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COMMON SENSE:
IN A
LETTER
TO A
FRIEND.

In a FREE COUNTRY he, who holds Knowledge from
the People, means to make their Ignorance an
Instrument to inflave them.

Proceeding of the Commons vindicated.

The FOURTH EDITION, with ADDITIONS.



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COMMON SENSE:

I N A

LETTER to a FRIEND.

Dear SIR,

YOU desire my Sentiments on our political Occurrences, and shall have them with Honesty and Conciseness. I am conscious I write to a Friend, and, therefore, little anxious about the Guise in which my Sentiments appear.

Simplicity of Argument and Stile is a necessary Attendant on the Cause of TRUTH; few *laboured* Performances on a plain Subject have any Foundation but *Deceit*. When great Pains are taken to *force* us into an Opinion, we may rest assured it is such a one as would never occur in the *strait*, and *natural* Path of Reason.

I have but one Difficulty in my Way. To you I need not clear myself; but, should you so far approve my Sentiments as to publish them, some Defence may perhaps be necessary to a Reader, for the Liberty I may take in my Censure of the Proceedings of certain Persons, whose Rank and Authority seem to demand a large Degree of Reverence. To the Reader then do I solemnly declare, that I detest Scurrility, and mean to avoid every Expression that tends that Way; if I should censure, I aim solely at the *Action*, not the *Man*; it would be hard if *Misconduct* should, at all Events, gain Sanction from *Splendor* or *Power*, and that all Freedom of Opinion on bad Measures, should be damp'd by the Appellations of licentious Libel, and personal Invective. But this is the stale Device of the Friends of misguided Authority; *one* Point in which they must be ever superior to their Adversaries, and to which, when hard pushed, they have had Recourse in every Age. When driven from the Merits of the *Cause*, their only Refuge is to sculk behind the *Person*.

Undeterred by this worn-out Art, and uninfluenced by Prejudice or Passion, I will venture to speak my Thoughts as they occur; I hope I shall be thought rather to *soften* than *aggravate*; it

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it is my Intention so to do, consistently with *Truth*; but, if the Narrative of some Men's Conduct should happen to carry in itself the severest Satire, to whom is it to be charged but themselves?

That this poor Nation has been, and still is, most violently agitated, its public Commerce, and its private social Happiness most severely wounded, the Hearts of all can witness. What all are thus materially concerned in, what all are thus so forely hurt by, becomes the Business, and the Right, of all to inquire into, to know the Source, the Motives, and the Actors of the Scene, as far as *uncontroverted Facts*, explained by *unperverted Reason*, can afford a Means to know.

These Confusions, every one will, I presume, allow, commenced with the present Ad——n here; whether the Proceedings have been such as bespeak the Authors well inclined to this Kingdom's Welfare, and actuated by a Desire to promote it, or whether, on the contrary, these Proceedings have tended to the Prejudice of this Kingdom, and the Projectors have been actuated by a Desire of elevating some Individuals, and gratifying others, both here and on the other Side of the Water, at the Expence of our national Felicity, is the grand Question to be decided; nor is, I think, the Decision hard.

I shall argue only from the Attempts *actually* made; it is true that a Number of nicely-correspondent Surmises, transpiring, through different Channels, from the Fountain Head, leave little Room to doubt that a more *suddenly-decisive* Stroke was ultimately resolved on, and ripe for Introduction. But these I shall wave; undoubted Facts afford an ample Field to form a Judgment on.

The first Step taken was the entire Rejection of that Set of Gentlemen who had long held the Favour of their Sovereign and a Succession of Vice-Roys, as the fixed NATIONAL INTEREST in the *Irish* Parliament. In their Room was adopted a *Party*, a detached, restless, Combination, distinguished only by their occasional Turbulence in every Transaction set on Foot by their Adversaries, however essential to the Dignity of the Crown, and consistent with the Liberties and Interests of the People. I beg Pardon of these Gentlemen for this diminutive Description of their parliamentary Consequence; I assure them I mean it only as a *Description*, and, I believe, they must themselves allow it is as high a one as they were entitled to, until fostered in the Sunshine of Power.

The Price of this Acquisition was naturally, the entire Enjoyment of Places, Pensions, and Employments; and the Consequence, that they who had been ever loud against the *Court*, became instantly as sanguine in the *ministerial Plan*, and the whole Nation was let see, that there was no possible Road to Favour, but

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but by renouncing those whom the People had long considered as their Guardian Representatives.

When the Scene had even thus far opened, it gave a disgusting and an alarming View; every Person, who reflected at all, must have asked himself, *What can this mean? This uncommon Apparatus must arise from some uncommon Design; something untoward and indirect in its Nature, which cannot be accomplished in the plain and usual Path; it cannot be the King's Business; the King's long-try'd and approved Friends are discarded: It can't be the People's, the Favourites of the People are rejected; it must then be something distinct from BOTH.*

Sir William Temple beautifully and justly remarks that "One of the principal Wheels on which alone the Chariot of the State can drive with Ease and Safety is, the Governor's pursuing the true and common Interest of the Nation he governs, without espousing those of any Party or Faction; or if these are so formed in a State that they must incline to one or other, then to chuse and favour that which is the most popular, or wherein the greatest or strongest Part of the People appear to be engaged; for, as the End of Government seems to be SALUS POPULI, so the Strength of the Government is the Consent of THE PEOPLE."

In another Place, he says, "The Ground on which all Government stands is the Consent of the People, or the greatest or strongest Part of them. — That Government which takes in the Consent of the greatest Number of the People, and consequently, their Desires and Resolutions to support it, may justly be said to have the broadest Bottom, and to stand on the largest Compass of Ground, and makes the Figure of the firmest Sort of Pyramid."

"On the contrary, a Government which, by alienating the Affections, losing the Opinions, and crossing the Interests of the People, leaves out of its Compass the greatest Part of their Consent, may justly be said, in the same Degrees it thus loses Ground, to narrow its Bottom; and if this be done to serve the Ambition, humour the Passion, satisfy the Appetites, or advance the Power and Interests not only of ONE MAN, but of TWO, or MORE that come to share in the Government, by this Means the Stability of the Figure is always lessened and impaired."

On this Topic he dwells a good good while, and illustrates it by a Variety of Instances; particularly the Distractions of *Athens* and *Rome*, when "by the Sway of Men grown to UNUSUAL POWER AND RICHES, the Governments were engaged in Councils and Actions contrary to the general Interests of the People."

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These Sentiments are as strikingly just, as the Writer's Authority is great; they necessarily result from the Nature and End of Government; and the natural Inference seems to be, that no Governor or Minister ever pursued an unpopular Method, who had either the Welfare of the People, or the true Dignity of the Crown at Heart. Such a one not only checks the Fluency of public Business at the Time, but runs a dreadful Hazard of propagating a Discontent, if not a Disaffection, which for Ages may not be eradicated, but may become a perpetual Source of Calamity; he lays the Seeds of private Enmity as well as national Division, and entails Distraction on Posterity, at the same Time that he makes the present, once happy, Generation miserable.

That the Case here stated was exactly ours, is undeniable; nay, it was much stronger; for, beside their *Popularity*, the Gentlemen, thus discarded from the Smile of Power could plead a Course of *Merit and Desert*, in a long and faithful Application to the promoting of the Dignity and Satisfaction of their Sovereign; this, one would imagine, should have had some Weight in their Favour, even though they had committed some *Faux-pas*; that they *had*, was never pretended; their Crime must therefore have consisted, not in any thing *past*, but their Unfitness for what was *to come*.

A Revolution of this Nature is almost a *constitutional* one; it is a violent Strain from which a Nation with much Difficulty recovers, and should therefore be never made use of but in a Case of the last Extremity; such as to exterminate some dangerous Malady that threatens Destruction to the whole. But in our Case what was our Ailment, or where was the Necessity of such a Procedure? The V——e R——y found us in Peace and Plenty; Harmony and Enjoyment; the Public not alarmed, nor private Families at miserable Variance; *the Crown* honoured and complied with in all it desired, and at the same Time, BECAUSE THE NATIONAL INTEREST HELD THE REINS, the Nation rested secure in its Immunities, advancing to a Degree of Opulence and Improvement never attained by any other in an equal Time. — Ill-fated Opulence! — Thus circumstanced, one would think a *Change* as needless as undesirable. — How soon the sad Reverse took Place I need not mention.

That this, and their other consequent Proceedings, have been the Source of our Distractions is undeniable; if then no adequate Cause can be shewn that made these Proceedings *necessary*, I humbly apprehend on the Intrigues of those in Power must be charged the whole Blame of these Distractions, and all their Consequences both immediate and remote. We see, we feel, the Effects of what they have done; they are almost as grievous as a People *can* feel; should there not be some great, some uncommonly

commonly great *Necessity* for such uncommonly great and grievous Sufferings? And where, and what, was this *Necessity*? Can the greatest Sagacity find it out? or must we be content to put *private Ambition* in its Place? a little Attention will quickly shew.

Sure I am, that should a Physician force an Operation on me which puts me at the Time to Torture, and, in its Consequence, emaciates my Constitution, I should expect a very categorical Answer to a few plain Questions; Where was the *Necessity*? what was my *Disorder*? I felt no Pain till *you* gave it; my Body was vigorous, my Spirits good, and every Part performed its Function in Ease and Harmony; what *Cure* have you performed? you leave me infinitely worse than you found me; nothing but the absolute Preservation of my Life can compensate *my* Sufferings, or justify *your* Proceedings; and unless you shew me to Demonstration that my *Life* was in *Danger*, I shall necessarily conclude, that what I have endured was not intended for *my* Benefit, but some private Gratification of *your own*, and that my Health is broken, by him who should have preserved it. — But how must my Suspicions be confirmed, should he turn on me, like another *Gregory*, with *Cabricius Arci Thuram Cathalimus*, &c.? Yet with many such *Replies* as this, has the Press been of late employ'd.

So far neither the Service of King or Country seems to demand, nor, consequently, authorize these Measures; private Designs must therefore have been the Groundwork of all; and, I fancy, if my Countrymen would be so just to themselves as to assert the Dignity of Reason, and, rejecting all other Guidance, follow *that* alone in their Inquiry, it will shew them the whole Course of these Transactions as naturally connected as Branches from the same Root, and that Root to be no more than a *private Cabal*, acting under the temporary Sanction of Authority.

It is easy to see, that the Party thus adopted into Favour, and raised to a most unexpected Degree of Lustre, were under a Necessity of fulfilling the Conditions of their Elevation; even though they were inclined to other Measures, yet they were under the Dilemma; they must either go through their *Business*, or forego all Hope of Power; this may, in some Sort, plead their Excuse; the Hand that raised, and still held them up, could, in the Twinkling of an Eye, let them sink into their pristine Situation. How reluctant they, or any of them, might have been, I can't take upon me to determine; it was said there were some *Expostulations*; but certain it is there was no Hesitation in the Execution, so that all Scruples were, some Way or other removed.

At first View it appears not a little surprising, that any Men, who were aiming at an Ascendency in a Nation, could bring themselves

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themselves to set out with a Step so excessively unpopular as that which was so industriously laboured in the first Session of this Ad—n; to support a Person in an Embezzlement of the public Money, an Embezzlement so flagrant, that not a Man in the Kingdom had a Shadow of a Doubt about it; to apply all the Force and Influence which attend on Government, to the Protection of a Servant of the People, from *their* Inquiry first, and afterward from their Censure, seems to be a capital Oversight in Politics. For, what must the People think? “ The first grand “ Care of Government should be to preserve our Interests, our “ Treasure, and our Privileges; to lay the whole Weight of “ the Authority committed to it, to the Support of parliamen- “ tary Dignity, the Vindication of our Rights, and the Punish- “ ment of public Abuses, yet here is a Contest where the Body “ of the People are on the one Side, and the G—t and the “ Delinquent on the other; a public Vote of Credit enormously “ abused, and the Abuser most zealously sheltered by the Arm “ of Power; can the national Interests be the ultimate Aim of “ those who interpose all their Might to prevent Redress of a “ national Injury? or can such a Conduct tend to the Dignity “ of our Sovereign, whose paternal Care for his Subjects has “ been long exerted in the strictest Justice, and tenderest Af- “ fection? Here, indeed, we see the *Policy* of the Change of “ Favourites.”

Thus most Persons argued at the Time, and it was natural they should. Why then was Room left for such obvious Inferences? It at first seems odd, but, on taking the whole of the Measures pursued into Consideration, the Wonder will cease; for we shall then see that Popularity was, from the Beginning, a good deal despaired of, and, consequently, not made the Groundwork of the Plan; some warm and active Genius seems to have been the moving Spring; one, impatient of Delay, and too ardent for Fruition to brook a slow-paced Policy; and such a one was really the fittest for so desperate a Design; a precarious Ad—n was to be made use of in haste, and, at such a valuable Crisis, *Storm* was infinitely preferable to *Sap*; nothing, under a Miracle, could sooth the People, or allay their Apprehensions; what then availed it to be nice in the Merits of the Cause? Was it not more prudent to bestow that Time and Assiduity, which may be wasted for Ages, in Pursuit of the national Favour, to the procuring of Auxiliaries, and putting their Stauchness and their Strength on *this* Trial, before a more important one was introduced? The first Point in View was *Success*; that obtained, the Palate of the People might, in Time, be reconciled to what they must learn to bear. This Plan, we may observe, was pursued in every Step of this and the last Session; *Disguise* appears to have been entirely laid aside; an avowed Enmity with

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with the national Interest could admit of none; and it seemed *unnecessary* to those whose sanguine Hopes pointed out a Probability of subduing us by *Force*. In Consequence of this we find Matters carried through the Whole with a very high Hand.

Mr. N—l was, therefore, most zealously espoused, and to as little Purpose, for his Advocates were as yet too weak to make any considerable Opposition; he was convicted and censured; but how merciful was the Censure! how expressive of Moderation, and a Disposition to Unanimity! I think it must strike every Man who reflects on it for a Moment; a Set of Men, after a Series of Services, plunged suddenly, undeservedly, from the Smile of Power into every *Disgrace* which the Frown of such an Ad—n could inflict; a Man supported, to their Faces, in an Abuse of their Resolutions, and an Embezzlement of their Money; and hugged in the Bosom of Authority for no assignable Reason, but his being the Subject of *their* Animadversion, for the Injury done to *them* and *the Nation*; this Man most solemnly convicted; his Misdemeanor so flagrant as to justify the severest Censure they could pass; in their Power, at their Mercy, and the most desirable Opportunity that *Resentment* could have desired, for mortifying and exposing *the Protectors*, by the natural and unstrained Punishment of *the Minion*.— Yet all Punishment, nay, indeed, all Censure, except what was necessary to support the Vote of Restitution, and *that* uncommonly soft in its Expression, was omitted; surely every one who looks back at this Transaction, and considers the Particulars of it, will be surprized to find so wise and dispassionate a Behaviour, among Men so circumstanced as the Majority of that Time; I own it astonishes me; for Men will generally be *Men* in their public as well as private Character, and we find but few Instances on our Annals where a parliamentary Majority have shewed much Clemency to inveterate Opposers; such an Occasion has ever been a most tempting one, and *here*, which made it still *more* tempting, *Resentment* might have had its fullest Gratification without appearing to be concerned, or incurring the least Degree of Censure. Yet certain it is, that, however it must have risen against the Supporters, it had no Share in the Decision; not even this repetitional Stroke at public Welfare could provoke them to encrease the gathering Storm, even by a Step of the strictest Justice; Mr. N—l's Conduct was considered, in his Sentence, not as a *Crime*, but an *Inadvertency*; the *Breach of Trust* they forbore to punish, and ordered only a *Restitution*.

They have since been blamed for this; it is thought that, had they *then* censured him as they have *since* done, such a spirited Proceeding would have struck a Damp on the Hopes of certain Persons, which have since gained Strength from such Appearance

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of Moderation. How far this Opinion may be just I will not take upon me to determine; certain it is, they were sometimes much mistaken in their Manner of Dealing with their Adversaries, and the Effects of their undefining and moderate Disposition have been turned upon them in a more material Instance than this; but surely we, the People, must not only *excuse*, but for ever *remember* and *applaud* a Conduct which arose purely from a View to *our* Advantage; had they consulted only their own *private Gratification*, they would have given loose to a Repentment which nobody could have condemned, they would have indulged the Call of Justice in its utmost Severity, and have repelled a lawless and formidable Attack with *all the Force* which our Constitution allows to their important Station; but THE PUBLIC was in their *Hands*, and in their *Hearts*; the Kingdom, they saw, was *vitally* attempted, and any *violent* Effort to disengage it, might have endangered the whole; the Power, which gave Life to this Attempt, was in its Nature but short-lived; they hoped this might have been its last Opportunity, and the Project would die away of itself; they dreaded, (and *justly* it seems) a *Misrepresentation* of their own, and the People's Principles, in a *Place* where neither desired or deserved to be misrepresented. They, therefore, chose to give the least possible Colour for such an Appearance, consistent with Dignity to themselves, and Justice to the Public.

They who think them faulty in this Forbearance, must also take into Consideration, that they had the additional Motive of a solemn Promise from *those* in Power, that the Nation should have an Atonement; that *their* Resolutions should be laid before his Majesty, and Mr. N——I should, in *Consequence* thereof, be punished by *him*, as such Resolutions required; requesting only that, as a public Servant, appointed *by the Crown*, he may suffer no Ignominy but from the royal Hand. This *Faet* has never yet, as I can find, been controverted. Here was still a further Sacrifice to the injured People, yet takes not off a Particle from the Merit of the Parliament, who gladly caught at the Proposal, as most agreeable to the Moderation they endeavoured to preserve in the public Transactions, and the surest Means to avoid the Evils that might arise from a more rigid Conduct. But how this *Promise* was performed, in the obtaining Leave for Mr. N——I to sell his Employments with every usual Mark of Honour, every Person is left to judge.

About this Time, the Linen Bill returned to us so mutilated, that, had it passed into a Law, it must have for ever ruined us; and if dropped (as it was) and the next Session, by any Accident, suffered to slip without renewing it, our Fate must have been the same: Here was the daily Bread of thousands, and the Source of our national Prosperity, brought upon the very Edge

of Destruction! Perhaps by Accident; it was said it was; a Clerk, it seems, in engrossing the Bill, let fall some Sheets of the Draft, and consequently omitted them in the engrossed Copy: It was very remiss in him to be so extremely inattentive to an ACT OF PARLIAMENT; and, what makes the Accident more odd, was, that the Sheets, which slid out of his Hand, happened to contain the most essential Paragraphs in the whole Bill, nay, these Paragraphs fell from him quite sole and entire, without one Word more or less than what was absolutely necessary to the Preservation of our Linen Manufacture. It seems a little strange, however, that this Omission was not detected by the same Clerk, or some other, Time enough to be repaired; for an *Act of Parliament*, one would think, though an *Irish* one, was entitled to a Revival; be that as it may, this, we were told, was the Case; some People, notwithstanding, cannot believe it, but affirm it was all a private Trick, calculated by aspiring Persons, like all the rest of their Measures before and since, to *intimidate*; to shew that we were in their Power, and what we may expect if we proved reluctant in complying with their Measures; and they produce, to confirm this Opinion, several Passages in the same Bill, *altered* from their original State, in a Manner most detrimental to this Kingdom. But whether this, or the Mistake of the Clerk, be the more probable Supposition, I leave the Reader to determine.

The Parliament taking upon them to enquire into Mr. N——I's Conduct, without previous Consent from his Patrons, gave them the highest Offence, and, by way of retaliation, it appears, that both the Representatives and the People in general, were pictured at the other Side of the Water as ripe for *Rebellion*, and ready to shake off their Dependency on the Crown of *England*; this Representation was built, I presume, on that ancient Maxim, that all *Opposition* to a *Minister* is *Disaffection* to the *Prince*. Certain it is, that such an Opinion was industriously propagated, where it most could hurt us; happy for us that its Credit was but small! our former constant Behaviour made the Improbability too gross to gain any Ground; the Stroke however was artful though precarious; for, had it, in any sort, succeeded, the united national Force of our parent Island, would naturally have exerted itself against us, to secure its own just Superiority, and thereby have, inadvertently, facilitated the Dominion over us which particular Persons so ardently aspired to. Who they could be that took this destructive Measure, that represented the most fond and faithful Subjects as Enemies to the best of Kings, and to that Nation under whose Protection alone they subsist, and how much they can, by the Rules of common Reason, be imagined to have the Welfare of this Kingdom at heart, is, I believe, a Matter that admits of small Difficulty in the Decision.

The Danger, however, was too great not to be opposed; and, accordingly the Commons, in an unusual Address to his Majesty, at the End of the Session, did all that Words could do to obviate the Misrepresentation; how just their Fears were, the Answer given to their parting Address by the L—L—most undeniably demonstrates; let such of my Readers as have it by them, cast their Eye on it for a Moment, and they will see in it the plainest *Promise* of painting them in disaffected Colours at the Throne; its equivocal Expression can bear no other Meaning, and farther than *that*, common Decency would forbid the keenest Rancour to go, in an Answer to one of the Estates of Parliament.

Thus ended the Session; in a Manner that could be hoped for, only from the unparalleled Moderation of our truly injured Patriots, and the general inviolable Attachment of the People to their King. Shew me on Record a House of Commons so circumstanced, so attacked, so misrepresented, and, at the same time, so powerful, conducting with so much Temper, Wisdom, and true parliamentary Dignity.

The Circumstance of the Money-Bill I have omitted, as I intend to say a few Words immediately, in Relation to the Doctrine of *previous Consent*, in which I shall include what was done with it this Session. I shall only first observe, that, in this Interval between the Sessions, occurred the ever memorable Transaction of the MEMORIAL; a Transaction for which the illustrious Author must be honoured and beloved, while any Sense of Virtue, of Liberty, and Love of their COUNTRY holds Place in the Breasts of IRISHMEN. It is hard to say whether the Nobleness of such a Step, or the Pravity of the Conduct which had made it necessary, be the greater; the one is certainly the strongest imaginable Contrast to the other: To turn the Authority of G—t against the Repose of an innocent, deserving People, to patronize the most destructive Combinations against their Interests, and most Groundlessly sully their fair Fame, in the Eye of their Sovereign, on the one Hand;—on the other, to stand the Shock of Power in Defence of TRUTH and his COUNTRY, to break through the incircling Cabal to the Foot of the Throne, and dispel the Mist of Falshood from the paternal Eye of our Prince, by pointing out, in one plain Narrative of *Facts*, the *real* Sources of our miraculously-fudden *Disaffection!*

This was a most mortifying Step; indeed they have met with a good many; as mortifying to their Pride as to their Designs, and the more, as being so very unexpected. It produced a Clamour of Rage, from every Member, and every Dependent, of the Association; but the most notable Production of all, was the Letter from the D—e of D—t to the L—d C—r*; every Man in

* For this, and several other curious Pieces, see the CABINET.

in the Kingdom should keep it by him; there cannot be a better Guide, in our forming a Judgment of the Nature and Tendency of the Transactions of these Times; it throws, indeed, a Light upon them that needs no other Assistance, and from hence it is that it is so industriously slurred over by its Friends. One Indulgence, however, is certainly to be allowed it; *that* Indulgence which is due to *Passion*; in *Passion*, as well as Wine, there is *Truth*; and hence in these few Lines is contained, the very genuine Spirit of the *Dictator*; we find the *Event* to be strictly *correspondent*; some *important* Scheme was *premeditated* by the *antecedent* Menaces here uttered, and *what this* Scheme was, and how near their Hearts, appears from these Menaces being so *immediately* and so *exactly* put in Execution. — Surely there cannot be really on Earth, a Man whom such striking Evidence can fail to convince — On the whole, this magnificent Performance did no Harm; it added Vigilance to the public Apprehension, and, doubtless, gave a very pleasing Vent to the Fullness of the Writer's Heart.

This naturally brings me to the Money-Bill: Shall I presume to handle such a Mystery? I am neither Judge, nor Lawyer, Place-man, Pensioner, nor Expectant; will my Reader think me the worse qualified? He may please himself among the Advocates for the Preamble. The Sentiments *my* Reason suggests to me, are not of the recommendatory Sort to the Smile of Power. My Plan is the Plan of *common Sense*; if this Doctrine comes not within *its* Sphere, I have been mistaken, and resign it over to those, whose Faculties are by various Means more quickened, and adapted to the Investigation of all its Subtilties.

There is not in the Nature of Things, a Point that, when fairly and clearly stated, can admit of less Doubt or Delay in the Decision. It was this, its very Self-evidence, which made it necessary for the Espousers of the weak Side, to be so industrious in raising a Mist around it, with all the Powers of Sophistry and Art; but, when divested of this, it strikes on the Mind, in all that irresistible Splendor, which is peculiar to TRUTH.

One Circumstance attends it which speaks this strongly, and is, indeed, *Truth's* grand Characteristic; notwithstanding all the laborious Efforts of the Friends of Power to disguise it, notwithstanding the most studied Perplexity and Subtily of Argument, and Plausibility of Diction, the utmost they have effected is to *puzzle* and *confound*; to produce a kind of momentary Scepticism, or Irresolution; nor have I ever met with one Person, within my Observation, who felt a Particle of *Conviction* from all those Performances, though they, doubtless, gave no little Trouble to the Invention of the Composers.

My poor, poor Country! formidably attacked from *without*, betrayed from *within*, and, at the same Time, pregnant with Swarms

Swarms who are eager to prostitute, each his Share of Talents, to the Disguise of the most *vital* TRUTHS, and Recommendation of the most fatal Measures! All for a Ray of temporary Sun-shine!

But why should we wonder? Has it not ever been the Case with the most important Maxims both in Religion and Government? The most important are, in their own Nature, the most evident, yet this very *Importance* has made it necessary for designing Men to muffle their *Evidence* in order to lay a Footing for *private Gratification*; thus has the Goodness of GOD, which so connected Things as to place those Truths within the Reach of *all*, on which the Happiness of *all* essentially depends, thus has it been counteracted by the Selfishness and Perfidy of Man; and *that Reason*, which HE bestowed for the Preservation, has been sinfully perverted to the Ruin of HIS Creatures.

Against the Subtilty of Falshood he has given us *Reason* for an Antidote, and an irresistible one if we *will* use it. From a Knowledge of our Species, if we reflect a little, we can easily see on *what* Topics it is *most likely* the Arguer designs to mislead us, and this will put us on our Guard, and rouze us in the Inquiry; thus, an Argument, whose direct Tendency is the Advancement of POWER, should call for the minutest Care in every Concession, because, from the Frailty of human Nature, it is plain that *Power* must have many, very many, Advocates, where plain *Truth* has not one; we know that *Power* can give every Thing that mortal *Passions* can desire, and consequently, that if any Sophistry *can* be devised, it *will* be where *Power* is a Party; where an endless Variety of Gratifications can be proposed to those *Passions*, which, alas! we all well know, have too strong a Predominancy, in every Branch of human Conduct.

Thus cautioned, set Reason against Art, and we may be easy about the Event of the Contest; but, without this Circumspection, we must ever run a Hazard of being imposed on by *Words*; and Words we may rely on being attacked with, where Men's darling Pursuits are concerned, let the Badness or Absurdity of the Cause be ever so flagrant.

We must not therefore be surprized at the Variety of Defences, with which the late rejected *Preamble* has been favoured; had it succeeded, there would have been little Pains taken in its Justification; but since its Fate has been unhappy, and the whole Scheme disconcerted, it is but natural to attempt some Palliation, to take off the publick Odium from those who have *shewn themselves* to no Purpose, and the *public Gratitude* from the much envied Defenders of their Country. The least the Losers can have is leave to *speak*.

In all such Cases we do not combat with the Difficulty of the Subject, but the Art of our Antagonist. Were *the Subject* adhered

hered to, a few Minutes would dispatch it; but *he* must be followed through all his Labyrinth of Fallacy, and driven out of every Subterfuge, before he resigns the Cause; every smooth-founding Sentence he can form, interspersed with some occasional Words relative to the Matter in Dispute, is, with him, and his prejudiced Advocates, an *Argument*; and should you grow tired of confuting Absurdity, he applauds himself as Victor, and closes his Jargon in Triumph.

This seems the Case with *previous Consent*; a Doctrine now almost as notorious as *Transubstantiation*; vindicated by the same Species of *Reasoning*, with as much Zeal, and pretty equal Success. Words, indeed, have been neatly put together, for those to *speak with*, who before were devoted to ministerial Measures; and I have heard an Orator of this Class, after getting the greatest Part of the CONSIDERATIONS by Heart, exult in his Fluency over a very sensible Man, who had never dreamed of considering a plain Subject, in so refined and complicated a Light. This is all the best Covering for a bad Cause can possibly arrive at; and a Party, who never before even pretended to have any Thing *to say* for themselves, may be glad of this Bettering of Condition. Whether the Voice of the Nation, speaking in Addresses from every Quarter, and avowing a *Scheme of Conduct* upon future Elections, might not have contributed to force them out of their former Taciturnity, is pretty easy to see. This Point was full as unjustifiable, nay, much more so, than any other Step they had taken; but it was *necessary* to defend it because it had failed, and the People were in a Flame; and it was thought *feasible*, as the Nature of it gave a Colour for making it a parliamentary Mystery, intelligible only to a few Adepts, and to be received implicitly by the Public, as by them taught and delivered.

But let not my Countrymen be imposed on; there is not a Man among them, of a commonly-informed Understanding, but may fully comprehend the Question, and, with a little Attention, see through the whole Chain of Fallacy, that has been made use of to mislead their Judgments, in relation to this Transaction, and the Designs of its Promoters, and (according to the *Phrase*, and the *Intention*, of the CONSIDERATIONS) to *quiet the Fears and Apprehensions of the People*, until a more fortunate Occasion presents itself for finally effecting them.

The principal Art made use of for this Purpose, has been that which, in every Instance, has been the Refuge of Falshood; the using of Words without determining their Meaning, from whence the Arguers take Liberty of using them in different Senses, at different Times, and, by keeping the Word always *wide*, slip in every Idea that can possibly serve the Occasion.

This

This has been the principal Art; for I cannot give the Name of *Art* to that Species of Argument which fills the Bulk of the Performances in favour of the Preamble, I mean the laying down undeniable Premises, and drawing the most foreign and absurd Conclusion. A Cause is hard pressed when thus defended.

In a Dispute wherein we are *all presumed* to be concerned, we have surely a Right to insist on the Expulsion of *hard Words*, and the Substitution of such as are, in their Import, quite clear and determinate to *all*. The *Astutia Politica* is built on *technical Phrase*, and this Rule should be therefore more carefully observed.

Let the honest and intelligent Reader take the following State of the Case in plain *English*; it will not long detain him, nor need he be deep-read to decide it; on the contrary, I will venture to answer, that he will not need one Argument to help him in his Determination: Nor will the hardest Court-Advocate say it is not exactly *just*; for there is not an Article of it but they have, in some Part of their Performances, confessed.

The King is at the Head of the State; put there *for the Benefit of the People*; for the same Purpose is he invested with the Office of *laying out* the public Money, which is raised out of the Pockets of the People, by the Means of their Representatives; this is absolutely necessary, because these Representatives cannot, in the Nature of Things, be always assembled; but the King is always at the Helm, and therefore is the fittest to become an *Agent* for the People, and a Trustee for the laying out the *public Wealth* for the *public Advantage*; as the Representatives of the People, however, are justly supposed to be adequate Judges whether the Money they raised has been applied to its proper Purposes, and, at the same Time, to have the highest Right to *inquire*, the public Accounts are laid before them when they meet again, and *their* Approbation or Disapprobation fixes the Propriety or Impropriety of the Application.

This will not be denied to be the general State of this Branch of our Constitution; the Author of the *CONSIDERATIONS*, indeed, denies that the Accounts are laid before the Parliament for their *Approbation*, and that the Commons have any *Right* to call for them in *that* Sense; but as he has prudently thought fit to recant in his second Pamphlet, this latter Part of his Doctrine, and graciously to indulge them in this *Right*, his other Assertion, though it were true, would make no manner of Difference in the Question before us.

Now as to the particular Circumstance which produced this Question: The public Expences had so far exceeded the Produce of the Taxes, as to make it necessary for the Parliament, to borrow different Sums of Money, from private Persons, at Interest, and to pledge the public Faith for the Payment. In some Time the Produce of the Taxes so swelled as to leave an Over-

plus

plus in the Treasury after all the public Purposes, FOR WHICH these Taxes were granted, had been answered. The Treasury, every one knows to be the PUBLIC COFFER, into which the Money, raised off the People, is brought, and to which the King, as the great public Officer, has recourse, when he is to apply this Money for the *public Service*.

As a Redundancy of the People's Money was thus found, by their Representatives, at their coming together, and the People were paying Interest for a considerable Sum, it was natural and equitable for the Representatives to do for the People, as the People would have done for themselves; to wit, to get rid of a heavy Interest, and pay their Debts when they were so well able to do it: The Redundancy in the Treasury could not therefore be so well disposed of, as in the Discharge of the public Debt.

The Form judged most advisable for doing this was an *Act of Parliament*, to which, of Consequence, the King becomes a Party.

Now to *him*, who never had a *Property* in this Money, who never had been or could be concerned in it, farther than, as the executive Power of the Constitution, to receive it, and expend what was necessary, and give up his Accounts to the Public, whose Money it was; to *him*, I say, one would imagine it a very sufficient Share of Compliment and Justice, from the Nature of our Constitution, to make him a Party in the Disposal of this Superfluity, and thereby to allow him a Negative on the whole Scheme, should he please to exert it.

This, however, is not thought *sufficient*; he must not only give his *Assent* to the Bill, he must not only be put on an *equal* Foot with the Representatives of the People, whose Money this was, but he must be put on a *superior* Foot; they must not presume even to *bring in* a Bill for disposing of *their own* Money, to the Discharge of their own Debt, until they had obtained *his previous Consent* so to do, nor must any Act of Parliament pass for this Purpose, without an Acknowledgment of such *previous Consent* being obtained.

This is the literal Fact, and, had the Fact been suffered to rest on its own Merits, more than such a plain Display would never have been necessary. Reader, if you are not a blind Devotee of Party, lay your Hand on your Heart, and avow, as warmly as you must feel, the Force of TRUTH; the Case lies before you naked and plain, unembellished and undisguised; and surely it must strike you in an Instant that such *previous Consent* from the Crown is (at least) not necessary to the People's framing a Bill for the Disposition of their own Money, which Bill, when framed, the Crown is at Liberty to refuse, and, consequently, to quash. Is it not enough that the King should

be made a *joint* Party with the other two Branches of the Legislature in a Matter entirely of *public Concern*? Is this not sufficient to keep up the Dignity of the Crown? But must the Parliament be doomed to perpetual Silence, though they should see the People labouring under a Grievance of Interest, and a large Sum of their Money, at the same Time, idle in the Treasury, and not be at Liberty even to *offer* a Bill for their Relief, until they have obtained *Leave* for that Purpose? What Maxim is there in our Constitution that affords a *greater* Power to the King, over the public Money, than to the Representatives of the People? or *what* Constitution must it be, in which *such* Power is to be found? Yet, surely, here is a *greater* claimed; an *equal* one, in *this* Instance, is conceded; he may refuse his Concurrence, and thereby as effectually overset the Scheme as either of the other Parties can do: But why must his Consent *before*, and his Assent *after*, be *both* necessary? Why should he be invested with a *double Negative*? It is allowed he may *recommend*, *advise*, and *propose* to his People what, in *his* Opinion, is most for their Advantage, and why may not they be indulged in a Right to *propose* to him what is, in *their* Opinions, most for their own Advantage, (of which, surely, they may be supposed to be tolerably well qualified to judge) and of presenting him a Bill, as the approved Method of carrying these their Sentiments into Execution? Surely, such an infinite Disparity in *such* a Point, is not consistent either with the Nature of our Government, or the Equilibrium of its respective Branches.

Whoever will consider this Point ever so little a while, will find a Succession of Arguments starting up in his Mind, and vying with each other in the Confutation of such Absurdity.

If the King has no Interest in the public Money but that of a *Trustee* or *Agent* for the *public Use*, and, of consequence, is subject to be called (or, which is *tantamount*, his Officers and Ministers) to an Account by the Representatives of the People for the Application of this Money, surely he may, by *them*, be *antedecently* directed in the Application of it, more especially when this *Direction* is no more than an humble Proposal by Bill which he is left at Liberty to reject? Surely, by all the Rules of Nature and common Reason, any Person who has a Right to punish a Breach of Trust when committed, must have a Right to *advise* before-hand how that Breach of Trust may be avoided, and how that Trust may be best used for the Service of himself the *In-truster*. But mark the Absurdity of this Doctrine: To-day, the King, the People's Trustee, has such a Kind of Dominion over their Money intrusted to his Care, that the Parliament shall not offer to him their Sentiments, in Form of a Bill, about the Disposal of it, (which Bill he may, if he pleases, reject) until they have

have obtained his Leave for so doing; to-morrow, the same Parliament, or one Branch of it, shall, of *Right*, call for an Account of the Disposal of this Money, examine it with the nicest Severity, and punish, censure, and impeach, from the lowest to the highest Minister of the Crown, the nearest and dearest, perhaps, to the royal Person, without the least Intimation of *Consent* for so doing, or thinking it at all necessary to wait for it; a sudden Change with them for the better, this! To-day, they are as low as a Parliament of *Paris*; to-morrow, they find themselves in all the Liberty of *Britons*; they may *censure*, but not *advise*; they may *punish*, but not *prevent*.

Thus, the late Bill would not be *suffered* to pass, without a Clause acknowledging his Majesty's *previous Consent* to the bringing it in; suppose the Money which was, by that Bill, intended to discharge the public Debt, had, on the dropping of the Bill, been taken out of the Treasury by some of his Majesty's Servants, and applied to any *private* Purpose, instead of the public Service; certain it is that the very House of Commons, who would not be permitted to propose an Application of this Money until *Leave* was obtained, and who incurred the Censure of Disaffection in general, and severe Penalties on some of their Individuals, for refusing to acknowledge the Necessity of such *Leave*, this very House of Commons may (by the Nature of our Constitution) censure, animadvert, and punish those who had *misapplied* that *very* Money of which they themselves have been deny'd the Liberty of even *proposing* an Application.

The Connection between the Right of *censuring*, and the Right of *proposing*, is so glaring, that, I believe, the smallest Share of Attention will be struck with it; and a little Attention will suggest more, and more strongly, in Favour of it, than any Words can do. Let the courteous Reader, if he desires to judge right on this Point, either for the Benefit of himself or others, pursue this *Connection*, and it will soon lead him to the TRUTH; and lead him so steadily, that no poor Fallacy in Words, or Argument, will be able to divert him from the Pursuit.

If the Parliament be allowed to know whether the public Money has been rightly applied, surely they may know *before-hand* how it may be rightly apply'd, or, at least, be capable of forming not a despicable Judgment of what may be for the Interests of the People; and if so, why in the Name of common Sense, may they not speak this their Judgment, put it into Form of a Bill, and present it to his Majesty, to know whether he thinks with them, and will concur in making this their *Plan* a Law? Or what is it that can deprive them of this *Right*, by making the Consent of the Crown previously *necessary*?

The memorable Author of the CONSIDERATIONS, who really does not want *Sagacity*, foresaw that if the Parliament be allowed a *Right* of calling for the *public Accounts*, all the World would see that they must have a *Right* to *propose* an Application of the *public Money*, and, therefore, cunningly enough, chuses to lop off this *Right*, though he generously indulges them in the *Right* of punishing Misapplications; that is, Misapplications may be punished when they can be found out, which never *can* be, because *the Means* of finding them the Parliament have no *Right* to look into. I shall point out, by and by, the Places where, in the plainest Terms, he has deny'd the *Right* of *Inquiry*.

As the Question stands in its original State, I believe an ingenious Mind would never be able to divine, where the least possible Colour could be found, for maintaining any other Doctrine, than what thus spontaneously presents itself; but nothing is impervious to Art, Art, rendered still more sagacious by *Interest*; and accordingly a Defence of the Necessity of *previous Consent* was framed, and most industriously propagated; but such a *Defence*, surely, no Cause was ever blessed with. We must, however, observe that, on the Question in the House, no *one* Argument appeared to be the ruling Motive of the Advocates for the Preamble, but a different one was started by every Man who spoke in its Favour; they had all however, without Doubt, *some* Principle to act on, and it required some Leisure, indeed, to make Reasons fit to appear in Public.

Though great Allowances are to be made, for the Confusion of Mind which must attend a Disappointment in a darling Scheme, and the Panic occasioned by popular Outcry; yet is it not a little surprising, that some among the Party could not have Presence of Mind to foresee the Consequences of attempting a Defence of a Measure so rotten, that it could not be supported, without making free with some of the Pillars of our Constitution? Such an Attempt necessarily, as it has done, must alarm the People more than ever, because it displays the true Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine; but to patronize and avow such a Plan seems to be the very Height of Temerity. Every Sentiment contained in it, comes from hence authorized to us, as the Principle which actuates its Patrons; and if every such Sentiment shall, on Examination, appear to correspond with the rest of their Conduct, my Reader will allow it to co-operate in producing *Conviction*.

Then, to the CONSIDERATIONS; those modern *Institutes*, whence every smaller Penman has taken his Subject of Paraphrase; I would give any Length of Time, to a Man who had not read them, for guessing, what Article of the Case, as I above stated it, this much celebrated Writer has chosen for his Argument;

ment; why indeed, the grand Article which forms the Confutation of all *his* Doctrine, and, at the same Time, the Happiness of *our* Constitution; to wit, that *the King is, by his Station, the TRUSTEE* for expending THE MONEY OF THE PUBLIC.

If the Reader has not seen this Book, he will, doubtless, stare at what I tell him; yet the Fact is so, and the whole Argument of the CONSIDERATIONS (or rather the *insinuated* Inference, for he hardly attempts to *prove* it) is this; *because* the King is, by the Nature of his Station, employed by the People to lay out their Money for their Service, and this Money is, for this Purpose, put into his Hands, that he may have it in his *Power* so to lay it out, that *therefore* the People must not, after it is once put into his Hands, presume even to speak their Minds by Bill, humbly offered for his *Approbation*, about what appears to them to be the best Method of applying Part of it for their own Benefit, until they have obtained *Leave* from him for so doing.

If this be not the plain *English*, and Sum total, of all the Learning and fine Language in his Book, I will give up the Cause. Let my Reader run through it, and he will see: Every one, it is true, has not Attention or Leisure enough to disengage it from the Disguise it is muffled in; and on this the Author presumed: But if the Reader finds this to be really the Case, will he think this monstrous Disguise *designed* or *involuntary*; and, if *designed*, for a *good* or a *bad* Purpose?

The chief Art he makes use of is, the laying all the Stress of his Proof upon that Part of the Argument which every one will allow him without any Proof at all; to wit, that the King is, by the Nature of our Constitution, the *Agent*, or *Trustee*, for laying out the Money of the People for their Service; or, as he *chuses* to phrase it, "That the *Trust* of applying the Money given by Parliament to the Crown, without any special Appropriation, is, by the Laws and Constitution of this Kingdom, *vested* in the Crown for *public Services*." These two Manners of wording will, I presume, be allowed to come just to the same Thing, as the TRUST, the *essential* Idea, is expressly mentioned in *his*. — Yet, who does not see into the poor little Art with which he varnishes this simple Sentiment, in order to make it look as like as possible to *the Thing* which he wishes, yet dares not *assert* it to be! The Word *given*, though joined to a *Trust*, may look to some People as a *Gift*, and what is *vested* in the Crown may seem to imply the Idea of *Property*.

To *prove* this *Trust*, had to him these several good Consequences. First, it engages the Favour of a Reader, by setting out with a Truth to which all must assent. Secondly, it looks as if this were the only Point that *requires* to be proved, and that when it is proved, the Question is at once decided. Thirdly, it

tires the Attention of the Generality of Readers, before they can come in View of the Point which really wants to be proved. Fourthly, it gives the Opportunity of hawling in the History of the public Revenue, the most desirable Thing for dazzling and perplexing an ordinary Reader. And, Fifthly, the best Consequence of all, to insinuate, by all his Pains, that *this* was the Point the Commons meant to deny by their rejecting the Preamble, and that consequently, they intended to strip the Crown of (what he justly denominates an *ancient* Right) the Right of acting AS TRUSTEE for the People, in the Application of their Money for *their* Service. This served to promote the Insinuation, which has been propagated both on this and the other Side of the Water, of their being actuated by *Disaffection*, and mature for *Rebellion*.

How fair, how honest, such a Proceeding! How ingenuous the *Advocate*! How sound the *Cause*!

My Reader will observe, that his prolix and important Dissertation on the several Kinds of public Revenue proves nothing, even by his own Confession, but that all these Revenues are *granted* to the King, or (in a *safer* and less equivocal Phrase) *put into his Hands*, merely for the Service of *the Public*; some in Perpetuity, and others from Two Years to Two Years.

And, once for all, I must caution him against being deceived by the Words, *granted to the Crown*, which this Author uses in Ambiguity through his whole Work. It can mean no more, on this Occasion, than *lodging the TRUST, putting it into the Power of the King to receive it from the People, that he may have it in his Power to lay it out for their Service*. Without *such a Grant* the Money could never be raised, nor could he discharge his *Office of constitutional Trustee*. This let my Reader bear all along in Mind. The Author dares not *avow* any other Definition of it.

Then he proceeds to heighten the Parade, by demanding why the King's Letters are *obeyed* at the Treasury, if he has not *the Right of Application*? The King *has* the Right of Application, but it is a Right for the Use of which he is ever *accountable* to the People, a Right of applying their Money *for their Service*; and not an *absolute, uncontrollable* Right of applying it as he pleases, such as attends on the Nature of PRIVATE PROPERTY. This too my Reader must remember in every Page he reads of the CONSIDERATIONS, where the word *Right* is carefully made use of in an ambiguous Sense, and confounded with *Power*: The Crown has, by being *intrusted*, a *Power of misapplying* the public Money, but no *Right*; it is of the nature of a *Trust* to invest a *Power of Abuse*.

The Reason then is plain why these *Letters* are obeyed; because, as he says himself, the King has this (*limited*) Right of Application;

Application; this *Obedience* proves that he *has*, and is the natural Consequence of his *having* it. Surely, If I *intrust* a Man to manage my Money which is locked up in my *Chest*, I must also intrust him with the *Key* that he may get at it; but will my giving him the *Key* imply, that I do any Thing more than *intrust* him? If not, why need the Circumstance of the *Key* be so much insisted on, when I am ready to acknowledge the *Trust*? All his Zeal in Support of these *Letters* leaves us therefore just where we were, and confirms what we had confessed long before his Book was thought of, to wit, *That, by the Nature of our Constitution, the King has the Right of acting as TRUSTEE for the People, in receiving and expending, for their Use, the Money raised out of their Pockets by Authority of Parliament; and that, in the natural Consequence of such TRUST, he is ever accountable to them for his Discharge of it, and the Application of their Money thus committed to his Care*.

Who his Adversaries, on this Point, can be, I really don't know; if he ever met with any, they are most dismally uninformed; for, one of the first Things we are taught to know is, that the King is the first Magistrate, the grand Officer of the State, and the Head of the executive Power; but we are also taught to know that every *Magistrate*, every *Officer*, every *executive Power*, not only implies, but is totally founded on a *Trust* reposed *for the Good of the Society*; for the Service of *that* were they originally constituted, but to promote *its* Welfare they would never have existed, and to *it* must they be ever answerable for the Manner in which they exert their delegated Authority.

All this the Author knew as well as any one, but it was convenient to *mistake*; the real Point of Argument was to be flurred over, and a false one pompously insisted on, that the House of Commons might appear to have *attacked* the royal Prerogative, by denying that *Trust* in the Crown which he takes such indefatigable Pains to evince.

One principal Purpose of this Book is, to inculcate some Maxims which, though essential to support his main Doctrine, are too gross for the People of this Island as yet to digest, he foresaw this in some Sort, and has therefore dressed them out with Care, in order to disgust as little as possible. Thus he will not, in plain Terms, assert, that the Money raised from the People, for public Use, is *the Property of the Crown*, yet it is palpable that he *implicitly* asserts it in almost every Page; and, indeed, he was under a Necessity of doing so to support the Doctrine of previous Consent.

But of his Art in this Way I have spoken before; what started it to me now, was his ostentatious Manner of insisting on the

the Authority of the King's Letters; he would plainly give them by Insinuation the Air of *absolute*, and make an ordinary Reader imagine, that the King must have some Kind of Property in Money which he can thus send for *whenever he pleases*; but surely the meanest Capacity must see, that to invest him with a *Trust*, without giving him *such a Power*, would be downright Nonsense; he must have a *Power* of getting at the Money, in order to apply it according to his *Trust*; and the best Method of doing so with Ease to himself, and Security to the Treasury Officers who have the Charge of it, is by sending his *Letters*, which are the legal Vouchers for their Justification.

Numberless other little Shifts and Evasions, in the Course of this Pamphlet, I pass over, as they would swell my Letter too much; my Reader, will, however, very easily detect them, if he will constantly, during the Perusal, keep in his Eye that one grand Circumstance of *the Trust*; let him never lose Sight of it, nor admit any one Maxim that is not strictly consentaneous to its Nature. This single Idea decides, indeed, at once the whole Dispute, and is an infallible Antidote against all the Fallacy that has been devised by the ministerial Advocates. I shall, therefore, detain him as little as possible.

Our Author has thus proved the *Trust*, and we allowed it before it was proved. But what is become of *previous Consent*? I believe nobody sees it in Company with the *Trust*; I fancy, if we look a little farther, we shall see it with its inseparable Companion, *private Property*.

If it does not result from the Nature of a *Trust*, the CONSIDERATIONS have laboured to no Purpouse; he does not pretend to prove that it *does*, through the whole Course of his Book, except in his 35th Page; this is, consequently, the only Place for *real* Argument in the Performance; for the grand Article to be proved is, that BECAUSE *the King is the People's TRUSTEE*, that THEREFORE *his Consent is necessary to their even RECOMMENDING, by Bill, any Application of their own Money*.

This, therefore, is a tough unpliant Word; our Author thought so, and could not spare more than seven Lines upon it, which are these; "If such *Trust* be in the Crown, the King's "Consent is necessary previous to PUBLIC DELIBERATIONS "on the Application; otherwise such Deliberations thereon "might lay the Crown under *great Difficulties*, and be attended "with bad Consequences to Government." Here are the seven Lines which contain all the Proof that could be invented to support this much contested Doctrine; on the Strength of these is the whole to be decided, and the most loyal Set of Subjects that ever a Monarch had, must be convicted of an illegal Attempt on his Prerogative.

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If any Man in the Community, with a Head reasonably free from Dulness, and a Heart from Prejudice, will allow, that this short Sentence, composed entirely of Words of a very vague and undeterminate Meaning, or, rather, without any at all, is a satisfactory Proof, and a firm Foundation for this mighty Superstructure, I give up the Argument.

I do not find that this Point, this *Proof* of necessary Connexion between a *Trust* and *previous Consent*, has been insisted on by the Followers of our Author, except by the florid *Haber-dasher*; a Gentleman who has taken it in his Head to ape *the Drapier*; as like him in his Abilities as his Cause, and in the Popularity he affects, as like him as in either. With the rest of his small Brethren, however, he has contrived to write a *new Book* by a Change of Phrase, and is, indeed, the most *faithful Interpreter* of the CONSIDERATIONS that we have.

He, indeed, ventures to go a few Lines farther on this Point, but still carefully keeping his *Text* (above quoted) in his Eye. If the Reader thinks it worth while, he may find the Place I mean in Page 23 and 24 of the second Letter. The Sum of it is, that, should the People have a Right to propose any Application of their Money to the King, their Trustee, without his *previous Leave*, they may happen, by some Chance or other, to do so exactly at the Time, when he was on the Point of applying this very Money to some important public Service; which may happen to be of so nice a Nature, that he could not divulge it without, perhaps, ruining the State; hence he would be under a Necessity of rejecting their Proposal without giving them any Reason, and this may incur the public Resentment. Besides, a wicked Parliament may make some such Proposal on Purpose to draw him into this Dilemma.

There seems such a Faintness in this Attempt at an Argument, and such an Air of Despondency in the Inventor of it, that it is almost cruel to attack it. But, as it comes originally from the CONSIDERATIONS, it shall have a Word or two.

In some very rare Cases it may happen, that the Crown may be engaged in Transactions not proper to divulge, *at the Time*, even to the Parliament, but very rarely, indeed, can such an Occasion occur, with respect to the *particular* Interests of this Kingdom; still more rare must such a Case be, if this should happen just at the very Nick, when the Parliament might propose *another* Application of this very Money, and no Fund be found sufficient to answer *both*: How often, in a thousand Years, such a Concurrence of unlucky Circumstances may be met with, I shall not now attempt to compute; but I fear that few will be got to believe, that such a framed *Possibility* is a Reason strong enough to cut off from the Parliament all Right of deliberating

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on the Application of the People's Money, without previous *Consent from the Crown*. But supposing this strange Affair should happen, is not the Remedy very easy? Surely a good King (directed by good Ministers) and an affectionate Parliament, could never disagree upon it; between *such* a Confidence must ever subsist, that could, in an Instant, disperse the most unlucky Combination of Incidents that can be devised; and, in a Case like this, must banish every Shadow of Difficulty; the King has a Scheme on Foot for the public Benefit, which, in its Nature, requires Secrecy; the People humbly approach with their Advice on the Disposal of that Share of their Money, which is destined for the Completion of this Scheme; a Proposal does no Harm, and the King, in such a Case, might, and must refuse his Concurrence, without divulging the Particulars of his Plan: Their Experience of his former Conduct, and continued Care of their Interests, must surely prevent every the least Tendency to Uneasiness or Distrust; and besides, all such Secrets can be but temporary, and the *Application* lies ever open to their Scrutiny. A most delicate and vapourish Being indeed must be the Genius of Government, to be scared out of its Abilities, and perplexed in the Discharge of its Office, if THE PEOPLE, whose Welfare ought to be the sole Object of its Concern, should approach uninvited to offer their *Opinion*.

Thus far to the first Part of this Argument; his second is built on what a bad Parliament *may* do; this Matter I will not contest with him, but, on the contrary, would be glad to know what a *bad Parliament* may not do; surely there is not a Branch of their Privileges which they may not pervert at their Discretion, either to distress their Sovereign, or betray their Constituents; but can this be a Reason for depriving them of these Privileges? or is it possible to contrive a human System of Power not liable to *Abuse*?

The same Gentleman's own Words immediately after (also badly copied from the *CONSIDERATIONS*) will do well enough on this Occasion; "As well on the same Principle may we argue against all Kinds of human Government, because, in the Hands of whatever Men Power is lodged, there a Possibility of Misapplication must be admitted. The Debate, therefore, is not about possible Abuse of the Power claimed; *an Abuse not even to be presumed at present*. The only Considerations of Moment to us in this Matter are—Is there such a Power established? does this Establishment naturally tend to the national Prosperity?"

If then this Right of humbly offering their Opinions, about the Application of their own Money, be by the Rules of Nature, and our Constitution, inherent in the Representatives of the People,

People, and that it be, in its direct Tendency, salutary to the Society, as the Loss of it must be destructive, no *Possibility* that they may, at some Time or another, pervert it to a sinister Purpose, can be a sufficient Argument for taking it from them. Indeed, it happens a little unluckily for the Author, that there is not a single Article of parliamentary Privilege which may not with much more Ease than this, be made an Instrument of distressing the Crown; and the Reason is plain; because *this* is the *humblest*, the least *energetic*, of all *Rights*; it amounts to nothing more than a Liberty of *Opinion*; a Right that in itself can never hurt the Crown, nor can the worst Intention give it a noxious Quality, without the Concurrence of a numberless Train of Fatalities, which never did, nor hardly ever can, exist.

But turn the Reverse, deprive us of this Right, this humble Right, and *what* do we become? Then, indeed, the worst of Consequences glare upon the Eye, and fright the free-born Soul from a Doctrine teeming with Evils; no *Contingencies*, no *possible Abuse*: Abuse implies a Contrast, implies a Benefit resulting from the same Source through a different Channel. But invest the Crown with a Right of prohibiting the Subject's *proposing* an Application of the national Wealth, and nothing *can* ensue but one uniform Series of Mischiefs to the People, without one *possible Advantage* to them, or one Particle of Dignity to the Monarch, consistent with the Nature of a FREE GOVERNMENT.

If then we agree with the Author of the *CONSIDERATIONS*, that to indulge the People, in this Right, *may be attended with bad Consequences to GOVERNMENT*, we must understand that Kind of *G*—t which, it is too probable, he had chiefly in his Eye when he invented the Doctrine; that *G*—t which so furiously attempted the Measure, and so industriously dispersed his Book; to such a one, indeed, *this* Right, and, I fear, some others, must be very disagreeable.

That a Necessity of *previous Consent* can never be the natural Result of a *Trust* is, therefore, not to be denied; its most celebrated Advocates have no where produced even a Shadow of a Proof that it is; and this is the true Reason why all their Pains have not effected a Particle of Conviction, nor, in any Sort, abated that honest Fervour among THE PEOPLE, which they were so industriously calculated to stifle. No Man, in his Senses, can be brought to think, that *because* a Person is *intrusted*, in general, with the Money of others, to be laid out *for their Use*, that *therefore* the Persons, who intrust him, can have no Right, even to *propose* an Application of any Part of this their Money, until they have previously obtained Leave from the Trustee for so doing. There could not be two more unlucky Ideas joined together, than a *Trust*, and a *Necessity of such Consent*; they are,

in their Nature, as incongruous as Fire and Water, not will the greatest Art be ever able to extract one from the other.

If a Necessity of *previous Consent* be not then the natural Growth of a *Trust*, it is easy to see of *what* it is the natural Growth; and this will, I believe, lead us, at the same Instant, to a View of the grand Spring which actuated this whole Proceeding; which produced the furious Effort, and the implacable Resentment. From hence too arise the Justification and the Merit of those, who, at every Hazard, withstood the insidious Measure.

ABSOLUTE, PRIVATE PROPERTY, in the Person whose previous Consent is thus necessary, will be found, without long Search, to be the *only* Basis on which this Doctrine can be built. Every liberal minded Man will think that, while he continues to hold a Property in his Money, he must ever retain with it a Right of *speaking his Mind* about the Application, though another Person may have the *Possession* of it for *his* Use. This is the last Privilege that can be parted with, nor can it, indeed, be resigned until the Property goes out of him. Take *this* away, and what becomes of the very Idea of *Property*? It is instantly fled; for this is its very Essence, Life, and Spirit: There is a Reverence essentially attending on its very Nature, which intitles a Man by the eternal Law of Nature to this Prerogative, and we find accordingly an universally innate Pride that asserts the Claim, and rises against every Attempt to deprive us of it.

On the other Hand where the *Property* and *Possession* are lodged together, *unincumbered with any TRUST, there, AND THERE ALONE*, the same great Law of Nature makes it absolutely necessary, that *previous Consent* be had, from the *Proprietor*, before any other Person on Earth can, with Justice or Decorum, enter into any Deliberation, or make any Proposal, relative to the Disposition of this his PROPERTY; such a Conduct would be an Invasion on its sacred *Reverence*, and the same honest *Pride* would take Fire at the Insolence.

If the Nature of a *Trust* does not make a Necessity for *previous Consent*, then to acknowledge such a Necessity would be to go beyond the Nature of a *Trust*; a *Grant*, not implying a *Trust*, must be a *Gift*, an uncontrollable Gift; there is no Medium; you step instantly out of one into the other; a *Grant* made to a Person must be either to *his* Use, or not; if not, then to *some other* Use, and so becomes a *Trust*; here is a *Grant* made to the King, and *previous Consent*, is, it seems, insisted on as, some Way or other, the necessary Consequence of this *Grant*; if then it partake not of, but be totally inconsistent with, the Nature of *one* Sense of the *Grant*, it must, doubtless, be the necessary Consequence of the *other* Sense; that

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is, if we cannot be brought to believe that it is necessary to the Nature of a *Trust*, we must see that its inseparable Inference is *absolute Property*.

If, candid and honest Reader, you desire to possess the TRUTH, follow this Clue, and you will find it in fuller Lustre than a Pen can picture it. Among other Things, you will see, that if the Money in the Treasury, had been the private Property of the Crown, uncharged with any *Trust*, and the King had offered it to be applied by Act of Parliament to the public Service of discharging the national Debt, the rejected Preamble would, in every Phrase, have been as strong an Acknowledgment of his *private Right* in the Money, and of his Condescension in suffering it to come under a Parliamentary Disposal for the public Service, as the Dignity of the Crown and the Greatness of the Action could require. Read over the Preamble, and it will strike you — Should it then be admitted where the Money was *our own*? With what View was it so zealously pushed for? What Inferences would have been established had it succeeded? Should the same Form be made use of in the Application of *the People's Money*, which would have been sufficient had it been *the King's*? Is there, can there be, the least Shadow of a Reason for putting both on *the same* Footing? And must not such a Conduct effectually break down the Barrier of Distinction between them, and thereby give a Colour, an irremediable Pretext to some future bad Prince, or a rapacious Minister of *any Time*, for making use of that Confusion, and wasting the Money of the People as the absolute Property of the Crown?

One of the great Excellencies of a Parliamentary Constitution, its greatest under a good King, is this; that the Representatives of the People, coming together from all Quarters, after residing among their Constituents, and having every the best Opportunity of perfectly comprehending both THEIR Interests and THEIR Sentiments, and from hence being qualified, in the highest Degree, to represent both to their Sovereign, are considered as the GRAND COUNCIL of the Realm, whose Opinions and Advice carry the greatest Authority, and are generally, or rather always, the Source and Basis of those Laws, by which the Welfare of the People is promoted and secured. The King cannot, from his own mere Knowledge, be equally enabled, and the *only true* Method for his Information is, to listen to THEM. Now, it will be allowed, that, as the public Wealth is the Sinew, the Life, of every public Measure, there cannot come under the Deliberation of a Parliament, an Article more worthy their Attention, more essential to the public Happiness, than the proper Application of the public Wealth: One (among many) blessed Consequence therefore of the Doctrine before us

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is, the abridging the grand Council of the Realm, of all Power of acting as such, in the most important Article that can ever come before them; they may see the most salutary Purposes retarded, nay, the whole Nation on the Brink of Ruin, for Want of Aid from the PUBLIC TREASURE, yet must they not presume to offer to their Sovereign's Acceptance, the Sentiments that burn within them on the great Occasion, until they have obtained Leave from him for so doing; and for this, they must often break through a Crowd of Ministers; who have already apportioned among themselves this very Money, on which the Preservation of a PEOPLE may depend — And all for what? Because the King was before made a *Trustee* for the People, to expend this Money for *their Use*; or thus, because the King is *intrusted* to act for the Service of the People, therefore the People can have no Right to point out to him, by what Method this *Service* may best be answered.

The CONSIDERATIONS, indeed, obviate this Inconvenience by the only Method of doing it, by assuring us, in the 18th Page, that NO PART of the Community, BUT the King, can judge how the *public Service* may be promoted. His Words are, “If the Affirmative be true, [to wit, that the King is the *acting Trustee* for the People] his Majesty, under that constitutional *Trust* must be THE JUDGE of the *Occasion, the Time, and the Sum*; for he SOLELY has the executive Power, AND knows the various Exigences of Government, and which of them ought to have the Preference in the Application.” — And from hence, indeed, very *consistently*, he infers the Necessity of *previous Consent*. On such Tenets as these, it is manifest, it can only be founded.

I shall not detain you with any Observations on this Position, or its innumerable necessary Consequences. A Minute's Reflection will shew, that it takes away every the least Trace of Liberty out of our Constitution. Of what Nature must a Proceeding be, that cannot be supported without Recourse to such a Doctrine as this? And what Men must they be, what Designs must they have had, who, at infinite Pains and Expence, both endeavoured the Completion of the *Proceeding*, and openly avowed and propagated the *Doctrine*?

I think I promised to point out where this Author denied the Parliamentary Privilege of overhauling and censuring the public Accounts: This brings me to it. *Dionysius* has already convicted him, so that I shall dwell the less upon it. In the Paragraph I lately quoted from his 35th Page, all such Privileges are expressly cut off under the general Article of PUBLIC DELIBERATIONS; and here we have indeed a very consistent Reason for it; for, if the King be the only Judge of the Occasion, the
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Time, and the Sum, it is apparent that the Commons could not, without the greatest Absurdity, inquire into the Propriety of Accounts, which are supposed to be grounded upon his Authority, and directed by his Judgment; and to call for them for this Purpose, would be the Height of impudent Stupidity. And accordingly, he afterward tells us (as *Dionysius* has observed) that the public Accounts have been ever brought into Parliament, not as a Matter of *Right* to give Room for their *Censure*, but only as a *Direction*, to assist them in making *farther Grants*; that is, though they have not Capacities for *applying* Money, they are sagacious enough to *raise* it for those who have. Yet I really think he must, of Consequence, cut off also this Privilege; for a Parliament, in such a Case, would surely follow *infallible* Direction, and they may as well leave it to the same Infallibility to act entirely in their Stead.

To confirm this Sentiment, that the Parliament can have no *Right* to call for the public Accounts, and that they are laid before them only as a Matter of Assistance, he tells us in Page 44, That “The saying that this is public Money, being given by the Public, and therefore to be accounted for to them, is *unfair Reasoning*.” If I understand *English*, the plain Meaning of this Sentence is this, “It does not follow, because this Money was given by the Public, that therefore they have any *Right* to inquire into its Application.” He then proceeds to give his *Reason*, “Because the Public have once intrusted the Crown by the general Grant, therefore, while that *Trust* remains, the Disposition is in the Crown, subject always to the *Trust* upon which it was vested, for the Use of the Public.” He found himself obliged to *qualify* this Sentence a little, or it would have been very *consistent*; but, as it stands, this is the *Purport*; “The Crown is not to account for the public Money to the Public, *because* the Crown is *intrusted*; and the Disposition of this Money continues in the Crown, always subject to this *Trust*, and yet no Power on Earth shall inquire whether this *Trust* is adhered to or not.”

For a full Display of these and his other principal Fallacies, and a true Representation of all his mistated Facts, and, indeed, for the most lively Information in every Article belonging to this Affair, I refer my Reader to the inimitable Pamphlet from which I have taken my Motto.

What more shall I say? or what more is necessary to be said? Surely every Person, who thinks at all, will see, that the Proceeding of our ever glorious House of Commons in rejecting this newly introduced Form, left the Crown in full Possession of its ANCIENT RIGHT, of being the *constitutional Trustee* for the People, and of every Privilege consequent on that great and
honourable

honourable Relation; nay, it was a strong Declaration in Affirmance of this *Right*; for had the Crown not been a *Trustee*, the Preamble might, and must, have been admitted. He will see that, by the same noble and intrepid Step, they rescued the Nation from a parliamentary Acknowledgment of A DISCRETIONARY DOMINION IN THE CROWN, OVER THE PUBLIC TREASURY OF THIS KINGDOM.

Who they were that had the Advantages resulting from such an Acknowledgment in their Eye, may easily be imagined, by reflecting who they were that were so *assiduous* to obtain it; who FIRST imported the Doctrine? who solicited, who fawned, who bribed, who menaced, to promote it? Who stopped the public Commerce a whole Week, to gain Time for *Misrepresentation* on its Defeat, and gave the Rein to every Suggestion of disappointed Rage? But on this I need not dwell;

— Their DESIGNS
Are known to all Mycenæ; WHO, indeed,
WHO CAN HAVE GOOD ONES THAT CORRUPTS A PEOPLE?

It is humbly hoped, that from what has been said, an Answer instantly results to the Question so pompously produced by the ministerial Advocates, "Whether any, and what, new Power could accrue to the Crown from a parliamentary Acknowledgment of the Necessity of *previous Consent*?"

It is evident, that such an Acknowledgment would confer on the Crown a Power unconsentaneous with the Nature of a *Trust* for the public Service, and, in its necessary Consequence, invest it with an uncontrollable Sway over the Treasury of this Kingdom for ever-more. That such a Dominion is no Part of the Crown's *ancient Prerogative*, will, I presume, be hardly denied.

I shall detain you no longer on this Head; the concurring Arguments that pour in to the Illustration of Truth, have already employed me longer than I designed, and would do so still were I to indulge them. You will, on considering the Subject, find its Force increase on you every Moment, and with it your Admiration, that Men could be hardy or intoxicated enough to insult the Understandings of a Nation by attempting to disguise it. I have dwelled on this Topic the longer, because (as the VINDICATION observes) "the principal Argument drawn from Law and Reason is, undoubtedly, the Power of the Crown over the Revenue being but a *Trust for PUBLIC SERVICE*, and stands the foremost Objection to the Doctrine of *previous Consent*."

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With a few Words from the same excellent Writer, I shall close this Part of my Argument.

"A *private Interest* cannot, by the greatest Art, be extracted out of a *public Trust*; and, consequently, a *private Wrong* cannot grow, by the *Public* controuling the *Trust*, which was of its own Creation, and for its own Use."

"This seems to be undeniable. The Conclusion then drawn from the above Premises, *That when an Application shall be PROPOSED by any Power, the CONSENT of the Crown must be PREVIOUS thereto*, is absurd."

"Because, THE CROWN HATH BUT A TRUST FOR PUBLIC SERVICE."

A strong and pointed Epitome of all that can be said on this Subject, and worthy of a Place in the Head and Heart of every IRISH-MAN!

The same Author, and the REMARKS, have illustrated this Topic, with a Force and Perspicuity that must perpetuate them with Honour, while a Love of LIBERTY and TRUTH holds its Residence in the human Breast.

They have also gone minutely into all the Proceedings of Parliament that add Force to this Privilege of interfering where the public Money is concerned, and have shewn, to Demonstration, a constant Exertion of this *Right*, through a Series of Years, in calling for, inspecting, and censuring the Applications made of the public Money, under the general Trust of the Crown, and, where any Surplus has remained, after the public Exigencies were answered, in carrying over this Surplus, of their own mere Motion, to the Service of the ensuing Two Years, although the Money that composed this Surplus, had been before granted to the Crown for the public Service.

The Author of the CONSIDERATIONS is miserably offended at this; and, indeed, no Wonder, for it is an unlucky *Fact*. He won't allow that they *applied* the Surplus, but only carried it in their own Estimates to the Credit of the Nation, and so made the ensuing Grants the less. Few, I believe, will be satisfied with this Distinction; for, surely, it appears by this their repeated Conduct for many Years, that they have looked on themselves as entitled to meddle with the Money *before intrusted to the King*, without asking his Leave, or forbearing on a Possibility that he might have destined this Money for some important *secret Service*; they have entered into many successive PUBLIC DELIBERATIONS on this Money without *previous Consent*, they have passed solemn Resolutions in relation to it as the Money of the Public, and have, at different Times, reduced the national Debt, by making Use of such Surpluses, and giving Credit for them to THE NATION.

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The same Gentlemen have shewn a Variety of Instances, where the Commons have pointed out to the Crown such Methods, as seemed to them advisable for the Application of the public Money, that had before been intrusted to the Crown, and all without a Trace of *previous Consent*. That the late Bill amounted to any Thing more than an humble *pointing out*, nobody will affirm, as the King's Assent remained still in his own Hands; this Usage, therefore, is confirmatory of its Propriety in the highest Degree, and the same Doctrine that prohibits the *bringing in a Bill*, must also inevitably prohibit an *Address*, pointing out any Application of the public Money, without Leave first had from the Crown.

The CONSIDERATIONS have not shewn, why the Commons have always thus presumed to *address* without *Leave*, but they insist much on the *humble Stile* of these Addresses, and infer from thence, that the Crown has *the Right* of Application; *i. e.* the *sole, absolute*, and uncontrollable Right of Application; in this Sense evidently would he represent it. A good Plea would my *Agent* have for claiming a Property in my Money, because I might have desired that he would *please* to pay such and such Sums, and I should be *much obliged* to him! A *royal Agent* may surely claim a still farther Addition of Complaisance; the Sublimity of his Station sufficiently authorizes and supports the Change, without having Recourse to a Change of Nature in the Subject.

I would ask this Author whether, supposing that an Address from the Commons, recommending a salutary Application of the public Money, should, at any time, through the fraudulent Designs of some of the Royal Ministers, be rejected by the Crown, the Commons, in such a Case, have not a constitutional Redress against all such Ministers, and every other Person, who might have advised or assisted in the Rejection of their Advice? If the Affirmative be true, many Consequences will follow, not very agreeable to his Doctrine; and, among the rest, this, that, be the *Stile* of such Addresses ever so respectful, it confers no Power on the Crown, but that which, by the Nature of a FREE CONSTITUTION, it enjoys; *the Power of acting as an ACCOUNTABLE TRUSTEE for the People.*

Many things occur in the same Author's first and second Performance, that, had I Leisure and Room, I might, perhaps, however unnecessary, be tempted to speak to. Every Reader has observed how he has left the VINDICATION in full Possession of all the principal Arguments, and modestly forbears to return to those untenable lurking Holes, from whence his too powerful Adversary had driven him.

One Circumstance I must mention, as a Specimen of his deplorable Condition: He had, in the CONSIDERATIONS, produced an Instance of *previous Consent*, being mentioned to the House by a Minister of the Crown, in relation to Lord Bolingbroke's Forfeitures. To overset this Attempt at a Precedent, the *Vindicator* quotes the Act of *Resumption*, and the Act for encouraging Seamen; both infinitely stronger, especially the latter; yet, who would think it? This Author, in his Reply, assures us, *they* are nothing to the Purpose, however *his own* may be: And why? Because they are not exactly parallel; because they did not relate to the national Debt: Nay, he condescends to grow facetious on the Occasion, and throws the *Vindicator* into a terrible *Dilemma*. I need not point out to the Reader how powerfully these two last quoted Precedents operate as Arguments *a fortiori*: Surely if the King's *previous Consent* be not necessary where his *acknowledged* Right is concerned, it cannot be deemed necessary where the Right is, by no means, an *acknowledged one*. But, as to the *Considerer's* Precedent, we do not find, by that, or the others he produces, that the Necessity of this *previous Consent* was *solemnly acknowledged* in the Acts of Parliament. If so, they are nothing to our Point, which solely relates to a *Parliamentary Acknowledgment*: For every one may see, that a Servant of the Crown, out of his Zeal for enhancing the Dignity of its Appearance, may, at any time, usher in a majestic Form of Words, which the rest of the House never intended to acknowledge a *Necessity* for; and without such an Acknowledgment, the Act of *one Person*, and he a Minister, will not, it is hoped, be deemed a Foundation for *Prerogative*, or be any Kind of Proof that the Crown's *previous Consent* is, on all such Occasions, CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY. By the same Way of arguing, he might have at once determined the present Matter of Contest, by producing, as a decisive *Precedent*, the L—L—'s Speech, wherein the like *Condescension* is promulgated to the People of *Ireland*: Or, indeed, he may, at any Time, establish any Right in the Crown by the officious Expressions of its Servants.

One Instance more of this ingenious Gentleman's Powers in Argumentation, which just now occurred to me, I must mention: In his Reply he tells us, That "the Act for laying Taxes on Pensions granted by the King, brought in by the Commons *without previous Consent*, and passed in 1703, was a strong Affirmance of his *Right* of granting them."—I should despair of a School-boy, who could be convinced, or hoped to convince another, by such wretched Jargon. The meanest Capacity will instantly perceive, that the royal *Power* of granting Pensions out of the public Money, is but a Branch of the *Trust*

for *public Service*, intended to reward and encourage Merit for *the public Weal*; where *this great End* is not promoted for want of adequate Merit in the Persons, such Pensions are a Deviation from That TRUST, and the public Money is so far wasted; This was the Case in this Session, and the Commons accordingly, after solemn Inquiries, and solemn Censures, on such Grants, proceeded to bring in a Bill for taxing them, *i. e.* for reducing them; which Bill, though it took its Rise from an Exertion of the King's Power of granting Pensions, yet was the strongest Denial of his *Right* of granting them in these particular Circumstances, and the strongest Demonstration that they knew themselves entitled to controul him in the Exercise of this Power, and restrain him to the Conditions of his *Trust*, on which alone he had a *Right* to exert it, to wit, the Advancement of the PUBLIC SERVICE.

But it is needless to enter into farther Particulars. The VINDICATION stands on Record the Terror of the Party and its Doctrines, and has left but little Room for any additional Confutation. A Work that was not to be forgiven! The only Argument that remained was that of *Power*; though THE PEOPLE could not be deceived, *their FRIENDS* could be punished, and, to strip the Author of his Employment, proved to Demonstration that he was on the *wrong* Side of the Question.

As to the CONSIDERATIONS, I shall only add, that as they have already been adjudged, in every private Opinion, to be as scandalous and slavish a Libel against Truth, Liberty, and our Constitution, as ever dishonoured the Press; so, had the House of Commons, *that GRAND BASIS* of our national Felicity, been permitted to meet, they would, doubtless, have condemned it to the same ignominious Censure, which Books of less Demerit have frequently met with among us, as well as in *England*.

As to the lesser Pamphlets, they are almost all, as I have observed before, transcribed from this; many Persons stood, with Pen in Hand, and Hearts full of Zeal, waiting for the Cue to proceed on, and, when *this* came out under the Stamp of AUTHORITY, to Work they fell; every one striving, according to his Abilities, to make his own Work look as *different* as possible from the Original. Let my Reader reduce their Words into some determinate Meaning as far as he can, and he will see the Truth of this Assertion; in some the Phrase is swell'd, in others, very unaffectedly, lowered; in some, thickly mixed with Abuse, in others, dash'd with Solemnity; but, in ALL, the Burden of the Song is, *The King's Consent is PREVIOUSLY necessary, because he is the TRUSTEE of the People*.

One or two, either through the Heat of Dullness, or Design, tells the Public in plain Terms, that the Commons wanted to dispose

of the Treasury Money without allowing the King any Share of Concurrence at all. I believe this must be downright Ignorance, for it could not be expected, that the meanest Person in the Community could be imposed on by so gross a Fallacy; for all the World knows it was to have been disposed of by *Act of Parliament*, which cannot exist without the King's Assent, that the Bill for this Purpose was brought in and passed by the House of Commons, and that its being afterward rejected by them, was entirely owing to a Clause put into it on the other Side of the Water, which imported, that the Consent of the Crown was necessary, before the Representatives of the People could *bring in a Bill* for the Application of the People's Money.

A few others, for the sake of diversifying the Argument, have ventured to affirm, that the whole Dispute has been about nothing but *Forms* and *Ceremonies*, or *Words* and *Compliments*. If *these* had no Kind of *Meaning* or *Tendency*, nor contained any *Acknowledgment*, then they are but empty *Sounds*, or absolute *Nothings*; and in such a Case, I fancy, the Odium will fall heavier where these Gentlemen would not chuse; for, though none but Children would squabble for *Nothings*, yet they must be *malicious* and *ill-minded* Children, who could give a mortal *Stab* for being disappointed of a *Gew-gaw*. But if *Forms* and *Ceremonies* contain an *Acknowledgment*, and such *Acknowledgment* intimately affect the public Happiness, it then becomes a Contest about *something*, and on the Merits of that *Acknowledgment* is the Conduct of the contending Parties to be try'd.

Were these *Forms* introduced for *no Purpose*, with no *Meaning*, no *Tendency*? Were they made the grand Business of a whole Ad—n, was every Head at Work to promote them, and all the Threats, the Donations, the Promises, the open *Purchases*, that Power and Wealth could afford, made use of to obtain a PARLIAMENTARY ESTABLISHMENT of those *Forms*, and all for *nothing*?

Something this Way *the Case fairly stated* seems to run; little superior, but in Phrase, to *the Letter to the Public*. It would insinuate, that, on the Face of the inserted Clause, there appears nothing but a *Compliment* to the Crown, which, in its Consequence, could never affect the People, however necessary to the Royal Dignity. It is not easy to conceive how a Matter can be of so great Concern to one Branch of our Constitution, and yet be quite nugatory to the others; for, if it be insisted on as Part of the King's Prerogative, it becomes highly incumbent on the People to see that *it is so*, and not to *acknowledge* it, but on the strongest Conviction of its Certainty and Propriety. To get over this, however, he gives us to understand, that

that the Insertion of the Clause, by no Means, inferred a *Necessity* for the *previous Consent* recited in it, and that the Meaning of it can, by fair Interpretation, only amount to a previous Declaration of the King, that he *would* consent when the Bill should be *afterward* offered to him.

I leave it to every Man, who understands the obvious Force of the *English* Language, whether the Words of that Clause do not plainly declare, that such previous Consent was not only obtained for the framing of that Act, but also, that it was *necessary* to be so obtained. Let my Reader throw his Eye over the Preamble of the Bill, which is always the *Foundation* of the enacting Part, and he will see the *previous Consent* is made a material Article of it; it is coupled to the *WHEREAS*, which runs through the whole, and, upon the *Strength* and *Ground-work* of it, it is, that the Parliament *humbly pray that it be enacted*, &c. It is not possible for Words to be more clear and expressive of the *NECESSITY* of the Clause to the *bringing in of the Bill*. But grant him his Distinction, and what does it avail him? If the Form was not *necessary* to the *Prerogative*, accumulated Odium reflects on those to whom he would recommend himself; if he affirms that it *was*, then is the Dispute where it was before; for surely, it comes exactly to the same Thing, whether such a previous *Promise* of consenting to the Bill, when framed, should be *necessary*, or that the *Consent* to the framing of it should be previously *necessary*; a Moment's Attention will shew the two Phrases to be, in every Instance, precisely of the same Amount.

But on such wretched Quibbles it were needless to dwell; the *CONSIDERATIONS* are the avowed Maxims of the Party, and they openly promulge it, as the Rule of their Conduct, and the Basis of their Doctrines, that the King's Consent is *NECESSARY*, *previous* to any public *Deliberations* on the Application of the public Money, that he had before been intrusted with for the public Use. The Assertion, it is true, is an hardy one, but a shuffling Phrase will mend it but little; in such this *fair stated Case* abounds, and is, indeed, but a weak Attempt at softening the Procedure of its Patrons, and the Sentiments made public by their Advocates in order to support it, against which the popular Clamour had raised itself with additional Resentment. A studied Fulness of Periods, a careful Latitude in Terms, and an affected Shew of Moderation, are his Instruments for this Purpose, and constitute the Sum total of his Excellence.

Had this Pamphlet met with any extraordinary Share of the public Favour, I should perhaps dwell longer on exposing its Fallacies; but as that is not the Case, and the same one Rule will

will be sufficient to detect the Sophistry of this, and all the other minor Productions on this Topic, I shall do no more than apply this Rule to that Form of Words which runs pretty much alike through them all, and which they seem to expect may pass for an Argument. It is this, *That as the King has a SEPARATE RIGHT of applying the unappropriated public Money, to such public Uses as he, in his great Wisdom, should think proper, it seems highly reasonable, that, when any of this Money is to be applied by an Act of Parliament, his Consent should be given PREVIOUS to the bringing in a Bill for that Purpose.*

Let the candid Reader sift this for a Moment, and reduce it into a precise and legal Meaning, and, I am sure, he must find it amount exactly to the same Proposition which we have been hitherto considering; to wit, *That, because the King is the Constitutional TRUSTEE for the laying out the Money of the People for their Use, and accountable to them for the Manner in which he discharges this TRUST, therefore his Consent should be obtained, before the People can even PROPOSE to him, for his Acceptance, a Bill for the Application of their own Money to their own Service.* The former Phrase is but a glittering Dress for this Absurdity, rendered less disgusting by the Addition of *separate Right*; but every intelligent Person will give these Words no more than their intrinsic Value: They seem to mean, that such *Right* is *absolute* and *uncontroulable*: If it were, I grant the Consequence very just; but in OUR Constitution, in a FREE one, they must never imply more than that the King is, by the Nature of his Station, the Person who is to *manage* the Money of the People for their Use, and to *account* to them for this *Management*. The only Sense in which the Word *Right* can be applied, on this Occasion, is this, *That, by his Position in the Frame of our Constitution, as he is the fittest, so is he intitled to be, the Trustee for them, who cannot be always assembled to watch a Vicissitude of Occasions, and consult for themselves; he can act separately from them in no other Sense but as every Trustee may and must, when they, who have the PROPERTY, are not on the Spot; still subject, when they meet, to their Scrutiny, Censure, and Direction.* But as a *separate Right* carries, in its common Acceptation, the Idea of a discretionary, unlimited Power, and gives an inadvertent Reader to understand, that the King may do *just as he pleases* with the public Treasure, it was the most adviseable Phrase for this Author, and his Compeers, to build their System on; and, indeed, in *this* Sense, it is the only Basis that can support it.

Sometimes we have the same Sentiment in Words like these:
 "The King had a *Right* to pay off the national Debt by himself.
 "as he has accordingly done; and, consequently, when he
 "permitted

“permitted the Parliament to have a Share in the Transaction, “it was but reasonable that his *previous Consent* should be acknowledged.” The first Proposition may admit of much to be said on it. I am not Lawyer enough to ascertain, how far it was necessary to pay off a Debt, contracted on the Faith of Parliament, by a *joint Act* of all the same Branches of our Constitution, or, if any Creditors should be hardy enough to refuse their Money from any Authority but *that* under which they borrowed it, and, in Consequence thereof, have their Interest stopped, how far a future Parliament may, with Justice and Propriety, espouse and vindicate such Refusal. On such arduous Points I will not venture to pronounce; and it becomes less necessary, as we have heard no Objection to the Thing being done by *Act of Parliament*; from whence we may conclude, that it was judged, at least, the *most adviseable* Form. But this I will rely on, as a *constitutional Truth*, that no Power, or Person, on Earth can say, with Propriety, that the Crown had or has a *Right* to apply the public Money to this, or that, or any other particular Use, excepting only THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED. Until THEIR Decision be passed, all such Applications remain quite uncertain and undetermined, as to their Legality: For these Applications can be made only under the *general Trust* reposed in the Crown for *public Service*; and who is to ascertain, whether this *Trust* has been adhered to in such Applications, or whether every such Application be made for the *public Service*, in pursuance of that *Trust*? Surely, indubitably, the Representatives of THE PEOPLE, for whose Benefit the Trust was reposed; the *private* Opinion of any Person must, in such Case, operate no farther than himself, and can never be introduced, as a Proposition, into Argument, and be made the Basis of a political Conclusion; the Approbation of this GREAT BODY can alone determine the Merit, and affix the Stamp of Legality to every particular Exertion of the Royal Trust in the Application of the Money of the People.

The *acknowledged Principle*, therefore, as the *Fair Stater*, with much Modesty, terms it, and on which he builds his Doctrine, is not a Particle sounder than as it stands in the *Original*: For, THE RIGHT of judging of the *Time*, the *Occasion*, and the *Sum*, seems to be *definitively* lodged in the People's Representatives, and not in the Crown, which can never pretend to more than a Right of judging on these Heads as a *Trustee*. While such *Right* is attended with real Love for the People's Welfare, and every particular Exertion of it calculated solely for that great End (as under our present most Excellent Sovereign, blessed be God, it has ever been) there can be no Danger of any material

material Error: But, surely, for common Safety, we must be assured, that it *has been so*; and that can only be by a Parliamentary Inquiry. The Propriety of every Application must depend on the *Time*, the *Occasion*, and the *Sum*; of all these Particulars, the Representatives of the People must therefore be allowed THE RIGHT of judging.

Every one, in his Conscience, must rest satisfied, that the public Money could not be *better* applied, than in paying off the public Debt; and it being the very Purpose intended by the rejected Bill, shews that it was the universal Sense of the Nation: But, as I have said, whether it can *properly* be done *under the general Trust of the Crown*, none but the Parliament can determine; and supposing it certainly *could*, what does it prove? Nothing, but what has been ever acknowledged, *That the King has a TRUST for the Use of the People, and that this is one, among many Instances, of his exerting it.*

To have omitted the Acknowledgment of *previous Consent*, would not, as the same Gentleman infers, have, in any Sort, precluded the King from acting in *that* separate Capacity which he *really* has by our Constitution: For, surely, the *Royal Trust* could never have been hurted, by his being made a *joint* and an *equal* Actor in the Disposition of the public Treasure; and to have made him a *distinct* and a *superior* one, would not, as I believe has been shewn, have been necessary to that *Trust*, consistent with the People's Privileges, or consonant to the Parliamentary Right, enjoyed through a Course of Years, of pointing out Applications, and punishing Misapplications, of the Money raised by themselves out of the Pockets of the People.

The first exactly parallel Instance of 1749, is a Precedent not to be got over: The Concession of 1751, however injudicious, was attended with every Circumstance that can destroy its Force as a Precedent, and hurts not all. It took its Rise from the same Principle that produced all the unparalleled Moderation of the Majority in that Session; from the warmest Inclinations to Harmony, a Hope that an Attack so unpopular, so unconstitutional, could not long subsist, and a Fear of the Consequence of Misrepresentations, in a Matter where *Prerogative* was pretended to be concerned. Every Measure, every Instance, demonstrates these, their truly Patriot Apprehensions, at that Time; they presented an unusual Address, solely to obviate them; and though they would not make the *Acknowledgment* required, an *Act of their own*, an Unwillingness to distract their Country, induced them to acquiesce under the Insertion made in their Names, on the other Side of the Water.

But now, thanks be to God, and the Defenders of our Liberties, we have a BASIS for that Privilege which, as a FREE PEOP-

PLE; we inherit; *the Right of Interposition in the Disposal of our public Treasure*; a Basis that, on any future Occasion, where this great Principle may intervene, must be regarded by every Lover of *IRELAND*, as great in its Consequences, and inestimable in its Value. We have had the whole of the Doctrine most thoroughly canvassed, every Argument minutely discussed, the Merits of the Question made plain to the whole Community, and, as the Result of all, a solemn DETERMINATION in Behalf of the People, which, while they retain a Care for their COUNTRY, they can never surely be brought to part with.

I shall add no more on *previous Consent*; I have been led farther already than I at first intended, and farther than was necessary, as I am convinced, that every Man, who dares to see with his own Eyes, must plainly discover the Purport and Tendency of this Doctrine, and the Design of its Introduction, and that, without any Assistance beyond a fair Display of the Truth; he must see, that it was intended as a Snare, to extort a Parliamentary Acknowledgment of an unlimited absolute Power in the Crown, over all Monies in the Receipt of the *Irish* Treasury: That an Administration was employed to effect it, highly qualified for the Purpose in every Circumstance, and, especially, in its close Connections with those, whose Station necessarily confers an extensive Share of Influence in this Kingdom, and whose private Ambition built all its Hopes on the temporary Assistance of such Patrons: That, to invest this beneficial Right, *every Means* was employed, and, on its unexpected Failure, the basest Misrepresentations have been too successfully put in Practice, against the truest and most affectionate Servants that ever King could boast of.

One thing must be ever remembered, that, as under the present Administration this modern Branch of Prerogative was first introduced, so was the rejected Clause inserted in *England*, by the Promotion, and at the Instance of our G—r, as may be seen by the Letter from the Privy Council there, on the Return of the altered Bill; a Circumstance that bespeaks the Project not so *deeply* laid as some have apprehended; the whole of it seems the Work of our *domestic Friends*, animated by the Concurrence of temporary Visitors; by *Misrepresentation* it is plain this pernicious Clause was inserted, and on *Misrepresentation* is built their every Measure and their Hope of Success. This is, surely, a chearing Reflection; it shews the national Interests of our Parent Island to be utterly unconcerned in the Scheme, and, consequently, our Safety and our Freedom to depend entirely on ourselves.

We

We of this Island should be ever most careful of admitting any Innovations in any Part of our public Proceedings; Concessions will always bear hard upon us, and be very difficult, if possible, to retrieve. We see how the Acquiescence of 1751 has been raised against us as a *Precedent*, notwithstanding all the combating Strength of Reason, our Constitution, and Usage almost immemorial. We have not, as an ingenious Writer expresses it, the *Principles* of a Constitution in *ourselves*, but derive them all as a *Branch* from the *English Stock*; *Redress* must therefore be to us an arduous Task, and *Prevention* our safest Dependence. As this Peculiarity is the weak Part of our Constitution, against it will every un-national Design be played, and our Circumspection should be always proportionably vigilant.

This important Maxim was the Foundation of the Rejection of the Clause; and, indeed, considering the whole Tenor of the Conduct pursued by those who so violently pushed its Establishment, there remained no room to doubt, that every Consequence which could, in any Sort, be drawn from it, beneficial to the Projectors, however unfriendly to the Interests of this Island, would infallibly be indulged in its fullest Scope. For, I imagine, that a commonly-attentive View of their Measures, must shew such a striking Similarity of Principle running through the whole, as, at once, to decide the Question I at first proposed; to wit, whether they can be reasonably supposed to have acted all along on a pure Desire of promoting the Welfare of *IRELAND*, or to have been actuated by an Ambition, of elevating some few Individuals to a Height of Dominion over us, which, by a NATIONAL and POPULAR Course of Proceedings, they could never hope to obtain.

And, indeed, the Wonder does, by no Means, lie in the last Supposition, however miraculous the former must appear: For, consider the *leading Persons* engaged, and what else could be expected? When did we see or hear of a Set of Men, some of them without a Particle of Property in the Kingdom, invested only with a temporary Authority; others, from their Nature, their Connections, and all their antecedent Conduct, demonstrably at the Beck of any Power that would lend them a Hand to that Advancement, for which they had been, for many Years, so ineffectually labouring; the joint Body acting under an extraneous Direction, and openly propagating their Schemes, by the lowest and most corrupt of Means. — When did we ever hear of *such* a Combination being actuated by the noble Motive of promoting the Interests of the People they came among, and forcing upon them a System of Happiness, which the whole

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Body

Body of that People was stupid enough not to see in such a Light, and so perverse as to refuse?

I shall not detain you longer, by going into the many other Branches of the same Ad——n; nor is it at all strange, that they, who so violently espoused a bad Servant of the Public, in his Embezzlement of their Money, should, afterward, throw out the Bill, brought in by the concurrent Voice of the Nation, to oblige him to *Restitution*; the common Act of Justice toward those who had been the Sufferers by the Fraud. — And, I believe, it will not appear more wonderful, that Persons conscious of their own Male-conduct, and afraid of a national Animadversion, should, for their own Sakes, prorogue the Parliament, although the most useful, salutary, and much wanted Laws, that were then ripe for Introduction, Laws, that would have added Life and Spirit to our Arts, Manufactures, Agriculture, and Improvements, should, thereby, fall to the Ground, and their Benefits be lost to the People; while others, on which the Security of our Properties, and the Advancement of our Religion, and our Interests, essentially depended, and by which they had long been signally promoted, were suffered to expire.

I have little more to add, than to observe, that, as under the Providence of GOD, the most dangerous Attack we have ever, in this way, experienced, has been gloriously baffled, so it can only be our own Fault, if it should ever hereafter succeed. We are still a FREE PEOPLE, and supported by a FREE PEOPLE; a People who, from the liberal Turn of their Nature and their Policy, as well as a true Regard for their own Interests, must ever wish well to our Liberties and Immunities. We have nothing to fear, but among *ourselves*. We are in the Hands of those who *represent us*; the present and future Happiness of *Ireland* depends on *their* Behaviour, and *that*, in the greatest Degree, on the Spirit of the People. Nothing, then, can save us, but our inviolably adhering, in Case of a general *Dissolution*, or particular Vacancies, to those, on whose Integrity we have the highest human Certainty for depending. They, who have already stood firm against the Storm, claim, in the first Rank, our Confidence and Services: A higher Test we cannot expect, nor need we desire; and, when the Merit of the *red List* ceases to draw our liveliest Gratitude and Esteem, PUBLIC SPIRIT must be vanished, and *Ireland* on the Brink of *Dissolution*.

Many there are, I doubt not, on the other Side, who wish for an Occasion of atoning to their Country, and shewing, that their Error was not built on a bad *Intention*, however destructive in its Consequences. To *such* the Door lies ever open to a Reconciliation; but on no Footing but one as certain as their

their Transgression. We *know* they have done Wrong, and we owe it to ourselves, and our Posterity, to be *as well* assured of their doing right, which can only be by *Experience*; the Crisis is too important for our believing on Assurances.

We should be the more careful on this Head, as all the Writings, since the grand unpopular Attempt, have been plainly calculated to break down the Distinction between the *Black* and the *Red*; to diminish our Gratitude to our Preservers, and our Resentment against our Betrayers. This, indeed, is treating us with all that implied Contempt, which runs through every Article of their Conduct; to expect that we shall forget substantial Blessings, which every Hour we feel, on the Strength of juridical Quibbles, and the chimerical Produce of byassed Imaginations. For my own Part, and, I believe, the Sentiment is pretty universal, I look on it as a DUTY, an indispensable Duty to my COUNTRY, to perpetuate the Merit of its Protectors: For this Reason, do I preserve the *distinguishing Lists*, with a Care proportionable to my Sense of the *Occasion*, and shall transmit them, as a valuable Record, to Posterity, who will never cease to look, with Veneration, on every worthy Name, while they shudder at the Reflexion on those Evils, from which they have been preserved.

My Countrymen should also guard against the Approach of Despondency and Irresolution, at this particular Juncture: It is true, there have been Changes that no one expected to see; the *best-loved* Man in the Kingdom, the Darling of THE PEOPLE, and BEST FRIEND to his Sovereign, is displaced, and *others* have aspired to one Point of the long wished-for Grandeur: But let us not *despair*; the *Vox Populi* must at last be heard, however, for a while, precluded from the Royal Ear: While *that* remains unanimous and uncorrupted, there is the greatest room for *Hope*; it ever had, and ever will have, a mighty Influence over political Counsels; and, though treated by some of our late ministerial Advocates, as capable of no Interpretation but *the Huzza of a MOB*, yet is it a formidable Cloud over the Enjoyment of their Wishes, as, indeed, it ever has been in these Dominions, where such unnatural and unpopular Measures have been pursued. — The King may, at any time, dismiss his Servants; but let the People judge for themselves, adhere firmly to their FRIENDS, and public Happiness still stands secure; nor should *Regret* be permitted to slide into *Despair*, when the *Occasion* promises, in its very Nature, to be but *temporary*.

My Sentiments thus thrown together, just as they occurred, you have, my Friend, my Leave to publish, if you chuse it. As
my

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my Name will be reserved, so am I free from the Apprehensions that attend the invidious Light of a *Writer*; for no other Reason, indeed, would I desire to be concealed, as I am not conscious of unconstitutional Assertions, or personal *Scurrility*. Here I must do Justice to the *Country* Writers in observing, that, in all their Productions, I have seen the Odium of all bad Measures has been thrown only on *the Authors*: Our excellent Sovereign has been ever particularly exempted from every the least Share; nor have I met with an Expression, inconsistent with that Duty and Respect, so eminently due to so good a Prince, and which may be ever expected from Subjects so affectionate and inviolable, as those of *Ireland* have ever been.

For my own Part, as I know him too well to think, I should also be most vilely ungrateful to insinuate, that he hath, through the Course of these Revolutions, acted on any Motive, but the most upright Intentions, for the Welfare of his People: I was so happy as to serve near his Royal Person for many of my younger Years; and I know him, by repeated Demonstration, to be ONE OF THE HONESTEST OF MEN, to have a most PATERNAL AFFECTION for all his Subjects, and as high a Pleasure in their constitutional Liberty, with as fervent a Desire for the Preservation of it, as they can have themselves. His repeated Goodness and Favours, crowned by a beneficent Grant of a lucrative and genteel Employment, call on me to make this Declaration, at the same time that they make it most pleasing to me to do so. And yet what human Qualities, however great and excellent, can be Proof against the Fallacy of MISREPRESENTATION!

As to private Calumny, I can, I think, with equal Justice, vindicate them also on that Head; indeed they have been sometimes too *personal*, in relation to one great Man, and, in Heat of Resentment, for his being so largely concerned in our Divisions, have been tempted to give into an Opinion, for which there never yet has been, as I can find, an adequate Demonstration. There seems, indeed, to be an Obstinacy of Perseverance, in suspicious Circumstances, that shews a perfect Tranquillity of Mind under the Accusation, and a total Indifference about the Opinion of the World; how far this may go in breaking down the Barrier against the Guilt, I leave the Casuists to determine. But this is certain, that a Man never yet made himself eminently odious in his public Character, who did not feel every private Foible exposed in Retaliation.

On the other Side, there are, indeed, a Multitude of scandalous Invectives, though happily no room afforded for such detestable

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detestable Insinuations. One or two of their Penmen seem uncommonly dextrous at this Work; but the *Candid Inquirer* must be allowed the Palm. I find him again, lately, in another Disguise, in which he gives his Adversaries the *finishing Stroke*. For God's Sake, why don't they do something for this poor Man? It would be a real Charity to the Public.

If you do expose this Letter, assure the good-natured Reader from me, that I have written it with a Heart full of the warmest and purest Inclinations for the Welfare of my Country, and, as it is pretty apparent, a Mind drawn off from an adequate Attention by a Vicissitude of interesting Circumstances.

I am,

Dear SIR,

May 27th,
1754.

With much Truth,

Yours, &c.

E R R A T A.

PAGE 5. Line 41. *for* a good good while, *read* a good while. — P. 39. L. 34. *for* but as every Trustee, *read* than as every Trustee. — P. 41. L. 32. *for* not all, *read* not at all. — P. 43. L. 28. *for* a Height, *read* an Height. — P. 46. L. 6. Take the Comma from after the Word *Productions*, and put it after *seen*. — P. *ib.* L. 36. Dele the Comma after *Perseverance*.

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