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By a *LOVER* of *Britain*.




L O N D O N: Printed in the Year, 1718.

AMPHLETS BY E. M. M. M. M.

HOT TUB

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IN such extraordinary Cafes as this, 'tis usual to find Abundance of People passing their Judgment, some on one Side, some on another; and which is worse, they generally do this without troubling themselves to search into the Circumstances and Merit of the Cause, but talking just as their Parties and Prejudices guide them.

The present Affair has made a great Noise in the World, and every body is busy, *as I have observed*, passing their Judgment upon it; disputing, writing Pamphlets: And, in a word, the Politicians are exceedingly taken up about it.

Among the Crowd of Pamphlets written on this Occasion, some deserve indeed to be taken notice of; particularly, there are some which seem to abound in Sense, and give good Turns to their Expressions, charming their Readers with fine Words; but they spoil all, by assuming to themselves the Determining and Deciding the Controversy, as if they were Judges Delegates in the Cause, who were to pass Sentence without Appeal. What Pity is it, that such arrogant Gentlemen did not give us a System of the Law of Nations, of their own framing, which might be the Standard of Judgment in this Case.

Grotius and *Puffendorf* speak with Caution in Cafes so nice as these; but these Men take upon them to ascertain what those in Modesty left doubtful, and to advance new Maxims in the Government of the World, which the Ages past never understood.

They ought farther to explain themselves, and not reserve the Reasons of their Opinions *in Petto*, and leave the World to examine them without due Helps to solve the Objections which occur from them;

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and therefore we must acknowledge they seem to leave the Question as obscure as they found it.

I dare not decide the Facts, as these Men do, in the Case before us; it is the Business of Sovereign Princes, who are indeed more nearly concerned in it, and who proceed often in such Cases by Methods not so easy to judge of as some think: The Circumstances, the Conjunctions, the Reasons, the Interests, that present to them, are various, and are visible in their Privy-Councils only; not to be judged at without Doors. The Kings of England and Sweden are Great Princes; if the one enjoys the bright Side of the World, and has the Glory of a rising Fortune; the other has the Lustre of an acquired Glory, which makes him justly admired even by his Enemies, and honoured by the whole World. Such Princes command our Regard, and cannot be spoken of with too much Respect.

I shall not therefore meddle with what these mighty Princes have done, or shall think fit to do in this Case, on one Side or other; but shall sum up the Judgment which the wisest Men here make of the Maxims published on one Side, or another, in the Printed Books and Pamphlets which we see upon the Subject.

Among these, we see here one very remarkable Pamphlet, call'd, *A Letter from Mr. N. N. to a French Gentleman*, upon this Affair, which deserves our first Notice; and in which they observe how the Author dresses up a Man of Straw, and then fights with him most manfully.

The first thing he goes about, is to establish a Thesis which no body ever deny'd, viz. That a Sovereign Prince may seize the Person of an Ambassador, without the Impeachment of the Law of Nations, or of the sacred Privilege of his Character.

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The greatest Civilians who have written on this Subject, grant this; but then they very carefully annex to it the Limitations necessary to the Point; by which, tho' the thing it self be allowed, the Law of Nations, and the Liberty of Ambassadors is made impregnable, and fortified even by the very thing which these Men bring to weaken and undermine it.

This Limitation is, that this Rigour may not be used against a foreign Minister, except where the Danger to the Sovereign, and to his Government, is so imminent and evident, as that the said Sovereign or Government cannot be otherwise preserved.

In all Arguments of this kind this is a Maxim, that the Exception is a Part of the Rule it self, and both are of equal Force and Extent.

And as the Author acknowledges this Limitation, he might even as well have owned, that no prudent Prince will ever do it; for his Words are the same thing in Effect. *Grotius* himself also confesses, that it is not sufficient to a Prince, that he has been ill treated by any foreign Minister, that he must do himself Justice, or that he thinks the Circumstances require it; but the only Reason that can justify such Measures, is his own especial Preservation; and that, as above, the Danger is so evident, that no other Method can be found out to prevent it.

Wiquefort writing at large in the Case of Bishop *Lesly*, says, so much Deference is due to the Prince whose Ambassador offends in this Manner, as first to acquaint the said Prince with what his Minister is accused. The Reason he gives, is this: That if Princes are at Liberty to proceed otherwise against the Ministers of foreign Powers, no publick Minister would be safe; for, as on one Hand, powerful Princes would always be at Liberty to insult the Ambassadors of others; so those Princes who were not able to protect their Ambassadors, would never be well served.

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Thus if these Writers establish the Rule with one Hand, they so fortify the Exception also, as that it overthrows all that they bring the Rule to support.

But this Author has the Assurance to advance the Rule without the Exception, and has thereby detected himself both of Folly and Fraud; for he concludes right or wrong, that Count *Gyllemburg* might be Arrested, and runs out into a long Flourish to soften the Violence used with him; but brings not any one Part of the Charge down to the Point, *viz.* To prove in the Terms of the Exception, that there has been any such unavoidable Necessity.

Is the Court of *England* ignorant of the Affairs of *Sweden*? Would the *British* Minister at *Stockholm* fail to give them an Account of Things? He neither wanted Opportunity to do it, nor Ill-Will to *Sweden*, to prompt him. The Preparations for such a Design as was pretended, must naturally be made at *Gottenberg*; that Port was open all the Winter, both to the *English* and *Dutch* Merchants: How come it to pass, they carried no Account of it? Their Masters and Seamen were without fail strictly examined when they came; What Account did they give of any Fleet fitting out? On the other Hand, was there any other Ships fitting out there, than a few small Capers? Where were the vast Number of Transports with the Men of War that must have been wanted for such an Expedition? King *William*, in his Expedition into *England*, tho' he had but 12000 Men with him, was obliged to have 600 Transport Ships, besides near 60 Men of War, notwithstanding the Shortness of the Voyage. There could not have been fewer wanting here, where the Voyage was three Times as far; and could such a Preparation be made without Noise? Again, where were the *Danes*, the inveterate Enemies of *Sweden*: And who are the constant Spies over their Motions, especially in *Schonen*? Were they asleep all this while, they that have given so many false Alarms,

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Alarms, and charged the *Swedes* with so many Projects, which the *Swedes* themselves never thought of: how come, that they did not give the Alarm? as to be sure they would have done, if there had been the least Appearance.

Let us go to the Letters which they pretended to intercept from *Schonen*, and which they published at *Copenhagen*. Let those Letters be true or false, I do not enquire; but they are so far from furnishing the least Appearance of such a Design, that indeed they prove the contrary, and particularly, that the *Swedish* Troops were quietly dispersed all over the Kingdom in their ordinary Quarters, in a Manner perfectly unlikely to be drawn together for such an Enterprize. Likewise these very Letters represent *Sweden* to be out of Condition for such an Enterprize. Private Letters at the same time confirm, that Mr. *Masters* an *English* Merchant at *Gottenberg*, of good Substance and Reputation, an eminent Whig, wrote a Letter to Messieurs *Lyel* and *Co.* at *London*, dated *April* 15-28, that Year, wherein he says, he is ashamed to see his Countrymen so overseen in an Affair wherein there was not the least Appearance of Truth.

After all this Violence, let us turn to *Sweden*: The King, far from being provoked by this Usage, to resent it, as he might justly have done, upon our *English* Merchants in his Dominions, carried it with all possible Calmness and Moderation, contenting himself with only confining the *British* Minister by way of Reprisal.

The fifty Seamen which were saved out of the Wreck of a *British* Man of War cast away on the *Swedish* Coast, and who are since arrived in *London*, are fifty standing Witnesses in this Case. How were they surprized, when they came to *England*, to see such a Stir about a Chimera! which they all protested there was not the least Sign of in *Sweden*; neither had they seen or heard any thing of it.

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The Story of buying Ships in *France* and *Holland*, was all of the same Nature. Was five or six Men of War a Fleet fit to invade *England*, who, upon the first Alarm, would make nothing to fit out thirty Men of War, as has been done in this Case? Suppose Ships had been bought, tho' no such thing appears; Was it a Crime for the King of *Sweden* to buy Ships? May not his *Swedish* Majesty encrease his Marine Strength when he pleases, as well as other Princes or States do theirs? And has not the *Czar* formed his whole Fleet with Ships bought in *England* and *Holland*?

Again; among all the Informations which have been given, is there any one *English* or *Scotch* Man convicted of holding any Correspondence with the *Swedish* Minister? The News-Papers taking it from one to another, did indeed make a great Noise of such a Discovery; but what did it all come to? 'Tis all buried; even the Court it self, tho' they had the greatest Concern in the World to make it be believed, that the Violence offered was the Effect of a most evident Danger, yet at last dropt the Pretence, and let it fall by degrees.

In a Word, if we consider the present Conjunction, after all the politick Turns they have given to those things, I do not see any Proof they have made, or can make, of the imminent Danger, from any thing at Home, any more than from any thing Abroad. There was not the least Disturbance either in *England* or *Scotland*. His *Britannick* Majesty had an Army of no less than 30000 Men on Foot; his maritime Affairs in an extraordinary Condition; a Triple Alliance newly signed, securing him the Assistance of two powerful Nations Abroad; *Sweden* all this while being surrounded by powerful Enemies on all Sides, exhausted by a long Series of Misfortunes; and apparently in Want of Means for so great a Design.

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All these Circumstances impartially considered, the Danger to *England* was so far from being pressing and imminent, as above, that, on the contrary, *Britain* was never in less Danger, than just at that Juncture.

But suppose we were to grant the Danger was really what was pretended; yet this was evident, that the Ruin was discovered, and consequently the Danger was less; and it would doubtless then have been more for the Glory of his *Britannick* Majesty, to have acted as *Q. Elisabeth* did in the Case of Bishop *Lesly* abovementioned, viz. She declared, that in the Case of publick Ministers, they should rather use them moderately, than with Rigour, even where the Laws would justify the latter; because, wherever the Laws of Nations were concerned, things should never be put to Extremities.

This was exactly according to *Grotius*, who lays it down as a Rule, that if a publick Minister give any Offence that ought not to be born with, they should either wink, as if they did not know it, or order him to leave the Country; but if it was a Crime that tended to the publick Ruin, they ought to send an Envoy to complain of him to his Principal, that he may be recalled.

Queen *Elisabeth's* Reign, which was known to be a Reign particularly engaged in these nice Cases, was yet distinguished for soft Measures on all such Occasions, and famous on that Account. Nor would it have been less to the Glory of his *Britannick* Majesty, to have followed her Steps in his Usage of the King of *Sweden*, who would not have been behind-hand with him in such Civilities.

There being then none of these just Pretences of Danger in the Case before us, the Arresting the *Swedish* Minister, whom, it seems, they keep still in Custody, must pass in all the Courts of *Europe*, for a Breach of the Law of Nations, and will certainly
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be remembered as such, tho' at present they may dissemble their Repentment. But there is a Secret discovered by these things, which appears more visibly than ever, *viz.* That the *English* Court is extremely desirous of a War, and that upon quite different Designs, than the ridiculous one which is pretended, *viz.* of preventing a Descent of which there was not the least Appearance.

We come now to another Part of their Proceedings in this Arresting the *Swedish* Ministers; and that is, the Seizing also their Papers. The Authors of the two Pamphlets I speak of, are mightily puzzled to get off of this dirty Article, and put themselves to the Trouble of Abundance of Words to no Purpose, or indeed to make it worse than it was before; of which I shall only say this; that if they were publick Ministers who argue thus, they speak against themselves; and if not, they speak like People that know nothing of the Matter. Even the *British* Ministers themselves, in these Parts, are alarmed at it; and Mr. *Jackson* himself among the first, who indeed ought to expect the like Treatment himself at the Hands of his *Swedish* Majesty.

It was remarkable at that time, that before the Printing those Letters, some certain People were mighty forward in their Discourse to persuade the World into the Belief of great Designs being on Foot; tho' others who knew the Practice of the Publick in *England*, in making Sham-Plots when they have Occasion to carry on their particular Projects, suspended their Judgments till they might see farther. But when the Letters came abroad, *Ridiculus Mus!* What Stuff did it look like? And how did People laugh at the Court Policy of some People, who like the Devil Sheering his Hoggs, made so much Cry, where there was so little Wooll? Nay, the same Gentlemen who talkt so high before, began to talk quite in another Tone now; and as to the rest,

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every one extoll'd the Answer which the Marquis *de Monteleone* gave to the Secretary of State's Letter, and blam'd the weak and dispirited Conduct of the other foreign Ministers, who had not Courage to speak plainly, tho' in a Case which so nearly touch'd them all. The Letters of the said Secretaries of State were compared to a confused Piece of Mosaick Work; that there was neither Head nor Tail in them, and less in the making them publick. Particularly it was taken Notice of, that the Originals were never shewn to any Body; no, not to the foreign Ministers, whom, one would have thought it had been their Interest to satisfy in such a Case, that they might have satisfied also their Principals, who had great Reason to think themselves concerned in it.

It is true, People in these Parts absolutely clear the King of *Great-Britain* from this Charge; who, as they say here, was not of the Opinion those Letters should be expos'd; and who could think less of a Prince so wise and moderate in all his Proceedings, and who knows so perfectly the Law of Nations; but it seems the Ministry prevailed by such Methods as are practicable in such Cases in *Britain*.

But it is still more surprizing to us here, that as they write from *England*, the Originals of these Letters were not so much as laid before the Parliament; but that after his *Britannick* Majesty had told his Parliament the Letters should be laid before them; yet the Ministry presumed to satisfy the Parliament with presenting the Copies only. It seems they were sensible, that wise Body of Men would not fail to have acted upon pacifick Principles; but they have Ways in *England* to dress up such things to their Advantage; and it was necessary they should use the best of their Skill when they were to persuade the People to be willing to enter into War with a Nation which they always had a Kindness for; and always

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thought it their Interest to preserve an unalterable Friendship with.

In short, People wonder here, that the Court of *Britain* have not taken the least Step to justify these Proceedings, neither to satisfy the Nation, whose Fleet and Forces are to be employ'd, their Trade ruined, and their Treasure exhausted in attacking their Friends, purely and simply to aggrandize the Dominions of *Hanover*, by the Accession of the Countries of *Bremen* and *Verden*.

It is observable, that when the Ministers of *Hanover* in these Parts are told these things, they stop our Mouths with telling long Stories of the Greatness and Power of the King of *Great-Britain*. We answer with all imaginable Respect to his *Britannick* Majesty, That it also is true, that the King of *Sweden* is a great Prince; and that an equal Regard to Justice is due to him, especially in a Case of such Consequence.

But let us now come to the Excuses which these Authors abovenamed make for these things. First, they refer us to *Livy's Roman* History, for an Example which *Grotius* has also quoted from him. But by their Leave, they have abused both these Authors grossly. The Case cited from *Livy*, is, That when the Consuls arrested the Ambassadors of *Tarquin*, they took an extraordinary Care, (says *Livy*) that they miss'd none of their Letters and Papers. Now this is so far from being a Precedent for Opening, Reading, and much less for Publishing the Papers or Letters of an Ambassador, that it rather proves they were kept secret from any one's looking into, or meddling with them; and yet if *Grotius* be examined strictly on this Subject, it will appear, that these Ministers of *Tarquin* went farther than the *Swedish* Ministers did in *England*. For they tamper'd with the Citizens of *Rome* to rise against the Senate; and it must be concluded from thence, that the Right of Nations was so sacred, as to ex-

tend to those who even concern'd themselves in a Conspiracy against the State.

Even the *Turks*, who we know are not the most religious Observers of these Laws of Nations, are nevertheless so just as not to meddle with the Papers of the foreign Ministers when they arrest their Persons; nor will all their History furnish one Example of it.

Nay, if we search universal History; nay, the *English* History it self, we shall not be able to find one Precedent to justify this Case of Count *Gyllemburg*. To the Honour of the *English* Ministry be it spoken, they have immortaliz'd their Name by a Rape on the Laws of Nations, something after the Manner that the fam'd *Herostratus* did, by burning the Temple of *Diana*.

The next thing the Author of *A Letter to a French Gentleman* brings to justify these Proceedings, is by a Turn of Art taken out of the Common-Place Books of the Schoolmen, and is taken from *Quintilian*, viz. That where the Law is silent, and the Negative is not expressly written, we may infer the Positive, or Affirmative, and take it for granted. It is strange this Author, who takes upon him to make so much Noise in this Affair, should really have no more to say for it. It is a poor Shift to establish a Principle of such Consequence as this upon the Common-Places of the Schools; which is, to oppose a received Law: *Quintilian* was dictating to his Pupils and Scholars, not to Statesmen and Historians. What are the Rules of Rhetorick to the Laws of Nations?

This Common-Place Man has the Assurance from hence to argue very absurdly in the before-recited Case of *Q. Elisabeth*. viz. That tho' she did not cause the Bishop of *Ross's* Papers to be seiz'd, yet she might have done it without any Prejudice to the Law of Nations; and he supposes it done too, attacking very merrily the Faith of all the Historians of those Times, for not taking notice of it. But I think it is much more just to conclude, that since none of the Writers

of that Age mention it, therefore it was not done; since also in a thing of such Moment as concerns the Right of Nations, they would never have omitted it, if it had been done.

After this, finding himself imbarassed with these Difficulties, he endeavours to bring himself off, by asking this very odd Question, viz. Whether dumb Evidences of Papers and Letters ought not to be more adhered to, than the Parole of Honour of the Minister himself; and he boldly answers in the Affirmative.

But I must contradict this Notion. A Prince that suspects the Couduct of a foreign Minister, ought to have good Evidence before he can pretend to take any Measures with him: But to seize his Papers, in order to come at such Evidence, is a new Way, and alters the Case quite, and makes a Man Evidence against himself. It is a Maxim grounded on Equity and Justice, That no Man shall be bound to be his own Accuser: Besides, in the Case of a publick Minister, his Papers and Letters do not properly belong to him, but to his Master.

This Author's Plea, that the Sovereign has no reason to complain in this Case, is therefore absurd like the rest. To support it, they ask us this wise Question, viz. How a Prince who suspects a foreign Minister, shall know, whether his Master be concerned in his Intrigues, or no, if his Papers may not be look'd into? But *Grotius* would have answer'd him this Question, if he had look'd into him, viz. Not by searching the Ambassador's Papers, but by sending an Embassy to his Master, to demand whether he approves what his Minister has done, or no. This has been the Practice of the greatest Princes in the World, and is grounded upon Equity, Justice, and the Right of Nations; and if it were not so, an Ambassador would always be exposed to be ill treated, and would have all their most secret Instructions and Or-

Orders made a Prey to the Curiosity of the Statesmen where they serve, who would never want Excuse to seize upon them, as it suited their Occasions.

This new Doctrine of claiming a Liberty to seize and look into the Papers of Ambassadors, saps the Foundation of all Societies; and therefore, at this rate, no Prince would venture to send Ministers abroad upon any secret Negotiations, seeing they would be continually uneasy under the Apprehensions of being affronted in the Person of their Ambassadors, and of having their secret Orders and Instructions exposed. The Court of *Great-Britain* would be very much mortified, if other Powers should act by these Maxims; and by seizing their Residents abroad, should by that means have the Advantage of looking into their Affairs.

Upon the whole, I may venture to say these Writers, who apologize for these things, know little of them, and do not consider the Consequences of what they have advanced, but use a great many Words to little purpose, leaving the Argument worse than they found it.

Let us follow them a little farther, and see what they have to say to the Case of Baron *Gortz*. *It's my Opinion*, says he, *that the Conduct of their High Mightinesses in the Affair of the Baron Gortz, and the Breach of Hospitality and Friendship, which is so much complain'd of, may be easily justify'd by the Arguments you bring against it.* And having said this, he runs on upon the Distinction between the Laws of Civility, and the Laws of Friendship; and insists, that the Laws of Friendship being the more binding, the States-General could do no otherwise than seize the Baron, in point of Friendship to the King of *Great-Britain*.

It seems, according to this Author, there was a great Friendship between the States-General and *Great-Britain*, but more between them and the King of *Sweden*; and they were only obliged in Civility to
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Sweden. But if he could suffer himself to write without prejudice, and to state the Merits of the Cause on both Sides, he would see Reason to talk at another Rate; and yet this Author must be very ignorant, if he does not know, that the Friendship has been infinitely greater between the States-General and the King of Sweden, than ever was between them and England; the Friendship between them and England being no other than that of Rivals who make Peace for politick Ends, but retain still separate and interfering Interests, and who scarce ever before acted sincerely with one another; at least, it may be said, the Court of England scarce ever acted sincerely with the States General, since their Establishment, except only since the Revolution; and this Author need only be referred to History for these Truths; particularly, to the words of a certain Ambassador of the States-General in England, upon that very Occasion. 'It is true, said he, that Queen Elisabeth was very kind, and did many good things for us; yet she never gave us any Assistance, but was so small, or so late, or attended with so many other ill Circumstances, as did us rather Harm than Good. All the Treaties we entered into with her, were attended with such Difficulties and Hardships, that it was almost impossible to conclude any thing; and she never offered any Treaty to us, but when her Interests obliged her to it. She never used our Country only as a Bulwark for her own, and always abandoned us when her own Turn was serv'd; oftentimes she deserted us, when we were at the very Brink of Ruin, and at best, comforted us with good Words, rather than Effects; and could never be brought to take one hearty Resolution in our favour. In a word, says this Great Man, if we compare the Service done, and the Number of Ships lent by the Dutch the Queen, with the Succours and Protection which they received from

from her, it will be found that the Balance was on our Side. These were the words of a Minister of the States-General, known in Holland for a Patriot to his Country, and perfectly acquainted with their Interests: Is it possible then, that this State should now talk of such Obligations of Friendship with the English, as to oblige them even to break in upon their own Independency. Certain it is, no Prince can claim a Right to what was now ask'd of the States-General, viz. To Arrest a foreign Minister in their Dominions; nor can grant it, without manifest Violation of the Law of Nations: Nor can the Pretence of any Crime, or projected Crime against the Prince desiring this, alter the Case. We have a fresh Example of this on the very same Occasion, viz. In the Solicitation made at the Court of France, for using the same Violence with the Swedish Minister there. The Court of France are at this time under the same Engagements to Great-Britain, as the States-General, as well to support the Protestant Succession, as in other Cases; yet that Court did not think themselves obliged by their new Friendship, to Arrest the Baron Sparr, as we hear they were desired to do, by the King of Great-Britain, and the States-General have done in the Case of Baron Gortz; tho' the Baron Sparr was, it seems, engaged in the same Design. I shall explain this Part by the following Comparison. Suppose a Minister from Great-Britain came to Holland, to negotiate Matters from the Court privately, and without Credentials; and the Minister of some other Power in Alliance with the Republick, upon some plausible Pretence, solicited to have him arrested, would they grant it? Doubtless they would refuse it, and with good Reason too. This is exactly the Case of the Baron Gortz. I will not contend whether he was a publick Minister to them, or no; it

it seems the Republick would fain take him in another Capacity: But they knew very well he was a Minister, and a Minister of the King of *Sweden* too; and that he was come into their Country to negotiate Matters of Importance for his *Swedish* Majesty. He had often been in Conferences with the *Dutch* Ministers about the publick Affairs he was charged with. Again, these Ministers visited him, discoursed with him on the publick Affairs, recommended the Interests of their Subjects in *Sweden* to his good Offices. He likewise convers'd freely and openly with the other foreign Ministers at the *Hague*, who all treated and received him as a Minister of the King of *Sweden*. Can such a Person be taken as a Stranger or Traveller only?

There is a late remarkable Case which comes fully up with this, and which happened in the very same Government but the last Year; and this is the well-known Story of General the *Marquis de Languallerie*. He resided in *Holland* as a private Person; not one Prince in the World would own him; and yet when the Emperor desired by his Ministers at the *Hague*, to have him Arrested, as a Person carrying on ill Designs against his Imperial Majesty; the States-General excused themselves, alledging, that the Rights of Sheltering Strangers in their Dominions, and the Protection such Strangers ought to enjoy, would not permit them to do it; and tho' the Designs of the said General were discovered, yet had he staid in *Holland*, he had never fallen into the Emperor's Hands; nor will our Author pretend, that there was no Friendship between the States-General and the Emperor, only a Law of Courtesy; nor will they alledge, the States-General have no Friendship but with the King of *Great-Britain*, and stand only on Terms of Courtesy with all the World besides.

The Author I speak of, then flies to the Treaties between the States-General and his *Britannick* Majesty, and particularly the last lately concluded; and pre-

pretends to justify this Proceeding on Account of those Treaties; but these Treaties are publick, and may be seen; and it is evident they are not at all to his purpose. There is indeed a Clause which says, that such Party shall study the mutual Safety and Advantage of one another, but none that says, to oblige one another, they shall affront other Princes, or insult the Law of Nations in the persons of their Ambassadors; especially when nothing is acted against the State where those Ambassadors reside. As for those Parties which are agreed not to be protected by this Treaty, they are particularly described, and the Clause even in the Case amounts to no more, than not to give them Shelter, and to oblige them to depart the Country in eight Days; not to apprehend and imprison them.

There are other Treaties between the two Nations, by which the States-General engage to support the Succession of *Hanover*; but in this Treaty it is Conditioned, that the Court of *England* is obliged, when they demand of them to act offensively, to give good Reasons why the States should draw a War upon themselves. Now it has already been proved, that there was not any Appearance of the Descent or Invasion pretended from *Sweden*; all the Pamphlets and Papers which have been published on the Subject, have yet made nothing of it appear, any more than they have been able to justify the King of *Great-Britain's* using Acts of open Hostility, while a Treaty of Alliance unbroken, remained in full Force between the two Parties, and without first applying the soft Remedies which are provided for in those very Treaties, to clear up any Difficulties which might happen.

Perhaps the Author does not know, or is not willing to own, that he knows that there is a Treaty of Alliance subsisting at this time between the King of *Sweden* and this Republick; and which is as binding to them as any Treaty can be made; and That with the

King of *Great-Britain*, the subsequent to it, can by no means weaken, or invalidate it. Now the Republick being by the Terms of the Treaty engaged to the King of *Sweden* in all Bonds of Friendship and good Neighbourhood, it must necessarily follow, that this Usage of his Minister was an Infraction and Breach of their Engagement.

The new Notions of Arresting one publick Minister at the large Request of another, and which are brought by these Writers to justify the Violence used against Count *Gyllemburg*, are destructive of all the Methods for establishing Peace and good Understanding among Nations; and Princes who are at War with one another, can never by these Rules have any Ministers at neutral Courts, they being ordinarily in Alliance with one or other of the Parties at War: And if we must reduce the Law of Nations to so narrow a Compass, as only to regard these Ministers who have Credentials to the Places where they reside; the Ambassadors, Plenipotentiaries, or Envoys Extraordinary, and other Ministers which Princes often send to form the Congress, or Meeting of foreign Ministers, on various Occasions, and who generally go without Credentials, only with what they call *Full Powers*. For the present Affair, these are all exposed to Violence, at the Discretion of those that please to insult them.

If these things are allowed, they ought at least to let us know it, and to publish to all the World, That for the future, the Laws of Nations ought thus to be understood; and till this is done, we cannot but say here, that the Arrest and Detention of the Baron *Gortz*, Minister and Plenipotentiary of the King of *Sweden*, is contrary to the Usage of neutral Courts, as well as to the Laws of Nations, and much more inconsistent with the Friendship which the States-General, by their Alliance, were bound to have preserved for his *Swedish* Majesty.

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The King of *Sweden* was certainly as much an Ally to the Republick, as the King of *Great-Britain*; and if we were to reckon in such Times as these Alliances, to be of any Force, his *Swedish* Majesty ought rather to have expected Assistance from the States-General, seeing his *Britannick* Majesty had for three Years together acted by *Sweden* as a declared Enemy, without any Occasion, or Provocation.

Nothing is more unaccountable, than what they write upon this Subject from the *Hague*. The *Dutch* excuse themselves upon the Arrest of Baron *Gortz* very oddly. They are not ashamed to tell us, that they do not keep him in Prison, but it is the King of *Great-Britain*; and yet, at the same time, they own that he is confined in the Town-House at *Arnheim*, that he is guarded there by the Officers and Troops of that State, and that he is deny'd so much as to have one of his own Servants to attend him; a Favour seldom refused to Persons of his Quality. In a word, was Commissary *Vlurtman* a Subject of the States, or no? Was not he otherwise a contemptible Fellow, empowered by the *British* Ministers to command at *Arnheim* so absolutely, that even the Magistrates of the City durst not admit any one so much as to speak with the Baron, without his Leave? Either this was by Order of the Sovereign Power of the States, or it was acknowledging a foreign Power superior to the States. How these Proceedings of the *Dutch* can be reconciled to their Protestations of Friendship to the King of *Sweden*, is very hard to make out.

The best Reason they give for it here, is, that the *Dutch* look'd upon the King of *Sweden* as a Prince ruined past Recovery; and that therefore they needed not to trouble themselves any more about him, or fear any of his Resentment.

And now the Partisans of *Hanover* tell us, that the *Dutch* have consented to deliver the Baron into the Hands of the King of *Great-Britain*; upon which some

of the publick Ministers here not being able to think so dishonourably of the States-General, asked them, If they thought the King of *Great-Britain* has so dispirited and aw'd the *Dutch*, as to bring them to be able to yield things contrary to their Honour, as a Sovereign and Independent State. They answered, That the States have yielded to it by way of Negotiation, and as the Effect of their great Attachment to the *British* Court. But they were told again, That nothing could be more dishonourable to any Government, than to propose things to them which were inconsistent with Honour and Justice, because it supposes them capable of submitting to them.

But above all this, there's one thing yet to be considered, *viz.* The Consequences and the Example of these things, and how far they shall be practised in the Ages to come, from this Precedent, which may hereafter fall upon the *Dutch* themselves, as well as upon others now by their means. This they might have avoided, if they had thought fit to release the Baron as soon as they pretended to know that he was a Plenipotentiary of the King of *Sweden*. The most powerful Princes of the World care not to make such dangerous Precedents as may in time come to be turn'd upon them to their Disadvantage; and the Reasons are evident, because the Time may come when every the meanest Prince may have an Opportunity to shew his Resentment.

But our Author intimates what is very dishonourable to the *Dutch* in this Case, *viz.* That they are obliged to keep fair Weather with the King of *Great-Britain*, tho' it be at the Expence of their Honour, and of their dearest Interests; meaning, their Sovereignty and Independence; and we say, this is dishonourable to the States, because it insinuates, that they stand more in need of the Friendship of the King of *Great-Britain*, than his *Britannick* Majesty does of theirs,

theirs, which is not true in Fact, as has already been observed.

But to shorten the Argument, they enquire here, if the *Dutch* have done this by way of Reprisal for some Persons, or Ships, or Effects of theirs seized by the *Swedes*; but the *Dutch* themselves do not pretend to it. But how comes it to pass, say they, that the *Dutch* suffer the *Danes* to take their Ships, without one word of Complaint? Something must be at the Bottom of such manifest Partiality. The King of *Sweden* forbids Commerce to four Towns only, which Towns were his own, tho' taken from him by the War: But if his *Swedish* Majesty takes any Ships going to those Towns, they immediately cry out, Piracy and Violence. But when the King of *Denmark* forbids Trade with all the Ports of *Sweden*, and declares the whole Kingdom block'd up, taking and confiscating all the Ships of their own *Dutch* Subjects; yet the States stand still, as if not concerned; and these *Dutchmen* who so vigorously maintain the Liberty of their Commerce against the *Swedes*, stand like the dumb People in the Play, when they are to do the same thing against *Denmark* and his Supporters.

To answer this, they tell us, the *Danes* do but follow the Example of the *Swedes*: But neither will this appear to be true, if the Date of the several Regulations of these two Nations for their Capers allowing Passes, &c. be examined. But be that as it will, the Precedent is good or bad: If good, why do they complain of the *Swedes*, who lead? If bad, why silent with the *Danes*, who follow? Let any one impartially weigh these things, and tell us where the Error lyes, for one or other must be in the wrong.

But to return to the *Dutch*. Upon what particular Account then is their Complaisance carried to so great a Height for his *Britannick* Majesty, and sunk so low for his *Swedish* Majesty? The Prudence is the Safety of the Protestant Succession; but has it not been said of-
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ten in *Great-Britain*, that a King of *England* has nothing to fear, if united with his Subjects, he being the common Father of his People, and having no other Interest than what is their own. But suppose some Danger, it cannot be from *Sweden*. Mr. Secretary *Stanhope*, in his Answer to the *Russian Memorial*, says *England* is at Peace with *Sweden*, what can they fear there for the Protestant Succession. The King of *Sweden*, far from envying his *Britannick* Majesty the Possession of his new Kingdom, has congratulated him on his Accession, and signified himself to be highly pleased with the Advantages of his House: but notwithstanding all this, his *Britannick* Majesty, as Elector of *Brunswick*, strives to imbarck *England* in the Quarrels of his Electorate, and brings the *British* Squadrons to act in Aid for a Quarrel they have no Share in, against one of their most constant Allies. Is this for the Interest of the Succession? Is this for the Advantage of the *British* Nation? Or is it not rather for the private Views of the House of *Hanover*, who are Strangers, and even in many things Opposites in Interest to the *English*, and likewise to the *Dutch*.

But to bring this Matter to a Head, the Short and the Long of the Story, they say, is this, *viz.* That the House of *Hanover* finding it a happy Conjunction for them to make their Advantage, by joining the Dutchies of *Bremen* and *Verden* to their State, made a Purchase of these Countries of him, who indeed had no Right to sell them, having possess'd them by an unjust Conquest; which Conquest too was but of one Part of the Dutchy of *Bremen*, the rest with yours of *Verden* having been deposited, or sequestered into the Elector's Hands, as a Trust. The King of *Denmark*, on the other Hand, not being so short-sighted, as not to see the Desire these had to get these Countries into their Hands, takes another Advantage, and refused to sell them, or to give up their Right, how-

however weak in it self, till his Electoral Highness engaged to declare War against *Sweden*. This was not only promised; but tho' his Electoral Highness was not yet possess'd of the Crown of *Great-Britain*, yet he engaged to procure the *British* Fleet, which was then sent to the *Baltick* with other Designs, to act against *Sweden*; all which was effected, the World well knows. This has been the Spring of all the Troubles on that Side, which still harass those Countries. These things furnished the King of *Denmark* with Troops and Money to attack the King of *Sweden*, and strip him of what remained to him in the Empire. The Possessors of these new Conquests being satisfied, that while his *Swedish* Majesty could but set his Foot in *Germany*, their Possession of his Dominions would be doubtful and precarious; and seeing his *Swedish* Majesty resolved rather to perish in a good Cause, than to yield without fighting to the last Drop, any of his Dominions; I say, in these Views they took two remarkable Steps. First, They brought the *Russians* into the Empire, and secondly, the *British* Fleet into the *Baltick*. The first of these was done to make a Tool only of the *Czar*, the sooner to compass their Projects then in Hand. These are the very words of his *Czarish* Majesty himself, in his Letter to the Emperor, dated *Nov. 7. 1716*. The second was done meerly because they could no otherwise match the Naval Power of *Sweden*, without which the Town of *Straelsund* and Isle of *Rugen* could never have fallen into their Hands, nor *Wismar* neither, as they did soon after.

But his *Britannick* Majesty finding that all this would not do, and that nothing but Force could reduce his *Swedish* Majesty to the Condition they intended, concluded last Year, while he was at *Hanover*, to spirit up more Enemies against *Sweden*, and to bring the *British* Nation, under other Pretences, to declare War against him.

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In the mean time, his *Britannick* Majesty perceiv-
ing, that the King of *Sweden*, notwithstanding all
this, could not resolve in himself to lose his Domi-
nions after that manner they would seize them, con-
cluded last Autumn, at *Hanover*, before his Return
for *London*, to raise up new Enemies against that
Prince, to bring the *English* Nation, under other Pre-
tences, to declare War against him, tho' an ancient
Friend and Ally; and to forbid all Commerce with
Sweden. Baron *de Gortz* knew this by two different
Letters in *October* last Year, which would make one
think, that the Discovery of the pretended Conspiracy
was contrived only to incense the *English* Nation, and
make them fall in with the Views of the Court: But
foreseeing the Difficulty of raising Forces, without
the Republick of *Holland* was made a Party, the Mi-
nistry thought it necessary to surprize the Integrity
of the wise Republick, and make them take such
Measures as would entirely embroil them with the
King of *Sweden*; and all this, as it appears, with
the sole View, that while several Princes engaged
by the Subsidies granted by the Parliament; at
the Disposal of the King of *Great-Britain*, should
join their Forces to oblige the *Russians* (formerly so
welcome, and now so troublesome) to quit the Em-
pire, that the Forces of the two maritime Powers
might join to oppress the *Swedes*; so that his *Swedish*
Majesty should be forced to consent to the Cession of
Bremen and *Verden*.

Thus you see in part the particular Interest of his
Britannick Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*; it remains
that we now examine whether this corresponds with
the Interests of the *English* and *Dutch* Nations, so as
to oblige them, in meer Complaisance, to sacrifice
their own Repose, and to take such Measures as are so
prejudicial to Prudence, and so disobliging to such a
Friend and Ally as the King of *Sweden*. For as the
English naturally know the Advantages of their Liber-

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ty and Trade, and that the *Dutch* also have always
passed for wise Managers of theirs, we shall only
observe what the Ministers here argue about it.

They seem perswaded here, that the *English*
Nation can never look favourably on the Enlarge-
ment of the Dominions of *Hannover*, so powerful
already in themselves, especially on an Enlarge-
ment of so ill a Consequence, as the Acquisition of
Bremen a maritime Province and having such good
Ports. The *English*, justly jealous of the Happi-
ness of their Constitution, have never wish'd their
Sovereign should possess any foreign Dominions, so
near *Great-Britain*; 'twas this Reason, one may
justly think, that they have never troubled them-
selves to reconquer their ancient Possessions in a
neighbouring Kingdom, tho' they have had several
Opportunities, and that here never was any Jealousie
of this kind, but when King *William* was upon the
Throne; and when Queen *Anne* declared she would
not keep an Inch of Ground in *Flanders*, 'twas plain
that 'twas not so much to free the Allies from the
Suspicion of her great Forces, as not to give any
Uneasiness to her own Nation; we may likewise
presume that those wise Persons who drew up the
Act of Succession in *England*, tacitly insinuated the
same, in covenanting, in express Terms, that the
English Nation, should not be obliged neither di-
rectly nor indirectly, to enter into the particular
Quarrels of the House of *Hannover*.

They likewise argue here very strongly, that
the Acquisition of *Bremen*, cannot agree with the
Interest of the *Dutch*, for of all the Branches of
its Commerce, those of the *Baltick* Sea, of the *Elbe*,
and the *Weser*, ought naturally to be dearest to the
States, the imprudent Covetousness of their Tra-
ders, have already ruin'd the first, to such a Degree
that they own their Fault themselves, and of
many Years they have not had so rich a Commerce

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as they had just before the War, it will be the same with the *Elbe* and *Weser*, of which they have already some small Examples by which they may judge what may be expected for the Future.

From hence it naturally follows say we, that the King of *Great-Britain* in drawing in the *Dutch* to consent to the arresting the Baron *Gortz*, and continuing his Confinement, could have no other View than of imbroiling the States of *Holland* with the King of *Sweden*, tho' he could advantage them nothing by it, but on the contrary, occasion great Expences, and keep them under a kind of Dependency by that Management. The *Dutch* themselves deprived their own Subjects of the Advantage of Commerce, and the Means of interesting themselves in the Pacification of the Troubles of the *North*, that the King of _____ might remain sole Arbitrator.

The Arguments of the Author I have been speaking of, upon the Baron *de Gortz's* being intrusted with full Power from His *Swedish* Majesty, are passionate and warm, and without any Force of Reason, only keeping himself to general Terms; this is always the Address of those who are sensible of the Weakness of their Cause, again he artificially confounds two Questions which ought to be answer'd separately, the Question is not, whether they could arrest Baron *Gortz*, as a publick Minister, but whether on the Supposition of a Defect in the Formalities they could arrest Baron *Gortz* at all, supposing he had but the Character of a Minister of the King of *Sweden*; both these Questions naturally arise from the Laws of Nations, and from these Principles it has already been shewn that they could not, in either of these Cases, proceed against him as they have done, if they pretend Ignorance when they arrested him, there is now no Room for any Excuse of that head, since he has been formally reclaimed. The full Power of the King

King of *Sweden*, signed by His Majesty himself, made him his Minister, 'tis sufficient that the Character his Majesty gave him was then in express Terms, the Author, or no body else, can dispute it; 'tis therefore false arguing to say, that a General's full Power does not constitute the Character of a publick Minister, or that such a Power is not sufficient to make a particular Treaty, therefore they might arrest the Baron *Gortz*, tho' a Minister of the King of *Sweden*, and, by Force, seize his Papers.

The Author knows it very well, therefore he confounds purposely the Ideas, tho' very different in themselves; all that he says upon the generality of the full Power makes nothing in Favour of his Conclusion, viz. That the Power was only a simple Procuration, that the Baron *Gortz* could only negotiate for Arms, Money, &c. That there's mention made of Peace, Alliances, and other Treaties, for the publick Affairs, is evident, but all this concludes nothing in the Author's Opinion; the Case in short is this, the full Power of the King of *Sweden*, shews the Character of the Minister, which he had from his Majesty, 'tis by this formal Declaration that he belong to his Majesty, and by that Publication he ought to enjoy that Security which the Laws of Nations grant to all the Subjects and Ministers of neutral Princes, Friends and Allies, who have acted nothing against the State they reside in.

Neither does the giving the full Power, which the Baron had in general Terms, alter the Case at all, his *Swedish* Majesty depended upon the Honour of those to whom there would be occasion to produce these Powers; for the Case is here, their Correspondence is intercepted, there is now no Room to send Explanations and Orders, as any Case may require, or to send an Account to his Majesty of things, as often as there might be occasion,

the King of Sweden's Enemies interrupted all Correspondence by Letters, even tho' absolutely necessary for negotiating a Peace; it was necessary therefore to give that Minister who was to be trusted, a general Order to act for his Master's Interest, according to the best of his Judgment, the Circumstances and Face of Things changed daily, he was to act as Things presented the very Moment they appeared to him, and to change as they chang'd; these are the Reasons of his full Power being in general Terms, they are such Reasons as are justified by the Nature of the Thing.

His *Swedish* Majesty has been always ready to give Proofs of his Inclination to Peace, and this was a Proof of it, (*viz.*) The giving such Plenipotentiary Powers to his Minister, but he is used, in this, just as his Majesty's Enemies use him, (*viz.*) to turn all the Steps taken sincerely to restore Peace, as Reasons for their insulting him: But to take away all the Cavils made by pretended Criticks in Politicks, let us look into History for Precedents, and we shall find all the same thing done in the Case of Chancellor *Oxenstren*, in the Time of the late *German* War; it was thought then that the giving such full Power was convenient, for the Honour of the Minister who was to be intrusted with them, testifying that he had the Honour of his Prince's entire Confidence, and that he was esteem'd one that knew so entirely his Sovereign's Mind, as also was thought so well able to judge of his Interest, as to be intrusted with his whole Concerns, without the usual Limitations of Orders and Instructions.

But our Author is so conceited now of himself, as to quit Argument, and impose Falshood on us, and after having affirmed, that a publick Minister may be arrested, and his Papers seized, he boldly quotes *Miquefort* as his Authority; indeed a Man that is so familiar with that Author, might be

be expected to get something from him to his Purpose, but he is quite out, in this also, and after he has spent a great deal of Time in Reasoning about the first Part of the Question, (*viz.*) whether a publick Minister may be seized; he dropt intirely the other Part equally material, (*viz.*) whether his Papers may be taken, and searched, and publish'd, and says not one Word to it, and would be no venture to challenge him to produce one Word out of his beloved *Miquefort* that makes for his Purpose.

Perplex'd with this Difficulty, they flye to their resigning upon Terms, and distinguishing upon the Functions of publick Ministers, and here they do but intangle themselves farther, for the Question is not whether Baron *Gortz* was a Minister in *Holland*; he may be, nay he was a Minister of the King of *Sweden*, for all that his *Swedish* Majesty has declar'd him to be so, and his Person was not the less sacred on that Account, his full Powers for treating as Plenipotentiary, proved him a publick Minister, those Powers also being sign'd before his being arrested, tho' presented afterwards, and if this Author had ever had the Honour to serve his Prince in the Quality of a Minister, he would look back upon his present Notions of these Things with great Contempt, I have done with these Authors, but I must say a Word to his Conclusion, where he pretends to give the *Dutch* good Advice, (*viz.*) to keep the *Baron* safe, and not let him get out of their Hands, and the Reasons it seems is very weighty, (*viz.*) that the King of *Great-Britain* ought to fear his Resentments, his *Britannick* Majesty is very little beholding to this Author for his Compliment, indeed nothing can be more ridiculous, after all he had said before of the Power of the King of *Great-Britain*, to talk now of fearing the Resentment of a Subject, but if

if he means he ought to apprehend the Influence the Baron might have on his Master the King of Sweden, the Zeal he has for his Interest, and the Application with which he would not fail to countertermine the Designs of his *Britannick* Majesty, against his Master, the King of Sweden, then he might have reason to recommend the shutting up all the Publick Ministers in *Europe*; there being few or none who are not equally desirous to see the vast Designs of the Governor of *Hannover* crush'd and defeated.

I have done with these Writers, but before I shut up my Letter I must speak a few Words to another whom I have not meddled with before; this is entitled, *A Letter from Hamborough, to a Friend at Amsterdam*; tho' I confess what he says is not like to make many Converts to his Opinion; the Subject he is upon relates to the Troops of the *Czar* remaining in the Empire, and the Motions of his *Britannick* Majesty to cause them to remove: He lays down his Foundation upon his own Authority, and draws his own Conclusions without giving a true State of the Case; his Point is this; (*viz.*) That a Prince who brings an Army into a Friend's Country, without a just Pretence, as he then pretends the *Czar* of *Muscovy* has done in the Empire, and causes his Troops to live upon the Country, cannot take it ill if the Neighbouring Princes endeavour to resolve him out again if they can.

All this may be true, and yet the *Czar* not at all affected with it, unless he had prov'd that the *Czar* brought his Troops into the Empire, *without any just Pretence*: And this Author certainly must be weak enough to believe the Princes of the Empire did not know who brought the *Russians* in; and if so, he ought to read the *Czar's* Letter to the *M.* mention'd before, dated from *Lubec*, Nov. 7. 1716. when his *Czarish* Majesty says positively, That his
Troops

Troops had not come into the Empire, but upon the pressing Entreaties of the Northern Allies, and particularly of his *Britannick* Majesty, who desired it, and press'd it more than any other, in order to assist them to drive the *Swedes* out of *Germany*.

In another Place his *Czarish* Majesty says, He cannot but take it ill that some of his particular Allies, and especially those who were most earnest for his bringing his Forces into the Empire to their Assistance, and who have the greatest Advantage by it are the most violent and pressing to remove them, and to suggest ill Designs in their causing them to come thither.

Now what Answer can the Ministers of *Hannover* make to this? Can they say, as this Author insinuates, That they came into the Country without any Pretence? Would the Court of *Hannover* been satisfied if they had come in without Arms or Artillery? And is it to be called acting with Violence to stay in the Country whither they were invited, and only till they were satisfied according to the Treaty made with their Master and the *Czar*? And why had not the Elector of *Hannover* the same Concern for the Dutchy of *Mecklemburg* in the Year 1711. when the *Muscovites* were there before; he was equally concern'd then as a Prince of the Empire, but it seems was not equally mov'd by his own Interest.

It seems the principal Design of this Letter is to oppose the *Czar's* making a separate Peace with *Sweden*. It seems the Author apprehends that there is some Danger of it, and most ignorantly goes about to persuade him against it, by telling him that he may do it very much to his Advantage, only that it would be Dishonourable to him, and that it would be more Glorious to continue War in favour of his Allies, till they had obtain'd all that they desire.

Now if one was to ask this Author a civil Question; (*viz.*) What shall the *Muscovites* have for their Labour when they have done all this? Is not the Answer plain, They shall be sent Home again, and if they won't go, they must not take it ill if they are driven out by Force; *Ala-mode de Mecklenberg.*

This is the very Language of this Author, when speaking warmly, he threatens them with the Forces of the Empire: In this Case he would have done well to have told also the Answer given by the *Russians*, when it was demanded what Pretence they had for keeping Possession of the Country which they had no Right to; (*viz.*) That they did nothing but what the Troops of *Hannover* did in the Dutchy of *Bremen* and *Verden*; and indeed would the Neighbouring Princes of the Empire act according to this Author's Rule, and lay to Heart the Sufferings of that oppress'd Country, there is doubtless the same and much stronger Reasons why they should Arm to drive out the Troops of *Hannover* from the Dutchy of *Bremen*, than the Troops of the *Czar* from the Dutchy of *Mecklenberg.*

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APPLICATION.

AFTER what this Gentleman has written, with so much Judgment, upon the Law of Nations, and the Right of Ambassadors and publick Ministers. There seems very little to be added to that Part, but there appears be not only Room, but an evident Necessity to say something to the Case, as it respects Affairs in *England* distinguish'd from the general Concern of Nations, or the particular Concern of *Sweden* and *Holland.*

Nor is this any Impeachment of the Judgment of the Author, whose Work this follows; if the Reader hereof will put away the Mists from before his Eyes, and look on the publick Affairs without Prejudice, opening clearly the Eyes of his Understanding, he will confess this Author has spoken very clearly to the Case; nevertheless, as it is written abroad, any one may see, tho' he knew much and many things which we did not know, even here at home: Yet there are some Things transacted in *England*; some Reasons of the publick Proceedings; some Ends in View, and some Persons concern'd, which it was not possible a Stranger at such a Distance should know. Therefore to what this judicious Person has said abroad, it may not be unprofitable to say something at home.

He has laid the Mischief of all the Proceedings in the late seizing the *Swedish* Ministers, and acting against *Sweden* in the *Baltick*, upon a previous ambitious

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bitious Design of securing the Possession of some of the Swedish Dominions in Germany to the House of Hannover; we see no Reason to question the End, but we see also Abundance of Steps taken, and Parties embarkt in Prosecution of the Means, which perhaps this Gentleman had no Knowledge of, also we see some other Ends in View here, equally wicked as those abroad.

If that Design was laid abroad, that Train has taken Fire at home also, and has reacht hither; Instruments have been found out here, to fall in with all their unjust Measures, and that main End has been made subservient to Designs of another Nature, as corrupt, unjust and detestable as the other. For Example,

Did the then Elector of Hannover, King of Great-Britain, swallow in his Imaginations, the rich Dominions of Sweden in Germany or elsewhere; did he for that End declare War against his Swedish Majesty without so much as a Pretence of Provocation; Did he to support this, bring the Muscovite Army into the Empire, the British Fleet into the Baltick, trick the Dutch into the wrong Step of arresting Baron Gortz, Great-Britain into a worse for seizing Count Gyllemborg and his Papers, as the foregoing Sheets declare; we shall shew a Party falling into that same bad Measures, to support Views equally unjust and dishonourable; viz.

1. To make a specious Pretence to keep a standing Army in Time of Peace, contrary to the Liberties of their Country, in order to support that Avarice and Power of some Men, who apparently aim at the aggrandizing themselves, at the Expence of their Country, and the Ruin of the Protestant Interest in Europe. And,

2. To gratifie a foreign Nation, by giving them that Advantage in Commerce, which we know those (Dutch Christians) daily sell their Souls to purchase,

purchase, and which (as has been now tryed) they will break thro' the Faith of Treaties, the Laws of Gratitude, and the Right of Nations, to secure to themselves.

What ought not the Dutch to do, to re-oblige the British Nation? What should we not expect of them within the Power of their whole State, when we have first been so obliging to them, and what could be the End and Designs of making such a Sacrifice to them? But to bring them to make a Return of something which Conscience and Honour would have promoted them to refuse, had not Interest been thus brib'd in our Favour.

But what can they ever do enough to gratifie a Nation, who have not declin'd impoverishing our own People to enrich theirs, and by a Self-Denial without Example.

Shutting the fore Door of our Trade, by a Prohibition to our selves; keeping open the back Door of the same Trade to the Dutch, by which the English Nation have seem'd to play the Part of very unskilful Gamesters, having plaid to their Neighbours Hands, and thrown the Card out of their own.

And where may be found the like Step taken by any People, whose Senses had any Share with them in the Actions of their Lives! Where have we seen any Government oblige a Neighbour-Nation, at the Expence of their own Peoples Bread? Some Drudgery must be done in Return for this! Some Work must be bespoke by this Earnest given! After such a Testimony of Favour, what can the Dutch refuse? Can they decline to affront their Friends, to abandon the Rights and Privileges of publick Ministers and Ambassadors, the Law of Nations? No, a Nation so entirely devoted to Gain, and to the propagating their Commerce, which is the Apple of their Eyes, can deny a Neighbour-Nation

Nation nothing, that gives up that beautiful *Virgin* to their eager Lust: Besides, in this Part (*viz.*) of Commerce, *Great-Britain* and the *Dutch* were known and antient Competitors, the Trade to the *Baltick* has been a Mistress coursed with incessant Importunities by those two Rival-Friends for many Years. This Part of it (*viz.*) to *Sweden*, was always, till now, the chief Part of the *Baltick* Trade, and is still very considerable, and very valuable; can any Lover oblige his Friend more, than to give up his Mistress to his Embraces? Yet this have we done to oblige our *Dutch* Rivals, and we shall in the next Place see how they will requite us.

It must be acknowledg'd the *Dutch* seem to be grateful, which, under the *Rose*, is a Thing we have not often to lay to their Charge; But now they are effectually engag'd, and nothing is so infamous but if it be desired of them, they stand ready to do for us, if we ask it of them; they are ready to go to War with *Spain*, against the Stipulation of that Treaty at *Utrecht*; to affront *Sweden*, in Defiance of that Treaty of *Roschild*; to abandon *Holstein*, tho' a Breach of the Treaty of *Traucndal*; and to arrest publick Ministers, in Defiance of that Law of Nations: If we speak but the Word, to day they will threaten *France*; to morrow, come into Alliance with *France*, unjustly rail at the *Swede*, and meanly truckle to the *Danes*. In a word, as they can refuse us nothing, who have engag'd them with such a Sacrifice, as that of our Commerce, so their unusual Gratitude, is a Testimony of that infinite Value of what we have given up to them.

But here a Question remains unresolv'd, (*viz.*) why we have made a Sacrifice so valuable to the *Dutch*? What has been the Case? The Answer is evident, That we might have them always at hand: For the Designs we had to carry on, and for the assisting our Party-Men in every Exigence, whether of Dis-

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affection at home, or forming Plots abroad, to keep that Power in proper Hands, seeing such is their Guilt or Misfortune, that without a standing Army, which is the other View of the Party, some People can never think themselves safe or easie.

This keeping up an Army is a Thing, so justly resented by the People of this *Freeborn* Nation. They are so jealous of it, and so watchful against it, that the Courtiers are sure to have the Disbanding of Troops puish'd at every Session of Parliament, if there are not some Appearances of Dangers either at home, or from abroad, either real or imaginary, brought upon the Stage, to make keeping up the Forces, reasonable; or at least to furnish Ministers with plausible Pretences for it.

It is to be observed, that at the Times when these Things were transacted, the *British* Throne seem'd perfectly well establish'd, and King *George* as much out of Danger of being disturb'd in the quiet Possession of it as his Heart could wish: This the Author of the foregoing Sheets observes well, and I cannot but repeat it more particularly, (*viz.*) The Rebels were all reduc'd at home, the *Pretender* driven into the remotest Exile abroad, the *French* Court brought intirely over from his Interest, even so as to turn, very sincerely, his Enemy; the *Marine* was in a great and flourishing Condition, and the King had not only a powerful Army of near 30000 Men on Foot, besides his Forces in *Ireland*, but by a new Alliance, secured Assistance of the two most powerful Allies in *Europe*, (*viz.*) *France* and the *States General*, who, in Case of need, were oblig'd to furnish Troops or Money, to a very considerable Degree.

What now was the Case in *England*, the King of *Great-Britain*, a wise and generous Prince, meaning nothing but to improve these Advantages to the utmost, for the Benefit of his Subjects, know-

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ing, by the Force of his native Penetrations, he was perfectly safe, thought of nothing but of reducing the Forces, disarming to a Degree, and assisting by this, to the Prosperity of his Dominions, which that People hoped for from his Prudence, and depended on from his Promises; as to his Foreign Designs, they were not at all obstructed by this disarming at home, because *Great-Britain* would still be formidable enough to support him in his Breach with *Sweden*, as Elector of *Hannover*, and to his securing *Bremen* and *Verden* to himself; in which it was enough to ask a Squadron of Ships, and some considerable Sum of Money, and of which more shall be said presently.

In this good Disposition of his Majesty, for the Ease of his People, and to gratifie, nay, even to prevent the Importunities of the Country Party abovemention'd, Orders were given to disband, and the Forces were accordingly reduced, by disbanding 10 Men out of every Company, and 2 Companies out of every Regiment of Foot in the Army, or thereabouts, but this was not without infinite Regret, *however they durst not appear against it*, to a certain Party in the *British* Court, whose Disposition to a military way of governing in *Great-Britain*, was well known, but whose extraordinary Attachments to the Profits and Advantages of military Employments was well known also.

Besides this, Profits of their great Posts in the Army, the Dependencies which these Men procured to themselves by the Officers who serv'd under them, who they diligently introduced into several Trusts, such as Commissions of the Peace, but especially Members of Parliament, and they in Return again, acting by the Court Measures in all Things, and adhering constantly to their immediate Benefactor and to his Party: I say these Men paid the mercenary Debt which their Advancement bound upon

upon them; and Thus the Court supported the Army, the Army the Court, and that one could by no Means want the other.

When these Men therefore saw the growing Peace of the Kingdoms tended naturally to a Reduction of the military Power, and that there would be no resisting the popular Clamours against the Army at the next Parliament; it is no Wonder, if as I said before, the Views of the King's inclining to it, gave them inexpressible Uneasiness, and wherefore they never left, 'till joyning their own Views with those of the Foreigners in the *British* Court, (*viz.*) joining their Desire of Power at home, with that of Dominion abroad, they concluded, it was absolutely necessary to both, that some imminent Danger to the Publick, should be publish'd, which should make the keeping up the Army appear absolutely necessary at home, and that preserving the Dutchies of *Bremen* and *Verden*, absolutely necessary abroad.

To this End they come unanimously into the Proposal made by the *Hannover* Ministry, for drawing *England*, by Head and Shoulders, into the *Puppy-Snatch* of a War with *Sweden*, thereby to make the encreasing the Dominions of *Hannover* (blind Politicks!) seem necessary to the securing the Liberties and Peace of *Great-Britain*: *Cujus contrarium verum est.*

But to bring this infernal Confederation to a head, some Difficulties were yet to be removed, for *England* had not the least Pretence to quarrel with *Sweden*, nay, were under the solemn Ties of an Alliance defensive, made between the present King of *Sweden*, and his late Majesty King *William*.

But to break thro' all this, a Contrivance was found out to make the *Swedes* Aggressors; no Man of Penetration could be thought so blind as to suppose the King of *Sweden*, a Prince whose Policy as

well as Fortitude has been terrible to his Enemies, even when surrounded with Misfortunes, and struggling with inexpressible Difficulties, and superior Adversaries, and abandon'd by those who in Honour were oblig'd to assist him. I say no Man can be so void of common Sense, as to think this was a Time for his *Swedish* Majesty to court new Breeds, and seek to make his antient Friends his Enemies; nay, it was a Plot so unlikely to take with the World, that the Conspirators were oblig'd to lay the Foundation for it, in the most infamous Attempts upon his *Swedish* Majesty's Character and Reputation, describing him as a *Fury*, a Man engag'd by his Desire of Revenge, depraved and even mad; as it is true, that none but a Prince who had merited such a Character, could be concern'd in such Things, as they had prepar'd to make the World believe his Majesty was embarkt in; so it behoved them to represent the most glorious, the most sedate, and the best temper'd Prince in the World, in all the Shapes of a distracted Man, that the World might be prepar'd to believe of him what they were about to impose.

The Improbability of the Design, the Falshood of every Matter of Fact suggested about it, the Demonstration, that neither his *Swedish* Majesty or *Swedish* Nation, were in any of these extravagant Measures, is sufficiently spoken of, and undeniably confuted in the foregoing Sheets, and nothing of History ought to be added thereto.

But who can refrain to reflect how uncouth a Scene, these Proceedings brought upon the Stage of the World, and how ridiculous it would have appear'd, could it have been seen at that Time all in one View; For Example, Suppose *Great-Britain* and *Sweden* to be represented by an able Pencil upon a Picture or Landskip; suppose the *Painter* to have design'd *Great-Britain* in a terrible Hurry and

and a great Fright, raising Soldiers, pressing Seamen, fitting out Ships, laying Embargo's, running, posting, flying to the Sea Ports to give Orders to stop Passengers, open Letters, search Vessels for People to come in or go out, stripping Women, &c. for carrying on the Plot.

Something further, on the said Landskip, are Messengers at work to take People up, the *Swedish* Envoy arrested by Soldiers, his Papers taken away, his Person injuriously treated, the King going to the Parliament to tell them the Danger and ask Aids, the Parliament (managed under-hand) addressing to promise Assistance, pledge Life and Fortune, give Money, consent to any Army, prohibit Trade, &c. behind a Curtain, the intelligent *Painter* may place a Cabal of red-coated Courtiers concerting all this, attended with a great Number of Agents, who separate into every Corner of the Kingdom, whispering among the People, and complaining in publick Places, that the *Swedes* are coming to invade them, and to bring in the *Pretender*, telling the People with all possible Seriousness from Papers printed by their own Emisseries, that at *Gottemberg* were 300 Transports laying ready, loaden with all manner of Provisions and military Stores, that 16000 Men of the King of *Sweden's* best Troops were drawn down to the Coast, and lay ready to embark, nay, the Foot were some of them on Board, and that all was coming for *Great-Britain*.

When rational Men, finding it difficult to credit such Absurdities, stand amaz'd, between the positive Assertion on one hand, and the said Absurdities on the other; they slide the Falshood down their Throats, with this gilded Surface; alas! What is so impracticable, what so improbable, but may be expected from a Prince that sleeps in his Boots, that can burn a House upon his own Head, and that

that will with 500 Men fight 10000 Janizaries ? Is not the King of Sweden a Madman ! Is he not in the Condition of a Bear robb'd of her Whelps, (a) savage in his Temper, desperate in his Fortunes, (b) a rash and desperate Prince, (c) a desperate Prince famous for Desolations, (d) a rash, arbitrary Prince, (e) an ambitious cruel Enemy.

The Noise of these Calumnies, having drown'd the Objections which Reason offer'd ; to the Credit of these Things, the Painter next represents to our View, the Nation of Great-Britain hurried on to entertain Apprehensions, suitable to all those Things ; taking all possible Measures to put themselves in a Posture of Defence at Home, nay, giving Money to hire Neighbour-Powers to attack the King of Sweden abroad by way of Prevention, and sending Fleets to join his implacable Enemies, in order to crush and oppress him.

When this Scene had been critically viewed, and a Man that knew nothing of these Thing than appear'd on the Surface of this accurate Picture, was to judge what he would expect to find Sweden employed in ? Doubtless, he would expect to see them in a Hurry, preparing for an offensive War, preparing to remove the War from their own Doors, where their Enemies flatter'd themselves it was fixt, and venturing boldly to carry it into Great-Britain, which they had great Reason to believe was an Enemies Country : To this Purpose Nothing could be expected to be seen, in their Military Part, but furnishing up their Arms, filling

(a) Address of Wendover in Bucks, Presented by Richard Hampden, Esq;
(b) Salop Address.
(c) Address of Bridport in the County of Dorset.
(d) Address of the County Louth in Ireland.
(e) Address of Chipping-Wycomb in the County of Bucks;

their

their Magazines, remounting their Squadrons, drawing their Troops down to the Sea-Coast ; likewise in their Marine Affairs, nothing could be expected but the hurrying out Fleets, Capers, Privateers and Men of War, and the like. If Gottemberg was represented in View, they would expect there, the Harbour throng'd with 300 Sail of Ships, the Governor very intent upon the amassing Provisions, Shipping of Stores, furnishing a large Train of Artillery, and all Things necessary for an Expedition of such Consequence ; the Soldiers at length shipp'd and all things ready, waiting chearfully for a fair Wind to carry them off to Sea, that they might land before the Government of Great-Britain could be in a Readiness to receive them : Let the worst Enemy we have judge, if after what was represented in the first Piece as doing in Great-Britain, less than this could be expected in the second Piece as doing in Sweden.

But turn we our Eyes then to the other Side of the Piece, where the true State of Affairs in Sweden at that very individual Time, is, by the impartial Workman, faithfully represented, and how shall we be surpriz'd to see the Swedes, perfect Strangers to all these Things, no Notions of them in their Thoughts, no Intelligence of them in their News But that whole Kingdoms of Sweden, resting in the most profound Tranquility, saving what belong'd to their other Disputes, viz. with the Danes and Muscovites. &c.

In the Harbour of Gottemberg, where all these Things as were said to be doing, not the least Sign or Appearance of any military Reparations to be seen, no Men of War, no Transports, no preparing any of the First, or fitting out any of the last, only fourteen or fifteen small Capers, and about three middling Men of War in the Harbour, on the other Side of the Piece, viz. on Shore, no Motions,

no Hurry, no Penetration, the Army at Quiet, re-
 posing in their Quarters, and spread over the whole
 Country, even in the remotest Part of it, some two
 hundred some three hundred Miles off, no Ren-
 dezvous appointed, no Orders for Marching, or so
 much as Preparations for it, in a word, no Inva-
 sion of *Great-Britain*, or of any other Country be-
 ing heard of in the whole Kingdom of *Sweden*;
 would not this be an amazing Reflection to Men
 of right Understandings, to think what all these
 Things should mean, and why the People of *Great-
 Britain* should be thus uneasy to themselves, and
 unjust to their Neighbours of *Sweden*.

But all these Things are unriddl'd, when behind
 the Curtains they shall see the Ministers of State
 setting all these Wheels at Work, blowing all these
 Coals up into a Flame, the better to carry on their
 Party-Projects, secure Posts and Profits to them-
 selves, and keep the Government of the Nation in
 a Method suited to their own Interests.

Then it appears visibly what Ends every feve-
 ral Part of these Corrupt Measures is severally
 calculated to answer, viz. That in general, the
 bringing *Great-Britain* into a Breach with *Sweden*, is
 absolutely necessary in aid of a foreign Quarrel,
 to support the unjust Designs of keeping Possession
 of Part of the *Swedish* Dominions wrongfully ob-
 tain'd and injuriously detain'd by the Government
 of *Hannover*; that the Suggestion of *Sweden's* being
 in the Interest of the Pretender, and engag'd by
 the *Jacobites* to make a Descent into *Great-Britain*,
 to support the Quarrels of the late Rebels, is a Plot
 found to make way for a standing Army at home,
 and to draw in the Kingdom of *Britain* to embark
 among the *Northern* Allies, to oppress, and reduce
 a Prince that never injur'd nor offended them; that
 the defaming, reproaching, and insulting a King
 whose Conduct they are as ill able to judge of, as
 they

they are to imitate his Glory, and whose Actions
 they unjustly and falsely charge with such Things
 as he is too just too honourable to entertain so much
 as a Thought of, is nothing less or more, than a
 Plot to render their Usage of him tolerable in the
 View of their own People, and to prevent the Re-
 proaches that would justly be brought upon them,
 by the World, for endeavouring to ruin that Na-
 tion, to whose Valour Treasure, and Blood, and
 that Prince to whose glorious Ancestors they owe,
 under God, the very being of the *Protestant* Name,
 and the Establishment of the Protestant Power in
 the World; a Prince with whom they are, at this
 Time in Alliance, under the Obligations of a So-
 lemn League (always unbroken on his Side) as it
 has been always unperform'd on their Side, for as
 to all the Injury suggested by taking of *British* Ships
 in the *Baltick*, which, however it is to be justified
 by the known Laws of Nations, and by the Pra-
 ctice of the *English* upon the *Swedes*, themselves,
 in the Case of the latter carrying Provisions and
 Merchandise to *France*, when the *English* declar'd
 that Kingdom block'd up: I say, tho' it be thus
 clearly justified, and may be defended by the known
 Practice of all Nations, yet as to the pretended In-
 jury it cannot be insisted on by the *British* Govern-
 ment, because Count *Gyllenberg*, in the Name of his
Swedish Majesty, offer'd to come to an Account with
 them, and to make Satisfaction for the Ships so ta-
 ken and condemned; provided, the Treaties sub-
 sisting between the two Nations, and that the same
 Friendship founded thereon, might be restor'd and
 preserv'd.

But this would have destroyed all the Designs
 abovemention'd that were in View, as well abroad
 as at home.

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From the Injustice of that Design in all these Things, it is necessary we cast our Eyes upon the Injury of the Means, as the one has been injurious to his *Swedish Majesty* abroad, so the other has been an Attempt upon that Nation at home, not only exhausting their Treasure in a needless Expence, but embarking them in an unjust War, and the shedding Innocent Blood, for such all unjust aggression in War must be esteemed, exposing them to the Indignation of just Nations, and the Vengeance of a righteous God, who fails not to recompense the Desolations of Oppressors upon their own Heads.

Let us see what Steps have been taken in this most abominable Scheme. First, The Nation has been enslav'd by the Misrepresentations of Things, as well as Persons, laying before the Parliament the Necessity of raising Forces, and fitting out Navys against an innocent Ally, which they were, by solemn Treaty, obliged rather to have raised Forces, and fitted out Ships, to aid and assist him him against the Enemies he already was engaged with.

To bring the People into these Things, Plots have been suggested, that were never heard of, till brought forth out of the Womb of a designing Party; and the Nations Temper was stirred up to a Phrenzy, equal to the Wicked Things that were to be proposed to them: The first of these was sending Squadrons to the *Baltick*, to insult a Prince who they had no real Quarrel with, the Admiral commission'd to treat that Prince and his Country as Enemies, without declaring any War against them. They block up his Navy, support a weak and cowardly Enemy, in an implacable Pursuit of his unjust Rage and Revenge; make a Descent upon the Country, burn Woods, ravage Lands, destroy Houses, and kill the Cattle which they cannot bring away, acting the Part of Savages,
not

not fair Enemies, much less sworn Friends and Allies.

But as if this was not enough to testify, how far the *British Nation* may be imposed upon, the Parliament, after having been exasperated, by that Calumny and Reproach raised as above, against *Sweden*, are drawn in to pass an Act to empower the King to prohibit Commerce with *Sweden*, or, in a word, to lessen the Trade of his own Subjects, and give it into the Hands of the *Dutch*, that they might not say in *Holland* they had prostituted their Honour, and the Law of Nations for nothing.

I shall not enter into Debate here, of what Advantage the *Swedish Trade* was to these Kingdoms, the Export of our Manufactures and Plantation-Goods to *Gottenberg* only, was, in the Space of one Year, enough to convince any reasonable Man in that Case, but what the Disadvantage was, of prohibiting it to us, and leaving it open to the *Dutch*, let our Enemies judge; nay, let the *Dutch* answer it, who by no Sollicitations, Memorials, or even Importunities, could be brought into the like Prohibitions, or any farther, than after we pretended to be assur'd they would do it, to laugh at us, and never take any one Step farther, so much as to make us believe they intended it.

It cannot be forgotten, that when the Bill to empower his Majesty to prohibit Commerce with *Sweden*, was depending in the House, Mr. *Nathaniel Gould*, an eminent East-Country Merchant, and Member for *Shoreham* in *Suffex*, spoke in Regard to our Commerce, concerning the *Dutch* coming into the like Prohibitions, and several worthy Members, even of the *Whigg-Party*, did the like also.

The Court-Party alarm'd with that Point's being started, the Equity of which could not be resisted, stopp'd their Mouths with the Pretences, that they did not Question but the *Dutch* would come into it,

it, but that their Constitutions required them to deliberate slowly of these things, and to demand the Concurrence of the Provinces, and to be long in resolving; but it might be depended upon, that the King of *Great-Britain* would concern himself to bring the *Dutch* into it: This was spoken by Mr. Secretary *Stanhope*.

Thus the House was cajol'd into that Thing, the Bill pass'd to empower, and the Government was no sooner empower'd to do it, but, to testifie it was a Thing desir'd beforehand, it was immediately done, a Proclamation published to prohibit our Commerce with *Sweden*.

Since this Step may we search what has been done on the other Side; have the *Dutch* done deliberating? Have the Provinces concurr'd? have their long Resolutions been yet known? rather, have not our Court, after a few seeming Importunities, given over solliciting them to it, knowing well it was never intended? And thus the *Dutch* enjoy an open, free Commerce with *Sweden*, carry *British* Manufactures thither, and sell them to the *Swedes* at second hand, by which they make a double Gain of the *Swedes*; bring back the *Swedish* Product, and sell it to the *English* at second hand, by which they make a double Profit of Us; and besides all this, make themselves the common Carriers of the Commerce on both Sides, and so employ their Seamen and their Ships, and we cheat ourselves of the Freights.

Oh, blinded and infatuated *Brittons*! How long are you to be the Fools of *Dutch* Avarice! How long are you to be imposed upon by Foreigners, and be exposed to the Contempt and Ridicule of those very People you have thus sacrificed your own Interest to serve!

Was the Commerce prohibited to prevent Correspondence between the *Swedes* and the *Jacobites* in *Britain*?

Britain? and to straiten the *Swedes* in Provisions for their great Fleet and preparing to an Invasion! Was this the true Reason! We know it was the Pretence, but if this was the Reason, why is not the Prohibition now taken off? the Cause being now taken away the Effect ought to cease; on the other hand, as none of these Ends could be answered while the *Dutch* kept open their Trade, thro' whom that Correspondence was easie, and by whom Corn and all other Provisions necessary, were constantly supplied to *Sweden*, (nay and as can be made appear, was even conveyed to *Sweden* by the *British* Fleet it self) I say since none of those Ends were answered, why is the Prohibition of our Commerce continued, and these Doors still barr'd against us, which are kept open to the *Dutch*? but the *Dutch* had a Service to do for our Court, and it was not to be expected they would not be well paid for it; the Work which they had to do, seem'd to require great Encouragement, and they earn'd it dear, it must be confess'd, viz. at the Price of the Honour, Faith and Reputation of their Country.

They must be wilfully blind who could not see thro' all this, and for the weak Attempts of some People here, to cover these things, have not succeeded; even Gentlemen abroad see it and mock at the *British* Nation for being dup'd by the *Dutch* as may be seen by the foregoing Piece; I have been told that the *Dutch* themselves, make themselves merry with it, and wish they may every Year, have the like Occasion of Trade to *Sweden*.

What makes them so tame under the Loss of so many Ships, and Cargoes as the *Swede* has confiscated belonging to their Subjects; the Merchants have sollicitated for Leave to fit out Privateers to use Reprisals, or that the States would fit out 10 or 12 Men of War, to protect their Commerce,

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but the States would never grant it, nay, if they have complained, it has been in such faint and general Terms, as that the *Swedes* take no notice of it, nor will the *States General* take any Notice of it, while they find their Account in it another Way.

In a word, the *English* Nation is grossly imposed upon in all these Things, not only in prohibiting Commerce, but in being jealous of *Sweden*, joining with *Denmark* a weak and beggerly Nation, and they have by this Method brought the Disaster upon these Nations, which Ages to come will think of with Regret, and which they ought to have carried on a ten Years War rather, than have suffer'd, viz. The throwing the King of *Sweden* into the Arms of the *Czar* of *Muscovy*, and by giving him the best Ports in the *Baltick* making him Master of the Trade of that Part of the World.

It cannot be mentioned, without Horror, by any true Subject of *Great-Britain*, what the Consequences of the Cession of those Ports, to the *Czar* of *Muscovy*, may be to our Trade; 'tis too long to enter here upon the Particulars, but the Names of these Men, who calling themselves Friends to *Great-Britain* have yet drawn this Evil upon her, ought to be branded with a Mark of Infamy, *in perpetuam rei memoriam*, and therefore I shall not fail, in a few Days to lay this Part before the *British* Parliament, that they consider whether these Men ought not to be esteem'd Enemies to, and betrayers of their Country.

Mention ought to be of the several Unkindnesses, Acts of Injustice, and ungenerous Things, which have pass'd on the Side of the *English*, against the King and the Nation of *Sweden*, which are contrary not only to the Friendship and Alliances which are subsisting between the Nations, but which are inconsistent with Neighbourhood, with Honour, nay, even

even with Christianity, and which, if fully related, would expose the *English* Nation as guilty of such Things, for which, if practis'd by others, they would still call those others infamous and dishonourable.

Such as the sending Fleets to insult an Ally, upon Pretence of Injury, when Satisfaction has been offer'd for the Injury, and not letting the *English* People know that such Satisfaction had been offer'd. (2dly,) Demanding by Force, and in Form of an Enemy, Satisfaction for about 70000 l. Damages, allowing all their Demands to be just, when *Sweden* has a Demand of more than four times the Sum upon them, for like Damages done upon her Subjects, in the very same Manner, in the former Wars between *Britain* and *France*, when her Subjects were taken, their Ships stopt, and Goods confiscated, and no Satisfaction made to this Day, the Accounts of which, are stated and settled by the Right Reverend the Bishop of *London*, when his Lordship was the *British* Minister at the *Swedish* Court, and *Sweden* never made them uneasy by demanding Reparation, much less by stopping their Ships for Payment, as the *Danes* have done by the *Dutch*, and which at that Time it had been very easie for them to have done, and for which they are not requited with the same Generosity, but on the contrary, their Men of War, appointed to guard their Coasts, and their Privateers, fitted out cruise upon the *Danes* and *Muscovites*, are attack'd, taken, and sold, even to their sworn Enemies. (3dly,) Landing and Plundering a peaceable People, without any War proclaimed, Robbing, Burning, and Destroying, &c. of which, one of the *British* Admirals has given a Testimony, by a *Swedish* Cow brought as a Trophy to *Chatham*, where it is to be seen, as the Triumph of his Dishonesty, not of his Valour.

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Mention might be made here, of the many Opportunities *Sweden* has had formerly, to have weaken'd, nay, even to have ruined the Allies, and the great Offers made to her frequently to have turn'd the Scale against them in Favour of *France*, and on the other hand, Her observing an exact Neutrality, tho' many Ways engaged to *France* on other Accounts; also something might be remembred, of what *Sweden* has antiently done for the Protestant Interest in *Europe*, and how many of the Nations, who now push this War on against his *Swedish* Majesty, had been without a Name, their Royal Families without a House to succeed to, and enjoy Crowns or Dominions, if they had not been rescued from those imminent Dangers which attended them, by the Blood and Treasure of *Sweden*, the Constancy of her Princes, and the Valour of her Subjects.

We might call upon the three Electors, now embark'd against his *Swedish* Majesty, to remember the gallant Actions of the glorious *Gustavus Adolphus*, the Ancestor of his present *Swedish* Majesty, the great Battles of *Scipfick* and *Lutzer*, how he spent not only his Wealth, but his Blood, to establish the Princes of the Lower *Saxony*, how he died fighting for the Liberty and Religion of the *German* Nation, and how his General and Armies carried on the War till they reduced the Formidable Power of the House of *Austria*, to the Necessity of settling the Ballance of Power in *Germany*, in the most Happy Protestant Peace, call'd the Treaty of *Westphalia*.

But these Things being too long, are refer'd to another Occasion.

P O S T

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P O S T S C R I P T.

At the Conclusion of this, came to our Hands, this, his *Swedish* Majesty's Declaration, which they assure me, was communicated last Spring by the Landgrave of *Hesse-Cassel*, to Mr. *Halden* then our Minister at his Court, who, no doubt, did transmit it to ours; and if this generous Offer of his *Swedish* Majesty had been accepted, the Charges of a Fleet might have been prevented, and perhaps the *Dutch* might not now reap the Advantage of a Commerce we refuse.

A D E

A DECLARATION
of His Majesty the King
of SWEDEN, to His Se-
rene Highness the Land-
grave of HESSE-CASSEL:
On the SCHEME laid
before His MAJESTY, by
Monfieur le Baron, and
Lieutenant-General Ranck.

On the Second Head.

HIS Swedish Majesty hath already,
at several Times, given to under-
stand, in Writing, to the Ministers of
Great-Britain at His Court, as well as
verbally by His own Minister at the Court
of Great-Britain, that His Majesty was
inclined to an Agreement, and just Esti-
mation, on the Score of indemnifying the
English Ships which have been taken
contrary

contrary to Justice, and the Orders of His
Swedish Majesty ; if the Court of
Great-Britain would, in an equal Man-
ner, buse it self in Respect of the Ships
of the Subjects of Sweden, taken and
confiscated during the foregoing War with
France ; His Swedish Majesty declar-
ing, that He still continueth in that same
Disposition, which He hath heretofore
caus'd to be declared.

His Swedish Majesty having never
intended to molest the reciprocal Commerce
between the two Nations, is, even Him-
self, dispos'd to apply convenient Endeav-
ours for a Treaty of Commerce.

F I N I S.

0230

