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3.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.

DEFENCE OF THE

DUTCH,

Against the Imputations of

FRAUD, CRUELTY, and PERFIDIOUSNESS.

Shewing how

DUTCH INDUSTRY may become profitable to Great Britain in the HERRING FISHERY; and this Kingdom restored to a prosperous Condition, by Good Oeconomy, and A more spirited Policy:

Particularly with regard to the

ENCROACHMENTS of FRANCE,

And the

UNTRACTABLENESS of SPAIN.

To which is added, A

SUPPLEMENT,

Relative to the

SETTLEMENT of NOVA SCOTIA.

L O N D O N:

Printed for R. Spavan, at the Crown in Ing-Lane, near Paternoster-Row. 1749.



DEFENCE

OFTHE

DUTCH, &c.



PONGULL national Reflections in Points of Policy, are unjust, when the Faults of the Few, are charged upon the Many: for, the Few on-

whole Society, are truly blameable for every Act of evil Admistration. If a Foreigner should charge the good People of England, with all the Blunders, Profusion and Corruption, of several successive Administrations in Times past, what Briton untainted by Venality, could bear the Imputation with Patience? It is not the Genius of a true Briton, to load himself, with Imposts, Excises, and various other heavy Taxes, unless (like the Provender-Ass in the Fable) he is allowed to lighten the Burden on his Back, by stuffing Part of it into his Belly. Dutchmen are as like us, as one Man is like another. The People of both Nations under the Influence of evil Administrations, are the real

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Sufferers; and are equally disposed to charge every Act of Misrule, to the Account of their Governors, whether distinguished by the Name of Pensionaries, or dignified by the frenchified Title of Prime-Minister, or known by the aggregate Appellation of The ruling Faction. These are the People who have the Power of doing Good or Mischief to Society, and are therefore chargeable with all the Public Acts of Cruelty, Fraud, &c. committed by one Nation against another. The Merchants, Artificers, and Seamen of Holland, were as innocent of the Amboina Massacre, and all the other Acts of Perfidy, imputed to the Dutch, as the Fool *, or any of his Fraternity. On the other Hand, the Dutch have suffered very often: and we all know how grievously of late, by the Perfidy and Oppreffions of their gallicifing Rulers; and how justly they have broken the Yoke, even by the dangerous Method of popular Tumulis. The Dutch therefore as a Nation, are to be pitied, and affisted also, (so far as it is prudent, and not injurious to our own Country) in reforming the Patch-work Constitution of their Government, which, like all other Things framed in an Hurry, cankered by Corruption, or compounded of Materials incompatible in Nature, must be often wanting Repairs.

In Support of the late national Reflections, cast upon the Dutch +, no good Argument

+ See the Fool, ibid.

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can be drawn from Declarations of War, which we know are very often founded upon false Imputations, or at least Misrepresentation of Facts: Much less can any just Inference be drawn, in Disfavour of the Dutch, at this Time, from the Declaration of War by K. Charles IId. when it is well understood that his War was waged on other Principles than those of National Honour, or Public Good. His Motive was generally servile Fear, or venal Compliance with the ambitious Views of France, at that Time our imperious Dictator, tho' now our faithful and most sincere Friend, as appear by the fingular Honour done to this Nation, in requiring Hostages, without giving any; by easing us of the enormous Expence of supporting Cape Breton; and by all the other truly generous Concessions to us, in the late glorious Pacification. More Thanks, however, are due to the great Patron of Nova Scotia; for bestowing on his Country an Equivalent for Cape Breton; by establishing a Colony upon the Borders of our American Fishery, which may protect it from any future Infults of its Neighbours; and in Time build a Navy, equiped with its own Productions, manned by its own Fishermen, and capable of avenging any Injury done to Britain, in that Part of the World. May the noble Lord and his Affociates, who did this fignal Service to their Country, live to complete the glorious Design; and to receive the Thanks of the present Generation, for the most

^{*} See the Fool republished in the London Evening-Post, Sept. 15, 1749.

important Public Good done to this Kingdom fince the Revolution.

Our Rivals in the American Fishery, see with Regret and Envy, what a Counterpoise this Colony may prove to their ambitious Defigns, of exalting their Naval Power, by the sole Possession of that Fishery: And therefore to disappoint our Measures, they have (we are told) made an Encroachment, and are actually establishing a Setttlement within our Limits, as ceded by the Treaty of Utrecht. In answer to our Remonstrances, they offer to adjust the Limits by Commissaries; the old Artifice of gaining Time to strengthen their Settlement, and then to support it by Force: or, by Negotiation to obtain, what they cannot in Justice demand. But furely there is Spirit enough yet left in Britain, not to suffer an apparent Right even to be disputed; but to drive out the Encroachers, as the French did, with much less Justice, our Settlers from St. Lucia.

Having thus, in a short Digression, paid my Devoirs to our new Friends, (with whom I must beg Leave to expostulate more hereaster) it is Time to return to our old Allies the *Dutch*, and examine the Charge against them, for presuming to fish for Herrings upon the North Coast of *Great Britain*.

That the Herring Fishery upon that Coast, is our undoubted Right; and perhaps, one of Nature's best Gifts to this Kingdom, cannot be denied with any shew of Reason: But if by Indolence, or Inattention to our chief Interest,

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we will not stretch out our Hands to value the Good offered by the Bounty of Providence, can we blame those who seek it with Hazard and Industry? It is our Part to applaud and rival them in that Fishery: or, rather encourage them to unite with us as one People, by inducing them to exchange their Marshes, for a more healthful Soil, on the northern Coasts of Scotland.

If the forfeited Estates of that Country, are applied without Fraud to this Purpose, and purchased Lands in a proper Situation, distributed by small Allotments, to such of the Dutch Fishermen as will bring over their Families, Boats, Nets, &c. this Kingdom will reap many great Advantages from an Accession of so many industrious Protestant Subjects; who by mixing with the Highlanders, will teach them of course, to taste the Sweets of Industry, and all the Bleffings of civil Life; will give them Independence, and by that Means set them free from the Influences of their present Lords more effectually than any Laws which human Art can devise, or legislative Power can enforce: for when People have a Variety of Means to acquire by common Industry, a comfortable Subfistence, with Independence, none can be so stupidly insensible of human Happiness, as to prefer Slavery, Hardship, and Want, to Freedom, Industry, and Plenty. To establish therefore the Herring-Fishery by all posfible Encouragement, is to open new Sources of Wealth; to root out all the Seeds of Rebel(8)

lion from Scotland, and to make a miserable People happy, by a right Application of their Time and Labour.

But if the forfeited Estates are insufficient for the Purposes above-mentioned, it is no hard Task to supply the Deficiency, and even to point out just Methods of discharging a great Part of the National Debt, by sumptuar y Laws, by Savings out of the Revenues; by lopping off. all needless Pensions, and useless Places; by reducing all exorbitant Salaries of Places that are necessary, in proportion to the Trouble of Execution; and by a more material Reduction of a great Standing Army, still kept on foot in Britain and Ireland, which cannot be necessary when the Seeds of Rebellion are extirpated by the Methods above suggested. And as no Seafon is more suitable to such Reforms than that of a profound Peace; so now it is expected with Impatience, from an Administration so remarkable for Oeconomy and public Spirit.

But if all the preceding Methods should prove insufficient for so many great and good Purposes, the Crown Lands, called Forests and Chaces, may be sold to the best Bidders, at the Royal-Exchange, for an immense Sum of Money, the of very little Value at present, either to the Nation or to the Crown; except as the Means of making Places for ministerial Purposes, surnishing Country-Seats for first, second, and third-rate Ministers, together with much Timber-pillage for them and their Underlings. But as the present wise and righteous Admi-

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Administration cannot want the Props of Corruption to support their Power; so it is hoped, nay it is expected that these, and all other just Measures shall be taken, to encourage our Fisheries, and to discharge as much as possible of the Public Debt, to ease the present Load of Taxes, and especially the late Imposts upon Commerce, which must otherwise fink under the Weight; for, to amuse Country Gentlemen with an Abatement of one or two Shillings in the Pound of the Land-Tax, without eafing Trade of its Burden, and discharging a great Part of the National Debt, is an Illufion under fair Appearances; it is in Effect increasing our Incumbrances by a small Loan at exorbitant Usury, which like a Canker will eat up the landed Interest of the Nation.

In short, the Power and Prosperity of this Kingdom is yet retrievable, by strict Oeconomy at home, and by good Policy with respect to our Allies, and Rivals abroad. And first, with respect to the Dutch, we need only to open our Arms, by giving easy and obvious Encouragements, which will induce the best, if not the greatest Part of that People, to become one with us. Let them have the common Rights and Privileges of British Subjects, with Places of Settlement proper for Trade, or Fisheries, and we may reasonably expect, from their present Circumstances, that all their rich Merchants, and of course their ablest Seamen, will foon retire to these Kingdoms, as the best Situation for Commerce, the Sanctuary for Li-

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berty, and of the Protestant Religion. Thus the Riches and Strength of the United Provinces may, in due time, be added to our common Stock, together with the Herring and Whale Fisheries, the Trade of the Spice-Islands, and all those other valuable Branches which

they enjoy, and other Nations envy.

A very small Part of that immense Treasure expended already in Defence of the Dutch as our Barrier on the Continent, might, by another Turn of Policy, have produced all those defireable Ends. But if ever that Maxim was true, how can the Dutch be our Barrier upon the Continent, at this Time? Not by their Land-force; for, the whole Body of that People, computed at about two Millions, is but an Handful in Comparison of their Neighbours: not by their Situation between us and our most potent Rivals; for the Ports of France are much nearer to our Coasts. The Dutch therefore cannot be our Barrier in any other Sense, than as a Maritime Power; but how great their Declension has been in that respect, is obvious to all Europe. Whether that Declenfion be imputable to the bad Constitution of their Government, (founded upon Aristocracy and Democracy, which are absolutely incompatible in Nature) or to the Fraud and Treachery of their late Governors, or to the Nature of their Harbours, which are too shallow for large Ships of modern Built, are Points well worthy of the Inquiry of better Judgment than mine. But if the latter be the Case

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(as I suspect) then the Dutch can never rise again to be a Maritime Power of great Eminence in Europe: for, as it is the present Practice to build Ships much larger and sharper in Proportion than usual, (by which Means they carry greater Weight of Metal, sail better, and require deeper Water than formerly) it seems to me impossible to admit Ships of that Constructure into the Dutch Ports; and therefore that Nation cannot for the future contend upon equal Terms with the other Maritime Powers of Europe. If then the Dutch cannot be our Barrier, either as a Maritime Power, or in any other Respect, to what Purpose has been all our Expence of Wars upon the Continent, in pursuance of that false Maxim? And of what Advantage can the Conquest of such a Country be to France, when deserted by the present Inhabitants, whose Tenaciousness of their Liberty and Religion would would most certainly induce them to prefer Freedom and Safety in so near a Retreat as Britain, to Bondage in their own Country: as the old Tyrians forfook the Continent, and fettled upon a neighbouring Island, where they lived free from all fear of the Affyrian Power, and gave Being to the Carthaginian State, which grew to be the greatest Maritime Power of that Age.

But after all, can this Nation want any other Barrier than its own Navy, and the Sea, cast round it by the Hand of Providence? Is it not populous enough for its own Defence against all the Powers of Europe in Conjunction, if

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formed into a regular well-constituted Militia? Is not the British Navy superior to all others united? and may not that Superiority be preferved by good Policy, and due Encouragement to our Fisheries, Commerce, and Colonies? Why then should Britain exhaust its Blood and Treasure by Wars on the Continent, to make Conquests, or procure Benefits for other Nations? But if it be necessary for preferving the Balance of Power in Europe, to form Alliances, in opposition to the Designs of Universal Monarchy, why should not our Part of any future War be at Sea, the Sphere of our natural Strength, where we may ferve our Friends most effectually, and injure our Enemies by intercepting their Treasures, which are the Sinews of War, as that Art is now exercifed by mercenary Armies?

Had our naval Operations been conducted with Vigour, Oeconomy, and good Discipline *, in the former and late War with France, that could not have lasted so long, nor this ended so much to our Disadvantage, both with respect to France and Spain, as was manifest by the Successes of the last Year. But yet France seems to have prescribed the Terms of Peace, and kept back Spain from any Stipulations in our Favour; for what Reason is not easy to comprehend, since its Losses at Sea, and in America, were an Over-balance of all its Acquisitions by Conquest at Land. But that politick

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Court has ever succeeded better by Negotiation, or Encroachment, than by its Victories; as may be demonstrated by a fair Induction of Particulars for a long Series of Years. The former Topic I expect to see treated by some abler Hand; and shall therefore take Leave, only to present to the Publick, a short Sketch of French Policy, by Encroachment in America; a distant Scene of Operation, out of the short Sight of modern Politicians; but perhaps not less conducive to the Advancement of French Power,

and Wealth, than any in Europe.

Before the Treaty of Utrecht was ratified, and in the very Interval between the Ceffation of Arms in Europe, and the Time when it was to take Effect in America, a French Squadron and Armament was equiped, and dispatched privately, to invade, take, and destroy the British Leeward Islands, as the envied Rivals of France in the Sugar Trade; and first Antigua was the destined Sacrifice, as the principal and most important of those Islands to Britain, for its excellent Harbours, and Situation in the Track of Navigation to the other Leeward Islands, and to Jamaica. But Monsieur Casfart, who commanded the Expedition, failed in the Attempt, partly by the Vigilance of the Inhabitants, and partly by some lucky Accidents, and not by our naval Power; and afterwards attacking Montferrat, he ruined it so effectually, that it is hardly restored to its former Condition at this Day. The Plunder of that Island falling very short of the Expence

^{*} By Discipline is meant a just Distribution of Rewards and Punishments.

Some Years after, (viz. in 1722.) the late Duke of Montagu having obtained a Grant from the Crown, of the Islands of St. Lucia, and St. Vincent; (two of the Carribee Islands, included for many Years in the Commissions of successive Governors of Barbadoes, from the Kings of Great Britain) provided Ships, Military Stores, and much People at a great Expence, to possess and settle those Islands: But soon after landing at St. Lucia, they were forced off by the French of Martinico; pursuant to an express Order from their Monarch *.

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The Mandate of the (French) King to the Sieur Chevalier de Fenquiere, Governor and Lieutenant General of the Windward Islands in America.

" TIS Majesty having been informed that the King of England has given the " Islands of St. Vincent, and St. Lucia, to the " Duke of Montagu; has made his Com-" plaint of it in England, and has alledged "that neither the one, nor the other of those " Islands belong to that Crown: The first of " them ought to remain to the Carribees, ac-" cording to Conventions made with that " People, and the second belongs to France; " who has been willing to suspend the Settle-" ment of that Island, on the Request * of the " King of England. Notwithstanding these " Reasons, his Majesty bas not been informed, " that there has been any Revocation of this "Grant. On the contrary, he understands " that the Duke of Montagu, is preparing to " fend and take Possession of those Islands, " and to transport Numbers of Families thi-"ther. This Undertaking being contrary to " the Rights of his Majesty, his Intention is, " that in Case the English should take Posses-

^{*} Vid. Salmon's modern Hift. p. 264. Vol. 3. Fol. Ed.

^{*} By this Part of the Mandate, it is confessed that the Settlement of St. Lucia was suspended by the Request of the King of England, or in plainer Words, by Agreement or Convention: And yet the French have settled that Island contrary to Agreement, without Interruption.

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" fion of St. Lucia, and fettle there, the Sieur Chevalier de Fenquiere, shall summon them to retire in fifteen Days, in Regard that Island belongs to France; and if they do not depart, he shall compel them to it by Force of Arms. He shall take Care to charge some of the wifest and most experienced of his Officers with this Expedition: His Maigesty desires there should be as little Essusion of Blood as possible; nor will have any Pillage made: He only wishes the English would retire, and not posses themselves of a Country which belongs to him."

Done at Versailles, Sept. 21. 1722.

If the Crown of France had a just Title to those Islands, who can blame such a spirited Mandate? It would be rather commendable, and is certainly well worthy of Imitation, by those who have a much clearer Title than bare Allegations and positive Assertions, to drive the French out of their Encroachments on those Islands, and in Nova Scotia, by a Squadron of Men of War, rather than by Reference to Commissaries: For, it is dangerous, and we know by Experience, very expensive and fruitless, to trust the Rights of a Nation to three or four private Men, called Commissaries; unless the Court should swarm with those of etherial Spirits, (such as a celebrated Writer dreams

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dreams of) who are much wifer, and more incorruptible than any modern Sons of Adam.

The French thus encouraged by (what shall I call it) the Remissiness or Timidity of several Administrations since the Peace of Utrecht, have kept Possession of those two fruitful Islands, Dominico and St. Lucia, to this Day, without Interruption; tho' it was perfectly easy, without much additional Expence, to have expelled them by the Squadron stationed at the Leeward Islands, during the last War. For the same Reason, that truly Politick People, have encroached lately upon St. Vincents, and Tobago, not by Stealth, but publickly, and immediately after the late Cessation of Arms. If the Surrender of Cape Breton had been fufpended until these well known Encroachments were given up, all the Puzzle and pufillanimous Apprehensions about the Means now proper to redress those Wrongs, had been prevented. But so it is, that Cowardice disappoints its own Purpofes, and runs into great, by endeavouring to avoid little Dangers. Good betide the Man, and the universal Applauses of his Country attend him, who advised that just and falutary Measure! And may those who rejected his Counsel, receive amply the Reward of their Wisdom! Wonderful it is indeed, that such Wisdom can preserve itself, in Power, and yet want Ability to exercise it in a few Instances, for the general Good; tho' that may be done confishently with the Plan of private Emoluments: For, Men of ordinary Genius,

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Genius, ever so wickedly inclined, have some Ambition for Applause; or, at least, they love a Dash of Popularity, if it were only as a decent Covering, like that of Charity, to hide a Multitude of Sins.

But fince all those Encroachments are now under Consideration of the noble Peer whose Province it is, and who is well apprised, and not less willing to redress these Injuries, to the Honour of Britain, and the Sasety of its Sugar Colonies: I need say no more upon that Subject at present, than to shew how the Injury extends to the Dutch, Danes, and Spaniards, as well as to this Kingdom.

By a transient View of the Map, it appears, that the Carribee Islands are situated in a Chain, cross that Part of the Western Ocean which terminates upon the Continent of South America. Of that Chain Antigua is the northern, and Tobago the southern Link. Now the French are possessed by Right of Martinico, Guadalupa, and several small Islands in the Centre; and by late Encroachment have extended their Possession as above mentioned, to Dominico, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Tobago: So that France has now the whole Chain of Carribee Islands*, of any Value for Extent and

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Harbours (except Antigua) which are fituated in the Track of Navigation, to the Coast of Carraccas, Curacao, Surinam, and Carthagena to the fouthward; and to St. Eustatia, St. Thomas, Santa Cruz, Porto-rico, St. Domingo, Cuba, Jamaica, Porto-bello, and all the Coast of New Spain; from thence to the Bay of Mexico, and Messippa to the northward. What then can hinder the French, in case of War, from intercepting all the Navigation from Europe, in the Passage to those several Ports, whenever the Naval Power of France is in tolerable good Condition? more especially if Antigua should also fall under their Dominion, which is far from being impossible, if its great Port, called the English Harbour, (the best of any in that Part of the World for the Reception and Security of a British Squadron) is not well fortified, and the Leeward Islands powerfully protected by the Royal Navy. For if Antigua should be lost, or its best Harbour ruined, Montserat, Nevis, St. Christophers, and all the leffer Islands, to the westward of them, must, for Want of Harbours, and Protection, fall of course into the Hands of our Enemies. In that Case, of what Value can Jamaica be to this Kingdom, when our Fleets cannot pass thither without a Convoy superior to the Naval Power of France? And what Trade can bear the immense Expense of fuch Convoys? Will then the Dutch, Danes, Spain, and Britain, rest satisfied under these Usurpations of France; and by that Means give

^{*} Barbadoes being to the eastward, is not mentioned as in the Chain of the Carribee Islands; but yet being one of them, is from its Nearness to Tobago, in more imminent Danger of Invasion from that Island, whenever it becomes well settled by the French, because an Armament may be conveyed from one to the other, in a very sew Hours.

it the Power of intercepting all the Trade of Europe to America? As the Crown of Spain is more eminently interested by its extensive and rich Dominions there, it is surely the Part of that Nation, even to take the Lead, in preventing such satal Usurpations, by a close and everlasting Union, with the greatest Maritime Power of Europe.

It is too true, that the Ambition or Avarice of Ministers, is often repugnant to the real Interest of their Sovereigns, as well as of their Fellow-Subjects. If the Spanish Ministry temporizing with France, for their own private Interest; or if ambitious Views to the Succession of that Crown, by Failure of Male-Heirs in that Branch of the Family now upon the Throne, should influence the Counsels of Spain; it is now, as much as ever, the Interest of every other State in Europe, to prevent the Union of those two mighty Empires under one Head; because, with such Accumulation of Power, what can hinder an universal Monarchy? Nay, it is not less repugnant to the Interest of every Subject of Spain, that its Dominions should be cantoned into Provinces of France, and of course the Spaniards become Vassals to the French.

But if the Spanish Court will pursue such destructive Measures, our Vigilance and Activity cannot be better employed, than in contracting their Designs; first, by sincere Overtures of Friendship, and a strict Alliance offensive and desensive; and by every reasonable Com-

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Compliance in our Power, without the least Intervention, Influence, or Mediation of France. But if these fail, by Counter-alliances, and other political Operations on the Coasts of Ckili, where there are mighty Nations of Indians, who never yet submitted to the Yoke of Spain, and who will rejoice to secure their Independence by an Alliance with Great-Britain. By their Friendship we may reap infinite Advantages in Trade, with a Country not less abounding with Gold-mines than other Parts of that Continent; and by their Strength we may force the Spaniards to a right Conduct, without great Armaments and Imbarkations from Europe, or any other Expence than that of a few able Leaders and Engineers; for Arms and Ammunition will produce plentiful Returns of Gold. If then Spain continues intractable, deaf to our Offers of Friendship, and persists in refusing us a Share of its Commerce, we have surely a Right to extend our Trade into Countries as independent of Spain as any in Europe, tho' on the same Continent.

This Hint I have taken from the Author of Lord Anson's Voyage, which abounds with admirable Observations naval and political; not less valuable than his Works in another Science, for which he is honoured by all Europe, except those of his own Countrymen, who want the Faculty of discerning Merit, or the Spirit of rewarding it. Thanks to the India Company for saving this Country the Disgrace of such a Neg-

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lect! Take that Author's own Words * as the Conclusion of this Head. "Indeed were we "disposed to aim at the utter Subversion of the "Spanish Power in America, no Means seem to me more probable to effect it, than due "Encouragement and Assistance given to these "(Patagonian) Indians, and to those of Chili.

From the preceding Arguments, it is prefumed this Conclusion may be fairly drawn, that whatever Part we take in future Wars, should be at Sea only; and by sudden Irruptions, into fuch Parts of the Enemy's Country as are most unguarded, and most liable to be fenfibly injured; fince by our naval Power we are best able to serve our Friends, and subdue their Enemies, without exhausting our national Treasure. Thus we may and ought to affift the Dutch, and all our natural Allies; but more especially the Spaniards, who, of all others ought to stand foremost in our Esteem, and we in theirs; because we are naturally united by mutual Ability to fupply each others Wants, without Danger of Rivalship; for no other Nation of Europe wants, or can take off their Fruits and Wines; nor can any other furnish them so well with Woollen, and a Variety of other Manufactures, not interfering with their own Productions. Nevertheless our ancient Friendship with Spain has been fatally broken, by a fervile Fear of another Court operating continually against us. Nothing therefore can restore our former Amity,

* Ld. Anson's Voyage, 4to Edit. Page 69: See also Page 92, and 141.

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but a new and more spirited Policy; together with a generous Removal of all Obstructions, except the Cession of Gibraltar *, to the Renewal of that excellent Treaty made in the Year 1715; by which all the beneficial Stipulations of former Treaties were revived, and many new Advantages conceded to us. Among others it was mutually agreed, that neither Kingdom should impose any new Duties upon each others Merchandize. An Advantage lost by the last War, and not restored by the subsequent Pacification. Nay, the grand Obstruction to our Navigation in the American Seas, by the Spanish Claim of Right to search our Ships, which occasioned the last War, has been ingloriously forgotten at the Conclusion of it. But it is humbly hoped the Legislature will take these Circumstances under Consideration; and particularly repeal that Law, by which an Impost of 5 per Cent. was laid upon all dry Goods + imported, (under which the Fruits, Iron, Wool, &c. of Spain are comprehended)

† In Consequence of this Duty on our Part, Spain has added new Duties on the Merchandize of Britain.

^{*} Whoever consents to the Surrender of Gibraltar to Spain, without an Equivalent, ought to be stigmatised as an Enemy to his Country: But yet it may be a right Policy to surrender that important Fortress for a full Equivalent, less important to the Honour and Interest of Spain, but more advantageous to Britain, as a Place of Trade and valuable Productions; For if a Fleet at Minorca cannot be stationed so well to prevent the Junction of French Squadrons; yet if we are sirmly united to Spain in Alliance, all their Ports will be as open to our Fleets, in case of a War, as Gibraltar is at present.

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not only as a previous Step, necessary to our Reconciliation with Spain, but as a Means of preventing the utter Ruin of our Commerce; for what Trade can support such an high Duty, accumulated upon all those Imports which the profligate Wit of former Times could invent, or Profusion require!

If therefore the present M----y will make good their high Pretentions to Public Spirit, let them ease our Trade of its insupportable Burdens; let them give due Encouragement to our Colonies and Fisheries in general, and to the Herring Fishery in particular, as the great Sources of our naval Power; let the obvious Means above mentioned, be taken for that Purpose, and for discharging the Nation ! Debt: Let a strict Oeconomy be observed in all the Expences of Government; not grudging however what is necessary to promote our Fisheries, and to establish our new Colony of Nova Scotia, as the great Barrier and Safeguard of the British Dominions, and Fishery in America: and in particular, let all our old false Maxims in Politicks be abandoned, as

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tions than of this our native Country.

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HE great Defects in the original Confitution of our old Settlements in America, is a just Cause of Complaint; and as it is a good Reason for endeavouring to prevent the like Evils in the new Colony of Nova Scotia, so it shall be my Apology for presuming to add a few Hints upon that Subject.

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In the Settlement of our old Colonies, proper Cautions were not taken to prevent the Monopoly of large Tracts of Land, which are still engrossed by a few rich People of Jamaica, as well as in the Provinces of Virginia, New-York, Carolina, New-England, &c. This is the only Cause why that Island is not well peopled at this Day. The Northern Colonies above mentioned are under the like Disadvantage, for the same Reason; particularly towards the Boundaries most remote from the Sea. Those Lands which are thus reserved by monopolizing Grantees, or their Succeffors, for the Profit of a future Sale, cannot be purchased by poor Settlers at an exorbitant Price, who would gladly cultivate them, if they might do fo upon reasonable Terms: And thus, for want of Occupants the French have made, and are still making, Encroachments upon the Back of all those Colonies.

For this growing Evil there are but two Remedies practicable; confistently with Justice, and the Constitution of a free Government. The first and most obvious is, by laying an high Tax upon every uncultivated Acre of Land, by the Legislature of each Colony. Such a Tax may contribute to the Support of Government, instead of other heavy Imposts upon

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upon the poor industrious People, who in all Places, and much more in new Colonies, should be exempted from such Burdens. For if Engroffers of uncultivated Land are obliged to pay annually a confiderable Tax per Acre, towards the Support of that Government by which they are protected (which is highly just and reasonable) they will be glad to sell those Lands at a moderate Price, rather than to keep them at a certain annual Expence, or otherwife fuffer them to be seized by the Publick. and fold to the best Bidder for the Arrears of Taxes. For thus the uncultivated Lands will be fold, and fubdivided into small Tracts; and confequently those Colonies will become more populous, by a Multitude of new Settlers.

The other Remedy (in case the Legislators of each Colony will not do this Justice to their Country, because perhaps they are the chief Engrossers of Land) is by a Law of that Kind enacted by the *British* Parliament, which has the same Right to interpose in such Cases as in those of Trade, when the public Good demands, and Necessary justifies the Measure.

But as it is much easier to prevent, than to redress publick Grievances, it may be expected that the Monopoly of great Tracts of Land in Nova Scotia, will be absolutely prevented by

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that no Tracts of Land be granted on the Seacoast, or on the Borders of the River St. Laurance, (which are here supposed the ancient Boundaries) but in small Allotments of 20 or 30 Acres to one Person or Family, without Quit-rent, or any other Tax, but that of military personal Service, one half Day in every Month, to learn the proper Exercises of a Soldier, and in all Cases of Alarm or Invasion, when the Occupant is to appear well armed, at his appointed Station. Arms, Ammunition, and proper Accoutrements should be provided for the first Settlers, at the publick Charge; but afterwards at their own Expence.

These Lands round the whole Colony (except the Part adjoining to New-England) for half a Mile from its Boundary, ought to be appropriated, partly for Towns, Roads and Commons; and upon the Sea-Coast, for the same Uses; and also for Stages proper for curing Fish. All the rest of the Lands contiguous to the Boundaries, should be granted in small Alotments, as above-mentioned, to disbanded Soldiers, or any other Protestant Settlers, who think sit to inhabit Nova Scotia as British Subjects.

Speculation, fince it is founded upon Facts verified in Barbadoes, which by these small Cantonments of Land, and other Institutions of the like Nature, is abundantly more populous than any Part of equal Extent, (except great Cities) in the British Dominions: as on the contrary, Jamaica, and many Provinces of North America, are thinly inhabited, and very weak, for want of such excellent Laws. But by the like Means, Nova-Scotia may become, as populous as Barbadoes; and as it is of much greater Extent, may, in Time, grow powerful enough to defend itself against all Attempts of its Neighbours, the French and Indians united.

The Patrons of that Colony (I mention it to their Honour) have already began the Distribution of Land with due Precaution; and therefore, we may reasonably expect, will proceed to secure all the Boundaries, by small Cantonments of Land upon military Tenures; not repugnant to popular Freedom, but in a manner like the Practice of Barbadoes, as before suggested. But there is yet a Difficulty remaining; and that is, to contrive an effectual Method of preventing, absolutely, the Monopoly of large Tracts of Land in Nova-Scotia, until the whole Province is cultivated; but without

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discouraging Industry in the present, or Astertimes. Now this is the great Point tending to render that Colony exceeding populous, the Practicability of which I have partly hinted already, and shall proceed to delineate more explicitly.

Let all the Lands from the Frontier (which I suppose half a Mile within the natural Boundary) to the Quantity of 300 Acres, be granted without any Quit-rent, faving a Barley-corn revertible however to the Crown, in Case of not being cultivated within 7 Years after the Grant, or so much of it as is not then cultivated: From 300 to 400 Acres, at a Quitrent of one Shilling Sterling per Acre annually, after 7 Years Possession; from 400 to 500 Acres, at 2 Shillings Sterling per Acre, after the like 7 Years Possession; from 500 to 600 Acres, at 4 Shillings Sterling per Acre, after the like Term of Possession; thus doubling the Quit-rent for every additional Hundred Acres. All these Quit-rents cease as the Lands become cultivated; but in the mean time to be received by the Treasurer of the Colony, chosen by its own Legislature, and applied by its Direction to support the Expence of Government; or in Default, to seize and sell the uncultivated Lands for Arrears of Quit-rent, to the best Bidder at publick Sale. By this Method

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thod of increasing the Quit-rent, in Proportion to the Quantities of Land granted above 300 Acres, all Monopolies of large Tracts must be absolutely secured from the rapacious Hands of Engrossers; because they cannot possibly make a Prosit by keeping uncultivated Lands, at the certain annual Expence of an high Quit-rent;

Among other Institutions it will be necesfary to set apart many Plats of Land for Cities or Towns, in dry and healthful Situations. where there is Plenty of good fresh Water, and Harbours or Rivers convenient for Trade or Fisheries. In such Places every Inhabitant may be entitled to an Allotment in Fee Simple, without Quit-rent, who will build a substantial Brick or Stone House of moderate Dimensions after 7 Years Possession. But in the Establishment of Towns, particularly of the Metropolis, and of those upon the Boundaries, exact Care also must be taken to appoint such Situations as may be capable by Nature of good Fortifications. And in these it is very easy to conform to all the Rules of Proportion, Convenience, Health and Beauty. Of all these perhaps Philadelphia is the most perfect Model, as it was contrived by its wife Founder upon the Plan of Babylon.

The preceding Regulations may be prefumed the Out-lines of an Institution much more perfect than has yet taken place in any of our Colonies; will certainly prevent Monopolies of large Tracts of Land; and, in all Probability, render Nova-Scotia the most powerful Province in America. And so indeed it ought to be, as the Barrier of all the other British Colonies upon that Continent, and the Bulwark of our greatest and most valuable Fishery. That this Colony will soon rise to fuch an Height of Prosperity, cannot be doubted, if properly encouraged, and powerfully protected: particularly if all foreign Protestants are induced to fettle, by being conveyed thither without any Expence; admitted to the same Rights and Privileges as British-born Subjects, and supported in their first Settlement for a reasonable Time, with Supplies of Provisions, and other Necessaries of Life, which may be bought excessively cheap in the neighbouring Colonies. But as a more expeditious, and less expensive Means of strengthening that Settlement, without draining the Mother-Country of its useful Hands, the Fishermen of Boston, and other Piaces adjacent, may, by proper Encouragements, besides the Nearness of so beneficial a Fishery, be induced to transplant into Nova-Scotia. For Boston, and the Province

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of which it is the Capital, are able to muster forty Thousand fighting Men; Half of which Number would render our new Colony impregnable, and *Boston* itself stand as secure from Invasion, by the Interposition of a Barrier so populous and invincible.

But after all these hopeful Beginnings, if this great and beneficial Enterprize should be sufpended, by the Menaces or golden Promises of a certain crasty Power; or if it should be neglected for Want of Money, withheld to squander another Way: If (I say) this Colony should at length prove a mere Baby of State, highly savoured and sondled in the Cradle for a young Patriot's Amusement, but afterwards for saken and exposed, as Carolina was formerly; then may we say, with just Cause of Lamentation, that this Kingdom is fallen indeed below the Envy of its meanest Neighbours.

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