it must be allow'd a good Argument against it: as it is in all parallel Cases: But, what is there in all this, which a *Divine* may not do? What is there in this which requires any nice Enquiries into this or that particular *Constitution* of *Government*? The Point her is, what is the extent of the *Duty* of the *Governed*, under all Forms of *Government*, according to *St. Paul*: and not,

142 *An Answer to Dr. Atterbury.*
 who are properly the *Governours*; or of what sort the Government is. And since, according to your self, Divines are the *Interpreters* of God's Word; it is not only lawful for them, but their Office and Duty, from all Circumstances duly considered, to settle the true extent of this Duty. 10. The Case of *Submission* to the Civil Power, and the extent of St. Paul's Precept, hath been now a long time a Case of Conscience disturbing and perplexing honest *Christians*: And that it is not the business of Divines to consider this, as well as other Cases of Conscience is, I confess, hard to be believed. They ought indeed to borrow all possible Assistances, from all Sciences, and all Professions: But still it is their proper business, by the help of these, to fix, and settle, as far as they are able, the *Bounds* and *Limits* of *Christian Duty*, upon the justest Foundations. 11. And accordingly I find you, in another place, when you are perfectly free from all *Personal Views*, and not heated with a more than ordinary Zeal, very much differing from your self in this. For, from whence do you fetch those *Limitations* and *Bounds*, which you fix to the extent of that *Gospel-Precept* of *doing to others as you would be done unto*? Do you not fetch them from *Reason*, and from the *Absurdity* of the contrary? Or, do you so much as pretend to have express Texts of *Scripture* for them? Why did you not send your Hearers to the *Moralists*, or to the *Political Writers*, who, I will venture to affirm, are as much concern'd in the explication of that *Rule*, as of St. Paul's Precept of *Non-Resistance*? Why did you rather appeal, in your own Name, to *Reason*? And afterwards make a digression to extol the method of settling

An Answer to Dr. Atterbury. 143
 tling the *Duties* of Men, and the extent of them, upon the Foundation of that? If this be the business of *Divines*, and a right Method of proceeding; Why may it not be allow'd as good a procedure, and as worthy of a *Preacher*, in the Case of the *General Precept* concerning *Non-Resistance*? But, 12. I must take notice of your representing those you differ from, as pressing the *Scripture* itself to settle the Bounds of this *Submission*, and *Non-Resistance*. You know that nothing like this hath been insisted upon, unless it be, that St. Paul's *Argument*, drawn from *usefulness*, cannot conclude In favour of any *Governours*, who are destructive of the *Public Interest*. And this I have already vindicated from all your artful *Suggestions*. But the *Arguments* for limiting this *Precept*, express'd in general Words, are taken from the like *Limitations* of other the like Expressions; from *Reason*; from the absurdities of the contrary; *Topics* often us'd by your self on other occasions. I grant what you allege, that the *Scripture* saith, *Put them in Mind to be subject*, &c. and that it no where saith, *Instruct them in what Cases Subjection is not a Duty*. But with what *Grace* can this be alleg'd by You? For I must return it upon You. The *Scripture* saith, *Put them in mind to be subject*, &c. and no where gives you commission to let the *People* hear of *Judicious and Good Men*, who will teach them *Cases* in which *Non-Resistance* is no *Duty*. It no more saith, *Send the People to Politicians, and Lawyers, many of which will inform them of Cases in which Resistance is Lawful*; than it allows You sincerely, and openly to propose your own Judgment for the same. And yet not at all

all affrighted by your own Terrors, you have so far forgot the Tenour of the *Scripture-Phrase*, as to propose a *Case* which that proposeth not; and, instead of continuing to press the Duty, to send your Hearers to *Judicious and Good Men*; to *Politicians and Lawyers*, whose united Judgment must be of more force against absolute *Non-Resistance*, than the declaring your own Opinion would have been. You may remember, likewise, that the *Scripture* saith, *Whatsoever ye would that Men should do unto you, that do unto them*: and no where gives you an express *Commission* to make exceptions. Yet this terrible *Argument* did not affright You from naming *Cases* particularly. The *New Testament* saith, *Resist not Evil*; without any allowance of *Resistance*. Yet this would not hinder your arguing against those who carry it too far. So in the other *Case*, the *Scripture* presseth the Duty in *general Terms*. But this is no *Argument* why those *general Terms* should be left to the misinterpretations of others: But it rather follows, that we ought, upon all just occasions, to examine into the true extent of the *Duty* we are to press upon Men. This may suffice to shew, that your first *Reason* against a *Divine's* speaking *Truth* upon this *Subject*, is all mere *Harangue*; equally condemning your own Practice, and that of all other *Preachers*; and founded upon such an account of the *Office of Divines* as is inconsistent with your own calling them the *Interpreters of God's Word*: unless it be the *Office of Interpreters* to rest in the *general Expressions* of those whom they undertake to interpret; and to offer nothing to clear up the true meaning of disputed Passages.

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2. The *Second Reason* is this, That the *People* are inclin'd enough to teach themselves the *Duty of Resistance*; and therefore need no one to exhort or stir them up to it. There is more occasion for a *Bridle* to curb in, than for *Spurs* to quicken their *Minds*: which of themselves are prone to *Sedition*. We generally are all so framed by our *Nature*, as to be glad of *Evasions*, and *Distinctions*, in any point of *Duty*: and never more so, than when we are commanded, in *omni re*, in every thing, to yield to, and obey, the *Magistrate*. Now, 1. If you find this to be your own *Case*, and your *Sagacity* to lie mightily this way; I think it had been better to have said so, than to have brought all others, almost, into the same *Accusation*. 2. Where is there one such *Expression*, in the *New Testament*, that we must obey the *Magistrate*, in *omni re*, in every thing? And if there be no such; how can you justify your representing thus the *Sense of Scripture*? *Children* indeed are call'd upon to obey their *Parents in all Things*: But I hope it is no wicked *Evasion*, or *Distinction*, to say that the *Apostle* doth not here mean to lay a *Contradiction*, or *Absurdity* upon *God Almighty*; or to intend any thing, but what it is *lawful* for them to command. 3. Is it so indeed? Is this the *Case* of the *Subject*, not excepting even the *Clergy* themselves? Are they so bent upon *Sedition*, and *Rebellion*, that any number of them should voluntarily leave the *Quiet*, *Ease*, and *Security* of good *Government* for it? I do not believe it. On the contrary, I cannot think it in the *Power* of all who grumble most at the present *Government*, not even by the help of that moving *Cry* of the *Danger* of the *Church*, to make the generality of the *Nation* insensible of the *Blessings* they enjoy; or to stir them up to *Sedition*, as long as they see no *Arbitrary Proceedings*, no *Tyrannical Designs* in their *Governors*. But if they be

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ready to take Fire; I will tell you one thing much more effectual than any thing I have done, as it hath been found upon *Experience*; and that is the Preaching up *Absolute Non-resistance*; and the making whole Nations to be absolutely at the Mercy of their *Governors*. This it is, and not the free owning the contrary, which hath made Nations jealous of the Designs of their *Princes*, and hath rais'd the greatest Oppositions against them. Therefore they who talk so much of the proneness of the *People* to *Opposition*, should beware how they awaken Fears and Jealousies by such a Doctrine as carries too much Absurdity along with it ever to compose those Heats which it raiseth. 4. To teach the lawfulness of *Opposition* and *Resistance*, in some *Cases*, is falsely represented as an *Incitement* to *People* to rebel in others. It is a *Bridle*, not a *Spur*, in all other *Cases*. To explain a *Duty* truly, is not to encourage the Transgression of it in any *Case*; but to shew more plainly when it is transgressed, and when not. As in the *Case* of *Church Separation*; it never was by any *Writer* thought an argument against speaking the Truth, that *People* were apt enough of themselves to separate, and therefore ought not to be told, that the *Imposition* of *sinful Terms* is a good Reason for it. And why then should the contrary be said in this *Case*? But, 5. If all that is here meant be this, that upon Attempts to set up a *dispensing supereminent Power* in the *Executive* part of our *Constitution*, there will be a Spirit in Subjects to preserve the known *Liberties* and *Rights* of the *Nation*; I hope, this will not be call'd a Proneness to *Sedition* and *Rebellion*, for the sake of *one* who, in the Name of the *Clergy*, boasted once of the Glory of bearing a part in the late *Revolution*; and of breaking off *Yokes* from the Necks of *English-men*. For with what *Grace* can such an one now call this Spirit a *Proneness* to *Sedition* or

on, and *Rebellion*? 6. It becomes you likewise to reflect a little upon the Conduct of a *certain Person* towards our *Ecclesiastical Governors*; whose Claims to *Submission* are in this *Sermon* made parallel to those of the *Civil Power*; of *one* I mean, who hath shewn himself, in his own Language, *wonderfully sagacious* to find out *Evasions*, and *Distinctions*, to keep up a *Spirit* of *Liberty*, and a Zeal for imagin'd, inconsiderable, *Rights* and *Privileges*! So glorious doth he think it to stand up for the least *Legal Right*! so little is he mov'd with the *Insinuations* of encouraging *Disturbances*! so weak an Argument doth he account it, that the Fear of *Consequences* ought to engage us to submit, even to what we think *Encroachments* of a *lawful Authority*! so unmoved is he with the popular Clamour of *Sedition*, and *Rebellion*! *Authority* doth not stand good, in this *Case*, separated from *Right*! *Submission* to *Church-Governors* implies nothing in it of *Submission* to the least imagin'd *Encroachments*! *Peace* is but a *Trifling Consideration*, when the *Ecclesiastical Administration* appears faulty! The *Clergy* then need *Spurs*, and *Incentives*, to allarm and rouze them to a *Perseverance* in *Opposition*! The poor *Church*, it is declared, must lose its real Subsistence, and become only a *Name*, should the *Clergy*, of one side, alter their conduct, and tamely yield to the Measures of their Superiors! *Some Proc. conv. p. 22.* The *Tameness* and *Supineness* of too many is complained of! and their *Unwillingness* to take the *Allarm*, is represented as their Fault! and all this, in a Cause of a very thin and obscure Nature. But when we come to the other Point of *civil Subjection*; it hath happened, that a Man not so well approved of, hath taught the Lawfulness of *Resistance*, only when the *Public Security* makes it absolutely necessary; and this both in order to explain a controverted *Christian*

Duty, and to serve an *Establishment* founded upon this Practice: Immediately this must be condemn'd. It is *dangerous* and *hazardous*; an *Incentive* to *Rebellion*, and I know not what. How incongruous, how inconsistent, are these Things? To be so severe upon *others* for declaring the lawfulness of Resistance in *Cases* of *Extreme Necessity*, whilst you your self think *Rights* and *Privileges* of a lesser, and more obscure Nature, Ground enough for kindling a *Fire* in a Church, which *Ages* may not extinguish, and for raising an Opposition to those *Ecclesiastical Governours*, whose *Title* to *Subjection* is made, by your self, the *Argument*, and *Model* for *Subjection* to *Civil Governours*. But again, 7. Are you truly so possessed with a Sense of the *People's* proneness to *Rebellion*, and *Sedition*, as you here pretend to be? Then how *inexcusable* are *You*, to give them such an handle as you do? They are apt enough of themselves, it seems, to learn this *Doctrine*: how then could you permit your self to tell them of *Judicious*, and *Good Men* who allowed of *Resistance*; and at the same time, by your *silence*, give Testimony to the Truth and justice of the *Allowance*? Or, How can you answer for the sending them to *Lawyers* and to *Politicians*, many of whom will tell them the same? Is this your regard to their *Unsteadiness*, and *Inclination* to *Rebellion*? Is this your Care not to give them the least encouragement? Is this becoming a Man who here thinks them fit for nothing but *Bridles*? Is it any more a *Bridle* to them to know the *Judgment* of many *Judicious* and *Good Men* on the side of *Resistance*, than to know my single Opinion? What more *inciting Spur* have I apply'd towards the moving them to shew their *Inclinations*, than this one Declaration of yours? Nay, What have I done equal to it? I press this upon you, that the World may

may see, what is to be expected from *one* who strikes his Adversary at all Adventures, even to the wounding of himself; and Judge what a mean Opinion you must have of your *Hearers*, and *Readers*, to imagine a *little Paint* of *Words* can dazzle their Eyes, and hinder them from seeing how greatly the *Cause* of *Absolute Non-resistance* is obliged to so nice and artificial a *Touch*. 8. It is in the same place declared that those *Judicious* and *Good Men* who allow of *Resistance* in some *Cases* have taken, not only great, but useful Pains to repress the *Licentiousness* of the *People*. From whence it appears that you think it very consistent to maintain the *one*, and yet to give no encouragement to the *other*. But we are not got one Page farther, before it is made an *Argument* against your own giving the same allowance, that it is an *Encouragement* to the *Licentiousness* of the *People*: that is, in other Words, if the *Argument* signify any thing, that this *allowance* can't be made without this Encouragement. Thus, just as you please, the same two Things are *consistent*, and *inconsistent*; worthy, and unworthy, of *Good* and *Judicious Men*. Nor can you evade this by saying that this is meant only against my *weak*, and *imprudent* method of speaking of it. For these are *Reasons* why you, your self, cannot join, in that open allowance, with those *Judicious* and *Good Men* before-mentioned. And the present *Reason* resolves into this, You cannot joyn with those *Judicious Men* who made this allowance, and yet did not encourage popular *Licentiousness*; because this allowance cannot be made without encouraging this Evil. This I take to be a *Contradiction*; tho' it be not unlike what you have endeavoured to fix upon the *Apostle* himself. And that I have represented this *Objection* fairly is plain from hence, that the fear

of encouraging the *People's* Licentiousness can be no Argument against making the Allowance; unless the making it be here understood by You to be inconsistent with guarding against that Evil. 9. I cannot here forbear to take notice of the Method of treating those call'd the *People*, that is, every individual Person under the *supreme Executive Power*; and of that wonderful Argument, that because what we call the *Mob* is giddy, and easily impos'd upon, therefore the whole *Body of Nobility, Gentry, Merchants, and Tradesmen*, must be term'd the *unskilful Multitude*, and deny'd the Capacity of understanding when their *joint-Interest* is going to be ruin'd; or the Benefit of so necessary a Truth, as this of the *Lawfulness of Resistance* when it becomes necessary for the preventing that Ruine. Without doubt, you think your self never the worse for knowing the *Truth* in this *Case*: And therefore why should you think the whole *Body of the Nation*, whose Interest it is, in the highest Degree, to keep all Things *quiet and orderly*, unfit to know this *Truth*; or incapable of regarding their true *Interest*, if they did know it? However, this I will own, that you have been so good as to give them as *kind Hints*, as could be expected from a Man that was resolv'd to be silent.

Under this Head, you go on, p. 44. to compare those who accurately dispute how far we may resist the *Civil Governor*, without the Guilt of *Rebellion*, to those *Casuits*, who have been deservedly blamed for handling *Cases* after such a manner as rather to instruct men how near they may approach to sin, without sinning, than to keep them at a distance from all that is unlawful. You add, that it is like making a *Speech to Soldiers* concerning *Cases* in which they may desert, or refuse to obey, or sometimes resist, &c. or like carefully teaching *Children, or Slaves* to understand what it is lawful for
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them to do against their *Parents, or Masters*; and by what method, and how many ways, they may warrantably get loose from the *Tie of Duty and Subjection*. It is, it seems, like a great many bad things: which, as you say, tho' they may have some probability, nay, some *Truth*, in them; yet are so troublesome to pious *Ears*, and do so flatter the *Vices and Lusts of impure Men*, that they ought very seldom to be handled amongst the *Learned*, but hardly ever communicated to the *unskilful Multitude*, &c. It is happy that there are still left in this degenerate Age some Men of tender *Ears*, and tender *Piety*; starting even at sound and sincere *Doctrine*, [*sani and sinceri* are the Words] and suspicious that *Truth* it self should flatter the *Lusts of Men*! But, I confess, for my own part, I cannot either thus complement the *Vices of Mankind*; or degrade *Truth*, by making a *Friendship* between it, and them. I have heard of Men's mistaking the *Case* for which a sound *Rule* hath been designed; and acting according to it in *Cases* to which it was never designed to extend. I have heard likewise of putting *Cases* without any occasion, and entering unnecessarily into the *Decision* of them. But I never yet heard that what is sound and sincere could flatter *Vice*; or even that what hath the *Appearance of Truth* could be said to do what, I hope, is one of the *Marks of certain Falshood*. But, to be a little more particular,

1. If the mere affirming, and proving the *Lawfulness of Resistance*, when it is necessary for the *Security of a whole Nation* (for about this entirely is the present part of the *Debate*); if this, I say, be like those nice *Determinations of Casuists*, who seem to instruct Men only how near to come to *Sin* without sinning; then I would ask, To what is it like for a *Divine* to propose this very *Case*, and to declare, That *judicious and good Men* have
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affirmed the same thing? Is not this, in effect, the same Resolution of the same Case; only with the Addition of a joint Authority of great and good Names? And where, I beseech you, would be the Difference between telling Soldiers a Case in which you thought they might forsake, or resist their Leader; and putting the Case in form of Words, and assuring them, That, tho' you did not your self care for speaking, yet, as judicious and good Men as your self, no Friends to Desertion, and Disorder, had allowed it? The same may be said in the Case concerning Children and Servants. Thus doth all your Satyr and all your Harangue fall back upon your own Head: especially considering that as much was said to the unskilful Multitude, as your Phrase is, upon another Occasion, in the *English Tongue*; or if it had not been so, it is now said to them by your publishing it, so as that every one may know it that hath but a mind to enquire after it.

2. If this be so like those foremention'd Casuists; to whom were you like, in putting Cases exempt from that Rule, *Whatsoever ye would that Men should do unto you, &c.*? Are not Men apt enough to be partial? Why then will you teach them, tho' truly, how near they may come to breaking that Rule without doing it? Or rather, Do not you see, by this Instance, that there may be occasion to distinguish Cases, and Circumstances; and to tell the unskilful Multitude, that that general Rule is not to be interpreted absolutely? If so; why may there not be an Exception made that concerns not private Men, but whole Nations, without incurring so severe a Censure?

3. How can you, of all Men, say, that this Allowance (for it is of this only we are speaking) flatters the Vices of Men, when you had but just now told

told us of judicious and good Men who made this Allowance, and yet had been successful in repressing Licentiousness likewise? But let us see,

4. How it is that this Doctrine can flatter the Vices of Men. *That it is lawful for a People, or Nation, to save it self from Ruine by Resistance, is the Proposition.* By flattering Vice, I suppose must be meant, the giving Encouragement to the wicked Inclinations of the People to rise up against their Governors. Now this Proposition can no more flatter this perverse Humour; no more encourage them to resist, or justify their Resistance, in any other Case; than your telling your Auditors of Cases excepted from the general Rule of *doing as we would be done to*, flatters their vicious Inclinations to disregard it in all other Cases; no more than the declaring the Lawfulness of Swearing before the Magistrate, encourageth People to swear on common and trivial Occasions; no more, lastly, than declaring that you may, to save your Life, and your Subsistence, resist a Man who assaults you, can be called an Encouragement to attack, and destroy, those who do not assault you. It is an easy matter to say, but it will be an hard matter to prove, that here is any more Flattery of Vice, in this Case, than in the explaining, or adding Limitations to, any other Precept of the Gospel, which you, and all good Preachers, find Occasion very frequently to do. But,

5. It may be said that the contrary Doctrine would put a Stop to all Inclinations of Men to Resistance, and quash all their rebellious Thoughts at once. For, if they were taught that it is not lawful, upon any Occasion, or in any Case possible, for a Nation to resist its Governors; they could have no Pretense at all to it. Why then were you not so just to Government, and so severe upon the

the Inclinations of Men, as to do this? Why then have you explained and limited other Precepts after such a manner as to leave Men still capable of Mistake? and why, in this, will not you join in decisively taking from a *Nation* all Pretences, and Occasions, of what you say, they are so inclined to? But if you should; I fear the effect would be, as it always hath been, and as you once thought, rather to raise Men's Jealousies, and with them their Passions, than to cool, and allay them. And I likewise fear that this very *Doctrine*, suppose it universally inculcated, will be found to flatter, and encourage the Vices of Men much more than the other. Not the *Passions* of the generality of the *People* indeed. *These* it doth not flatter, but provoke; and which is of best Service to *Governours*, I know not. But the *Vices* of the *Great* and *Mighty*; and of all who can by any means come to have Dependence upon them. The *Inclination* of a *Nero* to Tyrannize, and sport himself with the Misery of his Inferiors; the Lust and Ambition of those about him, who hope for great things from humouring, and encouraging this Temper; the Designs of all who can raise themselves by being Instruments of Cruelty. *These* are all sooth'd, and flatter'd, by the contrary *Doctrine*. *Our Inferiors* are taught, that they must, in no case resist, therefore we may safely act our part: Is an *Argument* which humane Nature, cloath'd with Power, will frequently yield to: whereas the Allowance of *Resistance*, in extreme Cases, is a great means of putting a Stop to such *Exorbitance*, and such Designs. And, I am perswaded, we have had an *Instance*, in our own *Nation*, of a *Prince* unhappily sooth'd by the *Doctrine* of *Non-resistance*, and flatter'd into open Attempts upon our *Liberties*; when perhaps if the hated *Doctrine* which

I have taught, had been current, and as generally taught, as the other; it had kept him firm to his Promises, and happy in the Obedience of a *willing People*. But,

6. I find that, all through this Head, you have wisely concealed the Occasion there may be for making the Allowance of *Resistance* in some *Instances*: which alters the *Case* extremely. And this Occasion, you know, ariseth from the *late Revolution*, formed upon the *Nation's* joining it self to the *Arms* of *Resistance*, and withdrawing its *Allegiance* from one who was once their *King*. You must be sensible that, the *Establishment* being built upon this, it must partake of the Strength, or Weakness, of its Foundation: You know that the *Enemies* of it perpetually attaque it, upon this Ground. This hath revived, in our Days, Enquiries about it. The *Case* hath been publicly put long before my Time; and more frequently of late than ever. The *Consciencés* of *Subjects* have been made uneasy with contrary Decisions: and the like. So that to speak plainly upon this point is become as necessary, as in any *Case* whatsoever: and to make evident the Truth of the *Doctrine* I have taught, is as useful. For it is to defend the Practice of all *Ranks* and *Orders* of Men amongst us. It is to strengthen the Foundation of the most happy *Establishment* this *Nation* ever had. It is to answer the main Objections of its *Enemies*, and to reconcile them to it. It is to satisfy the Enquiries of numberless honest *Christians*; to ease their *Consciencés*, and to settle their Notions. It is, in one Word, so far from flattering the seditious *Humours* of *Subjects*, that the *Enemies* of the *Establishment* very well know, that it is the best way to make them the most hearty Friends possible to their present *Governours*: as is plain in Experience.

And

And if, under all these Circumstances, a *Doctrine* taught with these Views, must be treated as an unnecessary disturbing Men's Minds with nice Disquisitions about the Borders of *Vice*, and *Virtue*, I will be bold to say, that no *Christian-Duty* can be explained; no *Case of Conscience* answered, without incurring the same *severe Censure*. If there were the same Occasion; if the same sort of Facts had happened to make it fitting; what good Man would scruple to tell a whole Army, that if their General would be so wild as to bring them to a Precipice, and command them still to march, they were not oblig'd all to throw themselves down, at his Pleasure? Or to tell a *Child*, that if Life cannot be sav'd without it, *Subjection* may be withdrawn from a distracted, or unnatural *Parent*. You your self would tell them that *Judicious* and *Good Men* had allowed it: and that is more than a single Judgment. But how the allowing this, upon a just Occasion, can be compared to a *Casuisist's* unnecessarily treating upon some unfit Subjects, and teaching Men how far to indulge their Inclinations without Sinning, remains yet to be proved. An *Universal Resistance*, in order to save a *Nation*, and *Posterity*, from *Ruine*, is so far from bordering, or looking towards Sin, that it is *Virtue*, and Honour. The wilful, and supine neglecting to do it, is the part which looks towards *Vice*. The *Tacit Consent* to the Sacrificing the present and succeeding Generations of Men, to *Lawless Power*; this is what *flatters* the *Lust* of *Empire*. But the teaching the other, however it may sound; I shall not fear to call it, the teaching a *Lesson* of *true Virtue*, and *true Honour*. That there was a Time when the whole Nation thought so, we may remember. And that there was a Time when you thought it a *Glory* for the
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Clergy to pull off *Yokes* from the *Necks* of *English-men*, (which must be by their *Doctrine*) you ought not to forget. But now, it seems, the Resolution of a *Case* so necessary, so useful, so important to a whole *Nation* of *Christians*, and *Subjects*, is like the *lewd Resolutions* of some wanton, and idle *Casuits*. This Comparison indeed fits much the lighter upon me, because, I find, it is one of your *Common Topics* of *Satyr*; and, when you are pleased to have it so, may serve as well for the contrary, as for this. When it was for your purpose to lessen the *Power* of the *Crown*, I find that *then* the carrying it even as far as you supposed, for the present, the *Law* to allow, presently put you in Mind of *those Casuists* that have taken pains to instruct Men how near they may possibly come to a *Sin*, without actually sinning. Pref. to your *Rights, &c.* of an *Engl. Conv.* p. 11. And now, when it is for your purpose to carry the *Authority* of the *Executive Power*, even above *Right*, and *Law*; the teaching any *Restraint* upon it, or *Opposition* to it, is like the Decisions of the *same Casuists*. It is happy enough for a Man of moderate Parts to be *Master* of a *lucky Comparison*, so well adapted to serve equally upon all Occasions: But it is pity methinks, that a Person of the brightest Parts, and quickest Invention, should be so hard put to it for a *Simile*, as to be forced to make use of the same for two so contrary Purposes. But it affords me an Opportunity of asking, *If You*, when you were settling the *Measures* of *Subordination* in the *Lower Clergy*; and instructing them how far they might go, in Opposition to their *Civil*, and *Spiritual Governours*, without sinning, were not at all like to these perverse *Casuists*: Why may not I be allowed, without such an *Imputation*, to endeavour to instruct a whole Nation, what it is lawful for them to do
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for their own Preservation, and necessary *Defense*? To which, I add this likewise, If the promoting, and bearing an active part in, the late *Revolution* were a *glory* to those concerned in it; as you then was willing to appear to think: how is it possible that the teaching the lawfulness of *Resistance*, only in that, and the like Cases, (for this is the present Supposition;) can be like to the teaching Men to go towards *Vice*, and *Infamy*? To proceed,

What *pious Ears* they are to which *Truth* is so shocking, when spoken in such a *Case*, and under such *Circumstances*, and upon such *Motives*, I shall never be able to understand; till I come to know what sort of *Piety* that is which is an Enemy to useful, and important Truths. But there is one thing, which now occurs to my Mind, that I cannot help thinking, must be, indeed, *shocking* to *pious Ears*; and that is, to hear a *Divine*, with a *solemn Air*, and great Professions of *Piety*, startled at the allowance; and yet making it himself in the prevailing name of several *judicious* and *good Men*; condemning *others* for teaching a *Doctrine*, which He himself hath put all Persons in as fair a way to learn as possible: and to find the *Good Man*, after a long *Sermon* of *pious Raillery*, unable to say, that the *main Doctrine* (against which one would think his zeal had sometimes run high) is false, or so much as improbable. Methinks there must be something in such a behaviour very shocking indeed to *pious Ears*. But it seems that you do not wholly forbid the speaking it, as some may imagine: for,

7. I observe that your Words are, *vix unquam*, that it is *hardly ever* to be delivered in *Sermons* preached to the *People*. So that, I suppose, when you think fit your self to do it, it may *safely* be done. Nay, it is to be hoped, since the Words seem

seem to imply that it may fitly sometimes be done; that the *Reasons*, and *Occasions*, which I have often laid down, will plead my *Excuse*; and, with the help of this *Concession*, blunt the *Edge* of your own *Satyr*. For after all, it seems, you do not mean to affirm, but that this *Resolution* of the *Case* of *Resistance*, tho' shocking to *pious Ears*; tho' soothing and flattering the *Passions* of *Men*; tho' never so like to teaching Men how far to go towards *Sin*; may sometimes, and upon some *Occasions*, be exposed to the *People*. From whence I conclude that it cannot be such a *Deviation* from the *Tenour* of *Scripture*; so unworthy of an *Interpreter*; or so bad on many *Accounts*; as you are pleased to make it, when you forget your self.

8. And farther, If this may be taught the *People* once, or so; I cannot but think that we had e'en as good not make a *Secret* of it afterwards; unless we had the *Faculty* of making them forget what we have at any time said to them: which I fear is not so very easy in this *Case*. For to what purpose should we? If they know it already, all the mischief is over; they have it by them, prepared for all *Occasions*. But to tell it them once: and afterwards to declare for *Silence* upon this *Subject*, is something very new, and very peculiar.

3. We come now to another *Branch* of your *Satyr*, which takes its rise from my having preached concerning the *Lawfulness* of *Resistance*, in some *Cases*, from that *Passage* in *St. Paul's Epistle* to the *Romans*. How could it enter (say you, in an elegant strain of *Words*) into the *Head* of any *honest Man* in his *Wits*, to make use of this *passage*, as an *handle* for such *Doctrine*? If we search thro' the whole *Bible*, we shall not find a *passage* in which the *Duty* of *Subjects* to *Governors* is so accurately treated of, so vehemently inculcated, or so strongly fortify'd on every side with *Arguments*. They

They therefore act very perversely, not to say absurdly, who take occasion from these Words to speak of the lawfulness of Resistance; who fix their Batteries, raised against the Power of Kings, upon this Ground. For my own part, I make a Conscience, even after I have so abundantly explain'd St. Paul's Doctrine, so much as lightly, at the End of my Discourse, to touch upon any Exceptions, which may seem to weaken his Precepts. What then have they to answer for, who entirely pass over what is commanded by the Apostle with the greatest ardour; but whatsoever can be thought of to lessen the Extent of the Apostle's Precept, this they gladly embrace, and with great Copiousness prosecute thro' their whole Discourse. You go on to compare it to the Absurdity of a Man's taking for his Text, Servants obey your Masters in all Things; or Children obey your Parents in all Things, and taking occasion from thence to shew in what Things they are not obliged to obey. Or, It is, you say, as if a Man, preaching before Soldiers, shou'd take that of the Centurion in the Gospel for his Text, I am a Man under Authority, having Soldiers under me: and I say unto this Man go, and he goeth, &c. and instead of speaking of the Obedience due to Generals, should spend his Time in enumerating whatever may lessen either the Right of commanding; or the Necessity of obeying. This is to put the Scripture upon the Rack, in order to force it to confess what is not in it. It is to refuse the Truth which offers it self from those sacred Writings, in order to extort from them, by the Application as it were of Tortures, the most distant Things possible. This is the Sum of this part of your Satyr. And,

1. That I am the Person thus far guilty of this huge Absurdity, I freely own, viz. that I took for a Text this Passage of St. Paul, and was so weak as to think it no Deviation from my Business to examine into every Expression used by him; and to try what was implied in them, and what was not; and

and freely and openly to declare what I thought. But as to this, indeed, I must complain that you have represented me amiss: for any one who will look into the Sermon, will find, that I have not wholly passed over what the Apostle delivers with Ardour, (as you give your self leave to say;) that I am as free to declare what is truly implied in it, as I am what is not; and to threaten the Divine Anger, in express Terms, against all who violate his Precepts. He will find that the part I acted was not, to put it upon the Rack, and apply Tortures to force it to speak the most distant things possible; but to vindicate it from the Interpretations of those who have tortured it into a Confession of Absolute Non-resistance. One would think, indeed, by your manner of Representation, that I had labour'd to prove the Lawfulness of Resistance, from St. Paul's having forbidden it: Whereas all that I was concerned for, was, to shew what that Resistance truly is, which he hath forbidden; and for that purpose to prove, that his general Prohibition was not to be understood in an unlimited Sense. But such Representations will fall back upon your own Head.

2. There is nothing more common amongst Preachers than to take a Text which hath been, or may be, misunderstood, and interpreted with too much rigour; and, after having shewn that it is not to be so understood, from thence to take occasion to combat some popular, or common Error founded upon this Text. Numberless are the Instances of this. Nor was it ever thought a torturing, or racking the Holy Scripture. Swear not at all, hath been interpreted by some too absolutely. It was never thought a Crime, or a Folly, as I know of, for a Person to chuse this for his Text; and to shew that swearing before a Magistrate, or upon a serious solemn occasion, is not forbid here; and

to take occasion from hence to add other Arguments in Vindication of it; nay, and to do it with *Copiousness*, through the *whole Discourse*: tho' *this* indeed is part of your unkind Representation. *I say unto you, resist not evil.* Suppose a Preacher should take this for his *Text*, and, because some have misrepresented it, should spend half an Hour once, at a time when He thinks it may be useful, to shew that a Man may defend his Life against a Robber, and that this *Text* is not to be understood to forbid it; this would be so far from being absurd, that it would be highly just and reasonable; so far from putting it upon the Rack, that it would be taking it off from the Rack, and releasing it from the *Tortures* of others. So it is in the *Case* before us. I took a *Text* which had been put upon the Rack; and forced to confess what you your self cannot say is in it. I shewed that this Confession was not genuine, but extorted. With your leave, therefore, I did not put it upon the Rack: but took it off. I forced it not to speak what was not in it: I only shewed what was not in it, that *others* might not force it: You your self, chusing that *Text*, *whatsoever ye would that Men should do unto you, &c.* immediately set your self to shew what is not contained in it, and cannot fairly be laid upon it. Yet I should not have taxed you with putting it upon the Rack; or applying *Tortures* to it; or acting an *absurd* part: but you have *taxed* your self with it. Nor is there a *Preacher* in the *Church*, I believe, but what must bear his part in this *Calumny*. I often have wished that some Men would be more cautious in their *Censures*, and take such care in shewing their *Zeal* against one *obnoxious* Man, that it might not involve in it the whole *Body* of the *Clergy* likewise. But to return; Since it hath ever been

been an allowed Practice, to spend a quarter of an Hour in vindicating a *Text* from such as have interpreted it too *absolutely*; and in shewing that what some have fixed upon it, is not implied in it: I humbly hope that I may be allowed the same Favour, and not incur your Displeasure, if I do, what I doubt not, *You*, and every *Preacher* almost, hath often done.

3. Nor is it the least part of your *Rhetorical Representation*, that this way of proceeding lessens the force of the *Apostolical Precept*: and the like. Whereas without this way of proceeding, it is impossible to know what the *Apostle's Precept* is: or when we fulfil it; go beyond it: or come short of it. In this part of your Argument you are pleased to suppose the *Truth* of the *Doctrine* taught by *Judicious* and *Good Men*. Now if that *Doctrine* be true, that *Resistance* in some *Cases* is lawful: then I say that it could not be *St. Paul's* Intention to forbid it in those *Cases*; and that this Declaration is so far from *lessening* the force of his Precept, that it only helps to inform us what the *Precept* truly is. An Instance or two will make this plain. To say that it is lawful to *swear* upon some Occasions, was never thought to diminish the force of that Prohibition, *swear not at all*: but to fix it to the *Cases* to which it belongs. The *Allowance* of *Self-Defense*, doth not abate the force of that *Precept, Resist not Evil*: But only shews in what *Cases* it hath not force; which still ascertains its force in those *Cases* to which it belongs. To say, with your self, that the *Rule of doing as we would be done to*, was not designed for all possible *Cases*, is not, I suppose, to weaken the force of the *Rule*, in the *Cases* to which it truly belongs. So, likewise, to say, that *St. Paul's* Prohibition of *Resistance* is not to be extended to all possible *Cases*, is not to

weaken his Precept, but rather to *strengthen* it, by shewing what is, and what is not, truly forbidden by *Him*. The *Precept* misinterpreted is not his *Precept*. The *Precept* vindicated from that Misinterpretation is *St. Paul's*. And the *Precept* therefore, rightly interpreted, is fortified by that true *Interpretation*. This is all I have done towards *weakening* a Precept; *viz*, declaring that a *Doctrine* is not implied in it, which you do only not acknowledge to be unreasonable, and absurd. And if this be *weakening* the *Divine Precept*; it is a new Discovery: and, I fear, your self must come into the *Condemnation*; and all the *Best Writers* of our *Church*, who have always taken this Method of explaining Moral Duties.

4. The *Occasions*, and *Circumstances* of things do extremely alter their *Appearances*: and these you are pleased wholly to omit. I have before gone over them, and need not here repeat every particular. Let any Persons of *Common Sense* but consider what hath pass'd in this Land upon the *Subject* of *Passive Obedience*; how great a Noise of it was in the World before my Time; what a *Concern* every one almost hath had in it; what a *Revolution*, and *New Establishment* we have had. Let them but consider that no *Passage* in the whole *New Testament* hath been more abus'd than this, to the Prejudice of that *Revolution*, and *Establishment*: And they will sooner wonder that it had not been the professed Business of many *Sermons* to vindicate this *Passage* from the *Rack*, and the *Torture*; than that there was part of one half Hour's Discourse spent, to shew that this great, and main Support of *Absolute Non-resistance*, implied not in it the *Duty* of *Subjection*, to that Extent to which it had been stretch'd. This was the *Occasion*, you very well know: tho' you are pleased

pleased to speak of the matter, as if there had been no *occasion* in the World for doing any thing like it. The *General Precepts* of *Scripture* may, indeed, be safely let alone, till gross Abuses are put upon them. But when they are abused; and this to the Prejudice of a *Nation*; it is a low sort of Prudence, to be afraid of explaining them; nay, it is not *safe* to let others go on to fix pernicious Absurdities, and Contradictions upon them. Now then let us see the force of your *parallel Cases*. Suppose a *Parent* void of Humanity, and, in a distracted manner, attempting the Lives, and Fortunes, and ruining the Happiness of his *Dependents*, and *Children*; and supposing that these *Children* had withdrawn from him, and by this, secured their Lives, and *Well-being*: would you your self join with those *Casuists* that should tell them they are in a *State* of *Damnation*; that they are to obey in all things; or would you think much to explain this *Command* both to *them* and their *Parents*, so as to shew, that no such unlimited Submission is enjoyn'd in it? or would any one blame any *Divine* who should allow that, upon such an *Occasion*, (as every one doth in the *Case* of other Distractions) they may, and ought to provide for their own Security. Again, suppose a *General* had actually led an *Army* to a *Precipice*, and commanded them to march down, assuring them, it is the right way; and this *Army* had unanimously refused, appealing to the great *Law* of *Self-Preservation*, and to the true Extent of his Power. Suppose that that *Text* in the *Gospel* where the *Centurion* saith, *I say to this Man, go, and he goeth*, &c. had been chosen by many, to entertain this *Army* with the great Sin they had been guilty of, the Sacred Oath they were under, the *Duty* they owed to their *General*: Would it not be as proper a thing,

as could possibly be done, for a *Preacher* to take this *Text* (supposing it of greater Authority than the *Centurion* could give to it) and shew that no such absolute Duty was contained in it; and to take occasion from thence to Discourse of the true *Duty of Soldiers*; that a *whole Army* ought to be so saved, in so extraordinary a *Juncture*; that they had been so far from doing amiss, that they had done their *Duty*; and the like. Would this be *racking*, or *torturing* the *Text*? No, it would be releasing it from *torment*, and making it speak only what it ought to speak: And the *Occasion*, and *Circumstances*, would make it commendable in him who should thus use it. But this *Occasion*, and these *Circumstances*, were not worthy of your Notice.

5. Now give me leave to put a *Case*. Suppose a *Preacher* should take for his *Subject* those same Words of the *Centurion*; and, after he had with great shew of Words inculcated, in a Discourse to *Soldiers*, the *Duty of Obedience*, as if he meant it should be absolute, all on a sudden, should himself raise the *Objection*, and put the *Case*, to this Effect, *But suppose your General should command you all to kill one another; or to march regularly down a Precipice; you will say, Are we still to be submissive and obedient? Is there no Licence for withdrawing our Submission? Why truly, I don't care for telling you my own opinion: But this I will tell you for once, That Judicious and Good Men have declared that you are under no Necessity of obeying in such Cases; and these such as are no Friends to Mutiny, or Desertion, but great Advocates for the General's Power.* So much the better, might they answer: *If Judicious and Good Men; Great Advocates for the Power of Generals have allowed this; this is more than one single Judgment.* And if this same *Preacher* should send them to the *Writings* of many

many who have allowed it; this would be something farther. Is not this as great a *Deviation* from the *Text*; as great an *Encouragement*, and *Allowance*, as any one could give, who speaks, with more Openness, his own Judgment? Nay, is it not a greater *Deviation* from the *Text*, and a greater weak'ning of it, *first* to explain it, so as to seem to desire to be understood as a *Great Advocate* for *Absolute Military Obedience*; and then, at last, to give an effectual Concession, seemingly, against the whole Tenour of what is gone before: than fairly and openly to enquire into the true meaning of the Words; what is implied in them, and what not? And what General, tho' of never so bad Designs, would thank you for your *Insinuations*, more than others for their *plain dealing*? This is your own *Case*. You are running your self out of Breath with a *well turn'd Satyr* against me, for chusing *Rom. 13. 1, 2, &c.* as a *Text*; for sincerely and openly examining the meaning of it; for freely declaring that *Absolute Non-resistance*, in all *Cases*, is not implied in it. You take this very *Text*; and in discoursing upon it you raise the *Objection*, and put the *Question* plainly, *Are there not Cases in which Resistance is lawful?* Then, you openly declare that *Judicious, Good Men, some of the Greatest Advocates for the Power of Kings, have allowed it.* Nor will you say, but that they were right in it. You send us likewise to *Writers of Politics*, and others; from whom we may obtain the same Allowance. Now, Is not all this equally a *Deviation* from the *Text*? A Diminution of the Force and Extent of the *Apostle's Precept*? A building Batteries, upon the same Ground, against the *Power of Kings*? A giving in, not your own single Judgment for *Resistance*; but that complicated one of several, whose

Decision is of more weight, because they were bias'd rather on the side of *Regal Power*, than of *Popularity*? Believe me, Sir, These Methods, tho' they may deceive a great many at first; yet make many others smile: especially that solemn Ayre with which you wash your Hands in Innocence, and profess that you make *Conscience* of so much as lightly touching upon any thing, even at the End of your *Discourse*, which may weaken the *Apostolical Precept*; when, not above a Page or two before, you had been putting more *Cases* than ever I put; and producing a *Cloud* of the best Witnesses against *Absolute Non-resistance*. It is extremely fortunate indeed, for a Man to be capable of managing *Words* after so dextrous a manner, as to be applauded, even whilst he is underhand wounding that *Cause*, which he would seem to patronize. But certainly, never was the *Cause* of *Non-resistance*, and *Passive Obedience*, more truly bantered, since the *Words* were known in the *Christian Church*: and this, with all the *Pomp* of *Piety*, and an awful *Dread* of saying any thing against it. Therefore, thou art *inexcusable*, O Man, who judgest another. For in that thou judgest another, thou condemnest thy self.

6. But lastly, what if I had chosen an improper *Text*? What is this to the main *Doctrine* I taught, about which only you are now contending? This is no *Argument*, that that is not true, or fit to be taught: And this only is the point you are now upon. But whether I committed such an *Absurdity* in choosing that *Passage*, the *Reader* will judge, from what hath been before said. I proceed now to your other *Reasons*.

4. You observe, that there were none amongst the *Primitive Christian Writers* who abused the *Holy Scriptures* for the propagating *Notions* concerning the *Lawfulness*

subtlety of *Subjects* defending their *Rights*, and of using *Force*, in cases of *Extremity*, against *Civil Governours*: And yet they lived in *Times*, in which such *Notions* would have found an easy *Passage* into the *Minds* of *Men*, &c. And yet, Sir, you thought not this, once, a good *Argument* why *Clergymen* should not glory in helping off *Tokes* of all sorts from the *Necks* of *Englishmen*. But however that may be; methinks you might in *Justice* have considered what hath been already said, in Answer to this *Objection*. And tho' you, and others, who profess to write for *Absolute Non-resistance*, will not be at so great Pains as to read, or to consider, what so unworthy a *Person* hath written in his own *Defense*: Yet, I hope, all who are not so byas'd, will give me leave to put them in mind, that I have produced the *Testimony* of *Origen*, that there were those in the *Primitive Times*, who interpreted this *Text* of *St. Paul*, with *Limitations*, and *Exceptions*, merely on account of the *Tyranny* of some *Princes*; and that I have shewn, that the *Highest Patrons* of it amongst them, founded it not upon this *Passage* of *St. Paul*, but upon other *Precepts*, respecting *Non-resistance* to *private Enemies*. From whence I now inter, that either they meant not an *Absolute Unlimited Non-resistance*; or that they abused the *Holy Scriptures*, to make them take away from *Men* a *Right* to *Self-Defense* against *Robbers* and *Murderers*. I add only this, that *They* are the *Persons* who abuse this *Passage* of *St. Paul*, who lay more upon it, than it was designed to bear, and press it into the *Service* of an *Absurd Doctrine*: but that *they*, who vindicate this from *Misinterpretation*; who shew that this can't be inferr'd from it, or fixed upon it, do *Justice* to the *Text*. And that you thought it no *Crime*, even in a *Discourse* upon this

this passage, to make *Insinuations* in favour of *Resistance*, is plain from your putting the *Question*, in this very *Sermon*, about the *Extent* of the *Precept*; and then declaring that *Men* of the best Character, and such as could not be suspected of any byas to *Popularity*, had allowed of the *Lawsfulness* of *Resistance*, &c. For, I beseech you, Is not this, to all intents and purposes, doing as much as I have done? and is it not as much a *Contradiction* to the *Tenour*, and *Design*, of *Primitive Writers*?

5. There are several *Homilies* of our Church which declare the *Duty* of *Subjects*, and lay *Obedience*, and *Submission* upon them: but they never put us in *Mind* of defending our *Liberties*, or of taking care lest we shew too much *Submission* to our *Civil Governours*. This is another of your *Arguments* against openly declaring the Allowance of *Resistance*. But I answer,

1. There is nothing in the *Homilies* for throwing off the *Yoke* of *Arbitrary Power*, by such a *Revolution* as the last: yet You boast of *Clergymen's* joining to throw off this, and all manner of *Yokes*, &c. nay, you ventured, before the *unlearned Multitude*, to drop a word in favour of it; even after you had carried *Non-resistance* as high as you could.

2. There is nothing in the *Homilies* expressly in favour of it: but You have not feared, notwithstanding this, to confront to them, and their *Interpretation* of *St. Paul*, the complicated *Judgment* of *great* and *good Men*, who have interpreted his precept with *Limitation*; and this without so much as bestowing any *Censure* upon them, but plainly enough, by *Silence*, consenting to the *Truth* of what they said. And do you think that this won't be seen through? Is not this as real a *dishonour* to the *Doctrine* of the Church, as mine? and as great an *Encouragement* to neglect it? or did e-

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ver any *Writer* thus severely deal with another, when He could not but be sensible, that all must at last light upon his own Head?

3. I must entreat the *Justice*, of those who are not blinded by prejudice, to read what I have already written upon this Head: and judge if I have not said enough to satisfy any one of the true intent of the *general Doctrine* of *Obedience* in the *Homilies*; and that I am as free from the guilt of contradicting the *Homilies*, as any of my *Brethren*, who do it without *scruple*, in many other Points. And, in this point, who will not see that the *dishonour* which I have done to the Church, and its *Doctrine*, by delivering my own *Judgment*, is not so great, nor of so much consequence, as the more artificial method, of giving in the *Judgment* of several *Judicious* and *Good Men*, against *Absolute Non-resistance*. Yet this last may be done with *applause*; whilst the other demands *synodical Notice*! But,

6. The *Times*, in which we live, seem very improper for declaring this *Doctrine*. We are zealous enough for *Liberty*. There is no danger of our not esteeming this sufficiently. The fear rather is, lest we come to think and live, more freely than either becomes *Christians*, or *Subjects*; and our care ought to be, lest by loosening the *Bridle* of the *Laws*, *Liberty* should break out into *Licentiousness*, and disturb, and confound all things, and at last *Murder* it self, as it were, with its own *Hands*.

1. Yet I must again put you in *Mind*, that this powerful Reason did not hinder you from declaring the same *Doctrine* in the name of several *Great* and *Good Men*. It did not hinder you once from declaring for taking off *Yokes* from the *Necks* of *Englishmen*. It did not hinder you from putting in a *Plea* for the *Revolution*, under the notion of *Resistance*. It did not hinder you from sending

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Christians to Lawyers, and to Writers of Political Discourses: many of whom will teach them as much as I have. What is it that I have done more than this; and how, therefore, can you, of all Men living, *harangue*, after this manner, as if you had done nothing like it?

2. I am, I hope, as heartily concerned that Men should think, and live like *Christians*, as others are. I am not conscious to my self, that I have given upon any Occasion, the least Encouragement to Men, to think and live more freely, than becomes *Christians*. And as for the matter before us: I cannot imagine but that one very likely method of helping Men to think like *Christians*, is to fix such *Christian Duties* upon their proper Foundations; and to explain rightly the Words of an *Apostle*, when there is any *Debate* raised about them.

3. I cannot but think that it even reconciles many Persons to the *Gospel* it self, to remove an *offense* from it, by vindicating a *Precept* from the *Absurdities* that have been fixed upon it. And I shall ever be ready to do it, where there is any the like occasion; as the likeliest way to make Men think, as *Christians* ought to think.

4. What ill effect the explaining this precept can have upon the *lives* of Men, I am at a loss to know. If I may trust my own Observation, I know no better *Christians*; none who come up more justly to that Character; than many of those who thus understand *St. Paul*, and thus limit *Civil Obedience*. Nor do I think that there hath been less *Licentiousness* of Manners amongst those who have professed to sacrifice all to the will of one Man; than amongst those who have opposed it. And indeed it is manifest, that the *principle* of *Absolute Authority* hath been the occasion of the greatest

greatest *Licentiousness*, in those who have had any thing to propose to themselves from it. Or, if you mean only, that Men may mistake and imagine that a greater *Liberty* is given them, than indeed is; this will be an *Argument* against explaining any thing in the World. But the Encouragement given by the contrary *Doctrine* to *Tyranny* will more than outweigh this accidental *Inconvenience*.

5. You may as well argue against the allowance of *Resistance* to *Private Enemies*, attempting our Lives; because Men are apt enough to defend themselves: and urge that the great fear is, lest they take too much *Liberty*. But He that tells them the *Liberty* they may take, warns them against taking more: and if they won't regard that; much less will they regard one who will allow them none at all.

6. And, indeed, the great cause of *Licentiousness* in any such particular, is the pressing the contrary to such extremity; and not the fixing a *medium* between the two Extremes: as you your self once thought.

7. I have been so far from pleading for *Licentiousness*; or from taking off the *Bridle* of *Laws*; that I have been pleading for a *Liberty*, terminated and guarded by *Laws*. And so doth every one else, as far as I ever knew, who speaks the same way. And therefore it is a vain piece of popular *Oratory*, to endeavour to represent me, as if I was pleading for taking off the *Bridle* of *Laws*; when I am for putting on that *Bridle*, both upon *Governours* and *Governed*. But,

8. We must not speak for *Liberty*; or for the *Revolution*, on which our *Establishment* is built; we must not fortify Men's Minds against the *Enemies* of

of this *Establishment*, because there is *zeal* enough for *Liberty* already, and, as we have Ground to fear, *too much*. Now, in my opinion, there cannot be *too much* for that *Liberty*, and that *Constitution*, which only I have pleaded for. If any others are for *Licentiousness*, or freedom from all *Civil Government*: I am no more to blame than you are; and have given them no more *Encouragement* to it than you have. But can you your self, who throw this *Accusation* about at random; can you, I say, name one single Person, who, either in confidence amongst *Friends*, or under the Provocation of *Enemies*, hath ever declared for *Anarchy*, or *Confusion*; or *Licentiousness*, as opposed to *Civil Government*? As opposed to *Civil Government*, I say: for all other *Licentiousness* is nothing to this *Question*. Experience will assure us, that the *Doctrine* of *Absolute Non-resistance* is no preservative against *Vice*, and *Debauchery*, any more than the contrary *Doctrine*. And if you cannot name any sort of Men, who, having once tasted it, do not infinitely prefer a *Limited Civil Government*, before *Licentiousness* without *Government*; You ought to own your self too hasty in the *Accusation*. To the present argument, I now answer two ways. 1. Supposing there are some amongst us for too great a degree of *Liberty*, as to *Civil Subjection*; the true way of putting a stop to their Errors, is not, to hide the Truth; or carry the matter to the other Extremity; by meer force of Affirmation or outside of Words, which, in this Age, will only make Men confirmed, and obstinate in their *Errors*: but freely to own what is true, and to fix the Bounds of *Duty* with as much Argument, and Reason, as possible. As it is in the *Case* of *Church-Separation*. Tho' many are

are too loose in this Point; yet the best way, and that used by the best Defenders of our Church, hath been, not to deny, or dissemble, the *Lawfulness* of *Separation* on some great Accounts: But freely and openly to declare it, notwithstanding that *some* carry it to more Instances than they ought. But, 2. I confess I cannot see what Ground there is for this great Suspicion. For where indeed is this great *Zeal* for *Liberty*? or, how hath it so universally discovered it self, as to raise your Fears, and Jealousies? Have I not been made the common Mark of Infamy, and Reproach, for defending it? Hath not *Synodical Censure* been called for by *some*; and even *Fire from Heaven* by others; only for allowing a *Right* in a *Nation* to save it self from ruine? Hath not there been, as it were, a general *Alarm* given, and an *Universal Cry* raised against the Man who hath ventured to allow it? Have not many of the *Clergy*, and *Laity*; *Furors*, and *Non-Furors*, as it were, united to hinder the Voice of *Liberty* from being heard? And had not as much *Noise* been raised, as if the *first Principles* of *Natural* and *Revealed Religion* hath been openly assaulted? And doth all this look, as if there were a *dangerous Zeal* for *Civil Liberty* in the *Land*? Are these the Proofs that Men are ready enough to embrace the *Doctrine*; or even to invent it for their own use? No, *Sir*, There is still too great a Fondness for *Slavery*. The *Old Leven* is not yet out. The *Revolution* is an *Eye-sore*; tho' it saved us: and still there is a looking back to that *Line*, from which our *Laws*, blessed be God, are departed. There is need enough therefore of vindicating *Liberty*: and of reconciling Men's Affections this way to the present *Establishment*; which its Enemies know very

very well, cannot be secure without it. But if you will please to call this Encouraging Licentiousness; or, in another of your Phrases, *sounding the Trumpet of the Gospel, to raise the Spirit of the Mob* (for sometimes, it seems, a Nation deserves no better Name;) or the like; I answer, in your own way, *Every one shall bear his own Burthen.* And what the Burthen of those will be, who thus represent the reconciling Men to a Government, as the raising Rebellion against it; the Defense of true Liberty, as the Encouragement of a *Vicious Licentiousness*; and who, whilst they are with Solemnity professing not to touch upon any thing like it themselves, *artfully* do the very thing which they condemn their Brethren for doing *openly, and sincerely*; I will not dare to take upon me to determine.

S I R,

I have gone over the whole of your long *Discourse*; and followed you through every turning of that perplexed *Labyrinth* into which you would lead your Reader: And through every *Article* of your *Accusation* against my self. The *Reasons* which moved you to this Behaviour, I entirely leave to God, and your own Conscience. I only remark, that it is most evident from your own Words, that the Ground of it could not be, your Approbation of the *Doctrine of Absolute, Unlimited Non-resistance*; or a Desire that *St. Paul* should be thought to enjoin it. But indeed, your *Management* of the Cause you have undertaken, is so very extraordinary, as that it deserves, before I conclude, to be, in a particular manner, recommended to the Consideration of all who heard you, and all who read you.

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That a Preacher of the Gospel should go up into the Pulpit, with a solemn Profession of *handling the Word of God*; and do it so *artfully*, as not to declare, in positive Words, his own Judgment concerning the main Question in the whole Debate; that, after he knew that he had avoided to say any thing which could decide the Controversie, he should put up a solemn Prayer to *Almighty God*, in his Preface; that He would be pleased to make what he had said subservient to the Decision of the Controversies upon this Subject, now on foot: These are such *Instances of Great Conduct* as, I believe, will hardly be forgotten by those who make any Observations upon Mankind. For what is there, I appeal to all the World, that without a Miracle, can be made subservient to this End? As for Resistance by Force, in private Cases of Injustice; no one ever defended it, or made any Dispute about it, as I know of: No, nor for Resistance by Arms, or entering into a State of War, on the account of Injuries done to the Public, provided other Methods of Opposition could secure the Happiness of the Community. Yet all your Harangue appears at last to be levell'd against these two Points. And lest any should interpret some of your former loose Expressions too rigorously; as condemning Resistance in all possible Cases; when you come to state the main Question, about Resistance in Cases of Extremity, you very fairly desire to be excused from saying any thing about it, in your own Name. This, Sir, is the main subject of present Controversies in this matter: And now, whether there ever was such a part acted, as first to say nothing, and then solemnly to pray to God, that this saying nothing may help to put an End to the Controversies now on foot, I leave to others to judge.

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Again,

Again, That a Man of Parts and Learning, whilst he is raising *Trophies* upon the Performance of another, should run himself into such Multitudes of *Inconsistencies*; as if he had designed rather to lay himself open to the *Attques* of others, than to shew the Absurdities of those he differ'd from! For Instance, That at first *St. Paul's* Words should be declared to belong to the *Persons* of *Governours*, and not the *Authority*; and afterwards be brought to prove their *Authority*, and not their *Persons*, to be immediately from God! That the *Occasions* of writing this Passage should be laid down at the beginning of this *Sermon*, and be declared to deserve the *Zeal*, and Care of an *Apostle*; and presently after it should be often proclaimed, that all was unworthy of the *Zeal* of an *Apostle*, unless he be supposed to intend something wholly distinct from, wholly unnecessary to, the answering these *Occasions*! That his Words should be affirmed to be designed for us, without any Restriction, *cum capita, cum fortuna periclitentur, when our Lives and Fortunes are in Danger*, p. 15. and yet be implicitly denied to command Obedience to *Princes*, *si in civium capita, & fortunas immaniter saeviant*, if they exceedingly rage against the Lives and Fortunes of their Subjects; p. 41! That a general Submission should be all along inculcated to *Bad Princes*, and *Bad Magistrates*; and at last it should appear that by *bad Princes* are to be understood, such whose Conduct is consistent enough with the *Public Interest*! That it should be declared ridiculous to suppose *St. Paul* to press Men not to be ungrateful to those who deserve well of them; but to be submissive to those who do them good; and yet, when his Precept comes to be explained, with respect to the whole Community, that he should be represented as pressing them to Submission

mission to *Princes*, (whom you sometimes call *Bad*) because they do good to them, and deserve well of them! For it is manifest that *Submission* is not pressed by you, when their *Administration* becomes ruinous to the Public. That *St. Paul's* Precepts should be declared at first to be designed originally by him, for Submission to *subordinate Magistrates*, as well as *supreme*; and yet afterwards be so explained, with respect to the *supreme*, as you your self cannot but think it absurd to understand them, with respect to the *subordinate*! That they should be declared at first, to be designed for the Benefit of such *Princes* as *Caligula*, and *Nero*, through their whole Conduct; and yet at last you should own, that you cannot say, they were designed for such *Princes* as *pervert all Laws, humane and divine, or exceedingly rage against the Lives and Fortunes of their Subjects*! These are such *Incoherencies*, as nothing but their due Distance from one another, and the outside of fine Language, could secure from the Observation of the most vulgar Understanding.

Again, That a Man should be so severe upon another; should represent him as *sounding the Trumpet to Sedition*; as *soothing the Vices of the People*; as *weakening the Force of the Apostle's Precept*; as *whispering Distinctions into the Minds of Subjects, to invalidate what the Apostle had laid down*; and in the mean while should represent himself as *making Conscience of bordering upon any such Concession*; as *under a Terror for fear of approaching towards it*: And yet should himself, in the very same *Sermon*, give the greatest Commendation to other Men who had *sounded the same Trumpet*; should himself *weaken the Force of the Apostolical Precept*, by speaking favourably, before the People, of the *Resistance* practised at the late *Revolution*; and should *whisper such a Distinction* into the Ears of *Subjects*, as limits the

Extent of the Command, under the prevailing sound of Great and Good Names. For indeed, you effectually limit the Precept by declaring that *Judicious and Good Men, Advocates for Kingly power*, have done it; and this in such manner as not to fix any Reproach upon them for doing it. By *this*, you introduce *Judicious and Good Men* as *whispering* into the Ears of the *Romans, Be subject to the Higher Powers*, provided they do not overturn, and ruine all public Happiness: Which you account so great a Crime in me. By *this* therefore, you *sooth and flatter the Lusts and Passions of Men*; By *this* you *contaminate the Divine Fountains*; *wrest St. Paul's plain Words*; *put them upon the Rack*; *force them to confess what you sometimes would seem to think very distant from them*; and, in one Word, equally merit all your own beautiful Complements of *Absurdity, Want of Sense, Abuse of Scripture, perverting of the sacred Writings*, and a multitude of others, prettily enough expressed in *Latin*; tho' hardly worthy either of a *Christian*, or of a *Gentleman*. But who, whilst he reads them, would imagine that a Man of so celebrated Parts and Abilities, should hardly allege one single thing to condemn *another*, but what as strongly condemns *himself*! That he should hardly ever go about to *contradict* the *Person* he had chosen to shew his Parts upon, without manifestly contradicting *himself*! Or shoot one Arrow at him, but what returns back upon his own Head! Particularly, who would think that a Man should make the Grounds, and Extent, of *Civil Subjection*, the same with *Ecclesiastical*; and this in Order to carry it to the highest pitch: whilst he himself is combating and opposing his *Ecclesiastical Superiors*, about *rights and privileges*, upon which the Being of the *Church of Christ* doth not surely depend! For if such Flames may be kindled upon

upon such Grounds against *Ecclesiastical Governours*; and yet their *Title to Obedience* be parallel to that of *Civil Governours*: for *God's sake*, what is there that may not be a pretense of raising a *Quarrel* and disturbance in the *State*? And how greatly is the *Civil Authority* indebted to you, who, under pretense of *exalting it*, have laid down *such a Rule*, and exemplified it by *such a Practice*? Whenever I deal thus by *Governours*, may all that your *Wit and Zeal* have inspired you to throw out against me, be believed! But, in the mean while, do not think that every Body is without Eyes, to see; or without Sense, to observe. We all allow you, in *Panegyric*, and *Satyr*, equally great: which vary and change with the Passions of the *Writer*; and seem to require nothing to make them *beautiful*, but a choice of Words, and curiousness of turn. But pardon me, if I put you in mind that *Truth* is one *uniform, invariable, Self-consistent* thing; and that *Strength of Reasoning* is something so entirely different from the *Sound of well-turned periods*, that a *perfect Master* of the *one*, may only give proof of his own *inability*, by attempting the *other*.

Upon the review of the whole, the *Art* of some Men will plainly appear. Alas! Every Man of the lowest capacity can speak his Mind openly, and declare his true Judgment. But to manage a *Controversy* after such a manner as to deceive many; to make *that* appear a *darling Doctrine*, which one believes to be *false*; to seem to differ *much* where one hardly differs one Hair's breadth; to speak so as to be esteemed an *Advocate* for one *Cause*; and yet to drop what really pleads for the contrary. *Hæ tibi erunt artes*. This is a management worthy of a *great genius*: and above the attainment of every vulgar Head. For instance, Supposing a Person, by whom you have no Mind

to be so understood, should tax you, with pleading for Submission to *Bad Governours*, *utcumque minus suum tuentibus, utcumque injurias, & damna inferentibus, &c.* and so laying whole Nations under Misery; arguing from the unlimited Expressions used by you when you were designing to speak accurately: Why, the answer is ready, This indeed may deceive some *Readers*: but whoever reads other passages will find that by *Bad Governours*, I mean *Good Governours*: only not perfect, not free from all fault; such as preserve the *Public Good*, though guilty of some *Evil Things* of a private Nature: and that though I speak of *Submission* to them, *however they behave themselves*, yet this is in the heat of Disputation against an *Adversary* whom I thought fit to oppose; but that when I come to explain my self I declare only for the *Submission* of *Private Persons*, when the *Public* is happy; and against placing all hopes in a State of *War*, and *Confusion*. If he should reply, *Nay*; but you say, *They must not be resisted in any thing; or in any wise*: You have to say for your self, I do say so indeed in some places; but, in *another*, I only say that they must not be resisted, *protervè, & improbè, saucily, and wickedly*; and from *others* it is plain, that I do not mean this *Non-resistance*, in *Cases* in which the *Public* is in danger. If he should put you in mind that you affirm that *St. Paul* must mean his *Doctrine* for the use of such *Princes* as *Nero*, and *Caligula*, who certainly were destructive of the *Public* to an high degree: your reply to this is ready likewise; I do indeed say so at the beginning of my Sermon, when I was opposing a Man of *pernicious Principles*; but when I come to the *End*, it is plain, I am not far from his *Principles*; and that all I mean with respect to such *Princes* is, that *St. Paul* saith, *They must not presently be resisted by Arms*; that a State

of *War* is a deplorable Condition; and that we must take care by *Resistance* to settle a *better*, and not a *worse*, *Estate* for the future. Well, but it may be said again, you have made the State of *Subjects* the same with that of *Slaves*, bought with Money, or taken captive in War. I have so, in Words, you may answer: but then it is to be remembered that I save all again at last; that I allege the united Judgment of *Judicious* and *Good Men* for resisting by *Force* those *Princes* who use the *Body* of their *Subjects*, as *Slaves*; and by my *silence* give consent effectually to that Judgment: And what could any one do more for a *Doctrine* which he thinks it necessary to seem to oppose? Besides, tho' I speak here of the need there is of *Bridles* for the poor *People*; yet I have sufficiently heretofore declared my Mind against all manner of *Tokes* upon the *Necks* of *Englishmen*: and this with a particular view to the *Yoke* of *Slavery*, properly so called. If any one should again reply, that you have laboured hard to fix a *Divine Authority* to those Parts of the *Conduct* of *Princes* which you Acknowledge to be void of *Right*, and *Justice*; and that this, if it be in *any*, must be in *all* supposable Instances of their *Behaviour*, and after such a manner as to command the profoundest *Subjection*: You may answer, I have indeed done this; but then I have made amends for it, at the *End* of my *Discourse*, from which it is plain that I design not that *argument* to go farther than I please; and that I cannot help acknowledging *Cases*, in which *Princes* are as much without the *Divine Authority*, as they are without *Right*, or *Justice*. If it should be asked farther, Why then all this zeal against *one* of your *Brethren*, who appears to think no worse than what you sometimes think your self? Why is he to be reproached as an *Enemy* to *Regal Power*,

a Patron of *Licentiousness*; a Flatterer of the *Lusts* of the People; a Contaminator, and Torturer of the *sacred Scriptures*; a Misrepresenter of the *Doctrine* of *St. Paul*? and under Multitude of other Colours to be figured as a most pernicious Creature? Why might not that *Defense* which he wrote for the *Explication*, and *Vindication*, of his *Doctrine*, be considered? and why might not more of *Christian Candor* be allowed him? What you could answer, I do not see: nor will I give my self leave to conjecture. But what must others say to behold all this *zeal*, against *One*, whose *Main Doctrine* you cannot bring your own Lips to disown: You may perhaps please your self with this *Art of Preaching*; and imagine that *Men* may be so blind as not to see thro' it: but you may find your self deceived. And however *Men* may be now imposed upon; the time will come when we must all severely answer for such *slips* of our *Tongues*, and of our *Pens*, before a *Judge*, whom no *false Colours* can pervert.

Give me leave now, before I conclude, to ask a very important *Question*, viz. What is become of the *charge*, so vehemently once urged against me, of being a *Preacher of Rebellion*, in the *State*? Have I laid hold of any supposed *Irregularities*, or *Invasions* of *Rights* and *Privileges*; and from thence taken occasion to stir up the *Spirits* of *Men* against their *Governours*? Have I endeavoured to scatter any *Jealousies*, or *Surmises*, of *Present*, or *Future Danger*, to make the *Management* of the *State* *Difficult*, or to disturb the *repose* of *them* to whom we owe our own *repose*? Is there any one single Person who hath more heartily, and more constantly endeavoured, either to recommend the *Administration* of the *Government* to the *Affections* of its *Subjects*; or to combat the *Errors*, and *reasonings*, of its *professed Enemies*? And is this *Rebellion*; to maintain and
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vindicate the *contrary Principles* to *those*, by which alone they hope to overthrow it? Is this *Rebellion* against the *State*; to establish the lawfulness of entering into those *Measures*, upon which this very *State* is founded? to settle those *principles*, which whoever embraces, becomes a stronger Friend than ever, to the present *Governour*, and *Government*; and more firmly resolved against a *second Revolution* to *Popery*, and *Slavery*? Or, what is it? for it being a very *terrible charge*, I must desire some account of it. I suppose, it was designed to be proved in this *Elaborate Discourse*: and if it be not done here, I doubt I must not expect any farther *proofs* from you. If we therefore examine how the *charge* is here supported; we shall find nothing equal to it. All that is pretended to, by your self, granting the whole, will not do it. Supposing that I have mistaken the extent of *St. Paul's Argument* taken from *Authority*; and, for the sake of *God's Honour*, have denied all *Authority* to any single *Act* of *Injustice*: yet this is not preaching *Rebellion* any more than your own declaring that there can be no *Right* in any to decree *Injustice*, which is exactly what I meant, in other Words. Or, do I preach *Rebellion*, when in the same *Sermon* I declare, from *St. Paul*, the wrath of *God* (an *argument* which you have weakened) against all who disturb the *Government* of *Princes*, under whom the *Public Happiness* is secure? As for the other *argument* taken from their *Universal usefulness*; I have urged it for *Submission* to instances of *Private Injustice*: and this, I hope, is not *Rebellion*. Supposing I have said that *St. Paul* makes not express mention, in his *argument*, of any *Governours* but those who may, in a good Sense, be called a *Terror* not to *Good Works*, but to *Evil*; this is but common justice to *St. Paul*: nor do
you

you pretend that he hath mentioned any other. And if this be *Rebellion*; then St. Paul must come into the *Charge*. Supposing I have said that St. Paul preacheth *Subjection* by way of *Reasoning*; and that an *Argument* drawn from the *Universal Usefulness* of *Governours* cannot possibly be designed to conclude for *Submission* to such as are *destructive* to the *public* and *general Happiness*: Neither will this, I hope, be accounted *Rebellion*; till the Observation is proved *false*; or till you can shew that *Truth* can be the support of *Vice*. And I the rather hope it, because you your self, in the Name of *Judicious and Good Men*, have effectually declared for *Rebellion*; if *Resistance* to such *Governours* be *Rebellion*. I never denied, as far as I can remember, that a *Prince* will punish, if he can, any who rise up against him; or that it is *impolitic* for any private Persons to venture their *Heads*. And yet these are the great Supports, according to you, of St. Paul's *Non-resistance*. But pardon me, if I have been unwilling to found *Obedience*, in point of *Conscience*, to *God's Ordinance*, upon the Denunciation of the *Wrath* of *Man*: which is often avoided; and is, therefore, but an uncertain Support; sufficiently known to any body without the help of an *Apostle*. I never have denied, or dissembled, the *Sin* of *disturbing Governments* on private Accounts; or maintained that private Persons are not obliged to submit to particular Instances of *Injustice*, rather than disquiet the *public Happiness*. I never taught, that, upon any *Attempts* which might threaten the *public Interest*, *Recourse* should *immediately* be had to *Arms*; and a *state* of *War* presently chosen, and continued in. And yet these two are the *main points* against which you conclude, when you come to *recapitulate* your *Atchievements*, and to explain your loose
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Expressions. And if this be all you have to say; I am sure, I am as far, as your self, from the Crime of preaching *Rebellion*. And that this is all, is still plain from hence, that, when you come to put the *Case*, whether St. Paul meant to include in his Precept such *Princes* as overturn and destroy the *public Interest* of whole *Communities*, &c. that is, in other Words, whether he makes these, considered in such Circumstances, the *Ordinance* of *God*; whether he means to include these in his *Argument* drawn from *Usefulness*; you assure the World, that *Men* of the *best Characters* have thought such *Princes* not included by St. Paul in his general Expressions; and very plainly intimate in this *Sermon*, that you have nothing to say against the *Truth* of this Allowance: as you more plainly once allowed it, your self, in an *English Discourse* to those whom you sometimes call the *Mobb*, in Latin *Vulgus*. Behold, therefore, to what the *vain*, and *hasty*, Charge of *Rebellion* is come! Even to the tacit Acknowledgment of the *Truth* of that *Doctrine*, upon which the *charge* was founded; even to *Self-contradiction*, and *Self-condemnation*. The only part of it remaining is, that I have spoken an *unseasonable Truth*. To which I answer, that I have already proved it not to have been *unseasonable*: and, supposing it were, that an *unseasonable Truth* is not *Rebellion*; or, if it be, that your self must bear your part in the *charge*. For it cannot be more *unseasonable* for me to declare my *single Judgment*, than for you to let the World know, that the *united Judgment* of several *Judicious, and Good Men*, is in favour of the same *Doctrine*. And this with all the Appearance of being of the same Judgment your self. And thus at length is the *Cause* tried: And what the *Issue* is; whether I be truly guilty of so great a Crime;
or

or whether you your self can really think me so, the World must judge.

I have been much the longer in the Examination of the proof you have brought of your heavy Charge : because there is the more of Pains, and Time required, where a Finesse of Art, and Delicacy of Expression have plaid their part so well ; and where such a variety of Insinuations are, in so dextrous a manner, and under the Covert of pious, and smooth Expressions, conveyed into the mind of the Reader. I cannot indeed call it true Cunning ; because the effect of it lasts no longer than till the Veil is taken off, and a few Observations placed before the Eyes of the Reader. If the Patrons of Non-resistance do not see what an Advocate they have got ; I pity them : but cannot yet think them so blind, as not to perceive, that the Support of their Cause was not the thing you aimed at. If my Brethren of the Clergy, to whom all this fine Harangue was directed, cannot yet have as good an Opinion of a Man who hath openly, and generously, attacked what he thought a pernicious Error, as of one who by slight of Words, (as other Artists by slight of Hand) hath only deceived the Sense, whilst he hath been doing the very thing which he would seem not to border upon ; mine must be the Misfortune. I must make my self easy in having endeavoured to detect, what I think ought to be detected.

If you shall judge it proper to take any Notice of this ; I pretend not to prescribe to you. But I think fit to let you know, that I will ever find Time and Leisure, if God grant me Ability, to pursue you through every Winding of what You shall offer ; to examine thoroughly every specious Word ; to search after every false Colour, and every Inconsistency ; and to set

set them all in as clear a Light as possible : that so, fine Language may not pass upon the World for Truth ; Insinuation may not go for Argument ; the Art of dissembling one's Real Judgment, may not be esteemed Christian prudence ; the giving up of a Cause, may not be thought the Defense of it ; nor the severe handling one of your Brethren, be imposed upon the World as handling the Word of God, and preaching the Gospel of Jesus Christ ; and lastly, that some Persons may be convinced, if their own Eye-sight will convince them, how securely they may depend upon such a Guide in Controversy.

The Trouble which I have now given you, you will, I hope, the more easily excuse : Because you have, without any reason, brought it upon your self, by unnecessarily interposing in a Cause, of all others the most improper for You to have touched ; and by making shew of zealously defending those Principles, which you, as zealously, profess, at least, to detest and abhor, in another Controversy which you still keep on foot.

So, beseeching God to forgive you that heap of Insinuations, and Ill Names, with which your Zeal hath loaded those from whom you would seem only to differ ; and to lead us all into just Notions of Christian Simplicity, and Open Sincerity : I take leave, till you are pleased to give me a farther Occasion of vindicating my self ; and assure you, that I am, in all Instances of Christian Love, and Charity, ready to approve my self,

Reverend Sir,

Your most Humble Servant,

BENJAMIN HOADLY.

APPENDIX.

THAT the Reader may the better judge of the Conduct of the Reverend Dr. Fr. Atterbury, in this Controversy; and of the Treatment which I, in particular, have received at his Hands; I beg leave here to transcribe some very remarkable Passages out of his Book, intituled, *The Rights, Powers, and Privileges of an English Convocation*, &c. published in the Year 1700. The Occasion of his writing this Book was, if we will believe himself, his great Indignation to find it asserted by as Great, and as good Men, as any in this Church, that the Calling, and Sitting, of the Convocation was in the Power of the Prince, so that he might call the Clergy to meet, or not, as he himself should judge fitting. He still keeps on foot that unhappy Controversy, of which he then laid the Foundation: and would take it very ill, I doubt not, to have it thought, that he hath altered his Notions, which, with so much Freedom he scattered thro' that Work of his, when he thought them fit for the purpose he had then in view.

One would not think that the making the Convocation an Occasional Meeting, sitting, or not sitting, at the Will of the Executive Power, could well be thought to threaten universal Ruine. Yet the Reader shall see how he then professed to be warm'd, and fired, at the Thought of this, and the

the like positions. Pref. p. 6. *And a very convenient Scheme it is, saith he, for Princes that meditate new Schemes of Government. Some Years ago, enforced by a Parker, or a Cartwright, it might have done great Service. It would have help'd on all the pious Designs then upon the Anvil: And if the Assertor had not been a Bishop, to be sure, it would have made him one. Can such Doctrines ever be serviceable, (I say not, grateful) to this Government, which would have ruined our Established Religion under a former?* p. 8. *This is a Doctrine that, at a convenient Season, will serve as well for Acts of Parliament, as Canons.* p. 9. *And then there is an End of our Constitution, whenever a Prince ariseth that hath an ill Design upon it.* Again, p. 10. *These principles we see, are such as have an immediate Tendency towards subverting Liberty in general.* p. 11. *Those Divines who read Lessons to Princes how to strain their Ecclesiastical power, to the utmost, without exceeding it, and oppress their Clergy legally [a very good Complement to our Laws!] are not surely the best Men of their Order. They are Church-Emptions, and Dudleys: And usually find the Fate of such wretched Instruments, to be detested by one side, and at last abandoned by the other.* In the same page, He goes so far as not to allow it a decent part in a Clergyman, to shew himself willing, even to prove the Truth, if it be against the Interest of his own Body. And, p. 15. *Can a Man pretend to principles and act at this rate? The very Swifs that fight for pay, will not march against their own Country: But whenever it is attaqued, go home and defend it. The Contempt, the Ignominy, the Aversion, to which he all along endeavours to expose some of the brightest Ornaments of our Church, only for thinking this power of the Executive, over the Convocation to be legal, and rightful, is what I am not willing to transcribe, in his own Words.* Now

Now, would any one, who sees this *Spirit*, and *Zeal*, with which he then thought it for his purpose to stand up against the *Executive power*; would any one, I say, imagine that this same Writer should pitch upon this *Executive part* of our *Constitution*, to exalt above the *other*? that this same Writer should in this *Sermon* give to the *Executive*, in so unlimited Expressions, an *Authority*, above, and without *Right*, or *Law*; that this same Writer should make the *Case* of *Subjects*, the same with that of *Slaves*, and their *Subjection* concluded by that of *Slaves*; that he should now use one who hath endeavoured to serve the *Interests* of that *Body* of *Subjects* to which he belongs, with so much *Severity*, when sometime before it was *Infamy*, with Him, to be free, to find out, or speak, even *Truth* it self, against the *Body* we are of; that He should now argue from the *Respect* due to *Ecclesiastical Persons*, tho' not doing their *Duty*, to that which is due to the *Executive*; when, He had in this *Preface* declared those, whom He was pleased to think unworthy *Clergymen* for standing up for this *Power* in the *Executive*, fit for nothing but the *Detestation*, and *Aversion* of all *Men*? that He should call that *fighting* against their *Country*; and yet himself go much farther in exalting the *Prerogative*, and *Authority* of the *Executive*? What can the *Reader* think of such a *Procedure*? and how easily may the *Reproaches* of a *Writer* be bor'n, who seems thus to cast them about at a venture, with an *Eye* to nothing but the present *Commotion* of his *Mind*; and the present point he hath in view?

In the *Book* it self, *Edit.* 1. p. 28. *True Protestants*, saith he, and *true Englishmen*, will like this *Fashion* the worse, for being of *Popish*, and *French Extraction*; and for coming from a *Country*, where both
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Civil, and Ecclesiastical Liberty have expir'd long ago. Now, from what *Country* comes the professed *Doctrine* of his *late Sermon*, which gives to the *Executive Power* an *Authority* against *Law* and *Right*; and treats of *Subjects*, as if they were in the condition of *Slaves*? And how must all *true Protestants*, and *true Englishmen* like this? p. 105. He hopes that the *House of Commons* will patronize the *Claims* of the *Convocation*, that so they may be in heart, and at hand always to stand up with them in behalf of *Liberty*, when it shall be ataqued; and to RESIST a growing *Tyranny*, either in *Church* or *State*, as it may happen. Doth not he here breath the *Spirit* of *Liberty*; and encourage the *Laity* to shew the same *Zeal*, to resist a growing *Tyranny*? It was for his purpose at that time; when the *King's Power* was to be depre's'd to his measure: but now it is a *Crime* to speak a *Word* to the *Laity* concerning *Resistance*. They have too much of the *Spirit* of *Liberty* already. They want *Bridles*, and not *Spurs*. The *Business* of *Clergymen* is to keep to the general *Doctrine* of *Submission*; not to give the *Allarm* against the *Beginnings* of *Tyranny*, Did ever *Man* act a part, or rather *two parts*, after such a manner? Or could ever *Man*, but one of so dextrous a *Management*, be well accepted by the same *Persons*, for both parts of a *Contradiction*? Again, p. 112. Speaking of the present *Clergy*, whose *Cause* he professeth to plead, Had they, said he, lived indeed in *Henry the Eighth's Time*, they should not perhaps have humour'd his *imperious Temper* so far as tamely to have given up any one *legal Privilege*, which belonged to the *Body*, and was not inconsistent with the good of their *Country*. The *Popish Religion* is all *Submission* and *Slavery*, p. 113. and it is no wonder, therefore, the *Fetters* prepar'd for
N ii them

them sat so easily upon them. But in a Protestant Clergy, the professed Assertors of the just Freedoms and Rights of Mankind in Religious Affairs; and who have been more than once Instrumental in shaking off YOKES of every kind from the Necks of Englishmen, such illegal Compliances would be inexcusable. Again, p. 294. speaking of the Established Clergy, He saith, No Men resisted the Encroachments of the late Reign, that is, King James's more than they; no Men, by their Labours and Zeal, contributed more to our present happy Establishment. This is something more than bare submission to it, when it is establish'd. And, p. 362. None had been more instrumental than They in promoting the common Deliverance. The Reader sees here the Spirit of the same Man, upon a different Occasion, who now calls another the Encourager of Licentiousness, only for removing the Yoke of perfect Slavery from Subjects. He sees that there was a Time when it was the Glory of Clergy-men to shake off YOKES: and He will wonder to find a Time, in the same Writer's Account, for forcing on again the Yoke of Slavery it self. He sees that there was a Time when it was the Glory of Clergy-men, to have been Instrumental in the late Deliverance: and he will wonder to find a Time, in which it is peculiarly infamous for a Clergy-man to defend that Revolution, which it was once the Glory of the Clergy to have promoted. He sees that the Power of the Executive against Right and Law, was once accounted only an Imperious Temper, without a true Authority; and a Compliance with it, even in one instance, not only illegal, but inexcusable: and how will he wonder to find the same Writer pleading for a Divine Authority to Illegal Acts, in general; and the necessity of Submission to them strenuously urged?

ged? One would think, it need not have moved the Admiration of this Author, of all Men, that I should talk of the Infamy; and Dishonour of submitting to Universal Misery; when it seems it is inexcusable in a Protestant Clergy to comply with the supposed Encroachments of the Supreme Power upon the Interest of their own Body only. Which Position (saith He, p. 203. of that which he then pretended to oppose) how it can be reconciled with an Original Contract, and with several Branches of the late Declaration of Rights, I do not see: And how far it may appear to the three Estates of this Realm, to encroach on their share in Government; and on the Fundamental Rights and Liberties of the free People of England, Time must shew. Once, it seems, Humane Contract was in favour: And to exalt the prerogative, but in one single Instance, relating to the Convocation only, animated Him to raise, if He could, the Jealousy of the Legislative Authority. But now, the Position, that Governing Authority comes from Men, must be made to contradict Reason, and Scripture: Now, the Executive Power is made choice of, to be exalted, considered as distinct from the Legislative; and the Determinations of it against Right, are made valid, and authoritative, properly speaking. The Tendency of such positions is so evident, that I need not point it out: And the contradictory Movements of some Pens is as manifest. To the same effect, p. 206. He represents his Adversary, as speaking all along of the King, as if He, in Exclusion to the three Estates, had the plenitude of Power, and were the point, in which the Obedience of every Man center'd. This, adds he, is a Fundamental Mistake, which runs quite through: and is such an one as overturns our whole Constitution; and confounds the Executive

ecutive and Legislative parts of it, and deserves a Re-
prehension, therefore, some other way than from the Pen
of an Adversary. So very hearty, and severe was
He once, or professed himself to be, against the
Appearance of this! But yet, in this Sermon that I
have been examining (which one would hardly
think) the same Fundamental Error prevails. He
speaks all along of the Executive part of every Con-
stitution, as if that had the plenitude of Power; and
were the point in which the Obedience of every Man
center'd. And let him look to it, whether He doth
not thus lay himself open to his own severest Cen-
sures. And lest any should think it an Excuse for
exalting the Regal Power, rather than defending the
Liberty of the Subject, that under a Good Prince
there is no Danger; His Words are these, p. 133.
Such kind of Books indeed were written twelve years
ago, by some false Members of our Communion, to
make way for those ill Designs that were on foot; but
to the eternal Infamy of the Writers of them, who
thought to find their particular account in the general
Ruine of our Constitution. — There is not, 'tis
true, so much hazard now, as there was then, in ex-
alting the Regal Power; when we live under a Prince
who is too just, and too clear-sighted to be flattered
into a Misuse of his Authority. However, No
Thanks are due for this to the Flatterers, who have
mark'd out the Arbitrary Scheme; and it is no Fault
of theirs, if it be not afterwards followed. Let the
Reader but consider, that all the exalting of the
Regal Power, against which He is so severe, was
the asserting a greater Authority in it, over the
Convocation, than this Author thought well of; and
yet that this rais'd his Spirits to that height:
and then, let it be remembred that, in this Ser-
mon, He himself, hath exalted it much higher;
and

and depressed the Condition of the Body of Sub-
jects, into that of Slaves. With respect to which,
I beg leave to return Him His own Words, p. 358.
with very little Alteration. *We live amongst a Peo-
ple, always jealous of their Liberties, and always care-
ful to preserve them; in a Land where Slavery, whe-
ther in Church or State, tho' sometimes planted, could
never thrive. — And those Fetters therefore which
might perhaps be laid upon Slaves, may not fit Subjects
so well.* I could add more: But these sentences will
sufficiently shew his Zeal, and Warmth, against those
positions and persons, who, in one instance only, gave
the Executive Power, a Prerogative, which He
could not approve of; and raise the Amazement
of the Reader at his present Procedure, and his
carrying on, with equal Zeal, at the same Time,
two different Causes, upon two inconsistent
Schemes.

2. It will not be disagreeable to the Reader, I be-
lieve, if I now lay before Him the Reasons which
He then alleged for publickly standing up for Li-
berty, and arguing against the Encroachments (as he
styles them) of the Executive Power; and the An-
swers which He gives to such Objections as He met
with against the part which he then professed to
act, against the Regal Power: Because it may be
seen that the very same Reasons might have more
strongly excused me to Himself; and that his own
Words will abundantly answer some of the chief of
those Objections, which he hath now thought fit to
urge against appearing in the Cause which I have
maintained.

In general, He declareth for the public Dis-
avowal of such oppressive Schemes, (as He calls
that

that which he thought to press hard upon the Clergy) in these Words, p. 116. *The Clergy betray their Privileges, if they lie still under the publication of such oppressive Schemes, without as open a Disavowal of them, and without expressing their Detestation of the Meanness of the Publisher. — They deserve to be used as ill as their open Adversaries, or their false Friends would have them used, if they can suffer their most valuable Right to be thus torn from them, in Print, without the least struggle for it. The Virgin, in the Law of God, was judged consenting to the Rape, who did not cry out, when help was near; and was order'd therefore, to be stoned, together with the Ravisher. And are not Subjects as much consenting to their own Ruine, and Betrayers of their own Privileges, if they do not openly disavow the Oppressive Schemes, and Principles, which have been so often openly avow'd? And will not all this justify a Subject for publickly appearing in the Cause of Liberty? And ought it not, at least, with this Author, to have been a prevailing Apology; who not only declares for publishing his Zeal against Oppression, in order to do good to the present Generation; but likewise, if that were despair'd of, in hopes that the Truths delivered by Him may, in some favourable Conjunction, contribute to awaken the Right, He is contending for? With this single Prospect He would have undertaken the Work, had all others failed Him; and in Despair of being listen'd to, by the present Age, would have wrote, and appealed to Posterity, p. 456. But, now, it seems, there can be no Apology for appealing, in behalf of Liberty, either to the present, or succeeding Generations.*

The

The Reader hath already seen that one main Topic of this Writer's Satyr against me, is Enmity to the Power of Kings; lessening the Prerogative of the Executive; and the like. Now He shall hear, how easy He finds it, in his Convocation-Controversy, to answer all such Reasons against contending for Liberty, in opposition to the Executive Power. Pref. p. 20. The Author, saith He, speaking of himself, is perswaded that He cannot make a more welcome Present to Good Governours, either in Church or State, than by affording them a true account of the Wants, and Rights, of such as are entrusted to their Care; and an Opportunity, by that means, of exerting their Power to the good Ends for which it was designed. And they who shall represent Him, as Disaffected to the Government, that is, the Executive) on this account, do not sure consider what a kind Complement they make to those, for whose Interests they pretend to be so warmly concerned. I might have hoped that He would have allow'd me the Benefit of the very same Apology, on a much weightier Occasion, and of more universal Importance. Again, p. 21. *Disaffection to the Government, (i. e. the Executive,) as the Charge is commonly managed, is a Word only, made use of by those that are in favour, to keep others out; it is a Reproach taken up on purpose to justify premeditated Designs of oppressing Men: For so the Soldier said, that the Countryman whilstled Treason, when He had resolved to plunder Him. Again, he goes on, in the same Page, to answer that Charge, in these Words. If to be a True Lover of England, it's Monarchy, and Episcopacy, is to have the utmost Esteem for the Heroic Qualities, and Matchless Merits of*

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our

our Prince; and to think no instance of Respect, and Duty that Subjects can pay him, too great, while they take Care to preserve their own Rights and Privileges; if to prefer the true Interests of the Protestant Religion, and the PRESERVATION of our CIVIL LIBERTIES before ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS? and for these, among other, Ends, to pray heartily for the Continuance of our present Government both in Church and State: If these be Marks of Disaffection, then the Author of these Papers, must own himself, disaffected; and not otherwise. I hope He will not deny me the Advantage of the same Words. The Reader will see here that Subjects are not to pay any Instance of Respect to the Prince, which is inconsistent with their taking Care to preserve their own Rights and Privileges; that the True Interests of the Protestant Religion, and the Preservation of our Civil Liberties, ought to be preferr'd before all other Considerations; and that the preferring these to all other Considerations, and the standing up for them, against the Executive, is very consistent with such an Affection for the Executive, as alone becomes a good Subject: And consequently, that all his Insinuations of Enmity to Royal Power and Prerogative, and the like, are, by his own Concession, of no account.

Another Topic, in his Latin Sermon, is that the standing up for Liberty, is encourageing Licentiousness; sounding a Trumpet to raise the Spirit of the People to Sedition; and the like. But when He supposed this Imputation to be laid upon Himself, whilst He was contending for the supposed Rights of one part of the Community

munity only, his Answer is this, No, The Imputation is more justly to be laid at their Door, who are for such new Methods, and Practises, as naturally tend to alienate the Hearts, and Affections of Subjects, and to make Governments uneasy. Pref. p. 22. Then, it seems, the exalting the Executive was the thing that raised Disturbances amongst Subjects. He goes on, in the same Page, How is it to be expected that this Management should work on the Inferior Clergy? What else can it produce in them but Distrusts, Uneasinesses, Complaints, and Endeavours of Righting themselves, as they are able.—The Projectors of such Schemes may fancy them proper Methods of laying Men's Passions asleep, but will in the End find that they are the sure way of raising them. Now, can this sort of reasoning be applied only to the giving the Executive a Power over Convocations, supposed to be too great? And ought it not to have hindered the Person, who made use of it, from exalting the Executive, as He hath done in his Sermon, and representing that, as the true, and only way of discouraging, and quelling, the Passions, of Subjects? But I need not make so particular Remarks.

Again, In his Latin Sermon, The People, the whole Body of Subjects are represented as wanting Bridles; as unfit to be trusted with the Knowledge of any such Right, as that of Self-Defense. But, when something like this was supposed by Him to be said of the Inferior Clergy, who are but a part of that Body of Subjects, He replies, in that Pref. p. 22. Doth it at all soften the severity of this Usage to tell the Clergy that it is really for their Interest, and Ser-

Service, if they understood it? That they are a Number of Men too warm, and indiscreet; and were they indulged the Liberty they claim, would soon ruine themselves, by the use of it?—This, saith he, is not only Oppressing Men, but Insulting them: The Reason given for the Usage is more provoking than the Usage it self. So say I to the Preacher of that Sermon; Doth it at all soften the Severity of this Usage, i. e. his degrading the Duty of Subjects into the submission of Slaves, to tell the whole Body of Subjects, that it is really for their Interest; that they are a Number of Men too indiscreet to be trusted with the Knowledge of such a Right as that of Self-Defense; that they would soon ruine themselves by such a Privilege; that they want Bridles, and not Spurs? This is not only Oppressing Men; but insulting them. The Reason given for the Usage is more provoking than the usage it self.

In the Book it self, p. 14. He speaks of that *Objection* taken from the *Unseasonableness* of his attempting to defend the *Right* of a part of the *Subjects*, against the *Executive*. The *Unseasonableness* of those Principles, I esponse, saith He, is yet a stranger Pretense than any of the former. For can it be thought unseasonable to defend a *Right* that hath been openly attacked, and denied, in a Book, solemnly written for that purpose, by a Man, whose Business it was to have stood up for the *Right*, if it were one: And more to the same purpose. Here the Reader finds two things asserted; that it cannot be unseasonable to defend a *Right* which hath been attacked openly, in one Book; and that it is the Business of those who belong to a *Body*, to stand

stand up for the *Rights* of it. If so; how highly *seasonable* must it be, in this *Author's* account, to defend a *Right*, which hath been openly attacked, not in one, but in numberless Books? And how highly inexcusable in *Himself*, who belongs to the *Body* of *Subjects*, to labour, with so much Pains, and Art, either to destroy a *Right* which He himself, it is very probable, believes to belong to them; or to obscure it, so as that it shall be as insignificant to them, as if it did not belong to them?

I should not have produced these passages out of a former Work of Dr. *Atterbury's*, to confront to His Procedure in this *Sermon*; had He given the World the least Reason to think, that, upon mature Consideration, His Judgment was really altered. For I think, every Man hath a *Right*, to declare, upon all good Occasions, against it, when He is convinced of any *Error*: And, I'm sure, every honest Man will do so. And therefore, I never can think the mere Change of Opinion an *Argument* of *Reproach* to any one: for fear of confirming Men in *Errors* once embraced, and leaving no room for *Conviction*. But when a *Writer* is carrying on two different *Causes*, upon two Sets of *Contradictory Principles*; and is gaining himself Applause, amongst the same Persons, at the same Time, by standing up for, and against *Liberty*; by *Depressing* the *Prerogative*, and *Exalting* it; by *Lessening* the *Executive Power*, and *Magnifying* it; by loading some with all *Infamy* for pleading for *Submission* to it, in one particular which

which He supposeth an *Encroachment*, and by loading *others* with the same *Infamy* for pleading against *submission* to it in *Cases* that touch the Happiness of the whole *Community*: When a *Writer*, I say, is carrying on two *Causes*, after so unparallel'd a manner; nothing can be more proper, than the Method which I have here taken, to open the *Eyes*, both of *Himself*, and of his *Readers*.

F I N I S.

CONTENTS.

C H A P. I.

An Examination of the Patriarchal Scheme of Government.

Sect. 1. **I**Ntroduction. *The Reasons for this Examination.* p. 1.

Sect. 2. *The Patriarchal Scheme distinctly proposed in it's several Branches.* p. 3.

Sect. 3. *An Examination of the first Branch of this Scheme, viz. That Adam was Universal Monarch, properly so called, over all his Descendents.* p. 5.

Here it is proved,

That the Subjection, and Inferiority of Eve, imply nothing of Civil Government in Adam. p. 7.

That the Obedience of Children, and the Injunctions laid upon them by Almighty God, have no proper relation to Civil Government. p. 8, 11.

That Kings being called Fathers toucheth not the point. p. 10.
That,

2 CONTENTS.

That, supposing Adam a Monarch over his own Children, this will not prove Him an Universal Monarch. p. 13.
That the Argument taken from God's calling Himself a Father, is of no Account. p. 15.

SECT. 4. An Examination of the second Branch of this Scheme: viz. That Adam's Monarchy was Absolute and Uncontrollable; and made so by the Appointment of God himself. p. 15, 16.

Here it is proved,

1. That Adam's Fatherly Authority did not imply in it the Absolute Disposal of Life and Death. p. 16, to p. 23.
 2. That his Marital Authority implied not in it such an Absolute Power. p. 23.
 3. That, supposing Adam a Civil Governour, the Nature of Government doth not require such an Uncontrollable Power, in all possible Cases: and that a Last Resort, in such Sense, as that it shall not be lawful for the Governed Body to preserve it self from Ruine, is so far from being agreeable to the Ends of Government, that it is wholly inconsistent with them. p. 26, to 31.
- The Argument for Absolute Non-resistance, taken from the supposed Absurdity, of making any thing Superior to the Supreme; and of making the Governours the Governed, and the like p. 31, 32.
- The Fallacy observed, which is built upon a Resolution of always interpreting the Scripture-Words, Obey, Rule, Subjection, and the like, absolutely. p. 33.

Sect.

CONTENTS. 3

SECT. 5. An Examination of the Third Branch of this Scheme; viz. That, Cain being disinherited, Adam was succeeded, according to Divine Appointment, in this Universal Absolute Monarchy, by Seth; and so, successively, by the Eldest of his Branch, down to the Flood. p. 35.

Here it is proved,

1. That the Words of God to Cain, Gen. 4. 7. contain nothing in them of a Succession, by Primogeniture, to Adam's Universal Absolute Monarchy over all the rest of Mankind. p. 36, to p. 38.
2. That the Genealogy, recorded Gen. 5. is not an Account of Monarchs, succeeding one another, in that Monarchy.

SECT. 6. An Examination of the Fourth Branch of this Scheme, viz. That, after the Deluge, down to the Division of Nations, Noah was Absolute Universal Monarch; as Adam, at first. p. 43.

Here are consider'd,

- The Argument drawn from Noah's Cursing his Wicked Son. p. 53.
- The Argument drawn from those Words of God, to Noah, and his Sons, Gen. 9. 6. Whoso sheddeth Man's Blood, &c. p. 44. to, p. 46.
- The Account given, Gen. 11. of building the Tower of Babel: which is proved to be a good Argument against this supposed Monarchy of Noah. p. 46. to p. 48.

Sect.

4 CONTENTS.

Sect. 7. An Examination of the Fifth Branch of this Scheme, viz. That, at the Division of Nations, this Universal Monarchy was changed, by Almighty God, into Seventy Independent Monarchies; and the several Nations rank'd by Him under their proper Rulers, all nam'd, Gen. 10. p. 49.

Here it is proved,

That there is nothing in this Chapter to make us think that Moses had any such Design in it. p. 49. to, 53.

That there are many things in it which are absolutely inconsistent with the Supposition that he had any such Design; and Demonstrations of the Absurdity of this Branch. Ibid.

The Text urged from the Book, Ecclesiasticus, ch. 17. 17. that in the Division of the Nations of the whole Earth, God set a Ruler over every People, considered. p. 53, 54.

Deut. 32. 8. Of God's appointing the Bounds of Nations, considered p. 54.

Sect. 8. The Sixth Branch of this Scheme, examined; viz. That the Succession in these, supposed, 70 independent Monarchies, went on by Primogeniture in the Male-line: and this by Divine Institution. p. 55.

Here it is observ'd, that the Texts alleged for a Divine Institution have been before answer'd. Ib. It

CONTENTS. 5

It is proved that Succession by Primo-geniture, in the Male-line, was not the constant Practice of all Nations; as is pretended:

First, From many Passages, and Instances, in the Holy Scripture. p. 56, to p. 70.

A Digression about Jeroboam's Revolt. p. 60.

It is here proved that the Texts alleged for a Pre-eminence by Primo-geniture; imply no such Institution, or Practice: p. 70. to p. 82.

And that one plain Text, viz. 1 Chron. 5. 2. implies the contrary. p. 82. to p. 85.

Secondly, What offers it self from the Heathen Writers, in relation to this Universal Practice, is considered. p. 85. to p. 90.

Thirdly, The Argument drawn from the Practice of Nations, to prove this Divine Institution, is particularly considered. p. 90. to p. 92.

Sect. 9. The Seventh Branch examined, viz. That the Present Possessor hath the Right, where there is no Claimer, who can make out a Better Title. p. 92.

The Argument taken from this Possession's wronging no body, considered. p. 94.

That taken from the Ends of Government, being answered by it, considered. p. 97.

Under both which it is shewn that this Possession can give no Right.

6 CONTENTS.

Se&t. 10. *The Eight Branch, examined, viz. That the People are to be Judges, in Case of Competition, or Doubt.* p. 101. to p. 104.

This is proved to be of as bad Consequence, as the Allowance made by others can be.

Se&t. 11. *Some Observations, of Importance, upon the foregoing Scheme, deduced from what hath been before discoursed.* p. 104. to p. 122.

Se&t. 12. *A Recapitulation.* p. 122.

APPENDIX. *Some Passages out of a late Work of the Author, whom I have been considering, which seem inconsistent with a Main Branch of this Scheme.* p. 124.

CHAPTER II.

A Defense of Mr. Hooker's Judgment concerning the Institution, and Nature, of Civil Government.

Se&t. I. *The Introduction.* p. 129.

Se&t. II. *Mr. Hooker's Judgment produced in his own Words.* p. 131.

Se&t.

CONTENTS. 7

Se&t. III. *Inferences from the foregoing Quotations.* p. 137.

Se&t. IV. *Objections to this Judgment of Mr. Hooker, answered.* p. 140.

VIZ.

Obj. 1. *Whatever founds Government, must be Superior to it. Humane cannot be Superior to Humane. Therefore Humane Consent cannot be the Foundation of Civil Government.* p. 141.

Obj. 2. *All acknowledge a Divine Right necessary. Humane Consent cannot give a Divine Right. And therefore there must be an Higher Original.* p. 143.

Obj. 3. *There was no Time, or Number of Men, before the Institution of Civil Government: and consequently Mr. Hooker's Judgment cannot be well-grounded.* p. 145.

Obj. 4. *The Time, and Place, cannot be named, when, and where, Mankind first met to consult about it; nay, it is impossible that all concerned, should meet freely to deliberate, and vote: and therefore this Judgment cannot be true.* p. 158.

Obj. 5. *There could not be such a State of Independency, and Equality, amongst Creatures descending one from another, as is requisite for this Deliberation, and Consent: and consequently the Supposition of it is groundless.* p. 161.

Q o 2

Obj. 6.

CONTENTS.

- Obj. 6. *There is no Original Contract, to be produced: and therefore there was none.* p. 167.
- Obj. 7. *The Power of Life and Death could not come from the People: and consequently, Magistracy could not be founded upon Humane Consent:* p. 169.
- Under this, what is offered upon this Head, in a late Book, called The Best Answer, is particularly considered.* p. 173, &c.
- Obj. 8. *Taken from Kings being called The Lord's Anointed, and not the Anointed of the People.* p. 188.
- Obj. 9. *Taken from Magistrates being called Gods: which cannot be created by the People.* p. 190.
- Obj. 10. *Taken from St. Paul's affirming the Powers that be, to be ordained of God.* p. 191.
- Obj. 11. *Taken from that Scripture-Expression, By me Kings Reign.* p. 194.
- Obj. 12. *Taken from our Lord's words, John 10. 34. with respect to Magistrates being called Gods.* p. 195.
- Obj. 13. *Taken from the Apostle's calling God the only Potentate: and from Irenæus, and Tertullian, their seeming to interpret these Words, contrary to this opinion of Mr. Hooker.* p. 195, to 199.

Conclusion, p. 199. A

CONTENTS.

A Large Answer to Dr. Francis Atterbury's Charge.

- The whole Charge produced.* p. 4.
- The first part of it, relating to my Treatment of the Body of the Establish'd Clergy, considered.* p. 5.
- The second part of it, relating to Rebellion.* p. 10.
- The Examination of his Latin Sermon, which was designed as a Proof of this Charge, proposed.* p. 14.
- And, First. Of his Interpretation of St. Paul's Doctrine.* p. 14 to p. 120.
- I. *His Account of what St. Paul meant by the Higher Powers.* p. 14. to p. 17.
- II. *His Account of the Measure, and Degree of Submission commanded by St. Paul, examined.* p. 17. to p. 76.
- Under which, His Argument, drawn from the then Reigning Emperour, is considered.* p. 19.

As

0531

10 CONTENTS.

As likewise, That drawn from the Sufferings of Christians, at that time. p. 39.

St. Peter's Precepts to Subjects and Slaves, explain'd, and vindicated. p. 53. to p. 75.

Our Lord's Example of Patient Suffering, proved to have no relation to the Passive Obedience of Subjects, as Subjects. p. 61, &c.

III. *His Account of the Arguments made use of by St. Paul, for Subjection.* p. 76. to (p. 120.

Under this.

A Reply is made to what He saith of Civil Authority coming immediately from God. p. 77.

To his Discourse concerning Authority without, and against, Right. p. 89.

To what He saith, of St. Paul's Argument drawn from the Usefulness of the Magistratical Office, in favour of such Magistrates, as are unjust, and oppressive. p. 99.

His Argument, drawn from the Parallel Submission required by St. Paul to Ecclesiastical Governours, and Teachers, tho' not executing their Office well, considered, and answered, p. 112.

Secondly, A View of his Doctrine, concerning the Measures of Submission, both for, and against Non-Resistance. p. 120.

Thirdly,

CONTENTS. 11

Thirdly, His deterring Reasons against speaking the Truth, considered. p. 132.

A Review of his Management of this Cause. p. 177.

APPENDIX. *Some Passages produced out of his Convocation-Controversy, which He stills keeps on foot; and compared with the Part He hath acted in this Sermon.* p. 190.

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0532

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